2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: DAs › Thumpers
McLaughlin 22. Jenna McLaughlin is NPR's cybersecurity correspondent, focusing on the intersection of national security and technology; “Estonia hosts NATO-led cyber war games, with one eye on Russia”; May 2, 2022; NPR; //BY
TALLINN, Estonia — Two months after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the cyberwar that experts feared has yet to materialize. But in the tiny Baltic nation of Estonia, digital disaster is playing out nicely.
Over the last week, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence hosted the 10th edition of one of the world's largest annual interactive cybersecurity drills.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Add Ons › 2AC – Israel A/O
Dagres 7-13 [Holly Dagres, 7-13-2022, "Biden’s Middle East trip is sending Iran an escalatory message. Here’s why.", Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/bidens-middle-east-trip-is-sending-iran-an-escalatory-message-heres-why/, DOA: 7-21-2022 //ArchanSen]
US President Joe Biden’s first Middle East trip since taking office comes amid escalating threats of an Israeli military attack against Iran. The visit takes place after talks to revive the Iran nuclear deal ended in Qatar on June 29 without any progress.
“We will not hesitate to use force to keep our citizens safe,” Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid said at an Israeli Defense Forces graduation ceremony on July 8. He cited a nuclear Iran, Hezbollah’s precision-guided missiles in Lebanon, and an axis of terror that is trying to entrench itself in Syria as posing challenging threats to Israel’s security.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Add Ons › 2AC – Israel A/O
Dana 7-14 [Joseph Dana, 7-14-2022, "Russian Cyberattacks in the Baltics Foreshadow the Future of War", Syndication Bureau, https://syndicationbureau.com/en/russian-cyberattacks-in-the-baltics-foreshadow-the-future-of-war/, DOA: 7-21-2022 //ArchanSen]
In 2014, the country even launched the world’s first e-Residency program with the goal of 10 million e-residents by 2025. Although only 85,000 people have become e-residents so far, the program has allowed entrepreneurs worldwide to set up more than 19,000 digital businesses without needing to be physically present. From freelancers to established entrepreneurs and digital nomads, Estonia’s e-Residency has made it possible to operate an online European Union-registered company from anywhere.
The future of warfare is digital because the future of society is digital. Renewed hostilities between the Baltic states and Russia have become critical laboratories to evaluate where the trend lines of cyber conflict are heading. Countries in the Middle East, such as the United Arab Emirates and Israel, are paying particular attention to how the shifting contours of cyber warfare and defense strategies unfold.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Add Ons › China
Pettyjohn and Wasser 5-20-2022, *senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security, **fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (Stacie and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs,
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Add Ons › China
Cyber - -> invasion and PRC can destabilize/counter US forces
Sacks 22 (David, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where his work focuses on U.S.-China relations, U.S.-Taiwan relations, Chinese foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, and the political thought of Hans Morgenthau. “Enhancing U.S.-Japan Coordination for a Taiwan Conflict”, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/Enhancing%20U.S.-Japan%20Coordination%20for%20a%20Taiwan%20Conflict_DP_1.pdf)LR
Adding to the worry, over the past five years China has steadily increased its pressure on Taiwan, reducing the number of mainland tourists who can visit the island, stripping away its few remaining diplomatic partners, placing an embargo on certain Taiwanese exports, ramping up military activities in its vicinity, conducting cyber-attacks, and interfering in Taiwan s democratic process. While Xi continues to publicly stress his commitment to peaceful reunification” with Taiwan and has not introduced an explicit timeline for achieving this objective, he has also said that the Taiwan issue cannot be passed on from generation to generation.”2 He has set 2049 as the date by which China must achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and achieving reunification” with Taiwan is a core condition for that project.3 Still, it remains unlikely that Xi has already decided to use force against Taiwan, which provides an opening for the United States to adjust its policies and work with its allies to help prevent such an outcome. Although there is debate over whether China will resort to force, China is clearly developing capabilities needed to invade and occupy Taiwan. Preparing for a conflict over Taiwan has driven China s military modernization campaign for the past two and a half decades. China has invested significant resources in developing the tools to defeat Taiwan and prevent the United States from coming to its aid, principally an arsenal of accurate ballistic missiles, the world’s largest navy, hundreds of modern fighter aircraft and bombers, and advanced cyber and counterspace assets The recommendations proposed, while ambitious, are feasible in the current political climate in both Washington and Tokyo, and, with sustained focus in both capitals, can be implemented in the next five years. While China has a number of options it could take to put pressure on Taiwan—seizing an offshore island, initiating massive cyberattacks, firing hundreds of ballistic missiles to take out critical infrastructure, and conducting a quarantine of the island—this paper focuses squarely on how to deter and respond to an invasion of Taiwan. It does so in the belief that Japan s appetite for assisting the United States in countering Chinese aggression against Taiwan short of a full war is politically challenging and likely limited. China is not relying on its inherent advantages, however, and has instead spent the last two and a half decades developing capabilities designed to neutralize U.S. power in the Taiwan Strait. Its military budget has grown from $14.3 billion in 1996 to $252.3 billion in 2020, a nearly eighteenfold increase (see figure 2).7 Preparing for a conflict over Taiwan has consistently driven Beijing s procurement decisions, and China can now bring significant capabilities to bear. The PLA Navy (PLAN) is now the largest navy in the world (as measured by the number of ships, although the United States continues to exceed it by tonnage), with 355 ships and submarines, and is set to grow by nearly 100 ships by the end of the decade.8 The PLA Air Force is the largest air force in the region and is rapidly catching up to Western air forces” and eroding U.S. advantages, according to the U.S. Department of Defense.9 The PLA has one thousand short-range ballistic missiles and six hundred medium-range ballistic missiles in its arsenal.10 China has also established an advanced integrated air defense system on its east coast that can cover Taiwan.11 The PLA is now turning its attention to addressing previous gaps that have persisted, such as anti-submarine warfare, while also rapidly developing information, cyber, and space and counterspace capabilities.12 Taiwan, however, is belatedly recognizing the need to dramatically rethink and invest in its defense. In 2017, its military leadership introduced the Overall Defense Concept(ODC), which aims to develop asymmetric approaches to fend off a Chinese invasion and calls for investing in a large number of smaller, cheaper, and more mobile weapons.23 Rather than seeking to defeat the PLA through attrition, ODC focuses on a decisive fight near Taiwans shores and the prevention of a successful PLA landing. Taiwan has steadily increased its defense budget in recent years, which is now the highest it has ever been in absolute terms.24 More important is using these funds to resource an asymmetric strategy, purchasing missiles, drones, and howitzers.25 There remain obstacles to ODC s implementation, however, and more traditional thinking could well make a comeback.26 All of this means that U.S. intervention on Taiwan s behalf would be a risky and costly proposition, as China can now challenge the United States across all domains and place U.S. aircraft, surface vessels (including aircraft carriers), and bases throughout the Indo-Pacific at risk. In addition, the United States would for the first time be fighting a nuclear-armed opponent with precision standoff weapons, extensive cyberwarfare capabilities, and the ability to target its satellites.27
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Add Ons › China
Cole 21 (J. Michael Cole, Senior Advisor, Countering Foreign Authoritarian Influence (CFAI) at the International Republican Institute (IRI); Global Taiwan Institute, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, Prospect Foundation. Senior Non-Resident Fellow @ Global Taiwan Institute, Masters in War Studies @ Royal Military College of Canada, International Diploma in Humanitarian Assistance @ Fordham University. “The Lithuanian model for expanding Taiwan’s ties with Baltic States”, https://www.caribbeannewsglobal.com/the-lithuanian-model-for-expanding-taiwans-ties-with-baltic-states/)LR
The establishment of a representative office in Lithuania constitutes a victory for Taiwan in its efforts to counter both international isolation and the Chinese narrative of Taiwan’s supposedly inevitable international isolation. By focusing on a part of the world that has not traditionally been an area for Taiwanese presence and engagement, Taipei has also demonstrated the virtues of an asymmetrical approach to combating China on the world stage. This development also exposes the fact that Beijing is willing to break its own rules on “One China,” in that it is now willing to punish states even when they continue to abide by their “One-China Policy” by not establishing official ties with Taiwan. Although the object of Beijing’s ire is ostensibly related to the nomenclature used for Taiwan’s office in Vilnius (which uses the word “Taiwan”), at a deeper level, the source of its anger is the gains that Taiwan has made in Europe, an area where China had hoped to increase its influence. Lithuania has taken some risks in placing its bets on Taiwan, and besides the retaliation it is currently facing, the move may also have cost it future economic opportunities. Consequently, it will be crucial for Taiwan to demonstrate that Vilnius’ risk-taking was not in vain. Already, a large Taiwanese trade and investment delegation has visited the country, with a total of 240 online and offline trade talks involving more than 150 Lithuanian firms and various Taiwanese ones. Taiwan must build on the complementarity of the two economies to replicate its successes in countries like the Czech Republic, where despite much Chinese propaganda, Taiwan has been a much more substantial investor and job creator. Lithuania has a hard-working, highly educated and productive workforce in the manufacturing sector, with strengths in areas such as the laser industry—which has also become a target for Chinese retaliation, with China deciding to halt cooperation between its laser industry bodies and Lithuania. Trade forms the basis of bilateral relations and must be mutually beneficial. Lithuania has made it clear that it expects to reap the benefits of engagement with Taiwan, a country with an economy approximately 11 times larger than its own, as well as a highly advanced tech sector. Lithuania therefore represents a golden opportunity for Taiwan to showcase the advantages of engagement and to demonstrate that small and medium states not only can afford to defy China but can actually benefit materially from doing so. Conversely, failure to build upon and to sustain this momentum could dissuade prospective partners from going down that path. Thus, Taipei must demonstrate a commitment to building prosperous and mutually beneficial ties with its new Baltic ally, and the tangible results must materialize as expeditiously as possible. The potential for engagement between Taiwan and the Baltics goes well beyond trade and investment, however. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia all have traditions of resistance to external aggression and, by virtue of their proximity to Russia, have developed their own strategies to counter the security threat posed by their much more powerful – and like China, expansionist neighbor. Taiwan and the Baltic states, therefore, have much to learn from each other, in areas ranging from cyber and hybrid warfare to the implementation of an asymmetrical defense posture. While Russia poses the more immediate threat to the Baltic region underscored by apprehensions across the region that Moscow could launch an invasion of Ukraine as early as next January – it is also clear that China has become a more active player in the region, with all the risks of espionage, cyberattacks, co-optation, and hybrid threats that this new presence entails. Countries like Lithuania that have already defied Beijing are now bracing for the very real possibility of cyberattacks against their institutions, and this is an area where Taiwan’s expertise in addressing such threats can come in handy. Appropriate intelligence-sharing mechanisms must therefore be established to facilitate communication, threat mitigation, and response; these are areas where, again, Baltic states can make real gains from a deeper relationship with Taiwan, whose capabilities in the cyber sector are larger by orders of magnitude. The fledgling relationship with this part of Europe also creates opportunities for Taiwan’s indigenous defense industry, particularly in the unmanned vehicle sector: for example, Taiwan donated 10 police drones to Lithuania in October to assist the country as it deals with an influx of refugees from Belarus. For its part, Taiwan has much to learn from the Baltic states in non-traditional military areas, particularly in areas of state resilience and the concept of total defense. For example, as it explores ways by which to increase its deterrence against a Chinese attack, the Taiwanese military could learn important lessons from the Lithuanian Lietuvos Šaulių Sąjunga (“Riflemen’s Union”), the Estonian Defense League, and the National Guard, initiatives that blend traditional military forces with a militia and civilian component. Among other things, Taiwan could learn from those countries’ experiences in providing training to these additional layers of defense, as well as how and where to safely store weapons so that they can be quickly accessed by paramilitary forces in times of national emergency. No doubt Taiwan could learn a thing or two about forming and training a proper Reserve Force. Taiwan and the Baltics can also identify areas for the joint training of special forces and other units charged with waging asymmetrical war against a much more powerful and better-equipped opponent. Latvia and Lithuania, in particular, have clearly signaled their willingness to engage Taiwan more closely on such matters. For this to happen, the Taiwanese government will have to be willing to go beyond its traditional areas of engagement on security issues, and civilian authorities will have to contend with a culture of historical resistance within the ministry of national defense to the idea of giving the population a role in national security (especially one that involves arming them). But as with trade, Taipei will need to overcome those difficulties and, as rapidly as possible, demonstrate to its potential partners that it is ready to engage them in a way that is mutually beneficial. As the experience with Lithuania shows, an unprecedented window of opportunity has been created for Taiwan in the Baltics -one that will not remain open indefinitely. While we cannot expect results overnight, especially on security matters, Taipei cannot afford to drag its feet – and must therefore be proactive in its efforts to turn this potential into a source of real benefits for all the countries involved. It has natural and willing partners in the Baltics; Taipei, too, must demonstrate that it means what it says. If it does well in that area, there is a high likelihood that countries elsewhere will take notice. Failure to seize this moment, however, could have long-term detrimental effects on Taiwan’s appeal, and thereby strengthen China’s ability to deter engagement with Taiwan. The ball, therefore, is very much in Taipei’s court. The main point: A window of opportunity has opened for Taiwan to deepen its engagement with the Baltic states, a grouping of small nations that also faces an existential threat from a powerful authoritarian neighbor. In areas ranging from trade to non-traditional defense, these states are natural allies for Taiwan, and provide a chance for Taipei to showcase the real benefits of closer ties despite threatened retaliation by Beijing.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Add Ons › China
Wierenga 22 (Louis Wierenga Junior Research Fellow, Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu | Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College. “Cybersecurity and Hybrid Threats in the Digital Baltic states: A state of the art”, https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/publications/Hybrid%20Threats_LIIA.pdf)LR
In light of power competition vis-à-vis cooperation with the US, NATO, and the EU, and small states standing up to larger powers with nefarious intentions, the drawback is that no entity is capable of defeating all cyberattacks; rather, in order to succeed in cyberspace, the key is learning how to adequately cope.24 When it comes to information warfare, and one of the reasons for which it is so dangerous, is that the antagonist need not win – they succeed if they are able to successfully cloud the issue.25 It is no secret that Russia has waged numerous information warfare campaigns in the Baltics and show no sign of giving up. Recommendations and policy developments Keep on the cusp of cyber hygiene and widely promote amongst citizens: General H.R. McMaster notes the importance of American efforts to conduct reconnaissance in cyberspace and preempt attacks.26 Strive to continuously be one step ahead of hackers. Although this is a daunting, if not (nearly) impossible task, it is one which would involve both governments and the general public. One aspect which has greatly contributed to the success of Estonia in becoming a world leader in cyber defence is investing in people.27 Promoting cyber hygiene is one aspect at which Estonia excels. Raising further awareness about media literacy to combat disinformation and misinformation also helps to win the battle against information warfare. McMaster also advocates for the US to learn from countries which were on the receiving end of Russian aggression.28 As one of the strengths which Estonia possesses is its investment in people, Estonia is a success story in cyber and IT education and training, ranging from kindergarteners to the elderly.29 In an increasingly multipolar world order, the rise of China presents a serious security challenge to Europe and the Transatlantic alliance and can be seen on a number of fronts. One of the most pressing, especially when it comes to cybersecurity, is 5G. If seen through the lens of ‘the West’, then a united front should consist of the US and NATO, plus PfP countries, along with the EU in cyber policy. When it comes to 5G, this is especially important. The Baltic states have taken strides to become leaders in 5G policy and can use this opportunity to take a leading role in a Western front in the battlegrounds for 5G policy. Keeping focus on both China and Russia as threats to the security of NATO and the EU: For valid reasons – both historical and contemporary – the Russian Federation is identified as the primary security threat to the 3 Baltic states. The most contemporary events in the neighborhood do not indicate any change in the consistency or persistence of the threat, nor its digital nature. Cyber and hybrid threats directed towards the Baltic states from the Russian Federation will not cease and military, government, and civilian entities need to continue with vigilance, adapt to the rapidly changing nature of cybersecurity and cyberwar, as well as anticipate future changes, staying ahead of the curve. However, despite the very valid concerns over Russian cyber activity, the Baltic states should not neglect such concerns as they relate to China. Indeed, as aforementioned, the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, have taken a firm stance towards China, in cyberspace and beyond, and should continue to use their growing digital prowess to expand their influence in the EU and NATO. Lithuania, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Gabrielius 63 Landsbergis, has increasingly stood up to China.30 Minister Landsbergis’s stance towards China led to him being named as one of Politico’s ‘most influential people in Europe’ – and the only one to make the list from any of the Baltic states.31 Latvia has called upon China to respect the rules of international cyberspace.32 It should be noted that this is certainly not the first time that leaders from the Baltic states have appeared on similar lists, granting small states representation on lists where the usual larger powers within Europe enjoy substantial representation. Such leadership should be emulated, and the digital advances made by the Baltic states provides an ideal way to achieve this, as many countries look to the Baltics as digital leaders. Demonstrating leadership to allies: If ever there was a time, as well as a concrete area for the Baltic states to showcase their strengths as small states, demonstrating leadership in the cyber and tech fields presents the perfect opportunity. Estonia has been the Baltic champion for cybersecurity and e-governance. Lithuania, and to a lesser extent Latvia have shown signs of catching up. Much like offline matters, the three Baltic states use opportunities to meet with US and EU leaders to highlight the dire security situation which the Transatlantic alliance faces from a resurgent Russia – they know from experience and contemporary matters. As the security of cyberspace is one of the acute questions of global politics this century33, cybersecurity and matters of digital warfare will be issues which merit pressing resolve, which is constantly changing. Being on the cutting edge will require countries to remain that way. While member of the United Nations Security Council for the first time, Estonia made cybersecurity a priority, along with the overall security of the region.34 As well, when a member of the UN Security Council, Estonia made it a point to align with the US and the UK to call Russia out over a cyberattack directed at Georgia.35 Latvia and Lithuania have also been active on such fronts. In 2021, Latvia signed an agreement with Poland which establishes a framework for cooperation between Latvia’s Military Information Technology Security 64 Incident Team (MilCERT) and Poland’s National Cyber Security Center.36 Latvia is also taking the opportunity to reach out to the United States to discuss cybersecurity in the region.37 Lithuania has, as aforementioned, developed their own cyber center the RCDC, which is a bilateral LithuanianUS initiative.38 Conclusion To conclude, the domain of cyberspace will be an arena for battle for the foreseeable future. All countries, governments, militaries will be faced with such threats, and the likelihood of businesses and private individuals being faced with such threats is high. The Baltic states are no strangers to such threats and have been leaders in facing up to them. Given the nature of threats faced and the manner in which the Baltics have faced up to them, it is safe to say that the Baltic states will continue to rise up to the challenges and keep up with the rapidly changing nature of cyber threats. However, the last point is the most persisting challenge any entity faces in cyberspace – the need to not only consistently keep up but remain steps ahead of adversaries. The bi- and multilateral agreements made as well as the leadership demonstrated, and the digital awareness can go a long way to not only meet contemporary and future challenges but serve as examples and demonstrate leadership. Cyber and hybrid threats are ominous, but on a positive note, the Baltic states have achieved many remarkable accomplishments in this field.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Add Ons › Institutions
Tisdall 22 [Simon Tisdall is a foreign affairs commentator. He has been a foreign leader writer, foreign editor and US editor for the Guardian, 1-9-2022, "The epic struggle for America’s soul is just getting started", Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jan/09/the-epic-struggle-for-americas-soul-is-just-getting-started, DOA: 7-20-2022 //ArchanSen]
A new USA Today/Suffolk University poll found eight in 10 Republicans, Democrats and independents are worried about the future of American democracy. But they disagree over the causes – and who’s to blame: 85% of Democrats call the Capitol Hill rioters “criminals”; two-thirds of Republicans believe “they went too far but had a point”.
“Only free and fair elections in which the loser abides by the result stand between each of us and life at the mercy of a despotic regime,” warns Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe. But increasingly, for today’s politicians, honourable defeat is a wholly foreign concept.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Add Ons › Institutions
Banka 2022, (Andris Banka , Journal of Transatlantic Studies volume 20, pages161–183 (2022), Published 4/5/2022 “Neither reckless nor free-riders: auditing the Baltics as US treaty allies” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s42738-022-00096-3)
A great deal of scholarly literature has treated Baltic States’ physical proximity to Russia as their Achilles heel. The conventional wisdom holds that due to the force imbalance in the region, which heavily favours the Russian side, Baltic republics are hard to defend territories.Footnote82 While this assumption is certainly valid, there is, however, a flip side to this predicament. Situated at a geopolitical crossroads, these small nations are in an advantageous position to produce valuable insights into Kremlin’s statecraft. As James Carafano suggests: “To a major power, a country’s greatest asset might be its map coordinates rather than the size of its arsenal or bank account”.Footnote83 Similarly, Brands and Feaver have noted that some of the most valued US intelligence assets stem from allied partners “geographical capability” and “proximity to the theater of interest”.Footnote84 Lacking in material power resources, the Baltic States, within the past decade, have made a concerted effort to set up “knowledge hubs” that excel in analysing their much larger eastern neighbour. Having been subjected to Russian-directed gray zone tactics for decades, the Baltics have amassed valuable regional expertise. Testifying before the US Committee on Foreign Affairs, a prominent Russia-observer explained: “They [the Baltics] see things that we don’t see. They can go to places that we don’t go. They understand things that we don’t in cyber and intelligence”.Footnote85 Retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, who commanded the US Army Europe, concurs by emphasizing that the Baltic republics, due to their location, “know more what is happening in Russia, than any American will ever know”.Footnote86 Indeed, the Baltics fill in critical gaps in fields such as cyberwarfare, intelligence gathering, and disinformation, actively sharing this “know-how” with their US counterparts. The following details such contributions The Republic of Estonia was the first known victim of a state-directed cyberattack. The 2007 incident, widely attributed to the Russian Federation, for weeks incapacitated Estonian governmental structures. Somewhat paradoxically, in the long run, the event turned out to have a positive impact as it propelled the nation of 1.3 million people to treat the cyber domain as an intricate part of its national security. Subsequently, the country set up the Tallinn-based NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. According to the Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid, this was a smart way for a small country to demonstrate its contributions to allies.Footnote87 Understanding that it has little to offer in hard-power deliverables, Estonian leadership chose instead to focus on the cyber domain. In the words of Kaljulaid’s predecessor, Toomas Ilves, the IT field served as “the great equalizer”, allowing a small nation to contribute considerably more than one “would expect by looking at the map, population, and GDP per capita”.Footnote88 Today, Estonia has a well-established reputation among its peers as the lead authority for devising cybersecurity-related solutions. When it comes to countering cyber threats, Tallinn and Washington have forged a close bilateral relationship on various departmental levels. In 2020, the two governments set up a joint cyber-threat intelligence-sharing platform.Footnote89 In addition, the US Army and Estonia’s Ministry of Defence entered into an agreement for collaborative research on cyber defence matters.Footnote90 Such joint initiatives have already borne fruit. In the run-up to the 2020 US Presidential election, in order to learn more about Russian hacking methods, the USA dispatched its cyber force operatives to Estonia.Footnote91 For the USA, this allowed to observe the work of Kremlin-linked agents and bolster its own election defences. Commenting on this deployment, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy pointed out: “Cyber is a team sport—when it comes to halting threats from cyberspace, no one can go it alone”.Footnote92 Such operations illustrate how small states can amplify the reach of the USA and effectively complement its capabilities. Estonian authorities have regularly received praise for the provision of such services. James Mattis, US Secretary of Defense in the Trump administration, upon meeting his Estonian counterpart underscored that Washington highly appreciates Estonian leadership in this new area of competition, and that its positive example speaks to the fact that the size of the country does not necessarily determine its contributions to collective security.Footnote93 In a similar vein, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has spoken highly of Estonia for its efforts in training and educating NATO military staff.Footnote94 After being the first victim of a Russian-linked cyberattack, Estonian leadership managed to turn the incident into a certain asset. By studying its lessons and building resilience, it gradually emerged as the lead cyber-knowledge exporter. For many, Russia’s abilities to effectively plant disinformation campaigns overseas came into sharper focus during the 2016 US presidential election. For the Baltics, however, such malign interference and attempts to sow societal divisions were hardly anything new. Lawmakers in the region have been sounding the alarm about it ever since regaining independence in the early 1990s. However, it was only in 2014 that Latvia opened the NATO Centre of Excellence devoted to the exploration of such issues. Its central analytical focus is on tracking and analysing Russia’s digital footprint. Since its establishment, the research institution has produced innovative studies regarding information-warfare efforts employed by Kremlin-linked actors and experimental takes on societal vulnerabilities. Such analysis has often been shared with the US government via testimonies before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and briefings with the US military staff.Footnote95 Commenting on the centre’s work, a senior US Congressman pointed out that because of their “first-hand experience with the Soviet Union and Putin’s Russia”, the Baltics have become “a valuable source of insight” for the US government.Footnote96
2022
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Affirmative
Add Ons › Add-On---Creative Economy
Saltmarshe and Pembroke 20 [Ella Saltmarshe, co-founder of the Long Time Project; Beatrice Pembroke, Executive Director Culture at King's College London; 7-14-2020, dated with Wayback Machine; "Why do we need to get long-term?"; The Long Time Project; https://www.thelongtimeproject.org/; KL]
Short-termism is rapidly becoming an existential threat to humanity. Short-term mindsets and structures across business, government and society are threatening our collective future.
The next few decades will be pivotal for the billions who have yet to be born. If we act wisely, humanity will survive; the Earth may remain habitable for at least a billion years; what has occurred so far could be a tiny fraction of possible human history and achievement. But, there is a darker alternative too. One where we don’t make the necessary changes in time and where we wipe ourselves out as a species, taking many others with us.
2022
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Affirmative
Add Ons › Add-On---Creative Economy
Štreimikienė and Kacˇerauskas 20 [Dalia Štreimikienė, Faculty of Public Governance and Business, Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius, Lithuania; Tomas Kacˇerauskas, Faculty of Creative Industries, Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies, Vilnius Gediminas Technical University; 7-12-2020; "The creative economy and sustainable development: The Baltic States"; Sustainable Development 28; https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/sd.2111?casa_token=EeQAAx6bpU0AAAAA:CGi0Bs9eKTmtNvAW2-q2G86MhIK-SbxCS9_n6F-znAUBXEcHZJR9JJlsuM1IpLQ-WRZ58xduSkFyKQ; KL]
The creative economy is one of the fastest developing sectors in the global economy, providing income growth, new jobs and export earnings. In addition to economic benefits that flow from cultural and creative industries, the aforementioned contribute to resolving issues of sustainable urban development, as well as contributing to the 2030 Agenda, which is the main initiative of the United Nations. Although it is acknowledged by scholars that creativity promotes inclusive social progress and empowers people to take responsibility for their own economic, social and personal development and encourages innovation, which contributes significantly to sustainable growth, there is lack of empirically tested results. The article aims to analyse the linkages between the implementation of sustainable development goals achieved by countries, and the development of the creative economy in such countries. The empirical data were collected for comparison of creativity and sustainability indexes by reference to the case study of the Baltic States. Policy implications were provided based on the research conducted. The study found that Estonia is the best performing country in terms of measures of creativity and assessments of that country's creative economy. Furthermore, Estonia is the most sustainable country, and has achieved the greatest progress in implementing sustainable development goals of any of the Baltic States. All of the environmental indicators for Latvia, and taking into account Lithuania's economic indicators place these two countries at the same level in terms of sustainability.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency Cards › Prodicts › Prodict---Prodict of Prodict
TTCSP 21 [James G. McGann, Ph.D. Senior Lecturer, International Studies Director, Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, The Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania; 1-28-2021; "2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report"; TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports; https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=think_tanks; KL]
Introduction The 2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index (GGTTI) marks the fifteenth year of continued efforts by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) at the University of Pennsylvania to acknowledge the important contributions and emerging global trends of think tanks worldwide. Our initial effort to generate a ranking of the world’s leading think tanks in 2006 was a response to a series of requests from donors, government officials, journalists and scholars to produce regional and international rankings of the world’s preeminent think tanks. Since its inception, our ongoing objective for the GGTTI report is to gain an understanding of the role think tanks play in governments and civil societies. Using this knowledge, we hope to assist in improving the capacity and performance of think tanks around the world.
Since 2006, the ranking process has been refined and streamlined, and the number and scope of the institutions and individuals involved has steadily grown. The process, as in past years, relies on a shared definition of public policy research and analysis and engagement organizations, a detailed set of selection criteria and an increasingly open and transparent nomination and selection process. As part of the nominations process, all 11,175 think tanks catalogued in TTCSP’s Global Think Tank Database were contacted and encouraged to participate in the nomination and ranking process. Over 44,992 journalists, policymakers, public and private donors, and functional and regional area specialists on the TTCSP listserv were invited to participate and over 3,974 fully or partially completed the nomination and ranking surveys. Finally, a group of peers and experts was asked to help rank and review the public policy research Centers of Excellence for 2020.
2022
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Solvency Cards › Prodicts › Prodict---CEPA
TTCSP 21 [James G. McGann, Ph.D. Senior Lecturer, International Studies Director, Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, The Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania; 1-28-2021; "2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report"; TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports; https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=think_tanks; KL]
Best Regional Studies Policy Research Center (Free-Standing, Not University-Affiliated): Think Tanks honored in this category are independent of government or university affiliation and are self-governing institutions. These institutions are autonomous and produce quality research that is objective and unbiased.
2022
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Affirmative
Solvency Cards › Prodicts › Prodict---Carnegie
*Actually Brookings is #1, but the #1 think tank from past years doesn’t get ranked for the next three years
TTCSP 21 [James G. McGann, Ph.D. Senior Lecturer, International Studies Director, Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, The Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania; 1-28-2021; "2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report"; TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports; https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=think_tanks; KL]
2020 Top Think Tanks Worldwide (US and non-US)
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency Cards › Say yes
Tol et al. 22 [Jan van Tol, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Prior to his retirement from the Navy in 2007, Captain van Tol served as special advisor in the Office of the Vice President. He was a military assistant to Andrew W. Marshall, the Secretary of Defense’s Principal Advisor for Net Assessment, from 1993–1996 and 2001–2003. At sea, he commanded three warships, two of which, USS O’Brien (DD-975) and USS Essex (LHD-2), were part of the U.S. Navy’s Forward Deployed Naval Forces based in Japan. Captain van Tol’s analytic work has focused mainly on long-range strategic planning, naval warfare, military innovation, and wargaming. He holds a B.A. in Philosophy and Logic from the University of Massachusetts/Amherst and a M.S. in Operations Research from the Naval Postgraduate School, and graduated with distinction from the College of Naval Command and Staff at the U.S. Naval War College; Christopher Bassler, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, where he researches technology & innovation, joint aerospace capabilities, maritime operating concepts, and overall U.S. & allied military strategies. He served as a civilian in the Department of Defense, for both the Departments of the Navy and the Air Force, as an engineer, designer, strategist, and advisor. His previous assignments include the F-35 Joint Program Office, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) in the Pentagon, the Office of Naval Research, and the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division. He has worked in various capacities to enhance capabilities and interoperability across all warfighting domains, in many technology areas, and with key allies and partners on five continents, including NATO for both the capabilities and the S&T Organisation. He was awarded two U.S. Patents. Dr. Bassler received two U.S. Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Awards, from the U.S. Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Research. His degrees include a Ph.D. in Aerospace Engineering from Virginia Tech; a M.A. in Security Policy Studies from the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs; and a Diploma in Strategy & Innovation from the University of Oxford, Saïd Business School; Katherine Kjellström Elgin, Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. She brings rigorous research to policy discussions and has held positions in both academic and policy organizations. Prior to joining CSBA, she served as a DAAD Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where she wrote and published on grand strategy, great power relations, U.S. defense strategy, European security, and alliance management. Dr. Elgin has also worked at the Brookings Institution and with the Long Term Strategy Group in Washington, D.C. In 2018, she served as a visiting fellow at the Institute for Security & Development Policy in Stockholm, Sweden. Dr. Elgin earned her Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Security Studies) from Princeton University’s School of Public & International Affairs. At Princeton, she served as the director of the Center for International Security Studies’ Strategic Education Initiative, leading the university’s program for educating and mentoring students with an interest in national and international security; Tyler Hacker, Analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His work focuses on U.S. defense strategy, future warfare, and great power competition. Prior to joining CSBA, Tyler was an analyst at the Congressional Research Service, where he conducted research on topics in defense logistics. Tyler previously served as a field artillery officer in the United States Army in Germany, where he participated in NATO operations and exercises in Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states. He has also completed internships at the U.S. Army War College and the American Enterprise Institute. He holds a B.A. in International Studies from Virginia Military Institute and an M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University; 2022; "Executive Summary"; Deterrence and Defense in the Baltic Region: New Realities, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA); https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA8312_(Deterrence_Defense_Baltic)_web.pdf; LR + KL]
The NATO posture “reset” announced by Secretary Stoltenberg, if properly and promptly executed, could greatly reduce the potential for a Russian fait accompli against the Baltic states as well as deter aggression against other NATO states on the eastern border. Presently it is broadly supported among the NATO member states because of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and its accompanying atrocities. However, depending on the evolution of the conflict, the enthusiasm and willingness of some member states may flag over time or individual member state priorities may start to shift. For any reset to be successful, there must be genuine burden-sharing among all member states, whether on the eastern front or not, until NATO’s “reset” is fully implemented.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency Cards › Say yes
Klein et al. 19 [Colonel Robert M. Klein, Senior Military Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University; Lieutenant Commander Stefan Lundqvist, Ph.D., Researcher and Faculty Board Member at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU); Colonel Ed Sumangil, USAF, Senior Military Fellow in CSR; Ulrica Pettersson, Ph.D., assigned to SEDU, Adjunct Faculty Member at Joint Special Operations University; 11-2019; "Baltics Left of Bang: The Role of NATO with Partners in Denial-Based Deterrence"; Strategic Forum 301, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University; https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-301.pdf; KL]
The NATO goal should be to knit partners together in a networked system of advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), targeting, precision-guided munitions, airborne early warning capabilities, integrated air defenses, maritime domain awareness, undersea surveillance, and standoff capabilities such as cruise and ballistic missiles. This networked system-of-systems approach has come to define the contemporary revolution in military affairs. Policy analysts James Thomas and Evan Montgomery have dubbed these “mini A2/ AD complexes.”25 The current willingness of key Allies and partners—particularly those in the Baltic region—to modernize their militaries makes it a favorable time for NATO to implement such a defensive concept. Therefore, providing partners with additional enabling capabilities to round out their defensive formations may prove critical. To enhance area denial, NATO needs additional mobile and survivable long-range precision-strike capabilities such as the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and Highly Mobile Artillery Rocket System. The Army is currently developing DeepStrike, a next-generation missile for these systems that doubles the firepower and can engage targets at distances up to 499 km, including the ability to hit moving targets on land and at sea.26 To counter Russian tactical missiles, cruise missiles, drones, and advanced aircraft, additional NATO and partner countries should procure the Patriot and other surface-to-air missile defense systems.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency Cards › Say yes
Gilliam and Van Wie 22 [Colonel John B. Gilliam, U.S. Army Armor Officer, senior executive fellow at the Strobe Talbott Center on Strategy, Security, and Technology at the Brookings Institution; Major Ryan C. Van Wie, U.S. Army Infantry Officer, international affairs instructor in the Social Sciences Department at the United States Military Academy; 3-2022; "Feasible U.S. steps to strengthen NATO deterrence in the Baltics and Poland"; The Brookings Institution; https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/FP_20220322_nato_deterrence_gilliam_van_wie.pdf; KL]
While most of our recommendations focus on the U.S. Army, it is worth continuing to press NATO to make mobility improvements and investments that ultimately will enhance the alliance’s effectiveness in the Baltics. As suggested in the Atlantic Council’s report “Moving Out,” the U.S. should pressure NATO members to invest in dual-use infrastructure such as Rail Baltica, expand strategic lift capacity and the prepositioning of equipment, digitize border-crossing and customs procedures, and build cyber resilience.90 By focusing NATO members’ investment on non-kinetic capabilities with benefits to civil society, the likelihood of European nations agreeing to do so is far more likely than arguing for the purchasing of advanced weaponry or additional force structure. As a component of this line of effort and as recommended in “Moving Out,” NATO members should purchase additional heavy equipment transporters such as the British M1070F, which is compliant with European regulations.91 Such an investment would help U.S. and NATO forces arrive to the Baltics quicker in a crisis. Finally, NATO members, such as Poland and Germany, should consider purchasing flatbed railcars and even forming some type of modest rail battalion under a NATO structure akin to what Russia utilizes. Doing so would fill an identified shortage of rail cars across Europe and ensure their availability in a crisis.92 Having dedicated and trained military rail personnel to operate the trains would also enable timely and effective movement.
2022
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Affirmative
Solvency Cards
Recut for civ-mil cp lol
Veebel 17 (Viljar Veebel is a researcher and consultant who has been researching in the University of Tartu, The Estonian School of Diplomacy and The Tallinn Technological University. “Baltic States and Cyber Deterrence: Taking or Losing Initiative against Russia”https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/01/baltic-states-cyber-deterrence-taking-losing-initiative-russia/)LR
Based on Russia’s strategy in Ukraine and Georgia, elements of “cyber warfare” will likely play an important role in future Russian conflicts. Russia carried out similar or even more advanced attacks during the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008 and the Ukrainian conflict from 2013. In Georgia, attackers combined targeted denial-of-service attacks (DDOS) with military action to impede strategic communications and to create panic among civilians. During the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Russia’s strategy has also focused on disinformation and psychological warfare through online media, massive trolling on social media, and even attacks on mobile phone operators. In contrast to their NATO counterparts, Russia’s cyber and propaganda units have shown great independence from moral considerations or legal hesitation, using every opportunity to compromise the Baltic states and NATO. Considering Russia’s current ambitions in Ukraine, the Baltic states are not likely the most important targets of Russian cyber attacks. However, as the “cyber war” from 2007 showed, they are vulnerable. If transatlantic security priorities change after Brexit and Trump’s election, the Baltic countries may come under considerable pressure again. From Cyber Defense to Cyber Deterrence Following its experience in 2007, Estonia has become a pioneer in international cyber security. Fortunately, contrary to military capabilities and power games, the size of a country does not matter much here. A cyber war’s battlefield is the whole world, and quality, initiative, and position are often more important than quantity. Waiting for the opponent’s first moves and relying only on defense does not bode well for success. Additionally, standardized and comfortable administrative procedures in combination with the highest possible compliance with international law offer little advantage against an opponent using a more flexible command model and selective approach to international law. The Baltic countries should strive to stay a step ahead of Russia. To achieve this goal, they must combine the resources and the knowledge of both the private and the public sector, guaranteeing more flexibility when countering cyber threats. First, cyber deterrence and cyber defense must be re-conceptualized and distinguished from one another. The Baltic states all too often understand cyber defense as a passive instrument that produces effective deterrence by itself. Thus, they focus mainly on reactive and defensive measures, with the status quo as the best possible outcome in regional cyber confrontation. As part of a re-conceptualization of cyber deterrence, it is also crucial to better understand Russia in terms of its fears and weaknesses, and a wider circle of specialists should contribute to cyber deterrence. More awareness of Russian technological capabilities, motives, and recent practices is also necessary. Second, the organizational structure and procedures of cyber defense units need to combine the best practices from the public, private, and military sectors, each with advantages and limits. The command chain must focus on results as much as possible, with automatic procedures and flexible power delegation in critical situations. Currently, army practices and rules dominate the logic of decision-making and resource distribution. However, the military rotation cycle, rank-based roles, commitment to manuals, the tendency to avoid innovation, strong limits for investments and procurements, and intolerance to failures do not contribute to success in cyber conflicts. Speed, flexibility, expertise, and new solutions are crucial there. Third, globalization and limited legal regulation of cyber security and deterrence must be fully exploited. There is no need to limit preparation and actions to traditional state boundaries, “best-practices” of the public sector, moral considerations, and legal hesitation. Cyber security units can and should have cells outside NATO territories, employ private contractors, and use unexpected retaliation tactics. Taking these actions can create the best possible deterrence against Russia’s model of aggressive hybrid warfare. Governments must equip their cyber units with the best possible resources in advance, and these units should have permission to test their tactics and tools and tolerance for failure during the development of these procedures. To start, more visible power, initiative, and agility will help to create effective deterrence against Russia. In practical terms, cyber defense action needs to follow a pre-emptive mentality because if Russian forces attack first, they might disable further defense or counterattack capabilities. By limiting cyber defense only to self-defense in the spirit of best moral and legal considerations, the Baltic states and NATO in general give Russia a comfortable zone of action. NATO voluntarily restricts itself from efficient strategies and warfare. Crimea was a clear sign for the West that in a hybrid war restricting oneself to a reactive role and “playing a Russian game” without innovation and initiative will lead to defeat. Baltic states have very little time and a lot to do: these countries and NATO should not merely focus on spending 2% of GDP on defense, but be more specific about the capabilities required to achieve the compulsory level of traditional and cyber deterrence. Goals, red lines, and success markers require more clarity. After Brexit in the UK, and the U.S. presidential elections, the Baltic states must further develop their cyber capabilities, especially cyber deterrence. Preserving peace may depend on it.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency Cards
Horchakova 2022, Veronika Horchakova Mykolas Romeris University, European and International Business Law program, Master’s degree student(“STRENGTHENING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE BALTIC STATES” https://repository.mruni.eu/bitstream/handle/007/18311/Teisines_minties_svente-97-107.pdf?sequence=1)
In conclusion, taking into account the current geopolitical situation and the number of commitments in the international arena, the Baltic States are likely to remain strong US allies and important US security partners in Europe. Analysts believe that close cooperation between the United States and the Baltic States will continue for the foreseeable future in areas such as efforts to deter potential Russian aggression, the future of NATO, energy security, and socioeconomic issues. As long as there are objective fears of peace demolition, NATO is interested in deepening cooperation with like-minded countries. There is still work to be done within the Baltic region to strengthen resistance to Russian propaganda and maintain sovereignty and determination towards pro-European standards in the socio-economic field. This work will follow, for instance, the example of banning Russian propaganda in the media. To achieve this, the Baltic States will likely continue to rely on the United States for leadership on foreign policy and security issues. This can be seen from current partnership programs devoted to enhancing defence power and providing training and an educational practicum. This reliance is not only from the side of the Baltic region; it is seen as a reciprocal one. For instance, there are climate change issues where Lithuania can share its experience and the best approaches to green ecology with the United States, and the US may be more eager to cooperate with Lithuania. Moreover, in terms of geopolitics, the United States should try to defeat China’s attempts to collaborate with US allies on the same issues. On successfully implementing and finalising those partnership activities, further steps will be taken to proceed with cooperation. In short, the United States’ commitment to Baltic security is part of the US commitment to European security, and the former would not and cannot exist without the latter. As new challenges are emerging, more efforts should be made to guarantee these commitments, thus strengthening transatlantic ties concerns building this partnership, reinforcing power, and preventing threats. This attitude undoubtedly appears to be beneficial for both sides.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency Cards
Cyberattacks in general too
Pernik 21 (Piret, is a researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). She has researched cybersecurity strategic and policy aspects since 2013. She has published research reports and analyses on cyber resilience, military 5G security, cyber commands, and cyber defence training. She is also a co-editor of the volume Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis, published by the CCDCOE. Her articles have been published in academic journals and she has written book chapters, as well as online commentaries. She holds an MA in Social Sciences from the University of Tallinn, and an MA in International Relations and European Studies from the Central European University, Budapest. “Cyber deterrence: A case study on Estonia’s policies and practice”, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20211012_Hybrid_CoE_Paper_8_Cyber_deterrence_WEB.pdf)LR
Estonia does not have a standalone policy of cyber deterrence, but strategic documents relating to national security, foreign policy and cybersecurity describe diverse components of cyber deterrence. Cybersecurity is deemed a part of foreign, security and defence policy, as well as domestic/internal security. It is also included in strategic documents and policies concerning digital modernization, technology, education and research, and so forth. The review and analysis of Estonia’s strategic documents associated with cybersecurity (presented in Annex I) shows that two concepts – cross-domain deterrence and cyber deterrence – play an important role in the government’s cybersecurity discourse. Three layers of deterrence – entanglement and norms, denial and punishment – are equally upheld. Generally speaking, the analysis demonstrates that in the Estonian national security discourse, deterrence by denial and punishment tend to be conceptualized in the context of national security and defence policy; entanglement and norms in the context of foreign policy and cyber diplomacy; and denial (domestic defence/resilience) in the context of digital and technology policies. In the latest strategy (2019–2022), cyber deterrence is referenced almost as frequently as in the 2014–2017 document, apart from the fact that cross-domain deterrence and military deterrence are not mentioned. Rather, concerns about challenges relating to digital modernization and technology policies come to the fore in this strategy. The last column of Table 2 provides examples of how a deterrence tool has been implemented. To strengthen its cyber diplomacy capacity, Estonia established a position in 2018 for an ambassador-at-large for cybersecurity. Estonia is one of the leaders among the Baltic and Nordic countries when it comes to cyber diplomacy. It has been a member of the UN Group of Governmental Experts for many years, and is also a leader in cyber diplomacy education for foreign diplomats.35 As a member of the UN Security Council in 2020– 2021, in June 2021 Estonia organized for the first time in the Council’s history an open meeting on cybersecurity, where it raised the issue of state behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international peace and security.36 Since 2008, Estonia has hosted the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), which sponsors the publication of world-renowned scholarly works on international law applicable to cyberspace – the Tallinn Manuals 1.0 (2013), 2.0 (2017), and the forthcoming volume 3.0.37 Deterrence by denial, conceptualized in Estonia primarily as domestic defence/resilience measures, is foundational for the country’s cybersecurity posture.38 Deterrence in this area includes a full spectrum of activities prescribed in the national cybersecurity strategies, in cybersecurity legislation and other relevant ministerial regulations. Some of the resilience-related objectives have remained constant since 2008, such as applying measures to harden networks (for example, standards, risk analysis and management tools, incident response, raising awareness, building cybersecurity capacity and competence, to name a few).39 In June 2021, Estonia published its first national information security standard entitled E-ITS, which is a guideline for public and private network owners and operators to ensure minimum security standards.40 The Estonian Information System Authority regularly alerts stakeholders and the general public to cyber threats, vulnerabilities and exploits, and helps them to protect their networks. These activities contribute to deterrence by denial by increasing the ability to protect networks and recover from cyber incidents. Public attribution can be regarded as a tool for deterrence.46 Indeed, among Estonian experts, public attribution is regarded as a primary tool of cyber deterrence.47 As noted by scholars, one aim of public attribution is the act of norm-setting – that is, establishing “the rules of the road” and subsequently enforcing appropriate behaviour in cyberspace (response measures).48 In a similar manner, the Estonian government holds that “public statements on attribution can be made, with the aim of increasing accountability in cyberspace and emphasising the importance of adhering to international law obligations and norms of responsible state behaviour”.49 The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs subscribes to the opinion that “public attribution […] allows states to send clear messages and shape expectations that malicious cyberspace operations will not be tolerated” and “it is necessary to send a message that harmful cyberspace operations are not part of acceptable state behaviour”.50 In other words, Estonia directly links public attribution to setting cyber norms, thus connecting deterrence by entanglement and norms to legal consequences, namely deterrence by punishment. According to this view, Estonia supports public attribution and collective measures “where possible” and “public attribution and messaging are tools for deterring and responding […] but also for raising wider awareness”.51 To support collective public attribution and to hold violators responsible, Estonia actively contributes to EU and NATO cyber deterrence discussions, and belongs to the US-led international cyber deterrence initiative.52 Based on the Estonian case study, a policy recommendation for EU and NATO countries is to apply a three-layered deterrence model.73 First, EU and NATO countries should participate in entanglement and norms measures such as cyber diplomacy and capacity-building globally. Second, they should invest more in denial measures and, third, jointly develop policies for punitive response options, including developing public attribution procedures to enable quick attribution, and systematically implementing sanctions regimes. It would be feasible to establish memoranda of understanding, and operational- and technical-level frameworks to radically improve information- and intelligence-sharing. Participation in cyber defence and crisis management exercises should be open to like-minded NATO partner countries. Joint bilateral cyberspace operations likewise contribute to mutual trust-building and information-sharing, and increase parties’ operational and technical competence.74 Operational- and technical-level joint activities should be regularly practised among allies and with like-minded partners as they contribute to deterrence by denial. Given that NATO’s cyber With regard to deterrence by denial, Estonia, together with other EU and NATO countries, should develop a zero trust security strategy and architecture.75 Zero trust is a cybersecurity paradigm that treats networks as untrusted, and that moves defences from static, network-based perimeters to focus on users, assets, and resources. It assumes that there is no implicit trust granted to user accounts or assets in any network segment (including a corporate local area network), and applies authentication and authorization before a session is established.76 While deterrence might work at the high end, novel security principles should be implemented by governments because deterrence is not sufficient to deter cyberattacks. Estonia’s public attribution guidelines serve as a blueprint for other countries to attribute cyberattacks and impose meaningful costs. A sharper focus on responses to high- and low-end cyberattacks should be developed in the future along with concrete deterrence actions and tools for individual 75 For example, the US government has released a strategy, architecture and maturity model that the US federal government agencies will implement: ‘Moving the U.S. Government Towards Zero Trust Cybersecurity Principles’, The White House, https://zerotrust.cyber.gov/. 76 Scott Rose, Oliver Borchert, Stu Mitchell and Sean Connelly, ‘Zero Trust Architecture SP 800-207’, August 2020, NIST, https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-207/final. 77 ‘Nye, Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace’, p. 62. sectors and target types. For example, deterrence tools can differ for diverse targets: internet voting and e-health systems would be targeted by different cyber threat actors that have political or criminal motives, and the same tool is not effective across all actors. Estonia’s forms of cyber deterrence are not effective individually, nor every time, but when implemented together in a whole-of-society approach, and systematically over a longer period of time, it is likely that many malicious cyberattacks can be deterred. As Joseph Nye pointed out, deterrence tools “can complement one other in affecting actors’ perceptions of the costs and benefits of particular actions”.77 Certainly, one cannot deter all cyberattacks – especially those conducted as part of malicious influencing campaigns below the threshold of the use of force – however, it is possible to reduce the number and effect of strategic cyberspace operations. It is likely that punitive responses may deter hostile actors from conducting similar attacks in the future. It will remain to be seen whether the EU and NATO can deter cyberattacks both above and below the threshold of an armed attack better in the future when they apply systematically stronger punitive responses.