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2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Generic China Heg Inevitable

China rise is inevitable---nationalist pressure and decline of the LIO---could also be China is revisionist card

Schweller 18 — Randall Schweller is Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003 Advance Access Publication Date: 8 February 2018 WMK

Emerging powers are expected to be outward-looking, to show competitive inter- national faces, to expand when and where they can. Throughout history, it has been a commonly held belief that demographic and economic growth must, like an irresistible law of nature, lead to territorial growth and the enhancement of the country’s political influence in other regions. Self-interest obliges leaders of rising states to take advantage of opportunities to augment their countries influence, power, and status, but not recklessly. In other words, rational leaders will try to avoid expansion and imperial ambitions that risk triggering the formation of powerful counter-coalitions.

Nevertheless, resistance to its prestige and status demands—that is, pushback by the existing Great Powers—is fully anticipated and expected. A rising power demands its rightful place in the sun knowing that the established Great Powers who created the existing order are unlikely to concede the prestige, territory, and privileges they enjoy under the current system. Hence, rising powers are often portrayed as troublesome states—as revisionist challengers seeking to expand their political and military influence by hook or by crook at the expense of the old guard. Just as the need to expand appears to be in logic of a nation’s develop- ment, the impulse to oppose such expansion appears to be in the logic of a hegemon’s decline. These two logics combine to drive a narrative of encirclement within the emerging power—one in which the older and stronger nation(s) seek to stranle the new and rising one before it is too late. All this is fertile soil for the growth within the rising power of a powerful brand of nationalism that looks outward.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Generic China Heg Inevitable

China rise and US decline is inevitable but clinging to the squo causes a violent transition

Schweller 18 — Randall Schweller is Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003 Advance Access Publication Date: 8 February 2018 WMK

China’s new assertiveness and the sudden inward turn of the United States are a function of causes located in both the second and third images. The key second- image variable is nationalism, which combines with the power trajectories (a third-image variable) of both China and the United States to define how their relationship will unfold in the coming years. The interaction between nationalism and power trajectory produces entirely different foreign policy orientations in ris- ing and declining powers—the former embraces an outward-looking, extroverted foreign policy of expansion, while the latter adopts an inward-looking, intro- verted foreign policy of restraint and retrenchment.

Why the focus on nationalism? Nationalism provides a natural complement to structural realist theory; it is rightly viewed as realism’s domestic-level counter- part.3 The constant struggle among nations over issues of power, security, and prestige that animates realism is in no small part a consequence of nationalism, which ‘fuels interstate rivalry and by its sharp delineation of in- and out-groups, abets status rivalry, accentuates stereotyping, and deepens and perpetuates per- ceived grievances.’4 This seems obvious enough.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Generic China Heg Inevitable

Increasing competition with China increases the risk of war – rivalry ends only with one side acceding to the leadership of the other

Heath and Thompson, 18 - Timothy R. Heath is a Senior Defense and International Analyst at the RAND Corporation, has over sixteen years of experience as a China analyst in the U.S. government; William R. Thompson is Distinguished Professor and the Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science (emeritus) at Indiana University, Bloomington (“Avoiding U.S.-China Competition Is Futile: Why the Best Option Is to Manage Strategic Rivalry”; Asia Policy, volume 13, number 2 (april 2018), 91–120; The National Bureau of Asian Research,

In sum, the rivalry between China and the United States will likely continue until one country concludes that it cannot win the competition and accedes to the leadership of the other. Another possibility is that one side concludes that the other side has lost the ability to compete or no longer threatens the other. This has historically been the norm for rivalries that evade or survive decisive combat, and there is little reason to expect the current U.S.-China rivalry to end differently.69 Sino-U.S. strategic competition is here to stay, and it could last many years, potentially even decades.

Aggressive Competitive Approaches Are Counterproductive

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Generic China Heg Inevitable

China rise is inevitable--- it’s only a question of how the US reacts.

Mark Beeson and Corey Crawford 02-10-2022 [Mark Beeson is of the University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, Australia, Corey Crawford is of the University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia; Chinese Political Science Review (2022), “Putting the BRI in Perspective: History, Hegemony, and Geopolitics,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-022-00210-y//ZW]

For many observers outside China, especially in the US, there is no doubt that China is bent on replacing America as the dominant power in the world (Mosher 2000). Indeed, for some observers, China’s elites are following nothing less than a 100-year plan to replace the US as the world’s dominant power (Pillsbury 2015). Prominent realist scholars worry that there is a certain structurally determined inevitability about both China’s rise and the chances of a conflict between the US and the PRC as the latter increasingly seeks to assert its growing power and influence (Allison 2017). While Western IR’s collective failure to predict the end of the Cold War, the dramatic decline in inter-state wars, or recognise the importance of national strategic cultures and beliefs in shaping thinking about security, suggests that we should be very cautious about its collective epistemic authority, there is no doubt that China’s behaviour has changed. One of the most important expressions of this possibility can be seen in the sophistication of China’s political and diplomatic elites as they have come to play a more prominent part in what some IR theorists describe as ‘international society’ and the institutional architecture that constitutes it (Clark 2014). At one level, hopes and expectations about China’s leaders being ‘socialised’ into the ways of Western diplomacy have been realised: China is nothing like the disruptive, revolutionary force that it was under before Richard M. Nixon and Henry Kissinger engineered the celebrated rapprochement with the PRC (Kissinger 1994; van Ness 1970). At another level, however, it is clear that China’s foreign policy goals continue to reflect ‘national interests’ and values, especially under the increasingly coordinated and centralised leadership of Xi Jinping (Lampton 2015). Indeed, not only are Chinese policymakers still pursuing national goals, but they are doing so in ways that are also often strikingly similar to those employed by the US in an earlier era.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Generic China Heg Inevitable

As American heg declines China rises.

Makhura Benjamin Rapanyane 03-31-2020 [Master of Arts Candidate in International Politics at University of Limpopo, Journal of Public Affairs Volume 21, Issue 1, “The new world [dis] order in the complexity of America’s hegemonic decline and the configuration of new power patterns,” https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2114//ZW]

2.3 Symptoms of USA hegemonic decline: A critical analysis of the emergence of BRICS, EU and the nuclear weaponry headache The contemporary time is characterized by the rise of China in the international system. Based on Waldron (2005), The Asian tiger (China)'s military and economic advancement are transforming the entire structure of the international politics and economics. As such, its vast economic expansion and rapid infrastructural establishments are both provenance of Western and Japanese concerns. Thus, this is mainly led by the Chinese quest for natural resources and mineral resources and also their policy of no strings attached positioning on their financial aid (Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2012). The Pentagon had also recognized China as the only country in the world to be able to challenge the US hegemony in the international system (Chen & Feffer, 2009, p. 48). The ensuing reasons behind these are: in 2015, China introduced the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to counter the US engagement in monopolizing the global lending system through the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Elsinga, 2015; Shangai, 2014). China had also demonstrated its interest in overtaking and exercising dominion over global connections by erecting the “New Silk Road” which runs between Western Europe and Asia with maritime and continental routes (Monteleone, 2018). These maritime routes are used by China to explore the world to significant markets like Greece's Piraeus and Gwadar's Pakistan and they are also used for the organization- facilitation between the peripheries and the core world (Komlosy, 2016). In spite of the attempts to establish and sustain “Eurasian Economic Union” by Russia, this will still be beneficial to China as Russia has welcomed with both hands, Chinese investment and loans in mining, pipelines as well as transport infrastructure (Kenton, 2018). China has also invaded the international areas of healthcare, medicine, life art, tourism and cooking (Komlosy, 2016). One important point to add is China's rise with manufacturing Multinational Corporations (MNCs) which often outperform USA MNCs is another problem to consider (Griffiths & Luciani, 2011; Knight, 2014). Projections show that the Asian tiger is anticipated to overtake the USA economically by 2041 (Knight, 2014). Despite the role of China in being the leading figure in the discussion of the challenging the USA hegemony, the BRICS countries at large are also engaged in efforts of countering the USA dominance of international finance. Relevant example include that they were able to launch a New Development Bank (NDB) in 2017. This has another important emerging power pattern found in BRICS, particularly as it relates to the International finance (Ernstzen, 2015). This emerging international economic Power Pattern had also invested heavily in the property investment esp. in the former industrialized countries (Komlosy, 2016). BRICS is also anticipated to overtake and out-perform the combination of the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, France, Italy and Japan by at least the late 2030s (Kim, 2010). A number of trade agreements have also been established in Latin America to counter the US hegemony over trade such as the Bolivian Alternative of Americas (ALBA) to counter USA's hegemony over the Caribbean and Latin America's perpetuated trade hegemony (Fox, 2019). Equally important is the EU, which instituted the Euro to counter the dollar (Lioudis, 2018). This has encouraged organizations such as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to attempt to substitute the US Dollar with EU's Euro (Knight, 2014). Knight (2014) further argues that the emergence of competing blocs in the international system has led to the establishments of EU and the schemes of Regional Integration (RI) in Europe. Thus, this contributes immensely to trade weakening between USA and Europe, which results in the weakening of the US dollar too. Besides the EU, the tactical Nuclear Weapons inclination depicted by North Korea, Russia, Pakistan and Israel worries USA because they are attested to have a lot of nuclear weapons and may continually develop more if they are not monitored and if they are serious about overthrowing USA's hegemony. The actual reality is that more Nuclear warheads are possessed by Russia now more than the USA and this has placed the USA on a security risk (Lockie, 2016). In the year 2014, 8,000 nuclear weapons were recorded by Russia with only 7,300 recorded by the USA (Nersisyan, 2016).

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: Not Zero-Sum

China will win the race – it’s zero sum – the AI lead snowballs

DSI 18, Data Science Insights is an online publication about Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Computing, “America is Roadkill on China’s Path to Artificial Intelligence Dominance”, https://datascientistinsights.com/2018/02/18/america-is-roadkill-on-chinas-path-to-artificial-intelligence-dominance/

America is Roadkill on China’s Path to Artificial Intelligence Dominance “That’s a dead armadillo,” I said pointing with my finger as my arm hung out the car door window. Back in the day, my dad would take our family on vacation drives along iconic Route 66. We drove for hours during the day, stopping at bizarre roadside attractions, and sleeping the night in one of those TeePee motels. Every summer it was the same drive. The same attractions. Same lodging. The only thing that changed was the kind of roadkill, lifeless flattened animal bodies, that my sister and I would try to identify as we motored along. As much as they were all different, they were all the same. Their tiny bodies were slower to move than the massive cars and trucks plowing along the highway. They never had a chance. America faces a similar challenge in our desire to navigate across the competitive roadscapes leading towards an artificially intelligent driven world. As a country, America stands at the slide of a heavily travelled global AI highway, tepidly stepping out into strategic traffic and then back onto the tactical breakdown lane. Back to a slow pace and a safer place. All the while, massive AI achievements are zipping by from other countries with amazing speed. Pushing us further back onto the side of the road. Keeping us from make our move. Giving us a false sense of safety. All the while keeping us from a lumbering move that would most likely have us end up like the dead armadillo of my childhood day. America is dangerously lagging other parts of the world when it comes to treating AI as a strategic asset. For example, China seeks to dominate the global AI industry. We do not. They are treating development of AI as an arms race, building massive government supported industries that drive toward their strategic endgame – own AI, around the world, and have the resources to support it. We have no stated strategy. To support their strategic goals, to win the inevitable zero sum competitive games with America, China has release a national AI development strategy. This set of capabilities, partners, and alliances that will guide their goals to develop a China-centric $23B AI industry by 2020 and a $59B industry by 2025. Local and state governments are also supporting this strategy, creating educational and delivery alliance partners. China’s 1.4 billion population is a data gold mine for building AI. For China, this is national strategic initiative. A Pax Americana of Asia AI. We don’t have one. They do. That’s an America problem. A strategic problem. Lack of a national strategic program is important because AI is a unique strategic resource. It is not like oil, water, or food. Traditional strategic resources do not beget more of those resource. Having a reserve of oil does not in itself generate more oil. These resources are finite and consumed. AI is different. AI produces more AI. AI is an exothermic resource, generating more than it consumes. It produces more knowledge, more insights, more advantages for the user. Having a strategic AI lead means one can produce more AI in the future, faster than those that don’t have it or are just starting. John Boyd, a United States Air Force Colonel, studies the tactical effects of strategically out thinking your enemy. He determined that when one operates at a faster tempo or rhythm than the adversary, you will win and they lose in a zero sum competitive game. AI is a catalyst for faster tempos and rhythms. But unlike other processes, like the OODA that Boyd studied, AI exponentially improves its results with each cycle, each evolution. This limits effective counter attacks, limits effective transformations that could equalize future competitive engagements. He who owns AI, owns the world.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: Not Zero-Sum

Yes zero-sum--- investors will only fund one countries start-ups.

Jillian D’Onfro 05-25-2018 [Jillian D’Onfro was a technology reporter for CNBC.com, CNBC, “Silicon Valley investors explain why they’re afraid of China,” Graphics omitted, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/25/why-silicon-valley-investors-are-scared-of-china.html//ZW]

Silicon Valley investors are worried that China’s tech sector will eat their lunch. The idea came up at a Bay Area debate earlier this week when Sequoia Capital venture partner Mike Vernal posited that China will soon overtake the U.S. in areas like artificial intelligence and autonomous vehicles. “The Chinese government and the Chinese tech leaders are marching in lockstep towards innovation,” he said on stage at an event hosted by The Churchill Club. “So I think there’s a real risk that in three to five years’ time, we wake up and realize that China is far ahead of the U.S. and Silicon Valley.” The four other investors on stage — David Cowan from Bessemer, Sarah Guo from Greylock, Nicole Quinn from Lightspeed and Tomasz Tunguz from Redpoint — largely agreed with Vernal’s prediction. In China, the government is eager to clear hurdles for self-driving cars, data sharing, or factory automation, while start-ups in the U.S. get caught up in regulation, Vernal said. Not only is the Chinese government more aligned with the country’s tech sector, but start-ups there have access to much larger data sets to train their AI algorithms, due to both the size of the population and fewer concerns or regulations around privacy, added Tunguz. Each investor had to present two technology trends that they thought would take off in three to five years and this was one of Vernal’s pitches: The only investor who didn’t agree with Vernal’s prediction was Cowan, who argued that technology isn’t a winner-take-all situation and that innovation in China will benefit economies and consumers everywhere. Guo rebuffed that notion. “Technology overall is not a zero-sum game, but for any of the companies we invest in, sometimes it is,” she said. Chinese start-ups relating to artificial intelligence are already attracting more funding: They received 48 percent of global AI funding versus 38 percent in the U.S., according to CB Insights. One way that Silicon Valley could maintain its status as a global innovation hub is to continue to make it a place where people from all around the world want to work, Guo added. ‘Wide-eyed optimism about China’ Several of the VCs brought up their opposition to President Donald Trump’s immigration reform plans, which could cause a brain drain in Silicon Valley. “This is not a criticism about China — it’s wide-eyed optimism about China,” Vernal said. “It’s more of a criticism of the U.S. I am deeply patriotic ... but I fear that China will become a more forward-leaning society and we descend into bickering and complacency.” Sequoia is arguably Silicon Valley’s most successful venture capital firm, having invested in giants like Apple, Google, Oracle, YouTube and Yahoo over its nearly five decades. Vernal joined in 2016 from Facebook, where he spent more than eight years, most recently leading its search group. In the early days of Facebook, the company resented the fast imitation of social network knockoffs in Russia and China, he says, but now it’s looking with envy at China’s extremely popular WeChat messaging app. “Today, if you look at WhatsApp or Messenger, both of them pale in comparison to WeChat, which is just a force to be beheld in China,” he said. “In many ways, the Messenger and WhatsApp teams wish they had something as influential, and powerful, and ubiquitous as WeChat.” Another Sequoia partner, Mike Moritz, recently came under fire for an opinion piece comparing Silicon Valley’s work ethic unfavorably to China’s, where he says tech employees often work 10 hour days, six days a week. Critics called his take tone deaf, and said it glorified unhealthy work practices. Here’s the full list of the top tech trends that the VCs presented at the event: [graphic omitted]

*the site is private? so I couldn’t access, this is that card:

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- China Tech Good

China tech prompts a shift to renewables.

The Global Times 07-29-21 [“Living in China’s technological miracle: CPC’s innovation-driven strategy powers xiaokang society”; https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202107/1230033.shtml//ZW]

Editor's Note: On July 1, China declared it had reached its first centenary development goal - building a moderately prosperous society, or xiaokang, in all respects and is marching confidently toward the second centenary goal of building China into a great modern socialist nation. To decipher what that means in the context of where China is now and where it's heading, the Global Times is publishing a series of multimedia productions about achievements under the xiaokang goal in various aspects. This piece focuses on technological miracles that have changed people's lives. If China were able to build a time machine and send one of its 1.4 billion citizens back to the late 1970s, the person would be stuck in a kerosene lamp-powered life without any electronics. Communication with family and friends would rely on mail carriers. Long-distance travel would mean standing in slow-moving trains for hours or days. Grocery shopping would require different stamps for different items. Those are just several aspects of what the life of an ordinary Chinese person looked like before China embarked on what has been an unparalleled journey to building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, or xiaokang - the 2,500-year old concept that was revived by late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1979 to describe China's goal of modernization. China might not be able to build a time machine. However, the changes brought about by the country's achievement in science and technology for ordinary Chinese people over the past four decades or so are just as magical as they are miraculous. Thanks to technological breakthroughs in various areas, kerosene lamps have been replaced with smart lights controlled by voice command or even the sole presence of a person and powered by greener energies. Mail carriers have been replaced with 5G-powered equipment ensuring that family and friends are just a button away. Old slow trains have been replaced with ultra-fast high-speed rail. And to buy groceries, you might just need to scan your face, if you have to show up at all. Over the past four decades, life in most countries around the world has been changed by advances in science and technology, but none could possibly match the pace or the extent of the change in Chinese life. What China has achieved in terms of scientific and technological advances is nothing short of a miracle. It's hard to pinpoint China's scientific and technological advances as it leads in countless areas from renewable energy to 5G network, and high-speed rail to artificial intelligence (AI), and has numerous world-leading companies. Miraculous advances Several statistics may put things into perspective. China's annual research and development (R&D) spending grew 169 times over from around 14.3 billion yuan ($2.21 billion) at the beginning of the 1990s to 2.44 trillion yuan in 2020. Based on exchange rate conversion, China's total R&D expenditures overtook Japan's in 2013, becoming the world's second after the US. [graphic omitted] China saw its patent applications flourishing from zero case prior to 1985 to 68,720 filings in 2020, having led the world in the number of patent filings since 2011 and overtaking the US in 2019. China has also surpassed the US in terms of the number of academic research papers in 2016. The profound progress in China's scientific and technological capabilities is an integral part of China's xiaokang goal, which contains a sweeping set of targets including economic growth, poverty alleviation, as well as technological innovation. At the centennial of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on July 1, Xi Jinping, Chinese president and general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, declared the completion of the goal and called for further building up of the country's strength in science and technology. Technological innovation and independence have been included as a core part of the CPC's next centennial goal of building China into a modern socialist power by 2050. And with the CPC's firm leadership, innovation-driven strategies, and unique institutional strength, China is well-positioned to become a technological superpower along the journey to socialist modernization, analysts have said. "The institutional advantage of socialism with Chinese characteristics, as reflected in the CPC's centralized and unified leadership, is also a key factor that drives the nation to concentrate its efforts on major tasks in order to make breakthroughs in areas that are closely related to national security and core competitiveness," Sun Fuquan, vice-president of the Beijing-based Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development, affiliated with the Ministry of Science and Technology, told the Global Times. Some current global technological leaders, most notably the US, have been increasingly nervous about China's technological rise and have even moved to contain China's rise. However, just as technological advancements under the xiaokang goal were aimed primarily at improving the livelihood of the Chinese people, China's pursuit of further scientific and technological advances are also aimed at further improving the lives of the Chinese people, analysts have said. To understand where China is headed in terms of how future technologies could change lives, it's noteworthy to look back at how China's achievements over the past several decades completely changed the most basic aspects of life that many have taken for granted. Kerosene lamp to green brightness With China's electricity market design highlighting a wide-reaching network of ultra-high voltage (UHV) transmission lines and a gradual shift toward renewable energy, the country's rise as the world's second-largest economy has been well underpinned by its miraculous advance in terms of power, experts have said. Such a miracle apparently overshadows the US, which is still being haunted by blackouts, as slow UHV progress versus an over-reliance on non-renewable energy fundamentally challenges the stability of the US power supply. Recollecting herself as a young woman in her mid-20s when the xiaokang goal began, a 65-year-old retiree from East China's Anhui Province surname Xing told the Global Times that a typical nightlife scene then was family members sitting around a kerosene lamp. Later on, during the early days when electric lights became initially available, kerosene lamps, candles, and flashlights remained viable alternatives. Over four decades on, she now takes the brightness of bulbs as a guarantee wherever she might be and she even has a handful of color-changing lighting devices that react to her touch and could be synced to music. She said she's now gotten accustomed to the company of a wide array of home appliances and electronics gadgets. As the country continued to gain economic momentum over the years, its electricity consumption has soared amid the influx of various digital gadgets into Chinese households. Last year, the country's power consumption grew by 3.1 percent from the previous year to 7.51 trillion kilowatt hours, official data showed. Back in 1979, China only consumed 276.2 billion kilowatt hours, media reports said. [graphic omitted]Behind the vicissitudes of life is the country's electricity revolution that has rendered different sources of power an increasingly important part of its technological rise. With a national network of UHV transmission lines in place that transmit energy over a long distance, linking far-flung interior regions with abundant solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear power to energy-thirsty coastal regions, China has taken the global lead in enabling efficient, cost effective, and environmentally friendly power transmission. The transition underway toward renewable energy, notably solar and wind power, is considered as the cornerstone of the Chinese economy's aim to hit peak emission by 2030 before becoming carbon neutral by 2060. By comparison, the US, a major global energy producer and consumer, has made slow progress in building a powerful national electricity grid, although a UHV transmission superstructure is widely seen as a solution to the aging transmission infrastructure that cripples [weakens] the nation. Mail carriers to 5G network Another high-profile technological miracle is the giant leap China has taken in eventually establishing itself as a world leader in 5G, to the extent of unnerving the US which has gone to extreme lengths to sanction Chinese 5G equipment vendors, notably Huawei, industry watchers have said, attributing the feat to the country's continued, forward-looking commitments to updating its telecom infrastructure. The eagerness for the arrival of mail carriers to make a delayed connection with your friends or family members, and the excitement of making a call on a public rotary dial telephone, among the common things in the earlier decades were only emblems pictured in some TV episodes or movies of that era. With a 1 billion-strong population of internet users, the country is now acknowledged as the global paradise for mobile communications where tech-savvy users with at least one smartphone are now deeply immersed in a mobile internet-linked world: Real-time video calls or conferences, geographically unbound mobile payments, shopping, food ordering, and taxi-hailing, among other activities that are all powered by the country's almighty mobile network. By the end of 2020, China's mobile phone subscribers had reached 1.59 billion. In stark contrast, there were only 3,000 subscribers in 1988 when China ushered in the era of mobile communications for the first time.[graphic omitted] By the end of 2020, a total of 989 million users in China were enjoying fast connectivity speeds and a rich variety of internet content by surfing on the web. In stark contrast, only 620,000 people could have access to the internet in 1997, the first year that marked China's entrance into the age of the internet. With internet-related industries taking a huge step, the country has rolled out 916,000 5G base stations, accounting for 70 percent of the world's total, and it's now home to over 365 million 5G-connected devices, making up 80 percent of the world's total, according to latest official data. The country's rise as a global leader in the 5G era, with domestic heavyweights including Huawei sitting atop the world's 5G-related patents, has unnerved the US in particular. Feeling frequently on edge over the past few years, the US government has gone to desperate lengths to add a rising number of Chinese entities and businesses to its export control and sanction lists. China, for its part, has been pushing even harder into a head start in next-generation wireless communication. In a fresh sign, Shanghai, where its Pudong New Area has recently been declared to be built into a pioneer area for socialist modernization in the coming decades, on July 21 unveiled a plan for the development of strategic, emerging industries during the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25). The development plan prioritizes breakthroughs in 6G core technologies and the active participation in 6G standardization competitions. Isolation to high-speed travel In yet another instance of China's miraculous rise in the tech world, high-speed rail (HSR) technology and bullet trains are now almost instantly labeled Chinese made, although it is actually China's fast-paced and impressive progress in HSR technology that makes many forget that the first HSR system began operations in Japan. The country's focus on sharpening its edge in higher-end manufacturing arguably makes the case for the HSR miracle, observers have said. Riding on an ultra-fast, comfortable HSR from Shanghai to Beijing, Liu, a frequent traveler, booked a food delivery via his smartphone one hour before the train stopped for a few minutes at the station in Ji'nan, capital of East China's Shandong Province. Receiving a freshly made rice and meat set meal from a restaurant outside the train carriage, Liu told the Global Times how he marveled at the drastic changes of train technologies and services. He still recalls the scene a decade ago when standing in the train for a whole night, enduring its slow movement, and felt his feet completely go numb on reaching the destination.[graphic omitted]Now the Beijing-Shanghai HSR, one of China's busiest and fastest rail lines, carried 1.35 billion passengers during its first decade of operation, running a distance equivalent to approximately 40,000 revolutions around the globe. It takes only four and a half hours between the two major cities, compared with nearly 17 hours in the 1980s on the green-skinned train. By the end of 2020, the country had more than 37,900 kilometers of HSR lines in service, the longest in the world, according to China State Railway Group, the country's railway operator. Marked as a historical breakthrough, the HSR demonstrated to the world the country's growing technology prowess by mastering technology in its own hands that was once held by Japan, Germany, and France, as well as its increasing prosperity as the world's second-largest economy. Not stopping its pursuit for more advanced HSR technologies, China is among the first in the world to introduce new technology such as autonomous train operation, as evidenced in the high-speed railway line connecting Beijing and Zhangjiakou, the cities to co-host the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics. With a maximum design speed of 350 kilometers per hour (kph), the trains can automatically start and stop, run between stations, open and close doors, as well as handle emergencies, marking the first time China will have had autonomous high-speed trains. To seek higher speed on land, China's self-developed high-speed maglev transportation system running at a speed of 600 kph debuted in Qingdao, East China's Shandong Province, on July 20, which symbolized a cutting-edge scientific and technological achievement in the field of rail transit. Stamps to facial scan China's spectacular march in artificial intelligence over the past decade is surely another miracle that can't be overlooked when gauging the country's technological revolution at a much later stage of its xiaokang adventure, as the economy's transition toward being innovation-oriented has prioritized AI, alongside big data and cloud computing, among other emerging technologies, to power the economic growth. As a consequence of the country's stunning leap toward being a trendsetter in AI, face recognition-enabled ticket checking machines have been deployed in a growing number of railway stations across the country. Face recognition clocking in machines are also becoming commonplace in the country.[graphic omitted] Thanks to broad-base applications of AI technology into everyday life and the workplace, these technological advancements helped in the quick and effective tracing of virus infections, with the country ahead of other major economies in emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic. In a sign of the country's fabulous stride from a manufacturing hub to a global technology power into the future, China holds 389,571 out of over 520,000 AI patent applications globally over the past decade, according to findings in a report by the Tsinghua University Artificial Intelligence Research Institute earlier this year. The four Chinese AI heavyweights - Megvii, SenseTime Group, YITU Technology, and CloudWalk - have also in recent years bagged numerous world-class AI-related awards, notably in image recognition and algorithm terms. The country has achieved a transition in AI technologies development from a focus on basic research to the enabling of its application into specific industries to AI functioning as infrastructure, Sun Jian, chief scientist of Megvii, said at the AI firm's tech open day in Beijing in mid-July. As part of efforts to close China's gap with the US in the AI ecosystem, Megvii has unveiled its proprietary open-source deep learning framework, MegEngine, as a new, promising alternative to Google's TensorFlow and Facebook-backed PyTorch. Maps to navigation satellites Last but not the least, a number of milestones China has hit in the aerospace spotlight the country's enviable miracle in space technology, backed by efforts of several generations of China's space industry experts to turn the country into a space power. An autonomous driving car packed with vegetables, fruits, and fresh seafood was driving to a residential area in Beijing's Shunyi district in July 2020 when the coronavirus epidemic put many people to stay at home. By receiving the signal of BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), the driverless car could adjust its route in real time operation while being guaranteed to stay on the right track. [graphic omitted] It was just one of various scenarios that the Chinese home-grown navigation system was applied to in quotidian life. With the last BDS satellite successfully sent into space in June 2020, it marked the completion of the country's domestically developed BeiDou constellation. The satellite system has now become part of usual technological advances in China in the space area; however, it was hard to imagine how Chinese pioneers overcame difficulties in extreme conditions to undertake "mission impossible" back in the 1970s. With the familiar melody of "Dongfanghong", a Chinese song that pays tribute to Chairman Mao, broadcasting from space, China's first man-made satellite Dongfanghong-1 was successfully launched in 1970. The launch was via China's own booster - Long March 1 rocket, making China the fifth nation to put a spacecraft into orbit using its own rocket. By that moment, China had proved to the world that it could realize what other foreign countries could. China's aerospace development started late from a low point, but has achieved outstanding progress in a short period of time. Through the efforts and contributions of several generations of people engaging in the aerospace cause, China has caught up with the world's other aerospace powers. Following successful tests of its first atomic bomb and hydrogen bomb in the 1960s, and the Dongfanghong-1 satellite, China opened a new chapter in space exploration, sending hundreds of self-developed spacecrafts including man-made satellites, crewed spacecrafts, and space probes. The space industry has produced a remarkable score over the past two years characterized by the nation's first independent Mars mission and the Chang'e 5 mission that retrieved rock and soil samples from the moon. The latest advance came as China sent three taikonauts into orbit in June via the Shenzhou-12 spaceship, the first of four crewed space flights to complete the country's space station by the end of 2022.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- China LIO Good

Exclusion of China causes backlash which escalates to great power war and turns every benefit from the LIO---Ikenberry is garbage

Shidore 21 — Sarang Shidore is Director of Studies at the Quincy Institute. His areas of research and analysis are geopolitical risk, grand strategy, and energy/climate security, with a special emphasis on Asia Sarang Shidore, "Calling 'liberal internationalism' what it is: American primacy," Responsible Statecraft, August 4, 2021, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/08/04/calling-liberal-internationalism-what-it-is-american-primacy/, accessed 7-7-2022, WMK

The authors argue instead for “liberal internationalism,” better characterized as primacy, or armed global dominance, of the liberal variety. However, liberal primacy, a major influence in Washington for decades, is itself partly responsible for the crises of the current world order and is now enhancing risks of great power conflict. Moreover, liberal primacy marginalizes alternative and quite different versions of internationalism, including those well within the American tradition, which have much to contribute to achieve a world of security and prosperity.

Deudney and Ikenberry’s main arguments are as follows: The restraint camp remains hostage to its critique of the American “blunder” in Iraq. It is moreover incoherent due to its dissimilar factions of libertarians, balance-of-power realists, and progressives, and thereby offers only a negative agenda for shaping the future world order. Restrainers purportedly provide no solutions to problems generated due to industrialization and high interdependence, such as inequality and climate change. Moreover, they resist defending and promoting democracy in a world threatened by a rising and authoritarian China. “Liberal internationalism” with its focus on democracy promotion, institutions, and regulated capitalism is the only model that can solve the world’s problems.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- China LIO Good

Only inclusion of China into the world order solves every global threat---its cooperate or die

Tiberghien 22 — Yves Tiberghien, Danielle Luo, Panthea Pourmalek, "Existential Gap: Digital/AI Acceleration and the Missing Global Governance Capacity," Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2-14-2022, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/existential-gap-digitalai-acceleration-and-the-missing-global-governance-capacity/, accessed 7-7-2022 WMK

We are facing an ever-growing gap between the phenomenal acceleration of technology and of connectivity, and the human capacity to manage these trends. The gap is well-documented in the fields of finance, climate change, pandemics and nuclear risks. But the contrast between the exponential growth of disruptive technology and the lacklustre supply of governance mechanisms is starkest in the fields of digital governance and artificial intelligence (AI).

That gap becomes existential when we consider the likely future development of artificial general intelligence (AGI) (Ord 2020) or superintelligence (Bostrom 2015) that can be misaligned with human values or even the goal of ensuring the continuity of human existence. This question of the governance of life with AI may be the most essential question of our time (Tegmark 2017), but you would not know it from the current output of global governance in this field. Summarizing the judgement of many scientists in the field, Toby Ord argues that unaligned AGI is actually the number-one global existential risk for humanity, with a 10 percent chance of human extinction within 100 years. The prophesized existential threats posed by extreme and accelerated technological advancement and expansion have never been as close to reality as they are now. As noted by Yuval Noah Harari and Daniel Kahneman (2021) in a recent conversation, the task of taming and governing the digital/AI revolution is daunting. Humanity may have no slack for a mistake this time around, given the existential consequences of such a mistake.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- China LIO Good

China leadership is key to global governance, peace keeping, and development---overcomes current UN flaws

Schwoob 18 — Marie-Helene Schwoob is Advisor to the Executive Secretary of the UNCCD. Marie-Hélène Schwoob, et al. THE UNITED NATIONS OF CHINA: A VISION OF THE WORLD ORDER. “Chinese views on the global agenda for development “ European Council on Foreign Relations, 2018. JSTOR, . WMK

Over the past few years, the position of China on the international stage has gradually evolved, following its rise as an economic power, visible in its rapidly increasing trade and investment flows. China’s evolving role has also had implications for its place in global governance, through a greater involvement in activities ranging from United Nations peacekeeping operations (China is by far the biggest contributor of personnel, with more than 3,000 troops and police committed) to contributions to development funds (Xi Jinping pledged $2 billion in support for the development of poor countries at the Sustainable Development Summit in 2015). Numerous Chinese scholars have started to rethink China’s role and consider new strategies that would help the country offer alternative models for international cooperation and governance for development. Cui Wenxing, a post-doctoral fellow at Fudan University, writes that there have been three main stages of evolution in China’s development policy. Firstly, under Mao, when the country’s south-south cooperation was essentially based on political considerations (such as providing assistance to socialist countries).[20] Secondly, after the reform and opening up, when China shifted its focus essentially to economic cooperation with other countries (in all directions), and, finally, the acceleration of the “going out” movement (走出去 zouchuqu) in the 21st century, when south-south cooperation became a way for China to encourage its enterprises to go abroad and to take part in global development.[21] Cui believes that both the “going out” movement and China’s development agenda provided opportunities for Chinese enterprises for more economic cooperation (for instance, via low interest loans provided to Chinese enterprises in developing countries). For Xu Qiyuan, associate research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Sun Jingying, postdoctoral fellow at Beijing University, even if “it is clear that China is still a developing country”, its role has evolved from that of recipient country to one of donor country, and China has become an important partner of international development agencies.[22] China’s role in the development of south-south cooperation has been increasing tremendously. The time has come, say these authors, for China to build a “new global partnership for development” (建新型全球发展伙伴关系 jian xinxing quanqiu fazhan huoban guanxi), arguing that this new approach should put aside political issues but focus partnerships on pragmatic interests.[23] Chinese criticism of the UN development agenda Chinese scholars point to the imperfections of the development framework that the United Nations has promoted since its foundation in 1945. Some Chinese scholars, such as Xu and Sun, recognise that the UN’s development framework managed to gradually mobilise the international community, that it has achieved some level of agreement on key concepts relating to development (such as environmental issues, climate change, or sustainable development goals), and that it has contributed to the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, several problems remain in the view of these authors. Among other issues, they note that the MDGs have had mixed results, such as uneven progress geographically, and areas of development lagging behind, such as universal access to primary education, maternal healthcare, and environmental sustainability. In addition, they believe that the development framework has sometimes focused too much on political issues – for instance, the controversial conditions attached to aid, which relate to governance, transparency, and human rights. In their view these issues should be separated from a country’s development goals. In particular, Xu and Sun argue that donor countries often link environmental aspects of sustainable development to political aspects that oppose the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, a phrase which is important to developing countries. Developed countries (“traditional aid countries”) indeed usually put emphasis on a “universal” principle of environmental responsibility, resulting in environmental sustainability goals being placed at the forefront of priorities.[24] In addition, for Cui, the “shock therapy” of the World Bank has had significant downsides, by forcing countries to adopt austerity policies and to engage in market liberalisation over short periods of time, instead of progressively changing policies based on long-term research and experimentation.[25] China’s development agenda and the UN In the view of Xu, Sun, and Cui, China has implemented a successful economic development model and it has performed well in its progress towards the MDGs, all of which (in their view) relate to Deng Xiaoping’s development paradigm “crossing the river by feeling the stones” (摸着石头过河 mozhe shitou guohe), which provided a smoother alternative to the shock therapy of the World Bank.[26] However, the author/authors believes that there is a role for China to play in redefining a more balanced global partnership for development, that would better reflect the rise of south-south cooperation and the growing role of emerging economies.[27] Xu, Sun, and Cao Jiahan (assistant research fellow at the Research Institute of Comparative Politics and Public Policy) recognise that the new role that China could play at the global level should take into account organisations which already exist, such as the development agencies of traditional aid countries or the UN agencies in charge of implementing the 2030 Development Agenda. For them, connecting Chinese development initiatives to the agenda of these organisations could indeed help increase trust in these initiatives. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in particular, has recently raised some concerns in the international community, in Western countries in particular. For Cao, connecting the BRI agenda to the United Nations’ 2030 Development Agenda could be a way to “increase trust and dispel doubts” ( 增信释疑 zengxin shiyi) and to exert greater international influence, as the BRI represents “an attempt by China to explore a new model of international cooperation for development and global governance”. [28]

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Regs Key/AT: AI Impact

Over 100 scientists say we need proper regulations.

George Dvorsky 01-14-15 [Writing for Gizmodo, Gizmodo, “Prominent Scientists Sign Letter Warning About AI Risks,” https://gizmodo.com/prominent-scientists-sign-letter-of-warning-about-ai-ri-1679487924//ZW]

Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, and many other prominent figures have signed an open letter pushing for responsible AI oversight in order to mitigate risks and ensure the "societal benefit" of the technology. The open letter was put together by the Future of Life Institute, a group mobilized by Skype co-founder Jaan Tallinn, MIT's Max Tegmark, Harvard's Viktoriya Krakovna, Boston University's Meia Chita-Tegmark, and UC Santa Cruz professor Anthony Aguirre. Its scientific advisory board boasts such figures as Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, Sir Martin Rees, George Church, and Nick Bostrom. The signatories of the open letter are not calling for a ban on AI research and development. Rather, they're calling for responsible oversight to ensure that it works with humanity's best interests in mind. They write: There is now a broad consensus that AI research is progressing steadily, and that its impact on society is likely to increase. The potential benefits are huge, since everything that civilization has to offer is a product of human intelligence; we cannot predict what we might achieve when this intelligence is magnified by the tools AI may provide, but the eradication of disease and poverty are not unfathomable. Because of the great potential of AI, it is important to research how to reap its benefits while avoiding potential pitfalls. Consequently, the authors say we need to "focus research not only on making AI more capable, but also on maximizing the societal benefit of AI." They have compiled a research priorities document which gives many examples of research directions that could contribute to the realization of these goals. "In summary," the authors write, "we believe that research on how to make AI systems robust and beneficial is both important and timely, and that there are concrete research directions that can be pursued today." Since the open letter was posted a few days ago, hundreds of people (myself included) have put their names on the list. I took a screen grab to show some of the more prominent signatories: You can add your name to the list here.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Regulatory Capture

Private companies develop unregulated AI.

Nicola Perrin and Danil Mikhailov 11-03-2017 [Nicola Perrin is head of Understanding Patient Data, an initiative that supports better conversations about the uses of health information and Danil Mikhailov is head of digital strategy at Wellcome, The Guardian, “Why we can’t leave AI in the hands of Big Tech,” https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/nov/03/why-we-cant-leave-ai-in-the-hands-of-big-tech//ZW]

Fresh breakthroughs in artificial intelligence come thick and fast these days. Last month, Google’s DeepMind revealed its latest Go-playing AI which mastered the ancient game from scratch in a mere 70 hours. AI can spot cancer in medical scans better than humans, meaning radiotherapy can be targeted in minutes, not hours. We may soon use the technology to design new drugs, or repurpose existing ones to treat other, neglected, diseases. But as we begin to realise these opportunities, the potential risks increase: that AI will proliferate, uncontrolled and unregulated, in the hands of a few increasingly powerful technology firms, at the expense of jobs, equality and privacy. Already, mistakes over the sharing of patient records between DeepMind and the Royal Free Hospital in London have raised public concerns about technology firms being involved in digital healthcare. As the Guardian reported this week, the danger of a public backlash to AI, similar to that seen with the introduction of genetically modified crops, is very real. There are similarities – the concern about unforeseen consequences, the complexity of the new technology, the need for public engagement and, above all, the role of industry. With GM crops, businesses initially reaped the benefits, while society bore the risks and the same may well apply to AI. But there are also significant differences. The barriers to introducing AI are much lower than for GM crops, where trials must be approved, as must the sale of seeds and products. Online, there are no borders, and national regulation is either non-existent or difficult to enforce. So the real worry about a public backlash is that the response will not be widespread regulation of the whole marketplace, but instead a clampdown on the use of AI in the public sector. Private companies will continue to use AI, unregulated, to improve the targeting of products. But in the public sector where there could be life-changing benefits, over-regulation will mean the opportunities will be lost. That is not to say that AI should be allowed to spread uncontrolled in the NHS. But it does emphasise why it’s so important to get this right. AI can only be introduced successfully in the NHS if the public, patients and healthcare professionals have confidence in the system, including clear oversight and accountability. Transparency is essential, and so too is a meaningful conversation with the public – something that was lacking with the failed care.data programme and the DeepMind partnership with the Royal Free. Having an early discussion about the value of data, and finding a way for the NHS to realise that value when using services based on algorithms requiring patient data, is crucial. Finally, the implications for the patient and clinician, and issues of fair access and benefit, must be fully addressed. While there is a risk that a GM-style backlash could prevent the appropriate application of AI in healthcare, we should not give up hope. As the Information Commissioner has recently emphasised, it does not need to be a choice between privacy or innovation. The example of embryo research and the recent approval of mitochondrial donation – so-called “three parent babies” – shows that the UK has learnt from the mistakes of GM crops. New technologies can be introduced with public confidence if done carefully, with clear oversight, a robust regulatory framework, wide-reaching debate about the ethical and social implications, and, above all, meaningful public consultation. We must follow the same approach with AI, to ensure that, ultimately, it is the patient who wins the game.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Tech Race

The tech race is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Heather Roff 12-29-2015 [Senior Research Analyst at The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. Fellow at Brookings Institution and Associate Fellow at University of Cambridge Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, The Duck of Minerva, “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of High Tech War,” http://www.duckofminerva.com/2015/12/the-self-fulfilling-prophecy-of-high-tech-war.html//ZW]

In fall of 2014, former Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced his plan to maintain US superiority against rising powers (i.e. Russia and China). His claim was that the US cannot lose its technological edge – and thus superiority – against a modernizing Russia and a rapidly militarizing China. To ensure this edge, he called for the “third Offset Strategy.” The previous two offset strategies were premised on Cold War rivalry and the belief that one can outspend the other through arms races. The first offset desired to gain dominance over Soviet Russia’s feared advantage in manpower and technological prowess. The US sought to deter the Soviets from engaging in a nuclear war. Aside from building up vast arrays of nuclear weapons, both at the tactical and strategic size, as well as creating and detonating thermonuclear weapons, and detonating nuclear weapons in space, both sides amazingly did not engage in direct hostilities. I do not know if the offset strategy had anything to do with this or not, but one could certainly argue that it increased the likelihood of a nuclear confrontation, given that we know during one of the most tense foreign policy situations in history – the Cuban Missile Crisis – four (yes four) nuclear weapons were detonated during the crisis. What is more, we also know that the US and the Soviets continually engaged in proxy wars. The second offset sought ways to fight against a numerically superior force; the results were increases in sensor technologies, command and control technologies, stealth technology, precision-guided munitions, lasers and unmanned vehicles. In an attempt at both creating defensive capacities domestically, and generating new technologies to fight the war in Vietnam, the US amassed the ability to wage network centric warfare. While the capability was not fully realized until Gulf War I, the legwork for much of the technology development was carried out during the 1970s. After Gulf War I, the US technological dominance was not missed by other powers. To counter the offset, these powers began rethinking ways to deny US maneuverability and access. It is this fear, of anti-access area-denial – that has given rise to the third offset. In Hagel’s estimation, the US requires a: “New Long-Range Research and Development Planning Program that will help identify, develop, and field breakthroughs in the most cutting-edge technologies and systems – especially from the fields of robotics, autonomous systems, miniaturization, big data, and advanced manufacturing, including 3D printing.” To lead the charge, Hagel appointed Undersecretary of Defense, Bob Work. Work, a former Colonel in the Marine Corps, is a tall and imposing man. He brooks no nonsense, and is forthright in his estimation that Russia and China pose the biggest threats to US security. Speaking this past November at the Halifax International Security Forum, Work stated “great power competition has returned.” He argued that the US must utilize a “strong but balanced” approach to these near competitors. Aside from wondering how an “offset strategy,” premised on the notion that one is technologically superior can work with a “balanced” approach, Work’s plan to pursue the third offset through autonomous technologies, artificial intelligence, robotics and big data was a bit of a mystery until earlier this month when he gave a speech at the Center for New American Security (where he was briefly CEO). There he stated that the Defense Department is seeking $12 to 15 billion in its 2017 budget to advance these technologies and to “kick the crap out of people who grew up in the iWorld under an authoritarian reign.” $15 billion. To get a handle on what this figure means, we should put it into perspective. The overall defense budget is somewhere on the order of $550 billion (excluding contingency and a black budget). Thus the third offset doesn’t really seem that large. However, compare this to NASA’s entire budget, which is somewhere in the $17 billion ballpark. Or think of it relationally to other state’s military budgets. Adjusted for inflation, Canada spends roughly $16 billion on its entire military force, and this was when conservative Stephen Harper was in power. Thus the US is getting ready to spend the same amount on autonomous weapons, artificial intelligence, robotics and other high tech weapons as Canada spends on all of its weapons, personnel, and logistics combined. It is thus clear that such a dramatic increase in research and development for Offset3 will change the character of future war. But what of the assumptions of this strategy? To begin, one might want to wonder whether preparing for near-peer conflict is the best strategy going forward, given that we know that non-international armed conflict and hybrid war is the new normal. Preparing for a war that is unlikely to play out on a formalized decision tree is unhelpful at best, and how these near-peers might test this technology is open to question (given that many of these conflicts are operationally inappropriate for such weapons). Another thought might be that relying on tactical approaches—due to the thinking that technology will solve the problem—will fail to address the need for strategic thinking. Technology is not “the” answer. Technology and technological development can only aid one in obtaining one’s predetermined goals. If one does not have a clear end point in mind, then one cannot know which technologies to develop. What is more, claiming that the US must “offset” a rising China and a modernizing Russia is not a strategy. It is a countermeasure. Finally, the assumptions driving the DoD, and particularly Work, are still mired in a Cold War perspective. Work has mentioned the “AirLand Battle 2.0”, without really explaining how this is different than the Air Land Battle 1.0 (which can be found in US Army Field Manual 100-5 from 1976). If we are to think that the AirLand Battle 2.0 is qualitatively different than its Cold War predecessor, I’d like to know how. For instance, Work describes how warfare will be “hybrid” and “asymmetric” and that we need to learn how to fight and win in these environments, but then he falls back on a strategic mindset that is not strategic. AirLand Battle 1.0 was a doctrine about how to fight. It was an operational and tactical handbook. It was not a strategic perspective. As Romjue points out in 1984: “FM 100-5 adds precision to earlier statements of the AirLand Battle concept. It is explicit about the intent of U.S. Army doctrine, and it conveys a vigorous offensive spirit. AirLand Battle doctrine “is based on securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to defeat the enemy. . . . Army units will. . . . attack the enemy in depth with fire and maneuver and synchronize all efforts to attain the objective.” it also notes that “our operations must be rapid, unpredictable, violent, and disorienting to the enemy.’” So where does this leave us in 2016 and beyond? First, it is beyond unhelpful to revisit the well of “offset strategies” and Cold War doctrine. As Khong rightly noted over 20 years ago, analogizing current foreign policy situations is not very helpful. Likewise thinking that what worked in 1959 or in 1972 will not work now. Second, the types of technologies that the DoD is pursuing are qualitatively different than their predecessors. This is not to say that they are more or less dangerous. It is to say that what Work and his colleagues are after is the ability of nonhuman agents to make decisions on and in the battlespace. Autonomous technologies are not, as I’ve argued elsewhere, “smarter smart bombs.” In other words, they are not precision-guided munitions; rather they are “deciding munitions.” Where a human being decides a particular target and launches munitions to that target, an autonomous weapon or an artificial intelligence, would be the entity deciding. Whichever munitions it launches is beside the point. In the end, it appears that the US fear of losing its technological edge to near-peer competitor nations is a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, the more it pursues this particular offset, the greater the chances that all sides will simultaneously benefit from these advances. Creating stronger AI is not like building thermonuclear warheads. The materials are easy to come by, the knowledge is readily available, and the commercial sector is driving the way. Moreover, if we are to abide by the same doctrinal insights from forty plus years ago without questioning their applicability or appropriateness, then perhaps we should also embrace some of the other gems of the day, like building fallout shelters, smoking on air planes and shooting student protesters who question war.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: China Won’t Regulate

China will continue to regulate emerging tech.

Dr. Sara Hsu 11-01-21 [Adjunct Fellow, Trade 'n Technology Program; ICAS; “China’s Regulatory Clampdown on Big Tech”; https://chinaus-icas.org/research/chinas-regulatory-clampdown-on-big-tech///ZW]

China has initiated a Regulatory Five-Year Plan which states China will “actively promote legislation in important areas such as national security, technological innovation, public health, culture and education, ethnic religion, biosecurity, ecological civilization, risk prevention, anti-monopoly, and foreign-related rule of law.” The plan aims to enhance law enforcement and ensure that administrative agencies serve the people. However, to the extent that the Regulatory Five-Year Plan dictates guidance by ideology, it is somewhat unclear how these new regulations and enforcement thereof will be carried out. The first point commits to the “in-depth study and implementation of Xi Jinping’s thoughts on the rule of law,” which refers to Xi Jinping’s writings and speeches that mention the topic. This was laid out at the first Central Conference on Work Related to Law-Based Governance in November 2020, where President Xi emphasized the need to focus on the people, to uphold Constitution-based governance, and to commit to the socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics. While the new plan appears to aim at making government more efficient and create a fair and stable business environment, it is not clear how Communist ideology will impact the types of rules to be created and enforced. Like Xi Jinping, the party is a living, breathing entity that takes a different view of how a government should be run compared to its Western counterparts. This is evidenced in the types of new technology regulations that China has recently laid out, particularly regulations that attempt to curb social behavior. Therefore, while we can expect that China will increase the number and enforcement of regulations, particularly in the tech sector, we do not know exactly what types of regulations will become a focus in the near future. We can only speculate that China will follow its current trajectory of tech-related regulations, implementing new rules that effectively reduce the power of its home-grown Big Tech firms. China also tends to favor domestic over international investors, and the concern that China has been seeking to crack down on the VIE structure has led the U.S. SEC to warn American investors over the riskiness of investing in Chinese stocks. In addition, while China has committed to expanding innovation, we now know as a result of these new regulations that innovations must have their own built-in guardrails. In other words, innovations must be mindful of following ever-evolving Communist Party dictum and best practices. Innovations should serve the people and the Party when everything is taken into consideration. What precisely that means is unclear but is likely to become somewhat more intelligible over time. So, what can one expect for the future? More regulations—especially rules that coincide with high-level political objectives and directives over time as well as those that reduce socioeconomic instability. We also expect more enforcement of existing regulations across industries and more activity by SAMR on anti-monopoly activity. The swathe of new regulations and the Regulatory Five-Year Plan are a call to arms by Chinese regulators. As such, U.S. investors should study these regulatory plans carefully to reduce uncertainty.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: China Won’t Regulate

Massive regulations from the government ensure no regulatory capture.

The Economist 09-11-21 [“China has become a laboratory for the regulation of digital technology”; https://www.economist.com/china/2021/09/11/china-has-become-a-laboratory-for-the-regulation-of-digital-technology//ZW]

With foreign competitors such as Facebook and Google blocked, domestic tech giants have for two decades dominated the Chinese market. The Communist Party has kept a firm grip on politics, but the tech firms have had considerable leeway in their business activities. “It was a Wild West within an authoritarian system,” says Martin Chorzempa of the Peterson Institute, an American think-tank. Now the Communist Party is reminding internet billionaires who is boss. President Xi Jinping has authorised an extraordinary crackdown. Last year the planned ipo of Ant Group, a giant internet finance company, was halted at the last moment. In July, two days after Didi, a ride-hailing firm, went public in New York, China’s internet regulator ordered it to stop signing up new users, and forced its apps off mobile stores. The city of Beijing on September 6th denied reports that it is considering taking Didi under state control. Video-game companies are being pushed into scanning their users’ faces to help enforce a ban on children playing online games for more than three hours a week. The crackdown has shifted the balance, says Mr Chorzempa. Now, “technocrats, who have been frustrated for years that companies ignore proper, sensible regulations, are empowered.” The party is pushing for more than superficial change. It is using a suite of new laws and regulations to force tech firms to alter both their behaviour and their products. The aim is to control what Chinese people see and do online. The new rules will require tech firms to write code for their platforms so that they promote content that the government likes, and inhibit what it does not. This is likely to be more efficient than the whack-a-mole approach of enforcing the party’s will case by case, and plausible at a scale that the labour-intensive approach of trying to control technological systems directly would not be. In the past month alone Chinese lawmakers have finalised at least four new laws and regulations which, as they go into effect over the next three months, will have the potential to reshape the Chinese internet. Technology regulations in other countries and regions, such as Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (gdpr), mostly require companies to obtain their customers’ consent for the specific processing of their data. China’s new rules are much stricter and more wide-ranging. Tech firms will be expected to protect national security and public order, says Nicolas Bahmanyar, a data-privacy consultant with Leaf, a law firm in Beijing. “A little banner is not going to cut it,” he adds. A Personal Information Protection Law (pipl), China’s first privacy law, comes into effect on November 1st. Years in the making, it is much shorter and less detailed than gdpr, which inspired it, laying out principles that are both broad and intentionally vague. Details and future reinterpretations are to be dealt with by regulations particular to certain industries or technologies. This, says Mr Bahmanyar, allows regulation to keep pace with fast-changing technology. It also gives the government leeway to enforce vague rules as it sees fit. Didi was hit by rules brought in to govern companies whose digital services are seen as critical infrastructure. These were rewritten to cover foreign listings just as the firm was attempting to go public. Not all new laws will worry investors as much as the ones used to clobber Didi. Some deal with problems that affect the West, too. One forthcoming set of regulations published in draft on August 27th by the Cyberspace Administration of China (cac) looks to set the rules for the use of recommendation algorithms. This is the sort of software that companies like Amazon and Alibaba use to recommend products based on a customer’s shopping history, or that short-video apps like TikTok use to work out what viewers like in order to give them more of it. The draft regulations require, for instance, that companies expose the keywords with which they have labelled their users, and allow users to delete them. This, in principle, will mean that internet users in China will no longer be dogged by advertisements for the refrigerator that a recommendation algorithm has decided they might like to buy. Writing algorithms which lead users to “addiction or high-value consumption” would also be banned. Algorithms which dispatch workers, such as Didi’s driver-management system, must “ensure workers’ rights and interests”. The regulations read like an attempt to fix the problems griped about by consumers everywhere. They also require firms that deploy recommendation algorithms to “uphold mainstream values” and to “vigorously disseminate positive energy”. Such algorithms must not be used to “engage in activities harming national security” or to upset the economic or social order. As such, their aim seems to be to withhold algorithmic juice from any content that does not make the government look good. Kendra Schaefer of Trivium, a consultancy in Beijing, has written that the publication of these new algorithm regulations marks the moment when Chinese tech laws have gone beyond those in Europe (in America, only California has such rules). Data-protection experts say many of these changes will be beneficial. Chinese internet users are constantly assailed by spam messages and phone calls. An app developed by the ministry of public security, which promises to screen fraudulent calls and messages, has become one of the most downloaded in China since it was released in March. The Chinese press is full of stories about people’s personal data being stolen. In 2016 Xu Yuyu, a prospective student, died of a heart attack after transferring her life savings to fraudsters who used personal data purchased on the black market to trick her into thinking they represented her university. Protecting people from such predations will burnish the party’s reputation for standing up for the little guy. The new rules give citizens more rights against companies than people in any other country. But they give Chinese internet users precisely no privacy rights enforceable against the state. Indeed, says Sajai Singh of J. Sagar Associates, a law firm in Bangalore, the creation of a single common standard for the treatment of data in China will make it easier for the state to spy on citizens. Mr Chorzempa says rewriting the law to make firms rewrite software is a sea change. Once they start feeling they can intervene “at this level and granularity, what else will they do?” he asks.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: China Won’t Regulate

China regulates tech now.

Kai von Carnap and Valarie Tan 12-21-21 [Kai von Carnap is an analyst an MERICS in Berlin. His research focuses on technological trends and digital developments in China, with an expertise in cryptocurrencies and Blockchain technology; Valarie Tan is an analyst at MERICS. Her research focuses on Chinese elites and global entrepreneurs, societal and media debates, as well as political communication; The Diplomat; “Tech Regulation in China Brings in Sweeping Changes”; https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/tech-regulation-in-china-brings-in-sweeping-changes///ZW]

When Jack Ma, the billionaire founder of internet giant Alibaba, told China’s financial elites on October 24, 2020 that their incompetence had created a severely underdeveloped financial system and insinuated that his fintech may be the cure, his words marked the moment when Beijing shifted its relations to big tech giants from toleration to confrontation. Ma was perhaps unaware that the same day saw the launch of “Operation Cyber Sword,” a wide-ranging campaign involving 14 ministries and agencies aimed at reigning in China’s tech sector. The regulatory actors were given six tasks: regulating live-commerce platforms, cracking down on unfair competition in online markets, strengthening the supervision of internet advertising, centralizing control of online sales, and ending illegal animal and plant trade on e-commerce platforms. What has followed over the ensuing 12 months is an unprecedented and ongoing regulatory onslaught. Hundreds of companies have been fined north of $3 billion, apps have been taken off stores, and Jack Ma – until then China’s richest man – inexplicably went missing for three months. The Chinese government was sending a message. As the People’s Daily put it: “There was never such as thing as Ma’s era, just an era that Ma happened to live in.” China’s Cyber Sword is being wielded not just at individual companies or apps but at entire industries and ecosystems. A whole range of antitrust guidelines and rules have been introduced and applied to e-commerce platforms, social media providers, and live-streaming services. Behind the regulatory onslaught is a paradigmic shift, the result of long-term preparation by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) leader Xi Jinping. Xi declared 2021 to be the beginning of the “New Development Stage” for China. The CCP has fulfilled the promise of former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping – achieving a “moderately prosperous society” through market reforms, partial opening and liberalization and other means over the past 40 years. The new goal set by Xi for “New China” is to become a “Modern Socialist Country” by 2049. Exact benchmarks to achieve that goal are not set in stone. What is clear thus far are the core elements of Xi’s vision – namely technological self-sufficiency, a closely steered government economy, and China’s ambition to become a technology superpower. The strict regulation of big tech companies we are witnessing at the moment is therefore not the genuine focus of policymakers, but merely the first, immediate result of implementing the larger national vision over the next 30 years. This vision was gradually introduced in recent years in the form of new institutions with a rapidly expanded legal framework. Bolstered with fresh manpower resources, enforcers are empowered to test these new institutional powers. The State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), for example, was only founded in 2018. Aimed at market regulation, it enforces the Anti-Unfair Competition Law that has been in effect since 2019. The SAMR has successfully investigated more than 3,000 cases of unfair competition and collected 206 million renminbi (RMB) in fines in the first half of 2021. It has also made use of the new E-Commerce Law, effective since 2019, and the recently updated Anti-Monopoly Law. Meanwhile, China’s new cyber watchdog, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) found in 2014, has focused on implementing the 2017 Cyber Security Law and the 2021 Data Security Law. It found more than 100 apps in violation of collecting users’ personal information and ordered Didi, China’s biggest ride-hailing app, to be taken off app stores. Didi and other Chinese tech behemoths saw exponential growth in the last decade attributed, in part, to an absence of regulatory oversight. To drive sales and revenue, companies engaged in business models that came with a host of financial risks and “regulatory problems.” Now the government is keen to tackle those issues in the name of safeguarding consumer rights against freewheeling businesses. A clean-up of unfair business practices is long overdue. As a result, China’s internet sector, once the hotbed of tech innovations, is now forced to undergo profound changes. Eighty percent of misleading advertisements to third party webpages, a vital source of income for many apps and websites, have been taken down. Financial pressure aside, restructuring businesses to comply with the rules has also resulted in lay-offs not just in ad sales, but in gaming and private tutoring, the other two sectors hardest hit by the regulations. Foreign firms operating in China have not been spared. Caving to regulatory pressure as new data and privacy laws came into effect , Microsoft’s LinkedIn pulled its social media services in the country and Yahoo bowed out of China, both citing the “challenging environment” as reason. Further adjustments lie ahead in 2022, not least because of the planned three-year clean-up program for algorithms. A fresh suite of draft regulations overseeing cross-border data transfer, and amendments for tighter enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law only adds to the uncertainty and pressure looming for firms to comply and conform to Xi Jinping’s “New China.”

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: China Won’t Regulate

The US can’t regulate---but China will.

Will Oremus 07-28-21 [technology news analyisis writer; The Washington Post; https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/28/technology-202-china-is-doing-what-us-cant-seem-regulate-its-tech-giants///ZW]

While a slow-burning movement to rein in the U.S. tech industry plods through a gridlocked Congress and various agencies, China’s one-party government is acting swiftly — and harshly — to rein in its own tech titans. This month alone, the country has instituted sweeping new protections for gig workers; imposed new interoperability requirements for online platforms; driven out cryptocurrency exchanges; barred its leading ride-hailing app from app stores; and essentially banned the entire industry of for-profit online tutoring services. Antitrust investigations and penalties have already targeted digital giants Alibaba and Tencent, among others, in recent months. The shakeout continued Tuesday as Tencent’s WeChat, China’s dominant social and messaging platform, stopped registering new users, saying it needs to upgrade certain security systems to comply with unspecified “laws and regulations.” The company expects registrations to resume in early August. The WeChat news comes a day after Chinese regulators issued tough new worker protection rules for food delivery services, including industry leader Meituan, and weeks after ride-hailing giant Didi was removed from app stores as part of a cybersecurity investigation, widely viewed as punishment for the company going public in the United States. The government’s hard line has sent Chinese tech stocks plummeting and rippled across the financial world. Shares of Chinese companies listed in the United States this week saw their steepest two-day drop since the 2008 financial crisis, according to BBC News. Some observers see the moves as part of a political power play against an industry that has grown too wealthy, powerful and independent for the comfort of President Xi Jinping’s regime. In a Substack newsletter, economics commentator Noah Smith argued that it represents a broader shift in national priorities from consumer-facing online platforms and apps to harder, more cutting-edge tech, such as artificial intelligence and chip-making, that supports the country’s geopolitical objectives. There may be truth to both views. But there’s another way of looking at these developments, in which China’s goals for its tech industry are not so different from those of its Western counterparts. It just has fewer checks and restraints on the use of state power to achieve them. [graphic omitted] Rui Ma, an investor and analyst of China’s tech industry and founder of Tech Buzz China, the country isn’t “smashing its tech industry,” as Smith put it. Rather, the crackdown shows that China’s government harbors many of the same concerns as tech critics in the United States and the European Union, and is intent on constructing the ground rules for an ever more digital economy. Protections for gig workers in China, for example, followed years of reports of such workers being overworked, underpaid and abused by unaccountable management algorithms. The tightening of data security laws, focusing on firms with a significant presence outside China, mirrors U.S. fears about data privacy and spying, notably by Chinese firms such as Huawei and ByteDance. The antitrust push draws on the arguments advanced by U.S. Federal Trade Commission Chair Lina Khan and others that dominant digital platforms lend themselves to new forms of monopolization and anticompetitive behavior. “The headlines are virtually the same as what I read in the U.S.,” Rui said. One big difference: Tech regulation in China faces fewer political hurdles than it does in the United States, where a gridlocked two-party Congress and intense lobbying by Silicon Valley firms have so far thwarted meaningful legislation. Despite broad agreement that tech giants are too powerful, both major U.S. parties are divided on how to address issues of competition, consumer protection and online speech. Of course, China’s approach comes with its own big downsides: The lack of democratic process and transparent debate means its regulations can come across as arbitrary, vindictive and unpredictable — traits that tend to spook investors and risk chilling innovation. There is one argument against U.S. regulation, however, that might be crumbling before our eyes: the specter of global domination by an unfettered Chinese Internet sector. In congressional hearings and media interviews, U.S. tech executives have repeatedly warned that onerous regulations, including new antitrust and privacy laws, would hamper their ability to compete with China’s tech gladiators on the world stage. The implication, often unspoken but sometimes explicit, was that China understood that having powerful tech giants was in its national interest, and wouldn’t dare sacrifice that power in the name of values such as privacy, competition or consumer protection. China does see value in its tech giants competing globally, Rui said, and the current regulatory wave is not a sign that it wants to destroy the industry’s ambitions abroad. But it does signal an abrupt end to the country’s hands-off approach to the tech sector, and demonstrates a new willingness to impose its own priorities — even at the cost of their profitability and international standing. There’s been a narrative for years that the United States, the E.U. and China are competing in global “races” in realms such as artificial intelligence; Rui suggests China sees itself as racing to establish a world-class regulatory regime to guide the sector’s future. “China wants to be world-leading in regulations,” Rui said. “They don’t just want to follow the E.U. and the U.S.” From its censorship of the Internet to its surveillance of vulnerable groups, many aspects of the Chinese government’s approach to are cautionary tales for the West. But its aggressive stance toward anticompetitive practices, speculative and carbon-intensive cryptocurrencies, and gig worker exploitation aren’t necessarily the destructive moves they might seem to U.S. observers and investors. On the contrary, they may be laying the foundation for a more sustainable and vibrant Chinese Internet sector in the decades to come.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- China Wins the Tech Race

AI and Biotech

Ghlionn 22 [John Mac Ghlionn is a researcher and essayist. His work has been published by the New York Post, The Sydney Morning Herald, Newsweek, National Review, and The Spectator US, among others. He covers psychology and social relations, and has a keen interest in social dysfunction and media manipulation, 6-10-2022, Has China Already Won?, theepochtimes, https://www.theepochtimes.com/has-china-already-won_4522279.html] Eric

In all five sectors, as I demonstrate below, China is already ahead.

Let’s start with AI. As the NCSC researchers noted, China already possesses “the might, talent, and ambition” to win the AI arms race.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- China Wins the Tech Race

Even with new budget increases--- China still wins the tech race.

Townshend and Crabtree 22 [Mr. Townshend is a senior fellow for Indo-Pacific security at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Crabtree is executive director of the Asia office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 6-15-2022, Opinion, NYT, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/15/opinion/international-world/us-military-china-asia.html] Eric

China has  U.S. warships in the region, its air force has staged intensifying incursions into  and  airspace, and its  . In recent weeks, Chinese fighter pilots have  Canadian military aircraft on a U.N.-sanctioned operation — sometimes  at the Canadians.

As China’s armed forces grow in strength, sophistication and confidence, U.S.-led military deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is losing its bite.