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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › REM’s/REE’s › 2nc cards

Revitalizing domestic supply is key to reducing dependency

Kim and Jariwala, PhD ‘21 (Hyong-Min and Deep, Hyong Min Kim is a senior majoring in electrical engineering and minoring in history at the University of Pennsylvania and Deep is an assistant professor of electrical systems engineering in the School of Engineering and Applied Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Deep has a Ph.D. from Northwestern University, published 9/23/21 by the Kleinman Center for Energy Policy, accessed 7/19/22, “The Not-So-Rare Earth Elements: A Question of Supply and Demand”, https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/research/publications/the-not-so-rare-earth-elements-a-question-of-supply-and-demand/)//lexmw

U.S. policies for the time being should accept that Chinese supplies will remain the most lucrative option for most industries, and punitive policies to discourage their use would not be advisable. Both the U.S. and other countries, through stockpiling of key REEs at both governmental and corporate levels, should ensure that domestic industries are relatively unimpacted by future fluctuations in the REE market for a reasonable period of a year or more. In the long run, incentivizing the use of American REE supplies should be considered, both to reduce dependency on Chinese supplies and to help vitalize the domestic REE market.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › REM’s/REE’s › 2nc cards

Government investment would provide certainty to investors and spills over to expand REE private investment

Klinger, PhD, ‘18 (Julie Michelle, has a PhD in Geography from University of California Berkeley and is Assistant Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University, published January 2018 by The Extractive Industries and Society, accessed 7/19/22, “Rare earth elements: Development, sustainability and policy issues”, https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2018/02/Klinger-2018-Rare-Earth-Elements_Development-Policy-and-Sustainability-Issues.pdf)//lexmw

The rude awakening precipitated by the 2010 crisis stimulated an unprecedented wave of interest in the supply chains and life cycles of rare earth elements. Some examined these dynamics out of concern for the environmental and health impacts of rare earth mining and processing (Klinger, 2015a; Pagano et al., 2015; Sprecher et al., 2014; Carpenter et al., 2015; Weng et al., 2013). Others focused on mitigating the risks of future supply disruptions (Keilhacker and Minner, 2017; Stegen, 2015; Mancheri, 2015), and still others capitalized on the moment to develop proposals to “green” the rare earth supply chain (Rauer and Kaufmann, 2014). Despite a number of feasible proposals to improve the sustainability of the rare earths lifecycle (McLellan et al., 2014), there remains a considerable gap between theory and practice, due to policy and market failures. Governments thus far have failed to provide sufficient certainty to support investments in environmentally sound rare earth production, while major downstream buyers have opted not to purchase more sustainably produced rare earth elements. Because rare earth elements are critical to life as we know it, they present rich and as yet, largely untapped, potential for fertile social science research. Beyond policy analysis and supply chain concerns, the integration of these elements into everyday life in ever more intimate and mundane ways requires further analysis.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › REM’s/REE’s › 2nc cards

Federal investment is key to sustainable mining development

Kim and Jariwala, PhD ‘21 (Hyong-Min and Deep, Hyong Min Kim is a senior majoring in electrical engineering and minoring in history at the University of Pennsylvania and Deep is an assistant professor of electrical systems engineering in the School of Engineering and Applied Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Deep has a Ph.D. from Northwestern University, published 9/23/21 by the Kleinman Center for Energy Policy, accessed 7/19/22, “The Not-So-Rare Earth Elements: A Question of Supply and Demand”, https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/research/publications/the-not-so-rare-earth-elements-a-question-of-supply-and-demand/)//lexmw

To meet growing REE demands, future U.S. policies should aim at locating and tapping into other promising REE reserves in the nation so that Mountain Pass Mine no longer constitutes the entirety of domestic REE mining. The United States Geological Survey has recently entered a joint venture with the respective geological survey functions of Australia and Canada in pooling data and best practices, called the Critical Minerals Mapping Initiative (USGS 2020). All three nations have vast tracts of land with potentially tremendous reserves of critical minerals, and an accurate understanding of the distribution and concentration of these reserves should precede any 10 major prospecting and development of mining facilities. The Round Top Mountain in Texas, Bear Lodge Range in Wyoming, and the Bokan-Dotson Ridge in Alaska have all been identified as promising deposits of REEs in the United States, and projects to develop and exploit these sites are underway (Borzykowski 2019; Goyal 2020). The former is expected to begin commercial production of refined REE in 2021. Deep sea mining for polymetallic nodules with exploitable concentrations of REE may be considered if its drastic environmental ramifications can be justified for value of REEs extractable. Sustainable development implementation of best practices may be encouraged with a combination of government funding and environmental regulations, e.g. by putting these mines under pilot programs in joint venture with the Department of Energy. Regulations may further ensure that ores mined from these mines are refined in the U.S. and fed into the domestic supply chain as opposed to being refined overseas. Policies regarding domestic mining and refining should keep in mind that, while multiple REEs are found in the same deposit, the most critical REEs are the few that are extensively used in permanent magnets—notably Nd and Dy. Relative concentrations of these elements could certainly be an important criterion in future mapping and prospecting of deposits. Future government funding and incentivization may encourage the priority purification of elements that are in high demand. For example, the Wheat Ridge refining facility was funded by the U.S. Department of Defense and the latter will determine the specific elements to be purified, ostensibly those that are essential to the defense enterprise (Stutt 2020).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › REM’s/REE’s › 2nc cards

Buying from domestic producers stops dependency

Green, PhD, ’19 ( John A., Green holds a BA, summa cum laude, from Yale University, a JD from Yale Law School, and a PhD from Harvard. Since 2017, he is director of the Andrea Mitchell Center for the Study of Democracy, published 11/12/19, accessed 7/16/22, DefenseNews, “The collapse of American rare earth mining — and lessons learned”, )//lexmw

By 2017, it was obvious that in the showdown between Molycorp and China, the Chinese had won. Mountain Pass was now sending U.S.-mined rare earth concentrate to China for processing. The dream of a one-stop American rare earths solution was over, and the private sector had little appetite for reviving it. The history of Molycorp is littered with “what ifs.” What if the Pentagon’s mid-2010s industrial policy determined that rare earths were critical to national security, like it does now? And, most importantly, what if American customers, including those in the U.S. government, had decided that diversifying their rare earth supplies with an American source had been worthwhile? Recently there have been stirrings of interest in repatriating rare earth production to the United States. The U.S. military has become acutely aware of its , due in part to belligerent Chinese threats to cut rare earth exports. American companies, too, are realizing how dependent they are on this single supplier, a country that is becoming more expensive to work with as trade tensions rise. However, those in the private sector know all too well how difficult it is for companies to take proactive supply chain steps. Therefore, it is the government’s responsibility to set the stage for increased American rare earth production. There are a number of steps the U.S. government can take to establish a more certain future for domestic rare earth production. Reducing red tape and bureaucratic inertia will lower costs and reduce risk — there is no reason that permitting a mine in the United States should take five times longer than it does in Canada or Australia. The government can also protect the market, at little cost, from Chinese manipulation by agreeing to purchase rare earths from American producers when such materials are intended for military systems. Instead of funding substitution technologies to reduce demand for rare earths, the U.S. should invest in production technologies to increase its supply.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › REM’s/REE’s

Buying from domestic producers creates a stockpile and solves dependency AND Japan and Australia can lead the way

Hui, B.A, ’21 (Mary, B.A in Spanish and Portugese from Princeton university, a reporter based in Hong Kong. She previously worked at New York Times, Washington Post, and CityLab. published April 23, 2021, updated December 28, 2021, accessec 7/16/21, published by Quartz, “Japan’s global rare earths quest holds lessons for the US and Europe”, )//lexmw

As the US and Europe seek to secure their rare earths supply chains and limit reliance on China, Japan’s model may offer some guidance. One key difference is that while Japan is scarce in mineral resources, the US and Europe have sizable rare earth reserves. The problem, in the case of the US, is that it ceded its mining and processing capabilities to China over the past decades, and must now rebuild the industry at a time when in global rare earth supply chains. “Japan and Australia have definitely led the way in terms of how the US government should approach [securing rare earths supplies],” but it’s “not necessarily a cut-and-paste” job for Washington in terms of emulating specific policies, said Pini Althaus, CEO of USA Rare Earth, which is developing a mine in Texas and establishing a domestic processing facility in Colorado. It is in a New York listing this year. For example, the US could use existing federal legislation to build up its national defense stockpile of rare earths by committing to buying rare earths from domestic producers over a certain number of years, and within a certain price band, explained Dan McGroarty, advisory board member of USA Rare Earth. That would, in effect, be an offtake agreement much like those of Jogmec with various rare earths producers. And the US government, by committing to buying from a particular domestic producer, would send a strong signal to capital markets, said McGroarty. This would also avoid “picking winners and losers,” which direct federal grants to specific companies would entail, possibly at the expense of driving private capital away from other firms. Experts also caution that rare earth mines only represent the upstream part of the supply chain concerned with getting the ores out of the ground. Processing those ores into high-purity rare earth metals, then using them to manufacture magnets and batteries, is just as crucial. “A hundred new mines can open around the world with generous public support, but without investing in value-added processing and manufacturing, the rest of the world will continue to remain dependent on China for refined rare earths and rare earth-bearing technologies,” said Julie Klinger, assistant professor in geography at the University of Delaware.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › REM’s/REE’s

First plank solves scenario 1 – that’s 1ac Giordano and DiEuliis’ 21

James Giordano and Diane DiEuliis ’21, *PhD, MPhil, is Professor in the Departments of Neurology and Biochemistry; Chief of the Neuroethics Studies Program; Director of the Cyber-SMART Center’s Program in Biotechnology, Biosecurity and Ethics; Co-director of the Program in Brain Science and Global Law and Policy; and Chair of the Subprogram in Military Medical Ethics at Georgetown University, **is a Senior Research fellow at National Defense University. Her research areas focus on emerging biological technologies, biodefense, and preparedness for biothreats. Specific topic areas under this broad research portfolio include dual-use life sciences research, synthetic biology, the US bioeconomy, disaster recovery, and behavioral, cognitive, and social science as it relates to important aspects of deterrence and preparedness, “Emerging Neuroscience and Technology (NeuroS/T): Current and Near-Term Risks and Threats to US—and Global—Biosecurity”, A STRATEGIC MULTILAYER ASSESSMENT, May 2021, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/SMA-Invited-Perspective_Emerging-NeuroST_Giordano-and-DiEuliis_FINAL.pdf

Additionally, it is important to note that although the US National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine report briefly mentioned recent developments in brain-controlled robotics and brainmachine interface (BMI), neuroS/T, writ large, was not a core aspect of their address. At present, a majority of countries do not yet identify the brain sciences as a principal economic focus. Of the 41 nations that pursued specific political strategies to expand and promote their bioeconomies in 2018, only 10 included neuroS/T research and development objectives.16 So, while there may be little doubt that neuropsychiatric disorders are a significant public health problem, brain research is relatively costly, and the perceived return-on-investment for those countries that do not have substantial neuroepidemiological burdens may not be sufficient to justify pursuing dedicated neuroS/T initiatives. However, while intranational human capital and socio-political agendas of a given nation may not prompt investment and engagement in neuro-bioeconomics, the relative economic—and perhaps cultural and political—hegemony afforded by leveraging global neuroS/T (and overall biological) markets might prove influential to changing perspectives, postures, and participation. To be sure, due to the current lack of emphasis on brain science in national bioeconomic strategies, those countries that initiate policies and programs to invest in neuroS/T may achieve significant financial successes and economic power, and thereby direct future (ethical, technical, and legal) standards of research and use.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › China Tech Coop Plank › A/T Won’t cooperate

China says yes

Evelyn Cheng 10-30-20 Evelyn Cheng is CNBC.com’s Beijing correspondent, covering China’s economy and financial markets. [China talks up a future in which it needs collaboration with the U.S. and other countries, ] // DHS WAgustin 🗿

BEIJING — As Chinese authorities prepare to build up their country in the next several years, they’re keen to ensure the rest of the world will still do business with them. In a high-level press conference Friday, central government officials emphasized the need for other countries to collaborate with China, amid rising global uncertainty from the coronavirus pandemic and protectionism. The media event comes as China’s top leadership conclude an important policy meeting aimed at setting the country’s economic and social priorities for the next five years. The officials particularly pushed back against “decoupling,” or a complete separation of the U.S. and Chinese economies that President Donald Trump’s administration has advocated, beginning with technology. Chinese telecommunications giant by U.S. restrictions in the last two years. “Decoupling is basically not realistic, and there’s no benefit for China or the U.S., or the entire world,” said Han Wenxiu, deputy director at the Office of the Central Commission for Financial and Economic Affairs. That’s according to a CNBC translation of his Mandarin-language remarks. “Those who want decoupling are few. Those who want collaboration are far more,” Han said, noting that the U.S. and China are only able to be the world’s two largest economies since they complement each other and operate in an open global environment. President Xi is bracing for a ‘combative’ period ahead with China’s five-year plan The U.S. is China’s largest trade partner, but the two countries have been locked in tensions for more than two years. Each government has levied tariffs on goods worth hundreds of billions of dollars from the other country. Critics say the dominance of the state in China’s economy gives it unfair advantages over American companies and other foreign businesses. Economists expect China to become the world’s largest economy in the next few years, surpassing the U.S. In an effort to reduce economic dependency on debt-fueled investment and manufacturing of goods for export, China has been trying to increase its reliance on domestic consumption. Foreign trade still accounts for about 30% of China’s gross domestic product, according to Han, who noted a decline from 60% previously. “Looking ahead, China’s imports and exports, use of foreign capital, and scale of investment overseas will expand, and international status will rise,” he said. “This is also an important characteristic of a large country’s economy.” ‘Self-reliance’ in technology Han and four other central government officials were speaking a day after the on a also known as the 14th Five-Year Plan. This week’s meeting of the central committee of China’s ruling Communist Party also addressed goals for the year 2035. The meeting emphasized China’s need to pursue “self-reliance” in technology as a strategy for national development, according to The country has been accelerating its own development of critical technologies such as semiconductors and a Again, while describing China’s need to pursue a new phase of development, officials were quick to point out how the country needed to learn from international expertise. “China’s technological innovation has never been closed innovation, and in the future it will not close its doors to innovate on its own,” Science and Technology Minister Wang Zhigang said during Friday’s press conference, according to a CNBC translation of his Mandarin-language remarks. Aim to build a ‘modern’ society In the release about goals for 2035, China’s leaders said they would focus on building a “modern socialist China“ that includes modernization of national defense and the military. The emphasis on “modern” comes after the ruling party said Thursday it will basically achieve its promise of building a “ by next year, when the Chinese Communist Party celebrates its 100th anniversary. The release also said that Beijing expects GDP to top 100 trillion yuan (about $14.9 trillion) this year, which would imply an increase of at least 0.9% from 2019′s level. Longer term, authorities said China aims to become “a strong country in culture, education, talent, sports and health.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › China Tech Coop Plank

Plank solves. Disables chances of a great power war and spurs innovation with China

Xiaoli Jin 3-12-20 Xiaoli Jin is an associate at Keystone Strategy. She is a prospective member of Harvard Law School’s Class of 2024. She has previously been published in YaleGlobal. [The Challenge and Necessity of US-China Technology Cooperation, ] // DHS WAgustin 🐒

With rising frictions between the United States and China in the field of science and technology, few may still remember the great accomplishments achieved when the United States and China cooperated in the field of technology over the past 40 years. During the rapprochement in the 1970s, cooperation in technology spanned over fields like energy, health, basic research in physics and chemistry, and civil industrial technology, among others that could easily be considered sensitive areas by current standards. Academic exchanges also thrived: the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology has hosted thousands of Chinese scientists since the 1980s. The U.S. National Science Foundation also to conduct scientific research in China. Yet in recent years, this collaborative ethos has been increasingly replaced by mistrust. The U.S. to stop purchasing 5G infrastructure and equipment from China’s technology crown jewel, Huawei. Renowned scholars were for involvement in technological research sponsored by the other nation’s government. Some people may view the deterioration of the U.S.-China technology exchange simply as a trade-off between national security and innovation. However, the contesting philosophies of technological protectionism and globalism is the more fundamental issue at play. This paper discusses the past, present, and future of US-China technology cooperation in three dimensions. 1.) Why has technological cooperation deteriorated? 2.) How is reviving cooperation beneficial to both countries? 3.) Is it possible to restore trust against the backdrop of U.S.-China competition? Why has U.S.-China cooperation in technology deteriorated? The reasons for deterioration lie in the rapid development of technology in both countries. On the one hand, China’s technological capacity has been advancing rapidly. Harvard Economics Professor Richard Freeman 36 percent of global scientific articles in 2016 and 37 percent of citations to scientific articles in 2013, which is two times more than China’s share of global population or GDP. The time to turn research into commercial applications has also shortened. In November 2019, China had already 5G services in 50 cities. The companies that run 5G services are none other but China’s three state-run telecom giants--China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom--reinforcing the United States’ concerns that Chinese government is closely involved in China’s cutting-edge technologies. On the other hand, technology has also developed by leaps and bounds in the United States. In the past, only a few high-stake, dual-use technologies would spark national security concerns. In addition, these technologies often had military applications. Yet as technological applications proliferated and interfaced pervasively with people’s everyday lives, even dating applications can now collect personal data that warrants regulators’ concerns. Increasingly, the United States finds itself vulnerable in many new technological fields that were not formerly considered sensitive. Most fundamentally, U.S.-China technology cooperation has shifted from unilateral to bilateral. In the past, the U.S. was typically the provider of capital and technological know-how while China was the receiver. For the United States, technological assistance to China was partly an exercise in . Since the U.S. surpassed China in technological capacity by a wide margin, exchanging technology assets for diplomatic objectives made political sense for the United States. Moreover, in the past, U.S.-China technological cooperation was often rolled out in formal settings. Cooperation usually took place between government agencies or government-affiliated research institutions, which enabled the U.S. to control the extent of the technological knowledge that was transferred to China. In recent years, however, China has started exporting capital and talent to the United States as well. Chinese technology giants Alibaba and Baidu established Artificial Intelligence research labs in California, where they collaborated with U.S. scholars and institutions. Chinese companies poured capital into U.S. technology companies. In the first quarter of 2014 alone, Chinese investors struck worth over six billion dollars, including the takeovers of Motorola Mobility and IBM’s x86 server unit. With the rise of Chinese talent and capital, the exchange of technological know-how between the United States and China now takes place among private businesses and between individuals: an exchange that is impossible for the United States to fully control. The changing nature of technological cooperation has made both countries reconsider the political costs and benefits. Meanwhile, as nationalist sentiments rise on a global scale, technology has become a convenient medium to strike a political point. Hence, it comes as no surprise that backlash against U.S.-China technological cooperation gradually comes to the mainstream. Technological protectionism has temporarily prevailed against technological globalism. Why is reviving technological cooperation beneficial to both United States and China? The United States and China should not let technological protectionism persist, as cooperation has proven valuable to both sides. These benefits are evident whether cooperation is organized through government-sponsored programs or through private companies and individuals. The (CERC) is a quintessential example of the value of technology cooperation through government-sponsored programs. Initiated at the presidential level in 2009, CERC aims to achieve a large-scale adoption of energy efficient buildings backed up by cutting-edge technologies. Through the collective effort of and researchers in the United States and China, CERC has launched high-tech products including daylight redirecting windows, trilogy integrated heat pumps and co-axial ground heat exchangers that are reported to consume 14 to 30 percent less energy than conventional products. In addition, CERC also published multiple copyrighted software applications and are on the path to file joint intellectual properties on behalf of research teams from both countries. CERC is just one example of the vast potential that U.S.-China cooperation can unleash, especially in fields that concern both countries. As acknowledged in a , the U.S. gained research access to important facilities in China and communicated with China’s leading scientists through various scientific initiatives. Needless to say, China also obtained a great amount of technological experience and know-how by collaborating with the United States. The two countries have only more to gain when their technology cooperation is carried out on a business-to-business or individual-to-individual level. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics a need for approximately one million more Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) professionals than the U.S. currently produces to retain its own preeminence in technology. And over the years, China has consistently been the leading source of STEM students enrolled in the United States. Moreover, surveys of U.S. National Science Foundation 90 percent of Chinese scholars still work in the U.S. ten years after receiving their doctoral degrees in STEM. These scholars power innovation in Silicon Valley, expediting the creation of technological applications that benefit millions of people in the United States. The benefit of cooperating with the United States on a business-to-business or individual-to-individual level is also obvious for China. For instance, through joint ventures, medical companies in the United States have brought innovative treatments to China’s vast healthcare market that cover a wide array of complex diseases like influenza, diabetes, and hypertension. How do we restore trust in technology cooperation against the backdrop of U.S.-China competition? Restoring U.S.-China technological cooperation will benefit the people of both countries. As the U.S.-China relationship is currently characterized by tension and mistrust, leaders in each country need to firmly express their determination to restore cooperation with their counterpart. They must co-develop strategic solutions to achieve this shared goal. First, the U.S. and China need to identify common interests, search for shared problems, and capitalize on existing relationships in those areas. For example, as Professor Lan Xue at Tsinghua University and Denis Simon at Arizona State University , the Integrated Gas-steam Combined Cycle field could be a potential opportunity to expand ties between the two countries. In this field, China appears to have the strongest technology in coal-gas transformation, while the United States ranks first in the world in steam turbine technology. The two countries could share their technological advantages to achieve a win-win outcome. Second, the U.S. and China need to enhance bilateral agreements that address pressing issues like intellectual property protection. Such agreements should contain clear protocols that guide the handling of sensitive data, specify the process of transferring technical knowledge, and establish corresponding auditing procedures. In addition, each country needs to do its part to address the other party’s core concerns. As scholars from the Asia Society , China has to further unleash its private sector and give businesses more freedom to make investment decisions that are unconstrained by the government. If China is willing to take bold steps to empower its private enterprises, the United States will be less concerned about the politicization of Chinese investments. Meanwhile, U.S. regulators should evaluate foreign investments in technology sectors based on the investors’ compliance history rather than their nationality. While all the aforementioned suggestions are by no means easy to achieve, each small step in the right direction can go a long way to make technological exchanges between the United States and China more transparent and open. History reveals that technological protectionism and globalism often take turns to dominate the mainstream political narrative. While neither is categorically better than the other, most would agree with that rapid innovations needs a certain level of collaboration to sprout. As the world awaits the two great powers to bring more technology advancement to mankind, it behooves the United States and China to continue close cooperation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Russian Sanctions Plank

Sanctions are effective in limiting Russian military capabilities – targeting specific sectors of their defense disables their military

Jack Detsch & Robbie Gramer 5-12-22 By , Foreign Policy’s Pentagon and national security reporter, and , a diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy.[Western Sanctions Are ‘Beginning to Bite’ Into Russia’s Military, ] // DHS WAgustin 🏋️‍♂️

U.S. and British officials believe that damaging international sanctions slapped on Russia over its full-scale invasion of Ukraine are hampering its ability to restock high-tech weapons, such as precision-guided munitions, though Russia still has plenty of conventional ammunition stocks at its disposal to continue to wage war. The impact of Russia’s sanctions-induced high-tech military shortages have been spotted by Western governments, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered troops into the besieged steel factory in the city of Mariupol, Ukraine, while Russian pilots have rained down “dumb bombs” without advanced precision guidance kits into the city. The Russian military burned through much of its stockpile of advanced weapons in the early days of the war; the United States believes Russia may have fired as many as 12 hypersonic missiles into Ukraine. U.S.-led announced in late February sought to starve Russia of computer chips and semiconductors that could be used in advanced military equipment. “Our sanctions and export controls were designed to deny Russia the critical inputs it needs to continue the war against Ukraine and to degrade its ability to project power in the future,” said Wally Adeyemo, deputy secretary of the U.S. Treasury Department. “We have disrupted the Russian military supply chain and overall production, inhibited its defense sector from settling payments, and will continue to target Russia’s ability to restock, resupply, and rebuild.” Since late February, when Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. government has designated 147 entities, 35 individuals, and 74 vessels operating in Russia’s defense sector, according to data from the Treasury Department. Among the top targets of U.S. sanctions is the Tactical Missiles Corporation, known as KTRV when transliterated and abbreviated. KTRV is a Russian state-owned defense conglomerate that produces hypersonic weapons and technology used in radar systems and other multipurpose missiles. The Treasury Department has sanctioned a chief executive of KTRV, Boris Obnosov, as well as 28 subsidiaries of the conglomerate. Within Russia, there are already signs the sanctions are starting to cut into the country’s ability to restock its high-end systems. U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo told Congress on Wednesday that Ukrainian officials had told her that Russia was being forced to take semiconductors from dishwashers and refrigerators for high-tech weapons. Raimondo said U.S. technology exports to Russia had dropped by almost 70 percent since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Moscow set up an interdepartmental committee to sort out how to source more military equipment domestically and if so-called friendly countries—including China—might be willing to work around sanctions to provide microelectronic processors and ammunition, two of Russia’s biggest military needs. “We do believe that the sanctions and the export controls, particularly when it comes to components, electronic components, has had an effect on the Russian defense industrial base and their ability to restart [precision-guided munitions],” a senior U.S. defense official told reporters this week. “It’s definitely beginning to bite into his defense industrial capabilities.” A British Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office spokesperson told Foreign Policy that international sanctions had frozen 60 percent of Russia’s foreign currency reserves, nearly $340 billion. Up to 70,000 computer specialists left Russia in March, and another 100,000 were expected to. “Persistent sanctions will lead to depressed long-term GDP growth as the country is unable to access key Western technology,” the spokesperson said in an emailed statement. (Russian GDP could fall by up to 15 percent this year.) It’s difficult to track the exact extent that sanctions are hitting Russia’s ability to rearm; Western officials speak about the matter in broad terms but have not publicly offered specific numbers due the sensitivity of the information. “We cannot publicly comment on the specific impact that these measures are having on the production of particular weapons systems or munitions Russia is using to prosecute its war against Ukraine,” a State Department spokesperson said. The bite of Western sanctions seems to have forced Moscow to begin dusting off Soviet-era defense stocks and use munitions that are less accurate—and thus potentially deadlier to Ukrainian civilians caught in the crossfire of Russia’s clumsy military offensives. On Monday, the British defense ministry’s intelligence arm assessed that the depletion of Russia’s precision-guided stockpiles has “forced the use of readily available but aging munitions that are less reliable, less accurate, and more easily intercepted.” The 77-day invasion has “revealed shortcomings” in Russia’s ability to conduct precision strikes, including subjecting Ukraine’s towns and villages to intense shelling, a trend that seems to be on the rise in the offensive in the Donbas region. Even if such ammunition is inferior to precision-guided munitions, Russia has plenty of it to continue its military offensives. “They will face problems on the security of supply on their precision-guided missiles, some other high-tech elements, and weaponry,” said one senior Eastern European defense official. “But at the same time, we shouldn’t discount their ability to wage war with simpler stuff. They have enough [ammunition] for years and years for fighting on that level they’re doing,” the official added. Much of Russia’s defense industrial base has been under harsh U.S. sanctions since 2014, during Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea. In late March, the Biden administration also slapped on dozens of Russian defense companies beyond KTRV, including High Precision Systems, which produces surface-to-air missiles such as the Iskander and anti-tank missile systems, and Tekhmash, the producer of many of the Russian military’s ammunition, multiple rocket systems, and unguided bombs. The Treasury Department has also targeted neighboring Belarus’s defense sector with its own sanctions packages. Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko, which has aligned his authoritarian government with Moscow, supported the invasion and allowed Russian troops to use his country to launch offensives and airstrikes across the border into northern Ukraine in the early weeks of the war, before Russia’s effort to capture Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, failed. The U.S. Commerce Department rolled out new export control restrictions aimed at stopping Russia from getting U.S.-made technology that could be used in military hardware, even if that technology is supplied by third countries. This includes microelectronics, telecommunications, information security equipment, sensors, navigation equipment, avionics, and parts for civilian aircraft. But much of the U.S. effort to stop Russia’s military supply lines from humming relies on extensive export controls that lean on the newly made Foreign Direct Product Rule to block almost any products made with U.S. software or technology. The problem with depending on that rule, former officials told Foreign Policy, is that it leans heavily on foreign countries to make enforcement calls. And the United States has limited—if any—visibility on products that are actually reaching Russia. “My huge, huge concern is that we do not have end use checks in Russia,” said Nazak Nikakhtar, a former assistant secretary of commerce during the Trump administration and now a partner at Wiley Rein, a law firm. “We do not have U.S. officials that can go to the Russian entities to figure out even if there’s an export license that has been granted. We have nobody to go in there and do an audit to see that that’s happened.” There’s another potential end-around, Nikakhtar said: China. The U.S. rival could help supply critical minerals needed to make steel and aluminum for military equipment as well as microchips needed to help guide precision missiles to their targets. But even if Russia is able to find other suppliers for military components, as some expect, it is likely to face an increasingly steep economic cliff as the invasion of Ukraine continues. Speaking to reporters in Washington on Tuesday, British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace said Western sanctions would pose a “real challenge” to Russia’s ability to refurbish his “worn out” armed forces. And even though the Kremlin has managed to stabilize the ruble with energy exports, it is not likely to be able to stave off the financial pain for long. “Russia is probably spending almost everything it’s earning on its energy exports to prop up the ruble and, you know, do all sorts of other B.S. to make it seem like the economy is okay when it’s not,” said Brian O’Toole, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council think tank and a former Treasury Department official. “They’re making hard choices now,” he added. “It’s frustrating for folks not to see all of the results, but this is unsustainable for the Russians. At some point, they’re just going to fall off a cliff.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Russian Sanctions Plank

Plank solves. Russian defense CEOs and companies alike have avoided Western sanctions, keeping Russia’s military alive – cutting them off at the head impairs the Russian military

Chris Kirkham & David Gauthier-Villars 7-1-22 Reporting by Chris Kirkham in Los Angeles and David Gauthier-Villars in Istanbul; Additional reporting by Tim Hepher in Paris; Editing by Marla Dickerson and Vanessa O'Connell. [Special Report: Dozens of Russian weapons tycoons have faced no Western sanctions, ] // DHS WAgustin 🍔

As Russia's military continues to pound Ukraine with missiles and other lethal weapons, Western nations have responded in part by targeting Russia's defense industry with sanctions. The latest round came on Tuesday, when the United States issued new sanctions on some arms makers and executives at the heart of what it dubbed Russian President Vladimir Putin's "war machine." But a Reuters examination of companies, executives and investors underpinning Russia's defense sector shows a sizable number of players have yet to pay a price: Nearly three dozen leaders of Russian weapons firms and at least 14 defense companies have not been sanctioned by the United States, the European Union or the United Kingdom. In addition, sanctions on Russia's arms makers and tycoons have been applied inconsistently by these NATO allies, with some governments levying penalties and others not, the Reuters review showed. Among the weapons moguls who have not been sanctioned by any of those three authorities is Alan Lushnikov, the largest shareholder of Kalashnikov Concern JSC, the original manufacturer of the well-known AK-47 assault rifle. Lushnikov owns a 75% stake in the firm, according to the most recent business records reviewed by Reuters. The company itself was sanctioned by the United States in 2014, the year Russia invaded and annexed the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. The EU and UK leveled their own sanctions against Kalashnikov Concern this year. The company accounts for 95% of Russia's production of machine guns, sniper rifles, pistols and other handheld firearms, and 98% of its handheld military machine guns, according to its website and most recent annual report. Its weapons include the AK-12 assault rifle, an updated version of the AK-47, some of which have been captured from Russian forces by Ukrainian soldiers. The Kalashnikov Concern also produces missiles that can be fired from aircraft or on land. A former Russian deputy transport minister, Lushnikov once worked for commodities tycoon Gennady Timchenko, a longtime friend of Putin. The United States sanctioned Timchenko in 2014 following Russia’s invasion of Crimea, naming him as a member of the Kremlin’s “inner circle.” Neither Lushnikov, Timchenko or the Kalashnikov Concern responded to requests for comment. It’s the same pattern with Almaz-Antey Concern, a Moscow-based defense company specializing in missiles and anti-aircraft systems. The company has been sanctioned by the United States, EU and UK, but CEO Yan Novikov has not been punished. Almaz-Antey’s website displays the motto “Peaceful Sky is Our Profession.” The company makes Kalibr missiles, which Russia’s Ministry of Defense has credited with destroying Ukrainian military installations. In a statement last month, the ministry said Russia had fired long-range Kalibr missiles at a Ukrainian command post near the village of Shyroka Dacha in eastern Ukraine, killing what the ministry claimed were more than 50 generals and officers of the Ukrainian military. Reuters was unable to independently verify that claim. Neither Almaz-Antey nor CEO Novikov responded to requests for comment. In response to a list of questions submitted by Reuters about Western sanctions aimed at Russia, a Kremlin spokesperson said "the consistency and logic of imposing sanctions, as well as the legality of imposing such restrictions, is a question that should be put directly to the countries that introduced them." The Reuters findings come as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has said that current Western sanctions against Russia “are not enough” as Russian troops make gains in their assault on Ukraine’s eastern regions of Luhansk and Donetsk. The Ukrainian military has been outgunned by Russian artillery in places such as the industrial city of Sievierodonetsk, which it ceded to Russian forces last week after weeks of intense fighting. Putin has portrayed his military’s assault on Ukraine as a “special military operation” aimed at demilitarizing and “denazifying” its democratic neighbor. On Tuesday, Russia’s Foreign Ministry announced it would bar Jill Biden and Ashley Biden, the wife and daughter of U.S. President Joe Biden, from entering Russia indefinitely in what it said was a response to “constantly expanding U.S. sanctions against Russian politicians and public figures.” U.S. National Security advisor Jake Sullivan said on Tuesday that Russia's action was not surprising because "the Russian capacity for these kinds of cynical moves is basically bottomless." The Russian invasion has killed thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians, but the exact number is unknown. The United Nations human rights office said, as of Monday, that 4,731 civilians had been killed in Ukraine since Russia’s invasion began on Feb. 24, including more than 300 children, with another 5,900 civilians injured in the conflict. The agency said most of the casualties were caused by the use of “explosive weapons with a wide impact area, including shelling from heavy artillery and multiple launch rocket systems, and missile and air strikes,” and that the actual number of dead and wounded was likely far higher. The West has levied sanctions on a swath of Russia’s economy to punish Moscow, an effort that so far has done little to deter the Russian offensive. Like the bans on other Russian firms, sanctions on weapons companies are meant to hamper their ability to sell to foreign customers. These penalties limit their access to imported components and generally make it more costly and time-consuming to produce weaponry. Levying sanctions on the people behind those firms goes a step further to make the pain personal. It allows Western nations to go after any mansions, yachts and other offshore wealth of those who supply Russia’s military, and it limits where they can travel abroad. “You’re demonstrating that being a regime collaborator comes with a cost,” said Max Bergmann, a former State Department official during the Obama administration who worked on U.S. arms transfers and safeguarding U.S. military technology. “They feel it very personally. You’re creating a disgruntled class of people that are tied to the Kremlin,” said Bergmann, now director of the Europe program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based national security think tank. AMMUNITION MAKERS UNSCATHED Other companies in Russia’s defense industry identified by Reuters that have not been sanctioned by the United States, EU or UK include the V.A. Degtyarev Plant, a facility 165 miles northeast of Moscow that makes machine guns, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons that are sold to the Russian military. Its weapons include the Kalashnikov PKM and PKTM machine guns, as well as Kord rifles and machine guns, some of which are mounted on armored vehicles. The Degtyarev Plant did not respond to a request for comment. Also not sanctioned is the Klimovsk Specialized Ammunition Plant, south of Moscow, where “world-famous cartridges” for pistols and Kalashnikov assault rifles are produced, according to an archived version of its website. Neither is the Novosibirsk Cartridge Plant, an ammunition manufacturer that calls itself “one of the leading engineering enterprises of the military-industrial complex of Russia.” Neither ammunition plant responded to requests for comment. Last month, Reuters sought comments from sanctions officials in the UK, EU and United States regarding the news agency’s findings that they had failed to punish a raft of Russian defense firms and tycoons fueling Putin’s war effort. As part of that process, Reuters provided those Western authorities with a detailed list of more than 20 companies and more than three-dozen people that had escaped sanctions. The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, which levies sanctions for Britain, said it could not comment on future sanctions. It added that London and its allies had levied “the largest and most severe economic sanctions that Russia has ever faced, to help cripple Putin’s war machine.” The European Commission and the U.S. Treasury Department, which handle sanctions for Brussels and Washington respectively, declined to comment on the specifics of Reuters’ findings. Elizabeth Rosenberg, assistant secretary for terrorist financing and financial crimes at the Treasury Department, said in a statement that sanctions have “made it harder for Russia to obtain what it needs to procure and produce weapons.” On Tuesday, in conjunction with a meeting of leaders of the G7 nations in the German Alps, the Treasury Department released a new round of defense-related sanctions that included eight of the weapons firms and two of the executives on the list provided earlier by Reuters. One of those newly sanctioned executives, Vladimir Artyakov, has played key roles in Russia’s weapons industry for decades, and serves as the No. 2 executive at Rostec, a military-industrial giant with hundreds of subsidiaries employing more than half a million people, according to its website and annual reports. Artyakov is also the chairman of at least five Russian weapons firms, among them Russian Helicopters JSC, which builds several lines of military helicopters including the Ka-52 "Alligator," some of which have been shot down and documented in Ukraine. He has not been sanctioned by the EU or UK. Artyakov and Russian Helicopters did not respond to requests for comment. Rostec has been sanctioned by Washington since 2014. On Tuesday the United States targeted the company again, levying sanctions on more than 40 Rostec subsidiaries and affiliates. Among those hit was Avtomatika Concern, a company linked to cyber warfare. It was on the list of Russian defense firms that Reuters had submitted to the Treasury Department last month seeking an explanation as to why the companies had not been sanctioned. Rostec and Avtomatika Concern did not respond to requests for comment. Other firms on Reuters’ list that were sanctioned just this week by the Treasury Department include PJSC Tupolev, a maker of fighter jets such as the Tu-22M3 bomber. The Ukrainian military said Tu-22M3 bombers were responsible for a missile strike at a crowded shopping center in the central Ukrainian city of Kremenchuk on Monday, which killed at least 18 people and injured about 60. PJSC Tupolev and another firm on Reuters’ list, JSC VNII Signal, have not been sanctioned by the EU or UK. JSC VNII Signal is a producer of mechanical and navigational systems that power Russian military tanks and some of the country’s most advanced missile systems. PJSC Tupolev and JSC VNII Signal did not respond to requests for comment. TOP BRASS UNTOUCHED Executives at a host of Russian weapons firms, meanwhile, have largely escaped sanctions from Western authorities. Nearly three months after a Tochka-U ballistic missile hit a train station in the eastern Ukrainian city of Kramatorsk on April 8, Russian weapons executives linked to the company that makes those missiles have yet to pay a price. The strike killed more than 50 people, including children, and injured more than 100 others. The Russian firm JSC Research and Production Corporation Konstruktorskoye Byuro Mashynostroyeniya, known as KBM, has been the primary manufacturer of Tochka-U missiles, according to a U.S. Army database of worldwide military equipment. Neither Washington, Brussels or London have sanctioned Sergey Pitikov, KBM’s chief executive. The three Western allies have likewise spared Alexander Denisov, the CEO of NPO High Precision Systems, KBM’s parent company. High Precision Systems oversees production of a wide range of missiles, artillery, grenade launchers and machine guns used by Russian troops and outfitted on military helicopters, aircraft, tanks and warships. Sanctions on Russia’s arms companies and tycoons have been applied inconsistently by the Western allies. The United States and EU have sanctioned High Precision Systems, for example, while the UK has not. The United States has sanctioned KBM, but the EU and UK have not. High Precision Systems, Pitikov and Denisov did not respond to requests for comment. KBM confirmed that Pitikov is its chief executive, but did not respond to additional questions submitted by Reuters. Europe and the United States have failed to coordinate sanctions even on makers of banned weapons. Since the outset of Russia’s invasion in late February, Western governments and human rights groups have decried its use of cluster munitions: small bombs delivered by missiles or rockets, which scatter and explode over an area as large as a city block. A 2008 international treaty bans their use or production under any circumstances because of the devastating effects on civilians. Russia used a Uragan – which translates to “Hurricane” – rocket launcher system to fire cluster bombs in Kharkiv on March 24, killing eight civilians and injuring 15 others, according to the U.N. human rights office and Ukrainian officials. The Uragan is made by JSC Scientific and Production Association Splav, a Russian firm whose systems have been sold abroad to countries including India. The company has been sanctioned by the United States, but not by the UK or EU. Its CEO, Alexander Smirnov, has escaped sanctions altogether. Splav and Smirnov did not respond to requests for comment. It’s much the same for Splav’s parent company, NPK Techmash. The United States and the EU have sanctioned the firm, but the UK has not. Techmash CEO Alexander Kochkin has not been targeted by American or European authorities. Techmash and Kochkin did not respond to requests for comment. In a June 10 statement, the European Commission said there is an effort to align sanctions lists “as much as legally possible” among allies to achieve “the maximum cumulative effect of the sanctions with all our like-minded partners.” In cases where the lists do not align, the Commission statement said, people and companies not currently on the EU’s sanctions list could be added later if there is sufficient evidence. "Nothing is off the table," the statement said. WESTERN CONNECTIONS One of the highest-profile Russian firms to escape Western sanctions is VSMPO-Avisma Corp, which is the world’s largest titanium supplier and 25% owned by Rostec. It supplies Russia’s defense industry, but also counts major Western aerospace companies among its clients. Based in Verkhnyaya Salda, in central Russia, VSMPO-Avisma has subsidiaries with facilities in the United States, Switzerland and the UK, as well as sales and distribution staff in the United States, Europe and Asia, according to its website and annual reports. That’s no doubt a factor that has allowed the company to escape punishment, according to three sanctions and Russian defense experts who spoke with Reuters. VSMPO-Avisma’s vice chairman and majority shareholder, Russian billionaire Mikhail Shelkov, ranked by Forbes this year as Russia’s 59th-richest person, likewise has not been sanctioned. According to past press releases, VSMPO-Avisma has long-term contracts to supply titanium to United Aircraft Corp, a Rostec subsidiary that oversees production of Russian fighter jets such as the Su-34 that have been shot down in Ukraine. United Aircraft has been sanctioned by the United States, EU and UK. VSMPO-Avisma also sells to Europe’s Airbus, and it supplied U.S. aerospace behemoth Boeing Co up until March, when the Arlington, Virginia-based company said it stopped purchasing titanium from Russia. Boeing had announced just months earlier, in November 2021, that VSMPO-Avisma would be its largest titanium supplier “for current and future Boeing commercial airplanes.” VSMPO-Avisma and shareholder Shelkov declined to comment. Boeing said in a statement that it has worked since 2014 to diversify its sources of titanium around the world, and that its current inventory and sources "provide sufficient supply for airplane production." Airbus did not answer specific questions about its relationship with VSMPO-Avisma. But in an emailed statement it said potential sanctions on Russian titanium “would massively damage the entire aerospace industry in Europe” while doing little to harm Russia because those sales are but a small portion of that nation's overall exports. In 2020, foreign sales accounted for about two-thirds of VSMPO-Avisma’s $1.25 billion in revenue, according to the company’s most recent annual report. That puts Western officials in a tough spot, said Richard Connolly, director of Eastern Advisory Group, a UK consultancy that advises governments and businesses on the Russian economy and its defense industry. Slapping sanctions on VSMPO-Avisma would curtail its lucrative export trade, but it would also force major players in global aviation to switch suppliers or risk sanctions themselves. “That’s the classic sanctions conundrum: If you want to hurt somebody, you’re going to hurt yourself,” Connolly said

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Hotlines Plank › A/T PDCP

Security Cooperation is administered by the DoD, Security Assistance is DoS

McLaren 14, US Air Force Captain (McKay, “Enhancing the Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of International Pilot Training (IPT) Within the U.S. Air Force: Is It Worth It?,” RAND Dissertations)//BB

U.S. Code Title 22 provides congressional authority to conduct DoS Security Assistance programs. The programs are carried out through two basic laws, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA).24 AECA enacted congressional legislative controls over export of defense articles and services. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee are responsible for foreign assistance and Security Assistance program authorization legislation. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees are responsible for defense programs authorization legislation. The term security cooperation is used within DoD, whereas the term security assistance is used within the DoS. It is important to note that these congressional committees play a role only in FMS authorization. Although Congress maintains legislative control over exports, FMS is a nonappropriated program, external to the U.S. budget, and the president is charged with signing off on spending for the program. Through Executive Order 11958, as amended, the President delegates selected functions in the AECA to the secretaries of State and Defense. They are required to provide reports to Congress and obtain specific congressional approval on certain exports or transfers. The DoS has responsibilities relating to security assistance, which include managing the export of defense articles, services, training, and military technology.25 DoD has responsibilities relating to security cooperation, which include activities to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.26 The military departments and other DoD agencies involved in managing FMS programs are collectively called implementing agencies (IAs). The Army, Navy, and Air Force usually have the responsibility of being the IA in the process of FMS.27 The Air Force agency for all security cooperation programs is the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA). The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition has oversight in the execution by virtue of having responsibility for Air Force acquisition. SAF/IA is supported by the Air Force Security Assistance Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, for most FMS and other logistics functions. The Air Force Security Assistance Training (AFSAT) squadron at Randolph Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, is in charge of planning and, with AETC, managing the Air Force international military training. It is organized under the authority of AETC.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Hotlines Plank › A/T PDCP

Hotlines are under the Department of State’s jurisdiction – here’s proof of US’s most RECENT hotline agreement

AP News 5-5-1998 The Associated Press is an independent global news organization dedicated to factual reporting. Founded in 1846, AP today remains the most trusted source of fast, accurate, unbiased news in all formats and the essential provider of the technology and services vital to the news business. [China, Russia Open Communications, ] //DamienHS WAgustin

China and Russia have opened a direct presidential hot line to improve understanding between the former communist rivals, the Foreign Ministry announced Tuesday. The secure telecommunications link, China’s first with a foreign capital, will allow presidents Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin to ``exchange views on bilateral relations and international issues at any time,″ Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan signed an agreement for a U.S.-China hot line last week, but Zhu said he did not know when it would open. China and the former Soviet Union engaged in a tense rivalry for the allegiances of the socialist world during the Cold War and fought border skirmishes in the late 1960s. Relations have improved steadily over the past decade.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Hotlines Plank › Solvency – China

China wants cyber diplomacy to maintain interdependence with the West

Nikolay Bozhkov March 2020 [China’s Cyber Diplomacy: A Primer, ] //DamienHS WAgustin

In absolute terms, the People's Republic of China is the European Union's largest trading partner. China is its most significant source of imports and second-largest export market. The EU is second only to the United States as China's top trade partner.207 In the framework of the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation signed in 2013 - the strategy that guides comprehensive bilateral cooperation - the EU and China agreed to establish strategic partnership across a wide range of issues, including sustainable development, economic prosperity, global governance, foreign policy, security and peace.208 In 2017, China and Europol reached an agreement known as the "Europol-China Strategic Cooperation Framework" to increase law enforcement cooperation directed at combating transnational crime. The 2016 Joint Communication on "Elements for a new EU strategy on China", adopted by the High Representative, the European Commission209 and the EU Council's Strategy on China210 further clarified EU priorities vis-à-vis China. In line with the EU's overarching engagement strategy, it put special attention on human rights, the rule of law, social-economic issues, trade and investment and market access. The EU has repeatedly highlighted the need to curb industrial cyber espionage by intensifying cooperation with China on reforming the country's "protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights"211 through mechanisms such as the Intellectual Property Rights Infringement Protection212 and the EU-China Strategic Framework for Customs Cooperation on IPR for 2018-2020.213 Underscoring the importance of intellectual property rights protection in Europe, and building on synergies with Japan and the USTR Section 301 Report, the EU has also launched a case at the WTO against China's "unfair [and forced] technology transfers" and discriminatory treatment of foreign companies.214 5.2 China's engagement with the EU and EU member states The landmark 2015 Xi-Obama industrial cyber espionage agreement has served as a template for EU member states' cyber-related bilateral partnerships with China. Both the United Kingdom (2016)215 and Germany (2015)216 have convinced China to formally adopt a norm against cyber espionage in bilateral accords, commit to hold a regular dialogue on pertinent cyber issues and cooperate in the fields of incident mitigation, CERTs assistance, cybercrime and CBMs. European member states' diplomatic approach to China has therefore been more functional and in pursuit of concrete practical outcomes of benefit for both sides. From EU countries' vantage point, this type of functional cooperation with China is necessary as it transcends unsurmountable differences between the two sides' normative preferences, threat perceptions and security interests. For decades, Sino-European Union relations have been characterised by consistently growing economic and cultural ties. Accommodating China's economic rise and appetite to shape international order has given rise to greater technological interdependence in tandem with tremendous new normative, security and political challenges. China's growing assertiveness - particularly its growing political reach in Europe, which is often perceived as a lever to undermine the cohesion of the Union - has eventually compelled the EU to fundamentally redefine its China strategy from an accommodation-based engagement policy towards one of balancing and "managed interdependence" in key strategic sectors and supply chains, with an emphasis on ensuring market reciprocity.217 2019 saw the European Union chart a new bolder course vis-à-vis China. In March 2019, weeks before the 21st EU-China Summit, and coming after recommendations made by the Federation of German Industries and other European actors (member states, other industry federations, etc.) earlier that year,218 the European Commission published an official document ("EU-China - A strategic outlook") describing a new "EU policy shift towards a more realistic, assertive, and multi-faceted approach" to dealing with China.219 The EU asserts that despite China being a cooperation and negotiating "partner" with which the EU needs to (re)align objectives and strike a "balance of interests", the PRC has increasingly become a "systemic rival" and an "economic competitor" that leverages economic investment to achieve geopolitical gains, energetically pursues global "technological leadership" and seeks to export norms and forms of governance at odds with neoliberalism. Furthermore, the profoundly intertwined role of the CCP in China's economy and the opaque and highly blended divisions between the public and private spheres and the military have made Chinese technology a security risk for the EU in the "short to mid-term". Overall, the EU's more critical stance before the 2019 summit has helped secure several concessions from the Chinese side. Concerning EU-China cooperation in cyberspace, the two sides will continue working towards implementing norms of responsible state behaviour under the EU-China Cyber Task Force framework and within parallel UN processes. While affirming that "there should be no forced technology transfers", the two sides also committed themselves to enhancing resilience against malicious cyber activities, including against cyber-enabled intellectual property theft. The two sides also committed to a concrete timeline to conclude the "EU-China Comprehensive Investment Agreement", for which "decisive progress" from the Chinese side - i.e. substantial market-opening reforms directed at ensuring a level playing field - will be required in 2019.225 Furthermore, China and the EU are to cooperate on reforming the WTO, though this will be conditional on China reforming the discriminatory effects of industrial state subsidies and other related issues.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Hotlines Plank › Solvency – China

Solves China – you can use this card for space too

Liselotte Odgaard 4-25-22 Liselotte Odgaard is a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies . Her work focuses on US–China–Europe relations, including NATO–China relations; Chinese foreign, security and defense policy; Indo-Pacific security, and the geopolitics of the Arctic region. [NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space, The Washington Quarterly, 45:1,167-183, DOI: ] //DamienHS WAgustin

Cyber and space is a promising arena for NATO to address China challenges by building member state resilience. Like the air and sea domains, as areas that belong to no one state and which provide access to much of the globe, they form part of the global commons. Command of the commons has been the key enabler of the US global position of power for many decades. However, China wields a sufficient range of sea, air, cyber, and space capabilities such that the global commons is now a contested zone. In contrast to the sea and air domains, cyber and space are sparsely regulated. This lack of international norms enhances the risk of conflict based on misperception, making NATO cooperation pertinent. Adversarial activities toward the US and Europe in the cyber and space domain threaten transatlantic security. These come not just from China, but also from other adversaries such as Russia and Iran. Mechanisms for addressing these challenges in the military sector are essentially generic and not, at least in their basic design, established with a particular country in mind. Thus, cyber and space provide an avenue for NATO to contribute significantly to deterrence of China without having to combat major internal resistance. NATO would also benefit from long-standing US-EU cooperation on cyber and space issues. Cyber and space provide an avenue for NATO to contribute without major internal resistance NATO has vowed to clarify Article Five’s collective defense commitment to encompass threats to satellites in space and coordinated cyberattacks. NATO can design this effort to include adversarial behavior from China. The alliance already has an array of instruments to deal with cyber and space challenges from adversaries. These can be extended to encompass China without pronouncing it a threat. This approach allows the US and Europe time to adjust their cooperation to take into account the fact that China poses military threats to them both without explicitly using the language of threat at a time when NATO members do not agree if China should be defined as a challenge that can trigger Article Five responses. Since the late 1990s, the vulnerability of shared space assets to cyberattacks has been a concern for both the US and Europe. For example, in 1998 a US-German satellite, used for peering into deep space, was rendered useless after it turned suddenly toward the sun, damaging its High Resolution Imager by exposure. NASA later determined that the accident was linked to a cyber-intrusion at the Goddard Space Flight Center. Coordinated cyberattacks have emerged as a major threat to both the US and Europe since the late 1990s. For example, for about eighteen minutes on April 8, 2010, China Telecom advertised erroneous network traffic routes that instructed US and other foreign internet traffic to travel through Chinese servers. Other servers around the world quickly adopted these paths, routing all traffic, including government and military traffic, to about 15 percent of the internet’s destinations through servers located in China. In the future, the need to enhance situational awareness in space is likely to lead to further integration of space assets between the US and its allies. Civilian entry points are likely to provide a growing opportunity for infiltration. The weak state of cybersecurity in civilian agencies should also be considered. Chinese military doctrine prioritizes weaponry that targets vulnerabilities in the deployment of US and allied power, such as the use of cyberattacks to disrupt surveillance assets, intelligence networks, and command-and-control systems. These threats are significant, since next generation systems, including fighter aircraft, destroyers, and special forces, will not function without access to space communication and space-derived data. Although European and US allies have indigenous space programs outside the NATO framework, cyber security and outer space would be a useful field for joint explorations of how to divert and manage attacks and identify an agency which can coordinate transatlantic responses to attacks. Allies are embedded in a range of information networks which may be disrupted, giving rise to alliance management concerns emerging from attacks. The lack of red lines regarding behavior in cyber and outer space between the US and its allies on one hand, and adversaries such as China on the other, adds to the risk of misperception and escalation, and hence also highlights the need for allied coordination to avoid starting a war by mistake. An improved NATO dialogue on safeguards and alliance consultation could also assist communication with China on arms control and conflict prevention in cyber and outer space, which is not currently taking place. Looking to the future, NATO’s success in establishing transatlantic mechanisms for cyber and outer space safeguards and consultation will be crucial to allow NATO a key role in taking on the China challenge in ways that help restore faith in NATO’s credibility as a provider of collective defense in all domains. It will also assist NATO in straddling the chasm between member states prioritizing threats from either China, Russia, the Middle East, or North Africa, since cyber and space threats potentially stem from all of them, and the effectiveness of cyber and space defense mechanisms do not necessarily depend on geographical origin. Cyber and space would allow NATO a key role in the China challenge without prioritizing China Improved communication between NATO and the EU will be essential for NATO to successfully address the military aspects of cyber and space threats. The framework for permanent EU-NATO relations, Berlin Plus, was concluded in March 2003. It allows for the exchange of classified information, the EU’s use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations, and the establishment of consultation arrangements. Due to disagreements over responsibilities and jurisdiction, however, meaningful coordination did not take place until July 2016. On this occasion, NATO and the EU issued a joint declaration stating their intention to work together on security and defense responses to unprecedented challenges emanating from the South and East of the Euro-Atlantic area.During Biden’s visit to Brussels in June 2021, NATO promised to strengthen cooperation with the EU on promoting peace and stability including protecting critical infrastructure, strengthening resilience, maintaining a technological edge, and addressing challenges to a rules-based order. The EU-US summit statement from the same visit merely reaffirms support for robust NATO-EU cooperation and promises to strengthen the partnership. At the level of policy implementation, it is clear when talking to NATO and EU officials that usually they do not coordinate their strategies and tactics for countering China challenges.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Hotlines Plank › Solvency - Russia

Russia says yes

Geoff Van Epps 13 Geoff Van Epps is a lieutenant colonel in the US Army. This article is based on research he conducted while serving as a Senior Fellow at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany, from 2012-2013. [Common Ground: U.S. and NATO Engagement with Russia in the Cyber Domain, ] //DamienHS WAgustin

An Agenda for NATO-Russian Cooperation Absent any ongoing cooperation between NATO and Russia, a virtually blank slate exists for developing NATO's agenda to finally begin to engage Russia in the cyber domain - and NATO must acknowledge that such engagement is imperative going forward. While the NATO Policy on Cyber Defense acknowledges that NATO will "tailor its international engagement based on shared values and common approaches,"147 and a recent NATO study called international partners "essential actors of NATO's cyber defense" with whom NATO should "develop bilateral arrangements ... focusing on infor- mation-sharing, exchange of best practices, and judicial agreements," Alliance gridlock has prevented NATO from even initiating a relationship with Russia on issues of mutual concern.148 As a consequence, NATO members with favorable bilateral relations with the Russian Federation are bypassing NATO to work directly with Russia on cybersecurity and other topics, which neutralizes the collective influence of NATO and plays toward the Russian strategic goal of marginalizing NATO wherever possible.149 Rather than sitting on the sidelines as the cyber domain is evolving around it, NATO has the opportunity and the need now to match its actions to its rhetoric by accepting Russian overtures to cooperate on cybersecurity. It should build internal consensus on engaging Russia with relatively low-cost, low-risk measures where both sides can easily find agreement as first steps toward an eventually more substantial partnership that tackles the thornier problems where the two sides have fundamental differences. Specifically, NATO should seek to cooperate with Russia to accomplish the following goals. Add a Cybersecurity Working Group to the NATO-Russia Council. Ideally, this arrangement would establish a stand-alone working group on par with working groups covering topics like missile defense, logistics, or terrorism. If that were to provide too broad of a mandate for the Alliance partners to agree to, it could be formed as a subgroup underneath the Science for Peace and Security Committee with a much narrower and more technical purview. In any case, forming a working group at the NRC would signal the intention to work seriously with Russia on cybersecurity and would provide an organizational venue for doing so.150 Partner Computer Emergency Response Teams. Regardless of the level of trust between NATO and the Russian Federation, having contacts established between the technical experts who have the ability to respond in the event of a crisis is invaluable.151 NATO should collectively adopt the pragmatic stance of some of its member states and begin a series of limited, technically-oriented exchanges between the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability Technical Center and the Russian CERT in order to exchange technical information and determine how best to communicate during a crisis. Share Cyber Intel. Because cyberspace is constantly evolving and the nefarious actors who operate within it are continually adapting, maintaining up-to-date information on cyber threats is an endless challenge. Likewise, sharing intelligence across NATO can be a sensitive and difficult process, so any proposal for trading secrets with Russia might on the surface seem dubious - except that during an April 2013 visit to Moscow, NATO Deputy Secretary-General Alexander Vershbow proposed the creation of two centers to allow Russia and NATO to share intelligence, conduct joint planning, and coordinate operations on missile defense.152 While a final agreement on establishing these centers is nowhere near, missile defense has been as much of a source of friction between the U.S., NATO, and Russia as cybersecurity, so the proposed facilities provide a template for a cyber threat information clearinghouse as another space for NATO and Russia to cooperate. Such a clearinghouse could start small and work initially on shared analysis of excellent but unclassified data from commercial cybersecurity firms and, as trust is built, graduate to more sensitive and classified intelligence products.153 Develop Confidence-Building Measures. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is nearing completion of a set of confidence-building measures (CBMs) intended to prevent misunderstandings and avert international conflicts among its fifty-seven member countries.154 Although the publicly available draft of the measures reveals them to be voluntary and not particularly robust,155 the agreement, once finalized, will be important for having started a conversation on cybersecurity among over a quarter of the world's nation-states and in facilitating the exchange of cybersecurity terminology, doctrine, and contacts among the members. NATO should build on the OSCE agenda to pursue a more detailed and more ambitious set of CBMs with Russia, including joint early-warning mechanisms, exchanges of technical cybersecurity recommendations, and improvement of cyber crisis communication channels.156 Given that all twenty-eight NATO countries and Russia are part of the OSCE, achieving consensus on confidence-building measures at the NRC should be attainable, and it would go a long way to addressing Russia's almost paralyzing fears of being blamed for a cyber incident in which it legitimately played no role.157 And since NATO and Russia have a long track record of devising CBMs related to nuclear weapons, adapting those existing procedures and processes to cybersecurity would appear eminently achievable.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Hotlines Plank › Solvency - Russia

Solves Russia

Franz-Stefan Gady and Greg Austin 6-24-10 Franz-Stefan Gady is an associate at the EastWest Institute. He has previously worked as an adjunct research assistant at the Institute for National Strategies Studies of the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., focusing on regional security issues. He was also an analyst for the Project on National Security Reform, a congressionally funded nonprofit organization founded to reform the national security structure of the United States. He holds an M.A. in Strategic Studies/International Economics from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and has served in the Austrian Army and the Austrian Foreign Ministry, working on various security issues. Greg Austin is Vice President of Program Development and Rapid Response at the EastWest Institute. Greg’s career in international affairs spans thirty years and includes senior posts in academia and government. He writes a weekly column in the newspaper New Europe. He has also held senior posts at the International Crisis Group and the Foreign Policy Centre in London. Greg is the author of several well-reviewed books on international security, especially on Asia. His books include The Armed Forces of Russia, co-authored with Alexei Muraviev. He has several postgraduate qualifica- tions in international relations, including a Ph.D. His main specializations have included Soviet and Russian security policy. [Russia, The United States, And Cyber Diplomacy Opening the Doors , ] //DamienHS WAgustin

Russky Newsweek, the Russian-language edition of Newsweek, ran a cover story in its November 23, 2009, is- sue on cyber crime that pointed a very big finger at Russian hackers working from home and abroad. It used terms like the “Evil Cyber Empire” and the “Cold Cyber War.” At the same time, NATO is trying to understand how it should deal with cybersecurity issues. Does a cyber attack on a NATO member state trigger the Article V commitment of the mutual defense treaty? Geopolitics during the Cold War was about borders and defending them. Cyber diplomacy in the twenty-first century is about managing a world that is not just borderless but can function best when connectivity is almost seamless. This world—so dependent on stable financial transactions and global trading—cannot function at all if cyber connectivity is successfully attacked. So how does NATO, a geographically defined alliance trying to redefine its relationship with Russia, understand its role in pro- moting cyber diplomacy and cyber peace? What should the institutional structure and strategic profile of NATO look like if the biggest security threats to it in the next ten years are from terrorists or states with advanced cyber offensive capabilities? One big change will be in espionage. It will continue but its fundamental character will change. Russia will change its intelligence-gathering priorities in NATO countries, and the United States will change its espionage priorities in Russia. All parties will become more interested in pro- tecting at least some of the others’ secrets than in stealing them, because to do so will buttress their own economic security. For NATO, the time has definitely arrived for it to el- evate cybersecurity to the top rank of issues to be dealt with in its official relations with Russia; the two sides have a shared interest in seeking common solutions, not simply looking at each other as potential threats. A low-profile speech by the vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James E. Cartwright, in June 2009 gave a glimpse of an emerging strategic concept in the world’s only military superpower—something he dubbed “global strike.”91 He said that the low-end capa- bility for global strike “is probably [the ability to be] any place on the face of the earth in an hour,” while the “high end is any place on the face of the earth in about 300 mil- liseconds—that’s cyber.” This view was expressed during a discussion of the forthcoming quadrennial review of the country’s military planning and capability. It flowed from Cartwright’s vision of what deterrence looks like in the twenty-first century. Citing the proliferation of ballistic missiles, Cartwright observed that a new attack—potentially nuclear—“could be over in minutes.” This circumstance would require, he said, “something that deters that conflict and it has to be more than nuclear.” For him, part of the argument is that his country’s military bases are located “where we fought the Indians, the Japanese and the Germans.” He suggested that current basing realities might not address the needs of deterring or responding to new threats.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Hotlines Plank

Multilateral cyber hotlines create cyber diplomacy and prevent attacks and miscalc

Stilgherrian 6-14-20 Stilgherrian is a freelance journalist, commentator and podcaster interested in big-picture internet issues, especially security, cybercrime and hoovering up bulldust. He studied computing science and linguistics before a wide-ranging media career and a stint at running an IT business. [Does the world need a multilateral cyber hotline?, ] //DamienHS WAgustin

When someone is throwing nukes at you, you can probably tell where they're coming from. There's only a few nuclear nations and, over the decades of the Cold War, they have developed complex strategic intelligence and early warning networks. But what about a cyber war? Particularly the kind of intense multi-vector cyber attack targeting critical infrastructure that's been dubbed as ? Cyber attribution is hard. It's not impossible, but it takes time. Time that doesn't exist when your infrastructure is collapsing and you're thinking about resorting to what is euphemistically called a "kinetic response". Retaliation against the wrong target could well result in disaster. One possible solution, at least in part, could be installing direct "cyber hotlines" between national leaders. The of Cold War fame is the archetype. During the high-stakes nuclear of 1962, official diplomatic messages took up to six hours to deliver. Presidents John F Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev had to resort to unofficial channels, including relaying messages via TV news correspondents. The Moscow–Washington hotline was installed the following year. This hotline was never the iconic red telephone of TV and movies. At first it was a teletype, then a fax machine, and now email. Initially, its terrestrial phone lines were backed up by a radio link via Tangier in northwestern Morocco. Today, a set of satellite links are backed up by optical fibre. At least eight other pairs of nations have . Cyber versions of these hotlines are a key recommendation of the (CSC), a US government initiative to "develop a consensus on a strategic approach" to defending the nation against "cyber attacks of significant consequences". "The US government should develop a multi-tiered signaling [sic] strategy aimed at altering adversaries' decision calculus and addressing risks of escalation. This signaling strategy should also effectively communicate to allies and partners US goals and intent," says the CSC's [PDF]. "The strategic level of signaling should involve overt, public diplomatic signaling through traditional mechanisms that have already been established for other domains, as well as private diplomatic communications through mechanisms such as hotlines and other nonpublic channels (including third party channels in instances in which the United States may lack robust diplomatic relationships)." At the operational level, this should include "clandestine, protected, and covert signaling (including through non-cyber means) that is deliberately coupled with cyber operations," the CSC wrote. "An example of this type of signaling is tailored messaging preceding or running concurrently with defend forward cyber operations." The CSC also recommends developing a framework to guide "when and under what conditions the US government will voluntarily self-attribute cyber operations and campaigns for the purposes of signaling capability and intent to various audiences". Diplomatic tools like hotlines are examples of what diplomats call "confidence building measures". Confidence building is one of four pillars of cyber diplomacy Your writer has previously reported on Australia's part in developing the so-called for nation-state behaviour in cyberspace and last year's for negotiating such rules. Last month, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) reported that it was . Norms of behaviour are only a quarter of the cyber diplomacy story, however. "You have binding international law, you have voluntary non-binding norms, which complement and together set clear expectations of behaviour," said Johanna Weaver, Australia's cyber negotiator at the UN. "You have capacity building, which is a really important part of it ... to make sure that all countries have the ability to implement the recommendations and agreements," she told ZDNet. "Then you've got confidence building measures, which are designed to increase trust and transparency." While the building of hotlines has not yet become a priority at the UN, there has been modest progress at the regional level in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Australia and Malaysia's proposal for a received in-principle endorsement at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Intersessional Meeting on Security of and in the use of ICTs in Singapore back in March 2019. "The directory will provide a means of direct communication to prevent miscalculation and escalation, as well as manage potential responses in the event of cybersecurity incidents with the potential to impact regional security," DFAT wrote. A cyber equivalent to the International Atomic Energy Agency? The UN's Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), one of the two UN bodies negotiating the rules for cyberspace, has stressed the importance of accurate attribution of cyber attacks. "It was suggested that developing a common approach to attribution at the technical level could lead to greater accountability, transparency, and could help support legal recourse for those harmed by malicious acts," OEWG wrote in the [PDF] of its report. Australia has noted that attribution comes in two flavours. One is factual attribution, "the factual circumstances, including the technical indicators that allow you to make an assessment as to a technical assessment of attribution," Weaver said during a briefing in April. "Then there is a legal attribution assessment, which is taking into account the considerations of state responsibility. Can you take those technical or factual circumstances and say this is therefore attributable to a particular government?" Separate from that is any political decision to act publicly or privately on both of those attribution assessments, she said. To this end, the Geneva-based ICT4Peace Foundation has proposed what they've dubbed to be a Global Cyber Attribution Network. "ICT4Peace proposes the setting up of an independent network of organisations engaging in attribution peer-review," the organisation wrote in its policy brief [PDF]. Currently, most attribution is done by private cyber threat intelligence organisations and national security agencies. "For international legal provisions to be effective, and accountability for malicious cyber activities to take hold, high levels of confidence and publicly persuasive attribution of responsibility are required," ICT4Peace wrote. This new independent attribution agency should include "government representatives, private sector pundits as well as proponents from civil society and academia". Microsoft has also suggested, in 2017, an as part of its Digital Geneva Convention proposal. Such an agency has been compared with the long-established International Atomic Energy Agency, but the cyber world is vastly different. "Nuclear technology is industrial by design. It is difficult, if not impossible, to develop nuclear capabilities in hiding. Also, military use of nuclear technology is very different from civilian use," ICT4Peace wrote. "Cyber capabilities on the other hand are software based. In contrast to nuclear technology, cyber tools do not emit suspicious radiation and do not require factories for their development. A handful of dedicated individuals gathered in a room can launch a cyberattack of sizeable magnitude." While an independent agency wouldn't be able to provide real-time attribution during a cyber attack, its existence and its ability to subsequently validate or refute a nation's claims could provide a break on cyber escalation. ZDNet understands that the idea of an IAEA-style cyber inspection agency is raised at the UN from time to time, including in the OEWG intersessional multi-stakeholder consultations, but for various reasons, it has yet to gain traction.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › BWC CP › Net Benefit answers/extensions

Bioterrorism creates a laundry list of impacts, from BioD loss to extinction, as well as loss of traditional cultures for many people

Nura A. Abboud, 9-21-2021, [(Nura A. Abboud is an environmental activist and Founder of the Jordanian Society for Microbial Biodiversity (JMB), the only NGO in the Middle East concerning the microbial biodiversity. Nura specializes in molecular biology, biological sciences, microbial biodiversity, genetic fingerprinting and medical technologies. Her vision is to establish an eco-research center in the astonishing desert south of Jordan. She has received several scholarships and awards including honorary doctorate in Environmental leadership.) "Catastrophic Impacts of Biological Warfare on Biodiversity," EcoMENA, ]//MaizeDS

Biological weapons are considered the most dangerous of all known weapons of mass destruction. They are used to deliberately cause epidemics among humans; destroy the environmental components, including water, air, and soil; and target crops and livestock. Examples of diseases used in biological warfare include anthrax, smallpox, plague, cholera, and avian flu. In addition to the catastrophic effects of biological warfare on the biodiversity and the environment, their danger lies in their low cost and rapid spread, as well as their easy preparation, transport, and use. Unlike nuclear and chemical bombs, biological bombs are without odor or color and therefore cannot be detected. Additionally, bioweapons are dangerous because of their effects on untargeted organisms in a military attack, and the clinical symptoms they create may be difficult to distinguish from normal diseases. Bioweapon pathogens remain in nature for several years and are able to survive in harsh environmental conditions. Bioweapons spread germs that contaminate air, food, water, and the environment, causing epidemiological diseases for different living organisms. Air: A wide variety of germs can contaminate air and are used in biological warfare. Fungi are the most common, and they travel by air over long distances to infect healthy plants. Food: Food contamination is also one of the most powerful methods used to carry out biological warfare attacks. Disease is transmitted either directly to humans through contaminated food or drink or indirectly by hosts. Water: Water can spread a number of lethal infectious agents as well. For example, one gram of Clostridium tetani poison is able to kill eight million people within six hours. Diseases are one of the main drivers of extinction in endangered species; therefore, disease control is fundamental to preserve biodiversity. Despite the presence of vaccines and drugs for most bioweapons, they may not be available in adequate quantities to cope with an epidemiological disease outbreak. Biological attacks pose a threat to naturally rare wild plants and animals and to species whose natural habitats have been degraded by human activities. Furthermore, diseases that humans, domestic animals, and domestic plants have been able to develop immunity to can be fatal in wild animals and plants. Bioweapons are not only having direct effects on the genetic biodiversity of indigenous species but also are having direct and indirect catastrophic effects on vital plant and animal communities. Conservation of livestock breeds is essential to maintaining genetic diversity, which in turn is vital to increasing the ability of living organisms to adapt to environmental changes. The danger of bioweapons regarding animal biodiversity is summarized in three main points: 1. The direct impact of diseases on wild species Some deadly diseases in humans or domestic animals can infect wild animals. For instance, an epidemic destructive impact on endangered species is reflected in the effects of Canine distemper, a natural viral disease that infects wild dogs and wild animals belonging to the same group. Canine distemper was also developed in bioweapon laboratories. Over the past decade, the spread of this disease has resulted in habitat loss and in the extinction of a large number of wild species in North America. Additionally, it led to the elimination of about one-third of the lion population in Tanzania and had serious impacts on the endangered leopard population. 2. Invasive species The history of rinderpest in Africa provides a model for predicting the potential effects of lethal diseases on wild species and livestock. In 1887, European colonial armies introduced the rinderpest virus to Africa through imported cattle, which led to a rinderpest outbreak among domestic cattle breeds and wild species, killing an estimated 90–95% of African cattle and buffaloes within three years. To control the epidemic, African herds and buffaloes have been destroyed in most parts of Africa. Despite efforts to combat rinderpest over the past century, the disease is still strong, and its outbreak in the region occurs frequently. 3. Elimination of animal species, hosts, and vectors Threatened species may be destroyed in areas that have been subjected to biological attacks with the aim of eradicating the disease. For example, in the United States, programs to control brucellosis in livestock have resulted in killing large numbers of wild animals, including the Bison and the white tailed deer. Microbes can be used in crop destruction. For instance, “Rice blast” is a disease affecting rice and therefore leads to crop destruction and genetic changes in the plant. The discussion about controlling destructive bioweapons is growing, as they pose a vast danger to both humanity and the environment alike. Any failure to prevent biological attacks can lead to the deterioration of genetic diversity in animals and plants, the extinction of endangered species, and the destruction of human livelihoods and traditional cultures. Biotechnology has increased the economical value of genetic diversity of living organisms; hence, it has increased the risk of eliminating genetic diversity through the use of GMO bioweapons. Most of all, the environment will be the silent victim of this war. It is not easy to put an end to the biological arms race, so global efforts must be consolidated to combat these threats. Countries must strengthen their ability to detect early attacks. Biologists and economists need to communicate with decision makers to convince them of the importance of developing defense systems to face bioweapons and limit their environmental and socioeconomical effects. Certainly, it is necessary to raise awareness regarding the dangers of biological warfare. Interdisciplinary and international efforts are required to increase the surveillance, monitoring, and identification of pathogens and to better understand the dynamics of disease transmission within human, plant, and animal populations. This will greatly enhance our ability to combat the effects of bioweapons and emerging diseases on biodiversity.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › BWC CP › A2: Perms

The BWC is legally binding – means the CP is mutually exclusive with the plan

Daryl Kimball, 1-19-2011, Reviewed February 2022, ["The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) At A Glance," Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwc]//MaizeDS

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is a legally binding treaty that outlaws biological arms. After being discussed and negotiated in the United Nations' disarmament forum starting in 1969, the BWC opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. It currently has 183 states-parties, including Palestine, and four signatories (Egypt, Haiti, Somalia, Syria, and Tanzania). Ten states have neither signed nor ratified the BWC (Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Israel, Kiribati, Micronesia, Namibia, South Sudan and Tuvalu). Terms of the Treaty The BWC bans: The development, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, and production of: Biological agents and toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;" Weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles "designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict." The transfer of or assistance with acquiring the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles described above. The convention further requires states-parties to destroy or divert to peaceful purposes the "agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery" described above within nine months of the convention's entry into force. The BWC does not ban the use of biological and toxin weapons but reaffirms the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits such use. It also does not ban biodefense programs. Verification The treaty regime mandates that states-parties consult with one another and cooperate, bilaterally or multilaterally, to solve compliance concerns. It also allows states-parties to lodge a complaint with the UN Security Council if they believe other member states are violating the convention. The Security Council can investigate complaints, but this power has never been invoked. Security Council voting rules give China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States veto power over Security Council decisions, including those to conduct BWC investigations. Membership and Duration The BWC is a multilateral treaty of indefinite duration that is open to any country. Implementation The convention has been flagrantly violated in the past. The Soviet Union, a state-party and one of the convention's depositary states, maintained an enormous offensive biological weapons program after ratifying the BWC. Russia says that this program has been terminated, but questions remain about what happened to elements of the Soviet program. Iraq violated its commitments as a signatory state with its biological weapons program, which was uncovered by the UN Special Commission on Iraq after the Persian Gulf War. Iraq became a state-party after the war. In November 2001, the United States publicly accused Iraq, as well as member state North Korea, of breaching the convention's terms. Washington also expressed concern about compliance by Iran and Libya, which are also states-parties, and by Syria. The United States itself raised concerns in 2001 about whether some of its activities, ostensibly being conducted as part of its biodefense program, are permitted under the BWC. In 2002, Washington added Cuba, also a state-party, to its list of countries conducting activities that violate the convention. According to the U.S. State Department 2021 Compliance Report, Russia “maintains an offensive BW program and is in violation of its obligation under Articles I and II of the BWC.” The United States certified North Korea in noncompliance with the BWC in 2021, and assessed it “does not have sufficient information” to determine whether China is in compliance with its obligation to eliminate its biological weapons stockpile under the BWC. The 2021 U.S. Compliance Report also noted that Iran’s activities continue to “raise concerns regarding its compliance with Article I of the BWC,” and that it is “unable to differentiate some of Iran’s public health research and biodefense activities from those that are prohibited under the BWC.” Review Conferences States-parties have convened a review conference about every five years to review and improve upon the treaty's implementation. Second Review Conference In an effort to enhance confidence and promote cooperation among states-parties, at the second BWC review conference in 1986 member states agreed to implement a set of confidence-building measures. Under these politically binding measures, states should: Exchange data on high-containment research centers and laboratories or on centers and laboratories that specialize in permitted biological activities related to the convention. Exchange information on abnormal outbreaks of infectious diseases. Encourage the publication of biological research results related to the BWC and promote the use of knowledge gained from this research. Promote scientific contact on biological research related to the convention. Third Review Conference At the third BWC review conference in 1991, the scope of the first measure was expanded to include national biological defense programs and the second and fourth measures were slightly modified. In addition, three more measures were added to this list. States should: Declare legislation, regulations, and "other measures" pertaining to the BWC. Declare offensive or defensive biological research and development programs in existence since January 1, 1946. Declare vaccine production facilities. These endeavors have been largely unsuccessful; the vast majority of states-parties have consistently failed to submit declarations on their activities and facilities. The 1991 review conference also tasked a group of "governmental experts" to evaluate potential verification measures for use in a future compliance protocol to the BWC. The group subsequently considered 21 such measures and submitted a report to a special conference of states-parties in 1994. Building off this report, the conference tasked a second body, known as the Ad Hoc Group, with negotiating a legally binding protocol to the BWC to strengthen the convention. Ad Hoc Group The Ad Hoc Group met from January 1995 to July 2001 and aimed to finish its work before the fifth review conference, which began in November 2001. During the course of the negotiations, the group developed a protocol that envisioned states submitting to an international body declarations of treaty-relevant facilities and activities. That body would conduct routine on-site visits to declared facilities and could conduct challenge inspections of suspect facilities and activities as well. However, a number of fundamental issues—such as the scope of on-site visits and the role export controls would play in the regime—proved difficult to resolve. In March 2001, the Ad Hoc Group's chairman issued a draft protocol containing language attempting to strike a compromise on disputed issues. But in July 2001, at the Ad Hoc Group's last scheduled meeting, the United States rejected the draft and any further protocol negotiations, claiming such a protocol could not help strengthen compliance with the BWC and could hurt U.S. national security and commercial interests. Fifth Review Conference The fifth BWC review conference, which many experts thought could resolve the fate of the Ad Hoc Group, was suspended on its last day, December 7, 2001, after the United States tabled a controversial proposal to terminate the Ad Hoc Group's mandate and replace it with an annual meeting of BWC states parties. The United States was the only country that favored revoking the group's mandate. The states parties resumed the fifth review conference in November 2002, but failed to agree on any verification measures, including the proposed protocol. Sixth Review Conference The sixth BWC review conference, which met between November 20 and December 8, 2006, was the was the first successful review conference since 1996, reaching agreement on a final document The conference produced a list of four work programs held each successive year until the next review conference in 2011. Some issues that enjoyed broad-based support did not make it into the work program. The United States and Russia opposed proposals to reform confidence-building measures on the basis that participation in the existing mechanisms is poor. Russia was the primary factor behind bio-terrorism being dropped from the list of agenda items. States parties did agree to address the BWC’s institutional deficit through the creation of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU), which is staffed by three permanent employees based in Geneva. The permanent staff members will be paid by the BWC and will be housed in the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs in Geneva. Previously, the BWC review conference was only supported on a part-time basis. The ISU’s mandate is to provide administrative support for the BWC as well as facilitating confidence-building measures between states parties. The ISU will, among other things, serve to ease communication between states parties, as well as compile and disseminate confidence-building measures submitted from states parties. Since the conclusion of the 2006 review conference the ISU has been strengthened in terms of budget and staff. Despite initial U.S. opposition, an EU proposal to allow states parties to make additional, voluntary contributions to the ISU was accepted during the 2007 annual meeting. The United States originally objected to the proposal on the grounds that it would increase the responsibility of the ISU. However, this problem was resolved through a statement stressing that the ISU has only three staff members, and any contributions are only designed to assist the ISU in completing its mandate. During the 2008 meeting of states parties, the EU provided a $2 million dollar donation to the ISU in order to pay for two additional staff members for the following two years. The two new staff are officially assigned to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, to avoid any conflict over a perceived expansion of ISU. Seventh Review Conference The seventh BWC review conference was held in December 2011. The Final Declaration document concluded that “under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons is effectively prohibited by the Convention and affirms the determination of States parties to condemn any use of biological agents or toxins other than for peaceful purposes, by anyone at any time." Eighth Review Conference The eighth BWC review conference took place in November 2016. At the end of the conference, delegates agreed to a future one-week meeting of states-parties at the end of the year and a five-year extension of the BWC Implementation Support Unit. Ninth Review Conference The ninth BWC review conference was repeatedly postponed due to the Covid-19 pandemic. It is scheduled to be held in August 2022.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › BWC CP › Solvency extensions

BWC something I will read this in a sec

Filippa Lentzos and Jez Littlewood, 3-4-2022, [(Filippa Lentzos is a Senior Lecturer in Science & International Security at the Department of War Studies and Co-Director of the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) at King’s College London. She is also an Associate Senior Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and a Non-Resident Scholar at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). Her research focuses on biological threats and on the security and governance of emerging technologies in the life sciences. A biologist and social scientist by training, Dr Lentzos has researched and been actively involved in biological disarmament and non-proliferation for nearly 20 years., Jez Littlewood is a policy analyst in Alberta. He previously worked at Carleton University (Ottawa) and the University of Southampton (United Kingdom); served under secondment to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office; and worked at the United Nations in Geneva. His areas of expertise include biological weapons, arms control, and national security issues.) “Don’t let finger-pointing doom this key treaty against bioweapons," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/dont-let-finger-pointing-doom-this-key-treaty-against-bioweapons/]//MaizeDS

When the US State Department accused Russia of maintaining a biological weapons program last year, officials were putting concerns they had been harboring for years squarely on the record. Meanwhile Russia and China have been accusing US partnerships in Ukraine, other former Soviet republics, and elsewhere of being fronts for nefarious biological activities or bioweapons programs. For some 50 years, the Biological Weapons Convention has been the bulwark stopping countries from including these arms in arsenals and war plans, but some experts warn there is a new interest in the weapons or even a budding biological arms race.

Few doubt that the Biological Weapons Convention is languishing at a critical time. Major world powers are accusing each other of maintaining bioweapons programs and the fast pace of the global scientific enterprise is making it harder for countries to find balance between technological advances and risky biological research. Meanwhile, efforts to strengthen the convention have been in a holding pattern for over 20 years since the United States scuttled negotiations meant to give the treaty a means of verifying compliance. It’s now generally very hard to get anything done at treaty meetings.