2022
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Aff Answers › Defense Autonomy INB › 2AC --- EU Autonomy Fails
Luke Coffey 20, MS, Politics and Government of the European Union, London School of Economics, Director, Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation, Daniel Kochis, MA, Comparative Political Science, Fordham University, Senior Policy Analyst, European Affairs, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, Davis Institute, 8/10/20, "NATO in the 21st Century: Preparing the Alliance for the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow", The Heritage Foundation, Speical Report, No. 235, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/nato-the-21st-century-preparing-the-alliance-the-challenges-today-and-tomorrow
NATO and the European Union. The strength of the transatlantic alliance revolves around the axis of NATO, which has done more to promote democracy, peace, and security in Europe than any other alliance—including the European Union—since its inception in 1949. Far from being outmoded, NATO today is more relevant and crucial for maintaining transatlantic security than it has been since the end of the Cold War. While some in Brussels and across the halls of power in Europe may have dreams of an independent EU Army or an independent EU defensive apparatus capable of replacing NATO and the U.S. military, true EU “strategic autonomy” in defense is a chimera.
The EU will never be able to provide the peace and stability that NATO— with feet firmly rooted in both North America and Europe for the past 70 years—has delivered, and will continue to deliver. While EU-led defense initiatives may be able to provide some defense improvements at the margins, the outsized costs include decisions that enervate NATO, exacerbate existing fractures within Europe, and severely stress the transatlantic link.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff Answers › Semiconductor INB › 2AC – Impact Turn
Chitkara 22, Hirsh Chitkara is a reporter at Protocol focused on the intersection of politics, technology and society. Before joining Protocol, he helped write a daily newsletter at Insider that covered all things Big Tech., (Hirsh, “The great onshoring: Inside the transcontinental chip race”, Protocol, May 20, https://www.protocol.com/policy/us-eu-semiconductors-ttc-onshoring) //CHC-DS
Fabricating our way into World War III? Political economists have long theorized that great powers are less likely to go to war if they rely on one another for trade. The so-called “capitalist peace theory” is a core tenet of classical liberalism — one of the many reasons scholars say we should embrace globalization, even if it comes with quite a few nasty side effects. Install a McDonald’s in your capital city, Thomas Friedman posited in 1996, and no other McCountry will invade. (Russia has since served as the counterpoint to this theory, though McDonald’s is now leaving Russia.) If the capitalist peace theory holds, then reshoring chips would have considerable geopolitical ramifications, according to Rao. In this sense, he added, China poses a greater threat: “The Chinese can’t actually threaten Taiwan currently, or at least not so easily, because they need the chips.” To secure that supply, China is expected to pour well over $100 billion dollars into developing its domestic semiconductor industry. “The way to frame this is whether or not China requires Taiwan — and in the future, they may not,” Rao said.
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2022
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Aff Answers › Semiconductor INB › 1AR – Squo Solves
Cota 22, Jillian Cota is a research intern with the Renewing American Innovation Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC., (Jillian, “The European Chips Act: A Strategy to Expand Semiconductor Production Resiliency”, CSIS, March 7, https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/european-chips-act-strategy-expand-semiconductor-production-resiliency) //CHC-DS
In February 2022, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the European Chips Act, which adds €15 billion to an existing €30 billion in public investments to create new STEM-focused programs, attract new talent to Europe, and build new infrastructure. These actions are part of a strategy to support a thriving European semiconductor industry ecosystem, averting future shortages of semiconductors, and promoting investment into the European semiconductor industry.
Through this legislation, the Commission hopes to: Increase EU resilience to supply chain disruptions like those created by building more domestic capacity. Make Europe a long-term industrial leader in semiconductors, increasing its global in manufacturing from 9% to 20% by 2030.
2022
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Aff Answers › Semiconductor INB › 2AC – Squo Solves
Arcuri 22, Gregory Arcuri is a research assistant for the Renewing American Innovation (RAI) Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)., (Gregory, “How Is the U.S. Cooperating with Its European Allies on Issues of Technology?” , CSIS, April 5, https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/how-us-cooperating-its-european-allies-issues-technology) //CHC-DS
The Council’s first meeting in September 2021 led to a series of notable outcomes on issues where significant agreement already exists. For example, on the issue of the global semiconductor shortage, both sides are committed to “identify[ing] gaps in the semiconductor value chain” and enhancing their respective semiconductor ecosystems. The U.S. and Europe have already begun taking important steps towards this shared goal. Of note, the European Commission has drafted legislation to mobilize over €43 billion in public and private funds to double its share of the global semiconductor manufacturing market by 2030. Meanwhile, in the United States, lawmakers continue to debate the CHIPS for America Act and the FABS Act, which provide lump-sum and tax-based incentives for chip manufacturers to “onshore” their operations. While these appear to be self-serving initiatives, the two sides view them as critical to ensuring mutual resiliency in a critical strategic industry.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff Answers › EU Leadership INB › 2AC – INB – Inevitable
Csernatoni 19 [, PhD in International Relations from Central European University, 2019. The EU’s Technological Power: Harnessing Future and Emerging Technologies for European Security. Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe, 119–140. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-12418-2_6 DOA: 6/20/2022 //ArchanSen]
This comes at a moment when National Defence Technological and Industrial Bases (DTIBs) in Europe have increasingly come under pressure to produce competitive defence capabilities, due to budgetary restrictions and defence market forces. There is no denying the fact that the centre of gravity for security and defence technology R&D and innovation has shifted from the national and military levels to the corporate and civilian ones, because of a variety of factors, such as economic austerity reasons and the sharp decline of national defence R&D investment programmes in the post-Cold War period in Europe. In this regard, the maintenance of a strong EDTIB was set out to become a top mission for the EDA and the European Commission, by improving security and defence capabilities, the military expenditure of member states and by focusing on enhancing European security via the development of innovative and competitive high-end technologies.
Political will has been developing in the EU concerning high-tech security and defence capacity build-up, as demonstrated by the policy initiatives and strategies recently spearheaded by the EDA and the European Commission to empower the European defence technology and innovation sectors. The rapprochement between the EDA and the European Commission has increased significantly as shown by their combined efforts to converge national strategic needs and advocate for a more coherent pan-European common defence policy. The 2016 policy initiatives, the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (SDIP) and the European Commission’s European Defence Action Plan (EDAP), are prefiguring a new practice of collaboration between the EDA and the Commission to create a stronger European defence market, to revitalise the European defence industrial base and to encourage member states to spend more on defence research and emerging technologies. The European Commission’s launch of the Preparatory Action (PA) on CSDP-related research and in partnership with the EDA as the hub of defence research is indicative of such moves. The PA is a support programme in the form of a one-off and of limited duration budget (Crespo 2015), which shifts financing opportunities for the European defence industries from EU member states to the EU per se.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff Answers › EU Leadership INB › 1AR – INB – Squo Solves
Satariano 22 [Adam Satariano, 3-24-2022, "E.U. Takes Aim at Big Tech’s Power With Landmark Digital Act", No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/technology/eu-regulation-apple-meta-google.html, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]
The European Union agreed on Thursday to one of the world’s most far-reaching laws to address the power of the biggest tech companies, potentially reshaping app stores, online advertising, e-commerce, messaging services and other everyday digital tools.
The law, called the Digital Markets Act, is the most sweeping piece of digital policy since the bloc put the world’s toughest rules to protect people’s online data into effect in 2018. The legislation is aimed at stopping the largest tech platforms from using their interlocking services and considerable resources to box in users and squash emerging rivals, creating room for new entrants and fostering more competition.
2022
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Aff Answers › EU Leadership INB › 2AC – INB – Squo Solves
Kang 22 [Cecilia Kang, 4-22-2022, "As Europe Approves New Tech Laws, the U.S. Falls Further Behind", No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/22/technology/tech-regulation-europe-us.html, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]
In just the last few years, Europe has seen a sweeping law for online privacy take effect, approved far-reaching regulations to curb the dominance of the tech giants and on Saturday reached a deal on new legislation to protect its citizens from harmful online content.
For those keeping score, that’s Europe: three. United States: zero.
2022
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Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – AI – Commercialization
Franke 21, Dr. Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). She leads ECFR’s Technology and European Power initiative. Her areas of focus include German and European security and defence, the future of warfare, and the impact of new technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence on geopolitics and warfare., (Ulrike, “Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI”, European Council on Foreign Relations, ) //CHC-DS
The EU’s effort to strengthen ethical AI, and to make ‘trustworthy AI’ a unique selling point for Europe, might also end up creating problems for transatlantic cooperation. Many EU policymakers believe that the EU’s insistence on ethical AI will eventually become a location advantage for Europe (much like data privacy): as more people become concerned about unethical AI and data security, they will prefer to use or buy AI ‘made in Europe’ rather than elsewhere. In this respect, two European aims are at odds with each other: on the one hand, Europeans want to ensure that AI is developed and used in an ethical way. Partnering with a powerful player such as the US on this matter should be an obvious way to help them achieve this goal. However, if the EU considers ethical AI not just a goal for humanity but a development that may also create commercial advantages for Europe, then transatlantic cooperation on this issue is counterproductive, as it would undermine Europe’s uniqueness.
2022
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Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – AI – Generic
Lawrence and Cordy 20, *Christie Lawrence is a Director for Research and Analysis working on international AI cooperation and intellectual property. Prior, she worked at Harvard Belfer Center’s Cyber Project, the State Department, and as a management consultant. She holds a B.A. in Public Policy from Duke University and is a concurrent MPP/JD candidate at Harvard Kennedy School and Stanford Law School. ** Researcher, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. Koichiro Komiyama – Director, Global Coordination Division, JPCERT/CC, (Christie and Sean, “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence”, Belfer Center, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/case-increased-transatlantic-cooperation-artificial-intelligence) //CHC-DS
The European Union’s Juncker 26 Commission (2014-2019) actively avoided regulating AI, causing the European Parliament to increase their efforts as a proactive voice in favor of stronger AI regulation. However, since the beginning of Ursula von der Leyen’s tenure, the Commission has initiated efforts to adopt stronger regulation for AI applications (i.e., differentiating regulation of AI based on defined “high-risk” and “low-risk” sectors”) and associated data spaces.27,28 These legislative proposals and their associated discussions are planned to be completed by the end of 2020. During the strategic planning and budgeting process of its R&D programs, the EU committed to providing at least EUR10.7 billion29 for AI-related research conducted between 2021 and 2027.30 Despite these financial and political efforts, the EU still remains technologically dependent on the US and China and suffers from a lack of capital and private funding, decentralized and uncoordinated AI expertise, severe brain drain (including to the US), and slow adoption of AI programming in its education and public sectors.
2022
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Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Funding
ND 22 [New Direction, 05-22-2022, "Why an EU Army is a bad idea – We don’t need a political bloc of the unwilling", https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/why_an_eu_army_is_a_bad_idea_we_dont_need_a_political_bloc_of_the_unwilling, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]
Arguments are made that limited European resources would be more effective if integrated. This has become one of the EU’s main selling points for EU defence. It sounds plausible – but if you add up the defence budgets of 26 EU countries (Denmark has opted out of EU defence) you arrive at a figure of approximately $200 billion (2020) or 1.5% of the accumulated GDPs of these countries. The US spent about $800 billion, which is some 3.7% of GDP. And you certainly do not need EU involvement to create joint forces with allies. The history of purposeful coalitions goes back centuries. In recent times, under NATO, we have had the 14-nation ACE Mobile Force, the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, and the German/Dutch Corps as examples of closely aligned national formations. All this has worked perfectly well. There is no need for EU involvement – unless of course your motives are political rather than military.
2022
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Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Say No
The Week 22 [Week UK, 03-29-2022, "The arguments for and against an EU army", https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/956217/the-arguments-for-and-against-an-eu-army, DOA: 6-25-2022 //ArchanSen]
History shows there have been numerous failed attempts at forming an EU army, with opposition from outside the union and within. Critics suggest these disagreements would continue even if the idea was signed off. In a 2018 opinion piece for the Atlantic Council, international security and defence analyst Brooks Tigner wrote that the bloc would face a plethora of “technical, legal, and administrative differences” that would “boil down to the most mundane things such as soldiers’ rights”. Operational costs and caveats “always pose major headaches”, he added. The Telegraph’s James Crisp warned that there were “already grumbles” about French defence companies receiving “preferential and lucrative contracts”. “Diplomats joke that Mr Macron is in favour of a European army as long as it is a very French European army,” he said.
2022
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Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Undermines NATO
The Week 22 [Week UK, 03-29-2022, "The arguments for and against an EU army", https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/956217/the-arguments-for-and-against-an-eu-army, DOA: 6-25-2022 //ArchanSen]
One of Britain’s key concerns about the prospect of an EU army was that it would duplicate or undermine the role of Nato.
Bart M.J. Szewczyk, from the US think tank the German Marshall Fund, agreed that it is “illogical” that a federal EU defence policy would be any better at “raising spending, pooling resources, or improving procurement” than current structures such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Nato allies and partners working as a team in long-established modes of cooperation – and not an inexperienced EU working at cross-purposes or even actively undermining the alliance – will remain the security provider of first resort for Europe,” he wrote in Foreign Policy.
2022
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Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Overlap
De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, ) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
PROBLEMS IN NATO-EU COOPERATION As the overall strategic interests and security priorities of NATO and the EU have begun to overlap in response to emerging global challenges, the relationship — and hence cooperation — between the two organizations has become more complex. Limited communication channels Although personnel exchanges and joint exercises have helped to set up a framework and a mindset for more integrated operations, officials interviewed for this paper24 under the condition of anonymity pointed out that information sharing and the results achieved have been very limited. The lack of a secure communication system to share information between the two organizations severely hinders their ability to work together on a daily basis but most importantly to coordinate in a real crisis scenario and consequently to put in place a joint response. As of now, there is no direct inter-institutional secure lines of communication between the EU and NATO. All communications take place between each member state and either within NATO or within the EU. This also is particularly relevant when it comes to sharing best practices or handing over tasks from one organization to the other.25
Political tensions and different strategic priorities Adding to this communication difficulty, political tensions have multiplied within both NATO and the EU, triggering a climate of distrust that prevents intelligence sharing. Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles26 and its invasion of northern Syria after U.S. troops withdrew raised security concerns in the alliance, while the Northern Cyprus question and Ankara’s activities in the eastern Mediterranean waters have created tensions with Greece.27 Relations between France and the U.K. have also significantly worsened since the AUKUS deal, which could ultimately impact the functioning of NATO. Complicating matters further, as described above, the two organizations’ activities have started to overlap, with NATO embracing capacity-building and cyber operations and the EU stepping up on crisis management. More recently, during preparation of its strategic concept, NATO has been questioning its role in the fight against climate change and in countering China’s multifaceted influence in the trans-Atlantic space. And following the AUKUS deal, the EU has been reflecting on developing a stronger military to be able to respond to crises directly impacting its security. NATO opposes any form of duplication, from command to resources, which is quite telling in terms of its soul-searching for the definition of its objectives and its range of action vis-à-vis global challenges.28 Recent events in Afghanistan offer a very good opportunity to reflect on the role of NATO and EU aspirations. After the Taliban took back Kabul, NATO called for an assessment of the accomplishments and failures of ISAF and Resolute Support.29 But instead the EU — not directly involved in Afghanistan as an organization but rather through individual member states — and the United Kingdom reflected on their excessive dependence on the United States in areas of paramount importance to European security. As evacuation operations started in Kabul, with devastating images traveling around the world, Borrell defined Afghanistan as a “wake-up call” for the strengthening of European defense.30 Allies complained about the United States’ lack of coordination and communication on the withdrawal, its unwillingness to extend the deadline for evacuations. For its part, the United Nation Security Council rejected a French-U.K. proposal to establish of a U.N.-controlled safe zone around the Kabul airport.31 While it is debatable whether or not the EU would have used its hypothetical army to secure Kabul’s airport, the Afghanistan experience exposed Europeans’ vivid vulnerabilities in the security domain and their dependence on the U.S. military’s logistical and technological capabilities.
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Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency › 1AR – Solvency – Generic
De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, ) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
Yet NATO-EU cooperation remains somewhat limited because of political tensions between member states (which hinders intelligence sharing) as well as weak European military capabilities and inadequate defense spending. Over the past few years the EU has made important progress in this domain through the establishment of the European Defense Fund and several defense projects under the Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism. Yet, according to several studies in the field, the state of European defense appears insufficient to tackle more serious military threats or to enable the EU to take initiatives in its neighborhood independently from the United States. In its “Strategic Compass” to be published in March 2022, the EU is supposed to adopt a bolder approach to its defense capabilities. In parallel, in a new strategic concept to be released in June 2022, NATO is supposed to tackle security throughout a widened angle, looking at domains that are not strictly defense-related.
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Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Generic
Retter et al 21, 1) Lucia Retter is a research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition, M.A. in international relations and international economics, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS); B.A. in modern and medieval languages, University of Cambridge, 2) Stephanie Pezard is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; M.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po); M.A. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; B.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po) 3) Stephen J. Flanagan is an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation. Ph.D. in international relations, Fletcher School, Tufts University; A.B. in political science, Columbia University 4) Gene Germanovich is an international defense researcher and currently serves as the acting international portfolio lead for the RAND National Security Research Division. B.S. in international affairs, Georgia Tech; M.A. in security studies, Georgetown University 5) Sarah Grand-Clement; publisher, 6) Pauline Paillé is an analyst at RAND Europe working in the area of defence and security. M.A. in international relations, Sciences Po Bordeaux (“European Strategic Autonomy in Defence: Transatlantic visions and implications for NATO, US and EU relations”, RAND Europe, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1319-1.html) //CHC-DS
In the last five years, direct association between EU defence integration efforts (such as CDP, CARD, PESCO, EDF) and the notion of European strategic autonomy has become widespread – at least when this term is understood to mean defence and a narrower understanding of ‘security’ rather than, say, economic self-reliance. Yet the pace of cooperation and emergence of new structures hides a wide range of official positions held by different EU member states, and differing views and visions even within each individual nation’s politics. Most notably, the views of European officials and experts differ on the question of leadership, the degree of autonomy, the desired level of the EU’s ambition and the optimal balance between national and joint capability development. These various divergences, jointly, and separately, undermine the cohesiveness and therefore the feasibility and credibility of the general ambition to achieve European strategic autonomy. This section briefly outlines the issues pertaining to each of these categories of debate and disagreement.
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Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Generic
Retter et al 21, 1) Lucia Retter is a research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition, M.A. in international relations and international economics, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS); B.A. in modern and medieval languages, University of Cambridge, 2) Stephanie Pezard is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; M.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po); M.A. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; B.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po) 3) Stephen J. Flanagan is an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation. Ph.D. in international relations, Fletcher School, Tufts University; A.B. in political science, Columbia University 4) Gene Germanovich is an international defense researcher and currently serves as the acting international portfolio lead for the RAND National Security Research Division. B.S. in international affairs, Georgia Tech; M.A. in security studies, Georgetown University 5) Sarah Grand-Clement; publisher, 6) Pauline Paillé is an analyst at RAND Europe working in the area of defence and security. M.A. in international relations, Sciences Po Bordeaux (“European Strategic Autonomy in Defence: Transatlantic visions and implications for NATO, US and EU relations”, RAND Europe, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1319-1.html) //CHC-DS
In addition to these overarching EU initiatives, a number of separate bi- and multi-lateral groupings and frameworks have also emerged in the last 10 to 15 years, aiming to unite like-minded nations in pursuit of greater defence integration. This trend further confirms that EU member states and partners recognise that, individually, their defence capabilities are insufficient to independently deliver most, if not all, defence missions and that collaboration and harmonisation are necessary. Under the leadership of French President Macron, for example, the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) was launched in 2018 to be an agile, nonbinding, voluntary forum, among the most capable European governments willing to employ their military forces, complementary both to the EU (including PESCO) and NATO.88 The EI2 seeks to deepen cooperation in four areas: intelligence sharing and strategic foresight, planning and scenario development, support to operations and lessons learned.89 In practice, the initiative consists of meetings between the militaries of participating member states and periodically at the ministerial level.90 In Northern Europe, for example, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden take part in the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), a political and military framework that establishes cooperation in five areas: capabilities, armament, human resources and education, training and exercises as well as operations. The aim of NORDEFCO is to increase interoperability between those five members, develop a common understanding in these areas and optimise the use of their resources based on their common strategic culture.91 In addition, members of the Northern Group, including 12 countries bordering on the Baltic or North Sea, have been working to deepen regional defence and security cooperation including on information sharing, exercises and military mobility.92
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Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Generic
Christie 22, Senior Research Fellow for the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Research in the areas of International Affairs and International Security, with a particular focus on: Geoeconomics, Economic Statecraft, Defence Economics, Defence Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, NATO, Great Power Competition., (Edward Hunter, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe” in European View, Volume 21(1), Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/17816858221089372) //CHC-DS
Before proceeding, it is worth spelling out the extent to which European security is dependent on NATO and in particular on the US. Of the EU’s 27 member states, 21 are members of NATO. These countries account for about 93% of the population1 of the EU. Within NATO, those Allies that are also EU members only account for about 20% of total defence expenditure across the Alliance, while the US alone accounts for about 70% of the same total.2 Beyond these aggregate indicators, it is furthermore the case that the US is considerably ahead of the EU in terms of practical adoption of AI. For illustration, in 2020 US private-sector investment in AI was around $23.6 billion, but was only $2 billion in the EU, implying a ratio of 12 to 1 in favour of the US (Zhang et al. 2021, 96). Scientific output indicators offer a more nuanced picture. In 2019, the EU accounted for 16.4% of the world’s peer-reviewed AI publications, ahead of the US with 14.6%, while China occupied the top spot with 22.4% (Zhang et al. 2021, 20). On the other hand, if one measures research output in terms of publications on the Arxiv database, the US is ahead of the EU (Zhang et al. 2021, 33) by a ratio of almost two to one, which is nonetheless much less than the large gap in private investment mentioned above. That the EU performs similarly to the US in terms of scientific research, but far less well in terms of investment and commercialisation of new digital technologies, is an old problem which has proven very difficult to address, whether at national or EU level (Baroudy et al. 2020).
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Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Generic
Puglierin 21, Dr Jana Puglierin is Head of the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies. From September 2013 to December 2015 she was a program officer at the DGAP’s Future Forum Berlin (Berliner Forum Zukunft). Prior to this she was an advisor on disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation at the German Bundestag, where she also worked on matters relating to German and European foreign and security policy., (Jana, “Strategic Partnerships and EU Security and Defence” in “Achieving Strategic Sovereignty for the EU”, European Parliament, ) //CHC-DS
3.1.2 Reconciling Strategic Sovereignty and the Transatlantic Relationship The idea that the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to military crises goes back to the 1998 St. Malo Declaration. Since then, the question of what constitutes an acceptable balance between a more independent European security and defence policy and transatlantic security cooperation in NATO has been hotly disputed on both sides of the Atlantic. The fear of upsetting the US and jeopardising the American security commitment to Europe was a good reason for many European member states to keep EU defence efforts to a minimum. However, the election of Donald Trump as US president has decisively changed the parameters of the debate. The US’ strong footprint in European security could no longer be taken for granted. For many Europeans, this was a wake-up moment that brought the need for greater autonomy from the US back into focus. At the same time, the very notion of ‘strategic autonomy’ became toxic. While Europeans insisted that strategic autonomy was not synonymous with a Europe ‘going it alone’, Washington, but also some EU member states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, perceived it as an attempt for de-coupling and hence as a threat. On this account, German defence minister Annegret KrampKarrenbauer spoke on behalf of many Europeans when she sent her message to the incoming Biden administration in November 2020: ‘The idea of strategic autonomy for Europe goes too far if it is taken to mean that we could guarantee security, stability and prosperity in Europe without NATO and without the US’. 36 The related dispute between her and French President Emmanuel Macron has once again shown that Europeans themselves have not yet agreed on how far Europe should be able to act independently of the United States.
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Aff Answers › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Generic
ND 22 [New Direction, 05-22-2022, "Why an EU Army is a bad idea – We don’t need a political bloc of the unwilling", https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/why_an_eu_army_is_a_bad_idea_we_dont_need_a_political_bloc_of_the_unwilling, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]
You might argue that it can only be a good thing if the Europeans step up their defence arrangements. But this has little to do with increasing military muscle. It is not the answer to the plea by successive US presidents for the Europeans to do more on defence. NATO is well established, well proven and credible. 27 of its 30 member countries are European, including 21 that also happen to be EU countries. So why create another structure?
Any EU force would have to draw on the same limited military resources and would be a duplicative, divisive distraction. EU ambitions already intrude into NATO where coordination structures between the two organisations have now been set up, in spite of the fact that their membership is largely the same. The EU wants to become the European leg of NATO – so where would that leave key non-EU European members of NATO such as the UK, Norway and Turkey? In any case, the EU countries can’t even agree among themselves. Many pay lip service to the idea of CSDP while refusing to participate in any meaningful way. Even the arch-federalist European Parliament, in its most recent report on EU defence, noted that “in over 15 years of existence EU battlegroups have never been used, in particular due to the lack of political consensus among Member States and the complexity of implementation and funding…”
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Framework › AT: Positivism Good
Sjoberg and Chessman 2012 (Laura Sjoberg, PhD in IR from USC and Professor at UF, and Christian Chessman, JD UC Berk, "The Biopower of Occupation: Insights for ‘Knowledge Exchange’in (Gender and) IR,” November 17, 2012 http://genderinglobalgovernancenet-work.net/events/critical-reflections-on-the-researcher-practitioner-relationship-2/attachment/sjoberg-and-chessman-biopower-of-occupation (rishi)).
The second contribution we argue that “Occupy” as method could make to feminist research is in understanding research more generally as being stable in its liminality rather than anchored by a static certainty about ontology, epistemology, method, or field politics. One way to think about this might be thinking about IR as art, as Christine Sylvester suggests: It takes an eye for sex and gender to see the art of it all. Even then it is difficult. Surrounded by enchanted positivism, which promises progress in knowledge – yes, this is the way! – only a long learning curve has brought us to the point of X-raying and carbon-dating the facts presented as timeless tendencies, as ‘objective’ IR. If we do not journey along the learning curve, we end up trying to draw without looking, observing, and reckoning with life. (Sylvester 2002, 273) Sylvester is arguing that seeing the world in a way that is linear, rational, and exclusively scientific neglects a number of concerns which are normatively important to feminisms, which find their substance in the political, the personal, and the critical. At the same time, anchoring research in liminality contradicts the discipline’s anchoring in a positivist social science based on approximating certainty. As researchers, liminality-as-research-goal is another uninhabitable space in IR – one which might be physically inhabited as an embodied disruption of positivist social science – one which might be a space of otherness and a space of protest all at once – both providing new intellectual turf for IR and disrupting its operationaliity. 29 Occupying Research to Occupy (Feminist) IR We are interested in a number of ways that both research practice and the political landscape of the field might change as a result of the introduction of the methodological principles for performing research and navigating the field that we glean from the ideas and practices of the ‘Occupy’ movement. In our view, one of the most useful questions such an interpretation can ask is how the space of the need to ‘do/think things differently’ becomes/became less inhabitable/uninhabitable space in the discipline of IR/the practice of governance, and how to inhabit that uninhabitable space, methodologically for IR theory and practically for the world of governance? In the paper (ready for posting soon), we think of it in terms of the “perfect operationality” (in Baudrillard’s terms) of a simulacrum of ‘what IR is’ (or, in your terms ‘how to govern’) where the system and its normalized ‘opposition’ form a tight narrative of completeness that makes ‘otherness’ to it impossible. That narrative completeness relies on bodies being where they are ‘supposed’ to be (in Foucauldian terms about biopower being an enforcer of sovereignty), and re-placement of bodies (occupation) interrupts the narrative completeness of the imperium by demonstrating the inhabitability of uninhabitable space.