2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AT: Turkey DA › 2AC – UQ – Thumper – Rafales
Spiros Sideris and Théo Bourgery 7/22, reporters for EURACTIV, a pan-European media network specialized in EU policies, “Paris silent over alleged Macron – Erdogan Rafale talks”, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/paris-silent-over-alleged-macron-erdogan-rafale-talks/ \\SYang
Turkish media has reported that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has expressed interest in acquiring French top-generation Rafales fighter jets in a phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron on 16 July.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AT: Turkey DA › 2AC – UQ – Thumper – F-16s + Swinland
Selcan Hacaoglu, Jordan Fabian, and Jenny Leonard 6/29, journalist for Bloomberg news, White House Correspondent for Bloomberg News, White House reporter for Bloomberg News focusing on international economic issues, “Biden to Discuss With Erdogan the Sale of F-16 Jets to Turkey”, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-29/turkey-seeks-support-in-talks-with-biden-to-buy-f-16-fighters \\SYang
US President Joe Biden and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will discuss the sale of dozens of new F-16 warplanes to modernize Turkey’s fleet on the sidelines of a NATO summit.
The meeting later on Wednesday in Madrid comes after Erdogan dropped his opposition to Swedish and Finnish bids to join NATO, bringing the alliance one step closer to bolstering its eastern front with Russia. That move appears to have won him US backing to strengthen the air force of Turkey, the second-largest military force in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AT: Turkey DA › 2AC – UQ – Thumper – Astana
Melih Altinok 7/21, columnist for the Daily Sabah, Turkish Daily available in English and Arabic, July 21, 2022, “Erdoğan's equilibrium policy is a chance for the world”, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/erdogans-equilibrium-policy-is-a-chance-for-the-world \\SYang
The last summit of the Astana process, which started in 2017 between Ankara, Moscow and Tehran and aims to bring peace to Syria, was held in Iran on July 19. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi met in Tehran.
The summit was more important than ever as it coincided with Russia's military operation in Ukraine. The eyes of the whole world were on the three leaders.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AT: Turkey DA › 2AC – UQ – Losing Now
Ray ’19 [Ashis Ray; writer for the National Herald; 6-27-2019; "Whoever wins Istanbul wins Turkey: Erdogan loses Istanbul but can he rule till 2023?"; National Herald; https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/international/whoever-wins-istanbul-wins-turkey-erdogan-loses-istanbul-but-can-he-rule-till-2023; Accessed 7-21-2022; AW]
For 16 years Erdogan as prime minister, and then president, tightened his grip on Turkish politics, proving forecasters of all hues wrong about his ability to remain in office, including seeing off an attempted coup d’etat in 2016. He, however, suffered a significant setback on 23 June. His party’s candidate in the crucial mayoral election in Istanbul, Turkey’s biggest city, lost to Ekrem Imamoglu. Indeed, the result in a re-run of voting, after Erdogan objected to the original result in March, reconfirmed the first outcome by a much bigger majority. AKP had previously ruled Istanbul for a quarter of a century. Imamoglu prevailed even in religious precincts of the city. His healing touch in a climate of confrontation and divisive politics struck a chord. He united a disparate opposition, including drawing in the secular nationalist Iyi party. Imamoglu can now be deemed to be a powerful alternative to Erdogan in Turkey’s national polity. With the all-important metropolis of Istanbul in the fold, opposition parties will in the foreseeable future control all major urban areas of the country other than Bursa. This means cities which collectively account for a distinctly greater part of Turkey’s GDP. This means the resources AKP had access to and which helped to catapult it to centre stage will in all probability diminish. “Whoever wins Istanbul, wins Turkey,” Erdogan asserted and virtually forced the country’s election board to order a re-poll on the basis of unsubstantiated claims of malpractice. But the bravado backfired. Imamoglu swept the election by the biggest margin in Istanbul’s history for 35 years. In the brief period he administered the city before facing a second ballot, his team uncovered corruption linked to tenders worth US $4 billion awarded to Erdogan’s family. AKP leaders may now also query the seemingly unpopular centralisation of authority triggered by the transition to a presidential system last year. To become mayor of Istanbul is considered to be a potential launchpad to Turkey’s presidency. This was the case with Erdogan. Consequently, the defeat of his former prime minister Binali Yildirim in the contest has given rise to speculation that this could finally be the beginning of the end for Turkey’s embrace of orthodox Islam. Erdogan’s hardline on a wide section of the opposition as a response to the coup may have troubled his people. It has certainly concerned countries in Europe and North America. Turkey possessed a relatively independent judiciary. But thousands of judges were purged after the coup and replaced by pro-Erdogan justices. Besides, all concerned function in an atmosphere of tension. Under Erdogan, Turkey has also sunk like a stone in international human rights and press freedom indexes. But as always, more importantly, an underperforming economy is probably the primary cause of the public’s discontent. Indeed, Turkey’s economic woes could worsen if the United States carry out its threat of economic sanctions because of Ankara placing an order for the Russian S-400 missiles system, despite being a member of the western military alliance North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The opposition in Turkey has been muzzled ever since Erdogan came to power. But Imamoglu’s win could have a cataclysmic effect. A national election is not due until 2023; there’s already talk, though, that Erdogan may not succeed in holding on that long. Indeed, Erdogan’s predecessor as president is about to unveil a breakaway party. That is bound to split the conservative vote.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AT: Turkey DA › 2AC – UQ – Losing Now
Singh 7/21 [Atul Singh; founder, CEO and editor-in-chief of Fair Observer. He has taught political economy at the University of California, Berkeley and been a visiting professor of humanities and social sciences at the Indian Institute of Technology, Gandhinagar; 7-21-2022; "Sultan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Erdonomics is Driving Turkey to Disaster"; Fair Observer; https://www.fairobserver.com/world-leaders-news/sultan-recep-tayyip-erdogans-erdonomics-is-driving-turkey-to-disaster/; Accessed 7-21-2022; AW]
To cut a long story short, the Islamist tide could not be held back by the military dam. Eventually, Erdoğan led them to power. He cut the wings of the military, initiated a rapprochement with the recalcitrant Kurds and made Islamism the new guiding principle of the country, both at home and abroad. Out went Kemalism, in came Erdoğanism. In the early days, this meant moving closer to Europe to avoid yet another military coup and fairly sound management of the economy. As war rages between Russia and Ukraine, the early era of Erdoğan seems a lifetime away. In June, some researchers estimated inflation in Turkey to be 160%, more than twice the official estimate of 79%. The country is also facing a currency crisis. In 2021, the Turkish lira fell by 44% against the dollar. In 2022, the lira is in freefall, the current account deficit (imports minus exports) is rising and the budget deficit (expenditures minus revenues) has reached a record high. Millions of workers, young people and pensioners have fallen below the poverty line, which is set at $1,200 a month for a family of four. While much of the economic pain was inevitable given the global economic downturn, some of it is self-inflicted. By stubbornly insisting on cutting interest rates at a time of soaring inflation, Erdoğan has scored a spectacular own goal. Elections and Revolutions Depend on the Price of Bread The Turkish economy has struggled with its economy long before Erdoğan. With an oversized military, Turkey spent too much on defense. The country has long relied on dollar-denominated debt, which leaves it very exposed to external shocks. As a NATO member and a frontline state against the erstwhile Soviet Union, Turkey was regularly bailed out by the US and institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Like Pakistan, Turkey extracted geopolitical rent from the West and bailouts have been par for the course. Only last year, the IMF doled out $6.3 billion to Turkey. The World This Week: Sultan Erdogan Tightens Grip on Turkey READ MORE Erdoğan has been putting a gun to the head of European leaders to wring some cash out of them. In 2016, the European Commission coughed up over $6.6 billion (€6 billion) for Turkey to host refugees and not disgorge them into the EU member states. Like a good bazaar merchant, Erdoğan has somehow kept the Turkish economy from falling into collapse because the US, the EU, the IMF and NATO all need Turkey for one reason or another. It is too important to fail. Even geopolitical rent and political blackmail have limits. They do not yield infinite amounts of cash or gold. When inflation rises, central banks raise interest rates so that people keep their money in the bank instead of spending them on goods and services or assets. Inflation is a regular feature of the Turkish economy. In the 1980s and 1990s prices soared. Then, the central bank raised interest rates and brought it under control. Erdoğan wants his central bank to keep interest rates low. Some of his key supporters have long been small businessmen who resent high interest rates. Turkish economists privately tell this author that Erdoğan thinks raising interest rates would put a spoke in the wheels of the economy. Like many politicians who want economic growth, Erdoğan wants to print money to achieve it. After all, he is doing what the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank did when they printed money through their policy of quantitative easing. The US and European central banks have since reversed course in the face of rising inflation. Erdoğan has held the fort and pressured his central bank to cut rates instead. This means there is more money sloshing around in the Turkish economy than necessary. With oil, food and commodity prices high thanks to the Russia-Ukraine War, Erdonomics has sent prices soaring even further. Turks are scrambling to get rid of liras as fast as they can. They are buying dollars, properties (prices are up by 182% over the past year), cars, electronics and other consumer goods, and even high-risk volatile assets such as overpriced stocks and cryptocurrencies. Turkey might not be Sri Lanka yet but Erdonomics is causing its economy to collapse. Over the last few years, he has become a de facto sultan. He has built Ak Saray, a pure white palace of 1,000 rooms on 50 acres of Atatürk Forest Farm, after razing Atatürk’s country lodge to the ground. Hagia Sophia is no longer a museum but a mosque. Secular Kemalist Turkey is dead. Istanbul’s elites have been defenestrated. Critics have been castrated. Furthermore Erdoğan has been able to project himself as a key leader of the Muslim world and won much popularity in places like Palestine and Pakistan. Recently, he even changed Turkey’s name to Türkiye. In his 19 years in office, Erdoğan has accomplished a lot. He has changed the nature of the state and the arc of Turkey’s destiny. Yet he is increasingly vulnerable. Turkey may not be Sri Lanka yet but it is in turmoil. Elections and revolutions depend on the price of bread. Erdonomics has set that on fire. At some point, the mob might turn on the sultan.
I realized after cutting this that it was from 2019 (oops) but the warrants are fire.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Aff › Rejecting IR Fails
Michelsen, 21—Department of War Studies, School of Security, King’s College London (Nicholas, “What is a minor international theory? On the limits of ‘Critical International Relations’,” Journal of International Political Theory, Vol 17, Issue 3, 2021, dml)
The problem of synthesis stalks all self-defining Critical approaches to IR. Defining the terms of reference for intellectual dissidence in relation to IR’s ‘disciplinary crisis’, as the poststructuralists did in viewing critique as a function of disciplinary marginality, created conditions ripe for viewing any competitor theory as problematic to the degree that they can be deemed insufficiently minor (Whitehall, 2016). The idea that critique necessitates moving ‘beyond IR’ as an inherently majoritarian project has become a widely expressed trope. The result is that Critical IR theorists now engage in increasingly virulent disagreements over the political and ethical implications of disciplinarity itself. In perpetual abeyance, claimants to Critical IR become hostages to a continuous risk of being exposed as insufficiently pure of the (modernist, racist, colonial, patriarchal, heteronormative, positivist, capitalist) traces of ‘the major literature/discipline’. At the same time, Critical IR scholars who advocate for a disciplinary exit in search of ‘more Critical’ inter-disciplines have found themselves wrestling with the charge of pre-judgement: Since they appear to know what ‘Being Critical’ will look like after de-disciplinarisation, critique takes the form of testing whether other scholars meet these pre-given criteria (Holden, 2006; Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2020).
This stream in contemporary IR scholarship ignores the manners in which minor theories, far from tending towards alliances, are often set to contradictory political and ethical purposes. And that the visions of world politics created by scholars ‘moving beyond’ disciplinary IR can be just as problematic as visions already settled within the discipline. Contemporary political and social movements borrow intellectual resources from various (once or still) minor theoretical traditions in IR to think against a ‘Globalist’ world order, incorporating the Gramscian position that ‘politics is downstream from culture’, the ideal of a transgressive emancipatory identity, and the critique of neo-colonialism (Love, 2017; Nagle 2017). The philosopher Alain De Benoist wrote his manifesto for the New Right in the year 2000 with the aim of challenging the oppressive implications of major international theories, especially Liberalism, borrowing widely from resources of minor intellectual critique (de Benoist and Champetier, 1999). This theory is marginal in disciplinary IR, but influential amongst populist politicians like Putin, Trump, Orban, Salvini and Le Pen, as well as online communities of Race Realists, western chauvinists, and white nationalists. It proposes that Liberalism destroys the autonomy of ethnicities and cultures, and that the history of the west has been one of ongoing cultural as well as political colonialism. De Benoist’s argument is that the project of decolonisation is incomplete, and continues through international aid and UN-led Liberal paternalism.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Aff › No Prior Questions/Root Cause
Rose, 21—editor of Foreign Affairs (Gideon, “Foreign Policy for Pragmatists,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2021, dml)
Theories of history, fundamental beliefs about how the world works, are usually assumed rather than argued and rarely get subjected to serious scrutiny. Yet these general ideas set the parameters for all the specific policy choices an administration makes. Know an administration’s theory of history, and much of the rest is easy to fill in.
There are a lot of possible theories of history, but they tend to fall, like Bush’s and Trump’s, into two main camps: optimistic and pessimistic. Thus, the Clinton administration followed its own version of happy directionality—think of it as Bush with less muscular Christianity. And there have been earlier believers in Trump’s dark and stormy night, as well.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Aff › Integrative Pluralism
Wight, 19—Professor and Chair of Government and International Relations in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Sydney, Australia (Colin, “Bringing the outside in: The limits of theoretical fragmentation and pluralism in IR theory,” Politics, Vol 39, Issue 1, 2019, dml)
Pluralism for the sake of pluralism seems to lead to an incapacitating relativism, or what Yosef Lapid (2003) calls a ‘flabby pluralism’. A better term might be disengaged pluralism. No claim or viewpoint would seem to be invalid, and theorists are free to pursue their own agenda with little or no contact with alternative views. This is a disengaged pluralism because there is no attempt to specify the relationships between theories or to examine one’s own theoretical position in the light of alternative views. The absence of an agreed unity of method would also entail that the standards by which the various theories are to be judged would be internal to the theory (Jackson, 2011; Smith, 2004). This would be a disengaged form of pluralism with each theoretical perspective legitimating its claims solely on its own terms and with little reason to engage in conversations with alternative approaches. It is the kind of pluralism that finds its political expression in apartheid. Despite the intense theoretical debate that followed the ‘third debate’ (Waever’s ‘fourth’), IR now seems to have settled into an uneasy truce based on theoretical pluralism/fragmentation. Indeed, in some respects, the validity of the ‘ism’s’ themselves have been called into question (Lake, 2013). Analytical eclecticism (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010) now seems to be the mantra of the day. The question remains as to whether we simply embrace this fragmentation or attempt to work towards a more coherent view of global processes. My own view is that we should attempt to move towards a position that I will term ‘integrative pluralism’ (Mitchell, 2003). Integrative pluralism is not an attempt to forge competing knowledge claims into one overarching position that subsumes them all. It is not a form of theoretical synthesis (Kratochwil, 2003), nor is it a middle ground that eclectically claims to take the best of various theories to forge them into a ‘grand theory of everything’ (Wendt, 1999). Integrative pluralism accepts and preserves the validity of a wide range of theoretical perspectives and embraces theoretical diversity as a means of providing more comprehensive and multi-dimensional accounts of complex phenomena. This is not a suggestion that a summation of the various theoretical claims will produce a complete account; we could not know when any account was complete. Moreover, engaging in integrative pluralism carries risks, and some theories may not survive. In the course engagement, some theories may ultimately be rejected, and others may undergo substantial change and modification; hence, it is not a form of relativism. Which theories contribute to our overall stock of knowledge and which fall by the wayside, however, is not an issue that can be resolved solely in the heat of metatheoretical debate. The ultimate test of integrative pluralism will be practice, but this is a practice that cannot even begin unless we have some sense of its problems, possibilities and practicality. Current theoretical debate in the discipline does not seem conducive to this discussion and theories seem to function as identity markers within a social system suffused by battles over resources and power. Understanding the different forms of pluralism is essential in terms of opening up space for global voices to enter the IR conversation. If mainstream, mainly Western, dominated IR theory struggles to listen to alternative voices from within its own limited inter-paradigmatic frameworks, then there is little chance that it will be open to non-western voices. In addition, if non-western global voices enter the terrain on the terms already set by the fragmentation of the ‘isms’ then opportunities for serious dialogue will be limited. Given the potential for non-western voices to reconfigure IR theory along new and interesting lines, it would be a disaster if those voices adopted the frameworks that have stymied serious cross theoretical debate thus far. Indeed, the current theoretical landscape that confronts new entrants to the discipline might be one factor that increases their exclusion. Those global voices will have a greater potential of not repeating the mistakes of the past if they have a sophisticated understanding of the structural configuration that has produced ‘isms inertia’. Getting around the current theoretical impasse will require an explanation of how it arises and an account of the limits, problems and potentials of theorising in IR. I suggest four main factors help explain theoretical fragmentation in the discipline. First is ontology. The contemporary international political system is best understood as a complex open system, which displays ‘emergent properties’ and degrees of ‘organised complexity’. Because all human systems have this form, they require a plurality of explanations to deal with phenomena at differing levels, and the complex differentiation of causal mechanisms within levels. Since theory is a process of abstraction, and since we cannot isolate particular mechanism in the manner of some of the natural sciences, then some form of theoretical pluralism is necessary and to be expected. Yet some of the natural sciences face a similar situation and have not regressed into a state of rampant theoretical fragmentation. So, complexity is not a sufficient explanation. Second, is the academic division of labour, which compartmentalises knowledge into zones of expertise, which in turn, structurally impedes the development of interdisciplinary research needed to explain complex systems. Third, is the structure of IR as an academic discipline, which using a framework developed by Richard Whitley (1984), I characterise as a ‘fragmented adhocracy’. Whitley views reputation as the currency of an academic discipline. A fragmented adhocracy is marked by a low degree of reputational interdependency between competing research groups, with few organisational impediments regarding the choice of theoretical framework, research methodology or even core problematic. As a consequence, the research activity within the field proceeds in an arbitrary, incoherent and at times ad hoc manner, with few sustained attempts to integrate new research with the existing configuration of knowledge. In such an intellectual structure, the potential for integrative pluralism is low. The fourth reason, however, is the most important, the most problematic, and I suspect the most difficult to change. This is the issue of epistemology, and in particular disciplinary accounts of its place in the practice of science. My argument here is simple: The way IR currently understands the issue of epistemology, is confused, incorrect and a severe barrier to serious debate across differing theoretical perspectives. I refer here to the widespread view that positivism, postpositivism, rationalism, constructivism, feminism and postmodernism, for example, are epistemological positions. For instance, according to Markus Kornprobst: The deepest and most consequential disagreements in the field are epistemological. Both the so-called ‘third debate’ (Lapid, 1989) between positivists and postpositivists and the ‘communicative stasis’ (Lapid, 2003: 130) that has succeeded it, speak volumes about the divisiveness of assumptions on how to produce knowledge. (Kornprobst, 2009: 87) And for Steve Smith: the key difference between rationalist and reflectivist approaches is that, broadly speaking, rationalist accounts are positivist, whereas reflectivist approaches oppose positivism … for now it is enough to note that the central differences between rationalist and reflectivist accounts are epistemological and methodological, and only secondarily about what the world is like (ontology). (Smith, 2010: 5) This account treats the debate between positivists and postpositivists as a debate between competing epistemologies. This is an error; positivism is not an epistemology but a philosophy of science. Moreover, the idea of a ‘feminist’ epistemology or a postmodern epistemology makes no sense. At best we might talk about feminist methods or postmodern methods. However, to ask of a positivist for example, ‘how do you know X’, and to receive the reply ‘because of positivism’ is not an epistemological position it is a statement of identity. As John Gunnell (1998: 7), argues ‘epistemology, properly construed, is I will maintain a post-hot enterprise contingent on substantive theory and scientific practice’. Yet rarely, if ever, are we told why the differences between positivism and postpositivism are legitimately treated in epistemological terms? Never is it explained why epistemologies cannot be integrated and/or combined; apart that is, from vague allusions to incommensurability (Wight, 1996). This is to misuse and abuse the term epistemology. It is a misuse and abuse of the term because epistemological positions do not operate as the a priori discontinuous and discrete entities this view suggests. I take it as given that the argument about complexity is a given. Likewise, the adverse effects of the academic division of labour in terms of impeding interdisciplinary work are not in doubt. Hence, the article will concentrate on the relationship between current understandings of epistemology and the structure of IR as an academic discipline. These two aspects are mutually reinforcing. Current understandings of epistemology in IR reproduce the disciplinary social structure, and the disciplinary structure reproduces the current understanding of epistemology. Before proceeding, however, a clarification on the issue of science. My position is based on what is known as scientific realism (Psillos, 1999). According to scientific realism, there is no such thing as the scientific method that can be applied in all domains and across all subject matters. Science is not one thing it is many. There is no one scientific method, and each science needs to orientate its methods according to the specifics of its object domain. How we study sub-atomic particles will require different methods to how we study human societies. For the sake of expediency, I will merely define science as the attempt to come to understand and/or explain the chosen object domain through systematic and critical inquiry.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Aff › IR Good---Short
Ettinger, 20—Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University (Aaron, “Scattered and Unsystematic: The Taught Discipline in the Intellectual Life of International Relations,” International Studies Perspectives (2020) 0, 1–24, dml)
Taking teaching seriously as part of the intellectual life of international relations can lead to intellectual renewal and self-reflection for individual professors and for the discipline as a whole. At the individual level, teaching has the ability to catalyze an intellectual renewal in the mind of the individual professor. The intellectual challenges of the classroom can provoke new avenues of research for the instructor. The classroom is a much more permissive intellectual environment than academic publishing. It affords the professor a degree of freedom to explore topics, ideas, and arguments, outside of their research expertise. Making use of the opportunity to teach beyond one’s comfort zone permits thinking out loud, working through ideas, and entanglement in analytical puzzles. Doing so is demanding, and it is much easier to fall back on existing teaching content. But an ambitious teaching agenda can lead to new research questions, new and unexpected intellectual horizons, and better background context for existing expertise. Indeed, there is truth to the aphorism that there is no better way to learn than to teach.
This kind of renewal turns on the “eureka” moment when research ideas flows directly from classroom activities. A more systematic approach to renewal that is less reliant on serendipity begins by asking discipline-wide questions. The first is this: what is the purpose of teaching international relations? It is a variation on a core concern to the discipline and one that remains unresolved (Dyvik, Wilkinson, and Selby 2017)? Is it for disciplinary self-reproduction, to train future practitioners, or more broadly, citizens and knowledge workers in the twenty-first century economy (Darling and Foster 2012; Szarejko and Carnes 2018; Zartner et al. 2018)? Arriving at an official “purpose” for international relations is probably pointless, and it is best left to the decentralized community of scholars to decide. IR scholars have debated this question widely within the published discipline but far less so in the taught discipline. This is a shame because the answers matter for the nature of the design of individual courses and entire degree programs.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Aff › IR Good---Long
Ettinger, 20—Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University (Aaron, “Scattered and Unsystematic: The Taught Discipline in the Intellectual Life of International Relations,” International Studies Perspectives (2020) 0, 1–24, dml)
The first benefit is generating a well-trained pipeline of future IR scholars and practitioners. Today’s students are the scholars and practitioners of tomorrow, and sparking curiosity in students, especially undergraduates, has the potential to rejuvenate the field from within. As Hagmann and Biersteker (2014, 292–293) argue, IR scholars should “take a more direct interest in how world politics is explained to students in everyday schooling practices.” This is eminently sensible. International relations’ preoccupation with “the cult of research intensivity” (Nossal 2006, 737), and to a lesser extent political practice, misleads the professoriate into believing that the very people who sustain universities as institutions and who are the future of the discipline—student subscribers—can be ignored. It has also led the IR professoriate to undervalue the contribution that the taught discipline makes to disciplinary renewal through the training of international relations’ next generation.
For future practitioners, whether in government or elsewhere, an IR education provides the conceptual architecture needed to make decisions about policy and its place in the world. In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger emphasizes this point: “The convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office. There is little time for leaders to reflect” (as quoted in Desch 2019, 153). While Kissinger is talking about the highest level of elected office, it is equally true that policymakers throughout government come in equipped with the intellectual capital and technical skills learned in the classroom (Biswas and Paczynska 2015). For future scholars, early lessons have downstream effects on the very content of IR knowledge. After all, the classroom is where IR theory gets reproduced “for the first time” to future generations of IR scholars. As Newsom (1995, 64–65) put it, “[t]eachers plant the seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world’s most lasting contribution.” It is also a place where the durability and centrality of the field’s major theories are reinforced as a matter of course and not necessarily for the better (Vitalis 2015, 6). Early undergraduates carry the assumptions they are taught throughout their undergraduate and graduate careers, and beyond. A discipline that cannot connect with students or is inward-looking and esoteric risks putting off its next generation. Thus, the classroom needs to be treated with greater regard as a site of knowledge production and dissemination in the intellectual life of the field. In this sense, curiosity can be provoked among students that may continue beyond an undergraduate career. Take, for example, the observation of one student on her intellectual awakening in the classroom:
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Aff › Critiquing Western Scholarship Fails
Vickers, 20—Professor of Comparative Education at Kyushu University (Edward, “Critiquing coloniality, ‘epistemic violence’ and western hegemony in comparative education – the dangers of ahistoricism and positionality,” Comparative Education, 56:2, 165-189, dml) [gendered language modifications denoted by brackets]
The central flaw in the argument advanced by the CER authors stems from an apparent lack of awareness of contemporary scholarship on the comparative history of imperialism and colonialism. Criticism of the Eurocentric assumptions that inform much mainstream social science is certainly warranted, as is critique of the excessive influence exerted by institutions such as key journals based in North America or Europe. However, when critical arguments rely on selective and historically flimsy claims for the uniquely colonial quality of modern Western culture, the risks are twofold: firstly, and fundamentally, actually to sustain or reinforce Eurocentrism by deflecting the critical gaze from non-Western societies and the patterns of oppression (‘colonial’ or otherwise) therein; and secondly, by the same token to weaken or discredit the case for a more inclusive and culturally sensitive approach to the comparative analysis of education.
The empirical and theoretical flaws of this approach are intertwined with the problematic language in which its arguments are typically couched. Historical and anthropological scholarship on East Asia and other regions amply demonstrates that colonialist or neo-colonialist attitudes and strategies of domination are not and have never been a Western monopoly. But decolonial theory posits the more or less uniform victimhood of non-Western ‘others,’ deriving claims for the moral superiority of ‘authentically’ indigenous perspectives. Debating the validity of such claims is complicated by an emphasis on ‘positionality.’ Readers are exhorted to judge an argument less by standards of evidence or logic (often portrayed as camouflaging a Western ‘will to power’) than on the basis of the writer’s self-identification or ‘positioning.’ The language of ‘epistemic violence,’ ‘secure spaces,’ ‘epistemological diffidence,’ ‘border thinking’ and ‘location’ suggests an image of the critical scholar as revolutionary guerrilla, valiantly sniping at Western hegemony from his or her [their] marginal redoubt. In so far as this reflects a desire for a more just, tolerant and sustainable society – one that values diversity as a resource for mutual learning – it is admirable. However, if we seek to combat oppression, in the educational sphere or beyond, it is incumbent on us to pick our enemies, and our language, carefully. Aiming a blunderbuss at the supposedly illegitimate or self-serving ‘universalism’ of ‘modern Western social science,’ while ignoring how calls for indigenisation and ‘authenticity’ are used to legitimate highly oppressive regimes across Asia and elsewhere, is to risk undermining those universal social and political values (freedom of expression, civil liberties, rule of law) upon which critical scholars themselves rely.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › US Lead Good
Weinrod 16 - Former Secretary of Defense Representative Europe and Defense Advisor to the U.S. Mission NATO (W Bruce, “We Still Need NATO,” The American Interest, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/01/15/we-still-need-nato/)
Not only does NATO remain relevant, but more importantly it continues to support and advance U.S. security interests—though again, often in ways that do not make headlines and that casual observers rarely appreciate in full. Most fundamentally, NATO provides a standing multilateral military capability that can deter or be deployed should a significant security threat arise. Because NATO has a military capability in place, the core elements for mobilization, deployment, and sustainment of substantial multilateral military forces already exist. The ongoing training, exercises, and regular communication among the national militaries of NATO members allows them to jump-start preparations and actions when needed without very lengthy preparatory work. This can allow the U.S. government to proceed in shaping and leading military coalitions more quickly, at less cost and with greater effectiveness, than if NATO did not exist and its functional equivalent had to be invented from scratch at a moment’s notice. While the U.S. government retains the capacity and the right to act unilaterally if and when necessary, it makes sense for it to act with others whenever possible, whether through NATO or ad hoc coalitions of the willing. A multilateral framework can provide both political cover and military resources, and the United States very much can benefit from both. The United States also benefits significantly from NATO’s logistics capabilities. Pontificating about grand strategies sounds impressive, but for military effectiveness and success, logistics capabilities are what really count. For example, while NATO did not formally participate in the 1991 Gulf War, NATO resources, supplies, bases, and other infrastructure provided crucial support prior to and during the U.S.-led coalition military action to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. The coalition in effect borrowed NATO capacities already in existence, and benefitted greatly from equipment compatibility and common training and resources. Other coalitions of the willing assembled under U.S auspices and utilizing NATO resources can follow the same approach. In addition, the U.S. government has access to the numerous military facilities and resources that member nations make available to NATO. A good example is Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, now being used against ISIS in what is not a formal NATO operation. As importantly, working through NATO usually makes it relatively routine for host governments to agree to U.S. requests to use facilities within their territory for military-related purposes. Without NATO, in order to fulfill its security responsibilities, the U.S. government would need to develop and maintain a complex network of bilateral and multilateral security agreements and arrangements that would seek to maintain the kind of connectivity and flexibility that NATO already provides. Further, the U.S. government would need not only agreements to access such military facilities but also would likely need to obtain specific approval from the host nation for each use and perhaps even in some cases legislative approval. In general, it is much simpler, faster, and easier politically and otherwise for nations to grant the United States the use of their facilities within a NATO framework than it would be to have to grant permission to the United States on their own. Over recent decades NATO has, as noted above, developed a global security network that reflects formalized relationships with non-NATO nations. For the United States, this brings the advantage that it can work through NATO to develop or enhance security relationships with states that belong to the PFP, the MD, the ICI, and NATO bilateral security relationships. Working through NATO provides an extra dimension to U.S. efforts to enhance the military capacities of friends and allies in various regions who, with training and assistance, can provide supplementary support to NATO or U.S.-led operations. NATO also supports U.S. interests by providing a multilateral framework for a U.S. presence in nations where the U.S. government wishes to help train and also enhance its military contacts, but where unilateral U.S. military involvement might be politically contentious.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 2AC AT: Burden Sharing
Kupochan 2019 - Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
Charles, "NATO Is Thriving in Spite of Trump," Mar 20, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-20/nato-thriving-spite-trump
Support on the other side of the Atlantic is similarly strong. Around two-thirds of Europeans approve of the alliance. Most European democracies not yet members of NATO are clamoring to get in.Confidence in U.S. leadership may have plummeted, but Europeans still want their security guarantor to stay put. Furthermore, European member states are finally taking steps to increase defense spending. Twenty-four of NATO’s 29 members increased their defense budgets in 2018, and nine NATO members will this year reach the NATO benchmark of spending two percent of GDP on defense—compared with just four members in 2014. A majority of members are on track to meet this benchmark by the target date of 2024 set at the 2014 summit.
Even Trump is applauding Europe for raising its military spending, noting in his February State of the Union that “we have secured a $100 billion dollar increase in defense spending from NATO allies.” The uptick in spending actually began before Trump was elected—the product of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the 2014 summit at which the two percent benchmark was formalized. Nonetheless, if letting Trump take credit for convincing Europeans to invest more in defense improves his view of the alliance, then let’s by all means indulge him.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 2AC AT: Burden Sharing
Kupochan 2019 - Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
Charles, "NATO Is Thriving in Spite of Trump," Mar 20, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-20/nato-thriving-spite-trump
Trump’s diatribes are not the only cause of the unease. A broadening chorus of realist strategists claims that the United States is overdue for a major strategic retrenchment and that it is past time for Europe to tend its own garden. Even staunch defenders of NATO express doubts about its future. Some worry that the growing U.S. preoccupation with East Asia will lure the United States away from its Atlantic calling and generate transatlantic tensions over how to deal with the rise of China. Others fear that democratic backsliding among members is compromising the alliance’s values-based solidarity. Close NATO watchers are concerned that EU efforts to more deeply integrate European foreign and defense policy could ultimately weaken the Atlantic link. And debate rages on both sides of the Atlantic as to whether NATO enlargement has enhanced or eroded European stability and whether to continue expansion despite the costs to the West’s relationship with Russia.
These worries are unwarranted: NATO at 70 is actually in remarkably good shape. Yes, European allies have been laggards on defense spending, and some members—Hungary, Poland, and Turkey in particular—have tarnished democratic credentials. But NATO has demonstrated an impressive ability to adapt to the changing geopolitical environment since the Cold War’s end, ensuring that the United States and Europe remain each other’s go-to partners. The alliance opened its doors to the new democracies that emerged from the former Soviet bloc, helping to anchor security and democracy in a wider Europe. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, members have taken important steps to strengthen deterrence against the Kremlin’s adventurism. NATO has struck partnerships across the globe and carried out ambitious missions well beyond the territory of member states—most notably in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya. All the while, the alliance has retooled to address new hazards such as cyberthreats, terrorism, hybrid warfare, and migration. Precisely because NATO has been so nimble and effective, it enjoys strong political support on both sides of the Atlantic, leaving Trump virtually alone as a vociferous critic.
2022
Michigan
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Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › AT: NATO can survive without the US
NYT 2018 - Editorial Board
"Why NATO Matters," Jul 8, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/opinion/editorials/why-nato-matters.html
Across seven decades NATO has invoked its Article 5 mutual defense commitment only once: to rally to the defense of the United States after the attacks of 9/11. Even today, the armed forces of 39 countries are serving, and sometimes dying, with American troops in Afghanistan.
More than 70 (NATO and non-NATO) countries are part of the U.S.-led fight against the Islamic State; two dozen countries have joined a global counterterrorism initiative.
2022
Michigan
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Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 2AC – European Populism
Drezner 17 – PhD, Professor of Int’l Politics (Dan, “The Angry Populist as Foreign Policy Leader: Real Change or Just Hot Air?, 41 Fletcher F. World Aff. 23, Lexis)
Leaders who rise to power in lower-probability scenarios are also likely to have a greater appetite for risk in foreign affairs. This matters, as Jeff Colgan notes: "risk tolerance leads to aggression in international affairs because it increases the perceived payoff of risky gambles." 17 Populist leaders more closely resemble revolutionaries than more established politicians. And as Colgan warns, "the ambition of revolutionary leaders also contributes to aggression. Ambition makes it more likely that a leader will reject the status quo internationally as well as domestically." 18 We can see this kind of ambition on display among elected populists. Hugo Chávez [*30] persistently proposed radical alternatives to the Washington Consensus. One longtime friend of Viktor Orbán noted, "he has always wanted to upset the status quo, to become a change-maker." 19 Orbán himself, in a meeting with Polish Law and Justice Party head Jaroslaw Kaczynski, proposed a "cultural counter-revolution" in Europe. 20 Donald Trump's inaugural address categorically rejected the postwar liberal order, arguing in favor of an "America First" approach to international relations. Populists are therefore more likely to pursue high-risk, revisionist foreign policies. Populist leaders also care about recognition by others, and will be quick to anger if that recognition is not forthcoming. Populists build their legitimacy on their support from "their" people, but part of that support comes from displays of dominance over others. Russian president Vladimir Putin is well-known for his over-the-top efforts to look strong and powerful. These range from his shirtless photos to videos of him weightlifting to scoring eight goals in an exhibition game with former NHL All-Stars. 21 In Erdogan's first two years as Turkey's president, the government has prosecuted more than 1,800 cases of Turkish citizens insulting him--including a former Miss Turkey. 22 Donald Trump has insulted anyone who has criticized him since he started running for president, ranging from erstwhile GOP rivals to federal judges to media outlets to a former Miss Universe to Meryl Streep. When dealing with domestic rivals and critics, such displays of dominance are an easy strategy for elected leaders to pursue. Populist leaders engage in such behavior to project their strength and mastery over the political fates. It is tricky to do this on the international stage, however. Populist leaders will therefore be more concerned than most politicians about the personal respect afforded to them by others. At the international level, this leads to one of two outcomes: recognition by other heads of state, or a denunciation of leaders who fail to confer such recognition. If populists cannot exploit the respect conferred by others, they will be quick to reject and delegitimize the leaders who spurn them. We can see this kind of pattern at work in how populist leaders have reacted to setbacks on the global stage. Vladimir Putin began his tenure in office with a much warmer attitude towards the West. During the first decade of this century, however, Putin lost an ally during Ukraine's Orange Revolution, and witnessed NATO expanding to Russia's borders. It was at this point that Putin began adopting a more hostile attitude towards the West. After President Obama cancelled a meeting with Duterte, the Filipino president responded with a series of tirades insulting the American president. 23 In Trump's first week as president, he faced pushback from the [*31] Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto on his policies for the southern border. In response, Trump tweeted that Peña Nieto should not bother coming to Washington. The Mexican president responded by canceling his visit. Populists do not possess a monopoly on anger in politics, but most populists tend to project anger as part of their leadership style. Based on their pathway to power and their philosophy of governance, it should not be surprising that they are commonly associated with that emotion. As previously noted, populist parties do particularly well after financial crises. They are adept at exploiting the (often justified) anger that voters possess towards authorities that were in charge when the crisis happened. Former UKIP leader Nigel Farage warned of "political anger" if the United Kingdom did not follow through on Brexit. In a press conference blasting the United States, Duterte said, "If you Americans are angry with me, then I am also angry with you." 24 During one of the GOP primary debates, Donald Trump explicitly stated, "I will gladly accept the mantle of anger." Trump famously refuses to apologize when he makes controversial or problematic statements. 25 Numerous press reports suggest that Trump lost his temper with the Australian prime minister in their first phone conversation. This wave of populist anger reverses a centuries-long western effort to contain that emotion in international relations. 26 Recent scholarship on emotions in world politics suggest that sustained levels of anger carry risks in world politics. Anger was valorized in societies with strong honor cultures and warrior castes, biologically conditioning citizens towards that feeling. Furthermore, as Neta Crawford notes, "threats that evoke anger (if they are associated with perceived insults) tend to decrease the perception of a threat and simultaneously heighten risk-taking behaviors on the part of those who feel angry." 27 This is particularly true if populist leaders find ways to institutionalize anger and resentment through new laws, executive orders, or bureaucratic structures. This tendency towards angry rhetoric can be exaggerated through misperception and mistranslation. Conventional foreign policy leaders are prepped to stay within the lanes of "accepted" diplomatic discourse, so that observers can detect subtle shifts in phrasing as a foreign policy signal. In contrast, populists scorn diplomatic language as exercises in sophistry and hypocrisy. They rely on language designed to appeal to their base, which increases the likelihood that outside observers misconstrue their words. Angry tirades from leaders like Trump, Duterte, or Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have been mistranslated--and usually in a direction that [*32] paints the leader as more bellicose than intended. 28 Populist leaders will be reluctant to correct such misperceptions, because that would require them to engage in the diplomatic discourse they have derided. Displays of righteous indignation might play well with a populist leader's domestic base. The international effect of angry outbursts, however, is to narrow the zone of cooperation between countries. If a leader unleashes an angry tirade against another country, that is sure to gain considerable public attention in both nations. This automatically raises the "audience costs" for both leaders. The larger the audience that is paying attention to any dispute, the greater the political costs a leader can suffer if they back down in that dispute. 29 Displays of temper make it harder for the populist to compromise, but it will also make it more politically difficult for the object of the tirade to make any concessions. Through effects on leaders and populations, provocations make negotiations more costly and conflict escalation more likely. 30 Perhaps the most important intellectual trait that populist leaders share is their tendency to think like hedgehogs. According to the classical Greek poet Archilochus, "a fox knows many things, but a hedgehog one important thing." Isaiah Berlin popularized that quote, arguing that intellectuals could be divided into foxes and hedgehogs. This works for decision-makers as well. Foxes will possess the necessary metacognition to adapt to new facts and new circumstances; hedgehogs will rely on their core beliefs, fitting the world into their preexisting worldview. 31 Populists are hedgehogs: the one big thing that they know is to reject the elites and technocrats who heretofore governed their country. As Philip Tetlock observed more than a decade ago, foxes and hedgehogs have different strengths when it comes to thinking about the world. 32 Foxes are much better than hedgehogs in their predictive accuracy about world events; simply put, foxes are better at incorporating new information and updating how they think about the world. Hedgehogs are better than foxes at anticipating big and unexpected events happening in the world, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the 2008 financial crisis. Anticipating those events requires an assuredness about the way the world works that hedgehogs are more likely to possess. The effects of these different intellectual styles on foreign policy are straightforward. As hedgehogs, populists are more likely to have their expectations confounded in world politics. At the same time, populist foreign policy leaders will face psychological and domestic political barriers to admitting error or reversing a failing policy. Any public recognition of a misstep demonstrates a leader's fallibility--which is problematic for leaders [*33] who claim that they can divine the general will of the people. At the same time, as hedgehogs, populists will be reluctant to take any action that deviates from the way that they think the world works. Stepping back, we can proffer some tentative predictions of how populist foreign policy leaders will behave in the coming years. Populist foreign policy leaders are likely to reject the pre-existing liberal international order and espouse a strong form of ethnic nationalism. They might try to create alternative international arrangements to the status quo, but these efforts are likely to be Potemkin efforts, with more pomp and circumstance than substance. Populist leaders will have greater appetites for risk and ambition on the global stage. These heads of state will crave recognition from their fellow world leaders, and be quick to anger if they are spurned in this area. These displays of anger could become institutionalized and will increase the audience costs of all the involved actors, making cooperation less likely. And populists are less likely to correctly perceive how the world works, and more likely to hold firm with policies that are not viewed as working terribly well. One disturbing conclusion to draw from this particular constellation of traits is that populist leaders are more likely to foment international crises. Breaking with pre-existing global governance structures can guarantee a crisis escalation. An international crisis can trigger rally-round-the flag effects within the domestic population and make it easier for a leader to suppress domestic dissent. At the extreme, one could envision populists threatening or launching diversionary wars to appeal to a nationalist base in times of trouble. Vladimir Putin employed this tactic. In early 2014, he was still reeling from protests over his return to the Russian presidency, and a slowdown in the Russian economy. He responded by annexing the Crimea after the fall of his ally in Ukraine, and bankrolling a secessionist conflict in Eastern Ukraine. These efforts caused his public support to skyrocket even though the Russian economy contracted in 2014 and 2015. It should be stressed that these are all probabilistic statements. Many of these traits are hardly unique to populists; other heads of state are likely to display some subset of these leadership traits. Still, this combination of [*34] attributes suggest that the world is experiencing an increase in the number of revisionist, risky, and violent actions in world politics.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 2AC – European Populism
Youngs 17 - Senior fellow in the democracy and rule of law program at Carnegie Europe. [Richard, 6/15/17, Politico, “Europe’s defense fund ignores real threat: populism”, ]
The European Union’s recently launched defense fund has been widely praised as a long-overdue step toward defense autonomy, a real game-changer at a time when the United States has become an increasingly unreliable ally on security issues.
These steps toward a so-called security union and common defense policies were even hailed by some EU leaders as the key to injecting fresh momentum into the European project after a decade of crises.
2022
Michigan
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Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 2AC – European Populism
Trofimov 19 - Columnist and Senior Correspondent, The Wall Street Journal [Yaroslav, Jan 4th, Wall Street Journal, “Is Europe Ready to Defend Itself?”, ]
The new Republican administration in Washington issued a blunt warning: Unless Europe quickly set up its own unified army, the U.S. would be compelled to undertake an “agonizing reappraisal” of its commitment to defend its European allies.
The year was 1953, and the main target of American ire was France, whose delay in ratifying the European Defense Community treaty, signed the previous year, meant that preparations for a federal European army had to be paused. But the pressure applied by the Eisenhower administration backfired spectacularly: A joyous choir of French lawmakers broke into the “Marseillaise” when France’s parliament finally rejected the treaty in August 1954. The idea of a joint European defense policy was shelved for decades.
2022
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Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 2AC – Balkans
Loren B. Thompson, 7-20-2016 - Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, taught at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.; “Why The Baltic States Are Where Nuclear War Is Most Likely To Begin," National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-baltic-states-are-where-nuclear-war-most-likely-17044?page=2
However, the possibility of nuclear war between America and Russia not only still exists, but is probably growing. And the place where it is most likely to begin is in a future military confrontation over three small Baltic states -- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Since those nations and several other Eastern European states joined NATO in 2004, the United States has been committed to defending their freedom and territorial integrity under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Because NATO from its inception was aimed at containing the expansion of a nuclear country -- Russia -- a vital part of the U.S. security commitment to Europe consists of Washington's willingness to use its nuclear arsenal in defense of allies. The formal name for that strategy is "extended deterrence," and since 2004 it has included the Baltic states. Simply stated, the United States seeks to deter aggression or blackmail against NATO allies from a nuclear-armed Russia by threatening to use atomic weapons.
2022
Michigan
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Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 2AC – Balkans
Wilson 15 – MPA @ Princeton, American foreign policy advisor and the current executive vice president at the Atlantic Council of the United States, Deputy Director of the Private Office of the NATO Secretary General, decorated by the Presidents of Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Poland for his efforts to advance transatlantic relations (Damon, “A Transatlantic Strategy to Deter Putin’s Aggression,” US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation, Lexis)
This crisis began long before Crimea. Indeed, Russia's annexation of Crimea was the natural outcome of a clear, consistent policy dating back years. I detail this record in my full testimony. Second, Putin will not stop until he encounters serious pushback. Third, only the United States can galvanize Europe and the international community around an effective strategy to deter Putin for the long term. Fourth, any strategy should urgently and decisively back Ukraine, as well as other vulnerable states with significant economic and military assistance in the short term, while keeping the door open to the European Union or NATO. And fifth, we should neither abandon the Russian people nor the vision that a democratic Russia one day can find its peaceful place within a Europe whole and free. Putin's strategy has been to use this crisis to consolidate his own hold at home through greater oppression of civil society and independent media even as he fuels nationalist fervor. He has created an environment of fear and intimidation fostering the circumstances that led to the assassination of Boris Nemtsov. Putin, of course, is also seeking to dominate his neighbors, to drain them of resources to fuel his kleptocracy, and to restore a sense of Russia's greatness in the only way a bully knows. He aims to prevent his neighbors from joining either NATO or the EU, achieving this through coercion when possible and by dismemberment and occupation when necessary. Ultimately Putin knows that the best check on his power is a united transatlantic community, and he has sought to divide Europe, undermining the resolve for sustained sanctions. But the most tempting objective for Putin is to call into question the credibility of NATO's Article 5 mutual defense commitment as doing so would effectively end NATO. A Russian move against an ally, such as a Baltic State, cannot be ruled out. Putin has demonstrated time and again that if he senses an opportunity to act he will, convinced that the West lacks the will or the ability to take decisive action. That is why today's situation is dangerous. We have seen repeatedly that Putin's objectives expand with success and contract with failure. This means that the best determinant of his action is Western action. There is a tendency, however, to argue that the Europeans should take the lead on Ukraine. After all, we have our hands full with ISIS and other global responsibilities. But the Ukraine crisis is a Russia crisis, and Russia is too big, too strong, and too scary for Europe to resolve this without us. Without U.S. leadership, Europe may feel forced to accommodate a revanchist Russia, and we have seen throughout history this is a dangerous formula. The United States has the ability to rally its allies and international partners around a comprehensive strategy that not only deters Putin's aggression, but avoids an unstable gray zone in Europe East. To do so, we should begin by articulating what we want to achieve. We should more decisively increase the cost to Russia, including by enacting sectorial sanctions and targeting Gazprom and Putin directly.