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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Impact › Impact — Draws in US

Turkey-Greece war draws-in the US

Ted Galen Carpenter 20, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. He received his Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Texas, “An Old NATO Nightmare Returns: Possible War between Greece and Turkey,” 9/10/20,

U.S. and other Western leaders have long worried about what to do if an armed conflict ever erupted between two NATO members. Rapidly rising tensions between Greece and Turkey, primarily involving a maritime dispute over oil, natural gas, and other resources under the eastern Mediterranean, have brought that nightmare to the surface once again. Germany’s Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, warned both governments in late August against further military escalation. “Fire is being played with and any small spark could lead to catastrophe,” he stressed. The heart of the North Atlantic Treaty is Article 5, which proclaims that an attack on any member of the Alliance will be considered an attack on all. The underlying assumption is that there would then be a collective response to repel and punish the aggressor. Obviously, that approach would not work if two NATO signatories went to war against each other. Even determining which country was the aggressor and which the victim could be quite challenging. Throughout NATO’s history, the greatest risk of an intra‐​alliance conflict has always been one involving Greece and Turkey. Although both countries joined NATO in 1952, mutual membership in that security partnership did not erase the centuries of animosity between the two populations. Athens and Ankara have nearly come to blows on several occasions, most notably when Turkey invaded majority‐​Greek Cyprus in 1974, proceeded to occupy nearly 40 percent of the island, and expelled Greek Cypriots from that territory. The occupation continues to this day. There have been several lesser, but still worrisome, incidents over the years. Among other problems, Turkish military planes continuously violate Greek airspace. Athens then sends its fighter planes up to intercept and challenge the Turkish aircraft—in some years as many as 2,000 times. Thus far, there have been no armed clashes, but as I’ve written elsewhere, similar games of aerial “chicken” involving the United States and such countries as Russia and China are extremely reckless. One such episode between U.S. and Chinese planes in 2001 resulted in a midair collision that killed the Chinese pilot and created an ugly diplomatic row between Washington and Beijing. All it would take is one miscalculation by a Greek or Turkish pilot to trigger a similar (or worse) crisis between Athens and Ankara. The Cyprus episode suggests what Washington’s reaction would be to the outbreak of a Greco‐​Turkish armed conflict. Under the guidance of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the United States pressured both countries to dampen their quarrel, and Kissinger used maximum leverage to get the other NATO members to adopt the same position. However, Kissinger’s stance was far from neutral. Even though Turkey had been the aggressor, the [US] United States soon tilted in favor of Ankara’s position. Congressional anger compelled Gerald Ford’s administration to implement sanctions against the Turkish government, but the White House moved inexorably to dilute those measures as quickly as possible. That approach continued under Jimmy Carter’s administration, and by the beginning of the 1980s, the restrictions were effectively moot. Washington’s response reflected the belief that Turkey was a much more important ally than Greece in terms of strategic considerations. There is little reason to believe that the U.S. attitude has changed. Even if a Biden administration would not share Donald Trump’s apparent admiration for Turkey’s autocratic president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, both security and economic calculations would push Washington toward that conclusion. There is one important difference, though, between the Cyprus crisis and a possible new confrontation between Athens and Ankara. Key NATO powers, most notably France and Italy, are not happy about Erdogan’s increasingly undemocratic rule and his government’s maverick, often pro‐​Russian, behavior on security issues. In addition, France has openly challenged Turkey’s territorial and resource claims in the eastern Mediterranean, and in late August, French warships and planes joined a joint military exercise with Greece and Cyprus to convey a blunt message of displeasure to Ankara. Washington may find it far more difficult today to drag its NATO allies into taking a pro‐​Turkish stance in case of an armed confrontation between Greece and Turkey than it did in 1974. The mere prospect of a possible Greco‐​Turkish war underscores one of the major drawbacks of the United States being the leader of a nearly 30‐​member military alliance. America automatically is entangled in the grievances and quarrels of every one of those members. And when two members openly hate each other, that situation can create not only a headache but an outright nightmare for the United States.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › AT: Arms Sales Thumper

Not happening, but if it does Erdogan spins the sales as concessionary NOT cooperation

Cengiz 6/23 — Mahmut Cengiz is an Adjunct Faculty at the Department of Criminology, Law and Society of George Mason University Mahmut Cengiz "Sweden, Finland, and NATO: Pawns in Erdogan’s Bid for Re-election Amid a Tattered Domestic Economy?," Hstoday, 6-23-2022, https://www.hstoday.us/featured/sweden-finland-and-nato-pawns-in-erdogans-bid-for-re-election-amid-a-tattered-domestic-economy/, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

The United States also appears to be a target of Erdogan’s manipulative behavior aimed at squeezing concessions from other countries and serving his own self-interests. When Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in mid-May to discuss bilateral relations, Cavusoglu presented Erdogan’s agenda: “persuade” the United States to follow through on the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, end its support for Kurdish groups in northern Syria, lift the sanctions imposed on Turkey under Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, and end the ongoing Halk Bank investigation. Erdogan’s demands are rooted in his unhappiness with the Biden administration and his inability to melt the ice between two countries. Erdogan is particularly annoyed about the Biden administration’s refusal to end the Halk Bank investigation. Under the Trump administration, Erdogan was allowed to exert at least some measure of influence over the case. Erdogan, however, understands the value in repairing relations with the United States. Doing so could create for Erdogan the momentum needed to mend his country’s relations with the Western world. That momentum and mended relations, however, may not materialize. To date, the Western world has been harshly critical of Erdogan’s authoritarian regime and actions such as jailing journalists and destroying democratic constitution of the country. A smiling face from the Western world, Erdogan likely knows, could boost his chances of victory in the coming presidential elections.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › AT: Foreign Affairs Don’t Matter Domestically

Anti-Americanism DETERMINES Erdogan’s electoral support — fopo is key

Taşpınar 21 — Ömer Taşpınar is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a professor of national-security strategy at the National Defense University in Washington. "The Domestic Calculations Behind Turkey's Foreign Adventure in Syria” Syndication Bureau. August 29, 2021. advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:63H4-WMN1-JCNX-318H-00000-00&context=1516831. Accessed June 24, 2022. WMK

Although Western media likes to portray Erdogan as an Islamist determined to destroy Ataturk's secularist legacy, today the real trend in Turkish politics is not Islamization but nationalism driven by anti-Americanism and anti-Kurdish sentiments. Erdogan is currently riding this nationalist wave with his military adventure in Syria. Once again, it is domestic dynamics of populist, anti-American nationalism that dictates foreign policy. Erdogan needs to galvanize nationalism in order to stay in power. All his calculations, in domestic and foreign policy, are above all motivated by regime survival. Most opinion polls show the Afrin operation helps Erdogan's AKP thanks to the nationalist frenzy it created. Instead of waiting until 2019 for presidential elections, Erdogan is therefore likely to capitalize on such dynamics and call early elections this summer.

In short, if you want to understand Turkey's timing in Syria, look no further than Erdogan's domestic agenda. Finally, Erdogan needed this war because of another urgent domestic problem: the economy. High inflation, growing unemployment and diminished consumer confidence means that time is not on his side. Under such circumstances, Erdogan doubled down on nationalist populism and launched the Afrin incursion.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › AT: Foreign Affairs Don’t Matter Domestically

Foreign Affairs and Domestic Politics are intrinsically linked — the AFF is viewed as Western Powers constraining Turkey

Ülgen 22 — Sinan Ülgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations. Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development , WINTER 2022, No. 20, A Cyber Odyssey: Quantum of Hope (WINTER 2022), pp. 220-229 WMK

The third point of departure relates to the nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy. For a long time, foreign policy in Turkey was viewed as being almost hermetically sealed from domestic political considerations. Foreign policy decisionmaking had been under the prevailing influence of the Foreign Ministry, which was staffed almost exclusively by professional career diplomats. The military was also an influential actor in areas of strategic relevance. The political leadership had the final say, sure, but it was essentially swayed by the calculations, assessments, and recommendations of these two powerful, professional institutions. Under the AKP, the balance of power shifted to politicians—to the detriment of the institutional players. In many ways, Turkey lurched from one extreme to the other. In the olden days, the body politic was heavily influenced by institutional thinking, with little interest in the domestic impact of their calculus. In the new Turkey, the body politic wanted no institutional pressure. Foreign-policy-making disassociated itself from the “weight” of these institutions and increasingly became guided and even led by domestic political concerns.

The shift away from a parliamentary system and back to a presidential one as a result of a April 2017 constitutional referendum accentuated these negative changes and further usurped the institutional underpinnings of Turkish foreign policy. Decisionmaking became opaquer and increasingly driven by a close set of presidential advisors.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › AT: Erdogan Says No to AFF

Erdogan lets his military desires get the best of him

Shipley 21, senior editor @ Bloomberg responsible for the editorial page (David, “Biden Should Cut the Gordian Knot With Turkey,” Bloomberg,

But Erdogan also craves the protection of the West’s military partnerships and membership in its economic associations. He wants Turkey to remain within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization even as he buys weapons systems that undermine the alliance’s security and hurls insults at heads of member states. And he seeks “mutual trust” with the European Union even as he threatens to flood it with millions of migrants.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › AT: Erdogan Says No to AFF

Erdogan says yes because he thinks he can balance the US and Russia. BUT, it’s a strategic misstep that TKOs his popularity

Syndication Bureau 21 — "Turkey's Frustration with the US in Syria Is Driving a Tactical Partnership with Moscow | Syndication Bureau". 8/29/2021 advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:63H4-WMN1-JCNX-31GB-00000-00&context=1516831. Accessed June 23, 2022. WMK

Yet, the facts on the ground point out to a different reality. The latest wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey has a much larger scale and scope than previous ones. Putting Turkish-American relations back on track may prove an insurmountable challenge when both the Turkish body politic and public opinion is caught in an anti-Western nationalist frenzy. Most opinion polls show that about 80 percent of Turks consider the United States the country's top national-security threat. Almost 90 percent support the Turkish military incursion in Afrin, in northern Syria. That operation, though now largely over, could still escalate into a military confrontation between Turkey and the US because American special forces are training the Syrian Kurds in Manbij, not too far from Afrin.

The driving factor of anti-Americanism in Turkey has traditionally been based on conspiracy theories. For decades, Turkish nationalists believed America had a hidden agenda to support Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East. Stories of American military support for the PKK - a Kurdish separatist movement recognized as a terrorist organization by Washington - have long circulated in Turkish nationalist circles. Such rumors came to be accepted as conventional wisdom. Well, this conspiracy theory has now become reality. In the absence of a better alternative, the YPG - the Syrian extension of the PKK - has become America's main military partner on the ground in the fight against ISIS. This, in the eyes of Ankara, makes its Nato ally a supporter of terrorism and it validates the worst conspiracies fueling anti-Americanism.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Swinland Link Mod/Swinland Thumper

It proves the link — he’s using it to pander to his base

Erlanger 6/22 — Steven Erlanger, "Analysis: What Turkey Wants to Let Finland and Sweden Into NATO," New York Times, 6-22-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/22/world/europe/finland-sweden-turkey-nato.html, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

Mr. Erdogan is facing elections next June, and his popularity is slipping along with the Turkish economy. The Kurdish issue is an important one in Turkey and he is playing on nationalist sentiment now, while suppressing political dissent and independent journalism.

In an interview on Swedish television, a former NATO official, Stephanie Babst, said that Mr. Erdogan’s real agenda is domestic. “Primarily this is a message toward his electoral base at home,” she said. “He has an election ahead of him. The economic situation in Turkey is pretty gruesome and so he wants to demonstrate leadership. He wants to demonstrate that he is a heard leader and so he is, I am afraid to say, using Sweden and Finland in order to get his strategic messages across.”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Swinland Link Mod/Swinland Thumper

Swinland is calculated Erdogan is framing it as ant western EVEN IF he says yes in order to get concessions

Cropsey 6/23 — Seth Cropsey is founder and president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy Seth Cropsey , "Diversionary war: Turkey’s actions against Greece are a growing threat to NATO," Hill, 6-23-2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3534155-diversionary-war-turkeys-actions-against-greece-are-a-growing-threat-to-nato/, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

Turkey also attempted to position itself as a mediator between Kyiv and Moscow, and it spearheaded a half-hearted attempt (albeit with great public fanfare) to ensure grain exports from Ukraine.

Yet, Turkey’s resistance to Swedish and Finnish NATO memberships is a ploy to extract concessions from Washington: If the Biden administration reinstates Turkey in the F-35 program and approves F-16 sales, Erdogan likely will relent.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Security Mechanism Link Mod/AT: Thumper

Sweden/Finland was a reset for the security mechanism

SWP 5/20 — Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), "Deciphering Turkey’s Geopolitical Balancing and Anti-Westernism in Its Relations with Russia," 05-20-2022, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/deciphering-turkeys-geopolitical-balancing-and-anti-westernism-in-its-relations-with-russia, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

First, Turkey and the West (particularly the US), can take steps to consolidate their geo­political convergence. It is notable in this respect is that the Biden administration has told Congress that meeting Turkey’s request to purchase F-16 jets and modernisation kits would serve US national security inter­ests and NATO’s long-term unity in light of the war in Ukraine. However, on the F‑16 question, Turkey is facing the opposition of a hostile US Congress. But if the Biden administration uses its political capital and this purchase goes through, it could signifi­cantly improve Turkish-US relations and po­tentially pave the ground for more serious engagement to find a formula to address the S‑400 crisis – probably this crisis can not be resolved soon but it can be better managed so that it does not contaminate the overall Turkish – US relations. Another positive development is that the US-Turkey launched a new “Strategic Mechanism” to review bilateral topics to boost ties. But if Turkey’s problematisation of the Swedish and Finnish NATO membership bids is not resolved, ideally before the next NATO meet­ing on 30 June 2022 in Madrid, this can then easily dispel the recent positive atmos­phere in Turkey-Western/NATO relations, which was largely a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. On the Turkey-EU level, launching a more structured foreign policy dialogue between Ankara and Brus­sels, including a potential Turkish role in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), paired with more clarity on the part of the EU on the role of non-EU NATO members, namely Turkey, the UK and the US, in the new European security architecture can further aid and sustain this process of convergence. Indeed, with­out a presence or contribution of these three actors, no serious European security order can be established, yet their roles remain undefined in the European debate on this prospective order.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Security Mechanism Link Mod/AT: Thumper

Nothing has happened—it’s just words—we read after their evidence ends

Ertan 4/6 — Nazlan Ertan is Al-Monitor's former culture editor. She is a Turkish blogger, journalist and editor who has worked in Ankara, Paris and Brussels for various Turkish and international publications, including the Hurriyet Daily News, CNN Turk and BBC Turkish Service."Turkey, US launch new strategic mechanism amid Ukraine crisis," Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East, 4-6-2022, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/04/turkey-us-launch-new-strategic-mechanism-amid-ukraine-crisis, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

“The launch of the mechanism is certainly the prelude to a more constructive era in the relationship,” Sinan Ulgen, a former diplomat and visiting fellow of Carnegie Europe, told Al-Monitor. “It will not be a cure-all to all the tough spots in the relations - from the US policy on Syria to Turkey’s acquisition of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system - but neither should it be dismissed as window dressing. The mechanism provides a comprehensive platform, with consultations at different levels, to deepen cooperation on issues such as trade or regional hotspots.”

The process was accelerated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ulgen said. Wendy Sherman, US Deputy Secretary of State, came to Ankara ten days later and underscored the importance of the strategic mechanism.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Security Mechanism Link Mod/AT: Thumper

Security mechanism fails now because of lack of US security cooperation — BUT this is another link because the AFF would make it credible

CoşKun 5/12 — Alper Coşkun is a senior fellow within the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, especially in relation to the United States and Europe. Alper CoşKun, "Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5-12-2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/12/making-new-u.s.-turkey-strategic-mechanism-meaningful-pub-87117, accessed 6-24-2022 WMK

The mechanism grew out of an understanding reached between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and U.S. President Joe Biden during their meeting on the margins of the October 2021 G20 summit in Rome. Though the idea is said to belong to Biden, the U.S. readout after the meeting lacked any reference to the mechanism, whereas it was the highlight of the Turkish narrative. This difference in emphasis initially triggered rumors that the United States might be dragging its feet.

After the initiative was announced, U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Marisa Lago visited Turkey to explore opportunities in commercial relations and to discuss how Turkey’s Russia-dependent energy mix could be diversified. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu will travel to the United States to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on May 18 in the first cabinet-level bilateral visit between the two countries since the Biden administration took office. The initial plans had been to have this meeting in Washington, DC, but the venue has been moved to New York, and the program has been curtailed, reportedly at the behest of the United States and probably in reaction to the conviction of Turkish philanthropist Osman Kavala. While the process hasn’t been derailed, this experience serves as a reminder that the mechanism is vulnerable to different dynamics. Its sustainability and potential to have a positive impact depend on Ankara and Washington making the right choices to facilitate and not undermine policy convergences.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › AT: Ukraine Fixed Ties

Ukraine did not fix Western ties—Turkey went back to Russia

Gaber 6/22 — Yevgeniya Gaber is a non resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey, "Turkey's wartime bridge to the West is collapsing," Atlantic Council, 6-22-2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkeys-wartime-bridge-to-the-west-is-collapsing/, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine has forced countries around the world to reexamine their geopolitical choices. Turkey, a strategic partner to both of the states at war, has been affected more than most nations. Caught in a lose-lose situation where taking any side in the conflict would lead to a major rupture with the other partner, it has tried to maintain amicable relations with both Russia and Ukraine.

At the same time, the war has given Turkish leadership a chance to turn the challenges of this shaky equilibrium into an opportunity by positioning Ankara as a potential mediator between Moscow and Kyiv.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Ukraine Link/AT: Ukraine Thumper

But it enflames anti-Americanism—the public wants to cut cooperation with the West, the aff would be their worst fears

SWP 6/4 — Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), "Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine," 6-4-2022, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2022C25/, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

Anti-Western narratives that the war has accentuated echo within far-left circles as well. At the center of the denunciation of the West is anti-Americanism.

Following the acquittals of various politi­cal and security factions in the early 2010s in the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, it is no coincidence that they did not shy away from endorsing and even shaping – implicitly and explicitly – some of the AKP’s foreign policy adventures, and that they are now watching the invasion closely. As important carriers of Eurasianism in today’s Turkey, these actors see the war in Ukraine first and foremost as a proxy war between the US (in cooperation with Europe and NATO), on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other. They also approach the war as the new militarized phase of a process through which the cen­ter of gravity is shifting to Asia.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Ukraine Link/AT: Ukraine Thumper

Ukraine does not help Erdogan

Tharoor 5/20 — Ishaan Tharoor “Turkey’s awkward role in the Russia-Ukraine war” Washington Post, 5-20-2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/20/turkey-ukraine-erdogan-russia-nato/, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

Of more pressing concern for Erdogan and his colleagues are the country’s mounting economic woes and political pressures ahead of elections next year that may actually be competitive. For them, the sooner the war finds a diplomatic conclusion — and the faster the economic disruption triggered by the conflict stabilizes — the better.

“Senior Turkish officials are quietly concerned that the conflict is now turning into a NATO-Russia war and that the risk of escalation is growing, fueled by greater arms support for Ukraine and the absence of a negotiations framework,” wrote Asli Aydintasbas, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “They are also disappointed with the West’s reluctance to rally behind Turkish-brokered ceasefire talks. High-level Turkish officials have accused ‘some NATO countries’ of not wanting the war to end in order to harm Russia.”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Econ Link Mod/AT: Thumper

Erdogan campaigns against NATO to distract from economic problems

Rubin 2019 — Michael Rubin "WHY THE TURKISH PRESIDENT REVELS IN CONSPIRACY THEORIES" March 7, 2019. advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5VKJ-XJ71-JCBF-S2RN-00000-00&context=1516831. Accessed June 23, 2022. WMK

It was simply the latest temper tantrum for Turkey's mercurial leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan. "What kind of NATO alliance is this?" he said in mid-February during an election rally ahead of March's local elections. "You give terrorists around 23,000 truckloads of weapons and tools through Iraq, but when we asked, you won't even sell them to us," he added.

On its face, this is nonsense. The United States began supporting Syrian Kurds fighting the Islamic State against the backdrop of the 20142015 Siege of Kobane , in which Syrian Kurdish fighters stood their ground and ultimately rebuffed an Islamic State assault on the border town. Not only did Turkey refuse to support the resistance to the Islamic State for the bulk of the siege, but it also allowed its border to be used to support and supply the Islamic State; and 90 percent of Islamic State foreign fighters during the period traversed the Turkish border, often with Turkish government facilitation.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Econ Link Mod/AT: Thumper

Erdogan running on anti-Americanism to overcome economic problems—the AFF takes away his pivot forcing him to find a new diversion

Cengiz 5/30 — Mahmut Cengiz is an Adjunct Faculty at the Department of Criminology, Law and Society of George Mason University Mahmut Cengiz "Sweden, Finland, and NATO: Pawns in Erdogan’s Bid for Re-election Amid a Tattered Domestic Economy?," Hstoday, 5-30-2022, https://www.hstoday.us/featured/sweden-finland-and-nato-pawns-in-erdogans-bid-for-re-election-amid-a-tattered-domestic-economy/, accessed 6-20-2022 WMK

When Turkish voters go to the polls in coming elections in 2023, Erdogan’s political future will be decided. It is a critical election for a man who loathes losing an election and despairs of what the future holds for him if the voters reject his bid for re-election. A relaxing life in retirement would not await him after having violated the human rights of thousands of Turkish citizens, been the subject of the anti-corruption investigations based on solid evidence, and been responsible for financing and sponsoring jihadist groups operating in conflict zones.

Erdogan’s domestic politics are based on the consolidation of power into himself through three distinct actions. First, Erdogan works to send a strong message to the people that his leadership of the country is an insurance of Islamic freedom for his followers who for many years have complained about the pressures of a secular system. The people who fall for this message strongly believe that, under Erdogan’s rule, mosques will be open and women will be allowed to wear headscarves in schools and in state institutions. Second, Erdogan used economic-development projects during the early years of his presidency to send a message that Turkey and its citizens are prospering financially thanks to his leadership. Third, Erdogan works to craft a foreign policy message that portrays him as a powerful leader who can defy all of Turkey’s “Western enemies.” An example of this message in practice is Erdogan’s stance on the expansion of NATO. To win the support of Turkey’s nationalistic voters, Erdogan stresses his opposition to allowing Finland and Sweden to join NATO.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Link Magnifier — Coop Restores Relations

The AFF restores the US-Turkey partnership---leads to more future cooperation

CoşKun 22 — Alper Coşkun is a senior fellow within the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, especially in relation to the United States and Europe. Alper CoşKun, "Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5-12-2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/12/making-new-u.s.-turkey-strategic-mechanism-meaningful-pub-87117, accessed 6-20-2022 WMK

If Ankara and Washington can advance cooperation in some of these areas, that would qualitatively improve a U.S.-Turkey partnership that has traditionally been set in a straitjacket of sometimes divergent security and defense interests. The Strategic Mechanism can help broaden this relationship and make it more resilient. The proposal’s added value would lie in introducing structure and continuity to different strands of engagement between the two countries and in its potential to swiftly elevate ripe schemes to political decisionmakers for their endorsement. In short, if the objectives are set right, the Strategic Mechanism could hasten both the incubation and implementation of useful ideas.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Link — Ethical AI

Turkey uses LAWs now — the AFF would have major public backlash

Gurcan 21 — Metin Gurcan is a columnist for Al-Monitor's Turkey Pulse. He has a PHD. Metin Gurcan 6-8-2021, "Turkish drone sets off international buzz over 'killer robots'," Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East, WMK

Turkey’s flourishing drone industry is back in the international spotlight following a UN report suggesting that Turkish-made artificial intelligence-based drones might have been used to kill enemy troops in Libya last year. If confirmed the incident would mark the debut of “killer robots” in the global theater of war.

The report by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya indicates that a Kargu-2 kamikaze drone manufactured by Turkey’s state-owned company STM was likely used in March 2020 in clashes between the forces of the Turkish-backed Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army of eastern warlord Khalifa Hifter following the latter’s besiegement of Tripoli. Logistics convoys and retreating Hifter forces “were hunted down and remotely engaged by the unmanned combat aerial vehicles or the lethal autonomous weapons systems such as the STM Kargu-2 and other loitering munitions,” the report says. “The lethal autonomous weapons systems were programmed to attack targets without requiring data connectivity between the operator and the munition: in effect, a true ‘fire, forget and find’ capability,” it noted without specifying whether anyone was actually killed.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Link — AI Catch All

Erdogan uses AI-independence as point of national pride and prestige. Plan undermines it

Shkurti, 21 — PhD candidate at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University (September 27, 2021, Gloria Shkurti, “Can Turkey’s Artificial Intelligence Strategy Be a Game Changer?; Turkey's publication of the national artificial intelligence strategy is vital as it "officially" brought Turkey into the AI race,” , JMP)

For Turkey, declaring its own national AI strategy is an important step to becoming more influential in international affairs and is highly important for tangible reasons. First and foremost, there is an ongoing AI race between several countries, with the U.S. and China at the forefront. At this point, the publication of the national strategy of a country is vital as it “officially” brought Turkey into the AI race, bolstering its competitiveness regionally and globally. Having a leading role in the AI industry is key for a global leadership role and a determinant in power struggles. Countries with an effective national AI strategy will have higher chances to leapfrog towards global leadership.

Most national AI strategies focus mainly on maximizing societal benefit. However, AI is a military trump card with a major impact on global AI competition and the concomitant strengthening of national security. It is very important that Turkey’s national AI strategy takes into account the military aspect. Leading countries in AI R&D such as the U.S., China, and Russia have indicated their intentions to use AI in the military field and increase their advantage. Turkey’s current national AI strategy does not have specific indications on how AI will be applied in the military, and it is imperative that in the following years Turkey announces a road map on how it intends to do so.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Link › Link — Generic — Cooperation

Turkey needs to remain strongly anti-American in order to shore up political support. Cooperation would be a major reversal of policy which undercuts Erdogan’s base messaging

Truitte 18 — Kevin Truitte is in his third semester in the Security Studies Program with a concentration in International Security. He also writes as a columnist for the Georgetown Security Studies Review. Until April 2019, Kevin worked as a Research Assistant at Hudson Institute, a think tank in Washington, DC. He has previously worked as an intern at Hudson Institute, the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, the U.S.-Libya Business Association, and the Institute for the Study of War. Kevin Truitte, 4/20/18, "The Implications of Turkey’s Anti-American Messaging," Georgetown Security Studies Review, WMK

Over the past decade, the Turkish government has slowly consolidated its power; media outlets have been shut down, opposition politicians have been jailed, and Turks have been arrested for social media posts deemed critical of government policies.[i] As the country has shifted away from an open society and democratic government, so too has it shifted away from its alliance with the country that long encouraged these values: The United States. In recent years, Turkey under current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has not only reoriented itself away from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its relations with the U.S., but has also actively engaged in anti-American messaging. The anti-American propaganda employed by Turkey’s government and pro-government allies has served to stoke anti-Americanism in Turkish society that has enabled the country’s movement away from strategic alignment with the West. This strategic shift has geopolitical implications for the United States’ strategic interests in NATO and in the Middle East.

Turkey first aligned with the United States in the early years of the Cold War. Joining NATO gave Turkey the promise of collective security in reaction to a threatening Soviet Union to the north, while the United States gained an ally strategically located on the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits. However, this initial alliance did not mean that Turkey always had strong pro-American feelings. At the height of the Cold War, strong anti-American factions emerged within the Turkish ruling elite. These factions were representative of a strong anti-American sentiment within the population that originated from Leftist circles.[ii] After the Cold War, anti-American feeling reemerged in Turkey over the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The Turkish parliament under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government—the first Islamist party to successfully take and hold power and the party of Erdoğan—rejected by three votes an agreement that would have allowed American troops and military logistics to pass from Turkey into Iraq.[iii] US favorability with Turks dropped from 52% in 2000 to only 15% in 2003. Turkish opinion of the U.S. has not changed since 2003, despite changes in US leadership. [iv]