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2022 Michigan Kritik
Misc › AT: Surrender to Blackness

“Surrender to Blackness” is worse for community formation, reifies trauma, and actively strengthens anti-Black structures by marginalizing the Black people who were never here to surrender to in the first place.

Táíwò, 20—assistant professor of philosophy at Georgetown University (Olúfémi, “Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference,” The Philosopher, vol. 108, no. 4, dml)

I think it’s less about the core ideas and more about the prevailing norms that convert them into practice. The call to “listen to the most affected” or “centre the most marginalized” is ubiquitous in many academic and activist circles. But it’s never sat well with me. In my experience, when people say they need to “listen to the most affected”, it isn’t because they intend to set up Skype calls to refugee camps or to collaborate with houseless people. Instead, it has more often meant handing conversational authority and attentional goods to those who most snugly fit into the social categories associated with these ills – regardless of what they actually do or do not know, or what they have or have not personally experienced. In the case of my conversation with Helen, my racial category tied me more “authentically” to an experience that neither of us had had. She was called to defer to me by the rules of the game as we understood it. Even where stakes are high – where potential researchers are discussing how to understand a social phenomenon, where activists are deciding what to target – these rules often prevail.

The trap wasn’t that standpoint epistemology was affecting the conversation, but how. Broadly, the norms of putting standpoint epistemology into practice call for practices of deference: giving offerings, passing the mic, believing. These are good ideas in many cases, and the norms that ask us to be ready to do them stem from admirable motivations: a desire to increase the social power of marginalized people identified as sources of knowledge and rightful targets of deferential behaviour. But deferring in this way as a rule or default political orientation can actually work counter to marginalized groups’ interests, especially in elite spaces.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Misc › Policy debates good

No broad offense- policy debates are uniquely key to prevent rollback of antiracist gains- we assume your authors

David Gillbor,et al*, Sean Demack , Nicola Rollocka and Paul Warmington A University of Birmingham, UK; b Sheffield Hallam University, UK; c University of Warwick, UKNo Publication, 10-x-2017 http://www.blackfeministpedagogies.com/uploads/2/5/5/9/25595205/moving_the_goalposts-_education_policy_and_25_years_of_the_black_white_achievement_gap.pdf//DG

Our analysis begins by looking at how the Black/White achievement gap has featured in the changing landscape of relevant academic and policy debates over the period. We then set out the methods and data sources that provide the material for our analysis. The paper concludes by discussing the wider lessons that can be drawn, especially concerning the role of education policy, the uncertainty of progressive antiracist gains and the speed with which they can be rolled back by apparently technical changes in how ‘standards’ are measured and debated. First, it is useful to be explicit about the parameters for our analysis. Framework and focus: What this paper is, and is not, about This paper charts the inequality of achievement between Black and White students at the end of compulsory schooling over a 25-year period (1988–2013). Our analytic framework is informed by Critical Race Theory (CRT), an approach that views race as a social construction whose definition and deployment (in policy and practice) is highly complex, contingent and fluid (Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado, 1995; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995; Dixson & Rousseau, 2006; Taylor et al., 2016). Critical race theorists do not view racism as merely encompassing crude and obvious acts of race hatred. Rather, CRT also focuses on ‘business-as-usual forms of racism’ (Delgado & Stefancic, 2000, p. xvi), i.e. the everyday, mundane and taken-for-granted processes and assumptions that shape society in the interests of people identified as ‘White’ and against the interests of particular minoritised groups.2

2022 Michigan Kritik
Misc › Passive voice

Passive voice is key – it boosts minority participation and expands dominant discourse into critical theory

Dillard-Knox 14 (Tiffany Yvonne Dillard-Knox, Knox is analyzing the History of Black discourse within debate @ U of Louisville, “Against the grain: The Challenge of Black discourse within inter-collegiate policy debate”, , Published December 2014, Accessed 2/5/19, pg 69-70, Lex RM)

Historically, the topics that have been selected have been constructed utilizing the active voice as opposed to a passive voice. An active voice example would be, ―Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase statutory and/or judicial restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States. A passive voice example would be, ―Resolved: The war powers authority of the President of the United States should be substantially restricted. The active voice topics require debaters to defend that the United States Federal Government ―do something in a more limited capacity, whereas a passive voice topic could allow debaters the opportunity to defend a variety of interpretations of ―something being done by or to the United States Federal Government. The active voice topic always gives the agency to act to the United States Government. For students that see themselves as having the possibility to access these positions of power, acquiring these skills become empowering. However, many marginalized students come to Debate from communities that have historically been excluded from these positions of power. Having a passive topic that removes the agency from the United States Federal Government and allows debaters the flexibility to choose who has agency thus becomes more empowering to this population of students. These students would then be more motivated to participate in the process of debate through which they can acquire a variety of skill sets from politician to community activists. Secondly, the literature base used to construct the topic has failed to include perspectives found within the race literature, such as the legal and political scholarship of Derrick Bell (1992), Cornel West (1994), and bell hooks (1995). Very little, if any, attention has been given to Critical Race Theory or Critical Legal Studies within the chosen controversy areas, such as Immigration and Supreme Court Cases. Even when topic papers are submitted that do include this literature, they are rarely, if ever selected in the voting process. This is important to the conversation of debating the topic in that the topic paper sets the definitional guidelines of what is considered topical. If the topic paper is limited to the language and perspective of the dominant, then so too will the debates be limited to the language and perspective of the dominant. Thus, it could be argued that the topic does not account for the discourse strategies of marginalized populations and could be an additional source of exclusion from Debate.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Misc › voters

Black voters make political change—Stacey Abrams mobilized voters that swung Georgia blue in 2020

Fedor 20 - US POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT (Lauren Fedor, “Stacey Abrams credited for mobilising black voters in Georgia,” Financial Times, 12/6/2020,

Nine months later and Stacey Abrams is earning similar plaudits for her significant efforts in the battle to defeat Donald Trump. Ms Abrams, a voting rights activist and former Democratic state legislator in Georgia, is widely credited as the architect behind grassroots efforts to turn “blue” a state that has not voted for a Democratic presidential candidate in nearly 30 years. Ben Rhodes, a former top adviser to Barack Obama, spoke for many of Mr Biden’s supporters when he said: “As Democrats chart a course forward as a party, the first person they should turn to is Stacey Abrams.” In 2014, Ms Abrams set up a group called the New Georgia Project focused on registering and mobilising black voters. Two years ago, she formed another organisation, Fair Fight Action, to tackle voter suppression after she lost the Georgia governor’s race to Republican Brian Kemp by less than a percentage point. Since then, some 800,000 new voters have been registered in the state, many of them African-American. As of Friday afternoon, ballots were still being counted in Georgia. But it looked increasingly likely that Mr Biden would emerge the victor there, after early and mail-in votes from black communities in and around the city of Atlanta were tabulated, allowing him to overtake Mr Trump in the vote count. Voter registration figures, early voting data and county-level election results suggest similar patterns helped Mr Biden edge out Mr Trump in other battleground states, notably Pennsylvania and Michigan. Had we not seen this level of engagement and intensity and enthusiasm, among voters of colour . . . we would be looking at a very different outcome Tom Bonier, TargetSmart “We have a really strong data set and pool of evidence that the black vote was crucial, especially as you look at the narrow margins in some of these key states,” said Tom Bonier, chief executive of TargetSmart, a Democratic data company. He added that voter registration figures in Georgia and nationwide showed a surge of black people signing up to cast ballots in the wake of the killing of George Floyd at the start of the summer. “Had we not seen this level of engagement and intensity and enthusiasm, among voters of colour . . . we would be looking at a very different outcome,” he said. Democratic activists have for years recognised that African-Americans were key to their party’s prospects at the ballot box, especially after the 2016 election, when black voter turnout nationwide fell for the first time in two decades. Even though 91 per cent of black voters cast their ballots for Hillary Clinton, compared with just 6 per cent who backed Mr Trump, analysts said the fact black voters stayed at home in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan — which Mr Trump won by razor-thin margins of 44,000, 22,700 and 10,700 votes, respectively — probably cost Mrs Clinton victory. “One of the shortcomings of the 2016 election for Democrats was black voter turnout lagged behind 2012, especially among younger black men,” Mr Bonier said. “The evidence we have now in this election is those numbers rebounded, and then some, to historic levels.” LaTosha Brown, right, co-founder of the Black Votes Matter Fund © Dean Anthony ll Ms Abrams wrote on Twitter on Friday that her heart was “full”, adding that “so many deserve credit” for Georgia’s surge towards the Democrats. Georgia voters have not backed a Democratic presidential candidate since 1992. Before that, the last Democrat to be successful in Georgia was Jimmy Carter, a native of the state, back in 1976. One of the groups Ms Abrams cited was the Black Voters Matter Fund, an Atlanta-based grassroots organisation co-founded by LaTosha Brown. Ms Brown, who has spent recent weeks on a multi-state bus tour meeting black community leaders, said the election results were the culmination of years of work in engaging underserved communities that politicians had historically ignored. “Community based organising works. Investing on the ground can make the difference,” she said, explaining that her group’s strategy was to support and fund grassroots organisations rather than take a top-down approach. Ms Brown led a multi-state bus tour to register black voters © Dean Anthony ll “We know our community. It’s going to take the churches, it’s going to take the civic groups, it’s going to take the activists, it’s going to take the organisers, it’s going to take the businesses,” she added. “We’ve shown that when you invest in people on the ground, these are the results that you get.” Antjuan Seawright, a Democratic strategist based in South Carolina and an adviser to Mr Clyburn, agreed. “This is why so many of us, for so long, have been screaming that you have to treat the black vote as an investment, not an expense,” he said. “Black people knew that this election was about survival, and they voted as such. “The truth of the matter is when democracy needed recalibration, it was the most consequential voting bloc in American history.”

2022 Michigan Kritik
Extinction / death bad

Critique despite certain death reinscribes domination

Murray 8 Rolland Murray, Associate Professor of English @ Brown. Black Crisis Shuffle: Fiction, Race, and Simulation Source: African American Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Summer, 2008), pp. 215-233 Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press on behalf of African American Review (St. Louis University) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40301207 Accessed: 12-03-2018 15:12 UTC http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40301207.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa229b4c3c0ca72e196ab632b748d88ba

The questions that Blanchot raises with respect to death's possibilities only multiply as one addresses works of literature that equate commodification with death. In Beatty's novel, the difficulties of that risky proposition are nowhere more apparent than in the novel's evocation of suicide as a national poetics. Frustrated simultaneously by the absence of viable political alternatives for black Americans and his own inability to slip the noose of commodification, Gunnar inadvertendy posits black suicide as an option. This prospect comes about at Boston University where Gunnar serves double duty as poet and basketball celebrity. After being asked to give a speech at a divestment rally, Gunnar laments, "today's black leadership isn't worth shit." These "telegenic negroes not willing to die. Back in the old days, if someone spoke up against the white man, he or she was willing to die" (200). Retooling one of Martin Luther King's civil rights era maxims, Gunnar pronounces, "I ain't ready to die for anything, so I guess I'm just not fit to live. In other words, I'm just ready to die" (200). In this articulation Gunnar acknowledges the impossibility of reviving the modes of bodily sacrifice that civil rights activists forged, and begins to articulate suicide as an alternative. Gunnar eventually proposes to consolidate human agency and autonomy by determining his own death. He articulates this logic in a conversation with his friend Psycho Loco who sees suicide as "taking the easy way out" (226). Viewing America's treatment of black men as inevitably lethal, Gunnar retorts, "Might as well kill myself, right? Why give you the satisfaction" (226). To take away the nation's capacity to issue death is thus to reclaim the autonomy of the subject by rendering morbidity a possession that can be reclaimed. It is this very instrumental notion of death that might lead readers to interpret the novel as one that holds a lingering nostalgia for the wholeness of civil rights activism or black nationalism. The text elaborates this interpretive prospect when blacks across the nation become utterly seduced by the idea of national suicide. Gunnar's speech inspires a black nationalist named Dexter Waverly to abandon his superficial rhetoric and kill himself in protest against Boston University's financial support of a corrupt African leader. The fact that this suicide actually forces the university to rescind its financial commitment to the African nation seems to confirm the instrumental use of death and makes Gunnar a national celebrity. Reports "of black people killing themselves indiscriminately across the United States" soon emerge in the national media (201). Additionally, at Gunnar's request, masses of people begin forwarding him their suicide poems. In a world in which all blackness has been thoroughly commodified Gunnar recommends a poetics and politics that seeks to reassert black national agency by rewriting death as a possibility. Or to frame this challenge to commodification somewhat differently, black suicide offers an intriguing twist on Baudrillard's vision of agency within capital. In his formulation, late capital achieves its hegemony through a symbolic substitution of labor for death. The "equivalence of wages and labour power presupposes the death of the worker," for a "man must die to become labour power. He converts this death into a wage" (Symbolic 39). In this sense, then, the wage labor system is always a curious commutation of an execution that capital itself has already performed. Capital's "gift" is the sleight of hand whereby it induces the worker's symbolic death by making him a wage earner and then allows that worker the "gift" of buying his own resurrection through labor. This is the unilateral nature of the gift that sustains capital's dominance. But if "domination comes from the system's retention of the exclusivity of the gift without countergift . . . then the only solution is to turn the principle of its power back against the system itself: the impossibility of responding or retorting. To defy the system with a gift to which it cannot respond save by its own collapse and death" (Symbolic 36-37; original italics). Following a parallel logic, national suicide in Beatty's novel draws its power from its simulation of capital's own unilateral gift, the production of black death as that which refuses exchange.

Despite the allure of death's possibility, the novel ultimately negates this gambit. Gunnar consistently refuses his role as the messianic leader of the masses. His rise to eminence brings increased surveillance by the police and almost constant media scrutiny. After returning to Hillside, the scopophilia becomes so acute that Gunnar and his pregnant wife leave their apartment to take up residence at the La Ciénega Motor Lodge and Laundromat. In his exile, he hopes that he can find a more authentic mode of expression. He subsequently founds the Bacchanalian MiseryFest, an open-mike poetry session that takes place under the "simple but effective" stage lighting provided by orbiting LAPD helicopters (219). While the events do allow for a communal experience of artistic expression - "neighborhood players read poetry, held car shows, sang, danced" - the political and aesthetic integrity of the events seem compromised by their very spectacular nature (219). One night, in commemoration of Nick Scoby's suicide, Gunnar reads a poem and stages an act of self-mutilation that underscores the limits of death as a paradigm of symbolic resistance. The poem articulates the model of suicide as resistance that asserts death as a unilateral gift. The piece submits that the most potent effects of slave rebellion lie not in the effects of infanticide on the "consciousness / of a murderous parent" but "in the slave owner's anguished cries / upon discovering / his property permanently damaged." After the master "calculates his losses / fore casts the impact on this year's crop," he "will notice the textual eyes of murder/ suicide / read 'caveat emptor' / let the buyer beware" (222). In one sense, this seems a perfect allegory for death as that which refuses exchange; the poem thus reads as a Baudrillardian offensive against capitalism. But Gunnar's subsequent mutilation of himself - his cutting off of his own finger - complicates this politics considerably: "I reeled for a moment, then meticulously wrapped the speckled red and-white handkerchief around the severed finger, exactly as I'd seen Robert Mitchum do in some American yakuza movie. Staring at the space where my finger used to be, I held my hand high above my head" (223). His audience of "distraught minions interpreted my masochistic act as sincerity, the media as lunacy. The more I tried to deny my ascendency, the more beloved I became" (223). The spectacle of mutilation must be seen as the enactment of the masochism that underwrites the poem's strategy of resistance. Both depend on a vulgar display of black self-mutilation. Gunnar's cynical response also confirms the ultimate bankruptcy of these strategies. Prisoner of both the police and the media at the moment in which he is most resistant to the system, his rebellion is being recycled as part of the dominant order's simulative strategies. He cannot imagine a form of agency without deriving it from a Hollywood film. In this respect, the reclamation of death as a radical subversion of capital is itself vulnerable to the social order that the strategy seeks to challenge. In short-circuiting the Utopian potential of revolt, the novel foregrounds the absoluteness of the system's dominance, the inescapability of its atomizing effects. The core contradiction of Beatty's novel, then, does not reside in a vexed nostalgia for coherent community, but in the fact that the text draws euphorically on the abstractions of commodification while foregrounding its insinuation into every sphere of contemporary African American life.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Extinction / death bad

Voting for the status quo is anti-black, too – evaluate consequences before ethical alignments

Mathew R. Silliman 3, Professor of Philosophy at the Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts, 2003, Theory & Research in Education, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 307-309

This brings me to my second proposal about the source of the problem: it will not I think be possible to validate, understand, and thereby combat the various levels upon which racism operates without finding a place in moral reasoning for outcomes as well as intentions. Blum is attracted, for what I take to be entirely sound reasons, to a non-consequentialist view of morality. On such a view, unintended consequences that are morally undesirable are unfortunate, but not wrong in a strictly moral sense of the term, unless closely connected in some way to actual bad intentions. I share with Blum a preference for this deontological approach to moral analysis, but as the persistence of structural racism shows, we need some way to admit the robust moral significance even of unintended consequences or seriously risk the irrelevance of our moral theory. This is not as difficult to do as it appears, for the idea that these two strains of modern moral thought, consequentialism and deontology, are wholly contradictory is more a product of 18th century intellectual politics than of anything inherent in their moral insights; admitting that consequences matter morally need not involve capitulation to the slippery slope of utilitarian calculation. One fairly inexpensive way to bridge the imaginary gap is just to parse the utilitarian demand as a deontological obligation (and it need not even be the highest of our prima facia duties): one of our moral duties is to live our lives, within the limits of our knowledge and ability, so as to make the world a better and more just place overall. Simple as this seems, and easy to reconcile with principles like the dignity of persons, it is subversive, for it removes a bias in favor of the (oppressive, unjust, racist) social status quo sometimes thought to characterize deontic moral theories. It also revises the relation between individuals and their enabling communities from accidental association to mutual obligation: social structures owe individuals support, (relative) independence, and the best available approximation of justice, whereas individuals in turn owe those same social institutions the impetus for continual moral revitalization.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Perm

Permutation do both---saving the Earth from its excesses is in line with Black radical scholarship

Moten and Kelley, 17—professor of Performance Studies at New York University AND Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Fred and Robin D.G., “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten In Conversation,” transcribed from , 31:49-55:57, dml)

MOTEN: Well, first of all, I just want to say how much I appreciate having a chance to be here with all of you tonight, and thank you, Rinaldo, and, uh, Alicia, and Afua, of course. Robin, as always, uh, an honor to be, have a chance to hang out with you, and uh, and to learn from you, and um, let me see. Um, well, I tend to think of Black studies not so much as an academic discipline or confluence of disciplines but as the atmosphere in which I grew up, and so, and I love that, that atmosphere. I love the way that it felt, and I love the way that it smelled, and I love the flavors, and I love the sounds, and I love the movements. Um, and so, it is, again, something that I think has a certain place, maybe, in the university, and what it meant, what it has meant for Black studies to take that place in the university has had both, has been both good and bad. I think it’s probably done much more for the university than it has for Black studies, and, and that’s something worth thinking about. And I don’t say that because I’m trying to advocate some withdrawal from the university of Black studies, but I’m thinking that, you know, that at this stage of the game in having done the work of attempting to actually bring, um, the university into some sense of its own, of what ought to be its own intellectual mission, Black studies has the right to look out for itself now, for a little bit, um, and I think it’s worth it to do that. And insofar as Black studies has earned a right to look out for itself, what that really means, I think, is that Black studies has earned the right to try again to take its fundamental responsibility, which is to be, uh, a place where we can look out for the Earth. Um, I think that Black studies has a fundamental and specific, though not necessarily exclusive mission, and that mission is to try to save the Earth, or at least to try to save, not, well, on the most fundamental level to save the Earth, and on a secondary level, to try to save the possibility of human existence on the Earth. Um, and I know that’s a big statement, and I don’t wanna take up all the time, but I’m happy to try to say more about what I think I mean by that later on, but, um, but I think maybe it’s important just to leave that big statement out there for a minute, and just to make sure that you know that I knew that I said it when I said it. KELLEY: Okay, well, actually I wanna echo, uh, Fred’s sentiments, that it’s really an honor to be here, in this space. Um, this is the second time that we’ve had kind of a public conversation, and it’s always packed, you know, and it’s always a lot of people, and expectations are always high, and one of my favorite things on the planet, besides just talking to my daughters, talking to Fred Moten, um, you know, and it’s just really, you know, I learn so much from it, and in fact, let me just begin by saying that one of the pieces that Rinaldo was referring to was an essay I wrote called, uh, “Black Study, Black Struggle,” which was entirely inspired by, uh, Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s, uh, book, “The Undercommons.” It was a way of the application of the notion of the undercommons to understanding what was happening at that moment, which in, in the fall of 2015, there was like an explosion of, um, Black protests on, on campus, and, you know, I won’t repeat what’s in the article, uh, but it, it’s not an accident that some of those struggles, uh, were products of what was happening in the streets. In other words, what happened in Ferguson, and what happened in Baltimore, what happened all over the country, and what happened in places like here in Toronto, were the catalyst for, um, a kind of explosion on campuses, where, uh, students were trying to figure out their place in the university. They’re dealing with racism, and microaggressions on university campuses, uh, they’re dealing with a, a kind of deracinated, you know, curriculum where ethnic studies wasn’t what it was, in its inception. Um, and, I was also dealing with, or many of us were also dealing with, uh, a culture of, and I hate to put it this way, but a culture of anti-intellectualism in, in a different sort of way. I mean, universities are often anti-intellectual, in that they actually disavow certain forms of knowledge and put other knowledge above that, which is an anti-intellectual position by the way. Um, but then when you’re assaulted by that all the time, uh, sometimes you end up mirroring that culture. And you’re saying “well I’m not gonna read this, I’m not gonna read that, because so-and-so wrote it,” as opposed to saying that there’s nothing off the table, uh, that Black studies, and Fred knows this ‘cause he repeats it more than I do, that our mutual, uh, teacher, Cedric Robinson, who paraphrased C. L. R. James, said you know, Black studies is a critique of Western civilization, and if that is the case, then we both have to dismantle it, recognize the weak edifice upon which it’s built, but also know everything that’s happening within it. But anyway, let me just back up, um, so, I just, so the three points I wanna make in reference to the question, one is that, uh, social movements have always been the catalyst for Black studies. When Fred was talking about, you know, Black studies as, as, uh, kinda, kinda like a way of life, as an atmosphere in which he grew up and which I grew up and many of us grew up, that’s so true. I never thought about it that way, but, you know, that’s so true. And in fact, um, if anything, Black Studies is not a multidiscipline but a project, a project for liberation, whatever that means, and liberation is an ongoing project. Um, Ruthie Gilmore, uh, who was at USC, uh, with me and Fred, had come up with this idea of renaming ethnic studies “liberation studies.” And, you know, we were actually serious about that, we were like, trying to figure out how to do that, and never filled it, but it reminds us that, you know, it’s not about, um, it’s not about a body. It’s not about bodies. It’s about ideas, and about the future, you know. It’s about recognizing the past and the construction of a new future. And so I think, in that respect, in order to understand the future of Black studies, we gotta understand the movements that produced it—that, that the Movement for Black Lives, that, um, uh, We Charge Genocide, that Black Youth Projects 100—all these struggles that erupted have, in fact, uh, pointed the way for Black Studies. The problem is, is that what gets constituted as the institutional space of Black studies, in many cases, isn’t really that. And I hate to bring people down, because we’re supposed to be up, right? But there are a lot of departments that I wouldn't call Black studies departments that have that name, you know, there are a lot of, there's a lot of scholarship that goes on that has no relationship at all to the project of transformation, or to people, to actual people in community. And one of the important things to always remember is that, um, we wouldn't have Black studies if it wasn't—in the United States, that is, I'm talking about the US—if it wasn't for Watts, if it wasn't for Detroit in 67, and if it wasn't for those kinds of urban rebellions, if it wasn't for the struggles in the South, that's where Black studies comes from. Uh, and so it moves into the university as a, as a transformative project. Um, it's not—and that's why I think there was a disconnect between some of the, the protests and what was happening in the academy. Finally, there’s this question of, of ethnic studies versus, or against, or for, or within or bedded in Black studies. And one of the things that, that I think a lot of us are trying to figure out is to deepen the relationship between indigenous studies and Black studies. Um, to understand that this was what I call second wave ethnic studies in the 1990s was itself a project that was, believe it or not, in a, a response to neoliberalism. And I think we don't always see that because we, we tend to read backwards in the 1990s and 1980s as, like, ethnic studies as identity politics in the narrowest sense of the word, that somehow this was about producing a sense of, of pride and a sense of identity devoid of the question of power. But if you actually look at the struggles for ethnic studies in the 80s and 90s, it was all about power. That, that what we think of as comparative or critical ethnic studies was, wasn't about the celebration of difference. It wasn't liberal multiculturalism. It was an assault on a neoliberal turn. And we, we sometimes forget that and, and, and then we write the history. And so I think I want to at some point talk more about that, but I think that's something to remember, because, right now, if we don't have Black studies as a critique in response to the neoliberal neofascist turn, then it's sort of worthless. You know, it's going to continue to exist. Maybe not in the academy though. So I'll just stop there. WALCOTT: So, um, Robin, where you ended, and, and where Fred began, it’s a, is a good segue into getting you, both of you, to talk about the work that you've been doing around questions of Palestinian struggle and freedom. Fred, the work that, the tremendous work that you did in the ASA, um, American Studies Association, for which the Association is still living true, and, and Robin the work that you continue to do with um, um, with faculty for Palestine. But I'm thinking about Fred's provocation here that Black studies about saving the Earth and if Black studies is indeed about saving the Earth, which I'm very willing to fall right into right now, you know, first to kind of maybe think about this relationship between the struggle and, and freedom of Palestine and the relationship between ongoing settler colonialisms globally, because it seems to me that one of the most powerful things that, um, the kind of Black studies that has taken to the streets recently has done is to make those kinds of concerns present, right? BLM visits to Palestine, BLM in Toronto, always making sure that the invocation of the politics of settler colonialism is a part of a political organizing, and, um, their intimate relations with indigenous communities. So maybe this is a way for us to begin to talk about what's really at stake in this contemporary political moment where, um, or, or a radical politics, a politics that wants to think a different kind of future formation, is grappling with, um, settler colonialism in various kinds of ways. But Palestine being central to that, given that we know as we sit in this university is that often, um, what we call our senior administrators have an entirely different relationship with the question of freedom for Palestine. MOTEN: Well, um, first, I mean, the work I did around, um, you know, the ASA’s, um, you know, decision to endorse the academic and cultural boycott of Israel was really minimal and minor compared to a lot of other people who were really out front, um, and, and have been working tirelessly for that for many, many years. Um, and I think, you know, the, my contribution was more, you know, rhetorical in many ways in, in, in, and, and maybe, maybe theoretical only in the most minimal sense, in the sense that what I wanted to do was a couple of things. First, to recognize that, um, you know, let's say that the conditions of what people call modernity, um, in, in, in, in, or global modernity, that the fundamental conditions that make that up are, you know, settler colonialism. And I think we can talk about settler colonialism in ways that are broader than the normal way that we usually think of them as a set of violent and brutal relations between Europe and the rest of the world. Because I think it's really important. And, and, and again, our, our mutual friend and mentor Cedric Robinson, pointed this out emphatically, and in brilliant ways early on, that settler colonialism is also an intra-European affair. Um, and it's important to understand that. It's important to understand this historic relationship between settler colonialism in the enclosure of the commons, um, which is part and, part of the origins of, of what we now know or understand as capitalism. But if we understand that settler colonialism, that the transatlantic slave trade, um, and that, you know, the emergence of a set of philosophical formulations that essentially provide for us some modern conception of self that has as its basis a kind of possessive, heteronormative, patriarchal individuation, right? That's what it is to be yourself on the most fundamental level. You know, and if you ask anybody in the philosophy department, they'll tell you that that's true, you know, and they won’t be joking, right, that, um, that, these, that these constitute the basis of, of our modernity. But for most of the people who live in the world, actually for everybody who lives in the world, although most of the people in live in the world are actually able to both recognize this and say this, that modernity is a social and ecological disaster that we live, that we now attempt to survive. Okay? And if we take that up, then part of what's at stake is that we recognize that feminist and queer interventions against heteronormative patriarchy, that Black interventions against the theory and practice of slavery, which is ongoing, that indigenous interventions against settler colonialism constitute the general both practical and intellectual basis for not only our attempts to survive, but also our attempts to, as I said before, save the Earth. And, and I put it in terms that the great poet Ed Roberson puts it; not just to save the Earth, but to see the Earth before the end of the world. And this is an emergency that we're in now and it's urgent. Um, and I believe that there’s a specific convergence of black thought and indigenous thought that situates itself precisely in relation to, and is articulated through, the interventions of queer thought and feminist thought that we want to take up. And, and it, and it strikes me as, for me at least, it's, it's a way of taking up a kind an—it's, it’s a way of imagining how one might be able to, how we might be able to walk more lightly on the Earth. To honor the Earth as we walk on it, as we stand on it. To not stomp on it, to not stomp all over it, where every step you take is a claim of ownership. And, and this is one way to put it, would be to not so presumptuously imagine that the Earth can be reduced to something so paltry and so viciously understood as what we usually call home. This is part of the reason why the queer and the feminist critique is so important. It's a critique of a general problematic notion of domesticity. It's like another way of being on the Earth that doesn't allow you in some vicious and brutal way to claim that it is yours, right? Um, this is important and this is so, you know, often the methods that we use to claim the Earth as ours involved fences, borders. This manifests itself on a private level from household to household, but it also manifests itself on a national level, and at the level of the nation state, and it's not an accident that settler colonial states take it upon themselves to imagine themselves to be the living embodiment of the legitimacy of the nation state as a political and social form. For me, there's two reasons to be in solidarity with the people of Palestine. One is because they're human beings and they're being treated with absolute brutality, but the other is that there's a specific resistance to Israel as a nation state. And for my money, to be perfectly clear about this, I believe that this nation state of Israel is itself an artifact of antisemitism. If we thought about Israel and Zionism, not just as a form of racism that results in the displacement of Palestinians, but if we also think about them as artifacts of the historic displacement of Jews from Europe, right, in the same way that we might think of, let's say Sierra Leone or Liberia as artifacts of racist displacement, okay. If we think about it that way, okay, and another, and the reason I'm saying this is just to make sure that you know that there's a possible argument against the formulation that criticism of Israel is anti-Semitic when we know that Donald Trump is a staunch supporter, that people like Pat Robertson in the United States are staunch supporters that help us to the fact that you can be deeply anti-Semitic and support the state of Israel. These things go together. They're not antithetical to one another. So that it becomes important for us to be able to suggest that resistance to the state of Israel is also resistance to the idea of the legitimacy of the nation state. It's not an accident that Israel has taken upon itself, that when Israel takes upon itself, when the defense of Israel manifests itself as a defense of its right to exist, this is important. It's a defense, not just of Israel's right to exist, but of the nation state as a political form’s right to exist. And nation states don't have rights. What they're supposed to be are mechanisms to protect the rights of the people who live in them, and that has almost never been the case, and to the extent that they do protect the rights of the people who live in them, it's in the expense, it's at the expense of the people who don't, okay. So part of what's at stake, one of the reasons why it's at, it's important to pay particular attention to this issue, why we ought to resist the ridiculous formulation that singling out Israel at this moment is itself anti-Semitic is because it's important to recognize that Israel is the state. [KELLEY: Right.] MOTEN: For reasons that I think are totally bound up with antisemitism, right? Israel is the state that, insofar as it makes the claim about its right to exist, is also making the claim about the nation state’s right to exist as such. It's this, it's that same kind of argument that, I remembered the—and I'm sorry to keep going on so long, but there's—there's those formulations that people often make about Black people in it or indigenous people as if they were the essence of the human, right, so that every time Black people or indigenous people do something that supposedly we're not supposed to do, it constitutes a violation to the very idea of the human. Right, because somehow as a function of the nobility of our suffering, we constitute the very idea of humanity, right? And there's nothing more brutal, right? Nothing more vicious than having been being consigned to that position. Similarly, Israel as a function of anti-Semitism has now been placed in the position of protecting the very idea of the nation state. So for me, first and foremost, it's important to have solidarity with the Palestinian people, but second of all, it's important to actually have some solidarity with the Jewish people insofar as they can and must be separated from the Israeli state because ultimately the fate of the Jewish people, if it is tied to this, to the nation state of Israel, will be more brutal than anything that has yet been done or can be imagined, and I mean everything that you think I mean when I say that.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Ontology / Psycho › Pessimism Bad

Reject fatalism – devaluing political engagement reinforces self-hatred and precludes positive coalitional politics, collapsing into white divide and conquer.

Massa ’14 (Andre; 12/16/14; Undergraduate student of philosophy at George Mason University, citing historians and Professors of Philosophy Carter Woodson, Mellville Herskovits, Jared Sexton, Vincent Brown, literary critique and Professor at Columbia University, Gayatri Spivak, Professor of Humanities, David Marriot, and the historiography of Orlando Patterson; The Historical Nerds, “Implications of Wilderson’s Afro-Pessimism,”

By disproving Wilderson’s claim that the Black Body is in a perpetual state of ontological death because of the violence of the Middle Passage and showing that the Black Body is not socially dead, then the possibilities of legal reform and coalitional politics become possible and desirable. For Wilderson, coalitional politics are just attempts to feign the ontological capacity of Blacks to shape their own future. He refers to white people and colored immigrants specifically who try to engage in coalitional politics with the Black Body as “the junior and senior partners of civil society” who pretend as if the Black is coherent and human. (Wilderson, Red, White and Black, pg. 39). It is this kind of ontological absolutism that Wilderson adheres to that David Marriott criticizes when he writes, “Wilderson is prepared to say that black suffering is not only beyond analogy, it also refigures the whole of being. It is not hard when reading such sentences to suspect a kind of absolutism at work here, and one that manages to be peculiarly and dispiritingly dogmatic: throughout Red, White, and Black, despite variations in tone and emphasis, there is always the desire to have black lived experience named as the worst, and the politics of such a desire inevitably collapses into a kind of sentimental moralism: for the claim that ‘Blackness is incapacity in its most pure and unadulterated form’ means merely that the black has to embody this abjection without reserve (p. 38). This logic—and the denial of any kind of ‘ontological integrity’ to the Black/Slave due to its endless traversal by force does seem to reduce ontology to logic, namely, a logic of non-recuperability.” (Mariott, Black Cultural Studies, pg. 37-66). Wilderson’s insistence of absolute negativity destroys the possibility for coalitional politics because it will always frame the Black Body as something that will always stand in an antagonistic position to the world. In engaging in this form of ontological absolutism, Wilderson effectively creates an "us against the world” logic whereby its best to either succumb to the negativity surrounding the Black Body or destroy the world to free the Black Body. Furthermore, as Mariott points out, this dogmatic ontological absolutism essentializes the Black experience to its most negative point, a kind of negativity that reproduces a form of self-hatred that contributes to the destruction of positive coalitional politics. When one comes to believe that they themselves are ontologically dead, this encourages the logic of political apathy where one refuses to attempt to engage with agents of change because they curse their own identity and believe that there is nothing they can do about their situation because Blackness is an ontological condition. To put it in Lehman’s term, “why go vote if I’m socially dead?”. This form of disengagement from the political is problematic when racism is entrenched in our law, as Ian Haney Lopez points out in his book White By Law when he writes, “law is implicated in the construction of the contingent social systems of meaning that attach in our society to morphology and ancestry, the meaning system we commonly refer to as race. The legal system influences what we look like, the meanings ascribed to our looks, and the material reality that confirms the meanings of our appearances. Law constructs race.” (Lopez, White By Law, pg. 16). If the precedent set by court cases, as Lopez points out, were responsible for creating the precedents that shaped how we see race as a social construction, then the need to challenge racism through legal reform becomes more apparent. Wilderson’s ontological absolutism destroys the possibility to form the kind of coalitions that are necessary to engaging with the legal systems that use the law to shape our social perceptions of race. The kind of self-hatred that Wilderson perpetuates through his ontological construction of Blackness will only re-entrench racism because the Black Body will refuse to engage in the forms of legal reform necessary to change the law and they way it shapes how we view race as a social construction. If the law is what truly shapes the social construction of race and if the Black Body is truly capable of engaging with these institutions, then Wilderson’s Afro-pessimism must be firmly rejected to usher in a politics of hope that is necessary to mobilize coalitions against dominant power structures. The idea of embracing a politics of hope and solidarity is a concept that would seem absolutely foreign to Wilderson. Indeed, with the recent events surrounding the likes of Eric Garner and Michael Brown, the credibility surrounding the Afro-pessimist school of thought is increasing. Yet it is precisely these events that necessitate a politics of hope and solidarity that Gloria Jean Watkins, better known by her pen name Bell Hooks, advocates for in her 1996 book Killing Rage: Ending Racism when she writes, “Black Americans are succumbing to and internalizing the racist assumption that there can be no meaningful bonds of intimacy between blacks and whites. It is fascinating to explore why it is that black people trapped in the worst situation of racial oppression—enslavement—had the foresight to see that it would be disempowering for them to lose sight of the capacity of white people to transform themselves and divest of white supremacy, even as many black folks today who in no way suffer such extreme racist oppression and exploitation are convinced that white people will not repudiate racism. Contemporary black folks, like their white counterparts, have passively accepted the internalization of white supremacist assumptions. Organized white supremacists have always taught that there can never be trust and intimacy between the superior white race and the inferior black race. When black people internalize these sentiments, no resistance to white supremacy is taking place, rather we become complicit in spreading racist notions. It does not matter that so many black people feel white people will never repudiate racism because of being daily assaulted by white denial and refusal of accountability. We must not allow the actions of white folks who blindly endorse racism to determine the direction of our resistance. Like our white allies in struggle we must consistently keep the faith, by always sharing the truth that white people can be anti-racist, that racism is not some immutable character flaw.” (Bell Hooks, Killing Rage: Ending Racism, pg. 269-270). Bell Hooks avoids falling into the colonial trap of Wilderson by speaking for herself and her own experiences. By acknowledging that there are many anti-racist whites, she has created a space where Black folk who believe that they have a future can speak of their own experiences and contribute to meaningful dialogue about how Black folk should take steps forward in the context of legal reform. Unlike Wilderson who universalizes the Black experience, Bell Hooks acknowledges that internalizing racist assumptions of the Black Body, or in the context of Wilderson, their own ontological construction, will only give into White supremacy because the cycle of self-hatred creates a sense of powerlessness that prevents the Black Body from ever getting out in the first place. Furthermore, Wilderson’s ontological absolutism is a tactic of White supremacy, because, as pointed out by Bell Hooks, it creates a sense of distrust that plays into the divide and conquer mentality that is crucial to White supremacy’s grip on society. For Bell Hooks, when the Black community gives into its own pessimism, White supremacists win because there is no motivation for resistance. In the wake of recent events, embracing a politics of hope and solidarity is more important than ever as racism begins to become more apparent. Hope offers the crucial first step towards encouraging the first steps towards resistance, a step that Wilderson’s extreme negativity prevents from ever been taken. Instead of imagining the end of the world, we must imagine a world with a better future.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Ontology / Psycho › Pessimism Bad

Racial pessimism is the political view of Clarence Thomas – their strategy reinforces a nihilistic, pull yourself up by your bootstraps view that can never embrace social progress

Illing and Robin, 19 [Corey Robin is an American political theorist, journalist and professor of political science at Brooklyn College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. Sean Illing is the Interviews Writer for Vox. Before publishing things on the Internet, he taught politics and philosophy at a university. Before that, he served in the United States Air Force. The racial pessimism of Clarence Thomas]

The way this kind of goes beyond cede the political is in the idea that – if you go far enough left, you end up back on the right – and so, Clarence Thomas can oppose school integration, prison reform etc. all because of his foundational nihilism

Sean Illing One of the strangest parts of all this is the fact that Thomas has managed to preserve his core black nationalist beliefs on the court while at the same time, as you put it, “remaining a hero to some of the most racist elements of the American polity.” Is this just a case of his supporters not bothering to understand what he actually thinks and why he thinks it? Or do many of them understand it and just don’t care? Corey Robin I think they haven’t bothered to understand what he thinks. It’s clear that most white conservatives just don’t see it. Even the best scholarship on the right just doesn’t touch this dimension of Thomas’s thought, at least not as far as I can tell. And this continues to be part of the paradox of Clarence Thomas. He’s probably the most well-known member of the court, everybody knows who he is, and yet no one really knows who he is. Sean Illing I think this is true on the left as well, but we’ll get to that. First I’d like to ask you how these background assumptions structure Thomas’s judicial philosophy. One of the contradictions you explore in the book is the fact that Thomas is an avowed originalist, someone committed to applying the Constitution as it was adopted in 1789, and yet he acknowledges that that Constitution was written by and for slaveholders. Corey Robin Well, the first thing I’d say is that Thomas’s originalism is pretty inconsistent, but let’s not get into the weeds on that. Here’s why I think originalism is important to Thomas and it’s partly for the reason you just mentioned: He sees it as a kind of permanent reminder of the constraints written into the Constitution under which African Americans have labored for over three centuries. Thomas sees value in this, and he’s very upfront about it. It would be too strong to say that he would like to rewrite the Constitution as if it were a Jim Crow Constitution, but he really does believe in his heart of hearts that black people, particularly black men, flourished under the heavy yoke of subjugation that was Jim Crow. And this is where his ideology is pretty straightforwardly conservative: he believes that under the conditions of extreme hardship, the strongest wills have a way of bashing their way through those constraints in order to overcome them, and he thinks this is what the African American community did when it was oppressed by the white majority. Sean Illing You say that “the story of Clarence Thomas is the story of the last half century of American politics and the long shadow of defeat that hangs over it.” This gets at the sense of racial despair a lot of people — on the left and right — feel right now. As the gains of the civil rights movement are eroding, as white nationalism subsumes the White House, it’s hard not to sympathize with Thomas’s pessimism about the possibilities of political progress. Is that how you feel after writing this book?Corey Robin I didn’t need Clarence Thomas to convince me that the gains of the civil rights movement and the black freedom struggle had been cut back in a big way — that movement has been in reverse motion for quite some time. But engaging with Thomas did clarify for me how strong this ambient mood of racial despair is right now, and I think many people on the left think that that signifies the mark of progressive values. But I don’t think that’s true at all. The beginning of the left tradition — and I say this as someone on the left — is the recognition that oppression can be undone and transformed. Oppression is the product of politics and it can be dismantled through politics — we risk forgetting this when we become overly pessimistic. I hope wrestling with Thomas’s conservatism opens up a discussion across the country about where we think racial pessimism leads necessarily. Identifying the structures of oppression is critical, but it’s only constructive if we also identify the vulnerabilities of those structures. This is the job of the left and we’ll lose if we cease to do it.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Ontology / Psycho › Pessimism Bad

Their account of hope overgeneralizes – they are right about the problem with absolute faith in the government, but that’s not our argument – a pragmatic understanding of hope as inseparable from political life is necessary to mobilize activism and prefigurative politics

Stitzlein 18. Sarah M. Stitzlein is a Professor at the University of Cincinnati School of Education. "Hoping and Democracy." Contemporary Pragmatism 15: 228-250. Emory Libraries.

What ought I hope for? This question guides our pursuit of the good life and its answer is often shaped by our social, political, and educational experiences. We aren’t born with ready-made hopes; rather, we shape them through our interactions with others, our growing sense of what is possible as we learn about our environment, and our experiments with the world to see what we can do within it and to change it. Other people play an important role in this process, especially through institutions like schools, social arrangements like families, and political practices like democracy. They shape the traditions and expectations we inherit, as well as the ways in which we test, challenge, and revise what has been passed on to us. Despite this, hope is too often described in individualist terms that fail to encapsulate the full process of hoping and its potential impact on shared living. Many theologians link hope with an individual’s faith in a deity who will act on his or her behalf, 1 some philosophers employ a narrow understanding of hope as an individual’s desire for an outcome in the face of uncertainty, 2 while many more psychologists describe hope as an individual’s use of willpower and “waypower” to achieve clear goals. 3 Instead, I will offer a pragmatist account of hope, which is firmly rooted in the experiences of individuals and grows out of real life circumstances, yet cannot be disconnected from social and political life. 4 I extend my account to show how a pragmatist view of hope is necessarily connected to other people and can be used to enrich our experiences in communities. Moreover, such hope can help us to better face current political struggles and social problems, all the while building a democratic identity together. 5 In this article, I will explain how pragmatism offers an enhanced understanding of hope and its role in our lives together. To examine the ways in which shared hoping and the shared content of our hopes shape our identity and our work together in democracy, I consider both how and what we hope. Unlike other accounts of hope that are largely divorced from life’s circumstances, such as theological accounts that direct our attention to deities and psychological accounts that tell us we must hope for our goals regardless of real world constraints, pragmatist hope is noteworthy because it is firmly rooted in reality. 6 Moreover, a pragmatist account addresses some of the current obstacles we face in American democracy and is capable of transforming or improving them. Perhaps more importantly, such hope can be directly and indirectly cultivated within citizens, thereby offering a feasible way that democratic life can be strengthened. 1 Present Context Before looking at hope in detail, let’s briefly first take stock of current conditions that relate to hopelessness in personal and political life. In pragmatist spirit, the account I offer here must attend to real conditions. Unfortunately, these are conditions where hope is struggling, where democracy may be in jeopardy, and where the dominant form of hope that we do see is largely privatized. To begin, a recent study using the World Values Survey and other polling sources finds that democratic citizens have “become more cynical about the value of democracy as a political system, less hopeful that anything they do might influence public policy, and more willing to express support for authoritarian alternatives.” 7 Those citizens have increasingly withdrawn from democratic participation, whether that be through formal institutions or alternatives in the public or civic spheres, such as joining in movements or protests. There has been a dramatic shift in how the wealthy view democracy, with 16 percent of them now believing that military rule is a better way of living and an astounding 35 percent of rich young Americans holding such a view. 8 There are likely many factors impacting this current state of affairs and I will touch on a few here. 9 First, in terms of hope most overtly, Alan Mittleman rightly notes that “the legitimacy of politics is damaged in proportion to its failure to fulfil the hopes it has engendered.” 10 Indeed, several recent American candidates ran on messages of hope and yet the visions evoked have often failed to be fulfilled in reality, crushing the heightened expectations of citizens. Politicians often use the rhetoric of hope, but they tend to distort what hope really is and what it requires of citizens, as I will explain later. Instead, they make reference to the supposed destiny of the nation with God as its backer. Or, as in the cases of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, some citizens place their hope in the leader himself, invoking a messianic figure. These forms of hope entail no more citizen action than, perhaps, donating to a campaign or wearing an iconic t-shirt proclaiming “hope.” Instead, I will argue that, rather than passively relying on the hope promised by politicians, citizens must participate in shaping and fulfilling hope, making such hope more genuine and robust. Second, structural violence and inequality, common amongst poor and racial minority communities in America, has wreaked havoc on hope. In some cases, it has eroded hope. 11 In others it has rendered hope exhausting, 12 ***footnote 12 begins*** Calvin Warren, “Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope,” cr: The New Centennial Review, 15 (2015), pp. 215–248. Shannon Sullivan, “Setting aside hope: A pragmatist approach to racial justice,” in Pragmatism and Justice, ed. by Susan Dielman, David Rondel, and Christopher Voparil (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).***footnote 12 ends*** with marginalized citizens told that they must never give up hope and that they must keep trying to earn a better life for themselves, in part through improving their own character regardless of the stagnant harmful practices of others. Many of those citizens are left either nihilistically without hope or perpetually chasing a vision of justice that is (perhaps sometimes intentionally kept) out of reach. 13 ***footnote 13 begins*** Calvin Warren, “Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope,” cr: The New Centennial Review, 15 (2015): 215–248. ***footnote 13 ends*** I intend to describe a form of hope that is more sustainable and more attuned to the real conditions of life that we can control and others where we have limited control. Third, citizenship in America has increasingly become centered on individuals, personal responsibility, entrepreneurship, and private success. Historical accounts of rugged individualism have now joined forces with calls to educate children in grit and expectations that one will fight to earn one’s position and goods in a competitive marketplace. 14 This environment lacks trust in others and discourages collaborative effort. Often those who have not been successful in the past, or do not see viable avenues for being so in the future, fatalistically accept these conditions and become passive about countering or changing them. While others who have enough resources and power to be comfortable with the present conditions, indulge in the privilege of being cynical or apathetic. Some spread these states of hopelessness or jaded negativity through memes and messages on social media, especially about the role and effectiveness of government, rendering cynicism a collective practice. 15 Cynics, left believing that their political efforts are useless or ineffective and perhaps that everyone acts on self-interest, are left to look out merely for themselves, without a sense of responsibility to act on behalf of themselves and others. Indeed, cynics may mock others who do not hold such views as naïve and out of touch with reality. Cynicism functions as a distancing maneuver, separating citizens from each other, from formal democratic institutions, and from civic organizations, where visions of an improved world and action to achieve it tend to occur. My notion of hope aims to span those divides. Finally, what is left of hope has become privatized. 16 This is exacerbated as neoliberalism continues to assert Margaret Thatcher’s claims, “There is no such thing as society, only individuals and families,” and “there is no alternative to the market.” Hope is reduced to a mere drive to achieve one’s own limited dreams, or those of one’s children, typically only through financial terms and material goods. When citizens are rendered isolated competitors, they lose the ability to detect social problems and the motivation to ameliorate them, especially if the effects on one’s self or family are not immediate. Economist Tyler Cowen describes these citizens as the new “complacent class,” who are content with the way things are as long as they are not directly harmed and as long as they can stay surrounded by people and things that confirm their experience of the world. In their complacency, the members of the complacent class are unable to “inspire an electorate with any kind of strong positive visions, other than some marginal adjustments.” 17 I aim to show how hope is better understand as a social and political endeavor that brings us into contact with others as we craft visions of the future. In sum, these changes in citizens’ lives and views debilitate individual citizens and democracy as a whole. They keep us from recognizing and solving collective problems and from leading better lives together. Citizens sit around waiting for reasons to hope, sometimes becoming swept up in campaign rhetoric when election cycles come around, rather than acknowledging that hope is generated through action as subjects working together, as I will argue. I will turn now to depict a pragmatist account of hope that can be formally cultivated in schools and informally in our lives together—a way of hoping together that may better support democratic life in these challenging times. 2 Pragmatist Hope I offer here a pragmatist account of hope, largely based in the philosophy of John Dewey. Notably, Dewey himself does not provide such an account, even though hope underlies much of his work and was evident in his own personal life as he encountered considerable despair at the loss of two of his children and his wife, while also facing two world wars. I construct a view of hope from Dewey’s well-articulated elements of inquiry, growth, truth, meliorism, and habits. Pragmatism begins with the real and complicated conditions of our world. It brings together intelligent reflection with inquiry, habits, and action so that we can understand and change our environments to better align with our needs and desires. Hope plays an important role in that process. Inquiry, Growth, and Truth For Dewey, hope often arises within the midst of despair, when we have lost our way and are struggling to move forward. Dewey describes these moments as “indeterminate situations.” He turns to the process of inquiry via the empirical method to help us explore those situations, consider possible courses of action, and test out various solutions. It is inquiry that helps us to understand, act upon, and reconstruct our environments and our experiences so that we are able to move forward out of the indeterminate situation. In a richly cognitive and often social practice, inquiry invokes curiosity and problem solving to move us out of ruts. Indeed, this method combats the stagnation of fatalism by urging us to formulate and try out solutions. Growth describes how reconstructions of our experiences through inquiry develops physical, intellectual, and moral capacities, actualizing them and helping them inform one another so that they continue in a chain that enables one to live satisfactorily. We grow when we learn from inquiry into indeterminate situations and create ways to re-establish smooth living that carries us from one activity to the next. Many people wrongly assume that growth necessarily has an end—as if it were “movement toward a fixed goal.” 18 We tend to think of growth as only progression toward some specific outcome, such as mastering bicycle riding or graduating from high school. But this way of thinking tends to place the emphasis on the static terminus, rather than focusing on the process of growing as itself educative and worthwhile. Dewey’s alternative view of growth does not neatly and linearly move toward a fixed goal. Instead, he describes trajectories that are more complicated, often shifting with the environment. Moreover, holding onto a fixed goal may be undesirable because doing so employs a limited or possibly foreclosed vision of the future. Instead, as changes occur in one’s environment, Dewey asserts that people must continually inquire into moments of uncertainty and changing circumstances, develop new hypotheses about those situations, and revise their aims. Dewey works with what he calls “ends-in-view,” which are relatively close and feasible, even if difficult to achieve, rather than overarching goals at some final endpoint in the future. Those ends-in-view guide our decisions and hypotheses along the way, keeping us resourceful in the present. In Dewey’s words, the discovery of how things do occur makes it possible to conceive of their happening at will, and gives us a start on selecting and combining the conditions, the means, to command their happening…there must be a realistic study of actual conditions and the mode or law of natural event, in order to give the imagined or ideal object definite form and solid substance—to give it, in short, practicality and constitute it as a working end. 19 For Dewey, ends and means are intelligently considered in light of each other, with both being revisable, and neither abstracted from the other. Each fulfilled end-in-view sustains our hope by highlighting meaningful headway and directing our further action. Ends-in-view later become means to future ends, working in an ongoing continuum. This sustenance of hope differs from theological accounts which are difficult to sustain on faith alone and may leave believers frustrated at an apparent lack of action or improvement. It also differs from positive psychology and grit literature which tends to focus on large, far-off, and challenging goals that one holds tenaciously. Many people think of hope as goal-directed and future-oriented. While objects of hope for pragmatists may temporarily serve as ends-in-view, the practice of hope moves us forward through inquiry and experimentation as we pursue our complicated trajectory. It helps to unify our past, present, and future. Hope, then, is not just about a vision of the future, but rather a way of living in the present that is informed by the past and what is anticipated to come. Whereas utopian views of what could be may actually immobilize one and may exhaust one in the present, pragmatist hope is always tied to what one is doing and feasibly can do in the present, especially when equipped with knowledge of the past. Central to pragmatist philosophy, ideas become true insofar as they “work” for us, fruitfully combine our experiences, and lead us to further experiences that satisfy our needs. Pragmatists are concerned with the concrete differences in our lived experiences that an idea’s being true will make. Pragmatic truth expresses “the successful completing of a worthwhile leading.” 20 Unlike truth as a corresponding match between proposition and reality, pragmatist truth is something that occurs when the goals of human flourishing are satisfied, at least temporarily. Built into these criteria is consideration of the well-being of others, for successful leading through experiences almost always necessarily requires working and communicating with others. Additionally, the differences an idea will make are quite limited, and therefore less truthful, if relevant only to one person. While not a comprehensive vision of the good life, certain norms including equality and just communication are entailed both in these deliberations and the determination of truth. 21 We must consider how to flourish alongside others as we craft our ends-in-view. This differs considerably from other philosophical and psychological accounts of hope based on the desire of objects or states of affairs regardless of whether they are good for us or other people. Meliorism Pragmatists like Dewey recognize the difficulty of present circumstances, yet approach them practically, rather than idealistically, with thoughtful action, believing that circumstances can be improved. 22 Unlike simple optimists, however, they do not hold that the situation will necessarily work out for the best, but rather they believe people should make efforts to contribute to better outcomes. Such efforts are rarely undertaken alone, instead they are tied to others who are working together to solve problems. In the words of contemporary pragmatist Cornel West, “Optimism adopts the role of the spectator who surveys the evidence in order to infer that things are going to get better. Yet when we know that the evidence does not look good…Hope enacts the stance of the participant who actively struggles against the evidence.” 23 Meliorism entails action in the face of difficulties. Dewey sees hope as a way of living aligned with meliorism, “the idea that at least there is a sufficient basis of goodness in life and its conditions so that by thought and earnest effort we may constantly make better things.” 24 Meliorism is not a belief in inevitable progress, but rather a call to human action, especially in the midst of struggle and uncertainty. Dewey firmly argued that it would be foolish to believe that there is “an automatic and wholesale progress in human affairs,” insisting instead that betterment “depends upon deliberative human foresight and socially constructive work.” 25 Martin Luther King, a champion and practitioner of hope, was enshrined on the floor of Obama’s oval office with his phrase: “The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” Importantly, given how many hopes fell flat under the messianic figure of Obama, King later explained in a pragmatist spirit of meliorism, “Human progress never rolls on wheels of inevitability; it comes through the tireless efforts of men willing to be co-workers with God, and without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the forces of social stagnation. We must use time creatively, in the knowledge that the time is always ripe to do right.” 26 We cannot wait until we have a clear picture of our final future goals; rather, we must act now in intelligent ways and through inquiry to bring about better conditions and, thereby, truth. 27 And we must be flexible to change and redirect our efforts as they unfold. Meliorism is an alternative to both pessimism and optimism. It cultivates hope, growth, and better worlds. For some pragmatists, like Colin Koopman, this meliorism-based hope is “the pragmatist affect par excellence: ‘hope is the mood of meliorism’ (27), ‘the characteristic attitude of pragmatism is hope’ (17).” 28

2022 Michigan Kritik
Ontology / Psycho › Libidinal

Neurological, racial bias is flexible and determined by coalitional habit forming in the brain---orienting groups around institutional change best breaks down bias. This is offense because their theory rejects these solutions.

Cikara and Van Bavel 15. (Mina Cikara is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Intergroup Neuroscience Lab at Harvard University. Her research examines the conditions under which groups and individuals are denied social value, agency, and empathy. Jay Van Bavel is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Social Perception and Evaluation Laboratory at New York University. The Flexibility of Racial Bias: Research suggests that racism is not hard wired, offering hope on one of America’s enduring problems. June 2, 2015. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-bias/)

The city of Baltimore was rocked by protests and riots over the death of Freddie Gray, a 25-year-old African American man who died in police custody. Tragically, Gray’s death was only one of a recent in a series of racially-charged, often violent, incidents. On April 4th, Walter Scott was fatally shot by a police officer after fleeing from a routine traffic stop. On March 8th, Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity members were caught on camera gleefully chanting, “There Will Never Be A N***** In SAE.” On March 1st, a homeless Black man was shot in broad daylight by a Los Angeles police officer. And these are not isolated incidents, of course. Institutional and systemic racism reinforce discrimination in countless situations, including hiring, sentencing, housing, and even mortgage lending. It would be easy to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and even, perhaps, an inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines. Early studies found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural fear response to racial out-groups. There is little question that categories such as race, gender, and age play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others. However, research has shown that how people categorize themselves may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on arbitrary grounds, such as the simple flip of a coin. These findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions. Recent research confirms that coalition-based preferences trump race-based preferences. For example, both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political party much more than they favor those who share their race. These coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics. Our research has shown that the simple act of placing people on a mixed-race team can diminish their automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias. Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race. Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity—the amygdala responded to team membership rather than race. Taken together, these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves. Although these coalition-based distinctions might be the most basic building block of bias, they say little about the other factors that cause group conflict. Why do some groups get ignored while others get attacked? Whenever we encounter a new person or group we are motivated to answer two questions as quickly as possible: “is this person a friend or foe?” and “are they capable of enacting their intentions toward me?” In other words, once we have determined that someone is a member of an out-group, we need to determine what kind? The nature of the relations between groups—are we cooperative, competitive, or neither?—and their relative status—do you have access to resources?—largely determine the course of intergroup interactions. Groups that are seen as competitive with one’s interests, and capable of enacting their nasty intentions, are much more likely to be targets of hostility than more benevolent (e.g., elderly) or powerless (e.g., homeless) groups. This is one reason why sports rivalries have such psychological potency. For instance, fans of the Boston Red Sox are more likely to feel pleasure, and exhibit reward-related neural responses, at the misfortunes of the archrival New York Yankees than other baseball teams (and vice versa)—especially in the midst of a tight playoff race. (How much fans take pleasure in the misfortunes of their rivals is also linked to how likely they would be to harm fans from the other team.) Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa). Indeed, psychological and biological responses to out-group members can change, depending on whether or not that out-group is perceived as threatening. For example, people exhibit greater pleasure—they smile—in response to the misfortunes of stereotypically competitive groups (e.g., investment bankers); however, this malicious pleasure is reduced when you provide participants with counter-stereotypic information (e.g., “investment bankers are working with small companies to help them weather the economic downturn). Competition between “us” and “them” can even distort our judgments of distance, making threatening out-groups seem much closer than they really are. These distorted perceptions can serve to amplify intergroup discrimination: the more different and distant “they” are, the easier it is to disrespect and harm them. Thus, not all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those stereotypes can be tempered with other information. If perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may overcome hostility toward perceived foes and become more responsive to one another’s grievances. The flexible nature of both group membership and intergroup relations offers reason to be cautiously optimistic about the potential for greater cooperation among groups in conflict (be they black versus white or citizens versus police). One strategy is to bring multiple groups together around a common goal. For example, during the fiercely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money to strangers who supported the same primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both candidates coalesced around the party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared. In fact, merely creating a sense of cohesion between two competitive groups can increase empathy for the suffering of our rivals. These sorts of strategies can help reduce aggression toward hostile out-groups, which is critical for creating more opportunities for constructive dialogue addressing greater social injustices. Of course, instilling a sense of common identity and cooperation is extremely difficult in entrenched intergroup conflicts, but when it happens, the benefits are obvious. Consider how the community leaders in New York City and Ferguson responded differently to protests against police brutality—in NYC political leaders expressed grief and concern over police brutality and moved quickly to make policy changes in policing, whereas the leaders and police in Ferguson responded with high-tech military vehicles and riot gear. In the first case, multiple groups came together with a common goal—to increase the safety of everyone in the community; in the latter case, the actions of the police likely reinforced the “us” and “them” distinctions. Tragically, these types of conflicts continue to roil the country. Understanding the psychology and neuroscience of social identity and intergroup relations cannot undo the effects of systemic racism and discriminatory practices; however, it can offer insights into the psychological processes responsible for escalating the tension between, for example, civilians and police officers. Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between groups. In one recent experiment, we sorted participants into groups—red versus blue team—competing for a cash prize. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to see a picture of a segregated social network of all the players, in which red dots clustered together, blue dots clustered together, and the two clusters were separated by white space. The other half of the participants saw an integrated social network in which the red and blue dots were mixed together in one large cluster. Participants who thought the two teams were interconnected with one another reported greater empathy for the out-group players compared to those who had seen the segregated network. Thus, reminding people that individuals could be connected to one another despite being from different groups may be another way to build trust and understanding among them. A mere month before Freddie Gray died in police custody, President Obama addressed the nation on the 50th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Selma: “We do a disservice to the cause of justice by intimating that bias and discrimination are immutable, or that racial division is inherent to America. To deny…progress – our progress – would be to rob us of our own agency; our responsibility to do what we can to make America better." The president was saying that we, as a society, have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination. These recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity. Of course this capacity is not sufficient to usher in racial equality or peace. Even when the level of prejudice against particular out-groups decreases, it does not imply that the level of institutional discrimination against these or other groups will necessarily improve. Ultimately, only collective action and institutional evolution can address systemic racism. The science is clear on one thing, though: individual bias and discrimination are changeable. Race-based prejudice and discrimination, in particular, are created and reinforced by many social factors, but they are not inevitable consequences of our biology. Perhaps understanding how coalitional thinking impacts intergroup relations will make it easier for us to affect real social change going forward.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Ontology / Psycho › Libidinal

Socialization better explains their libidinal thesis

Hudis 15 [Peter, Professor of English and History @ Queens College, 2015, “Frantz Fanon: Philosopher of the Barricades,” p. 35-37]

Fanon’s vantage point upon the world is his situated experience. He is trying to understand the inner psychic life of racism, not provide an account of the structure of human existence as a whole. Racism is not, of course, an integral part of the human psyche; it is a Social construct that has a psychic impact. Any effort to comprehend social distress that accompanies racism by reference to some a priori structure- be it the Oedipal Complex or the Collective Unconscious- is doomed to failure. Carl Jung sought to deepen and go beyond Freud's approach by arguing that the subconscious is grounded in a universal layer of the psyche- which he called "the collective unconscious:' This refers to inherited patterns of thought that exist in all human minds, regardless of specific culture or upbringing, and which manifest themselves in dreams, fairy tales, and myths. Jung referred to these universal patterns as "archetypes:' It may seem, on a superficial reading, that 1 Fanon is drawing from Jung, since he discusses how white people tend to unconsciously assimilate views of blacks that are based on negative stereotypes. Even the most "progressive" white tends to think of blacks a certain way (such as "emotional;' "physical," or / "aggressive"), even as they disavow any racist animus on their part. However, Fanon denies that such collective delusions are part of a psychic structure; they are not permanent features of the mind. They are habits acquired from a series of social and cultural impositions. While they constitute a kind a collective unconscious on the part of many white people, they are not grounded in any universal "archetype." The unconscious prejudices of whites do not derive from genes or nature, nor do they derive from some form independent of culture or upbringing. Fanon contends that Jung "confuses habit with instinct." Fanon objects to Jung's "collective unconscious" for the same reason that he rejects the notion of a black ontology. His phenomenological approach brackets out ontological claims on both a social and psychological level insofar as the examination of race and racism is concerned. He writes, "Neither Freud nor Adler nor even the cosmic Jung took the black man into consideration in the course of his research.” This does not mean that Fanon rejects their contributions tout court. He does not deny the existence of the unconscious. He only denies that the inferiority complex of blacks operates on an unconscious level. He does not reject the Oedipal Complex. He only denies that it explains (especially in the West Indies) the proclivity of the black "slave" to mimic the values of the white "master." And as seen from his positive remarks on Lacan's theory of the mirror stage, he does not reject the idea of psychic structure. He only denies that it can substitute for an historical understanding of the origin of neuroses .23 Fanon adopts a socio-genetic approach to a study of the psyche because that is what is adequate for the object of his analysis. For Fanon, it is the relationship between the socio-economic and psychological that is of critical import. He makes it clear, insofar as the subject matter of his study is concerned, that the socio-economic is first of all responsible for affective disorders: "First, economic. Then, internalization or rather epidermalization of this inferiority."24 Fanon never misses an opportunity to remind us that racism owes its origin to specific economic relations of domination- such as slavery, colonialism, and the effort to coopt sections of the working class into serving the needs of capital. It is hard to mistake the Marxist influence here. It does not follow, however, that what comes first in the order of time has conceptual or strategic priority. The inferiority complex is originally born from economic subjugation, but it takes on a life of its own and expresses itself in terms that surpass the economic. Both sides of the problem-the socio-economic and psychological-must be combatted in tandem: "The black man must wage the struggle on two levels; whereas historically these levels are mutually dependent, any unilateral liberation is flawed, and the worst mistake would be to believe their mutual dependence automatic:''5 On these grounds he argues that the problem of racism cannot be solved on a psychological level. It is not an "individual" problem; it is a social one. But neither can it be solved on a social level that ores the psychological. It is small wonder that although his name never appears in the book, Fanon was enamored of the work of Wilhelm Reich. This important Freudian-Marxist would no doubt feel affinity with Fanon's comment, "Genuine disalienation will have been achieved only when things, in the most materialist sense, have resumed their rightful place:'27

2022 Michigan Kritik
Ontology / Psycho › ontology

Anti-Blackness isn’t historically calcified and their reading runs counter to the Black radical tradition.

Kelley 17 Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten In Conversation,” transcribed from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP-2F9MXjRE, 1:57:36-2:02:56, dml)

KELLEY: Um, Fred—Fred will take most of these questions. So that's why I'm going to begin first because he's gonna, he's gonna—he's gonna end it because he, he, he has the answer to all these questions ‘cause I turn to him for these questions. On the specific, on the first question, I just want to make sure I understand it because I'm, you know, I don't always recognize, uh, it may be because I'm just old, but I don't always recognize, uh, that black politics, black [unclear—maybe “guys”] work politics have been structured or defined by white supremacy. I mean, white supremacy is there. And I guess maybe because I'm such a student of Cedric Robinson, you know, not everything is about, or in response to, white supremacy. And in fact, one of the critiques coming out of doing Southern history was this idea that race relations framework, that race relations defines, uh, African-American history or Black history. And it's simply not true because much of what people do in terms of, of social formation, community building, um, is, is, is what Raymond Williams might call alternative cultures. In other words, it may be structured in dominance in some ways, but not defined by it. And Cedric's Black Marxism, you know, really made this point. He talks about the ontological totality, you know, the, this sense of being and making ourselves whole, in that we come out of an experience, again, structured by white supremacy, structured by violence, structured by enslavement and dispossession, but, but one in which western hegemony didn't work, you know, that modes of thinking wasn't defined by Enlightenment modes of thinking. In other words, that, that part of the Black radical tradition is a refusal to be property, to even admit that human beings could be property. You know, so we sometimes give white supremacy way too much credit, and maybe I misunderstood the question. And so I think that there's lots of things that happen outside of joy and survival, and survival is important, but survival is not the end all, you know. So I think, and I'll give you one very, very specific example, and now I'm not gonna say anything else after this. The way we have tended to more recently treat slavery, Jim Crow and mass incarceration as a piece, as the reinstantiation of the same thing, the continuation, that denies the fact that these systems are actually distinct, that they are historically specific, and in fact they’re responses to, in many ways, to the weakness of this as a racial regime. So if you think of like the whole idea of the new Jim Crow to me is very, very problematic. Um, although that book by Michelle Alexander is very, very powerful and very useful in terms of educating people about prisons. Jim Crow was not the continuation of slavery. It was not. Jim Crow was a response to the Black Democratic, uh, upsurge after slavery. It was a revolution of Reconstruction. It was a way to try to suppress that. The fact that, that, you know, there was this incredible response. That's why there's a, there's a huge gap between 1877 at the official end of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow, which is the 1890s, disfranchisement, lynching. That's because you've had 13, 14, 15, 20, 25 years of a democratic possibility and struggle. The same thing with mass incarceration—yes, we've had incarceration, but it's, but that, that, that, that upward swing has a lot to do with, again, responses to the struggles in the 1960s, the assault on the Keynesian welfare-warfare state, the fact that you know the, the war on political, the formation of political prisoners, those struggles in fact was the state's response to opposition. And so if we don't acknowledge that, then what we end up doing is thinking that somehow there's a structure of white supremacy that's unchanging, fixed, and so powerful we can't do anything about it when in fact it's the opposite. White supremacy is fragile. White supremacy is weak. Racial regimes actually are always having to shore themselves up precisely because they're unstable. We can see that. We can't see it because the whole system of hegemony is to give us the impression that it is so powerful, there's no space out. And yet it’s working overtime to, to respond to our opposition. Right. That may not answer your question, but that's sort of a way I think about it. Maybe it’s not satisfactory, but yeah.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Ontology / Psycho › ontology

Afro pessimism is wrong---ignores history, demobilizes anti-racist action, totalizes black experience, and is coopted by the neoliberal university

AP™ = Afropessimism

Okoth 20 MPhil in Political Theory at University of Oxford Kevin Ochieng Okoth, "The Flatness of Blackness: Afro-Pessimism and the Erasure of Anti-Colonial Thought by Kevin Ochieng Okoth," Salvage, 1-16-2020, https://salvage.zone/the-flatness-of-blackness-afro-pessimism-and-the-erasure-of-anti-colonial-thought/, accessed 7-15-2022 WMK

II. The Flatness of Blackness

2022 Michigan Kritik
Ontology / Psycho › ontology

Refuse ontology frames---Black isn’t coterminous with Slave but is an agent of a shared history of humanity---ceding democratic ideals to slaves is inaccurate, racially paternalistic, and zeroes pragmatic harms reduction

McCarthy 20 (Jesse McCarthy is an assistant professor in the departments of English and of African and African American Studies at Harvard University. “On Afropessimism.” //shree)

Nonetheless, the fact that the main current of Afropessimist thinking runs counter to all of Black political history and tradition thus far; the fact that the foundational thinker for this perspective, Frantz Fanon, came to completely opposing conclusions with respect to the nature of politics and solidarity in struggle; the fact that the theory often appears to evade scrutiny or contestation by proclaiming itself “meta-theoretical” and “ontological”; the fact that it asserts a “mandate” for which no empirical evidence is provided and in the face of overwhelming evidence that it constitutes at best a minoritarian and class-specific position — all of this has to be reckoned with by those who want to take Afropessimism to heart.

Perhaps it’s worth reminding ourselves that when he was murdered, Fred Hampton was encouraging poor whites to analogize their position to that of poor Blacks. At the time of his assassination, Malcolm X was embracing and actively seeking to incorporate a cross-racial coalition into his new organization. Ella Baker actively encouraged the deepening of organizational ties and activist links across different communities by emphasizing common struggle and common oppression. What evidence do we have, on the other hand, that the power behind the status quo is quaking at the thought of Black folk gathering in isolation to mourn the end of the world?

2022 Michigan Kritik
Ontology / Psycho › ontology

Their ontological and libidinal readings of blackness are inaccurate and undermine liberation---a history of black resistance disproves the rigidity of it as a metaphysical category.

Stephens 17. (R. L. Stephens is the A. Philip Randolph Fellow at Jacobin. Between the Black Body and Me. May 31, 2015. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/05/ta-nehisi-coates-racism-afro-pessimism-reparations-class-struggle)

Liza Bramlett was a slave. She lived on a cotton plantation in the Mississippi Delta during the nineteenth century. White men raped her repeatedly throughout her life. They traded her body amongst themselves in exchange for calves and piglets. In the end, Liza gave birth to twenty-three children, twenty of whom were conceived by rape. One of Liza’s daughters, Ella Townsend, was born after emancipation, but remained in the bondage of sharecropping in rural Mississippi. As an adult, she carried a pistol with her in the fields, determined to protect herself and the surrounding children. One day, a white man on horseback rode into the fields. He had come to abduct a young black girl. Ella, carrying her pistol in a lunch pail, intervened. “You don’t have no black children and you’re not going to beat no black children,” she told the intruder. “If you step down off that horse, I’ll go to Hell and back with you before Hell can scorch a feather.” “I do not believe that we can stop them … because they must ultimately stop themselves,” Ta-Nehisi Coates says of white racists in the final paragraph of his bestseller Between the World and Me, written as an open letter to his son. Coates describes racism as galactic, a physical law of the universe, “a tenacious gravity” and a “cosmic injustice.” When a cop kills a black man, the police officer is “a force of nature, the helpless agent of our world’s physical laws.” Society is equally helpless against the natural order. “The earthquake cannot be subpoenaed,” says Coates. In a widely replicated gesture, Coates locates the experience of racism in the body, in a racism that “dislodges brains, blocks airways, rips muscle, extracts organs, cracks bones, breaks teeth.” In the slim volume, fewer than two hundred pages, the word “body” or “bodies” appears more than three hundred times. “In America,” he writes, “it is traditional to destroy the black body.” Another brooding passage dwells on the inevitability of this violence. It had to be blood. It had to be nails driven through a tongue and ears pruned away. It had to be the thrashing of a kitchen maid for the crime of churning the butter at a leisurely clip. It could only be the employment of carriage whips, tongs, iron pokers, handsaws, stones, paperweights or whatever might be handy to break the black body. Yet Coates’s descriptive language and haunting narrative are not mere metaphors. They act as a kind of ontological pivot, mystifying racism even as it is anchored in its physical effects. Metaphor has long been used to capture racism’s almost unimaginable brutality. Lynching became “strange fruit” in Abel Meerpool’s song, made famous by Billie Holiday. In a wry, tragic innuendo, rape was referred to in Black communities as “nighttime integration.” The use of metaphor is not in itself an obfuscation. But Coates wields metaphor to obscure rather than illuminate the reality of racism. What we find all too often in Coates’s narrative universe are bodies without life and a racism without people. To give race an ontological meaning, to make it a reality all its own, is to drain it of its place in history and its roots in discrete human action. To deny the role of life and people — of politics — as Coates does is to also foreclose the possibility of liberation. No Helpless Agent Ella knew her mother Liza’s unimaginable suffering, but her memory was not a yoke on her shoulders. It provoked something in Ella. As an adult, she did not see the white predator stalking the fields as some helpless agent. She took matters into her own hands. There was no gravity strong enough to break her will or loosen her grip on her pistol. Her efforts rippled beyond those cotton fields. Ella taught her own daughter, Fannie Lou Hamer, not only to struggle, but to resist. Fannie Lou was born into a sharecropping family in rural Mississippi but would go on to become a beacon of the Civil Rights movement. She is best known for her work registering black voters in Mississippi, most famously during 1964’s Freedom Summer, at great personal risk. Police arrested and beat her. White racists shot at her. Lyndon Johnson dismissed her as an illiterate. In 1973, an interviewer asked her, “Do you have faith that the system will ever work properly?” By then, Fannie Lou had seen a decade of setbacks and false dawns since first walking off her plantation in 1962 to fight for Civil Rights. She responded, We have to make it work. Ain’t nothing going to be handed to you on a silver platter. That’s not just black people, that’s people in general, masses. See, I’m with the masses… You’ve got to fight. Every step of the way you’ve got to fight. She marched. She sang freedom songs. She testified. She co-founded the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. For her, the logical solution was political: uniting a powerless many against a powerful few. White racists could be stopped. Black people could resist, and Fannie Lou and so many others did just that. Fannie Lou knew that the wages of racism were measured on the body. “A black woman’s body was never hers alone,” she once remarked. White doctors sterilized her without her consent during a minor surgery, a barbaric intrusion so common she called it a “Mississippi appendectomy.” However, though she knew racism’s physical toll, she drew inspiration from stories of black resistance passed down orally across the generations. Hamer recalled her grandmother’s will to survive and her mother’s weapon of protection. These intergenerational resistance narratives, according to Charles Cobb in his book This Nonviolent Stuff’ll Get You Killed, “underlay a deep and powerful collective memory that was invisible to whites but greatly affected the shape and course of the modern Freedom Movement.” As a result, Fannie Lou and so many others possessed an intimate knowledge not only of their own human dignity, despite the racist brutality they endured, but also of the human frailty of their racial oppressors. In the years before Fannie Lou’s political struggle began, whole communities, black women and men, rose up against the violence that was forced on black women’s bodies. Feminist historian Danielle McGuire argues this anti-rape community organizing in Alabama laid the foundation for what eventually became the Montgomery Bus Boycott. She observes, “The majority of leaders active in the Montgomery Improvement Association in 1955 cut their political teeth demanding justice for black women who were raped in the 1940s and early 1950s.” Despite being a poor, black sharecropper drowning in the poverty and racial terror endemic to rural Mississippi, Fannie Lou held fast to her forbearers’ stories of resistance. She did not resign herself to fatalism, as Coates does. The "Birthmark of Damnation" Coates too takes a multigenerational view. Between the World and Me is framed as a letter to his son. However, rather than seeing a legacy of resistance, he finds a lineage of blackness defined by fear and dysfunction. “When I was your age the only people I knew were black, and all of them were powerfully, adamantly, dangerously afraid,” he writes. “I felt the fear in the visits to my Nana’s home in Philadelphia,” Coates continues. “And I saw it in my own father.” My father was so very afraid. I felt it in the sting of his black leather belt, which he applied with more anxiety than anger, my father who beat me as if someone might steal me away, because that is exactly what was happening all around us. Coates describes his condition, and that of all black people, as a “birthmark of damnation.” The resistance stories passed down to Fannie Lou and so many others spurred them to march. Coates’s narrative, riddled with fear and futility, begs us to retreat. Though Coates has never explicitly cited it as his theoretical framework, the dour outlook of his work evokes the themes of Afro-Pessimism. The pivot to the ontological that is apparent in Coates’s rhetoric is a hallmark of Afro-Pessimism. “Ontology by definition is the study of being, and to speak of Blackness as an ontological condition means analyzing the state of Black bodies through the lens of slavery,” Afro-Pessimist scholar Michael Barlow, Jr., writes in the academic journal Inquiries. However, for Barlow, the relation of slavery that ontologically defines blackness is not a matter of political economy, but rather a “libidinal economy.” In this telling, labor and ownership — that is, political economy — are merely incidental to racial slavery. Instead, it’s the white imagination and its depraved “metaphysical desires for Black flesh” that both predated and catalyzed racialized chattel slavery. Racism is reduced to the spiritual, more a matter of a sinful nature than a political struggle. Coates has echoed this retreat to interiority, to the spiritual, to consciousness. It’s the ontological pivot that leads Frank Wilderson, perhaps the world’s foremost Afro-Pessimist, to declare in his foundational text “Gramsci’s Black Marx: Whither the Slave in Civil Society?” that black people are no more than cows in a slaughterhouse. Wilderson posits that “death of the black body is foundational to the life of American civil society,” just as a cow’s death is essential to the slaughterhouse. Flippantly, Wilderson asks, “how would the cows fare under a dictatorship of the proletariat?” Coates adopts a similar sense of impotence. He characterizes struggle as aimless toil — an apolitical end in itself. “The struggle is really all I have for you,” he tells his son, “because it is the only portion of this world under your control.” Yet how are we to struggle against earthquakes and physical laws? How can we fight gravity? Both Coates and Wilderson speak of power in terms of dreams. Coates writes of monolithic white “Dreamers,” those whose investment in the American Dream requires a faith in their own whiteness. Similarly, Wilderson sees America as enacting two distinct dreams. For Wilderson, “the dream of black accumulation and death” is separate from “the dream of worker exploitation.” Ultimately, in both Coates’s and Wilderson’s respective frameworks, solidarity is unimaginable and class struggle is rendered futile. Though Coates does not go to the lengths Wilderson does to position himself in opposition to materialist politics, the result is effectively equivalent: a separation of race and class combined with a deep skepticism of class-based solidarity, reforms, or even revolution. This is a turn away from the Freedom Tradition embodied by Fannie Lou Hamer. For her, the problem of racism wasn’t cosmology or ontology — it was an expression of politics implicated in class antagonism. Fannie Lou Hamer stood “with the masses,” both white and black. Solidarity through struggle from below, including class struggle, formed her path to victory. Coates’s ontological pivot is more muddled than Wilderson’s. Fleetingly peppered throughout his work are allusions to material reality, betraying the imposition of metaphysical abstraction that ultimately drives his perspective. “We did not choose our fences,” he writes. “They were imposed on us by Virginia planters obsessed with enslaving as many Americans as possible.” Coates knows that Virginia planters did not invent gravity or earthquakes. Yet this historicizing impulse does not prevent him from essentializing racism when he confronts it head on. In string of tweets from December 2016, Coates conceded that racism is not transcendental, noting that “at its very root it was always economic.” But acknowledging racism’s economic impact has not led him to embrace class struggle. Even Frank Wilderson can acknowledge that racism has an economic impact, but he still believes that class struggle and racism exist on distinct planes. Coates holds a similar belief; that racism is wholly different in kind from class. In the same series of tweets, he concluded that “in America, ‘class’ isn’t the only kind of class.” Just as he mystifies racism, even while locating its impact in the bodies of black people, here he again pivots. Coates cannot address material politics on its own terms, preferring instead to retreat to a contrived mystification. He replaces action with interiority. As he recently told an auditorium of eager Northwestern students, “The process should not be… people looking out at the world and saying, ‘I would like for there to be change in the world, how do I do that?’” Instead, he implored the crowd to engage from the “inside-out, not outside-in… because if you are in the business of justice, and making this society more democratic, you might get a lot of disappointment.” Consciousness matters, of course. “Baby you just got to love ’em,” Fannie Lou Hamer would say of the white segregationists who routinely threatened her life. “Hating just makes you sick and weak.” This was Hamer in a reflexive moment, but it was no retreat. In the very next breath, she warned, “I keep a shotgun in every corner of my bedroom and the first cracker even look like he wants to throw some dynamite on my porch won’t write his mama again.” Fannie Lou truly was her mother’s daughter. Reflection, whether through intergenerational story or her own thoughts, enhanced her resistance. The same cannot be said of Coates. Instead of finding relief in political action, Coates finds it in a cookout at Howard University’s homecoming, surrounded by black people. He fantasizes that he is “disappearing into all of their bodies,” as the music and dancing, the black cultural zeitgeist of the moment, cure him of the “birthmark of damnation.” The curse is lifted. Blackness is transfigured, becoming a space “beyond the Dream.” It’s another ontological pivot, this time allowing Coates to conclude that The Mecca’s” — his term for Howard — cookout has a “power more gorgeous than any voting rights bill.” It’s a fantasy of retreat, as if black culture were beyond the machinations of capitalism, as though black cultural expression existed in the world but was not of it and were enough to take us to a new one. Between the World and Me concludes with Coates considering climate change. He sees climate change as a manifestation of a polluted white consciousness, rather than the unfettered excess of industrial capitalism. It is a “noose around the neck of the earth,” allegedly resulting in large part from white flight, the mid-century exodus of negrophobic white families to the suburbs and the pollution caused by the cars that took them there. Coates’s words here are poetic but grossly inaccurate. They mimic Afro-Pessimism’s emphasis on the white libido, relegating his rhetoric to the realm of interior life, the souls of white folks, and stopping well short of the political domain. For Coates, the Civil Rights movement was not a struggle to alter a material world; rather the “hope of the movement” was merely to “awaken the Dreamers.” Black politics is only relevant as far as it can arouse white consciousness, which he sees as a largely futile exercise, due to “the small chance of the Dreamers coming into consciousness.” Coates sees common interest between the black elite and the black poor, as he marvels at “the entire diaspora,” from lawyers to street hustlers, present at Howard’s homecoming. Yet he cannot conceive of anti-capitalist class solidarity across racial identity. He has a darker vision, of a kind that Corey Robin has described as “apocalypticism.” Coates’s ultimate hope is not in collective human action, but rather the total annihilation of the world and all those living in it— another feature that unites him with Afro-Pessimism, which calls explicitly for the “end of the world.” As he says of the Dreamers, “the field for their Dream, the stage where they have painted themselves white, is the deathbed of us all.” Paradoxically, though he can see a collective fate in apocalypse, he rejects shared struggle for liberation. “The Dreamers will have to learn to struggle themselves,” he declares. The problem is, the whole of capitalist enterprise, both past and present, cannot be reduced to race as Original Sin. Left out of Coates’s mythology is the fact that colonial enterprise, in what would become the United States, relied first on European indentured servants, most of whom died within a handful of years after arriving on the continent. It’s Coates’s reading of race as sin that pushes him to imagine a perverted form of salvation in the fantasy of apocalypse. In this racial fatalism, reparations for slavery emerges as the anticipation of the inevitable Judgement Day. It is therefore no surprise that Coates has taken up racial reparations as his cross to bear — not to change the world, but to condemn it.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Ontology / Psycho › ontology

Their ontological and libidinal readings of blackness are inaccurate and undermine liberation---a history of black resistance disproves the rigidity of it as a metaphysical category.

Stephens 17. (R. L. Stephens is the A. Philip Randolph Fellow at Jacobin. Between the Black Body and Me. May 31, 2015. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/05/ta-nehisi-coates-racism-afro-pessimism-reparations-class-struggle)

Liza Bramlett was a slave. She lived on a cotton plantation in the Mississippi Delta during the nineteenth century. White men raped her repeatedly throughout her life. They traded her body amongst themselves in exchange for calves and piglets. In the end, Liza gave birth to twenty-three children, twenty of whom were conceived by rape. One of Liza’s daughters, Ella Townsend, was born after emancipation, but remained in the bondage of sharecropping in rural Mississippi. As an adult, she carried a pistol with her in the fields, determined to protect herself and the surrounding children. One day, a white man on horseback rode into the fields. He had come to abduct a young black girl. Ella, carrying her pistol in a lunch pail, intervened. “You don’t have no black children and you’re not going to beat no black children,” she told the intruder. “If you step down off that horse, I’ll go to Hell and back with you before Hell can scorch a feather.” “I do not believe that we can stop them … because they must ultimately stop themselves,” Ta-Nehisi Coates says of white racists in the final paragraph of his bestseller Between the World and Me, written as an open letter to his son. Coates describes racism as galactic, a physical law of the universe, “a tenacious gravity” and a “cosmic injustice.” When a cop kills a black man, the police officer is “a force of nature, the helpless agent of our world’s physical laws.” Society is equally helpless against the natural order. “The earthquake cannot be subpoenaed,” says Coates. In a widely replicated gesture, Coates locates the experience of racism in the body, in a racism that “dislodges brains, blocks airways, rips muscle, extracts organs, cracks bones, breaks teeth.” In the slim volume, fewer than two hundred pages, the word “body” or “bodies” appears more than three hundred times. “In America,” he writes, “it is traditional to destroy the black body.” Another brooding passage dwells on the inevitability of this violence. It had to be blood. It had to be nails driven through a tongue and ears pruned away. It had to be the thrashing of a kitchen maid for the crime of churning the butter at a leisurely clip. It could only be the employment of carriage whips, tongs, iron pokers, handsaws, stones, paperweights or whatever might be handy to break the black body. Yet Coates’s descriptive language and haunting narrative are not mere metaphors. They act as a kind of ontological pivot, mystifying racism even as it is anchored in its physical effects. Metaphor has long been used to capture racism’s almost unimaginable brutality. Lynching became “strange fruit” in Abel Meerpool’s song, made famous by Billie Holiday. In a wry, tragic innuendo, rape was referred to in Black communities as “nighttime integration.” The use of metaphor is not in itself an obfuscation. But Coates wields metaphor to obscure rather than illuminate the reality of racism. What we find all too often in Coates’s narrative universe are bodies without life and a racism without people. To give race an ontological meaning, to make it a reality all its own, is to drain it of its place in history and its roots in discrete human action. To deny the role of life and people — of politics — as Coates does is to also foreclose the possibility of liberation. No Helpless Agent Ella knew her mother Liza’s unimaginable suffering, but her memory was not a yoke on her shoulders. It provoked something in Ella. As an adult, she did not see the white predator stalking the fields as some helpless agent. She took matters into her own hands. There was no gravity strong enough to break her will or loosen her grip on her pistol. Her efforts rippled beyond those cotton fields. Ella taught her own daughter, Fannie Lou Hamer, not only to struggle, but to resist. Fannie Lou was born into a sharecropping family in rural Mississippi but would go on to become a beacon of the Civil Rights movement. She is best known for her work registering black voters in Mississippi, most famously during 1964’s Freedom Summer, at great personal risk. Police arrested and beat her. White racists shot at her. Lyndon Johnson dismissed her as an illiterate. In 1973, an interviewer asked her, “Do you have faith that the system will ever work properly?” By then, Fannie Lou had seen a decade of setbacks and false dawns since first walking off her plantation in 1962 to fight for Civil Rights. She responded, We have to make it work. Ain’t nothing going to be handed to you on a silver platter. That’s not just black people, that’s people in general, masses. See, I’m with the masses… You’ve got to fight. Every step of the way you’ve got to fight. She marched. She sang freedom songs. She testified. She co-founded the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. For her, the logical solution was political: uniting a powerless many against a powerful few. White racists could be stopped. Black people could resist, and Fannie Lou and so many others did just that. Fannie Lou knew that the wages of racism were measured on the body. “A black woman’s body was never hers alone,” she once remarked. White doctors sterilized her without her consent during a minor surgery, a barbaric intrusion so common she called it a “Mississippi appendectomy.” However, though she knew racism’s physical toll, she drew inspiration from stories of black resistance passed down orally across the generations. Hamer recalled her grandmother’s will to survive and her mother’s weapon of protection. These intergenerational resistance narratives, according to Charles Cobb in his book This Nonviolent Stuff’ll Get You Killed, “underlay a deep and powerful collective memory that was invisible to whites but greatly affected the shape and course of the modern Freedom Movement.” As a result, Fannie Lou and so many others possessed an intimate knowledge not only of their own human dignity, despite the racist brutality they endured, but also of the human frailty of their racial oppressors. In the years before Fannie Lou’s political struggle began, whole communities, black women and men, rose up against the violence that was forced on black women’s bodies. Feminist historian Danielle McGuire argues this anti-rape community organizing in Alabama laid the foundation for what eventually became the Montgomery Bus Boycott. She observes, “The majority of leaders active in the Montgomery Improvement Association in 1955 cut their political teeth demanding justice for black women who were raped in the 1940s and early 1950s.” Despite being a poor, black sharecropper drowning in the poverty and racial terror endemic to rural Mississippi, Fannie Lou held fast to her forbearers’ stories of resistance. She did not resign herself to fatalism, as Coates does. The "Birthmark of Damnation" Coates too takes a multigenerational view. Between the World and Me is framed as a letter to his son. However, rather than seeing a legacy of resistance, he finds a lineage of blackness defined by fear and dysfunction. “When I was your age the only people I knew were black, and all of them were powerfully, adamantly, dangerously afraid,” he writes. “I felt the fear in the visits to my Nana’s home in Philadelphia,” Coates continues. “And I saw it in my own father.” My father was so very afraid. I felt it in the sting of his black leather belt, which he applied with more anxiety than anger, my father who beat me as if someone might steal me away, because that is exactly what was happening all around us. Coates describes his condition, and that of all black people, as a “birthmark of damnation.” The resistance stories passed down to Fannie Lou and so many others spurred them to march. Coates’s narrative, riddled with fear and futility, begs us to retreat. Though Coates has never explicitly cited it as his theoretical framework, the dour outlook of his work evokes the themes of Afro-Pessimism. The pivot to the ontological that is apparent in Coates’s rhetoric is a hallmark of Afro-Pessimism. “Ontology by definition is the study of being, and to speak of Blackness as an ontological condition means analyzing the state of Black bodies through the lens of slavery,” Afro-Pessimist scholar Michael Barlow, Jr., writes in the academic journal Inquiries. However, for Barlow, the relation of slavery that ontologically defines blackness is not a matter of political economy, but rather a “libidinal economy.” In this telling, labor and ownership — that is, political economy — are merely incidental to racial slavery. Instead, it’s the white imagination and its depraved “metaphysical desires for Black flesh” that both predated and catalyzed racialized chattel slavery. Racism is reduced to the spiritual, more a matter of a sinful nature than a political struggle. Coates has echoed this retreat to interiority, to the spiritual, to consciousness. It’s the ontological pivot that leads Frank Wilderson, perhaps the world’s foremost Afro-Pessimist, to declare in his foundational text “Gramsci’s Black Marx: Whither the Slave in Civil Society?” that black people are no more than cows in a slaughterhouse. Wilderson posits that “death of the black body is foundational to the life of American civil society,” just as a cow’s death is essential to the slaughterhouse. Flippantly, Wilderson asks, “how would the cows fare under a dictatorship of the proletariat?” Coates adopts a similar sense of impotence. He characterizes struggle as aimless toil — an apolitical end in itself. “The struggle is really all I have for you,” he tells his son, “because it is the only portion of this world under your control.” Yet how are we to struggle against earthquakes and physical laws? How can we fight gravity? Both Coates and Wilderson speak of power in terms of dreams. Coates writes of monolithic white “Dreamers,” those whose investment in the American Dream requires a faith in their own whiteness. Similarly, Wilderson sees America as enacting two distinct dreams. For Wilderson, “the dream of black accumulation and death” is separate from “the dream of worker exploitation.” Ultimately, in both Coates’s and Wilderson’s respective frameworks, solidarity is unimaginable and class struggle is rendered futile. Though Coates does not go to the lengths Wilderson does to position himself in opposition to materialist politics, the result is effectively equivalent: a separation of race and class combined with a deep skepticism of class-based solidarity, reforms, or even revolution. This is a turn away from the Freedom Tradition embodied by Fannie Lou Hamer. For her, the problem of racism wasn’t cosmology or ontology — it was an expression of politics implicated in class antagonism. Fannie Lou Hamer stood “with the masses,” both white and black. Solidarity through struggle from below, including class struggle, formed her path to victory. Coates’s ontological pivot is more muddled than Wilderson’s. Fleetingly peppered throughout his work are allusions to material reality, betraying the imposition of metaphysical abstraction that ultimately drives his perspective. “We did not choose our fences,” he writes. “They were imposed on us by Virginia planters obsessed with enslaving as many Americans as possible.” Coates knows that Virginia planters did not invent gravity or earthquakes. Yet this historicizing impulse does not prevent him from essentializing racism when he confronts it head on. In string of tweets from December 2016, Coates conceded that racism is not transcendental, noting that “at its very root it was always economic.” But acknowledging racism’s economic impact has not led him to embrace class struggle. Even Frank Wilderson can acknowledge that racism has an economic impact, but he still believes that class struggle and racism exist on distinct planes. Coates holds a similar belief; that racism is wholly different in kind from class. In the same series of tweets, he concluded that “in America, ‘class’ isn’t the only kind of class.” Just as he mystifies racism, even while locating its impact in the bodies of black people, here he again pivots. Coates cannot address material politics on its own terms, preferring instead to retreat to a contrived mystification. He replaces action with interiority. As he recently told an auditorium of eager Northwestern students, “The process should not be… people looking out at the world and saying, ‘I would like for there to be change in the world, how do I do that?’” Instead, he implored the crowd to engage from the “inside-out, not outside-in… because if you are in the business of justice, and making this society more democratic, you might get a lot of disappointment.” Consciousness matters, of course. “Baby you just got to love ’em,” Fannie Lou Hamer would say of the white segregationists who routinely threatened her life. “Hating just makes you sick and weak.” This was Hamer in a reflexive moment, but it was no retreat. In the very next breath, she warned, “I keep a shotgun in every corner of my bedroom and the first cracker even look like he wants to throw some dynamite on my porch won’t write his mama again.” Fannie Lou truly was her mother’s daughter. Reflection, whether through intergenerational story or her own thoughts, enhanced her resistance. The same cannot be said of Coates. Instead of finding relief in political action, Coates finds it in a cookout at Howard University’s homecoming, surrounded by black people. He fantasizes that he is “disappearing into all of their bodies,” as the music and dancing, the black cultural zeitgeist of the moment, cure him of the “birthmark of damnation.” The curse is lifted. Blackness is transfigured, becoming a space “beyond the Dream.” It’s another ontological pivot, this time allowing Coates to conclude that The Mecca’s” — his term for Howard — cookout has a “power more gorgeous than any voting rights bill.” It’s a fantasy of retreat, as if black culture were beyond the machinations of capitalism, as though black cultural expression existed in the world but was not of it and were enough to take us to a new one. Between the World and Me concludes with Coates considering climate change. He sees climate change as a manifestation of a polluted white consciousness, rather than the unfettered excess of industrial capitalism. It is a “noose around the neck of the earth,” allegedly resulting in large part from white flight, the mid-century exodus of negrophobic white families to the suburbs and the pollution caused by the cars that took them there. Coates’s words here are poetic but grossly inaccurate. They mimic Afro-Pessimism’s emphasis on the white libido, relegating his rhetoric to the realm of interior life, the souls of white folks, and stopping well short of the political domain. For Coates, the Civil Rights movement was not a struggle to alter a material world; rather the “hope of the movement” was merely to “awaken the Dreamers.” Black politics is only relevant as far as it can arouse white consciousness, which he sees as a largely futile exercise, due to “the small chance of the Dreamers coming into consciousness.” Coates sees common interest between the black elite and the black poor, as he marvels at “the entire diaspora,” from lawyers to street hustlers, present at Howard’s homecoming. Yet he cannot conceive of anti-capitalist class solidarity across racial identity. He has a darker vision, of a kind that Corey Robin has described as “apocalypticism.” Coates’s ultimate hope is not in collective human action, but rather the total annihilation of the world and all those living in it— another feature that unites him with Afro-Pessimism, which calls explicitly for the “end of the world.” As he says of the Dreamers, “the field for their Dream, the stage where they have painted themselves white, is the deathbed of us all.” Paradoxically, though he can see a collective fate in apocalypse, he rejects shared struggle for liberation. “The Dreamers will have to learn to struggle themselves,” he declares. The problem is, the whole of capitalist enterprise, both past and present, cannot be reduced to race as Original Sin. Left out of Coates’s mythology is the fact that colonial enterprise, in what would become the United States, relied first on European indentured servants, most of whom died within a handful of years after arriving on the continent. It’s Coates’s reading of race as sin that pushes him to imagine a perverted form of salvation in the fantasy of apocalypse. In this racial fatalism, reparations for slavery emerges as the anticipation of the inevitable Judgement Day. It is therefore no surprise that Coates has taken up racial reparations as his cross to bear — not to change the world, but to condemn it.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Ontology / Psycho › ontology

Social death theory is wrong---conflates the oppressors’ view with the truth of black of existence, which re-centers the slave owner’s perspective and prevents struggles for re-humanization

George Lipsitz 17. Professor of Black Studies and Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. 2017. “What is this Black in the Black Radical Tradition?” in Futures of Black Radicalism, ed. by Johnson and Lubin, 2017. p. 108-110.

Three miracles seem to characterize the history of Black people in the United States. The very survival of Black people in the face of murderous brutality and genocidal intent qualifies as a miracle. The enduring reality of Black humanity in a society that has used every means at its disposal to destroy Black dignity and deny Black people the opportunity to exercise their full humanity appears miraculous. The historical record of democratic aspiration and achievement by Black people, of creating democratic opportunities for themselves and extending them to others, seems to defy normal rational explanations. Despite the social death at the center of the slave system and the organized abandonments of today's neoliberal capitalism, despite beatings, lynchings, shootings, mass incarceration and systematic impoverishment, Black people have survived and thrived. In slavery, African people in the Americas owned virtually nothing, not even the skin on their backs. They had every reason to give in to despair. Yet they somehow managed to survive, to extend recognition and respect to each other while in bondage, and to maintain a commitment to the linked fate of all humans. Time and time again, Black people have countered vicious dehumanization with determined and successful re-humanization. Insisting on their own humanity and the humanity of all people, even that of their oppressors, they have been at the forefront of what Dr. King called “the bitter but beautiful struggle” for a more just and better world. From the egalitarian politics of abolition democracy in the wake of the Civil War and the participatory democracy of the civil rights movement to the contemporary insurgencies waged under the banners of #BlackLivesMatter and #SayHerName, struggles for Black survival and Black humanity have repeatedly linked the termination of existing racist policies to the creation of new democratic practices and institutions. Forced to cope with the nadir of political evil over centuries, Black people have responded consistently by forging advanced concepts of a deeply politicized love. Perhaps precisely because brutality and oppression can make people decidedly unlovable, African people in America have been adept at finding ways to perceive something left to love inside themselves and in others. That ability has enabled their survival, the preservation of their humanity, and their emergence as the nation's foremost champions of democracy and social justice. The people who were systematically denied access to the fruits and benefits of democratic citizenship and social membership turned out to be the people who valued democracy the most and who did the most to extend it to others. [END PAGE 108] Cedric Robinson has demonstrated that the three miracles were not really miracles at all, but rather products of a collective intelligence developed over generations of struggle. In Black Marxism, Robinson defines the Black Radical Tradition as “the continuing development of a collective consciousness informed by the historical struggles for liberation and motivated by the shared sense of obligation to preserve the collective being, the ontological totality.”1 Thus in many ways, the greatest achievement of the Black community was itself, its emergence as an aggrieved and insurgent polity committed to social justice. The “Black” in the Black Radical Tradition is a politics rather than a pigment, a culture rather than a color. Yet this Blackness does not presume a unified homogenous community with only one set of interests, needs, and desires. On the contrary, Robinson's research reveals that the key building blocks for Black survival, Black humanity, and Black democracy came from the lower rungs of Black society, from the plantations and slave quarters, out of the contradictions of the rural regimes of slavery and debt peonage and the living conditions in ghettos of northern and western cities. Experience taught the Black poor and the Black working class that racial capitalism entailed “an unacceptable standard of human conduct”2 that they needed to counter with a politics that was “inventive rather than imitative, communitarian rather than individualistic, democratic rather than republican, Afro-Christian rather than secular and materialist.”3 Robinson's emphasis on political struggle as the main explanation for Black survival, humanity, and democracy reminds us not to confuse the grandiose aspirations and illusions of the powerful with the actual lived experiences of those they control. Slavery did mandate legally and militarily supported social death, but slaves worked assiduously and effectively each day, every day, each year, and every year to create a rich social life.4 As Robinson argues, “Slavery gave the lie to its own conceit: one could not create a perfect system of oppression and exploitation.”5 Domination produces resistance, and resistance plants the seeds of a new society within the shell of the old. As Robinson explains in Black Movements in America, "The resistances to slavery were the [END PAGE 109] principal grounds for the radically alternative political culture that coalesced in the Black communities of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the era of revolutionary, liberal and nationalist impulses among Europeans in North America.” 6 Declaring Blacks to be less than human could not make them so, even in the eyes of their oppressors. Research by John Blassingame, George Rawick, Sterling Stuckey, Herbert Gutman, and Stephanie Camp (among others) reveals how slaves fused African retention and New World invention to forge a culture that affirmed their humanity and the humanity of others.7 They recognized this common humanity through multicultural, multiracial alliances with poor whites and others in maroon communities. 8 In colonial Louisiana, Blacks reached out to Native Americans for help in resisting slavery.9 Slave owners, however, were less successful in preserving their own humanity. In order to maintain the illusion of complete control, they tortured, whipped, hanged, burned, and dismembered their "property" when it displayed signs of having human will.10 Black people witnessed white people's inhumanity and pitied them. As early as the 1820s, David Walker argued that while whites lost the moral capacity to perceive the evil they enacted, they nonetheless knew "in their hearts" that Blacks were human. He argued that it was precisely this recognition that propelled their cruelty and brutality: they presumed that Blacks resented them and, if given the opportunity, would do to whites what whites had done to Blacks.11 In his history of the New Orleans slave market, Walter Johnson notes a similar loss of humanity among slave owners. Whites invested more than money in the slave system; they looked to it to elevate them beyond the status of ordinary mortals and became outraged when their chattel refused to conform to the roles they had been assigned. Johnson notes: The greater the transformative hopes slaveholders took with them to the slave market, the more violent their reactions to the inevitable disappointment of their efforts to get real slaves to act like imagined ones ... If they had to, they would use brutality to close the distance between the roles they imagined for themselves and the failings of the slaves they bought as props for their performance. 12 [END PAGE 110]

2022 Michigan Kritik
Ontology / Psycho › ontology

Ontology is contradictory, self-aggrandizing, and devolves into anti-political moralizing – it ignores institutional engagement which is a better way to engage anti-black racism.

Gordon 21 – Professor of Philosophy and Department Chair at University of Connecticut, PhD in Philosophy at Yale, founder of the Center for Afro-Jewish Studies, Honorary Professor in the Unit for the Humanities at Rhodes University, South Africa; Chairperson of the American Philosophical Association Committee on Public Philosophy; and Chairperson of the Awards Committee and Global Collaborations for the Caribbean Philosophical Association, of which he was the organization’s first president [Lewis, Freedom, Justice and Decolonization, Chapter 5: Thoughts on Afropessimism, Copyright Year 2021]

At this point, the crucial meditation would be on politics and political action. An attitude of infinite resignation to the world without the leap of committed action would simply be pessimistic or nihilistic. Similarly, an attitude of hope or optimism about the future would lack infinite resignation. We see here the underlying failure of the two approaches. Yet ironically, there is a form of failure at failing in the pessimistic turn versus the optimistic one, since if focused exclusively on resignation as the goal, then the “act” of resignation would have been achieved, which, paradoxically, would be a success; it would be a successful failing of failure. For politics to emerge, there are two missing elements in inward pessimistic resignation to consider.

The first is that politics is a social phenomenon, which means it requires the expanding options of a social world. It must transcend the self. Turning away from the social world, though a statement about politics, is not in and of itself political. As we have seen, the ancients from whom much Western political theory or philosophy claimed affinity had a disparaging term for an individual resigned from political life—namely, idiōtēs, a private person, one not concerned with public affairs, in English: an idiot. I mention “Western political theory” because that is the hegemonic intellectual context of Afropessimism; I have not come across Afropessimistic writings on thought outside of that framework. We do not have to end our etymological journey in ancient Greek. Recall that extending our linguistic archaeology back a few thousand years we could examine the Middle Kingdom (2000 BCE–1700 BCE) of Kmt’s Mdw Ntr word idi (deaf). The presumption, later taken on by the ancient Athenians and other Greek-speaking peoples, was that a lack of hearing entailed isolation, at least in terms of audio speech. The contemporary inward resignation of seeking a form of purity from the loathsome historical reality of racial oppression, in this reading, retreats ultimately into a form of moralism (private, normative satisfaction) instead of public responsibility born of and borne by action. The nonbeing to which Afropessimists refer is also a form of inaudibility.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Ontology / Psycho › ontology

Afro-Pessimism fails to understand failure. Transformative revolutions can make new worlds through relational humanisms.

Gordon 17 (Lewis R, Professor of Philosophy @ UConn, “Thoughts on Afropessimism”, Contemporary Political Theory, Volume 17, Issue, 1, pages 105-137, December 7)

I begin with this tale of philosophical abstraction to contextualize Afropessimism. Its main exemplars, such as Jared Sexton and Frank Wilderson III, emerged from academic literary theory, an area dominated by poststructuralism even in many cases that avow ‘‘Marxism.’’ Sexton (2010) and Wilderson (2007) divert from a reductive poststructuralism, however, through examining important existential moves inaugurated, as Daniel McNeil (2011, 2012) observed, by Fanon and his intellectual heirs. The critical question that Afropessimism addresses in this fusion is the viability of posed strategies of Black liberation. (I’m using the capital ‘‘B’’ here to point not only to the racial designation ‘‘black’’ but also to the nationalist one ‘‘Black.’’ Afropessimists often mean both, since blacks and Blacks have a central and centered role in their thought.) The world that produced blacks and in consequence Blacks is, for Afropessimists, a crushing, historical one whose Manichaean divide is sustained contraries best kept segregated. Worse, any effort of mediation leads to confirmed black subordination. Overcoming this requires purging the world of antiblackness. Where cleansing the world is unachievable, an alternative is to disarm the force of antiblack racism. Where whites lack power over blacks, they lose relevance – at least politically and at levels of cultural and racial capital or hegemony. Wilderson (2008), for instance, explores my concept of ‘‘an antiblack world’’ to build similar arguments. Sexton (2011) makes similar moves in his discussions of ‘‘social death.’’ As this forum doesn’t afford space for a long critique, I’ll offer several, non-exhaustive criticisms.

The first is that ‘‘an antiblack world’’ is not identical with ‘‘the world is antiblack.’’ My argument is that such a world is an antiblack racist project. It is not the historical achievement. Its limitations emerge from a basic fact: Black people and other opponents of such a project fought, and continue to fight, as we see today in the #BlackLivesMatter movement and many others, against it. The same argument applies to the argument about social death. Such an achievement would have rendered even these reflections stillborn. The basic premises of the Afropessimistic argument are, then, locked in performative contradictions. Yet, they have rhetorical force. This is evident through the continued growth of its proponents and forums (such as this one) devoted to it.