Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Michigan Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – at: nb – squo solves

Status quo solves the internal net benefit

Alexander Ward 7/12, Jonathan Lemire and Quint Forgey, Alex Ward is a national security reporter and anchor of “National Security Daily.” Before joining POLITICO, Ward was the White House and national security reporter at Vox. He was also an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and U.S. foreign policy. And he previously wrote the #NatSec2016 newsletter for War on the Rocks where he covered the 2016 presidential election and the candidates' views on national security. Jonathan Lemire is POLITICO's White House Bureau Chief. Quint is a breaking news reporter for POLITICO. Quint previously worked as a digital producer and editorial intern for POLITICO, a freelancer and news intern for The Wall Street Journal, an associate producer for Louisiana Public Broadcasting, a reporting intern for The News Journal in Delaware, and a national reporting fellow for the Carnegie-Knight News21 program. Quint graduated from Louisiana State University, where he served as editor in chief of the student newspaper, The Daily Reveille. 07/12/2022, "Jet-lagged dinners and Biden's gift to the Middle East," POLITICO, , nihara

FIRST IN NATSEC DAILY — LEAHY LAW LOOPHOLE: Rep. SARA JACOBS (D-Calif.) and Sen. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN (D-Md.) have introduced the “Upholding Human Rights Abroad Act” to close a gap in the Leahy Law — which prohibits the Defense Department and the State Department from providing military assistance to foreign security forces that violate human rights.

Specifically, the bill by Jacobs and Van Hollen would require human rights vetting for a pair of the Pentagon’s security cooperation programs — “Section 127e” and “Section 1202” — that have drawn scrutiny in open-source reporting by the Intercept and other media outlets.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
5G Aff › 2AC – Russia CP – Intrinsic Perm

Russia doesn’t care about 5G.

Ian Morris 20, international editor for LightReading, 11/19/2020, "Russia's long 5G wait goes on," Light Reading, , RMax

As 5G hurtles through China and goes live in the West, it has been stopped in its tracks like Napoleon's army in the vast expanse of Russia.

None of the mobile operators looks close to launching a mainstream 5G mobile service. If there is such a thing as a 5G "race" between different countries, Russia is merely a spectator.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
5G Aff › 1AR – Eurasia DA – AT: China Diversionary War

Diversionary War Theory is wrong.

Wang 18 Yaping Wang, Politics PhD Candidate at the University of Virginia, M.A. at both George Washington University and the National University of Singapore. [The Dog That Barks: Understanding Propaganda Campaigns on Territorial Disputes, Dissertation for the University of Virginia]//BPS

The logic of the diversionary argument is summarized in Figure 2.5. The limitation with this argument is that resorting to nationalism for regime legitimacy is a dangerous venture. For one, it increases the chance of unwanted conflicts that might eventually wear off the nationalist sentiments. The audience cost theory argues that diversions are too risky because they tie a government's hands. Two, the anger of the mass might turn inward and backfire to threaten regime survival.100 State leaders are aware of these risks. Existing literature on state-instigated nationalism has not reached a conclusion on why and when states would overcome such trade-offs and deliberately pursue such a risky policy. Managing nationalism within control is, after all, a delicate game. Besides, for authoritarian states where domestic stress is a constant concern and governing legitimacy is always a valued good given the non- democratic nature of the government, it remains a puzzle as why stoking nationalism through hiking up territorial disputes is not a constant effort. It also does not explain why states choose some disputes but not others to attract the public eye for regime consolidation purposes. Despite these shortcomings, diversionary war theory has often been used to explain authoritarian international behaviors because of its emphasis on domestic politics and regime survival at home, which are critical in understanding authoritarian foreign policy. So it deserves our attention here.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
5G Aff › 1AR – Eurasia DA – AT: China Diversionary War

No diversionary war under Xi.

Yin 19 George Yin, government PhD from Harvard, political economy MSc from the London School of Economics, Dickey Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy and International Security at Dartmouth College. [Domestic repression and international aggression? Why Xi is uninterested in diversionary conflict, 1-22-2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/domestic-repression-and-international-aggression-why-xi-is-uninterested-in-diversionary-conflict/]//BPS

Crucially, diversionary war theory rests on a number of assumptions, two of which do not hold for Xi today. Assumption 1: Leaders prefer foreign adventure over addressing domestic troubles. As discussed earlier, in the realm of domestic policies, Xi has been criticized for primarily two things: his promotion of his cult of personality and a slowing Chinese economy overly focused on inefficient SOEs. It is easy for Xi to dial back his cult of personality, and he has already done so. Reverting his policy of guo jin min tui (“as the state advances, the private sector retreats”) is not going to be easy and would entail important financial system and legal reforms (see discussions from the 2018 Chinese Economists 50 forum), but is quite doable. There is little reason why Xi would want to create international tension to distract his critics when it is much more straightforward to directly address the domestic issues. Furthermore, a diversionary skirmish involving Vietnam or the Philippines over one of the South China Sea islands would hardly be significant enough for diversion. To rally the nation behind him, Xi must pick on Taiwan, Japan, or even the United States. The problem is that a confrontation with either Taiwan or Japan is highly risky. The Chinese military, which has not fought a war since the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1979 and is embroiled in corruption scandals, might well suffer defeat. Perhaps China could take on the United States in the economics arena, but China has been unable to react effectively to the ongoing trade war with the United States. CCP elites do not want international conflict, especially one involving the United States. Assumption 2: Key domestic political players want conflict. Most importantly, the CCP elites do not want international conflict, especially one involving the United States. This is not because the CCP elites like the United States, which is still seen by many as an imperial power that supports Japanese militarism and secessionism in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang. However, in Fan’s words, it is important “to deal with domestic issues before pacifying the barbarians” (an nei rang wai). In the eyes of his critics, any foreign adventure would indicate that Xi was getting the priorities wrong and further deviate from Deng’s grand strategy of fostering a favorable foreign environment to promote development. A diversionary conflict is therefore likely to further galvanize Xi’s opposition. In conclusion, the Xi administration’s performance since 2012 has been attacked by a wide range of groups that constitute China’s governing elites; Xi can do little to eliminate rival factions who are waiting for the opportune moment to strike back. Xi is unlikely to be interested in a foreign adventure that would at best distract him from domestic power struggles, and at worst provide more political ammunition for his opponents to use against him. Instead, Xi actually faces a lot of pressure to improve China’s relations with the U.S. in his second term, which could help him deal with his domestic troubles or at least not exacerbate them.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
5G Aff › 1AR – Eurasia DA – AT: CCP Instability

CCP’s resilient – western academics are biased.

Tang 18 Wenfang Tang, Political Science Professor at the University of Iowa. [The “Surprise” of Authoritarian Resilience in China, American Affairs, 2(1), 101–117]//BPS

The information explosion based on public opinion surveys in China in the past thirty years has left a few cracks in the empirical foundation of some of the classic theories of political science that were first developed in the West with limited firsthand evidence. For example, the classic theory of civic culture was developed from survey data in only five countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico. Today, the World Values Surveys cover more than eighty countries in all continents with human inhabitation. Among these countries, China stands out as an outlier and does not fit the theoretical predictions of Western political science. As discussed in the above mentioned “surprises”: (1) the Tiananmen protest in 1989 was an anti-reform movement, but it was expected to be a pro-democratic movement; (2) the Chinese regime enjoys strong public support even though many in the West expected it to have collapsed already; (3) social capital in China is among the highest in the world, despite political science’s expectation that its authoritarian political system would produce public distrust; (4) the authoritarian government is (perceived to be) highly responsive while the theory of democracy predicts otherwise; and (5) Chinese citizens are politically active and enjoy a strong feeling of political efficacy even if they are expected to be politically apathetic. One problem in the existing political science literature is the rigid (and black-and-white) definition of democracy. For example, in the rankings of democracy and freedom by Polity25 and Freedom House,26 both highly respected organizations whose annual rankings are widely used in political science teaching and research, China has been consistently ranked at the very bottom in terms of freedom and democracy. Yet in the World Values Survey in 2012, more than 60 percent of Chinese respondents said they felt free, which was higher than in many democracies. Yes, the Chinese may have extremely low expectations, but they do feel free, and that feeling matters because unhappy citizens can cause political disruption. The problem of measurement error is not only limited to China. In fact, when comparing the subjective feelings in public opinion surveys with the “objective” measures of democracy in the rankings assigned by Polity and Freedom House, public opinions throughout the world show a negative correlation with the democracy rankings. This negative relationship between the subjective and the “objective” measures of democracy can be clearly seen in the chart below, based on the Global Barometer Surveys (2010–2015) covering more than seventy countries and regions. The respondents in these surveys were asked about their opinions regarding the following six questions related to the levels of subjective democracy in their societies: (1) The level of democracy is very high in my country; (2) The democratic system in my country is functioning very well; (3) Ordinary people in my country can freely express their opinions; (4) I trust the media in my country; (5) My government responds to what people need; and (6) I am satisfied with my government’s performance. These six items are combined into a single index of subjective democracy. When this index is compared to the Polity scores of “objective” democracy in these same countries and regions, the correlation coefficient is a statistically significant –0.51! In other words, democratic citizens feel less democracy and freedom in their societies than authoritarian citizens. One way to solve the inconsistency between the subjective and “objective” measures is to slightly stretch the concepts in the political science literature. Concept stretching may carry a negative meaning because it may result in the diluted explanatory power of a theory. Yet overly rigid definitions can limit the scope and effectiveness of political analysis. Some of the key concepts in political science can be stretched (or enriched) by the available public opinion surveys. For example, the traditional study of authoritarian politics can include both elites and masses, and formal and informal politics;27 social capital can incorporate both civic trust (trusting strangers) and community-based interpersonal trust. More importantly, the traditional definitions of democracy, freedom, government responsiveness, and political legitimacy that are derived from institutional designs (objective measures) can be enriched by including public (not elite) perceptions of these concepts (subjective measures). Those who only focus on the institutional design of democracy but discount the importance of public perception of democracy run the risk of political arrogance. Finally, a further barrier to understanding China’s authoritarian resilience is ideological bias. While people outside China take it for granted that academic research in China is ideologically limited, it is also true that China is frequently judged with ideologically tinted glasses by some media organizations and scholars in the West. According to these ideologically tinted views, the authoritarian political system in China is inherently bad; supporting such a system is unhealthy; civic trust is the only type that can qualify as interpersonal trust and social capital; government responsiveness is due to Chinese citizens’ “extremely low expectations,” and so on. These value judgements prevent researchers from understanding what is working and what is not working in the Chinese political system, regardless of whether it is good or bad.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
5G Aff › 2AC – Eurasia DA – UQ

Tech influence is failing now.

Marta Makowska 22, Senior Research Fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, Guest Contributor to Council on Foreign Relations, 5/19/2022, "China’s Digital Authoritarianism vs. EU Technological Sovereignty: The Impact on Central and Eastern Europe," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-digital-authoritarianism-vs-eu-technological-sovereignty-impact-central-and-eastern, RMax

What is Next for China in the Region After the War in Ukraine?

China’s support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may be a defining moment for the future of EU-China relations. For most Central and Eastern European states, the war, and Beijing’s embrace of Moscow, will result in a further political decoupling from China. This will have an impact on economic relations as well: The reception of Chinese tech companies in these countries, already under severe pressure, will suffer even further scrutiny. Perhaps, more Chinese firms will be banned from Central and Eastern European markets.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
5G Aff › 2AC – Military Adv – NC3 Internal

Domestic Huawei networks compromise NC3 and military movements.

Katie Lillis 22, reporter for CNN covering intelligence and national security, 7/23/2022, "CNN Exclusive: FBI investigation determined Chinese-made Huawei equipment could disrupt US nuclear arsenal communications," https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/23/politics/fbi-investigation-huawei-china-defense-department-communications-nuclear/index.html, RMax

On paper, it looked like a fantastic deal. In 2017, the Chinese government was offering to spend $100 million to build an ornate Chinese garden at the National Arboretum in Washington DC. Complete with temples, pavilions and a 70-foot white pagoda, the project thrilled local officials, who hoped it would attract thousands of tourists every year.      

But when US counterintelligence officials began digging into the details, they found numerous red flags. The pagoda, they noted, would have been strategically placed on one of the highest points in Washington DC, just two miles from the US Capitol, a perfect spot for signals intelligence collection, multiple sources familiar with the episode told CNN.  

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF—Biotech—Updates › Solvency › Allies say yes

Growing threat of russia and emerging tech means NATO says yes

Chris Dolan 22, 6-8-2022, "NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept Must Enhance Digital Access and Capacities,"[ Dolan is a Professor of Political Science and Director of the Master’s of Science Intelligence and Security at Lebanon Valley College. He is currently a Fulbright U.S. Scholar (2021-2022) in security studies at the Max Van der Stoel Institute at South East European University in Tetovo, North Macedonia} Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/81839/natos-2022-strategic-concept-must-enhance-digital-access-and-capacities//AL

The Strategic Concept is among NATO’s most important documents as it informs alliance planning, resource allocation, and programming based on changes in the threat environment. But the document has not been updated since 2010. The 2010 Strategic Concept, entitled “Active engagement, Modern Defense,” contained just one brief sentence about cyber attacks and did not even mention China. It also stated that “Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace,” even though Russia had invaded Georgia two years before and the threat of a return to great power competition loomed. To argue that a lot has happened between 2010 and 2022 would be an understatement. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shattered any illusions of a lasting peace with Russia. China’s territorial ambitions, economic assertiveness, threats against Taiwan, and military modernization threaten the rules-based order. Emerging technologies – in the form of hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and machine learning – have intensified great power competition. The 2022 Strategic Concept should highlight the essential role of technology in collective defense. To build greater digital capacity while also emphasizing resilience, NATO must adopt a new technological orientation on the military strategic level of command, especially within the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia and the Allied Command Operations (ACO) in Mons, Belgium. ACT leverages advanced technologies for security and defense in capabilities, procedures, public-private partnerships, civil-military relations, and at NATO’s Centers of Excellence. Led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, ACO is responsible for collective defense through direction, requirements, planning, and execution at the strategic level. However, the Strategic Concept 2022 should focus less on the emergence of new technologies and more on how NATO’s military and civilian personnel use them. ACO and ACT must emphasize greater accessibility to information and data for its multinational warfighters, cyber operators, and civilian professionals. NATO must reach out to experts in the private sector, academia, and non-governmental organizations to harness ways to expand access and emphasize flexibility in multi-domain operations. NATO can do this by providing more grants to private sector partners and establish a new center of excellence on data and information sharing. ACO and ACT should also enable personnel and partners to readily access data and information in DIMEL domains: diplomatic, information/cyber, military, economic, and legal. This would expand the range of measures needed by ACT and ACO to connect and correlate deterrence with evolving hybrid threats. To deter hybrid threats across multiple domains, with enhanced access on different digital platforms, NATO members should develop smarter and lethal capabilities to confront threats from state and non-state actors. This would allow ACT and ACO to prepare for any contingency and respond to adversaries in battlefields and battlespaces. Plug and Play The 2022 Strategic Concept encourages collaboration in the implementation of guidelines and procedures through a “plug-and-play” concept, in which platforms and systems are optimized for readiness and response at lightning speed. Plug-and-play is based on approaches used in commercial software that allow for innovation and easy access to networks and systems through secure platforms. The NATO School Oberammergau should offer platform training and education courses programs in mobile access for ACT and ACO personnel with appropriate security clearances. This would allow them to access the appropriate platform and utilize data and information necessary for their tasks and responsibilities. For example, NATO’s Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Mine Action (MA) Information Sharing Platform contains rich and publicly available datasets on the roles played by the alliance in mitigating the illicit trade in small arms, tanks, aircraft, and naval vessels. It reports and updates NATO-funded projects to prevent adversaries from acquiring these weapons. However, the SALW-MA platform is outdated and not user friendly, impeding its functionality in practice. Put simply, NATO’s ACT and ACO should focus as much on easing access to information as it does on advanced technologies and conventional weaponry. This would provide NATO with useful tools to access data and intelligence on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and in land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains using devices and platforms that can seamlessly connect in different locations. But NATO Commands cannot simply expect its existing personnel to adapt. They must be trained and educated on a regular basis to use digital infrastructures in ways that make their jobs easier. On the strategic level, the 2022 Strategic Concept must provide NATO’s political and military leaders with flexibility and resources to discern the diversity of hybrid threats in the environment. NATO’s strategic planners, cyber operators, and warfighters should be trained and educated in relevant digital platforms, access, and sharing data and information in ways that improve collaborative decision-making and collective defense. On the operations level, personnel must be given enough space to share data and intelligence as well as to train tactical level personnel on software that enables them to collect, analyze, process, and disseminate information quickly and easily across multiple domains. Addressing these challenges is difficult for just one nation-state, let alone for all 30 NATO members. Therefore, the 2022 Strategic Concept should emphasize connectivity between member states in multi-domain operations and in collaboration with the private sector and academia. Accessibility to information and data sharing among NATO members should be securitized and harmonized.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF—Biotech—Updates › Solvency › Allies say yes

Empirically NATO say’s yes to plans on emerging tech

Robert K. Ackerman, 19. 10-1-2019, "Innovation Leads NATO Modernization Efforts," SIGNAL Magazine, https://www.afcea.org/content/innovation-leads-nato-modernization-efforts//AL

NATO is accelerating its efforts to input innovation into its operational capabilities. This effort is aided both by industry and academia and by different nations that bring new technology applications to the alliance table. But even the best ideas are encountering speed bumps, and adversaries are moving quickly to exploit their own technological advances. Through its Allied Command Transformation (ACT), headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, NATO has focused capability development on emerging technologies that can change battlespace operations. An innovation center developed with local academia is earmarked to grow into a full-fledged laboratory that would seed new capabilities into the force. And the ACT is improving NATO’s state-of-the-art battlefield network to accommodate advances in command and control (C2). One advantage NATO has for innovation is strength in numbers. The alliance’s 29 members all have innovation assets that can be brought to bear in planning future military systems. Yet that broad membership also offers a significant drawback. The alliance must agree on systems that meet advanced capabilities and are interoperable among NATO’s members. Lt. Gen. Thomas J. Sharpy, USAF, deputy chief of staff for capability development at the ACT, offers that the command is looking to the future to maintain a military edge across all the capabilities it delivers. This involves making sure it is applying innovation to either adapt current capabilities or revamp them, building on progress from science and technology advances in industry, academia and other nations. “Hockey great Wayne Gretzky once said, ‘Good hockey players skate to where the puck is; great hockey players skate to where the puck is going to be,’” the general relates. “We are trying to figure out where the puck is going to be and develop those capabilities so that we maintain that military edge as our competitors are trying to do the exact same thing,” he declares. The ACT has stood up an innovation branch within the capability development directorate to go with an innovation hub partnered with Old Dominion University. Gen. Sharpy notes that the directorate is moving ahead with plans to escalate this hub into a laboratory that would enable incremental as well as open innovation through academia. With the growth of this center, the ACT would align resources to extend innovation across all aspects of the ACT. He describes this innovation center as “very effective at integrating with academia and like-minded personnel amongst the alliance.” It also is working with people who are not part of NATO to capture innovation as it emerges. He looks to improve this effort by providing the center with more resources and more people. This would enable it to be a laboratory where ideas could be cultivated with industry for demonstrations by the military. Another advantage would be that the facility is located in the United States, so U.S. participants would not have to travel to and across Europe to deal with NATO. The ACT has developed an emerging disruptive technology road map that focuses on command and control, big data, artificial intelligence (AI), automation, hypersonics and other areas that many nations also are exploring. This effort is part of the command’s overall thrust. “We’re not only trying to put coherence into those systems that we have, but also are trying to look at using innovation to make them maintain cutting edge so we maintain our military edge going forward,” Gen. Sharpy says. “We don’t want to be lagging in those, because those are the big rocks that we are trying to move. “Even though we might not be in a conflict, I would say that cyber is a contested domain every single day,” the general continues. “Being able to leverage the same opportunities that cyber provides us from a good standpoint also enables our adversaries in the negative standpoint, because they have the same capabilities.”

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF—Biotech—Updates › Solvency › SPD -- NATO-US Bioethical Network guide

This coordinated framework creates a flexible regulative program to create safe policies that give room for innovation

EU fails—ignores data

Val Giddings 22, 3-11-202 Giddings has over three decades of experience in science and regulatory policy relating to biotechnology innovations. His work at ITIF focuses on constraints inhibiting innovations in these areas, and remedies to those constraints. Giddings is also president and CEO of., a consultancy focusing on regulatory compliance, media, and strategic planning for governments, multilateral organizations, and industry. "Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation in Biotech Policy—A US Perspective," No Publication, https://itif.org/publications/2022/03/11/prospects-transatlantic-cooperation-biotech-policy-us-perspective//AL

Mutual self-interest provides a strong basis for transatlantic cooperation in biotechnology based on shared recognition of its vast potential to provide solutions to some of civilization’s most pressing problems. Thanks to explosive advances in our understanding of the many ways in which promiscuous nature has been manipulating DNA and RNA for the past billion years, it is widely anticipated that the 21st century will belong to biology.1 We are now at the point where our ability to innovate is constrained less by technical capability than by the limits of our imaginations. Multiple laboratories and companies on both sides of the Atlantic (and throughout the world) are pursuing promising applications, and experience confirms progress would be accelerated by cooperative approaches. But there are some considerable challenges, especially in agricultural and industrial contexts. The most important rate-limiting factor in our ability to harness biological innovations to the challenges of feeding the world, sustaining human and environmental health, and addressing climate change, is the burden imposed by ill-considered regulations. Unless this bottleneck can be unblocked, the enormous potential for transatlantic scientific cooperation will not yield the necessary fruits. DIVERGENT REGULATORY PATHS: PRECAUTION VS. OPENNESS TO INNOVATION Existing policies, legislation, and regulations do little or nothing to advance human or environmental safety.2 Born out of understandable caution at the dawn of recombinant DNA technologies, today their most obvious impact is to obstruct and discourage research, development, and deployment of innovative solutions to various challenges.3 This is so despite an abundant record of production and consumption of new biotech products with enviable records of improved safety, superior sustainability, and widespread beneficial economic impacts.4 The benefits are so substantial that a pattern has emerged of farmers breaking the law to acquire and plant improved seeds in countries where governments have lagged in allowing access.5 It is one thing to implement policies and regulations ostensibly designed to ensure safety; it is quite another to ignore vast data and decades of experience around the world to maintain obsolete policies and regulations that add nothing to safety or sustainability, but only impede our ability to use the most innovative, precise, and safest tools to address our gravest challenges.6 In terms of regulatory policy and openness to biological innovations, the width of the Atlantic might be measured better in light years than miles or kilometers. As imperfect as regulations for the products of biotechnology are in North America, they are simply indefensible in Europe.7 The United States decided in 1986, after years of study and consultation, that no new laws were required to ensure the safety of crops and foods improved through biotechnology. This was based on the finding that they present no novel hazards, and foreseeable risks of their development and use fall into categories with which humans have considerable experience from millennia of conventional plant and animal breeding.8 The United States therefore decided to regulate these novel products under existing authorities administered by the Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration, and Environmental Protection Agency.9 While implementation of this policy, the “Coordinated Framework,” has been far from perfect, it has been sufficiently predictable and science-based to enable an explosion of innovation, new product development, and commercial activity. Consequently, the United States has led the world to the present day wherein crops improved through biotechnology are now the global standard for quality seeds, delivering improved yields, safety, sustainability, and economic productivity around the world, with the lion’s share of benefits accruing on behalf of small farmers in developing countries.10 Europe took a different approach. It is one thing to implement policies and regulations ostensibly designed to ensure safety; it is quite another to ignore vast data and decades of experience around the world to maintain obsolete policies and regulations that add nothing to safety or sustainability. The European Union decided to regulate seeds improved through biotechnology as a novel class governed under new regulations specifically focused on an arbitrary category known as “GMOs” (for “genetically modified organisms”). The conceit was that because they represented gene combinations produced by mechanisms supposedly “not found in nature” (but actually ubiquitous) they must present novel hazards, even though none has ever been identified. These putatively novel hazards, despite the lack of any concrete manifestations, allegedly required dedicated, specific, “precautionary” regulations. The resulting regulatory regime proved so burdensome it led to the general collapse of agricultural biotechnology in Europe, which had played a leading role in its discovery and invention. Permissions for field trials proved almost impossible to obtain, products could not be developed and brought to market, academic labs abandoned the field, and the industry relocated most of its assets and activities to the Americas. And Europe became the world’s largest importer of commodity foods improved through biotechnology, only recently surpassed by China. OPPORTUNITY FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION Many scientists in the EU (and around the world) knew from the beginning that this was the wrong approach, yet the EU pushed its model internationally, with aggressive diplomacy, leading to emulation by many countries in the developing world, with equally unhappy results to those seen in Europe.11 But a growing number of scientists, policymakers, and even “green” NGOs that had originally opposed GMOs, now recognize the counterproductive results of this approach and are working to avoid repeating the same mistakes with gene editing. This shines a spotlight on the most important and potentially fruitful opportunity for transatlantic cooperation in biotechnology: the revival of science-based regulatory regimes in which the degree of regulatory oversight is proportional to the hazards involved, and regulation that enables, rather than discourages the safe development of innovative products. A return to and reaffirmation of these first principles would provide fertile ground for cooperation and coordination globally. Regulatory reform (everywhere, not just in the EU and its emulators, though the need is greatest there) provides fertile ground for transatlantic cooperation and coordination. We have robust models of proven approaches.12 Without such cooperation, other progress in developing and deploying innovative solutions through biotechnology will be impeded or foregone. As to national security risks, just as with other risks, novelty attributable to biotechnology is elusive. One can do very nasty things with conventional bioweapons, and they are easily magnified with recombinant DNA techniques. At the same time, defensive capacities are also buttressed by biotechnology, as demonstrated by the rapid development of mRNA vaccines against SARS-CoV-2. There has been some good work done in this area, but this topic is worth exploring at greater depth. The OECD has a track record of thoughtful analyses with such topics. One possibility would be to build on that foundation by establishing a joint OECD/NATO working group to serve as a forum.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF—Biotech—Updates › Solvency › SPD -- NATO-US Bioethical Network guide

Only soft regulations are key to solve – any alternative means NATO say’s no and private organizations circumvent

NATO say yes—plan popular

Venkat Rao and Cassandra Waite, 12. “Soft Regulatory Mechanisms and Open-source Bioethics to Counter Biothreat Proliferation.” Rao is a chief scientist at ERP international and Doctor of Philosophy. Waite Applied Biosafety 17 (2012): 110 – 119//AL

Introduction Much of the current focus in biodefense, aimed at countering current and emerging biological threats, has been interdisciplinary in scope, drawn mostly from the foundational ethical guidelines for medicine, science, public health, law, the environment, war, and international relations. As a result, biodefense and counter-bioterrorism programs at national and international levels have sought to employ conventional regulatory frameworks by merging a collection of concepts and guidelines implemented as “hard regulations,” but without systematically addressing the unique challenges posed by biodefense and biological threats. Technical and policy experts concur that hard regulations are likely to be counterproductive in the long run, when the academic research and private enterprise business models thrive on the basic principle of freedom to pursue scientific research and free exchange of information among the community of researchers and biotechnology business entrepreneurs (Roland, 2007). Public policymakers in government and multilateral agencies faced with challenging tasks involving environmental protection, national security, economic policy, healthcare, and labor laws are beginning to explore a range of options that include command-and-control type regulations and others involving participatory instruments and working with stakeholders to change behavior (Gaudioso & Salerno, 2004; Gunningham & Sinclair, 1998). For example, comparative risk assessment is increasingly used as a decision-making tool in the environmental and public health policy decision-making process involving the scientific community, public policymakers, and public stakeholder communities (Alm & Rao, 1994). The U.S. National Research Council employed a biological risk assessment paradigm to assess the operational safety of advanced emerging pathogen disease research laboratories (NRC, 2010a), or the maximum credibility event-based environmental consequence analysis to assess safety of high biocontainment laboratories (NRC, 2010b). From a public policy standpoint, some experts and professional organizations have suggested the use of the public health model proposed by Buchanan (2000), where individual interests are subordinated to the interests of the common good of society as the guiding framework for what might constitute a “soft regulation” to biodefense bioethics and a basis for countering biological proliferation threats. Guzman and Meyer (2011) have proposed a formulation for international soft law on international common law to form the basis for international tribunals towards nonbinding interpretations of binding legal rules. As a result, legal consequences flow from a range of nonbinding international instruments similar to expert committee recommendations and advisories and guidelines developed by regulatory agencies in the domestic setting that do not have enforcement powers or legal consequences due to noncompliance. Legal experts have opined that the quasi-legal characteristic of international soft law will be attractive to state parties engaged in a multilateral forum on a regional or international issue. Application of soft regulations is a well-established mechanism in international diplomacy, such as in regional and global multilateral fora aimed at global health protection (Magnusson, 2007; Sutton, 2009; WHO, 2003), prevention and elimination of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction (Lee, 2004), labor laws (Borghijs et al., 2003; Kuruvilla & Verma, 2006), environmental protection (Alm & Rao, 1994; Koutalakis et al., 2010), and human rights (Andorno, 2009, 2007; Hillgenberg, 1999). Articles Soft Regulatory Mechanisms and Open-source Bioethics to Counter Biothreat Proliferation Venkat Rao* and Cassandra Waite CSC Defense Group, Alexandria, Virginia Downloaded by 67.194.0.233 from www.liebertpub.com at 06/24/22. For personal use only. www.absa.org Applied Biosafety Vol. 17, No. 3, 2012 111 Using illustrative examples from these well-established international initiatives, this article outlines the basic framework for a soft regulatory mechanism as part of regional or global efforts to coordinate the pursuit of scientific investigations and to manage biological threat proliferation. At the conclusion of the 2006 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) meeting. titled “Sixth Review Conference of the State Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention,” held in Geneva, it was concluded that national implementation would remain the biggest challenge during the 2007-2010 Intersessional program, which focused on regional cooperation; biosafety and biosecurity; oversight measures for biological research; and increased awareness, educational measures, and international cooperation in biological science and technology. BWC review conferences implement a quasi-regulatory framework to meet the goal of the treaty, which is to promote the development of the peaceful uses of biological agents and toxins. The confidencebuilding measures outlined in these sessions are supposed to provide practical steps to increase the level of

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF—Biotech—Updates › Solvency › SPD -- NATO-US Bioethical Network guide

The plan utilizes soft power diplomacy tools and methodologies to create architecture for a NATO-US Bioethical Network to guide national security policymakers

Venkat Rao and Cassandra Waite, 12. “Soft Regulatory Mechanisms and Open-source Bioethics to Counter Biothreat Proliferation.” Rao is a chief scientist at ERP international and Doctor of Philosophy. Waite Applied Biosafety 17 (2012): 110 – 119//AL

A Broader Context for Soft Power Diplomacy (SPD) One of the more common examples used to describe the demonstrable effectiveness of SPD is its application in global communication via broadcasting media. For example, in the aftermath of World Wars II, when the Cold War had just begun between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were created by the United States and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) as conduits to provide more accurate world news to listeners all over the world, particularly to the audience in Eastern Europe, South East Asia, East Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Cultural centers were created all over the world as another conduit to communicate the merits of democracy and a free market society to the common man. A long-term objective was to use these communicated merits to generate admiration and respect for the West. It is interesting to note that SPD tools related to communication were instituted as public diplomacy to alter the behavior of foreign powers by influencing its citizens. The basic asArticles Downloaded by 67.194.0.233 from www.liebertpub.com at 06/24/22. For personal use only. 112 www.absa.org Applied Biosafety Vol. 17, No. 3, 2012 sumption was that if public opinion in a nation or region is molded towards objectives favorable to the West, this would create internal pressure for the hostile foreign government to alter its behavior towards its rivals and ideologies. Many decades of investment in global broadcasting programs during the Cold War yielded desirable results, measured by the fact that more nations in the world have elected governments and open economies, and espouse free trade than ever before. Modern communication technologies—particularly the interactive forms of social networking and the Worldwide Web—have introduced radically new mechanisms to communicate and share information, which are likely to play a major role as soft powers (Nye, 1990). The participation of non-state actors, such as the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs), and transnational media corporations (TMCs), has further empowered SPD tools in global communication through social networking media. Tehranian (1997) reported that there are over 30,000 NGOs compared to 200 state actors, but if the number of TNCs and TMCs is taken into account, a significant level of complexity and role-play for SPD in international relations has been added. The scientific community has embraced the latest technological innovations in communications and information sharing with the utmost enthusiasm. This is evidenced by a growing number of online versions of peer-review journals, web sites, and portals exclusively devoted to new biology and life sciences research; here, a vast global network of scientists and technical experts can share information on their current research interests, findings, and guidelines for others to experiment and validate. The open forum used by the scientific community fosters transparency, promotes information-sharing, and propels innovation in research and development. Simultaneously, this environment poses serious security issues on what are generally known as DURC. No regulatory mandates oversee and monitor the vast online media currently used by the scientific community, and it is safe to assume that mandated regulations are less likely to modulate individual scientists regarding ethical questions related to DURC and its potential impact on the research institutional safety and national security. Within this context is where employment of SPD options might prove more effective in modulating behavior through voluntary means. There are good examples, albeit from other industry sectors, where use of SPD options has yielded desirable outcomes. Public diplomacy related to national and international policy on environmental protection and promotion of equity in labor laws and workman compensations has yielded Figure 1 National security policymakers and the scientific community face overlapping bioethical issues during operational planning and implementation of biosecurity and bioterrorism preparedness programs. positive outcomes of global significance. For instance, in global labor governance—in the absence of a formal legal framework—self-regulation, norm setting, and international labor codes provided a policy premise attractively referred to as “voluntaristic initiatives” (Hassel, 2008). Remarkably, the SPD measures to rectify global labor governance did not stem from national governments or from multilateral forums such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organization. Instead, the public diplomacy channeled through mass media and social networking created broader global awareness on issues related to workplace safety and compensation. As a result of increased global public awareness and response by way of consumer boycotts, the private sector adopted more progressive workman compensation programs and invested in improving the quality of workplace conditions, for they could not afford to ignore the collective voice of their consumers (Hassel, 2008). As a result, we now witness a vast number of large, multinational corporations embracing good labor practices and even publicizing these efforts in the marketing of their products. Companies now tout their safe workplace environment, good wages, and best labor practices as part of a corporate culture because it is popular now to be socially responsible. While one could argue that some sectors within the industry have adopted ethical practices because it is the right thing to do, a compelling argument could be made that it makes a better business case offering or a better economic incentive, or arguably that it is a necessity for companies to meet or exceed the ethical demands of consumers and their special interest groups. SPD in this case could be interpreted as the collective voice of consumers that now has a huge influence on the global marketplace and the international economy. A broader global acceptance of an environmentally friendly “green policy” is yet another example where SPD measures have made a significant impact on environmental diplomacy when environmental treaty-making systems were deemed less effective (Susskind, 1994). SPD in environmental diplomacy offered self-enforcing options to nationstates without compromising their sovereignty and promoted better coordination among the various institutions involved. NGOs working on environment and global ecosystem protection promoted SPD tools and measures as part of global agreements aimed at environmental sustainability, greater awareness of pollution, and the need for environmental protection. Progress was made possible in this arena by carefully crafted SPD tools and methodologies that were deployed to influence government policymakers and regulators, private and public sectors, academia, and the international media. Soft Power Diplomacy to Counter Biological Threats It is evident from the preceding section that SPD tools and methodologies have remarkable success in the formulation and implementation of national and international policies related to public health, trade and commerce, and protection of the environment and ecosystem. Human pursuits to understand natural processes through research and discovery are essential aspects of our society, and therefore, SPD tools imparting education and training for aspiring scientists to increase awareness on the dual-use threats and instill code of conduct for responsible behavior may succeed as well. Existing biological threat-related mandates are mostly hard regulations promulgated either at the national level or a binding requirement under the existing international biological arms control regime. However, during the past 2 decades, policymakers, life sciences researchers, and the biotechnology industrial community have evidenced interest in exploring SPD tools and methodologies in what could be the architecture for future biological engagements covering research and development, global health security, and protection against new and emerging diseases and threats of bioterrorism. Unfortunately, progress in bioengagement architecture remains fragmented due to a divergent stakeholder community and an overall lack of understanding of the potentials of misuse of new frontiers in modern biological research and development. Bioethics-based SPD provides the enduring quality of higher-order thinking and enhancement of quality of life through self-imposed behavior modification, which is inherently appealing to the research and policy communities. Understanding the moral dimensions of the emerging health and biological systems, and analyzing them according to the bioethical principles and core value system of the community, will drive decision making at the bottom levels, where the practice of science and medicine occurs. SPD will provide the conceptual framework to evaluate a series of competing options and illuminate the inherent recognition that there is no single moral course of action. Practical application of a bioethics-inspired SPD framework faces fundamental challenges.

First, policy analysts and researchers working on SPD in the international arena often cite the sheer complexity of the legal and technical issues involved in domains such as global nonproliferation treaties, international labor laws, and environmental protections that render hard regulations less effective in the long run (Sisson & Marginson, 2001). This would apply to any treaty-based efforts towards nonproliferation of biological weapons given the sheer size, scope, and complexity of modern biological research and the vast and varied applications in the biotechnology domain. For instance, the 1972 BWC has no provision for enforcement because of the fundamental difficulties with verifiability of treaty compliance. A key problem with the implementation of verification is that the BWC applies not only to sovereign entities but also to private parties as well. Unlike nuclear nonproliferation treaties (and the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty [ABM] which involves sovereign nations’ commitment to reduction and eventual elimination through mutually verifiable and implementable protocols), biological treaty verification covers an extremely vast array of stakeholders involving the private sector, university research laboratories, and contract research facilities in biotechnology R&D and commercial development. A formal inspection regime is bound to be ineffective, and compliance verification is nearly impossible. Second, bioethics-based SPD approaches are likely to be more effective in the globalized biotechnology research and commercial environment, where business-to-business contacts and networked strategic communication have assumed a prominent role in engaging the stakeholder communities. SPD tools and methodologies are better suited to exploit the evolving social networking and other platforms for communication and information-sharing such as professional societies, disease surveillance and reporting networks, data sharing and reporting systems, and collaborative research programs. SPD tools will greatly benefit the global biotechnology research community and the industry that depends on new biologics-based product development and commercialization. Likewise, global informationsharing on disease prevention and health promotion through the 2005 World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO, 2005) brings the global comity of 194 nations as state parties to voluntarily share diseasespecific information through a standard reporting format. The goal to harmonize global rules to categories of infectious disease identification and reporting has inherent appeal as a SPD, where the broader aims are to enhance national, regional, and global public health security. Finally, bioethics-inspired SPD tools offer more flexible approaches to addressing thorny issues, such as conflicts of interest among stakeholders involved in various aspects of public- and private-funded biotechnology ventures, compared to mandated compliance with national regulations or treaty obligatory requirements. This is basically due to the fundamental differences in the enforcement between SPD and mandatory regulations. Whereas, successful implementation of a mandate is primarily via some form of legal sanction or a form of punishment, SPD methodologies carry no such punishments due to noncompliance. Instead, SPD approaches are primarily driven by ethical and moral implications of advances in biomedical sciences and on value judgments pertaining to code of conduct and responsible behavior in the areas of biological research and biotechnology. SPD tools such as peer-review audits, institutional review boards, best business practices, and institution collaboration are premised on professional responsibility and practitioners’ voluntary commitment to adhere to institutional-level oversight and the broader ethical and moral questions related to science, medicine, health, life, and the environment. Education and Training as SPD Training and educational programs in bioethics and biosecurity as part of university curricula towards advanced degrees in modern biology and biomedical sciences would considerably promote aspiring scientists’ awareness of dualuse threats and recognition of biorisks in their own work and in that of others. Unfortunately, in current university curricula for students, few educational modules exist regarding ethics training on biological and biomedical tracks, and even those few programs treat biosecurity and dual-use issues only superficially. A case-study of bioethics training in the United Kingdom reported that biosecurity-related education received scarce attention from educators, and bioethics course modules reviewed during the study did not adequately address biosecurity and dual-use issues (Revill, 2009). To a large measure, training in bioethics would serve as the lynchpin in educational programs, bringing up the moral obligations and expectations of responsible behavior on the part of the scientific community regarding the potential security implications of dual-use research (Kuhlau et al., 2008; Selfelid, 2009). Institutions such as Bradford University (Bradford, England) with leading-edge educational programs in bioethics and biosecurity have focused on educational criteria to identify biorisks and obligatory measures on the part of life scientists to take preventive measures. The SPD-based moral obligations offer training modules to: a) prevent bioterrorism; b) engage in responsible activities; c) recognize negative implications of dualuse research; d) avoid submitting for publication study results posing biosecurity risks; e) participate in educational and training programs promoting biorisk awareness and dual-use risks; f) maintain oversight of dangerous pathogens and toxic substances in the laboratory; and g) develop a protocol to deal with suspicious activities of students and laboratory staff. Training modules addressing these core criteria should be available more broadly, both as part of formal educational programs and on-the-job training programs for staff and laboratory operators. Recognizing the value of dual-use education for scientists, the BTWC Review Conferences have repeatedly identified education, awareness-raising, and ethics training on code of conduct and responsible behavior to prevent potential misuse of biological research (BTWC, 2008). However, no clear guidelines are available to state parties on the nature of educational and training programs, implementation metrics, and performance measures. Given the vast scope and scale of the modern global biological research enterprise, educational programs for national implementation ought to address a much broader range of activities if the goal is to prevent misuse of research and prevent acquisition and use of biological weapons. This is yet another justification to more actively consider SPD-based tools to impart broader awareness through bioethics and biosecurity education and training programs. Moving Toward a Global Bioethics Network The conceptual architecture guiding bioethics-inspired SPD will resonate with a) the medical ethics first written in the 18th century by Thomas Percival, which forms the code of ethics in the practice of clinical medicine and the ethical framework in the 1846 creation of the American Medical Association, and b) the Nuremberg Code for research ethics, established in the aftermath of World War II, on the use of human subjects in experimental research (Mitscherlich & Mielke, 1947). In 1979, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services issued the first historical document on ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human subjects. This was known as “The Belmont Report” and provided a set of bioethics-inspired principles of respect, beneficence, and justice as the foundation for use of human subjects in medical research (DHHS, 1979). Most recently, the 2009 Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues for the first time addressed more broadly the bioethical issues related to advances in biomedical sciences research and biotechnology and explored SPD options to ensure the freedom to pursue scientific research and innovative technology development in a socially and ethically responsible manner (DHHS, 2012). These guidelines offer a conceptually cohesive framework to the more challenging task of crafting SPD approaches taking into account the difficult bioethical issues surrounding the spectacular progress in biomedical and genomic research. It is relevant to note that the conceptual elements of SPD and regulatory mandates and treaty obligations have interdependencies, and the overall effectiveness of the former is linked to the policy-guiding development and implementation of the latter. Figure 2 illustrates the interdependency of SPD with the policy-making and regulatory establishment and implementation process. Mandatory regulations by design require compulsory compliance and stipulate penalties for noncompliance. Hence, success in a large measure depends on faithful compliance by the regulated community, which is where SPD tools and methods come into play. Defined more broadly as a process that effects a change in attitude upon a willing subject without invoking the regulatory mandates, SPD aims to enhance voluntary stakeholder participation towards the broader regulatory objectives set forth under the mandates. Simultaneously, SPD tools and methodologies offer the regulatory community feedback on the mandates to allow further modifications in the regulatory process to improve implementation effectiveness and to better coordinate with the regulated community. Therefore, maintaining internal consistency with mandatory regulation is a crucial aspect in the formulation of SPD strategies. We propose bioethically-inspired SPD tools and methodologies be closely linked to the existing regulatory process to ensure consistency in communication and to assess overall compliance. Key criteria would involve identification and delineation of the essential conceptual elements of SPD architecture. The decision-making process in a clinical or laboratory setting among two or more seemingly conflicting choices often revolves around anticipated positive or negative outcomes at different levels: Articles Figure 2 Bioethical principles guide formulation and interpretation of soft power diplomacy initiatives and its interdependency with hard regulatory mechanisms. Downloaded by 67.194.0.233 from www.liebertpub.com at 06/24/22. For personal use only. 116 www.absa.org Applied Biosafety Vol. 17, No. 3, 2012 a) The first set of decision points revolves around individual needs and interests weighted against those of the community, where choices may present options beneficial to one while placing a serious burden on the other. b) The second set of decision points revolves around short- and long-term benefits, where options offering immediate short-term benefits require careful consideration of long-term impact on human society and the general environment. c) The third and final set of decision points revolves around the balanced consideration of administering justice as opposed to the relevance of mercy to the affected community. For example, the decision to provide licensure for a new category of medical countermeasures may address a serious public health problem but at the same time pose an unquantified measure of risk to population subgroups likely to be exposed to the new medical countermeasures. Bioethics-inspired SPD should recognize the basic dilemma presented in each of these decision points where competing values are at play. Therefore, the need for a SPDguided decision-making process would extend beyond the professional communities and their governing institutions. The bioethics-inspired SPD roadmap would have to engage a broader participation of society-at-large since the overall impact is on the human society as a whole. A global bioethical network of broader stakeholder communities will be actively involved in the formulation of SPD tools and methodologies that go beyond the narrow confines of regulatory mandates. Figure 3 illustrates the functional components of bioethics-inspired SPD tools and methodologies, where considerable emphasis is placed at the individual and institutional level and provides transparency to a wide array of stakeholder communities throughout the network. Nodal elements participating in the network would participate in dialogue and discussions ranging from: a) initiatives to modify behavior at the individual level that results in self-governance; b) balanced consideration on threats to populations versus individuals as in the case of bioterrorism; c) methods to safeguard DURC and intellectual properties produced through research; and d) approaches to improve biosecurity without hindering the advancement of biomedical science research and technology innovations. As illustrated in Figure 3, the proposed SRM tools and methodologies of a global bioethical network are directed primarily at individual scientists and the institutional-level decision makers with a guiding rationale that better outcomes are realizable when implemented proactively as a voluntary initiative to broadly promote education, awareness and active participation: • Peer-review (for both ethics and safety) of research proposals to ensure that proposed research is fully vetted prior to initiation of the project. Articles are already being reviewed by most of the popular publications to ensure that gained knowledge is not publicly available if it should be determined a threat to biosecurity (Johnson, 2012). Articles Figure 3 Soft power diplomacy tools and methodologies constituting the conceptual architecture for a Global Bioethical Network guide national security policymakers and the stakeholders in the scientific community. • Research checklists to aid scientists in determining if their research takes into account all the concerns of biosecurity and also to help ingrain the standards through repetitious use of the tool. • Dual-use plan for publicly funded projects in the future (e.g., animal use plan). Currently, biosafety plans are required when submitting grant proposals, but it should become a standard practice for government-funded research to also require a plan to ensure the protection of dual-use information through a “dual-use plan.” • Clearinghouse for scientists to direct questions and to determine if a piece of information or specific research area is a biosecurity concern. • Advisory boards at the state level similar to the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (DHHS, 2012) with the aim to better utilize local and regional capabilities for oversight and to promote educational awareness. • Research assessment template for individual assessment of potential research. • Global forums and NGOs can serve as venues for best practices and experiences to be shared. We should focus on creating communities at this level and down to the individual. • A list of proposed obligations for life scientists as a set of standard, widely accepted, best practices from peers across the field. • Training on best practices. As illustrated in Figure 3, performance outcome depends on proactive initiatives at the individual level and voluntary participation of institutions in the overall process. Unlike the established regulatory framework that depends solely on enforcement by authorities at the national and international levels, the SPD framework for the bioethical network is proactive, participatory, and fundamentally based on the awareness of the community. National science policymakers have considered policy options and research standards, and best business practices to oversee DURC without compromise on the essential core tenants of the freedom to pursue biological research (Shea, 2007). These efforts are in concert with concurrent initiatives from the scientific community (NRC, 2004). However, the framework outlined in this study formally integrates a systems approach to the evolving consensus in the scientific community towards simultaneous measures that promote self-regulation at the individual level and better biosecurity measures at the institutional level, both supported by increased biodefense-related awareness and educational programs (Dolgister, 2007). The global bioethical network would serve as the SPD architecture to develop in a proactive manner in tandem with major international forums, such as the Intersessional Working Groups of the BWC and the World Health Organization, aimed at broadening the network of communities and providing a forum to develop and test novel SPD tools. These tools are aimed at improved awareness of biological risks and a better understanding of the threats posed by new and emerging infectious diseases. The network would provide a forum for sustained interactions among various participants and a cross-cultural dialogue on the development of national systems for research ethics, education, and outreach. Recommendations National security policymakers examining alternate options to meet the goals of biological threat reduction through treaties and hard regulations ought to place more emphasis on the potential role of SPD tools and methodologies for developing universal norms towards open-source bioethics. Policymakers should note the effective precedence in the contemporary international arena to articulating SPD approaches as alternative options to meet the goals and objectives of the treaty- and legislation-based hard regulations. • Leverage growing awareness: National security policymakers should consider SPD-based policy alternatives to more effectively leverage the growing awareness among scientific researchers towards self-regulation and the promotion of responsible conduct in research. Institutionlevel guidelines on research misconduct, safe handling of sensitive data and materials, and a peer-review process in research publications that takes biosecurity into account are also required. Clearly, regulatory mandates and international treaties are partial solutions to addressing the sensitive and contentious bioethcial challenges associated with biological threat reduction and biosecurity. • Alternative options to empower regulatory mandates: A bioethics-inspired SPD framework has the power to dramatically alter the nature of discussions related to biosecurity in the life sciences research enterprise. In particular, the dynamic of the SPD framework should address the shortcomings in existing regulatory mandates in the biotechnology-driven Bioeconomy, where not much is known of its inherent hazards and potential long-term impact on human society, the general environment, and national/international security. • Engage the global community on the merits of SPD initiatives: Bioethics-inspired SPD is attractive for its enduring quality of high-order thinking that shapes quality-oflife goals. A deliberate process aimed at embracing the moral dimensions of human endeavors, such as in conducting research with troubling ethical dimensions, with the potential to adversely impact health and the general environment, will guide decision making at the operational level. • Integrate bioethics-based SPD as part of education curricula: Given the broad interdisciplinary nature of the SPD tools and methodologies, universities and institutions should develop educational and specialized training programs catering to students pursuing careers in science and technology, law, public policy, and business. These training programs should focus on the nonbinding rules or instruments in the SPD and approaches to integrate these tools within the existing regulatory framework. Biosafety professionals have stressed the value of well structured educational programs on codes of conduct, biosafety, and biosecurity as a prerequisite for graduation in advanced university education and training programs (Johnson, 2006). Bioethics-inspired SPD tools and methodologies could also play a meaningful role in biological arms control and biological threat reduction goals. They could aid in carefully evaluating and deciding among a series of competing options, but with the inherent recognition that there is no single moral course of action. Active participation from the scientific and policy communities is essential to further articulate the influential role of SPD in countering biothreat proliferation and to gain participation of other stakeholders

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF—Biotech—Updates › Adv-- Leadership › AT No China rise in biotech

US currently leading in biotech innovation but China rise on the horizon

Rob Carlson 21 - PhD, managing director at Bioeconomy Capital & affiliate professor in the Paul G Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering at the University of Washington "Beyond Biological Defense: Maintaining the U.S. Biotechnology Advantage," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/beyond//AL

Maintaining America’s Biotechnology Advantage Biotechnology in the United States is a significant contributor to the economy. By one estimate, in 2017, U.S. biotechnology revenues exceeded $400 billion, or 2 percent of gross domestic product, substantially surpassing better-measured sectors such as mining. Bioeconomy revenues have grown at an average rate of 10 percent annually for two decades. Notably, U.S. biotechnology revenues alone were approximately equal to worldwide semiconductor revenues for 2017. Biotechnology now supplies critical medicines, and, as more than 90 percent of the corn and soy grown in the United States is genetically modified, biotechnology feeds the armed forces. Industrial biotechnology is responsible for upward of 20 percent of chemicals produced in the United States, suggesting a similar proportion of chemicals used in the military are also biologically derived. And these impressive figures may still be significant underestimates: Using a different methodology, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences recently concluded that the biotechnology industry contributes 5 to 7 percent of U.S. gross domestic product. Biotechnology, therefore, may already constitute an even larger share of the military supply chain. As biotechnology continues to mature, its contribution to physical and economic security will become even more significant. Tools are now being deployed that enable the engineering and biomanufacturing of materials that will eventually not only displace petrochemicals but also surpass them in production scale and performance. Over the next ten to twenty years, biological production could soon supply up to 60 percent of physical inputs across the global economy, and biotechnology could have a “direct economic impact of up to $4 trillion a year.” While the United States is arguably still leading in biotechnology, it risks losing this lead to China. In China, biotechnology is a national development and a security matter. China’s Innovation Driven Development Strategy emphasizes biotechnology’s essential role in the country’s economic development, while the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy seeks to ensure that biotechnology research is also oriented toward the country’s military and broader security goals. Chinese biotechnology revenues are reported to be of a similar size to those in the United States, although they are subject to even lesser clarity in reporting. While China continues its licit and illicit acquisition efforts targeting the U.S. biotechnology sector, it is also shifting its attention to domestic innovation. In time, this will provide the People’s Liberation Army with new capabilities and increase both America’s and the Pentagon’s reliance on Chinese biotechnology products.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF—Biotech—Updates › Adv-- Leadership › AT no biotech development

Yes biotech development

Rob Carlson 21 - PhD, managing director at Bioeconomy Capital & affiliate professor in the Paul G Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering at the University of Washington "Beyond Biological Defense: Maintaining the U.S. Biotechnology Advantage," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/beyond//AL

The global growth of the sector is likely to accelerate demand for the pro ducts of biotech. New tools, decreasing costs and an expanding skill base imply that more people in more places will have access to more powerful technology (4,30,31). Governments around the globe are grappling with the desire to benefit from biotech-driven economic development, while simultaneously facing questions about who should have access to which technology and under what circumstances. The US government has taken an official position that physical and economic security, in addition to economic and employment growth, are best served by encouraging and embracing open access and innovation in biotech in all contexts, "from cutting-edge academic institutes, to industrial research centers, to private laboratories in basements and garages" (32). This position sets the stage for a necessary refocusing of biosecurity discussions and practices. Relying on biotech to produce economic growth requires support both for research and job creation and for safe and secure use in equal measure. These goals are hampered at present by the lack of data and reporting on biotech as an industry. Addressing these deficiencies in measurement is a necessary first step in accurately quantifying the role of biotech in the economy. The voluntary ignorance resulting from the absence of such data confounds an understanding of national security that surely must include the economic role of biotech in the context of both biological production and natural resources. Consequently, it is important to better discern the impact of underlying technological development on physical and economic security and on the economy as a whole. Biosecurity has typically been interpreted as the physical security of individuals, institutions and the food supply in the context of threats such as toxins and pathogens. These will, of course, continue to be important concerns. Yet governments can no longer limit their concern to the proverbial white powder produced in a state-sponsored lab, a 'cave' in Afghanistan or a garage in Seattle (33). Safeguarding the large and rapidly growing bioeconomy requires embracing a more substantial challenge; it is essential to have a refined and ongoing understanding of what must be secured and from where threats might arise. Economic demand is driving technological proliferation, and the revenue estimates described here must necessarily inform the evolving definition of biosecurity. Alongside the preexisting bioeconomy, we are building a system composed of inherently 'dual-use' engineering technologies that will constitute critical infrastructure for the future economy. Assuming that the revenue and growth estimates above are borne out with improved measurement and analysis, biosecurity is now clearly synonymous with economic security. The focus of biosecurity policy must shift from protecting specific targets from specific threats to securing the bioeconomy as a system that increasingly drives economic growth and employment and, ultimately, enables humans to thrive on a global scale.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF—Biotech—Updates › Adv – innovation › add on -- Democracy !

Democracy solves a laundry list of impacts---economic growth, public goods, alliances, and war---the US is key.

Lee ’18 (Carrie; is an assistant professor at the U.S. Air War College and a Security Fellow with Truman National Security Project. Any views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, Air University, or Truman National Security Project; The Truman Project; September 10th; “Why Democracy Promotion is in the Strategic Interest of the United States”; ; accessed 7/9/19; MSCOTT)

However, reducing the United States’ emphasis on a values-driven foreign policy is wrong, and contrary to the strategic interests of the United States. Democracy promotion in particular serves a key role in safeguarding U.S. interests and promoting global, long-term growth in ways fundamentally compatible with U.S. strategic interests. After all, democracies protect private property in important ways, invest in public goods, are more politically stable, make for more dependable allies, and empirically do not go to war with one another. Ultimately, a world full of democratic governments is safer, more prosperous, and more stable — all states of being that the United States has an interest in promoting.

Democracy guarantees that the public has a stake in its own institutions and government, which leads to investor confidence and growth. Since elected politicians are accountable to property owners and are held in check by an independent judiciary, democracies tend to have better mechanisms for protecting private property than their autocratic counterparts. This makes democracies a particularly attractive type of country for investors — both public and private — because checks and balances make it difficult for the state to nationalize industries. Further, private property rights protected by the legal system encourage entrepreneurship and small business development, both of which are key to a growing and modernizing economy. As a result, democracies tend to be wealthier and more economically stable than their autocratic counterparts. This is fundamentally in the interest of the United States in that both private and public investors have an interest in seeing returns on their investments, thereby potentially making countries less willing to go to war if that would require severing economic ties. Democratic institutions ensure that citizens with both economic and political power are heard.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF—Biotech—Updates › Adv – innovation › add on -- Democracy !

Diplomatic credibility is key to democracy

Burns 20, Goodman Family professor of the practice of diplomacy and international relations, is chair of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Program on Transatlantic Relations, director of the Future of Diplomacy Project, and a co-leader of the American Secretaries of State Project (Nicholas, “The Indispensable Power,” Harvard Magazine,

MY EXPERIENCE in government has also taught me that diplomacy is most effective when it is cemented in American values and the rule of law. That should lead us to stand up for democracy when it is threatened in NATO-allied countries such as Turkey and Hungary, and when human rights are assaulted in Russia and China. When I interviewed former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis a few months ago in Washington, he pointed to this foundational American strength. The United States exercises two great powers in the world, he said. The first is the “power of intimidation,” through our first-class military. But America has a second and more important power—the “power of inspiration” to the rest of the world, reflecting our nation’s democratic founding. A Harvard audience heard a variation of this theme from Winston Churchill in Memorial Hall on September 6, 1943, when he received an honorary doctorate of laws from President James B. Conant. In a lyrical speech entitled, “The Gift of a Common Tongue,” Churchill urged his audience of deans, professors, and dignitaries—and in later remarks in nearby Tercentenary Theatre, more than 6,000 cadets training to go to war—to reject isolationism and accept the mantle of world leadership. At a time when the United States had surpassed the British empire as the most powerful global leader, Churchill’s speech was a metaphorical handing of a baton to the young Americans on the front lines of World War II. “The price of greatness is responsibility,” he said. “One cannot rise to be in many ways the leading community in the civilized world without being involved in its problems, without being convulsed by its agonies and inspired by its causes.” Churchill’s words at Harvard then are as vital and relevant to Americans today. Americans can author a better, more just, and peaceful era if we recall our responsibility to lead and to be a force, through diplomacy, for democratic values in an ever more complex and dangerous world.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF—Biotech—Updates › Adv – innovation › AT biotech not key

Biotech sector is a major pillar of future growth

Rebecca Cons 22, 5-9-2022, "Solvay declares biotech a key pillar of future growth : Biofuels Digest," No Publication, https://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2022/05/09/solvay-declares-biotech-a-key-pillar-of-future-growth//AL

In Brussels, major chemical maker Solvay has declared renewable materials and biotechnology a major pillar of future growth. The company, which reported $10.6 billion in sales last year and is among Europe’s largest chemical producers, says the platform will build on its already leading position in biobased products that includes guar, solvents, and vanillin. Its other growth platforms are battery materials, green hydrogen, and thermoplastic composites. “The sustainable use of renewable resources and biotechnology has gained momentum in the industry and has the potential to help solve some of the most pressing challenges faced by society today,” Solvay CEO Ilham Kadri says in a press statement. “Through our new growth platform, we aim to connect with our partners to reinvent progress, as we have done throughout our 160-year history, playing a key role in the chemical industry’s transition to the bioeconomy and helping to create the sustainable and circular solutions required by society.” Solvay says it will pursue products with applications in agrochemicals, personal care, food and flavors, and advanced materials for transportation and aerospace. The company expects products made using synthetic biology to account for a third of global manufacturing by the end of 2030.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF—Biotech—Updates › Adv – innovation › AT biotech not key

Biotech k2 growth—innovation impact’s every sector of the economy

National Intelligence Council’s Strategic Futures Group 2021, "Office of the Director of National Intelligence," No Publication, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/gt2040-deeper-looks/future-of-biotech//AL

Many forecasts during the past 30 years have anticipated amazing advances in biotech—including cures for disease, eradication of hunger, and the means to transition away from petrochemical dependence—but the story of biotech has been one of incremental gains in food and material production, and medical advances. During the next 20 years, however, biotech is likely to transform a broader range of human experiences. A more multidisciplinary, digital, and data-rich approach to life sciences is accelerating the understanding of and ability to predictably manipulate living matter, although market, regulatory, and normative conditions will moderate the pace and focus of progress. Biotechnology probably will improve many aspects of human existence; however, the pursuit and possible application of these technologies may also create social and economic disruptions and raise numerous ethical questions. BIOSCIENCE POISED TO ACCELERATE Over centuries, our use and manipulation of life processes in agriculture, medicine, and manufacturing have progressed incrementally, punctuated by leaps in understanding brought about by key discoveries, such as Mendelian genetics, Germ Theory, and DNA. These leaps could not have happened without the development and acceptance of novel tools and algorithms for detecting, imaging, and manipulating biological systems. During the next 20 years, a more multidisciplinary and data-intensive approach to life sciences will shift our understanding of and ability to manipulate living matter. Scientists are increasingly treating genetic instructions as a form of computational code and incorporating insights and new tools from the rapidly advancing realm of computational science. These disciplines, combined with cognitive science, nanotechnology, physics, and others, are propelling new leaps in our understanding. It is anticipated that the collective application of these diverse technologies to the life sciences—known as bioconvergence—will accelerate discovery and predictability in biotech design and production. This multidisciplinary approach has made it possible to: Visualize, measure, identify, and manipulate biological systems at molecular scales Treat genetic instructions in DNA, RNA, and amino acids like a language that can be written, edited, and executed with high precision to synthesize useful materials or organisms Collect, digitize, store, and analyze genetic instructions, referred to as genomes, from many thousands of individuals, along with their physical, mental, and health traits to correlate how specific genetic instructions interact with the environment to produce distinct traits Combine complex biological and nonbiological processes, such as bioelectronic interfaces for sensing or stimulating biological systems in support of medicine, agriculture, and manufacturing FACTORS SHAPING BIOTECH’S TRAJECTORY Economic, social, and political factors are likely to influence the pace and focus of biotech research and the availability of products. Increased Investment and Decreasing Cost These economic factors together will be pivotal to future biotech breakthroughs and applications. In 2019, the global bioeconomy, defined as all activity enabled by research and innovation in the life sciences and biotechnology, accounted for about $5 trillion, or nearly 6 percent of global GDP. Based on 10-15 percent annual revenue growth trends, the world bioeconomy could exceed $20 trillion by 2030. A drop in the cost of key enabling technologies could spur application of biotech to a wider set of challenges and potentially democratize aspects of biotech R&D and production, increasing its global accessibility.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF—Biotech—Updates › Impact– Climate

Warming leads to extinction

Kareiva 18, Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al. (Peter, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” Futures, 102)

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (climate change, global freshwater cycle, and ocean acidification) do pose existential risks. This is because of intrinsic positive feedback loops, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all directly connected to the provision of food and water, and shortages of food and water can create conflict and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. Ample clean water is not a luxury—it is essential for human survival. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-guard and produce a true apocalyptic event. Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that runaway climate change, and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF—Biotech—Updates › I/L– Marine

Increasing biotech innovation is key to marine ecosystem conservation and climate resilience

R&R 19 (Revive&Restore, Conservation project that focuses on the genetic rescue of species by partnering with workshops and global experts, “A Call For Biotechnology in Ocean Conservation”, December 5th 2019, , WC-NAS)

This report is the culmination of nine months of research with over 100 experts in ocean ecology, genomics, and biotechnology. It describes how genomic and biotech innovations—including genomic sequencing, biobanking, advanced reproductive technologies, and genetic engineering—can address some of the ocean’s biggest threats—from coral bleaching and overfishing to invasives and island biodiversity—all-the-while complementing traditional conservation and remediation strategies.

To a roomful of scientists, conservationists, and thinkers, Phelan stated that these “genomic technologies in synthetic biology, by-in-large are highly underutilized by the conservation community, especially when it comes to the ocean.”