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2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Advantage Counterplans › 1NC---Democracy

CP solves authoritarian AI without security cooperation

Andrew Imbrie et al 20, Andrew Imbrie Ryan Fedasiuk Catherine Aiken Tarun Chhabra Husanjot Chahal. Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown’s Walsh School of Foreign Service is a research organization focused on studying the security impacts of emerging technologies, supporting academic work in security and technology studies, and delivering nonpartisan analysis to the policy community. February. "Agile Alliances: How the United States and its Allies Can Deliver a Democratic Way of AI" //pipk

One of the chief attractions of Chinese-supplied consumer technologies (5G, cell phones, computers, digital wallets) is that they are less expensive than Western equivalents, and market access is often a condition for Chinese companies investing in developing countries. For example, some allies and partners are reluctant to ban Huawei for fear of losing access to the Chinese market and investments. Even among partners, the appeal of cost effectiveness sometimes outweighs considerations of privacy and security. The CSET survey found that cost effectiveness matters more than privacy for international agreements around software contracts. Yet privacy matters more among partners for international agreements around data storage and sharing. Surveyed officials were split in terms of the relative importance of privacy and cost for international agreements around novel applications and hardware investment. Germany, Australia, and the EU tended to favor privacy in all cases, while Colombia and the Czech Republic tended to favor cost effectiveness when considering international collaboration.

To promote a rules-based global trading order, the United States should not mimic China’s model of state-driven, top-down national development strategies that trade investment for market access. Instead, the United States should form a multilateral consortium to coordinate the extension of credit to European mobile telecommunications networks and invest in next-generation networks.91

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 2NC---Uniqueness

Tech industry wage inflation is on the brink

Suman Bhattacharyya 22, Wall Street Journal Reporter. April 21, 2022. "Tech Wage Inflation Puts Pressure on Companies"

Wage inflation in the technology sector is accelerating, pressuring companies to boost compensation for key roles by 20% or more as they compete for a limited pool of workers skilled in areas such as cloud computing and data science.

There is no single source of data on all tech jobs, but it is clear from a range of market analysts and executives that demand for labor in the tech sector is on the rise. During the first quarter, U.S. employers posted 1.1 million tech jobs, an increase of 43% from a year earlier, according to information technology trade group CompTIA.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 2NC---Innovation Impact

Extinction—innovation is the only way to avoid tipping points.

Naam, fellow of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, 13

(Ramez, former Microsoft executive, "How Innovation Could Save the Planet", World Future Society, The Futurist, 2013 Issues of The Futurist, March-April 2013 (Vol. 47, No. 2), www.wfs.org/futurist/2013-issues-futurist/march-april-2013-vol-47-no-2/how-innovation-could-save-planet)

The Best of Times: Unprecedented Prosperity There are many ways in which we are living in the most wonderful age ever. We can imagine we are heading toward a sort of science-fiction utopia, where we are incredibly rich and incredibly prosperous, and the planet is healthy. But there are other reasons to fear that we’re headed toward a dystopia of sorts. Ramez Naam spoke at WorldFuture 2013, the annual conference of the World Future Society in Chicago, in July of 2013. On the positive side, life expectancy has been rising for the last 150 years, and faster since the early part of the twentieth century in the developing world than it has in the rich world. Along with that has come a massive reduction in poverty. The most fundamental empowerer of humans—education—has also soared, not just in the rich world, but throughout the world. Another great empowerer of humanity is connectivity: Access to information and access to communication both have soared. The number of mobile phones on the planet was effectively zero in the early 1990s, and now it’s in excess of 4 billion. More than three-quarters of humanity, in the span of one generation, have gotten access to connectivity that, as my friend Peter Diamandis likes to say, is greater than any president before 1995 had. A reasonably well-off person in India or in Nigeria has better access to information than Ronald Reagan did during most of his career. With increased connectivity has come an increase in democracy. As people have gotten richer, more educated, more able to access information, and more able to communicate, they have demanded more control over the places where they live. The fraction of nations that are functional democracies is at an all-time high in this world—more than double what it was in the 1970s—with the collapse of the Soviet Union.* Economically, the world is a more equal place than it has been in decades. In the West, and especially in the United States, we hear a lot about growing inequality, but on a global scale, the opposite is true. As billions are rising out of poverty around the world, the global middle classes are catching up with the global rich. In many ways, this is the age of the greatest human prosperity, freedom, and potential that has ever been on the face of this planet. But in other ways, we are facing some of the largest risks ever. The Worst of Times: The Greatest Risks At its peak, the ancient Mayan city of Tikal was a metropolis, a city of 200,000 people inside of a civilization of about 20 million people. Now, if you walk around any Mayan city, you see mounds of dirt. That’s because these structures were all abandoned by about the mid-900s AD. We know now what happened: The Mayan civilization grew too large. It overpopulated. To feed themselves, they had to convert forest into farmland. They chopped down all of the forest. That, in turn, led to soil erosion. It also worsened drought, because trees, among other things, trap moisture and create a precipitation cycle. When that happened, and was met by some normal (not human-caused) climate change, the Mayans found they didn’t have enough food. They exhausted their primary energy supply, which is food. That in turn led to more violence in their society and ultimately to a complete collapse. The greatest energy source for human civilization today is fossil fuels. Among those, none is more important than oil. In 1956, M. King Hubbert looked at production in individual oil fields and predicted that the United States would see the peak of its oil production in 1970 or so, and then drop. His prediction largely came true: Oil production went up but did peak in the 1970s, then plummeted. Oil production has recently gone up in the United States a little bit, but it’s still just barely more than half of what it was in its peak in the 1970s. Hubbert also predicted that the global oil market would peak in about 2000, and for a long time he looked very foolish. But it now has basically plateaued. Since 2004, oil production has increased by about 4%, whereas in the 1950s it rose by about 4% every three months. We haven’t hit a peak; oil production around the world is still rising a little bit. It’s certainly not declining, but we do appear to be near a plateau; supply is definitely rising more slowly than demand. Though there’s plenty of oil in the ground, the oil that remains is in smaller fields, further from shore, under lower pressure, and harder to pump out. Water is another resource that is incredibly precious to us. The predominant way in which we use water is through the food that we eat: 70% of the freshwater that humanity uses goes into agriculture. The Ogallala Aquifer, the giant body of freshwater under the surface of the Earth in the Great Plains of the United States, is fossil water left from the melting and the retreat of glaciers in the end of the last Ice Age, 12,000–14,000 years ago. Its refill time is somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 years from normal rainfall. Since 1960, we’ve drained between a third and a half of the water in this body, depending on what estimate you look at. In some areas, the water table is dropping about three feet per year. If this was a surface lake in the United States or Canada, and people saw that happening, they’d stop it. But because it’s out of sight, it’s just considered a resource that we can tap. And indeed, in the north Texas area, wells are starting to fail already, and farms are being abandoned in some cases, because they can’t get to the water that they once did. Perhaps the largest risk of all is climate change. We’ve increased the temperature of the planet by about 2°F in the last 130 years, and that rate is accelerating. This is primarily because of the carbon dioxide we’ve put into the atmosphere, along with methane and nitrous oxide. CO2 levels, now at over 390 parts per million, are the highest they’ve been in about 15 million years. Ice cores go back at least a million years, and we know that they’re the highest they’ve been in that time. Historically, when CO2 levels are high, temperature is also high. But also, historically, in the lifetime of our species, we’ve actually never existed as human beings while CO2 levels have been this high. For example, glaciers such as the Bear and Pedersen in Alaska have disappeared just since 1920. As these glaciers melt, they produce water that goes into the seas and helps to raise sea levels. Over the next century, the seas are expected to rise about 3 to 6 feet. Most of that actually will not be melting glaciers; it’s thermal expansion: As the ocean gets warmer, it gets a little bit bigger. But 3 to 6 feet over a century doesn’t sound like that big a deal to us, so we think of that as a distant problem. The reality is that there’s a more severe problem with climate change: its impact on the weather and on agriculture. In 2003, Europe went through its worst heat wave since 1540. Ukraine lost 75% of its wheat crop. In 2009, China had a once-in-a-century level drought; in 2010 they had another once-in-a-century level drought. That’s twice. Wells that had given water continuously since the fifteenth century ran dry. When those rains returned, when the water that was soaked up by the atmosphere came back down, it came down on Pakistan, and half of Pakistan was under water in the floods of 2010. An area larger than Germany was under water. Warmer air carries more water. Every degree Celsius that you increase the temperature value of air, it carries 7% more water. But it doesn’t carry that water uniformly. It can suck water away from one place and then deliver it in a deluge in another place. So both the droughts are up and flooding is up simultaneously, as precipitation becomes more lumpy and more concentrated. In Russia’s 2010 heat wave, 55,000 people died, 11,000 of them in Moscow alone. In 2011, the United States had the driest 10-month period ever in the American South, and Texas saw its worst wildfires ever. And 2012 was the worst drought in the United States since the Dust Bowl—the corn crop shrank by 20%. So that’s the big risk the world faces: that radical weather will change how we grow food, which is still our most important energy source—even more important than fossil fuels. A number of people in the environmentalist movement are saying that we have to just stop growing. For instance, in his book Peak Everything: Waking Up to the Century of Declines, Richard Heinberg of the Post-Carbon Institute says that the Earth is full. Get used to it, and get ready for a world where you live with less wealth, and where your children live with less wealth, than any before. I don’t think this idea of stopping growth is realistic, because there are a top billion people who live pretty well and there are another 6 billion who don’t and are hungry for it. We see demand rising for everything—water, food, energy—and that demand is rising not in the United States or Europe or Canada or Australia. It’s rising in the developing world. This is the area that will create all of the increased demand for physical resources. Even if we could, by some chance, say That’s enough, sorry, we’re not going to let you use these resources, which is doubtful, it wouldn’t be just, because the West got rich by using those natural resources. So we need to find a different way. Ideas as a Resource Expander, Resource Preserver, and Waste Reducer The best-selling environmental book of all time, Limits to Growth, was based on computer modeling. It was a simple model with only about eight variables of what would happen in the world. It showed that economic growth, more wealth, would inevitably lead to more pollution and more consumption of finite resources, which would in turn take us beyond the limits and lead ultimately to collapse. While it’s been widely reported recently that its predictions are coming true, that’s actually not the case. If you look at the vast majority of the numbers that the researchers predict in this model, they’re not coming true. Why did they get these things wrong? The most important thing that the forecasters did was underestimate the power of new ideas to expand resources, or to expand wealth while using fewer resources. Ideas have done tremendous things for us. Let’s start with food. In The Population Bomb (1968), Paul Ehrlich predicted that food supply could not support the population, just as Malthus did. But what’s happened is that we’ve doubled population since 1960, and we’ve nearly tripled the food supply in total. We’ve increased by 30%–40% the food supply per person since the 1960s. Let’s look at this on a very long time scale. How many people can you feed with an acre of land? Before the advent of agriculture, an acre of land could feed less than a thousandth of a person. Today it’s about three people, on average, who can be fed by one acre of land. Pre-agriculture, it took 3,000 acres for one person to stay alive through hunting and gathering. With agriculture, that footprint has shrunk from 3,000 acres to one-third of one acre. That’s not because there’s any more sunlight, which is ultimately what food is; it’s because we’ve changed the productivity of the resource by innovation in farming—and then thousands of innovations on top of that to increase it even more. In fact, the reason we have the forests that we have on the planet is because we were able to handle a doubling of the population since 1960 without increasing farmland by more than about 10%. If we had to have doubled our farmland, we would have chopped down all the remaining forests on the planet. Ideas can reduce resource use. I can give you many other examples. In the United States, the amount of energy used on farms per calorie grown has actually dropped by about half since the 1970s. That’s in part because we now only use about a tenth of the energy to create synthetic nitrogen fertilizer, which is an important input. The amount of food that you can grow per drop of water has roughly doubled since the 1980s. In wheat, it’s actually more than tripled since 1960. The amount of water that we use in the United States per person has dropped by about a third since the 1970s, after rising for decades. As agriculture has gotten more efficient, we’re using less water per person. So, again, ideas can reduce resource use. Ideas can also find substitutes for scarce resources. We’re at risk of running out of many things, right? Well, let’s think about some things that have happened in the past. The sperm whale was almost hunted into extinction. Sperm whales were, in the mid-1800s, the best source of illumination. Sperm whale oil—spermaceti—was the premier source of lighting. It burned without smoke, giving a clear, steady light, and the demand for it led to huge hunting of the sperm whales. In a period of about 30 years, we killed off about a third of the sperm whales on the planet. That led to a phenomenon of “peak sperm-whale oil”: The number of sperm whales that the fleet could bring in dropped over time as the sperm whales became more scarce and more afraid of human hunters. Demand rose as supply dropped, and the prices skyrocketed. So it looked a little bit like the situation with oil now. That was solved not by the discovery of more sperm whales, nor by giving up on this thing of lighting. Rather, Abraham Gesner, a Canadian, discovered this thing called kerosene. He found that, if he took coal, heated it up, captured the fumes, and distilled them, he could create this fluid that burned very clear. And he could create it in quantities thousands of times greater than the sperm whales ever could have given up. We have no information suggesting that Gesner was an environmentalist or that he cared about sperm whales at all. He was motivated by scientific curiosity and by the huge business opportunity of going after this lighting market. What he did was dramatically lower the cost of lighting while saving the sperm whales from extinction. One more thing that ideas can do is transform waste into value. In places like Germany and Japan, people are mining landfills. Japan estimates that its landfills alone contain 10-year supplies of gold and rare-earth minerals for the world market. Alcoa estimates that the world’s landfills contain a 15-year supply of aluminum. So there’s tremendous value. When we throw things away, they’re not destroyed. If we “consume” things like aluminum, we’re not really consuming it, we’re rearranging it. We’re changing where it’s located. And in some cases, the concentration of these resources in our landfills is actually higher than it was in our mines. What it takes is energy and technology to get that resource back out and put it back into circulation. Ideas for Stretching the Limits So ideas can reduce resource use, can find substitutes for scarce resources, and can transform waste into value. In that context, what are the limits to growth? Is there a population limit? Yes, there certainly is, but it doesn’t look like we’re going to hit that. Projections right now are that, by the middle of this century, world population will peak between 9 billion and 10 billion, and then start to decline. In fact, we’ll be talking much more about the graying of civilization, and perhaps underpopulation—too-low birthrates on a current trend. What about physical resources? Are there limits to physical resource use on this planet? Absolutely. It really is a finite planet. But where are those limits? To illustrate, let’s start with energy. This is the most important resource that we use, in many ways. But when we consider all the fossil fuels that humanity uses today—all the oil, coal, natural gas, and so on—it pales in comparison to a much larger resource, all around us, which is the amount of energy coming in from our Sun every day. The amount of energy from sunlight that strikes the top of the atmosphere is about 10,000 times as much as the energy that we use from fossil fuels on a daily basis. Ten seconds of sunlight hitting the Earth is as much energy as humanity uses in an entire day; one hour of sunlight hitting the Earth provides as much energy to the planet as a whole as humanity uses from all sources combined in one year. This is an incredibly abundant resource. It manifests in many ways. It heats the atmosphere differentially, creating winds that we can capture for wind power. It evaporates water, which leads to precipitation elsewhere, which turns into things like rivers and waterfalls, which we can capture as hydropower. But by far the largest fraction of it—more than half—is photons hitting the surface of the Earth. Those are so abundant that, with one-third of 1% of the Earth’s land area, using current technology of about 14%-efficient solar cells, we could capture enough electricity to power all of current human needs. The problem is not the abundance of the energy; the problem is cost. Our technology is primitive. Our technology for building solar cells is similar to our technology for manufacturing computer chips. They’re built on silicon wafers in clean rooms at high temperatures, and so they’re very, very expensive. But innovation has been dropping that cost tremendously. Over the last 30 years, we’ve gone from a watt of solar power costing $20 to about $1. That’s a factor of 20. We roughly drop the cost of solar by one-half every decade, more or less. That means that, in the sunniest parts of the world today, solar is now basically at parity in cost, without subsidies, with coal and natural gas. Over the next 12–15 years, that will spread to most of the planet. That’s incredibly good news for us. Of course, we don’t just use energy while the Sun is shining. We use energy at night to power our cities; we use energy in things like vehicles that have to move and that have high energy densities. Both of these need storage, and today’s storage is actually a bigger challenge than capturing energy. But there’s reason to believe that we can tackle the storage problem, as well. For example, consider lithium ion batteries—the batteries that are in your laptop, your cell phone, and so on. The demand to have longer-lasting devices drove tremendous innovations in these batteries in the 1990s and the early part of the 2000s. Between 1991 and 2005, the cost of storage in lithium ion batteries dropped by about a factor of nine, and the density of storage—how much energy you can store in an ounce of battery—increased by a little over double in that time. If we do that again, we would be at the point where grid-scale storage is affordable and we can store that energy overnight. Our electric vehicles have ranges similar to the range you can get in a gasoline-powered vehicle. This is a tall order. This represents perhaps tens of billions of dollars in R&D, but it is something that is possible and for which there is precedent. Another approach being taken is turning energy into fuel. When you use a fuel such as gasoline, it’s not really an energy source. It’s an energy carrier, an energy storage system, if you will. You can store a lot of energy in a very small amount. Today, two pioneers in genome sequencing—Craig Venter and George Church—both have founded companies to create next-generation biofuels. What they’re both leveraging is that gene-sequencing cost is the fastest quantitative area of progress on the planet. What they’re trying to do is engineer microorganisms that consume CO2, sunlight, and sugar and actually excrete fuel as a byproduct. If we could do this, maybe just 1% of the Earth’s surface—or a thirtieth of what we use for agriculture—could provide all the liquid fuels that we need. We would conveniently grow algae on saltwater and waste water, so biofuel production wouldn’t compete for freshwater. And the possible yields are vast if we can get there. If we can crack energy, we can crack everything else: • Water. Water is life. We live in a water world, but only about a tenth of a percent of the water in the world is freshwater that’s accessible to us in some way. Ninety-seven percent of the world’s water is in the oceans and is salty. It used to be that desalination meant boiling water and then catching the steam and letting it condense. Between the times of the ancient Greeks and 1960, desalination technology didn’t really change. But then, it did. People started to create membranes modeled on what cells do, which is allow some things through but not others. They used plastics to force water through and get only the fresh and not the salty. As a result, the amount of energy it takes to desalinate a liter of water has dropped by about a factor of nine in that time. Now, in the world’s largest desalination plants, the price of desalinated water is about a tenth of a cent per gallon. The technology has gotten to the point where it is starting to become a realistic option as an alternative to using up scarce freshwater resources. • Food. Can we grow enough food? Between now and 2050, we have to increase food yield by about 70%. Is that possible? I think it is. In industrialized nations, food yields are already twice what they are in the world as a whole. That’s because we have irrigation, tractors, better pesticides, and so on. Given such energy and wealth, we already know that we can grow enough food to feed the planet. Another option that’s probably cheaper would be to leverage some things that nature’s already produced. What most people don’t know is that the yield of corn per acre and in calories is about 70% higher than the yield of wheat. Corn is a C 4 photosynthesis crop: It uses a different way of turning sunlight and CO2 into sugars that evolved only 30 million years ago. Now, scientists around the world are working on taking these C 4 genes from crops like corn and transplanting them into wheat and rice, which could right away increase the yield of those staple grains by more than 50%. Physical limits do exist, but they are extremely distant. We cannot grow exponentially in our physical resource use forever, but that point is still at least centuries in the future. It’s something we have to address eventually, but it’s not a problem that’s pressing right now. • Wealth. One thing that people don’t appreciate very much is that wealth has been decoupling from physical resource use on this planet. Energy use per capita is going up, CO2 emissions per capita have been going up a little bit, but they are both widely outstripped by the amount of wealth that we’re creating. That’s because we can be more efficient in everything—using less energy per unit of food grown, and so on. This again might sound extremely counterintuitive, but let me give you one concrete example of how that happens. Compare the ENIAC—which in the 1940s was the first digital computer ever created—to an iPhone. An iPhone is billions of times smaller, uses billions of times less energy, and has billions of times more computing power than ENIAC. If you tried to create an iPhone using ENIAC technology, it would be a cube a mile on the side, and it would use more electricity than the state of California. And it wouldn’t have access to the Internet, because you’d have to invent that, as well. This is what I mean when I say ideas are the ultimate resource. The difference between an ENIAC and an iPhone is that the iPhone is embodied knowledge that allows you to do more with less resources. That phenomenon is not limited to high tech. It’s everywhere around us. So ideas are the ultimate resource. They’re the only resource that accumulates over time. Our store of knowledge is actually larger than in the past, as opposed to all physical resources. Challenges Ahead for Innovation Today we are seeing a race between our rate of consumption and our rate of innovation, and there are multiple challenges. One challenge is the Darwinian process, survival of the fittest. In areas like green tech, there will be hundreds and even thousands of companies founded, and 99% of them will go under. That is how innovation happens. The other problem is scale. Just as an example, one of the world’s largest solar arrays is at Nellis Air Force Base in California, and we would need about 10 million of these in order to meet the world’s electricity needs. We have the land, we have the solar energy coming in, but there’s a lot of industrial production that has to happen before we get to that point. Innovation is incredibly powerful, but the pace of innovation compared to the pace of consumption is very important. One thing we can do to increase the pace of innovation is to address the biggest challenge, which is market failure. In 1967, you could stick your hand into the Cuyahoga River, in Ohio, and come up covered in muck and oil. At that time, the river was lined with businesses and factories, and for them the river was a free resource. It was cheaper to pump their waste into the river than it was to pay for disposal at some other sort of facility. The river was a commons that anybody could use or abuse, and the waste they were producing was an externality. To that business or factory, there was no cost to pumping waste into this river. But to the people who depended upon the river, there was a high cost overall. That’s what I mean by a market externality and a market failure, because this was an important resource to all of us. But no one owned it, no one bought or sold it, and so it was treated badly in a way that things with a price are not. That ultimately culminated when, in June 1969, a railway car passing on a bridge threw a spark; the spark hit a slick of oil a mile long on the river, and the river burst into flames. The story made the cover of Time magazine. In many ways, the environmental movement was born of this event as much as it was of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. In the following three years, the United States created the Environmental Protection Agency and passed the Clean Water and Clean Air acts. Almost every environmental problem on the planet is an issue of the commons, whether it’s chopping down forests that no one owns, draining lakes that no one owns, using up fish in the ocean that no one owns, or polluting the atmosphere because no one owns it, or heating up the planet. They’re all issues of the commons. They’re all issues where there is no cost to an individual entity to deplete something and no cost to overconsume something, but there is a greater cost that’s externalized and pushed on everybody else who shares this. Now let’s come back again to what Limits to Growth said, which was that economic growth always led to more pollution and more consumption, put us beyond limits, and ends with collapse. So if that’s the case, all those things we just talked about should be getting worse. But as the condition of the Cuyahoga River today illustrates, that is not the case. GDP in the United States is three times what it was when the Cuyahoga River caught on fire, so shouldn’t it be more polluted? It’s not. Instead, it’s the cleanest it’s been in decades. That’s not because we stopped growth. It’s because we made intelligent choices about managing that commons. Another example: In the 1970s, we discovered that the ozone layer was thinning to such an extent that it literally could drive the extinction of all land species on Earth. But it’s actually getting better. It’s turned a corner, it’s improving ahead of schedule, and it’s on track to being the healthiest it’s been in a century. That’s because we’ve reduced the emissions of CFCs, which destroy ozone; we’ve dropped the amount of them that we emit into the atmosphere basically to zero. And yet industry has not ground to a halt because of this, either. Economic growth has not faltered. And one last example: Acid rain—which is primarily produced by sulfur dioxide emitted by coal-burning power plants—is mostly gone as an issue. Emissions of sulfur dioxide are down by about a factor of two. That’s in part because we created a strategy called cap and trade: It capped the amount of SO2 that you could emit, then allowed you to swap and buy emission credits from others to find the optimal way to do that. The cost, interestingly enough, has always been lower than projected. In each of these cases, industry has said, This will end things. Ronald Reagan’s chief of staff said the economy would grind to a halt, and the EPA would come in with lower cost estimates. But the EPA has always been wrong: The EPA cost estimate has always been too high. Analysis of all of these efforts in the past shows that reducing emissions is always cheaper than you expect, but cleaning up the mess afterwards is always more expensive than you’d guess. Today, the biggest commons issue is that of climate change, with the CO2 and other greenhouse gases that we’re pumping into the atmosphere. A logical thing to do would be to put a price on these. If you pollute, if you’re pumping CO2 into the atmosphere and it’s warming the planet, so you’re causing harm to other people in a very diffuse way. Therefore, you should be paying in proportion to that harm you’re doing to offset it. But if we do that, won’t that have a massive impact on the economy? This all relates to energy, which drives a huge fraction of the economy. Manufacturing depends on it. Transport depends on it. So wouldn’t it be a huge problem if we were to actually put a price on these carbon emissions? Well, there has been innovative thinking about that, as well. One thing that economists have always told us is that, if you’re going to tax, tax the bad, not the good. Whatever it is that you tax, you will get less of it. So tax the bad, not the good. The model that would be the ideal for putting a price on pollution is what we call a revenue-neutral model. Revenue-neutral carbon tax, revenue-neutral cap and trade. Let’s model it as a tax: Today, a country makes a certain amount of revenue for its government in income tax, let’s say. If you want to tax pollution, the way to do this without impacting the economy is to increase your pollution tax in the same manner that you decrease the income tax. The government then is capturing the same amount of money from the economy as a whole, so there’s no economic slowdown as a result of this. This has a positive effect on the environment because it tips the scales of price. Now, if you’re shopping for energy, and you’re looking at solar versus coal or natural gas, the carbon price has increased the price of coal and natural gas to you, but not the cost of solar. It shifts customer behavior from one to the other while having no net impact on the economy, and probably a net benefit on the economy in the long run as more investment in green energy drives the price down. Toward a Wealthier, Cleaner Future The number-one thing I want you to take away is that pollution and overconsumption are not inevitable outcomes of growth. While tripling the wealth of North America, for instance, we’ve gone from an ozone layer that was rapidly deteriorating to one that is bouncing back. The fundamental issue is not one of limits to growth; it’s one of the policy we choose, and it’s one of how we structure our economy to value all the things we depend upon and not just those things that are owned privately. What can we do, each of us? Four things: First is to communicate. These issues are divisive, but we know that beliefs and attitudes on issues like this spread word of mouth. They spread person to person, from person you trust to person you trust. So talk about it. Many of us have friends or colleagues or family on the other side of these issues, but talk about it. You’re better able to persuade them than anyone else is. Second is to participate. By that I mean politically. Local governments, state and province governments, and national governments are responsive when they hear from their constituents about these issues. It changes their attitudes. Because so few constituents actually make a call to the office of their legislator, or write a letter, a few can make a very large impact. Third is to innovate. These problems aren’t solved yet. We don’t have the technologies for these problems today. The trend lines look very good, but the next 10 years of those trend lines demand lots of bright people, lots of bright ideas, and lots of R&D. So if you’re thinking about a career change, or if you know any young people trying to figure out what their career is now, these are careers that (A) will be very important to us in the future and (B) will probably be quite lucrative for them.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 1NC---R&D Tradeoff Turn

Extinction

Johnson 16 – George Johnson, columnist and science journalist for the New York Times, M.A. in Journalism and Public Affairs, American University (“Scientists Ponder the Prospect of Contagious Cancer,” New York Times, February 22nd, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/science/scientists-ponder-the-prospect-of-contagious-cancer.html?mcubz=0)

For all its peculiar horror, cancer comes with a saving grace. If nothing else can stop a tumor’s mad evolution, the cancer ultimately dies with its host. Everything the malignant cells have learned about outwitting the patient’s defenses — and those of the oncologists — is erased. The next case of cancer, in another victim, must start anew. Imagine if instead, cancer cells had the ability to press on to another body. A cancer like that would have the power to metastasize not just from organ to organ, but from person to person, evolving deadly new skills along the way. While there is no sign of an imminent threat, several recent papers suggest that the eventual emergence of a contagious human cancer is in the realm of medical possibility. This would not be a disease, like cervical cancer, that is set off by the spread of viruses, but rather one in which cancer cells actually travel from one person to another and thrive in their new location. So far this is known to have happened only under the most unusual circumstances. A 19-year-old laboratory worker who pricked herself with a syringe of colon cancer cells developed a tumor in her hand. A surgeon acquired a cancer from his patient after accidentally cutting himself during an operation. There are also cases of malignant cells being transferred from one person to another through an organ transplant or from a woman to her fetus. On each of these occasions, the malignancy went no further. The only known cancers that continue to move from body to body, evading the immune system, have been found in other animals. In laboratory experiments, for instance, cancer cells have been transferred by mosquitoes from one hamster to another. And so far, three kinds of contagious cancers have been discovered in the wild — in dogs, Tasmanian devils and, most recently, in soft shell clams. The oldest known example is a cancer that spreads between dogs during sexual intercourse — not as a side effect of a viral or bacterial infection, but rather through direct conveyance of cancer cells. The state of the research is described in a review, “The Cancer Which Survived,” published last year by Andrea Strakova and Elizabeth P. Murchison of the University of Cambridge. The condition, canine transmissible venereal tumor disease, is believed to have sprung into existence 11,000 years ago — as a single cell in a single dog — and has been circulating ever since. (Why did this happen in dogs and not, say, cats? Perhaps because of what the authors demurely call the dogs’ “long-lasting coital tie” — the half an hour or so that a male and female are locked in intercourse, tearing genital tissues and providing the cancer cells with a leisurely crossing.) Normally a cancer evolves in a single body over the course of years or decades, accumulating the mutations that drive it to power. But to have survived for millenniums, researchers have proposed, canine cancer cells may have developed mechanisms — like those in healthy cells — to repair and stabilize their own malignant genomes. Early on, cancer cells typically flourish by disabling DNA repair and ramping up the mutational frenzy. Somewhere along the way, the age-old canine cells may have reinvented the device to extend their own longevity. There is also speculation that this cancer may have learned to somehow modify canine sexual behavior in ways that promote the disease’s spread and survival. The second kind of contagious cancer was discovered in the mid-1990s in Tasmanian devils, which spread malignant cells as they try to tear off one another’s faces. Though it may be hard to sympathize, devil facial tumor disease threatens the creatures with extinction. With so few examples, transmissible cancer has been easy to dismiss as an aberration. But in December, scientists at the Universities of Tasmania and Cambridge reported in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences that Tasmanian devils are passing around another kind of cancer — genetically distinct from the first. It’s weird enough that one such cancer would arise in the species. What are the chances that there would be two? One theory is that the animals are unusually vulnerable. Driven so close to extinction — by climate change, perhaps, or human predators — the species is lacking in genetic diversity. The cells of another devil injected through a vicious wound may seem so familiar that they are ignored by the recipient’s immune system. If some of the cells carry the mutations for the facial cancer, they might be free to flourish and develop into a new tumor. But the scientists also proposed a more disturbing explanation: that the emergence of contagious cancer may not be so rare after all. “The possibility,” they wrote, “warrants further investigation of the risk that such diseases could arise in humans.” Cancer has probably existed ever since our first multicellular ancestors appeared on Earth hundreds of millions of years ago. The life spans of even the longest-lived animals may be just too brief for cancers to easily evolve the ability to leap to another body. Otherwise, contagious cancer would be everywhere.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 1NC---R&D Tradeoff Turn

Federal research solves cancer

Doudna & Marson 17 (Jennifer & Alex. Jennifer Doudna is a professor of chemistry, and molecular and cell biology, at the University of California, Berkeley. Alex Marson is an assistant professor of microbiology, immunology, and medicine at UC San Francisco. "Federal funding for basic research led to the gene-editing revolution. Don't cut it" ) *edited for language

Labs across our country are a source of American optimism — advancing knowledge, technologies, and cures. And yet, as citizens in 500 cities worldwide prepare to march this weekend in support of science, many American scientific practitioners are afraid. They worry that American science as we know it would be hobbled [hurt] if President Trump’s proposed 18 percent cut to the National Institutes of Health, America’s premier medical research funder, becomes reality. We hope Congress will hear history’s call and re-assert American leadership in advancing humanity’s scientific knowledge. Call us naïve, but we believe — as an immunologist and biochemist attempting to perfect and deploy gene-editing advances to cure disease — that Democrats and Republicans alike can be united by a shared drive for scientific exploration and life-saving discoveries. Science is not the property of any political party or region of the country. In red states and blues states, daughters and sons ask their first scientific questions when they come to us and wonder how the human body grows, how genes are inherited, and how a medicine works. Over the past century, American political leaders have encouraged young people to ask these fundamental questions, invested in their training to become scientists, and given them tools to translate questions into innovation. The rewards of breakthroughs are felt most acutely when our families experience illness. Many of us know the pain of a loved one discovering a lump that turns out to be cancer or showing signs of neurological decline. In these moments, whatever our politics, we all hope to reach for the most powerful medicines, which continue to result from the relentless pursuit of scientific knowledge. Gene editing will lead to major breakthroughs in combating disease As we write, biomedical progress is accelerating, changing how we understand and fight disease. One example is CRISPR, a tool that can edit specific sequences in human DNA, which one of us helped invent and the other uses in research to understand and control the human immune system. Targeted at the building blocks of life, CRISPR could induce immune cells to fight disease or neutralize predisposition to one. The combination of CRISPR and new therapies has raised hopes for a new generation of powerful cancer treatments. Across the US, our colleagues are teaming up and racing to apply similar approaches to dementia, heart disease, and countless other conditions. A growing number of Americans have heard of CRISPR and its medical potential. Far fewer realize that the transformative applications of CRISPR genome editing would never have occurred without robust funding for basic scientific research. Inquiry into unusual genes in unglamorous bacteria before we even knew the gene-altering power they contained, laid the foundation for CRISPR technology. Now that same technology is driving a revolution in biomedicine and rapidly advancing towards clinical trials. We certainly have not charted the breadth of microorganisms that will inspire the invention of future drugs, nor fathomed the full complexity of the inner workings of human cells. That’s the work of basic scientific research. The next revolution in biology is currently an idea in a scientist’s head, or being hashed out in a late night lab conversation among graduate students, or sitting in a grant application to the NIH asking for a chance. Our research represents just a sliver of the vital projects that more than 300,000 researchers are undertaking in 50 states with NIH support. Unfortunately, the president’s proposed budget threatens that research. Among the deep cuts to science support he seeks is a nearly $6 billion reduction for NIH, representing nearly a fifth of the agency’s funding. (For context, that’s more than its entire current cancer budget.) The proposal has prompted justifiable concern among scientists and patient advocates. Funding cuts would deter tomorrow’s scientists from the field, or at least from pursuing careers in the US. Curtailing the NIH budget, a significant chunk of America’s biomedical research funding, would cripple our capacity to lead on pressing health challenges. The vast majority of NIH funds go to funding scientific research and training, both within the agency and externally. For decades, America has been at the forefront of scientific innovation. Slashing funding would destroy long-term projects and threaten American primacy in medical research. More importantly, underfunding NIH will hamstring efforts to fight disease. By funding basic research, the federal government lays the groundwork for future innovation Some might argue that private industry will fill the void, given the economic benefits of scientific breakthroughs,. But the truth, surprising to many, is that while private investment can indeed lead to the discovery of profitable new drugs and therapies, its focus on the bottom line tends to short-change basic — as opposed to applied —research. In weighing a project’s anticipated earnings and costs, businesses seek a probable path to profit. Transformative science requires a different mold than the one found in industry. CRISPR grew not out of a race to develop disease treatments, but out of basic scientific research into bacteria. The boldest innovations stem from unlikely collaborations or quixotic investigations — in other words, exploration driven by discovery rather than profit. Occasionally, these projects do become profitable, but only through a scientist’s persistent drive to show that an idea, a hope, a hunch, is not so crazy after all. While stockholders may not want a corporation to make bets that are unlikely to have an immediate payoff, as citizens we must demand our government does so. And that’s precisely why the National Institutes of Health exists: It ensures that, though we may not know what the next CRISPR will be, there are bright and dedicated American scientists pursuing many roads of inquiry, even if the path to profit isn’t immediately clear. As Congress considers the president’s budget, we have a simple request: Please give America’s scientists the tools we need to succeed. Supporting NIH will position American scientists to continue the open-ended explorations at which they excel. Government funding is critical to encourage our scientists to pursue not just the challenges that are relatively easy, or obviously profitable, but the ones that are fiendishly hard —yet crucial. NIH funding is a down payment on discovery, the seed money to fund a critical step toward ending Alzheimer’s or curing cancer. What could be a bigger “win” for America than that?

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 1NC---R&D Tradeoff Turn

AI trades off with other federal R&D

Christie Lawrence & Sean Cordey 20, concurrent Master of Public Policy and Juris Doctorate 2024 candidate at Harvard Kennedy School and Stanford Law School and recipient of Harvard Kennedy School’s John F. Kennedy Fellowship. She previously worked as a management consultant for Oliver Wyman where she focused on regulatory risk and global data protection for financial institutions. She also worked at the Department of State. Her research with the Belfer Cyber Project includes AI policy, cybersecurity, US-Russian cyber relations, and US foreign policy in the digital age. a dual Master degree in International Affairs candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the University of St. Gallen and was a Belfer Cyber Security Project research assistant. He previously worked for the Swiss ministry of foreign affairs in Washington D.C. and currently works as a researcher for the Cyber Defense Project at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the ETH Zürich. The Cyber Project Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School. "The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence" August. //pipk

AI Funding: Although the Administration has pledged to increase (non-defense and defense) AI-related spending and absolute AI R&D budget numbers have increased, there are concerns that these numbers may not accurately reflect development. First, as AI-related expenditures have increased, the budget for all government R&D has decreased.158 For example, the President’s budget request for cuts in R&D at NSF, NIH, DOE, and other agencies, would force these government entities to prioritize AI R&D to the detriment of other, potentially equally useful R&D.159 Second, without full transparency about the procedures undertaken to re-classify projects as AI-related, it is not possible to fully credit the supposed increase in AI-related R&D to new AI projects. One analysis by Bloomberg Government of the Pentagon’s FY2020 budget found that approximately 27% of the legacy AI-related activities had not included any AI components or descriptors in the previous year budget.160, 161 Observers have suggested that the DoD was partaking in “AI-washing,” or exaggerating the increase in its AI-related R&D to meet government imposed objectives. 162 The US government will need to be careful that initiatives to enhance AI innovation do not foster a zero-sum competition between AI and other S&T research but instead foster genuine innovation.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 1NC---Defense

There’s not enough AI workers to solve---shortages means innovations won’t be effective

Stefano Costalli 21, Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Florence, Italy and Research Fellow of the Michael Nicholson Centre for Conflict and Cooperation, University of Essex. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. //pipk

A key requisite for all organizational innovations to occur and for Big Data analysis to be effective is the development and incorporation of a Big Data culture. Chief data officers and senior data-related leadership positions will acquire crucial importance in the analysis of information and in the actual decision-making process, but these positions require a special mix of talent and tools that are currently scarce in many large organizations, especially in the public sector. The organizations that are implementing big data analysis seem especially in need of ‘translators’ – professionals that can ensure effective communication between the Big Data analysis unit and other parts of the organization, where workers are not data scientist and may not be ready to work directly on complex models. However, organizations willing to use Big Data are also in need of real data scientists and analysts, because sophisticated techniques and data analysis tools eventually rely on talented humans who know how to manage the tools and interpret data. As a result, attracting new types of talented young workers and retaining them creating new career paths and opportunities will represent both an essential organizational innovation and an important challenge.

In fact, some members of the WG highlighted that it will not even be easy to find many workers with the appropriate knowledge and skills to perform the new tasks in old and complex organizations. It is possible to find computer scientists, but sometimes these individuals do not seem to fit well with large organizations whose main core business has not much to do with computer science. At the moment, it is even more difficult to find translators, since in principle these workers should be social scientists with an expertise in Big Data analysis, but most academic institutions are not ready to forge these profiles. For what concerns NATO and national armed forces, this educational task is not even performed by military academies, even though some experiments are emerging. The ideal profile would include technical awareness, quantitative analytical skills, broad vision, flexibility and open-mindedness – and this explains why it is not easy to produce it.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 1NC---Defense

Developing trust in AI is impossible---black box problem means true integration is impossible

Erik Lin-Greenberg 20, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. Texas National Security Review, Vol 3, Iss 2. Spring. "Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making" //pipk

AI can also strain alliance decision-making by fueling uncertainty about information and military actions. Unlike human analysts or military personnel who can be asked to explain and justify their findings or decisions, AI generally operates in a “black box.” 97 The neural networks that underpin many cutting-edge AI systems are opaque and offer little insight into how they arrive at their conclusions.98 These networks rely on deep learning, a process that passes information from large data sets through a hierarchy of digital nodes that analyze data inputs and make predictions using mathematical rules. As data flows through the neural network, the net makes internal adjustments to refine the quality of outputs. Researchers are often unable to explain how neural nets make these internal adjustments. Because of this lack of “explainability,” users of AI systems may have difficulty understanding failures and correcting errors.99

Policymakers have called for the development of more transparent AI systems, and researchers are working to develop explainable AI tools that peer inside the AI black box.100 Yet, many decision-makers remain uncomfortable with the uncertainty surrounding AI-enabled systems. The commander of the U.S. Air Force’s Air Combat Command, for instance, publicly explained that he was not yet willing to rely on AI programs to analyze the full-motion video collected by reconnaissance drones. He argued that although systems are improving, they are still unable to consistently provide accurate analysis.101 So long as the decisions and analysis of AI systems remain opaque, military commanders may be reluctant to trust AI-enabled systems. And if used, AI may contribute to the fog of war, rather than reduce it, making it difficult to make decisions using information delivered by AI technologies.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › NATO Advantage › 2NC---A2/AD Turn

Seriously, they’re totally uncoordinated and terrible

Jon Lindsay 15, Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies., Lindsay, Jon R. “The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction.” International Security, vol. 39, no. 3, Jan. 2015, pp. 7–47.

china’s fragmented cyber defenses The CCP’s obsession with political “information security” has so far not translated into effective technical “network security.”34 Cybercrime thrives amid a fragmented bureaucracy. Lax and uneven law enforcement emboldens Chinese cybercriminals to prey on domestic targets and creates a blatantly open online underground economy in China. Chinese cybercriminals target Chinese victims given the relatively low risk of domestic police action; by comparison, Eastern Europe cybercriminals tend to avoid hacking at home, instead focusing their predation abroad. Stolen usernames and passwords, ªnancial data, video game accounts, and hacker tools can be bought and sold openly on Chinese social media forums such as Baidu and Tencent QQ. By one estimate, cybercrime damage to the economy exceeded $830 million and affected more than 20 percent of users and websites in 2011 alone.35 Rampant cybercrime is a result, in part, of China’s below-average cyber defenses.36 Importantly, networks exposed to criminal predation are also vulnerable to foreign exploitation, because state intelligence services use some of the same technology and methods. Cyber policy coordination among defense, law enforcement, and regulatory agencies is a challenge in any state, but China’s lack of governmental transparency makes a hard problem worse. Prior to 2014, primary responsibility for cybersecurity policy resided in a subcommittee of the CCP State Informatization Leading Group (SILG), formed in 2001 to guide national information technology development or “informatization” (xinxihua) and chaired by the CCP premier. SILG’s early focus on cybersecurity was eclipsed by the Chinese elite’s preoccupation with the 2008 Beijing Olympics and ªnancial crisis, leaving regulatory agencies and newly funded companies to their own devices. SILG updated its guidance criteria in 2012 to reºect renewed concerns about critical infrastructure and privacy, but elite focus remained sporadic. In February 2014, amid tension stemming from the Snowden leaks, the CCP announced the creation of the Cybersecurity and Informatization Leading Group (CILG), chaired by Xi Jinping (with twenty-one other Politburo or ministeriallevel ofªcials on the roster).37 The CILG aids Xi’s efforts to tighten Party discipline and respond to foreign cyber threats.38 Greater attention by China’s elite via CILG may improve cyber policy coordination, but prior experience does not bode well. In China, as in other states, a large and diverse set of public and private entities has a stake in the making of cyber policy, yet the steady stream of cyber friction does not add up to sustained elite pressure for reform. Policy elites with more pressing priorities usually do not focus consistent pressure on a heterogeneous set of bureaucratic interests.39 Numerous agencies under the State Council are responsible for the implementation of policy and the regulation of information technology in China. The People’s Liberation Army, subordinate to the CCP rather than the state, has considerable military and intelligence cyber capacity as well as civilian regulatory responsibility (e.g., in the transportation sector). Provincial governments, furthermore, enjoy substantial de facto autonomy and compete ªercely for patronage. In response to a glut of funding for SILG initiatives, expenditure in China’s information security industry grew from $527 million in 2003 to $2.8 billion in 2011. In the assessment of one industry observer, however, this expansion was marred by a “lack of overall planning,” “decentralization of decisionmaking power,” and a “lack of adequate communication.”40 As in other areas of Chinese policy, the implementation of cybersecurity is disjointed functionally and regionally, rife with rent seeking by bureaucratic agencies and enterprises. Haphazard interagency cooperation and industrial regulation create a permissive environment for cybercrime, which saps the potential of e-commerce and user trust in online services.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › NATO Advantage › 2NC---A2/AD Turn

We should make China as dependent on cyber as possible. They can’t punish us for it --- they haven’t practiced, hacking the US military is harder than it seems, and China’s bad at it

Jon Lindsay 15, Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies., Lindsay, Jon R. “The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction.” International Security, vol. 39, no. 3, Jan. 2015, pp. 7–47.

Military Threats of Cyberwarfare Just as the social context of exploitation and adversary counteraction combine to blunt the potential of cyber espionage, similar challenges in operational weaponization and strategic interaction constrain the potency of more disruptive cyber threats. Yet conventional wisdom holds that a multitude of technical factors favor offense over defense in cyberspace and that the difªculty of attribution undermines the credibility of deterrence; therefore, weaker actors can attack the control systems of superior adversaries to achieve levels of physical disruption possible previously only through kinetic bombing. As President Obama writes in a Wall Street Journal opinion article, “Computer systems in critical sectors of our economy—including the nuclear and chemical industries—are being increasingly targeted. . . . In a future conºict, an adversary unable to match our military supremacy on the battleªeld might seek to exploit our computer vulnerabilities here at home. Taking down vital banking systems could trigger a ªnancial crisis. The lack of clean water or functioning hospitals could spark a public health emergency. And as we’ve seen in past blackouts, the loss of electricity can bring businesses, cities and entire regions to a standstill.”74 A number of former U.S. government ofªcials have even likened the advent of cyberweapons to a new atomic age and have wondered why a catastrophic cyberattack has not yet occurred.75 Chinese military doctrine similarly envisions cyberwarfare to be a low-cost, long-range, highly effective counter to a superior adversary.76 There are reasons, however, to doubt the PLA’s ability to implement these ideas or to defend itself against cyberattacks launched by a superior adversary. chinese cyber doctrine The aggressive tenor of Chinese writings on cyberwarfare and the copious APT activity described above are the major sources of evidence that Western analysts usually offer to characterize the Chinese cyberwarfare threat. Ofªcial Chinese military doctrine and sources in Chinese military professional literature consistently describe cyberwarfare as a revolutionary development in military affairs. Senior Col. Ye Zheng, author of books published by the Chinese Academy of Military Science entitled On Informationalized Warfare and Information Warfare Course, writes, “Although the main melody of the times—peace and development—is still playing strongly, the dark spirit of network warfare is lurking in the sky above humanity.” This rhetorical construction implies that the cyber revolution undermines Deng Xiaoping’s diagnosis of the largely stable nature of the international environment. Ye singles out the United States for experimenting with cyberweapons such as Stuxnet (used in the attack on Iranian enrichment infrastructure) and hints at the prospect of more to come: “[J]ust as nuclear war was the strategic warfare of the industrial age, network warfare will be the strategic warfare of the information age. It has already become a ‘top level’ form of operation that is highly destructive and relates to national security and survival.”77 He further describes cyberwarfare as an integral force multiplier as well as an instrument for achieving more strategic effects such as paralyzing another state’s economy or exerting psychological inºuence on entire populations. Similarly, an author in the PLA’s Science of Information Operations writes that cyber strikes “can seek to achieve partial or large-scale paralysis of enemy systems. As soon as a virus enters the enemy’s command and control system, it will have tremendous destructive impact. . . . Therefore computer network war is an important means for paralyzing the enemy in wars of the future.”78 The PLA recognizes the existence of an “information domain” (xinxi lingyu), although as with “information security” it encompasses a wider range of subcategories to include computer network and electronic warfare as well as psychological and intelligence operations.79 Information operations are con-sidered so vital for the limited high-technology wars the PLA envisions ªghting that information supremacy is thought to be a precondition for gaining military supremacy anywhere else. The PLA’s general strategic principle of “active defense” stresses offensive operations to seize the initiative. The authoritative Science of Campaigns thus states that the beginning of a network war will determine its outcome: “Whoever strikes ªrst prevails.”80 PLA strategists assert that the vital targets of an advanced technology adversary are its information systems, and by attacking them covertly from beyond the range of enemy weapon systems it is possible to cause paralysis of the enemy’s organization, strategic decisionmaking, and national economy. As an important article by Gen. Dai Qingmin on the concept of “integrated network-electronic warfare” points out, “Information operations in high-tech warfare are, to a very great extent, a struggle which revolves around the destruction and the protection of C4ISR systems.”81 Chinese writers argue that a relatively weaker PLA can achieve information superiority against a stronger military only as long as it is able to launch paralyzing strikes at the beginning of a conºict. The Chinese perspective on using information technology to improve awareness, synchronization, and precision is inspired by 1990s-era American writings about the “revolution in military affairs [RMA].”82 RMA ideas were themselves inspired by Soviet strategists, and the common Marxist-Leninist belief that “technology determines tactics” surely inºuences PLA thought.83 Yet the most recent and relevant inspiration comes from Chinese study of U.S. operations in Iraq and the Balkans and analysis of the U.S. military’s heavy dependence on communication and logistics networks.84 In particular, the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade prompted President Jiang Zemin to direct the PLA to develop so-called assassin’s mace (shashoujian) weapons to solve the problems of “seeing far, striking far, and striking accurately.” Jiang reasoned that “what the enemy is most fearful of is what we should be developing.”85 As the consummately “network centric” U.S. military leverages data links to reduce its force size—substituting information for mass in the RMAformula for success—those links become vulnerabilities and thus tempting targets for the PLA. Insofar as the cyber revolution thesis is inºuential in U.S. strategic planning, moreover, the specter of PLA cyberwarfare may indeed have some success in creating fear and encouraging restraint in U.S. planning. Remarkably, however, there appears to be little mention in Chinese writings of the considerable controversy over the RMA in Western strategic literature or considerations of the downsides of the RMA.86 The United States has fought several regional wars in recent decades and in the process has experienced no small amount of confusion and the “fog of war” as computer systems break down unexpectedly, adversaries refuse to conform to the assumptions of network-centric doctrine, and service members resort to ad hoc improvisations to muddle through. The PLA, by contrast, has not had the opportunity to test its ideas of “integrated network electronic warfare” in combat, and realistic command and control training is notoriously hard to achieve absent interaction with a real enemy and complex environment. The following review of Chinese cyber capabilities suggests that similar skepticism is also warranted for Chinese cyberwarfare. chinese cyber capabilities Although Chinese writers emphasize the revolutionary potential of cyberwarfare, episodes of Chinese aggression in cyberspace have been more mundane. China’s “hacker wars” ºare up during episodes of tension in Chinese foreign relations, as between Taiwan and the mainland between 1996 and 2004 in the wake of Taiwanese elections, between the United States and China following the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 EP-3 spy plane collision, and between China and Japan throughout the past decade during controversies involving the Yasukuni Shrine and the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands.87 Nationalist hackers (as distinguished from PLA units) deface foreign websites and launch temporary distributed denial of service attacks. Nationalist online outbursts may take place with the tacit consent or encouragement of the Chinese government, yet patriotic “hacktivism” is essentially just another form of symbolic protest. There has been speculation that PLA “cyber militias” associated with Chinese universities maintain a more potent reserve capability, but one study of open sources suggests that they are oriented toward more mundane educational and network defense activities.88 The majority of known PLA cyber operations are CNE for intelligence rather than computer network attacks to cause disruption.89 Nevertheless, many analysts worry that CNE is “only a keystroke away” from CNA, thereby generating dangerous ambiguity between intelligence gathering and offensive operations. Intrusion techniques developed for industrial espionage might be used to plant more dangerous payload code into sensitive controllers or constitute reconnaissance for future assaults. Chinese probing of critical infrastructure such as the U.S. power grid is aggressive, to be sure, so a latent potential for the PLA to convert CNE into CNA cannot be discounted.90 The discovery of access vectors and exploitable vulnerabilities, however, is only the first step to achieving effective reconnaissance of a target, and effective reconnaissance is just one step toward planning and controlling a physically disruptive attack. The most signiªcant historical case of kinetic CNA to date, the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s enrichment infrastructure, suggests that painstaking planning, careful rehearsals, and sophisticated intelligence are required to control a co- vert disruption.91 The U.S. military also considered using cyberattacks to take down Libya’s air defense system in 2011, but reportedly it would have taken too long to develop the option.92 The latency between CNE and CNA is more complicated than generally assumed.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › NATO Advantage › 2NC---AT: Miscalc

And, no miscalc- cyber attacks will stay below the threshold of causing violence

Jon Lindsay 15, Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies., Lindsay, Jon R. “The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction.” International Security, vol. 39, no. 3, Jan. 2015, pp. 7–47.

Exaggerated fears about the paralysis [deactivation] of digital infrastructure and growing concerns over competitive advantage exacerbate the spiral of mistrust. Closer consideration of domestic factors within China and China’s strategic interac- tion with the United States reveals a more complicated yet less worrisome situation. This article argues that for every type of purported Chinese cyber threat, there are also serious Chinese vulnerabilities and Western strengths that reinforce the political status quo. Cyberwar between the United States and China, much like U.S.-China conventional war, is highly unlikely. Nevertheless, the economically driven proliferation of information technology enables numerous instances of friction to emerge below the threshold of violence. From a technical perspective, cyber operations are often thought to be inexpensive and effective, but there are underappreciated institutional costs involved in their employment. Moreover, even if actors can overcome the operational barriers associated with ambitious cyber penetrations, they still have incentives to moderate the intensity of their exploitation in order to preserve the benefits that make exploitation worthwhile in the first place. This logic culminates in a relentlessly irritating but indefinitely tolerable stability in the cyber domain. China and the United States can look forward to chronic and ambiguous intelligence-counterintelligence contests across their networks, even as the internet facilitates productive exchange between them.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › NATO Advantage › 2NC---No Escalation

There are diminishing returns on cyber escalation because stronger attacks are more likely to provoke disconnection.

Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke 14, Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, AND Erik Gartzke is Professor and Director of cPASS at the Department of Political Science @ UCSD, Lindsay, Jon R., and Erik Gartzke. “Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited.” The Power to Hurt: Coercion in the Modern World, Oct. 2014.

The combination of cross domain deterrence and voluntary connection to the internet gives rise to a variant of the classic stability-instability paradox. In Glenn Snyder’s original articulation of the paradox, mutually assured destruction could deter nuclear war. However, MAD was not credible for, and might even encourage, limited conventional war.56 Or as Robert Jervis puts it, “To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.”57 Cyber capacity is a poor substitute for nuclear weapons, myths of paralysis notwithstanding, yet there is a similar logic constraining the distributions of harms which are possible via information technology. To extend this logic to the cyber domain, there are a variety of deterrent mechanisms contain the most disruptive types of cyber attacks yet fail to contain, and even enable, a wide variety of online espionage, subversion, symbolic protest, and criminal predation. In cyberspace we observe a rather stable damage contest (i.e., no “paralysis” and limited “disruption”) but a very unstable intelligence-counterintelligence contest (lots of “espionage” and “fraud” vying with efforts at “control” and “mobilization”). Thus the actors that have the ability to carry out highly destructive cyber attacks (mainly state actors for now) lack the motivation to attack; by contrast, these same actors as well as many different actors have both the ability and motivation to inflict irritant aggression with little fear of suffering consequences By and large, cyber options fill out the lower end of the conflict spectrum where deterrence is not as credible or reliable. The very few cases of physically disruptive cyber attack we do observe—mainly powerful states conducting covert action or battlefield support operations against militarily weaker opponents—have notably involved stronger actors who not only have the capacity to plan and conduct a sophisticated attack but also have the ability to deter retaliation against their use of cyber attack. This cyber variant of the stability-instability paradox has a slightly different logic, however. In the nuclear realm, actors cannot disconnect from the threatened harm, and this is what makes the threatened destruction both mutual and assured. When there are many missiles with many warheads, the chance of intercepting them on the ground through a disarming counterforce strike or in the air through ballistic missile defense with any confidence becomes vanishingly small. Not so in cyberspace, where connection to the internet or acceptance of connections through it is voluntary. There is “no forced entry in cyberspace” in Libicki’s phrase, and so the hundredth cyber attack against a closed vulnerability is as ineffective as the first. Attackers thus rely on deception to exploit vulnerabilities and ensure that they stay open. However, offensive deception can fail in the “fog of cyberwar” and defenders can be deceptive as well, both of which are more likely against high-reward targets (where cross domain deterrence also more credible). The need to preserve internet connections to facilitate ongoing and future deception as well as the need to preserve stealth to avoid the consequences of getting caught imposes discipline on attackers. Actors cannot enjoy the substantial benefits of interconnection without accepting some risk of exploitation (hacking to spy) and attack (hacking to disrupt). Thus the successful “lockout” of the internet, with advantage accruing exclusively to one political group or another, is not realistic. Moreover, because these harms share similar techniques, the observed abundance 39 of the former represents a latent potential for the later. The latent escalatory potential of even minor irritants leads to rampant fears of unrestrained catastrophe, to be sure. Yet this latent potential is difficult to harness for targeted coercion because the threat is self-effacing. Declared cyber threats that highlight the vulnerability to be exploited are readily mitigated. Instead, the ineradicable threat of cyber catastrophe (ineradicable as long as the internet continues to be useful) creates a general if diffuse deterrent effect among all parties who value their connection to the internet. No one who wants to make money on the internet really wants to have a cyberwar, and this includes states as well as criminals. Which types of actors are most able to benefit through internet coercion and which are most vulnerable to coercion? Large powers like the U.S. are highly dependent on the internet but also highly skilled at inflicting harm, both through cyber and traditional military force. Poor powers across the digital divide may have little vulnerability at all, while medium powers may have vulnerability but lack a range of forces to deter attacks. This might imply a “curvature” to the utility of cyber coercion. Big-capable countries are vulnerable to cyber harm but can deter through other military instruments. Poor states are not vulnerable. It may be the prosperous small or digitally developing who are in trouble, since they cannot credibly deter and have high dependence on the internet. The information revolution is often thought to be a boon to non-state actors, and indeed it is, but mainly in the irritant class of cyber operations. Moreover, the increasing ubiquity and sophistication of information technologies can be expected to have something of a democratizing effect on intelligence and counterintelligence techniques whereby firms and citizens will have access to and be concerned about the types of things that were historically the purview of obscure state intelligence agencies. However, it would be a mistake to use the increasing ferment of low-intensity information contests to infer the shape of higher 40 intensity activity. On the contrary, the traditional logic of war will continue to dominate the expression of cyber aggression. Because threatened internet harms depend on voluntary connections in the first place, and as many actors have alternative means to inflict (cross domain) harm in retaliation, the coercive utility of cyberspace is actually somewhat limited. At the same time an ever increasing variety irritants and more temperamental adjuncts becomes available for global political interaction. The “net” result is that opponents have strong incentives to impose costs via the internet but also to keep those costs low enough to preserve interconnection and avoid retaliation. Therefore, contests in damage will remain relatively stable while contests in intelligence will be increasingly unstable. The human-built world is becoming more complex, to be sure, but it is not necessarily more dangerous. As long as it is desirable to connect to the internet tomorrow, there will be only limited harm via the internet today.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › NATO Advantage › 2NC---No Escalation

Attacks are too hard

Rebecca Slayton 17, Assistant Professor at Cornell University with a joint appointment in the Science and Technology Studies Department and the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies., Slayton, Rebecca. “What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Conceptions, Causes, and Assessment.” International Security, vol. 41, no. 3, Jan. 2017, pp. 72–109.

Conclusion This article has shown that widespread claims about the offense dominance of cyberspace are fundamentally flawed; the offense-defense balance can be understood only in the context of specific adversaries with distinctive goals and levels of capability in managing complex information technology. In many cases, particularly those in which the goal is to achieve complex kinetic effects, cyber operations may well be less costly for the defense than the offense I have presented this argument in four parts. First, I have argued that conceptions of offensive advantage need to include valuations of the goals as well as the costs of cyber operations. The goals of cyber operations are much more varied than are battles for territory and may include propaganda, espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage, in addition to assistance with territorial military operations. This article has focused on the relative utility of offense and defense—the value of the goals of offense less the costs of offense, and the value of the goals of defense less the costs of defense. A more complete analysis would consider expected utility—that is, it would include the probability of success for offense or defense as a function of offensive and defensive expenditures. The statistics for empirically predicting the probability of success for offense or defense under various conditions do not exist, however, and there is reason to doubt that such calculations will reach a useful level of accuracy or precision. Nonetheless, decisionmakers’ beliefs about the probability of success will shape behavior, and thus both theoretical and empirical analysis of the factors that make cyber offense and defense costly and valuable is crucial to informing policy. Second, I have theorized what makes cyber operations costly and valuable, arguing that the resulting offense-defense balance is a characteristic not of cyberspace, but rather of the relationship between two adversaries; the balance is not systemic, but dyadic. Although software does have an essential characteristic—arbitrary complexity—which provides the offense with many vulnerabilities to exploit, technology alone does not determine the balance. Nor is technology one of several independent factors to be summed up in a net assessment. Instead, it is the processes that govern the interactions between skilled users and technology that determine an organization’s readiness for offense or defense. Research on the capability maturity model shows that the cost of managing complex software decreases as the maturity of an organization’s processes increases. Nonetheless, cost grows with complexity. The skills and organizational capabilities needed for offense and defense are very similar, but offensive capabilities often require less coordination and therefore are less costly than defensive operations. Nonetheless, an offensive operation that aims to precisely control a complex system is much more difficult than one that merely aims to disrupt the system, and may be costlier than defense. Additionally, the advantages that complex software offers attackers diminish rapidly at the “edges” of cyberspace, where computers are used to control physical systems, because knowledge of the physical systems is needed to exercise careful control. Such knowledge is often tacit and therefore unavailable through cyber espionage. Thus, although information technology offers unprecedented efªciency for espionage, it is not the most cost-effective means of destruction. Cyberweapons are primarily advantageous for their covertness, and they become expensive when physical systems are the target.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › NATO Advantage › 2NC---No Escalation

And, actors self-deter --- cyber is unique because defenders have the absolute defense of disconnecting. If attacks get strong enough, the internet itself becomes a bad deal for the defender, which also screws the attacker by denying lower-level cyber coercion and espionage

Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke 14, Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, AND Erik Gartzke is Professor and Director of cPASS at the Department of Political Science @ UCSD, Lindsay, Jon R., and Erik Gartzke. “Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited.” The Power to Hurt: Coercion in the Modern World, Oct. 2014.

Perhaps the simplest form of cross domain response to cyber threats is to forgo the use of the cyber domain altogether. While it is hard if not impossible to limit exposure to nuclear weapons and even a determined conventional assault, the risk of cyber attack can be completely eliminated by disconnection from digital networks. The internet is an artificial environment and connection to it is voluntary. Individuals, organizations, and states retain the ability to unplug completely, limit their online transactions, or erect various barriers to connection. Obviously disconnection is not very feasible commercially, socially, and militarily today, but this is more of an indicator of how positive the benefits of interconnection are compared to the perceived risks. If the risks were perceived as extreme, then firms and states could go back to making a living as they did before 1991 (when WWW went public). This is a cross-domain threat because it entails exiting the cyber domain altogether to leverage more traditional economic and military transactions. The threat of disconnection follows from the more general logic of international organizations, where contracts must be self-enforcing.44 On the internet as in institutions, ties among egoistic actors under anarchy must be mutually beneficial. If the internet is a bad deal for actors, they can throw up boundaries or exit cyberspace altogether. If repeated exposure to adversarial exploitation causes states to lose more than they gain from being online, then they can undermine the attacker’s very means for accessing the victim. The threat of voluntary disconnection is especially relevant for repeated interactions, or repeated exploitation, rather than a one-shot “bolt from the blue” cyber attack (which is better countered with cross-domain retaliation). The threat of disconnection is implicit in the voluntary nature of connection to the internet, and the potential loss of the ability to make future attacks exercises a deterrent effect on attacks in the present. An aggressor who does not want to lose the cyber adjuncts for espionage and disruption it has invested so much in developing will show restraint in their employment. This does not mean that coercion cannot take place online, but it is bounded by excess value. One implication is that the countries that can be most coerced on the internet will be those that have the most to lose by leaving it.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › NATO Advantage › 2NC---No Escalation

Their ev fearmongers

Valeriano and Maness 15 – co-authors of Cyber War versus Cyber Realities, AND *Senior Lecturer in Social and Political Sciences at the University of Glasgow, AND **Visiting Fellow of Security and Resilience Studies at Northeastern University (Brandon and Ryan C., The Coming Cyberpeace: The Normative Argument Against Cyberwarfare, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-05-13/coming-cyberpeace)

The era of cyberconflict is upon us; at least, experts seem to accept that cyberattacks are the new normal. In fact, however, evidence suggests that cyberconflict is not as prevalent as many believe. Likewise, the severity of individual cyber events is not increasing, even if the frequency of overall attacks has risen. And an emerging norm against the use of severe state-based cybertactics contradicts fear-mongering news reports about a coming cyberapocalypse. The few isolated incidents of successful state-based cyberattacks do not a trend make. Rather, what we are seeing is cyberespionage and probes, not cyberwarfare. Meanwhile, the international consensus has stabilized around a number of limited acceptable uses of cybertechnology—one that prohibits any dangerous use of force. Despite fears of a boom in cyberwarfare, there have been no major or dangerous hacks between countries. The closest any states have come to such events occurred when Russia attacked Georgian news outlets and websites in 2008; when Russian forces shut down banking, government, and news websites in Estonia in 2007; when Iran attacked the Saudi Arabian oil firm Saudi Aramco with the Shamoon virus in 2012; and when the United States attempted to sabotage Iran’s nuclear power systems from 2007 to 2011 through the Stuxnet worm. The attack on Sony from North Korea is just the latest overhyped cyberattack to date, as the corporate giant has recovered its lost revenues from the attack and its networks are arguably more resilient as a result. Even these are more probes into vulnerabilities than full attacks. Russia’s aggressions show that Moscow is willing to use cyberwarfare for disruption and propaganda, but not to inflict injuries or lasting infrastructural damage. The Shamoon incident allowed Iran to punish Saudi Arabia for its alliance with the United States as Tehran faced increased sanctions; the attack destroyed files on Saudi Aramco’s computer network but failed to do any lasting damage. The Stuxnet incident also failed to create any lasting damage, as Tehran put more centrifuges online to compensate for virus-based losses and strengthened holes in their system. Further, these supposedly successful cases of cyberattacks are balanced by many more examples of unsuccessful ones. If the future of cyberconflict looks like today, the international community must reassess the severity of the threat. Cyberattacks have demonstrated themselves to be more smoke than fire. This is not to suggest that incidents are on the decline, however. Distributed denial-of-service attacks and infiltrations increase by the minute—every major organization is probed constantly, but only for weaknesses or new infiltration methods for potential use in the future. Probes and pokes do not destabilize states or change trends within international politics. Even common cyber actions have little effect on levels of cooperation and conflict between states.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › NATO Advantage › 2NC---Prevents Escalation

Cyber-warfare is good—it prevent kinetic conflict and keeps war cool

Arquilla 12 - John Arquilla earned his degrees in international relations from Rosary College (BA 1975) and Stanford University (MA 1989, PhD 1991). He has been teaching in the special operations program at the United States Naval Postgraduate School since 1993. He also serves as chairman of the Defense Analysis department. Dr. Arquilla’s teaching interests revolve around the history of irregular warfare, terrorism, and the implications of the information age for society and security. (“Cool War,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/15/cool-war/ 6/15/2012)

But now, somehow, it seems that war may no longer seem so terrible. How has this come to pass? The culprit is the bits and bytes that are the principal weapons of cyberwar. It is now possible to intervene swiftly and secretly anywhere in the world, riding the rails of the global information infrastructure to strike at one’s enemies. Such attacks can be mounted with little risk of discovery, as the veil of anonymity that cloaks the virtual domain is hard to pierce. And even when "outed," a lack of convincing forensic evidence to finger the perpetrator makes heated denials hard to disprove. Beyond secrecy, there is also great economy. The most sophisticated cyber weaponry can be crafted and deployed at a tiny fraction of the cost of other forms of intervention. No aircraft carriers needed, no "boots on the ground" to be shot at or blown up by IEDs. Instead, there is just a dimly lit war room where hacker-soldiers click for their country, and the hum of air conditioners keeping powerful computers from overheating. Cool room, cool war. The early returns seem to suggest the great efficacy of this new mode of conflict. For example, the Stuxnet worm, a complex program of ones and zeros, infected a sizeable proportion of Iran’s several thousand centrifuges, commanding them to run at higher and higher speeds until they broke. All this went on while Iranian technicians tried fruitlessly to stop the attack. The result: a serious disruption of Tehran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities — and possibly of a secret proliferation program. The sabotage occurred without any missile strikes or commando raids. And, for now, without any open acknowledgment of responsibility, although reporters and others have pointed their fingers at the United States and Israel. It is loose lips in high places, not sophisticated "back hacking," that seem to have divulged the secret of Stuxnet. Another example of the looming cool war is the malicious software known as Flame, which sought information via cyber snooping from target countries in the Middle East. The code that comprises it seems to make the point that we no longer need physical agents in place if we can now rely on artificially intelligent agents to dredge up the deepest secrets. There will be no new John le Carré to chronicle this era’s spies. Not when the closest thing to George Smiley is a few lines of source code. Beyond Stuxnet-like "cybotage" and software-driven spying, the coming cool war might also influence whether some traditional wars are even going to break out. The good news is that a preemptive cyber attack on the military command-and-control systems of two countries getting ready to fight a "real war" might give each side pause before going into the fight. In this instance, the hackers mounting such attacks should probably publicize their actions — perhaps even under U.N. auspices — lest the disputants think it was the enemy who had crippled their forces, deepening their mutual antagonism. There are no doubt some risks in having a third party mount a preemptive cyberattack of this sort — but the risks are acceptable when weighed against the chance of averting a bloody war. The other potential upside of cool war capabilities, in addition to tamping down military crises between nations, would lie in multilateral tracking of transnational criminal and terrorist networks. These villains thrive in the virtual wilderness of cyberspace, and it is about time that they were detected, tracked, and disrupted. Think of Interpol, or an international intelligence alliance, using something like Flame to get inside a drug cartel’s communications network. Or al Qaeda’s. The potential for illuminating these dark networks — and bringing them to justice — is great and should not be forgone. On balance, it seems that cyberwar capabilities have real potential to deal with some of the world’s more pernicious problems, from crime and terrorism to nuclear proliferation. In stark contrast to pitched battles that would regularly claim thousands of young soldiers’ lives during Robert E. Lee’s time, the very nature of conflict may come to be reshaped along more humane lines of operations. War, in this sense, might be "made better" — think disruption rather than destruction. More decisive, but at the same time less lethal. Against these potential benefits, one must also weigh the key downside of an era of cyber conflict: the outbreak of a Hobbesian "war of all against all." This possibility was first considered back in 1979 by the great science fiction writer Frederik Pohl, whose dystopian The Cool War — a descriptor that might end up fitting our world all too well — envisioned a time when virtually every nation fielded small teams of hit men and women. Their repertoires included launching computer viruses to crash stock markets and other nefarious, disruptive capabilities. In Pohl’s novel, the world system is battered by waves of social distrust, economic malaise and environmental degradation. Only the rebellion of a few cool warriors – some, but not all, were hacker types — at the end, offers a glimmer of hope for a way out and a way ahead. The question that confronts us today is whether to yield to the attractions of cyberwar. We have come out of one of mankind’s bloodiest centuries, and are already in an era in which wars are smaller — if still quite nasty. Now we have the chance to make even these conflicts less lethal. And in reality, there may be no option. Once the first network or nation takes this path — as some observers believe the United States is doing — others will surely follow, starting a new arms race, this time not in weaponry, but in clandestine and devastating programs like Stuxnet and the Flame virus. It is a curious irony that the United States, a power traditionally reluctant to go to war but furious in its waging, is now seemingly shifting gears. It is becoming a nation with the capability to go to war easily, while at the same time far less ferociously. Is this an improvement? Perhaps. Delaying Iranian proliferation with bits and bytes seems far superior to the costs and risks that would be incurred, and the human suffering inflicted, by trying to achieve such effects with bombs and bullets. But looking ahead, how will Americans respond when others begin to employ cyber means to achieve their ends, perhaps even by attacking us? After all, Stuxnet escaped from that Iranian facility into the wild, and is certainly being studied, reverse engineered and tweaked by many around the world. No country may be foolish enough to engage the incomparable U.S. military in open battle, but we seem like fairly easy pickings to the computer mice that may soon roar. Despite all these concerns, though, a cool war world will be a better place to live in than its Cold War predecessor. Yes, conflict will continue in the years to come, but it will morph in ways that make our self-destruction as a civilization less likely — even if it means living with occasional disruptions to vulnerable high-tech systems. The bargain made when "cyber" and "war" came together need not turn out to be Faustian. This story can still have a happy ending: As war becomes "cooler," mankind’s [humankind’s] future may edge a bit closer to the utopian end that all of us, secretly or not so secretly, truly desire.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › NATO Advantage › 2NC---Prevents Escalation

Cyberwar reduces physical war

Thomas Rid 13, THOMAS RID is a Reader in War Studies at King’s College London, 12-1-2013, "Cyberwar and Peace," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-10-15/cyberwar-and-peace

Cyberwar Is Coming!” declared the title of a seminal 1993 article by the RAND Corporation analysts John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, who argued that the nascent Internet would fundamentally transform warfare. The idea seemed fanciful at the time, and it took more than a decade for members of the U.S. national security establishment to catch on. But once they did, a chorus of voices resounded in the mass media, proclaiming the dawn of the era of cyberwar and warning of its terrifying potential. In February 2011, then CIA Director Leon Panetta warned Congress that “the next Pearl Harbor could very well be a cyberattack.” And in late 2012, Mike McConnell, who had served as director of national intelligence under President George W. Bush, warned darkly that the United States could not “wait for the cyber equivalent of the collapse of the World Trade Centers.” Yet the hype about everything “cyber” has obscured three basic truths: cyberwar has never happened in the past, it is not occurring in the present, and it is highly unlikely that it will disturb the future. Indeed, rather than heralding a new era of violent conflict, so far the cyber-era has been defined by the opposite trend: a computer-enabled assault on political violence. Cyberattacks diminish rather than accentuate political violence by making it easier for states, groups, and individuals to engage in two kinds of aggression that do not rise to the level of war: sabotage and espionage. Weaponized computer code and computer-based sabotage operations make it possible to carry out highly targeted attacks on an adversary’s technical systems without directly and physically harming human operators and managers. Computer-assisted attacks make it possible to steal data without placing operatives in dangerous environments, thus reducing the level of personal and political risk. These developments represent important changes in the nature of political violence, but they also highlight limitations inherent in cyberweapons that greatly curtail the utility of cyberattacks. Those limitations seem to make it difficult to use cyberweapons for anything other than one-off, hard-to-repeat sabotage operations of questionable strategic value that might even prove counterproductive. And cyber-espionage often requires improving traditional spycraft techniques and relying even more heavily on human intelligence. Taken together, these factors call into question the very idea that computer-assisted attacks will usher in a profoundly new era. THE THIN CASE FOR CYBERWAR One reason discussions about cyberwar have become disconnected from reality is that many commentators fail to grapple with a basic question: What counts as warfare? Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist, still offers the most concise answer to that question. Clausewitz identified three main criteria that any aggressive or defensive action must meet in order to qualify as an act of war. First, and most simply, all acts of war are violent or potentially violent. Second, an act of war is always instrumental: physical violence or the threat of force is a means to compel the enemy to accept the attacker’s will. Finally, to qualify as an act of war, an attack must have some kind of political goal or intention. For that reason, acts of war must be attributable to one side at some point during a confrontation. No known cyberattack has met all three of those criteria; indeed, very few have met even one. Consider three incidents that today’s Cassandras frequently point to as evidence that warfare has entered a new era. The first of these, a massive pipeline explosion in the Soviet Union in June 1982, would count as the most violent cyberattack to date -- if it actually happened. According to a 2004 book by Thomas Reed, who was serving as a staffer on the U.S. National Security Council at the time of the alleged incident, a covert U.S. operation used rigged software to engineer a massive explosion in the Urengoy-Surgut-Chelyabinsk pipeline, which connected Siberian natural gas fields to Europe. Reed claims that the CIA managed to insert malicious code into the software that controlled the pipeline’s pumps and valves. The rigged valves supposedly resulted in an explosion that, according to Reed, the U.S. Air Force rated at three kilotons, equivalent to the force of a small nuclear device. But aside from Reed’s account, there is hardly any evidence to prove that any such thing happened, and plenty of reasons to doubt that it did. After Reed published his book, Vasily Pchelintsev, who was reportedly the KGB head of the region when the explosion was supposed to have taken place, denied the story. He surmised that Reed might have been referring to a harmless explosion that happened not in June but on a warm April day that year, caused by pipes shifting in the thawing ground of the tundra. Moreover, no Soviet media reports from 1982 confirm that Reed’s explosion took place, although the Soviet media regularly reported on accidents and pipeline explosions at the time. What’s more, given the technologies available to the United States at that time, it would have been very difficult to hide malicious software of the kind Reed describes from its Soviet users. Another incident often related by promoters of the concept of cyberwar occurred in Estonia in 2007. After Estonian authorities decided to move a Soviet-era memorial to Russian soldiers who died in World War II from the center of Tallinn to the city’s outskirts, outraged Russian-speaking Estonians launched violent riots that threatened to paralyze the city. The riots were accompanied by cyber-assaults, which began as crude disruptions but became more sophisticated after a few days, culminating in a “denial of service” attack. Hackers hijacked up to 85,000 computers and used them to overwhelm 58 Estonian websites, including that of the country’s largest bank, which the attacks rendered useless for a few hours. Estonia’s defense minister and the country’s top diplomat pointed their fingers at the Kremlin, but they were unable to muster any evidence. For its part, the Russian government denied any involvement. In the wake of the incident, Estonia’s prime minister, Andrus Ansip, likened the attack to an act of war. “What’s the difference between a blockade of harbors or airports of sovereign states and the blockade of government institutions and newspaper websites?” he asked. It was a rhetorical question, but the answer is important: unlike a naval blockade, the disruption of websites is not violent -- indeed, not even potentially violent. The choice of targets also seemed unconnected to the presumed tactical objective of forcing the government to reverse its decision on the memorial. And unlike a naval blockade, the attacks remained anonymous, without political backing, and thus unattributable. A year later, a third major event entered the cyber-Cassandras’ repertoire. In August 2008, the Georgian army attacked separatists in the province of South Ossetia. Russia backed the separatists and responded militarily. The prior month, in what might have been the first time that an independent cyberattack was launched in coordination with a conventional military operation, unknown attackers had begun a campaign of cyber-sabotage, defacing prominent Georgian websites, including those of the country’s national bank and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and launching denial-of-service attacks against the websites of Georgia’s parliament, its largest commercial bank, and Georgian news outlets. The Georgian government blamed the Kremlin, just as the Estonians had done. But Russia again denied sponsoring the attacks, and a NATO investigation later found “no conclusive proof” of who had carried them out. The attack set off increasingly familiar alarm bells within American media and the U.S. national security establishment. “The July attack may have been a dress rehearsal for an all-out cyberwar,” an article in The New York Times declared. Richard Clarke, a former White House cybersecurity czar, warned that the worst was yet to come: the Georgian attack did not “begin to reveal what the Russian military and intelligence agencies could do if they were truly on the attack in cyberspace.” Yet the actual effects of these nonviolent events were quite mild. The main damage they caused was to the Georgian government’s ability to communicate internationally, thus preventing it from getting out its message at a critical moment. But even if the attackers intended this effect, it proved short-lived: within four days after military confrontations had begun in earnest, the Georgian Foreign Ministry had set up an account on Google’s blog-hosting service. This move helped the government keep open a channel to the public and the news media. What the Internet took away, the Internet returned. ISTOCK.COM / -ANTONIO- Overblown: keyboard as grenade. IN CODE WE TRUST? Perhaps the strongest evidence presented by advocates of the concept of cyberwar is the Stuxnet operation launched against Iran by the United States and Israel. Stuxnet, part of a set of attacks known as Operation Olympic Games, was a sophisticated multiyear campaign to sabotage Iran’s nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz by inserting a harmful computer worm into the software that ran the facility’s centrifuges, causing them to overload. American and Israeli developers started designing the project as early as 2005, and it launched in 2007, growing more sophisticated until its discovery in 2010. The attack was groundbreaking in several ways. The developers built highly target-specific intelligence into the code, enabling the Stuxnet software to make autonomous decisions in its target environment. Most important, Stuxnet represented the first and only physically destructive cyberattack launched by one state (or, in this case, two states) against another. Yet even cyberattacks that cause damage do so only indirectly. As an agent of violence, computer code faces a very basic limit: it does not have its own force or energy. Instead, any cyberattack with the goal of material destruction or harming human life must utilize the force or energy embedded in its target: for example, shutting down an air traffic control system and causing trains or planes to crash or disrupting a power plant and sparking an explosion. Yet besides Stuxnet, there is no proof that anyone has ever successfully launched a major attack of this sort. Lethal cyberattacks, while certainly possible, remain the stuff of fiction: none has ever killed or even injured a single human being. Thanks to its lack of direct physical impact, code-induced violence also has less emotional impact. It would be difficult for a cyberattack to produce the level of fear that coordinated campaigns of terrorism or conventional military operations produce. Owing to their invisibility, cyberweapons also lack the symbolic power of traditional ones. Displays of weaponry, such as the elaborate military parades put on by China and North Korea, sometimes represent nothing more than nationalist pageantry. But revealing one’s arsenal can also serve tactical and strategic ends, as when countries deploy aircraft carriers to demonstrate their readiness to use force or carry out operations designed to intimidate the enemy, such as using military aircraft to conduct deliberately low flyovers. Indeed, displaying weapons systems and threatening to use them can prove more cost-efficient than their actual use. But cyberweapons are hard to brandish. Perhaps the most crucial limitation of violence in cyberspace is its almost entirely destructive quality: unlike traditional political violence, which can maintain trust in institutions and states as well as undermine it, violence in cyberspace can do only the latter. Any established political order comes with a certain degree of inherent violence; consolidated states, after all, survive only if they maintain monopolies on the legitimate use of force. By encouraging trust in the ability of state institutions to protect property and safeguard citizens, this inherent violence buttresses a state’s power and allows the state to establish the rule of law. But cyber-violence lacks this ability, since it does little or nothing to build up trust in institutions; indeed, it is very difficult to imagine how cyberattacks could be used to enforce rules or laws, either domestically or internationally. Digital surveillance presents a more complicated picture. In democracies, intelligence agencies tread a thin line between providing security and eroding public trust in the state, as demonstrated by the recent controversy over the U.S. National Security Agency’s data-collection practices. In authoritarian countries, digital surveillance can assist the state’s coercive use of force, but it cannot replace it. Such limitations, however, should not lead anyone to dismiss the corrosive potential of cyberattacks. Indeed, such assaults can undermine social trust in a more direct way than traditional political violence. Cyberattacks are more precise; they do not necessarily undermine the state’s monopoly of force in a wholesale fashion. Instead, they can be tailored to attack specific companies or public-sector organizations and used to undermine those groups’ authority selectively. Stuxnet provides a good example of this dynamic. Putting aside the question of whether the attack was an act of war, its primary intention was to undermine the trust of the Iranian scientists in their systems and in themselves and the trust of the Iranian regime in its ability to build nuclear weapons. The original intention was to cause physical damage to as many Iranian centrifuges as possible. But the American and Israeli attackers knew that the physical effect could be exploited to unleash a much more damaging psychological effect. “The intent was that the failures should make them feel they were stupid, which is what happened,” an American participant told The New York Times. The Americans and the Israelis hoped that once a few machines failed, the Iranian engineers would shut down more machines because they distrusted their own technology or indeed their own skills. At the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in Vienna, rumors circulated that the Iranians had lost so much confidence in their own systems and instruments that the management of the Natanz facility took the extraordinary step of assigning engineers to sit in the plant and radio back what they saw to confirm the instrument readings. “They overreacted,” one of the attackers revealed to David Sanger of The New York Times, “and that delayed them even more.” The Iranians also began to assign blame internally, pointing fingers at one another and even firing some personnel. DIGITAL UNDERGROUND Damaging though it may have been, Stuxnet, along with the cyber-scuffles in Estonia and Georgia, represents not a new form of warfare but something more akin to other, less lethal forms of aggression: sabotage and espionage. Unlike acts of war, these political crimes, which are often committed by nonstate actors, need not be violent to work. And although saboteurs and spies do act politically, they often seek to avoid attribution, unlike those who launch acts of war. For those reasons, the cyber-era has been a boon for political crime. Consider sabotage. Before the computer age, saboteurs had trouble calibrating and controlling the effects of their actions. Sabotage had to target physical property and relied on physical violence, which often proves unpredictable. During postal and railway strikes in France in 1909 and 1910, for instance, saboteurs cut signal wires and tore down telegraph posts. Destroying property risked running afoul of public opinion, and the tactic ultimately divided the workers. The strikes themselves, as a form of sabotage, also ran the risk of leading to unpredictable violence: indeed, labor demonstrations often intensified into riots, making it easier for opponents to portray the strikers as uncompromising radicals. It is much easier for saboteurs to avoid counterproductive side effects in the age of computer-assisted attacks, which can contain violence and generally avoid it altogether. Cyberattacks can maliciously affect software and business processes without interfering with physical industrial processes, remaining nonviolent but sometimes still causing greater damage than a traditional assault. A 2012 attack against the computer network of the oil company Saudi Aramco illustrates this potential. The attack physically harmed neither hardware nor humans. Yet by allegedly erasing the hard disks of some 30,000 computers, the attackers likely did much more monetary damage to Saudi Aramco than they could have through an act of traditional sabotage against machinery in one of the company’s plants. The oil giant reportedly had to hire six specialized computer security firms to help with its forensic investigation and post-attack cleanup. Despite such potential, it is also important to remember the inherent limitations of computer-assisted political crime and to note that human agents remain critical in the age of digital violence. Even Stuxnet, the most successful example of cyber-sabotage, demonstrates this fact. For the United States and Israel, the “holy grail,” in the words of one of the attack’s architects, was getting a piece of malicious software into the control system at Natanz. The Americans and Israelis needed fine-grained data from inside the Iranian plant to develop their weaponized code. The problem was that the control system was protected by an air gap: it was not connected to the Internet or even internal networks. As a result, the attackers had to deliver the malicious code via a removable hard drive such as a USB flash drive -- delivered by a human hand. To make this happen, U.S. intelligence operatives first obtained a list of the people who were visiting the targeted plant to work on its computer equipment and who could carry the payload there. “We had to find an unwitting person on the Iranian side of the house who could jump the gap,” one planner later told Sanger. The list of possible carriers included engineers from the German company Siemens, who were helping their Iranian colleagues maintain the control system -- work that required the Siemens engineers to bring portable computers into the plant. Precisely how the U.S.-Israeli team managed to exploit this vulnerability remains unknown. Suffice it to say that although “Siemens had no idea they were a carrier,” in the words of one U.S. official quoted by Sanger, “it turns out there is always an idiot around who doesn’t think much about the thumb drive in their hand.” SAFETY IN ONES AND ZEROS If cyberattacks reduce the amount of violence inherent in conflict, and if they often take the form of sabotage or espionage, then many officials and commentators who have been warning about the dawn of cyberwar have been ringing false alarms. Digital violence does have implications for ethics and for national security strategy, however. Weaponized code, or cyberattacks more generally, can achieve goals that used to require conventional force. The most sophisticated cyberattacks are highly targeted, and cyberweapons are unlikely to cause collateral damage in the same way conventional weapons do. Therefore, in many situations, the use of computers would be ethically preferable to the use of conventional weapons: a cyberattack might be less violent, less traumatizing, and more limited.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › NATO Advantage › 2NC---Prevents Escalation

Cold war empirics prove --- tactical instability creates strategic calm

Jon Lindsay 15, Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies., Lindsay, Jon R. “The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction.” International Security, vol. 39, no. 3, Jan. 2015, pp. 7–47.

Barring gross misperception, however, one can expect the risk of unwanted escalation from cyber to other military domains to deter both sides from resorting to more destructive forms of computer network attack in most situations. 113 Yet although nuclear or conventional deterrence might be able to check catastrophic cyberattack, it cannot credibly discourage minor cyber aggression such as nationalist hacktivism, industrial espionage, or harassment of dissident expatriates. Indeed, the observable pattern of Chinese (and American) cyber activity conforms to the logic of the Cold War stability-instability paradox, but in slightly revised form. In the original formulation of the paradox, mutual vulnerability to nuclear retaliation inhibits nuclear war but encourages conventional war in peripheral theaters where nuclear threats are not credible.114 Today, the intensity of cyber aggression is bounded by the risk of any form of military retaliation as well as the need to preserve interconnection and protect sources and methods that rely on deception. Cyberattackers intentionally keep the costs they inflict below the assessed threshold of even limited military retaliation by opponents, occupying a region where military threats of punishment would be utterly noncredible. The aggressor’s freedom of action is further constrained by the need to maintain stealth and plausible deniability for ongoing operations. Actors that are deterred by threats of military punishment, on the one hand, and threats of counterintelligence detection or loss of connection, on the other, are encouraged to find more limited ways to inflict costs. The complexity of modern computer network infrastructure, in particular, offers many inexpensive ways to inflict minor costs. One implication is that cyberspace creates more scope for nontraditional security concerns (e.g., harassment of human rights organizations and vulnerable user communities) that powerful actors usually ignore in their focus on protecting high-value economic and military assets.115 As long as dense interconnection and economic interdependence remain mutually beneficial for powers such as the United States and China, they will be able to tolerate the irritants that they will inevitably inflict on one another. The modern intelligence-counterintelligence contest plays out in a complicated sociotechnical space where states take advantage of economic cooperation and hedge against security competition. If their broader mutual interest frays, however, then cyberwarfare becomes just one facet of a more serious strategic problem involving more dangerous means. Exaggeration of the cyber threat feeds spirals of mistrust, which make this undesirable outcome slightly more likely. The United States and China should discuss the interaction of cybersecurity and traditional military force in depth and take steps to limit misunderstandings about the other’s intentions. They might even learn to interpret chronic cyber friction as a sign that more truly dangerous threats have been constrained. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the emergence of complex cyber threats may be a positive development in the tragic history of international politics: the bad news about cybersecurity is good news for global security.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › NATO Advantage › 2NC---Prevents Escalation

Provocative friction is good --- reduces escalation by demonstrating capability, and the capacity to escalate deters attackers from crossing red lines --- the aff undermines both dynamics

Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke 14, Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, AND Erik Gartzke is Professor and Director of cPASS at the Department of Political Science @ UCSD, Lindsay, Jon R., and Erik Gartzke. “Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited.” The Power to Hurt: Coercion in the Modern World, Oct. 2014.

1 Introduction Information technology is the nervous system of the global economy. Critical infrastructure for banking, power, transportation, and industry increasingly depends on embedded computers connected to the internet. Firms and citizens entrust vital personal, medical, and financial data to distant servers in return for more convenient and efficient services. Military command and control relies on digital networks to connect far-flung surveillance and strike systems and to project power rapidly and precisely. Yet this vital interconnectivity also facilitates new modes of crime, protest, espionage, and warfare. Ubiquitous computer networks both provide access to valuable targets and become targets themselves. Protecting and influencing cyber infrastructure has thus become a major priority for governments and other political actors around the world. The very ubiquity of information technology makes the danger of cyber threats easy to exaggerate. In contemporary defense policy discourse there are three influential narratives of mounting cyber peril. The most dangerous envisions the paralysis of industrial control systems of military command and control through surprise attack by anonymous hackers. This scenario is often described as a “digital Pearl Harbor” or a “cyber 9/11” depending on whether the imagined aggressor is a revisionist state like China or Iran or a non-state anarchist or terrorist empowered by the information revolution. A second narrative offers an alternative to the shock of sudden catastrophe by warning of the long term erosion of economic and military competitiveness. The relentless theft of vital secrets stored on corporate and government networks is thus thought to cause a prolonged “death by a thousand cuts.” In both of these scenarios, weaker states and terrorists gain increasing access to powerful hacking tools while technology-dependent advanced industrial states become increasingly vulnerable to cyber attack and exploitation. 1 A third category of threat narrative concerns the transformation of internet architecture to decisively benefit one political group at the expense of the other. At one extreme, the growth of flexible social media enables connected protesters to overwhelm and overthrow authoritarian regimes.2 At the other extreme governments censor and reconfigure the internet to undermine innovation and freedom. State paranoia about paralysis and erosion thus leads to digital lockout or “the end of the internet” as we know it.3 National security officials, the defense industry, and media pundits all have incentives to exaggerate the cyber threat.4 The secrecy of cyber operations further complicates assessment, even as states make major investments in cyber defense. Each of the three narratives above are indeed exaggerations, but they point toward more plausible scenarios using cyber operations as subtle complements to or even substitutes for more traditional forms of aggression. Understanding the dynamics, magnitude, and likelihood of aggression online requires greater attention to the operational requirements for staging various types of cyber operations, the strategic benefits actors hope to gain through them, and the risks of unintended consequences. Too often defenders of the cyber revolution focus narrowly on the technological possibility for harm but discount operational and institutional obstacles to effectiveness and ignore the strategic utility of cyber harm or threats of harm. 5 A realistic appraisal of cyber threats must take not only technological but also strategic logic into account. Thomas Schelling distinguishes brute force, which is needed in a contest of strength, from coercive threats, which are useful in a contest of resolve.6 Both require the power to inflict harm, but brute force exercises it while coercion holds (at least some of) it in reserve. Likewise, actors might use cyber operations to attempt to change the balance of power directly or they might use them to provide information about their intentions and commitment. To paraphrase Clausewitz, cyberwar is politics by other means. As a result of technical and political constraints, the coercive potential of cyberspace is more limited than generally appreciated, but it is not negligible, especially when exploited in conjunction with other forms power such as military force. In this chapter we lay out a typology of cyber operations, distinguishing the skills and resources needed to cause different types of harm. Not all cyber options are equally available to all actors because of varying requirements in organizational capacity, intelligence support, and risk sensitivity. For each of the exaggerated myths mentioned above, there are low-cost, low- payoff irritants widely available as well as higher-cost, potentially higher-payoff adjunct capabilities available to a more restricted set of predominantly nation-state actors. Next we evaluate the coercive utility of these various harms, or threats of these harms, by taking into consideration the interaction of cyberspace with other domains. Finally we ask, what types of cyber coercion are most likely? We argue that there exist two important bounds on the distribution of cyber harm. First, because voluntary connections to the internet make cyber harms possible in the first place, aggressors must be careful not to provoke their victims to disconnect. Second, the availability of military instruments beyond the cyber domain, creates potential for retaliation for unacceptable harms. These constraints combine to make small-scale cyber aggression relatively appealing and thus more likely while making large-scale aggression difficult and undesirable for initiators and thus less likely. The finding of this chapter extends the logic of the stability-instability paradox pioneered in the 1960s. While nuclear weapons can deter nuclear war, they can fail to deter, and even encourage, conventional or peripheral war. Mutually assured destruction restrained the superpowers from engaging in direct confrontations during the Cold War, even as this restraint encouraged and facilitated the exercise of proxy wars throughout the Third World. The mechanisms of restraint in the cyber domain are slightly different than in the nuclear world—the risk of voluntary disconnection and military retaliation vs. mutual Armageddon—but the results are similar: little truly dangerous behavior and a lot of provocative friction. The social and economic value of the internet expands the scope for minor aggression like espionage, covert influence, and symbolic protest. Cyber operations also act as valuable adjuncts for battlefield operations akin to signals intelligence and electronic warfare for states who are willing and able to go to war for other reasons. However, there are diminishing incentives to “go big” with cyber warfare alone given the incentives targets have to identify even a hard-to-identify attacker and shift domains to punish cyber aggression. Although the attribution of the attacker’s identity is widely thought to be hard problem in cyberspace, anonymity is never guaranteed and might not even be useful for some forms of coercion. A nonzero risk of attribution opens the door to retaliatory punishment, which encourages attackers to exercise restraint in cyber aggression. Ironically enough, the instability we perceive in cyberspace is indicative of the stability of deterrence of the most dangerous cyber threats.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › NATO Advantage › 1NC---Cyberwar Good

If they refocus on conventional weapons, they’ll beat us straight up.

Col Michael W. Pietrucha 15 (Col Michael W. “Starbaby” Pietrucha, 10/5/15, "Re-Fighting the Wrong War: Applying the Pacific War Template Against China," Leading Edge, accessed 2-12-2017, https://leadingedgeairpower.com/strategy/re-fighting-the-wrong-war-applying-the-pacific-war-template-against-china/)

Military organizations are often accused of fighting the last war. In the case of the US Air Force, the war in question is DESERT STORM, the last unambiguous US victory and a major milestone in the development of airpower. The Gulf War was a major success for airpower, demonstrating effective applications of stealth, precision, and electronic warfare. But the war was fought with overwhelming logistical, numerical and technological superiority against an adversary that was geographically isolated, poorly trained, badly equipped and ineptly led. It is unlikely that we will operate from such a position of advantage again. DoD planners should give up on the fantasy of a short, decisive war against the People’s Republic of China – any short decisive war involving the PRC is likely to end in a PRC victory. The lessons from the Gulf War should be applied to future conflicts with caution, especially if the adversary is China. In a potential conflict with China, it is the US that is geographically and numerically disadvantaged, and Chinese military development for the past two decades has been organized around one key principle – that the US would not be allowed to repeat DESERT STORM. The DoD summarizes the Chinese approach under an “anti-access, area denial” (A2AD) label, but is overly focused on finding technological means to operate in the A2AD environment in order to attempt a repeat of the Gulf War’s air campaign. China is perhaps the least likely country to succumb to such a strategy, which is an attempt to match strength against strength in an epic, mano-a-mano battle where China holds advantages in distance and mass that we are unlikely to ever overcome conventionally. If the Air Force is going to do its part in deterring the PRC, we must contribute to a viable offset strategy that relies as much on geography as technology. This is not to say that the PRC cannot effectively be fought, only that we cannot do so with a replay of techniques that proved successful over two decades ago over Iraq. It is to say that we are turning to the wrong war for our example. The war we should be basing our upon strategy is another conflict in which we fought an island nation that had successfully executed an “A2AD” strategy by physically occupying much of the Asian landmass from Manchuria to Burma to Wake and the Solomons. The example we are looking for, and should be planning to, is the Pacific War from 1941 to 1945. An analysis of the flow of goods and materials into and out of China reveals that with 98% of all freight moving by sea, China is practically, if not geographically, an island nation. As such, it is vulnerable to interdiction of trade routes to a far greater degree than a land power, and this is a national vulnerability that airpower is well-positioned to exploit – if applied properly. Background The Pacific War against Japan was not a quick war. Excepting the very end, it had no “shock and awe” component. It was a grinding advance across limited real estate to approach the Japanese home islands from the south while maintaining pressure on other fronts, including the interior of China, New Guinea and the Philippines, India and Burma. Fundamentally, it was a series of campaigns focused on establishing a logistical chain for Allied forces that would allow the application of airpower against Japan until such time as a massive amphibious assault could be undertaken or the home islands could be starved into submission. Equally important, it was a sustained counter-logistics campaign conducted against an island nation occupying island territory across the theater. The US executed a sustained maritime interdiction campaign beginning at the outset of the war. Admittedly, it was the only option available to the US Navy, but also one that had received a great deal of thought prior to the outbreak of war. The submarine war against Japan began immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor – Admiral Hart, commander of the Asiatic Fleet, authorized unrestricted submarine warfare before the Japanese second wave had recovered aboard their carriers.[ii] While airpower accounted for more warships, submarines and mine warfare accounted for the majority of the Japanese merchant marine, sinking 1360 of the 2,117 large merchant ships sunk by US forces.[1] Despite the fact that Japan impressed captured ships into service, their merchant marine shrunk continuously during the war because of relentless Allied attack. Eventually, the Japanese merchant fleet was unable to perform its most basic functions; it could not replenish forward naval forces, move resources to Japan, supply outposts, or evacuate forces that could not be resupplied. The maritime interdiction campaign was essentially Joint a campaign intended to gain effects in what we would characterize today as an A2AD environment. Land-based air was the major source of airpower in the west, while carrier-based air supported successive island-hopping campaigns beginning in November 1943. Fifth Air Force’s (5AF) first responsibility was to gain control of the air, which entailed substantive offensive and defensive components with limited fighter resources. In 1942, 5AF bombers spent the majority of their time conducting logistics and counter-logistics, attacking Japanese maritime traffic, ports, airfields, and oil refineries. In their efforts to prevent the Japanese from reinforcing their forces in New Guinea, 5AF routinely attacked anything that moved on the water. While merchant ships loss statistics tell some of the story, they do not tell all of it. The official statistics only count ships of 500 tons displacement or greater used for long-haul routes. Short haul supply was supplemented by small watercraft of less than 500 tons displacement, commonly referred to as “barges”. 5AF in particular attacked watercraft during the day, from locally-built barges to tramp steamers and small warships, sinking them quite literally in the hundreds. In sea areas beyond the routine reach of aircraft and in joint attack areas by night, the naval interdiction effort was undertaken by PT Boats and submarines, ensuring constant pressure. By November 1942, Japanese Naval Forces in and around the Solomons ceased all offensive operations and light forces were dedicated almost entirely to resupply. By May of 1943, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s defensive perimeter did not enclose New Guinea, which was abandoned.[iii] Japanese deaths on New Guinea alone exceeded 148,000, the vast majority through disease and starvation.[iv] From November 1942 until the end of the war, 5AF claimed to have sunk 1.75 million tons of enemy shipping, excluding barges and similar small craft.[v] In the home islands, the effects of maritime interdiction were substantial. In 1941, Japan’s economic development was a fairly recent event. Japan began orienting the economy towards war in 1928, multiplying its heavy industrial production by 500% by 1940. The primary limitation on Japanese industry was the import of raw materials, including and especially oil, ferro-alloys, and nonferrous metals. They established strategic reserves in bauxite and oil.[vi] But attacks on shipping reduced the Japanese industrial base far below capacity. The economy was designed for a short, sharp war at the end of which the Japanese economy would have retained access to resources. Japan’s economy not structured or resourced for a long war against an industrial power. By 1943, oil was being successfully interdicted in part, and the flow of oil from the Dutch East Indies completely halted in April 1945. It is the opinion of the Survey that by August 1945, even without direct air attack on her cities and industries, the over-all level of Japanese war production would have declined below the peak levels of 1944 by 40 to 50 percent solely as a result of the interdiction of overseas imports… Even though the urban area attacks and attacks on specific industrial plants contributed a substantial percentage to the over-all decline in Japan’s economy, in many segments of that economy their effects were duplicative. Most of the oil refineries were out of oil, the alumina plants out of bauxite, the steel mills lacking in ore and coke, and the munitions plants low in steel and aluminum. Japan’s economy was in large measure being destroyed twice over, once by cutting off of imports, and secondly by air attack.[vii] The successful interdiction of the Indies did not completely shut off the flow of materials to Japan. Manchuria provided iron, coking coal (for steel), salt, bauxite and arable land (for food production), but did not provide significant sources of petroleum. Taiwan, a Japanese territory since 1895, provided resources including petroleum, but not nearly in sufficient quantities for wartime Japan. Even the Japanese investment in synthetic fuel production was centered offshore in China and Manchuria, and by 1944 the Japanese had reached their peak production, with 15 plants producing 717,000 barrels of oil.[viii] Combined with domestic production in 1944 of 1.6 million barrels from Japanese home islands, essentially only 9% of the annual oil demand was not subject to maritime interdiction.[ix] Japanese oil inventories in thousands of barrels[x] Fiscal Year Crude Petroleum Refined Products Starting Inventories Consump-tion Imports Production Total Imports Production Total Crude Refined Total 1941 3,130 1,941 5,071 5,242 15,997 21,239 20,857 28,036 48,893 36,974 1942 8,146 1,690 9,836 2.378 16,674 19,052 12,346 25,883 38,229 41,790 1943 9,848 1,814 11,662 4,652 16,167 20,819 6,839 18,488 25,327 43,992 1944 1,641 1,585 3,226 3,334 9,615 12,949 2,354 11,462 13,816 25,045 1945 (first half) 0 809 809 0 1,933 1,933 195 4,751 4,946 ~6,576 For the majority of the war, the short water route across from Korea to Japan was not interdicted. The Sea of Japan had proven a particularly difficult operating area for submarines, and it was not within reach of US aircraft. After USS Wahoo was declared lost in November of 1943, no US sub re-entered the Sea of Japan until June of 1945. But in March of 1945, Tinian-based B-29s began the largest aerial mining effort in history, codenamed operation STARVATION. The operation was intended to close the Shimonoseki Strait (also called the Kanmon Straits), blockade Tokyo and Nagoya in the adjacent inland sea, and mine ports in Korea and the northern Japanese coast. At the time, the Straits were the key maritime chokepoint, with 80% of Japan’s maritime traffic passing through.[xi] Total monthly traffic consisted of 1.25 million tons of shipping, consisting of 20-30 ships above 500 tons and 100-200 ships below 500 tons.[xii] STARVATION effectively shut down maritime traffic in targeted areas, accounting for more ships damaged or sunk during the last six months of the war than all other sources over the entire Pacific Theater combined.[xiii] The efforts to deprive Japan of needed resources were long-running and widespread. The mix of submarines, carrier aviation, and land-based airpower was an effective combination for conducting an extensive campaign at long ranges in spite of enemy defenses and a lack of local basing for Allied airpower. Despite plans for an invasion of the Japanese home islands, many senior airmen felt that Japan could be driven to surrender by a combination of maritime blockade and strategic bombing.[xiv] In any event, the use of Atomic weapons forced a rapid surrender and ended the debate. Nevertheless, it is clear that absent any direct attack on the home islands by any means, the maritime interdiction campaign had successfully brought Japan to the brink of surrender. Like any island nation, Japan was uniquely vulnerable to the interruption of sea traffic. China: The Island Nation We do not think of China as an island nation. After all, it has almost double the land border of the United States – 11958 nm – and borders 13 independent countries. But the land transportation links over these borders are extremely limited. The border terrain is unfavorable, dominated by desert, steppes, mountains (including the Himalayas) and jungle. Border disputes with several countries, including Bhutan, India and Pakistan, have delayed or prevented development of transportation infrastructure along the PRC borders. The total number of border “ports” along the Chinese Border stands at 90, counting the newest connection to the Afghanistan border but excluding airports. The capacity compares unfavorably with the 119 border crossings between the US and Canada alone.[xv] The comparison is inherently unbalanced, in that the Chinese border is relatively undeveloped, while the US-Canadian border has benefitted from more than two centuries of continuous expansion. The US and Canadian road and rail networks are effectively linked, whereas Chinese railroads do not even share the same gauge (track width) as any of their neighbors excepting Mongolia and North Korea, and sometimes not even then. Continuous rail lines extend only into Russia, Kazakhstan, North Korea or Vietnam, requiring either bogie exchange or cargo crossloading wherever there is a gauge change.[2] The total cross-border cargo carried by rail in 2012 was 54.24 million tonnes, with another 64.9 million tonnes[3] moved by truck.[xvi] This is a fraction of comparable US overland trade in that same year, where the rail systems moved 139 million tonnes with trucks moving 177 million tonnes.[xvii] Roughly a fifth (19 million tonnes in 2012[xviii]) of the PRC’s import flow by rail is coal mined in Mongolia. There are only five long-haul rail lines crossing the border at all, three crossing from Siberia and two from Kazakhstan, and those lines carry more exports than imports. The primary reason for the expansion of the PRC’s rail crossings in the last five years has been to carry exports to markets rather than to import goods or resources. The fifth line, Hunchun, has been closed for most of the last 15 years, but reopened in late 2013 and in 2014 moved comparatively little rail traffic, mostly coal. While the border crossings have been expanded and upgraded in the last five years, they are limited in capacity by the infrastructure on both sides of the border. All five lines are much more limited than their US counterparts, because they tend not to be double tracked (less than half of China’s rail lines are double-tracked)[xix] and do not have the high height limits of US trains, which can double-stack containers. The comparable road systems are also substantially less developed, with long distances between markets and much more limited capacity than the US interstate system. Also unlike the US, China’s international land ports are concentrated in five locations, all rail and road-served. Figure 1: China’s Border Port and National Railway Structure[xx] Port Country 2012 traffic (metric tonnes) Horgos Kazakhstan 22,000,000[xxi] Dostyk Kazakhstan 15,000,000[xxii] Hunchun Russia 0 (600,000 in 2014)[xxiii] Manzhouli Russia 30,060,000[xxiv] Suifenhe Russia 8,000,000[xxv] Table 1: 2012 Traffic through the five major PRC border ports with rail freight Table 2 shows the total cross-border cargo movement traffic for 2012, which includes river, road and rail traffic. Air traffic and petroleum pipelines are not included. Notably, there were no exploitable land routes to Afghanistan (even now, the road only goes to the PRC side of the border) or Bhutan, which does not even have diplomatic relations with China. Despite the fact that China is India’s largest trading partner, the countries do not exchange goods across their disputed border. Country Ports Number Foreign trade cargo (1000 tonnes) Percent (%) Kazakhstan 9 40,884 33.6 Mongolia 13 34,851 28.6 Russia 23 31,783 26.1 Vietnam 10 4655 3.8 Burma 5 3621 3.0 North Korea 15 3513 2.9 Kyrgyzstan 2 1048 0.9 Laos 4 1005 0.8 Tajikistan 1 173 0.1 Nepal 4 174 0.1 Pakistan 1 59 0.0 Afghanistan 0 0 0.0 Bhutan 0 0 0.0 India 0 0 0.0 TOTAL 87 121,766 Table 2: Overland foreign trade cargo in 2012[xxvi] China has three international oil pipelines, crossing from Russia, Kazakhstan and Burma. The total capacity is advertised as 980,000 barrels per day, but this number is deceptive. The largest capacity pipeline, through Burma, has yet to move more than test quantities of oil, although it has been moving natural gas. The Sino-Burmese oil pipeline is limited by the fact that while the pipeline exists, the oil has nowhere to go once it reached the Chinese terminus in Kunming. The refinery that was supposed to be built in Kunming hasn’t broken ground as of this writing and there are no internal oil pipelines from Kunming to elsewhere in China. The Energy Sector[4] China is not entirely self-sufficient in any of the non-renewable energy sources that it uses to provide electricity and transportation. As a result, China has two key vulnerabilities on the energy front. The first is the distribution network within country, which is highly energy-intensive, and largely dependent on oil. This ties together with electricity generation, in that China’s power generation capacity is mostly coal-dependent, and coal is dependent on surface transport for distribution. For 2013, coal provided 65% of China’s energy consumption, which has been a relatively constant figure for the last decade.[xxvii] China meets 96% of its coal demand domestically, meaning that effective coal interdiction would have to be accomplished by affecting the domestic transportation network. Chinese coal imports tend towards coking coal for industrial processes, versus steam coal for power generation. Figure 2: China’s Energy Infrastructure. Crude oil pipelines are in green (orange if international), and oil product pipelines are blue. Refineries (gas pumps) that produce jet fuel are red, with orange producing jet fuel components. Green refineries mostly produce chemicals and no fuel. Oil terminals are green ships, green and purple circles are the SPR sites, and the rail network is in red. No teakettle refineries or province borders are displayed. The second vulnerability is that the PRC imports the majority of its petroleum, and the maritime petroleum transport network involves long distance movement that the PRC cannot possibly protect. As of 2014, China is the world’s second largest oil importer, approaching the US. Throughout 2014, China averaged 6.2 million barrels per day (bpd), compared to 7.4 million bpd for the US. However, in February 2015, China’s oil imports spiked at an average rate of 7.53 million bpd, exceeding the US for the month. Driven in part by low oil prices, China is assessed to be filling strategic reserves while prices are low, maintaining at least a 30-day supply of imported oil (and probably closer to 100 days).[xxviii] As with coal, China’s demand exceeds domestic production, but China imports much more oil, approaching 60% of its total requirement. Petroleum import data alone gives an incomplete picture of China’s fuel requirements. Crude oil is simply sticky black goo with very little utility in its unrefined state. Refining is necessary to turn that goo into useable fuels. In 2013, China’s total refining capacity was 12.6 million bpd, behind only the US at 17.8 million bpd and representing a comfortable overcapacity of about 24%.[xxix] The output of China’s refineries has typically focused on lighter distillates, tending towards diesel fuel and gasoline, which allowed China to become a net diesel fuel exporter in 2012. In 2014, driven by a strong market, Chinese major refineries switched to the more profitable middle distillates (naphtha, kerosene and jet fuel), becoming a net jet fuel/kerosene exporter and reversing a trend that had seen China as Asia’s largest jet fuel importer only a year earlier.[xxx] This occurred despite the fact that China’s smaller, private “teakettle” refineries, which account for a quarter of the nation’s refinery capacity, produce no jet fuel components at all.[xxxi] Overall, China’s expansion of its refinery capability within the past four years has left the PRC able to meet 98% of its demand for petroleum distillates, and capable of having a net export balance for all distillate fuels except naphtha.[xxxii] China’s vulnerability to supply interdiction is largely limited to crude oil, although as naphtha is a key ingredient for jet fuel, this remaining import dependency is still significant. Maritime Dependency By comparison to trade across land borders, China’s sea trade is massive. Using figures from only the top 15 coastal ports, the volume of seaborne trade in 2013 came to 7.28 billion tonnes, up from 6.65 billion tonnes in 2012[xxxiii]. Using 2012 figures, this means that international road and rail trade comes to less than 1.8% of the volume of freight transported by sea; that disparity is likely to have increased in 2013 and 2014 as the amount of seaborne trade is increasing at a faster rate than any other transport mode in both relative and absolute terms. Put another way, the annual movement of freight through all of China’s international borders is matched in under 60 days by Shanghai’s port complex alone.[xxxiv] There is no conceivable condition under which China’s land trade routes could mitigate a maritime interdiction campaign. Figure 3: China’s Crude Oil Imports By Source (2013) (USEIA) The huge disparity between land and sea trade is likely to continue to increase. Overland trade is infrastructure-limited, and depends heavily on road and rail infrastructure in neighboring countries. Russia’s pipeline and rail infrastructure in Siberia has to serve multiple customers, including Russia itself, Japan, and Korea. With sea trade essentially a global phenomenon, the infrastructure is well-established and continuing to expand worldwide, without intermediate bottlenecks. For China, this means that this trade flow is subject to interdiction. China’s power projection capability is limited, and the maritime geography is strategically unfavorable. The first and second island chains hem in China, putting it in a position where all of its maritime trade must pass through waterways that can be controlled (or at least denied) by foreign powers. China’s maritime trade generally passes through a number of chokepoints, most especially the Straits of Malacca. Overland transport of oil via pipeline and rail accounts for less than 10% of all oil imports, and this only from Russia and Kazakhstan. Even Russia relies on maritime transport for oil; in 2014, 55% of the oil imported from Russia went by sea rather than pipeline or rail.[xxxv] Looking at the rest of the totals, it’s clear that around 85% of the oil imported into China passes through the Straits of Malacca (77%) or the Panama Canal (8%). Around fifty percent of the PRC’s oil imports pass through two chokepoints rather than just one – the Straits of Hormuz, the Panama Canal or Bab al Mandar as well as Malacca. The limits on the Straits of Malacca have a real impact on ship design, as ships too long or deep for the narrow passageway have to detour around Indonesia and sail through the Lombok Strait. Tanker sizes have actually shrunk since the 1970s partly because of this; “Malaccamax” designs are the largest ships able to transit the Straits of Malacca, and are classed a Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs). A typical VLCC can carry two million barrels of oil, but is reliant on offshore terminals or smaller tankers for loading and offloading. A single VLCC carries about four days maximum flow for the Siberian and Kazakh pipelines combined. Eleven to fifteen of these vessels pass through Malacca daily, in both directions. Figure 4: Maritime Freight Traffic 3rd Semester 2013 (Marinetraffic.com) From a military standpoint, the majority of maritime trade is irrelevant. Container ships, which are used to move commercial goods, constitute the majority of the maritime traffic and are not militarily relevant except for spare parts and system components. Similarly, while China imports vast quantities of raw materials (particularly iron), domestic production of most raw materials such as metal ores, minerals, rare earths and potash is among the top three global producers, depending on the year.[xxxvi] In the 1930s, Japanese military expansion looked towards China’s resources as a solution to Japan’s natural resource shortages, recognizing that China is comparatively resource-rich. While China cannot fuel its industrial machine with domestic products alone, it has the capacity to maintain its military industry almost entirely with domestic supplies of raw materials. China’s vulnerability is related to the fact that while its resources are large, the country’s massive consumption exceeds the capability of domestic resource production. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the energy sector, where Chinese demand for coal, petroleum and natural gas is satiated only through foreign imports. Indeed, it is these energy imports that could provide a key degree of leverage on the military front. The energy supply from overseas powers all of China’s power projection capabilities, along with the industries that produce it and the transportation network that supplies and moves it. Implications The vast majority of seaborne imports come from well outside the capability of the PLAAF or PLAN to effectively protect. Unlike Japan and South Korea, which could reasonably expect to maintain northern supply routes to Alaska against Chinese opposition, the Chinese have no such geographical advantage or supporting alliance structure. Moreover, in any conflict with China, the US would start in a much more favorable position than it did against Japan in 1941. We have more combat power forward, our partners are nations in their own right and not poorly defended colonial outposts, and this time we are not opposing a Japan that has already expanded. China today cannot yet compare with Imperial Japan for amphibious sealift and will not have a decade-long running start on territorial expansion on the Asian Mainland. Certainly, our forward basing posture leaves US forces subject to direct attack from the PRC proper, but the islands which host our facilities are not under the threat of occupation. The unfavorable maritime geography and dependency on overseas trade leaves China vulnerable to a Strategic Interdiction strategy – a Joint effort designed to prevent the movement of resources related to military forces or operations. While a deeper discussion of Strategic Interdiction is a subject for a follow-on paper, an overview of such a strategy can be outlined and applied to China. In contrast with maritime interdiction, Strategic Interdiction (SI) is not a broad blockade but is a targeted effort to interdict primarily the production and transport of energy resources. A campaign would have four elements: A “Counterforce” effort designed to attrit the adversary air forces (particularly bombers), naval forces (gray hulls) and naval auxiliaries (replenishment) to the point where they can neither project military power nor defend against US power projection, at least far beyond the PRC continental shelf.[5] An “Inshore” element, which consists of operations to deny effective use of home waters, including rivers and coastal waters. Standoff or covert aerial mining is a key component of this element. An “Infrastructure Degradation” plan intended to disrupt or destroy specific soft targets, such as oil terminals, oil refineries, pipelines and railway chokepoints such as tunnels and bridges. Many of these targets would be in airspace not defended by ground-based air defense. A “Distant” maritime strategy, which occurs out of effective adversary military reach, intended to interdict energy supplies. This strategy is aimed primarily at bulk petroleum carriers (tankers) and secondarily at coal transports, and not at container, dry bulk, or passenger vessels. Such a strategy might not be lethally oriented, directed instead towards the seizure and internment of PRC-bound vessels. A strategic interdiction campaign is fundamentally a logistically based strategy. The primary objective is to effectively neutralize certain elements of PRC military power by starving them of energy. In effect, this strategy targets naval and air forces, which rely on jet fuel, and leaves the gasoline and diesel-dependent army to compete with domestic fuel needs – because without the PLAAF and the PLAN, the PLA doesn’t ever leave the mainland. The primary targets are air and naval forces, but they are affected by an indirect route that is difficult to counter over the medium to long term. Much has been said, with respect to PRC missile forces, that the objective is to “shoot the archer”, the implication being that such an action would prevent the archer from launching standoff weapons against air or surface targets. An SI campaign is designed to starve the archer, the guys who protect the archer, the folks who make, carry and deliver the arrows, and the people who brought the archer to the battlefield in the first place. A complete campaign design would take advantage of the relationship between energy and infrastructure to disrupt a slice of the energy web in as many places as possible. Such a strategy is inherently asymmetric for the US, in that it cannot succeed against our mainland. Our maritime geography is extremely favorable, with four coasts that are difficult to interdict, two of which are not adjacent to the Pacific. The power projection capability required to conduct a maritime interdiction campaign against the US is well outside any projected PLAN capability. The strategy also takes advantage of the US advantage on blue-water naval capabilities and long-range strike aircraft. Indeed, the US airpower advantage is critical to any interdiction campaign, just as it was in World War II. Wrapup Against the USSR, the United States elected not to undertake an approach that was intended to directly offset the Soviet advantage in numbers and the vulnerabilities of Europe to a ground invasion. Instead, it adopted offset strategies to asymmetrically counter the USSR’s strengths, leading to both tactical nuclear weapons and a revolution in precision munitions and sensors. A quarter century after the fall of the wall, it is perhaps time to adopt a third offset strategy aimed squarely at the PRC. For more than two decades, the standing USAF template for applying combat airpower against a target country has been the DESERT STORM model. While this model may still have some applicability, it is long past time to abandon it for a conflict against a peer or near-peer nation. DESERT STORM was conducted against an adversary that was surrounded by enemies, outnumbered, technologically outmatched, and attacked by a force that had unlimited local basing, was better trained, better led, and better equipped. None of those conditions will apply in a conflict with China, where we are likely to have parity in a number of these areas, a slight degree of superiority in others, and a critical disadvantage in basing, numbers, and magazine depth. It makes no sense to attempt to enter a fight on Chinese terms, in their own front yard, against a massive opponent who has historically demonstrated the ability to take a great number of punches on home ground and still stay in the fight.