2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—LIO Turn
McTague, 22 [Tom McTague, staff writer at the Atlantic, 3-24-2022, The Atlantic, ‘Biden Can’t Paper Over the West’s Disunity’, /alundy]
Ideological incoherence is the main threat to the Western alliance, but a close second can be found in the West’s imperial center—the U.S. And here, again, we return to Trump. The essence of his complaint about Europe was not simply that it was not contributing enough; it was that he didn’t really believe in the U.S.-led order itself. Trump believed the whole structure was unfair to the U.S.: Why should it shoulder most of the burden of policing the world? But the thing with orders—liberal, “rules-based,” or any other—is that they need ordering, and this is the job of the hegemon. Burdens can be better shared, and Europe can do more to free America for its contest with China, but ultimately the U.S. either guarantees European security or it doesn’t.
Biden will undoubtedly speak a familiar language to European leaders—one of liberal values and the defense of democracy, and that will be comforting to them. But the question that nevertheless troubles European politicians, diplomats, and officials is whether instead of Trump being an eccentric one-off, his instinctive antagonism to the obligations of global leadership represents a trend in American public opinion more generally. The question that follows is whether the U.S. has the political will to be the hegemonic power it has been since the end of the Second World War, the basis on which the Western world functions.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—Econ Turn—Europe K2 Global Econ
Dadush, 10 [Uri Dadush, PhD, Business Economics, Harvard University, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focuses on trends in the global economy and is currently tracking developments in the eurozone crisis, 6-2-2010, ‘The Euro Crisis: A Threat to the US Economy’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2010/06/02/euro-crisis-threat-to-u.s.-economy-pub-40887]
The trade and investment links between the United States and the European Union (EU) are significant. Europe consumes twenty percent of U.S. exports and holds more than 50 percent of U.S. overseas assets, while the United States holds close to 40 percent of Europe’s foreign assets. Lower growth and higher volatility in Europe could therefore have serious consequences for the United States, hindering export growth and endangering assets. Europe has already shown itself to be the laggard in the global recovery—in the first quarter, European GDP was up only 0.3 percent (y/y), compared to 2.5 percent in the United States and 11.9 percent in China—and the situation may well get worse before it gets better.
IMGXYZ5032IMGZYXThe crisis will likely lead the euro to depreciate further in the coming months. The euro has already fallen more than 20 percent against the dollar since late November—two months before Obama unveiled his goal of doubling exports in the next five years—and it may fall to parity. In sectors where U.S. and European exports overlap (e.g., aircraft, machinery, professional services), a lower euro will hinder the competitiveness of U.S. goods on the global market. The depreciation will also reduce the purchasing power of European tourists traveling to the United States and make European goods relatively cheaper in U.S. markets at a time when policy makers are hoping to avoid a return to high current account deficits. With imports likely to rise and exports likely to fall, the U.S. bilateral trade balance with Europe will likely deteriorate. By definition, the profitability of U.S. companies operating in Europe will be affected by the Euro crisis when profits and assets on the balance sheets are expressed in dollars. U.S. companies selling in Europe and sourcing in dollars will see even sharper profit declines, though U.S. companies selling into the dollar area and sourcing in Europe will benefit.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—Econ Turn—Europe K2 Global Econ
Collignon, 12 [Stefan Collignon, professor of political economy at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, founder of the Asia Forum, and the London School of Economics, UK, taught at Harvard University and Hamburg University, Deputy Director General for Europe in the German Federal Ministry for Finance, 7-2012, ‘Europe’s Debt Crisis, Coordination Failure, and International Effects’, ADBI Institute, /alundy]
The European debt crisis started as a small local policy shock in Greece, but it has come to threaten the survival of the euro with potentially far reaching consequences for the world economy. Since December 2011 financial markets have stabilized somewhat, but fundamental issues remain unsolved. This crisis is due partly to fundamental economic developments, such as growth and competitiveness, and partly to uncooperative behavior between the main policy makers in Europe. One of the paradoxes of this crisis is that, despite all its problems, the euro has remained relatively firm in its internal (inflation) and external value (exchange rate). Financial markets may be concerned with some parts of the euro area, mainly in the south, but they still see the euro as a major currency in the world. However, the euro will only maintain this role if European governments can get the sovereign debt crisis under control. Whatever the ultimate conclusion of the drama, the experience has shown that Europe needs a much tighter form of economic governance if it wants to live up to the ambition of providing the world's alternative reserve currency. While a series of events has progressively deepened the European debt crisis, it is important to distinguish between sudden shocks and underlying fundamental problems in Europe’s economic governance. Their interaction has been the specific flavor of this crisis. There are two views to the European debt crisis. For the “fundamentalists”, the debt crisis is caused by the lack of discipline in sticking to the principles of “a sound and competitive macroeconomic base and solid public finance” (Weidmann 2001). Hence, the remedy is to implement “painful reforms” and consolidate budgets, which would rebuild trust and confidence in financial markets (Issing 2009). For the “monetarists”, the European debt crisis is a liquidity crisis. A small local liquidity shock causes a sudden deterioration in a specific class of asset values, can cause a global systemic financial crisis when the need for liquidity spills over to banks that then get distressed because the deteriorating asset prices put their balance sheets into difficulties and reduce bank capital (Chacko et al. 2011). In this case, a crisis can be stopped by a lender of last resort that provides the necessary liquidity and stops the crisis from turning into a default avalanche.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—Econ Turn—Kills Growth
Muhammad Azam 20, Department of Economics, Faculty of Business & Economics, Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan, 12/28/2020, “Does military spending stifle economic growth? The empirical evidence from non-OECD countries,” Heliyon, 6(12), , RH
Undeniably, peace and long-term sustainable economic development are the prime agenda of all countries. This study aims to empirically evaluate the impact of military spending on economic growth for a panel of 35 non-OECD countries over 1988–2019. A multivariate regression model based on the augmented production function is used to achieve the objective of the study. The panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL)/pooled mean group (PMG) technique is employed, while, in addition the robust least squares and fixed-effect estimators are implemented for the robustness of the results. This study found a clear negative effect of military spending on economic growth. The pairwise Dumitrescu Hurlin panel causality test results exhibit bi-directional causality between military expenses and economic growth. Overall, these estimates provide strong support that military expenditure is not beneficial rather detrimental to economic growth. The empirical findings of this study suggest that policymakers need to redesign the military budget to stimulate economic growth and improve social welfare.
The assessment of the economic and social effects of military expenditure remains an interesting desirable area of research. The ultimate objectives of underdeveloped and developed countries are to achieve sustainable economic growth and prosperity in the long-run. There is a substantial volume of literature about the economic consequences of military expenditure; however, no consensus has been developed, whether military spending is beneficial or detrimental to economic growth. Military spending according to the Keynesian approach is a component of government consumption, which stimulates economic growth by expanding demand for goods and services. Military spending affects economic growth through many channels. When aggregate demand is lower relative to prospective supply, rises in military spending tend to enlarge capacity utilization, raise profits, and consequently, enhance investment and aggregate output (). Several prior studies have drawn findings that support the Keynesian military view of the positive influence of military expenditure on national output (; ; ). In a study conducted by , it is ascertained that military spending has several positive effects on capital, labor, growth, and the effectual use of available resources in the economy as a whole.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—Populism Turn—Populism Low
Meyer ’22 [Brett; 6 Jan; Research Fellow; Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, “A Playbook Against Populism? Populist Leadership in Decline in 2021,” https://institute.global/policy/playbook-against-populism-populist-leadership-decline-2021]
In our annual update to our Populists in Power database, we find that the number of populist leaders in power at the beginning of 2022 is down from 17 at the beginning of 2021 to 13 – the lowest since 2004. Three of the four populist leaders who lost power were less ideological anti-establishment populists, meaning that the remaining populists are almost all culturally right wing.
Two common factors appear to have contributed to this significant fall in the number of populist leaders. First, the pandemic may have reminded the public of the importance of seriousness and expertise in policymaking. Countries with populist leaders around the world had higher Covid-19 case and death rates than those without populist leaders, and populist leaders in Europe have seen a sustained dip in their polling popularity relative to more conventional parties throughout the pandemic.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—Populism Turn—Burden Sharing Causes Populsim
Henke 21 [Marina Henke; 17/2/21; Professor of International Relations at the Hertie School and Northwestern University, focuses on military interventions, peacekeeping, and European security and defense policy; “The populist challenge to European defense”; ]
Right-wing populist parties in the EU are broadly nationalist, sovereignist, and Euroskeptic (Mudde, 2007; Vasilopoulou, 2018). But while these parties sharply oppose supranationalism and the EU's broader integrative trajectory, it is less clear whether their anti-EU sentiment extends to other forms of institutionalized cooperation, and in particular to coordination or collaboration with other EU member states on defense.12 We argue that populist parties are likely to constrain European defense cooperation under the following two conditions: First, populist parties hold strong anti-EU, anti-globalization, and anti-establishment sentiment and a more general skepticism over the merits of international cooperation. If these preferences are given clear precedence over national security interests or concerns, we are unlikely to see these parties engage in defense cooperation. This form of populist challenge to European defense cooperation may come from either right-wing or left-wing parties. While left-wing populist parties highlight economic anxieties and grievances, right-wing populist parties emphasize threats to national identity, culture, and sovereignty (De Vries & Edwards, 2009). They also often mix populism with nationalism (Camus & Lebourg, 2017). These nationalist sentiments are likely to stoke intra-EU divisions and constrain defense cooperation. Second, European defense is presented as an issue that populist parties may use to mobilize the mass public, polarize the electorate, and win votes. In other words, populist parties politicize European defense issues for electoral purposes. According to De Vries et al. (2021), two key elements lead to the politicization of international cooperation: public discontent about existing forms of international cooperation and the mobilization of this discontent by political entrepreneurs. Since most mainstream parties have not politicized European defense cooperation, populist parties may perceive an incentive and opportunity to mobilize opposition on this issue to attract new voters, and often in tandem with anti-immigrant and nationalist messages (Hobolt & De Vries, 2015).
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—Populism Turn—Burden Sharing Causes Populsim
Fay 17 - Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ Niskan (Matthew, “THE PROBLEM WITH EUROPE PAYING ITS DEFENSE BILLS,” Niskan Center, )
Writing at the Washington Post’s “Monkey Cage” blog, Andrea Gilli—a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation—identifies some of the domestic barriers to European states investing in their militaries. Gilli names three main constraints on the ability of European states to balance, but two of them are particularly important. The first is the inability of many European states to contribute financially to their own defense. Some European states simply do not have large enough economies to adequately invest in military capabilities. Gilli notes that Estonia is one of the few European countries to meet the minimum standard of defense spending for NATO member states—two percent of gross domestic product—but that still only amounts to $500 million in defense expenditure. Larger states have greater financial resources to invest, but they are tied up in welfare programs. As Gilli writes, [C]utting welfare state provisions in Europe to fund defense expenditures is going to be extremely difficult, if not counterproductive. On the one hand, those who receive these benefits are far more numerous, and thus politically more influential, than those receiving a direct benefit from military spending. On the other, cuts in welfare spending risk actually bringing additional support to anti-establishment parties like the Five Stars Movement in Italy, Die Linke in Germany or Podemos in Spain — all of which have strong anti-defense stances. It is possible European states could combine their military capabilities, but as Gilli argues, that option is also problematic. He notes, With Europe’s limited funds to spend on defense, large cooperative projects will be difficult to launch. In the past, countries in Europe abandoned cooperative projects because of their negative domestic implications for jobs, technological know-how or military exports. In an age of austerity, amid a refugee crisis and high youth unemployment, this mind-set is unlikely to change anytime soon. And some countries may have little interest in cooperation. They may operate in completely different environments — Mediterranean vs. North Sea, for example. Or they perceive a different strategic threat at home — think Russia vs. the Islamic State. Some countries may even have a strategic interest in leaving unaddressed some capability gaps — to compel proximate allies to come to their defense. This was Finland’s military strategy during the Cold War.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—Populism Turn—Burden Sharing Causes Populsim
Edoardo Saravalle 17, a Researcher at the Center for a New American Security, “NATO Funding Frustration Could Cause Friction in Europe”, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-funding-frustration-could-cause-friction-europe-20216
Second, increased burden sharing may actively hurt the cause of EU stability. Military buildup in Europe would sap the political capital and limit the nondefense spending options of establishment pro-American leaders confronting the gravest threat to the EU and U.S. power on the continent, the insurgent populist movement.
Many EU countries are in a cycle of elections that could be decisive for the future of Europe and the West. Dissatisfaction over lackluster economic prospects and opposition to immigration have powered anti-EU and anti-NATO parties like Marine Le Pen’s National Front and placed electoral victories within their grasp. Brexit proved that EU integration is neither inevitable nor irreversible. Now, populist parties are trying to follow the example and reshape Europe in a more nationalistic vision.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—Populism Turn—2AC
Fay 17, Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ Niskan (Matthew, also cites Andrea Gilli, a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “THE PROBLEM WITH EUROPE PAYING ITS DEFENSE BILLS,” Niskan Center, )
The European Union is also unlikely to force member states into a cooperation arrangement, according to Gilli. Given the rise of nationalist populist parties across Europe, any such assertion of power from Brussels will likely create a greater backlash. The two reasons Gilli notes for the inability of European states to increase defense spending also raise another question: should the United States want European states to do so? Writing at the end of the Cold War, political scientist John Mearsheimer warned that a Europe free from superpower domination would return to its recurrent patterns of interstate warfare. Europe’s major states would be forced to pay for their own defense absent American and Soviet security guarantees. To convince domestic populations to support investment in military capabilities—likely at the expense of welfare spending—state leaders would likely lean on nationalist rhetoric and policies. According to Mearsheimer, the reason they have not had to do so was because the American “pacifier” has remained in place even after the superpower standoff in Europe ended. An American withdrawal as an effort to induce greater defense spending in Europe might lead to the empowerment of the very nationalist populist parties that would like to see the European Union dismantled. The disintegration of Europe—coupled with increased spending on military capabilities by its largest states—could lead to the return of security competition and the dilemmas inherent in it. Meanwhile, smaller states—Estonia just being one example—unable to invest sufficiently in their own defense will be subject to manipulation and domination by the continent’s major powers. So the question of whether the Trump administration should consider withholding defense of America’s European to encourage them to “pay their bills” hinges on two things: whether they can, and if so, whether doing so is worth potentially undermining the peaceful integration of Europe.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—Asia Pivot Bad—Russia
Erlanger ’21 (Steven Erlanger, Chief Diplomat correspondent in Europe for the NY Times, “The Sharp U.S. Pivot to Asia Is Throwing Europe Off Balance” ) //sethlee
BRUSSELS — Until this week, the so-called “pivot to Asia” by the United States had been more of a threat than a reality for Europe. But that changed when the Biden administration announced a new defense alliance against China that has left Europe facing an implicit question:
Which side are you on? It is a question that European leaders have studiously sought to avoid since first articulated that America should as part of its rivalry with China. European leaders hoped that the relationship between the two superpowers could remain stable and that Europe could balance its interests between the two. Then the Trump administration sharply raised the temperature with China with tariffs and other trade barriers. And now the Biden administration on Wednesday announced an alliance between the United States, Britain and Australia that would help deploy nuclear-powered submarines in the Pacific — and, in doing so, also tore up for Australia to buy a French fleet of diesel-powered subs. “Europeans want to defer the moment of truth, to not make a choice between the two,” said Thomas Gomart, director of the French Institute of International Relations, or IFRI. “The Biden administration, like the Trump one, is provoking the moment of choice.” . Yet if it was a humiliation — as well as the cancellation of a lucrative defense deal — it possibly did have a silver lining for ’s broader goals. President Emmanuel Macron of France has been Europe’s loudest proponent of “strategic autonomy,” the idea that Europe needs to retain a balanced approach to the United States and China. “We must survive on our own, as others do,” said Josep Borrell Fontelles, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, echoing the French line. The French embarrassment — the Americans also announced the submarine deal — came after the disastrous fall of Afghanistan. European allies were furious with the Biden administration, blaming the Americans for acting with little or no consultation and feeding Mr. Macron’s argument that the United States is no longer an entirely reliable security partner. “The submarines and Afghanistan, it reinforces the French narrative that you can’t trust the Americans,” said Ulrich Speck of the German Marshall Fund in Berlin. But whether France will succeed in turning this bilateral defeat into a way to promote strategic autonomy is doubtful, analysts suggest. “Many Europeans will see this as a transparent way for the French to leverage their own interests,” said Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, the London-based research institution. Even so, there seems little doubt that Europe’s balancing act is becoming trickier to maintain. “Europe needs to think hard about where it sits and what it does,” said Rosa Balfour, director of Carnegie Europe. A Europe that spends more on defense is to be desired, but it also needs allies — including Britain and the United States, she said. And a Europe that does more to build its own security capacity “is the best way to be listened to more by its partners,” she added. The new alliance, known as AUKUS, is an effort to integrate Australia and Britain into the broader American effort to create a security deterrent to China. For Australia, which has seen its once-strong relations with Beijing deteriorate, America and Britain provide a much stouter deterrent to China in the Indo-Pacific, analysts agree, than could the deal with France. “It’s sending a very big signal to Beijing, which is useful for the U.S., but especially useful to Australia,” said Ian Lesser, acting director of the German Marshall Fund and head of its Brussels office. “And the weight of that signal is important because of who the partners are.” Mr. Lesser also questioned why the American moves in the Pacific have to be interpreted as a zero-sum equation in which Europe’s importance is diminished. “I don’t see any diminution of American interest and commitment to European security in the wake of Afghanistan or the moves in Asia,” he said. The biggest issue for the European Union may be finding the political will for strategic autonomy, a point made by the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, in her earlier on the day the new Asian alliance was announced. France may be pushing autonomy, but whether the rest of the European bloc has an appetite for it — and for creating greater distance from Washington — is uncertain. “France could end up isolating itself,” said Mr. Speck of the German Marshall Fund, noting that in nearly every region where France has security concerns — including Russia, the Sahel and even the Indo-Pacific — the United States continues to be a critical partner. There are deeper questions about America’s future reliability as a security partner, especially if the conflict with China turns kinetic, which is part of Mr. Macron’s argument, Mr. Lesser acknowledged. “For all the U.S. commitment to Europe, if things go wrong in the Indo-Pacific, that would change the force structure in Europe pretty fast.” In Poland, a strong American ally in the European Union and NATO, the reaction to the new alliance was more positive, focusing not on a pivot away from Europe “but on the U.S., with the British and the Australians, getting serious about China and also defending the free world,” said Michal Baranowski, who heads the German Marshall Fund office in Poland. At the same time, he said, Poles see another case where the supposedly professional, pro-European Biden administration “again doesn’t consult and shoves European allies under the bus,” he said. “This time the French, but for us, it was Nord Stream 2, when we were thrown under the bus for Germany,” he said. That was a reference to Mr. Biden’s decision to allow the completion of a natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, bypassing Ukraine and Poland, that was a priority for European powerhouse Berlin. “The U.S. will say again that ‘We’re building strong alliances, with Germany and Australia,’” Mr. Baranowski said. “But who suffers? Other allies.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—China—Asia Pivot Fails—ASEAN Solves
Tuazon 21, Bobby M. Tuazon is the Director for Policy Studies and an analyst at the Center for People Empowerment in Governance and former head of the Political Science Committee at the University of the Philippines, “Biden’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ at a dead end,” September 28th 2021, ChinaDaily, From the Press, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202109/28/WS6152da6aa310cdd39bc6c2cf.html
Biden's attempt to win over ASEAN to its side against China is doomed to fail. Not only is China the region's major trading partner, but the economic future of the US is tied to a harmonious relationship with the Asian giant. For years, ASEAN countries have refused to be dragged into any feud between the two major powers as they pin their future on an environment of peace and neutrality. To emphasize this point, ASEAN in 1995 signed the Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, where the member countries committed to keeping nuclear weapons out of the region. The treaty has been supported by China. In effect, the regional organization, not the US, provides the stability in this part of the world, parrying any destabilizing pressure from the current superpower, which is not part of Asia. Pursuing this role, ASEAN is in continuing talks with China for the Code of Conduct for the SCS. Both parties have agreed that the talks should continue without any interference by a non-ASEAN country. Nowhere is ASEAN's rejection of the US's gambit diplomacy more revealing than in their reactions to the recent formation of the new trilateral military alliance AUKUS (Australia, the UK and the US) and the reactivation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) of the US, Australia, India and Japan. This month, the Indo-Pacific AUKUS pact forged an arms deal to equip the Royal Australian Navy with multibillion-dollar worth nuclear-powered submarines. Majority of ASEAN countries, led by Indonesia and Malaysia, warned about the destabilizing effect of AUKUS and the threat of an arms race. Influential former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad rebuked Australia: "You have escalated the threat. This will elicit a response from China.″ Kuala Lumpur immediately announced that it will send a ministerial-level delegation to China to discuss the issue. In the QUAD summit he hosted, Biden argued for a "free and open Indo-Pacific," open navigation and an end to "Chinese military expansion" in the SCS. For years, the US has been cajoling India into playing an active role in the Indo-Pacific but New Delhi officials are reminded of their neutral foreign policy lest India slides into the dangerous orbit of the US As a key member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, India is engaged in active talks with Russia and Iran and is expected to receive $5.4 billion worth of Russian surface-to-air missiles in the coming months, which could anger the US With all these misfortunes, Biden's "Pivot to Asia" and containment strategy against China appear to be at a dead end.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—China—Asia Pivot Fails—Econ
Green & Medeiros 22, Michael J. Green is the Director of the Asian Studies Program at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, the Senior Vice President for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and served as the Special Assistant to President Biden for National Security Affairs; Evan S. Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, served as the Special Assistant to President Biden, and was the Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council under the Obama administration, “Can America Rebuild Its Power in Asia?: Biden Started Strong, But Progress Is Halting,” January 31st 2022, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2022-01-31/can-america-rebuild-its-power-asia#author-info
MIXED MESSAGES But these same polls illustrate that Biden’s gains are limited, if not tenuous. The 2021 ISEAS survey showed respondents believe U.S. economic influence in Southeast Asia has decreased since Biden took office. The survey also found almost half of respondents think China has greater regional political sway than the United States. The Lowy Asia Power Index may have found that the Biden administration restored the United States’ diplomatic influence, but it docked Washington more than ten points (from 61.7 to 51.1) on economic sway. The index also found the U.S. military’s relative lead over China shrank in 2021—and that was before Beijing conducted its alarming hypersonic missile tests. For the United States, both these challenges will intensify. On the economic front, China is expanding its financial footprint across the Indo-Pacific. U.S. allies such as Australia and Japan have privately pledged to help keep Beijing out of the CPTPP and to hold a place in the trade agreement for Washington. But the Biden administration has said it has no plan to return to the CPTPP, and officials in Canberra and Tokyo warn they cannot hold off China for more than a few years without some positive signals from the United States. Meanwhile, in addition to trying to join the CPTPP, China has also asked to join the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) with Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore—yet another economic group with no U.S. seat at the table. The Biden administration has promised “the development of an Indo-Pacific economic framework” focused on a patchwork of issues—trade facilitation, digital trade, supply chain resiliency, clean energy, infrastructure, and worker standards. But at best, the United States’ closest Asian partners see the framework as a save-the-date card for what they hope will be the day when Washington decides to join the CPTPP or a comparable agreement. The announcement on January 21 of a new U.S.-Japanese economic dialogue helps, but most Asian policymakers and business leaders view the vagueness of the Indo-Pacific economic framework as indicative of a lack of focus and commitment to deep economic engagement. The relative strength of the U.S. economy continues to drive the region’s investment and trade with the United States, but as things stand, Washington is losing influence over the rules that will govern trade, investment, supply chains, and ultimately, geopolitics in Asia. The administration has no long-term economic strategy toward Beijing. The United States’ vague economic policies extend to its goals with Beijing. The Biden administration has rightly sought to limit sensitive technology transfers—particularly of semiconductor- and -related technology—to China. But the administration has no long-term economic strategy toward Beijing beyond seeking more Chinese agricultural and energy exports under the 2020 Phase One trade deal negotiated by the Trump administration to end the trade war the White House started in 2018. U.S. businesses cannot get a clear answer about whether the administration will promote trade and investment with China in non-sensitive sectors, such as retail and automobiles. (Washington originally championed the TPP to gain leverage in economic negotiations with China, but this tool is now missing.) U.S. defense policy faces different but equally formidable challenges. The Biden administration has clearly made gains at by strengthening its alliances, but it has been less purposeful about the types of military capabilities it deploys in Asia—and where it puts them. The Defense Department’s signature Global Posture Review resulted in almost no significant additions to U.S. military forces in the Indo-Pacific beyond what the Trump White House already had planned. The administration and Congress have failed to properly fund the new Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), legislation that was designed to improve the composition of the military’s funding for much needed capabilities in the Indo-Pacific theater. Although many experts expect Congress to increase defense spending next year, the crisis in Ukraine could drain resources to the continuing detriment of the Indo-Pacific theater.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—China—Asia Pivot Fails
Jackson 22, Van Jackson is a senior lecturer in international relations at Victoria University of Wellington, “America’s Asia Strategy Has Reached a Dead End,” January 9th 2022, Foreign Policy, Argument, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/09/us-southeast-asia-china-biden-economic-strategy-geopolitics/
In December 2021, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, Kurt Campbell, the shape of U.S. thinking about China and Asia during a conference on Indo-Pacific security. He hit all the familiar notes: the importance of alliances, weapons sales to counter China, the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the optimistic view that Sino-U.S. relations could be at once competitive and stable. In any other era, such talk might have been comfort food for regional experts and policymakers. But absent from Campbell’s remarks at the conference, which was organized by Australia’s Lowy Institute, was any meaningful statement about political economy—the single aspect of statecraft most crucial to the Indo-Pacific region’s stability. It is in this arena of policy that China has done more to displace the United States than in any other, and it remains the glaring hole in Washington’s attempts to craft an Indo-Pacific policy. When pressed on this by his host, Campbell acknowledged that defense initiatives were not enough. But he could mention no concept, policy, or action to suggest economics was anything more than a throwaway gesture in a speech. Grand references to a forthcoming “economic framework” that would be “cutting-edge” lacked all specifics and stated no purpose other than wanting the United States to “design” the region’s standards. To the extent Campbell’s remarks reflect Washington’s view of Asia, they are at once modestly reassuring and highly troubling. Reassuring because Campbell’s bland rhetorical restraint is a refreshing departure from the volatility and pugnaciousness of the Trump administration. Troubling, however, because the ideas powering U.S. President Joe Biden’s Asia policy are as bland as the rhetoric itself. U.S. policy toward the world’s most important region is no more than a mashup of the residual inertia from Trump’s Asia policy with a revival of then-U.S. President Barack Obama’s well-intentioned but ill-fated “pivot to Asia,” which also had a agenda. Consequently, the United States is misallocating its attention and influence relative to what would actually benefit the region most. Economic policy, not defense policy, is the only way to address the interrelated problems of development, pandemic recovery, and adaptation to climate change—issues that plague policymakers throughout Asia and threaten to derail the region’s peace and prosperity. Washington must also stop conflating economic strategy with stale tropes on free trade and coercive sanctions. This is precisely the trouble with U.S. engagement in Asia to date: The United States has no economic strategy for the region—at least not since Obama’s ill-fated attempt to negotiate a new U.S.-Asia trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And it is unrealistic to expect any economic strategy beyond the free-trade pabulum so sharply at odds with U.S. domestic political constraints.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—China—Asia Pivot Fails
Shankar ’22 (Priyanka Shankar, Independent Journalist based in the Brussels, “Nato leaders say China is a ‘systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security” ) //sethlee
It accused Beijing of employing “a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up”.
The policy document said China’s “malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target allies and harm alliance security”.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—No Impact—US increase spending
Mira Rapp-Hooper 20, Political Science PhD at Columbia University, Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center., “Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances,” Harvard University Press//Wompus =)
But it is also reasonable to argue that these spending gaps are of little consequence. The important question is whether it is cheaper to have a foreign policy that relies on sustained cooperation with allies afflicted by moral hazard than to have a unilateral policy with no burden-sharing at all. On this view, as long as US defense spending does not exceed national means, it is hardly tragic if allies spend a bit less as a proportion of GDP. There is no evidence that American defense spending hampers growth or makes the country less competitive. And while the defense budget makes up a sizable chunk of federal spending, a relatively small portion of that money goes to forward basing. To those who bemoan burden-sharing gaps, a reasonable rejoinder is that Washington should ensure that its own budget commitments are sound in national terms, rather than preoccupy itself with false equivalence abroad.7
Finally, when we think about the costs of alliances, we should be mindful that alliance agreements themselves impose no financial burdens on the US Treasury. What costs money—and potentially lives—is the associated force posture. Proposals for cutting US alliance spending are usually suggestions about curtailing overseas defense presence. This is not a semantic difference. It points to an important reality that many miss when they refer to alliances as extravagant: in order to generate substantial savings in its own defense budget—that is, to close the gap between its “allied contribution” ratio and those of its thriftier partners—the United States would have to close overseas bases and return the personnel and materiel to the continental United States. Simply consolidating bases and relying more on rotational deployments would not generate substantial cost savings.8 Leading scholars have argued for just this kind of move—ending alliances and shuttering related bases to curb commitments and spending. Such dramatic changes would require not just a transformed alliance policy but a completely different grand strategy— one that does not seek to secure the balance of power in Eurasia through forward defense, deterrence, and allied assurance and control.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—Burden Sharing Fails—European Disfunction
Bergmann 21 -- Max Bergmann, a senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, official at the U.S. State Department from 2011 to 2017. [The EU Is the Military Ally the United States Needs: Take the Pressure Off of NATO States and Embrace the Union’s Defense, 1-6-21, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-01-06/eu-military-ally-united-states-needs]
Insisting that European states hit two percent by 2024 is setting up the alliance to fail. Not only are these states unlikely to hit the target, but even if they did, the results would likely be underwhelming. The two percent metric is, after all, arbitrary, as it is not tied to specific defense requirements, and is moreover subject to broader economic fluctuations. Greece, for instance, hit two percent only because its GDP contracted so dramatically, increasing its military’s share of the shrinking budget. Indeed, marginal increases in any single country’s defense spending won’t automatically help improve the European pillar of NATO, which is plagued with inefficiencies. EU member states in total spend roughly $200 billion annually on defense, on a par with China. But Europe struggles to deploy forces; it runs out of munitions when it fights; and its forces are seldom prepared to fight.
The problem, then, is not really low spending but that European defense spending is fragmented, wasteful, and redundant. For instance, although Germany is the strongest economic power in Europe, few of Germany’s attack helicopters are ready for combat. France, by contrast, has a very capable military engaged in active combat operations in the Sahel. But French forces depend on U.S. support for those operations. When European states spend on defense, most of them allocate too little of their budgets to research and development and face stark tradeoffs between acquiring expensive new technologies and simply maintaining the forces they have. As the European defense analyst Sven Biscop of the Egmont Institute assesses, “The status of Europe’s armed forces and their dependence on the US will basically remain unaltered, even if they all spend 2 percent of their GDP.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—Burden Sharing Fails
Economist 19 – (“What would happen if America left Europe to fend for itself?” March 14, 2019. =)
A pale shadow Yet the Europeans would immediately face institutional hurdles. Compared with Russia’s top-down system, command and control is hard enough in consensus-bound nato. It would be a bigger challenge for Europeans alone, especially if they did not inherit nato’s command structure. The eu may want to take the lead, but military thinking is not in its dna. Besides, an eu-only alliance would be a pale shadow of nato: after Brexit, non-eu countries will account for fully 80% of nato defence spending. There would be gaps in capabilities, too. How bad these were would depend on the mission, and how many operations were under way at the same time. The European-led interventions in Libya and Mali exposed dependence on America in vital areas such as air-to-air refuelling and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. A detailed look at the sort of scenarios Europe might face would help to identify other gaps, and what it would take to fill them. Bastian Giegerich of the iiss, who is starting to work on such assessments, reckons that realistically the gap-filling could take 15 years or so. That is a long time for places like Poland and the Baltic countries that feel under threat. Fear and mistrust could quickly conspire to make narrow national interests trump efforts to maintain European unity. Hence a second, perhaps likelier, version of what might follow an American withdrawal: Europe Divided. Jonathan Eyal of the Royal United Services Institute in London imagines a frenzy of activity, a cacophony of summits—and a renationalisation of defence strategies. Lots of countries would seek bilateral deals. In central Europe he would expect an alliance between Poland and Romania to guarantee the eastern border. The Russians and Chinese would not sit idly by, he says, but would play their own games with the Greeks, Hungarians and others. It is these games of mistrust that the American security guarantee has largely helped to avoid. They could all too easily resurface. “Establishing a purely European defence”, warns Michael Rühle, a long-time nato official, “would overwhelm the Europeans politically, financially and militarily.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—Burden Sharing Fails
Zannella, 20 [Anthony Zannella Seton Hall University, majored in Political Science and Philosophy, 4-7-2020 "An Analysis of Burden Sharing in NATO and the Problem of Free Riding," Political Analysis: Vol. 21 , Article 5, /alundy]
Regarding Libya and Afghanistan, it would appear as though NATO allies were contributing to a more balanced and fair system of burden sharing, but this is in fact not the case. In Afghanistan, alliance cooperation and burden sharing were on more equal footing with the initial invocation of Article 5. Countries were attempting to provide military assistance to the operations despite the limitations their economies and populations imposed upon them. However, there were only a few countries that provided enough force in any truly effective sense. While major allies such as Canada did indeed provide a great deal for the alliance in the beginning, support tapered off overtime. Several other capable countries did not dedicate as much as they could have, and even when they did, their support provided little strategic significance. Instead, U.S. forces were providing for the bulk of the operation while its allies were hampered by inefficient forces and a reluctance to give in to U.S. unilateralism. In addition, the restraints placed on rules of engagement and other factors significantly reduced the effectiveness of their combat roles. This forced the U.S. to pick up the slack, as it had done during the Cold War, with its deterrence abilities. The eventual decline in alliance involvement also indicates support for collective action theory as allies began to outweigh the costs to the benefits of participating in combat operations with the U.S. In Libya, on the other hand, the U.S. attempted to reduce its role in combat operations while NATO allies shouldered the burden of putting their forces in potential danger. While the U.S. was dedicating its budget to strategic command, its allies were making up for their lack of defense spending by taking more responsibility through both material and non-material variables. The involvement of more subtle factors completely changes the implications of collective action. However, the statistics indicated that the U.S. was still forced to engage in taking on a larger share of the burden than it had anticipated or even wanted. The other allies did in fact break through domestic constraints by putting their forces in harm’s way. But Hasebrouck’s work showed that such constraints were not as prominent because Libya was considered an easier operation, and the U.S. still took on a greater role. Furthermore, the implications of increased U.S. involvement show in a concrete way that free riding is occurring. The inability of European forces to deal with the realities of modern combat forced them to rely on the U.S. even though they were trying to take more of a leadership role in the operation.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—European Defense High—Ukraine
Dowd, 22 [Alan W. Dowd, contributing editor with The American Legion Magazine, writes in U.S. foreign policy, national defense and international security, 5-12-2022, "No more free-riders in the free world," American Legion, /alundy]
In the wake of Vladimir Putin’s beastly assault on Ukraine, multiple NATO nations have announced immediate plans to increase defense spending. This reawakening is long overdue. In this post-post-Cold War era, there’s no room in the free world for free-riders.
Rearming What Winston Churchill said of Josef Stalin and his commissars remains true of Putin and his henchmen: “There is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—European Defense High—Ukraine
Mackenzie ’22 (Christina Mackenzie, ““ ) //sethlee
PARIS: The war in Ukraine has been a strong wake-up call for a number of European countries who’d been basking in post-Cold War comfort thinking that armed conflict was relegated to history and that spending on defense could be minimal.
The turnaround since has been nothing less than stunning, to the point that six NATO members have now pledged defense increases of $133 billion so far; militarily neutral Sweden has also pledged an increase. And more nations seem poised to follow suit in the days and weeks to come.