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Dr. Tardy ‘20
(Thierry Tardy, PhD in Political Science, Director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense College (Rome), taught at Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEID, Geneva), the War College in Paris, the Sorbonne, the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po) and the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisations (INALCO, Paris). He is also Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges., “The risks of NATO’s maladaptation,” European Security Volume 30, 2021 - Issue 1, pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)
Conclusion – overcoming maladaptation This article has offered an analysis of the risks of maladaptation that NATO has been exposed to while seeking congruence with its environment. As any security organisation, NATO has since the end of the Cold War sought to align with the needs and policies of its member states; yet such adaptation has generated side effects that can undermine the Alliance’s own relevance. We have looked at the context of the new Cold War to explore this maladaptation. As of 2014, the resurgence of Russia as a peer competitor has given NATO a new role as a collective defence organisation; Russia constitutes a threat and NATO offers a response to it; through the shift to collective defence NATO seemed to align with its environment. What we have seen in this article though is that the pure defence-focused response is insufficient to NATO’s alignment with its threat environment. Because the threats are diverse and embrace a large range of possible actions, the policy response needs to be equally broad-ranging and multi-domain. This leads to the dilemma by which NATO must play with two imperfect policy options: either it focuses on the narrow segment of defence but then risks being ill-equipped for the multifaceted threats; or it enlarges its mandate to a broad range of tasks but then it runs the risks of diluting its core military function. The dilemma is here to stay. Member states are unlikely to agree on a strategy that would clearly identify one path at the expense of the other. And security institutions inherently struggle to demonstrate relevance and adjust their own mandate to the evolving environment. In this context, the challenge comes from the exposed dilemma as much as it is about a trade-off between the narrow and the broad paths; in lieu of a binary choice the way forward is probably to calibrate the scope of the broadening (see Shea 2019). Here is the relevance challenge: for NATO to keep the military edge and being able to prevail in future military operations, while sufficiently enlarging the scope of its mandate so that it can respond to the most acute contemporary threats. Such trade-off builds a slightly different notion of congruence that is in the end more equivocal than initially asserted. Further research is needed on this calibrating exercise as a potential response to maladaptation. When doing this, three sets of considerations will have to be taken into account, and one possible path is recommended. First, the NATO of the Cold War is no longer a useful point of comparison; the threat environment is simply too different today and adaptation has, as a consequence, become a very different process. Second, maintaining a comparative advantage in the military domain will most likely remain a priority and therefore the starting point of any adaptation policy. Failing that, NATO’s added value would be at stake. Third, the nature of the threats means that NATO must to a degree embrace a wider security agenda: hybridity calls for it, and resisting task expansion will be difficult. In this context, one possible way out comes from burden-sharing through institutional partnerships (Flockhart 2014). Back in the 2000s, the idea of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) emerged from the acknowledgement that “NATO cannot do it all”, and must, therefore, rely on partners which, because of their own expertise and comparative advantages, would maximise the broad international efforts, be it in Kosovo or in Afghanistan (see Williams 2011, Tardy 2012, Jakobsen 2018). This is no less valid today. Partnerships carry benefits that alliances bring, be it in terms of capability aggregation, strategy coordination, or burden-sharing (Wallander and Keohane 2002). Partnering with others is imperative as there are issues that are simply not for NATO to tackle and that are nonetheless essential to NATO’s mission. How to organise this new type of comprehensive approach goes beyond the remit of this article. The thinking relates to other institutions such as the EU or the UN, but also to sub-state actors such as municipalities, law enforcement entities or regions, as well as the private sector. At least two principles should guide the reflection so as to minimise the risk of maladaptation: first is the fact that any task expansion be based on NATO’s added value as a defence institution. It is this defence added value that must determine the nature of NATO’s role in any broader partnership. Any task expansion that would not make the military nature of the Alliance the starting point of the discussion would potentially lead back to the unintended consequences of adaptation and create incongruence. Second, any burden-sharing implies that NATO may not be in the lead, but rather in support of other actors, and even, theoretically, coordinated by others. This implies a sense of modesty in some areas of multi-domain threat response, where NATO’s added value is not central. Making these points takes us far from the alleged pertinence of the post-Ukraine collective defence agenda. Yet, this is what NATO’s relevance and congruence with the twenty-first-century security environment are about.
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Ringsmose and Rynning ‘21
(Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning are both professors of war studies at the University of Southern Denmark.“NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish,” Survival Global Politics and Strategy Volume 63, 2021 - Issue 5 pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)
The challenge for NATO is to tap into these values without falling into the familiar trap of committing itself to global governance, a commitment which the disorderly and hasty Afghan retreat has robbed of much of its credibility. Today, NATO needs to be clear on the need to defend democratic values at home and on the lengths to which it is willing to go in the defence of such values abroad. Partnering with established democracies in Asia may fit the bill, but building democracy in contested countries likely will not. In short, NATO needs to subordinate cooperative security to its key priority of collective defence.
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Larsen 5/22/22
(Henrik, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich., “NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China,” pg online @ //pg online @ //um-ef)
NATO must steer clear of the temptation to take on too many tasks and instead enhance resilience only in areas that can be reconciled with its mandate as a security and defense alliance. The encounter with illiberal powers strengthens NATO’s unity, but that does not necessarily mean that NATO is the right institution to meet the illiberal challenges that Russia and China pose. So far, the alliance’s record of responding to these threats has been uneven, and the perspectives about its role have diverged at times between the United States and its European partners. But there is a way forward, if NATO can clearly delineate what should and should not fall within its remit, be clear-eyed about its strategic environment, and prioritize international partners that share NATO’s interests and values.
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Uniqueness › EDT/Innovation Uniq › Uniq --- DIANA = Privatize Now
Simona R. Soare 21, Simona holds a PhD in Political Science from the National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest where she lectured on international security, 6/11/21, “Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies,” GMF, This policy brief is published as part of the GMF Transatlantic Security Task Force project, with the support of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, , JH
In the context of the rapid pace of progress in several technologies driven by the private sector and market forces, NATO’s approach to innovation and EDTs stands out in comparison to previous adaptation efforts in the 1990s and 2000s. The ongoing reflection in the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Roadmap and the NATO 2030 process is perhaps one of the most systematic efforts to develop a strategic and coordinated approach to several technology priority areas, backed simultaneously by institutional change and procedural innovation. Today’s iteration of defense innovation seems an order of magnitude and speed above what the alliance has experienced before. It builds on substantial changes in NATO processes, structures, authorities, and skills to reward risk taking and experimentation. NATO’s innovation efforts also go beyond the traditional focus on technical and operational standardization, and they include a prominent ethical and normative dimension. As the NATO secretary-general recently underlined, allies “should also look into how NATO can be the platform to address ethical aspects of these technologies,” including by developing “guideline standards.”22
NATO has a real opportunity to broaden its vision and practice in this area by using innovation in EDTs as a linchpin for a new allied framework in which innovation drives the adaptation process. If the flexibility, creativity, and diversity of democratic societies, governments, advanced economies, and research communities are a strategic asset, as the NATO 2030 process suggests, then NATO can create an innovation environment that competes with more centralized alternatives, such China’s process of civil-military fusion. For example, the new NATO accelerator could prioritize disruptive innovation in strategic digital systems of systems and technology convergence (notably, combinations of emerging technologies) while maintaining the trend of sustained innovation in other emerging technologies such as hypersonics. The aim would be to start on a disruptive pathway, with a view to challenging the operational models of adversaries, rather than merely improving allied military capabilities. Thus, the accelerator could become NATO’s permanent offset capacity.
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Uniqueness › EDT/Innovation Uniq › Uniq --- Concept = Privat Now
Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović 22, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović is a Croatian politician and diplomat who served as President of Croatia from 2015 to 2020, 6/16/22, “NATO Must Ensure Defense and Civilian Industries Work Together,” Defense One, defense-and-civilian-industries-work-together/368250/, JH
The internet, microwaves, and synthetic rubber came into our lives as products invented for military purposes. Even everyday things, such as undershirts and concentrated fruit juice were created to improve the combat readiness of armed forces. Though many people typically associate the military with war and suffering, this industry has been a source of incredible progress, producing inventions that made our lives longer, healthier, and easier. These days, innovation is likely to run the other way, with the military benefiting from inventions developed with private funding.
A symbiotic relationship between military needs and human progress is not necessarily the default. Instead, it requires a well-oiled innovation ecosystem in which military and civilian industries share their expertise and knowledge with one another. NATO has recently announced several initiatives to build on past success, but more are needed—particularly as members increase their military funding.
Virtually all alliance members are investing more in defense or are soon planning to do so. Germany, for example, declared that it would create a 100-billion-Euro fund and reach its 2% goal in 2022. Poland, which shares the longest EU border with Ukraine, has taken in more than 3.5 million Ukrainian refugees and promised to dedicate 3% of its GDP to defense. Croatia ramped up its defense investment to 2.3% of GDP.
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Uniqueness › EDT/Innovation Uniq › Uniq --- NATO Unity on DIANA Now
Chris Ruff 22, Director for Political Outreach & Communications, 3/24/22, “Increase security spending to 3% of GDP, with 1% dedicated to emerging technologies,” Digital Europe, , JH
Ahead of the NATO and European summits today, DIGITALEUROPE urges leaders to bolster their cooperation with the private sector, and invest in a strong and resilient security policy with digital technologies at its heart.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has shocked the world. Our support goes out to the Ukrainian people who are suffering unimaginable horrors.
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Uniqueness › EDT/Innovation Uniq › Uniq --- NATO = Privat EDT Now
Kyle Wiggers 21, Kyle Wiggers is a senior reporter at TechCrunch with a special interest in artificial intelligence, 10/21/21, , The Machine, , JH
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the military alliance of 30 countries that border the North Atlantic Ocean, this week announced that it would adopt its first AI strategy and launch a 'future-proofing' fund with the goal of investing around $1 billion. Military.com reports[1] that U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin will join other NATO members in Brussels, Belgium, the alliance's headquarters, to formally approve the plans over two days of talks.
Speaking at a news conference, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that the effort was in response to 'authoritarian regimes racing to develop new technologies.' NATO's AI strategy will cover areas including data analysis, imagery, cyberdefense, he added.
NATO said in a July press release that it was 'currently finalizing' its strategy on AI' and that principles of responsible use of AI in defence will be 'at the core' of the strategy. Speaking to Politico in March, NATO assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges David van Weel said[2] that the strategy would identify ways to operate AI systems ethically, pinpoint military applications for the technology, and provide a 'platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards.' van Weel said.
'Future conflicts will be fought not just with bullets and bombs but also with bytes and big data,' Stoltenberg said. 'We must keep our technological edge.'
NATO's overtures come after a senior cybersecurity official at the Pentagon resigned in protest because the slow pace of technological development at the department. Speaking to the press last week, Nicolas Chaillan, former chief software officer at the Air Force, said that the U.S. has 'no competing fighting chance against China' in 15 to 20 years, characterizing the AI and cyber defenses in some government agencies as being at 'kindergarten level.'
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in 2020 launched the AI Partnership for Defense[3], which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context. More recently, the department announced that it plans to invest $874 million next year in AI-related technologies as a part of the army's $2.3 billion science and technology research budget.
Much of the DoD's spending originates from the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) in Washington, D.C., a government organization exploring the use and applications of AI in combat. According to an analysis by Deltek, the DoD set aside $550 million of AI obligations awarded to the top ten contractors and defense accounted for 37% of total AI spending by the U.S. government, with contractors receiving the windfall.
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Uniqueness › Deterrence/Doctrine Focus › Uniq --- Conventional Strength Focus
Kojala and Kulys 6/19/22 [Linas Kojala, Director of the Eastern Europe Studies Center, Lithuania. Justinas Kulys, Policy Analyst / Project Manager, Eastern Europe Studies Center, Lithuania.; “Lithuania Hopes NATO’s Strategic Concept Leads To More Heavy Metal And Boots On The Ground – Analysis”; Eurasia Review; June 19, 2022; https://www.eurasiareview.com/19062022-lithuania-hopes-natos-strategic-concept-leads-to-more-heavy-metal-and-boots-on-the-ground-analysis/]//eleanor
In its last strategic concept, NATO focused more on problems like terrorism rather than on conventional warfare, reforming its military structure and procuring lighter military equipment. After the Russian aggression in Ukraine there is much speculation in the media about the lack of specific military equipment in NATO countries. Their lack could also be detrimental to strengthening NATO’s eastern flank on a more long-term basis. To strengthen the security of the Baltic States more heavy equipment, such as tanks and heavy artillery, must be deployed in the region. This could be a helpful deterrence measure against Russia and increase the capabilities of NATO forces in the area as all three Baltic States have either mechanised or motorised brigades. All of these combat-ready military capabilities must be formed in NATO countries at a national level and only then can they be sent to the Baltics. It is to be hoped that the current trend in rising military spending will soon cover all the most urgent gaps. Air defence is a crucial gap for the security of the Baltic States. They lack fighter jets and long-range air-defence systems, so they are heavily dependent on NATO air policing missions (despite efforts to strengthen their mid-range air defence capabilities). While the air policing concept might have been efficient when it was created, it should now focus more on integrated air defence. First, NATO fighter jets in the Baltics should be consistently armed and ready to engage if needed. Secondly, NATO should think about deploying extra surface-based air defence (especially long-range) capabilities that can be integrated with local air defence infrastructures and capabilities and strengthen air defence capabilities by expanding eFP forces to the brigade level. Furthermore, NATO’s presence in the air could be reinforced by having high-readiness airpower capabilities assigned to be deployed in the Baltic States in a crisis or conflict.
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Miller and Superville 6/25/22 [Zeke Miller is an American journalist and past President of the White House Correspondents Association. Miller is a White House reporter for the Associated Press. Darlene Superville is a veteran White House reporter for The Associated Press.; “Biden’s mission in Europe: Shore up alliance against Russia”; AP News; June 25, 2022; https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-inflation-biden-g-7-summit-nato-090e5cc5390acf29a069334dba0a5b47]//eleanor
WASHINGTON (AP) — President Joe Biden is out to sustain the global alliance punishing Russia for its invasion of Ukraine as he embarks on a five-day trip to Europe as the four-month-old war shows no sign of abating and its aftershocks to global food and energy supplies are deepening. Biden first joins a meeting of the Group of Seven leading economic powers in the Bavarian Alps of Germany and later travels to Madrid for a summit with leaders of the 30 NATO countries. The visit comes as the global coalition to bolster Ukraine and punish Russia for its aggression has showed signs of fraying amid skyrocketing inflation in food and energy prices caused by the conflict. Biden, who left Washington on Saturday, and the G-7 leaders intend to announce a ban on importing gold from Russia, according to a person familiar with White House planning who was not authorized to discuss the matter publicly. Gold is Moscow’s second largest export after energy. The Ukraine war has entered a more attritional phase since Biden’s last trip to Europe in March, just weeks after Russia launched its assault. At that time, he met with allies in Brussels as Ukraine was under regular bombardment and he tried to reassure Eastern Europe partners in Poland that they would not be the next to face an incursion by Moscow. Russian’s subsequent retreat from western Ukraine and regrouping in the east has shifted the conflict to one of artillery battles and bloody house-to-house fighting in the country’s industrial heartland, the Donbas region. While U.S. officials see broad consensus for maintaining the pressure on Russia and sustaining support for Ukraine in the near term, they view Biden’s trip as an opportunity to align strategy for both the conflict and its global ramifications heading into the winter and beyond. Allies differ over whether their goals are merely to restore peace or to force Russia to pay a deeper price for the conflict to prevent its repetition.
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Coffey 6/25/22 [Luke Coffey is the director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation.; “NATO’s chance to chart a new path for its future”; Arab News; June 25, 2022; https://www.arabnews.com/node/2110366]//eleanor
The second issue to watch is the publication of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, its first since 2010. Had it not been for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this would have been the big news from the summit. The Strategic Concept is the premier policy document to guide the alliance’s role into the future. The current version is woefully out of date. In the past 12 years there have been major geopolitical crises such as the so-called Arab Spring and its aftermath, NATO’s intervention in Libya, the defeat in Afghanistan, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the rise of Daesh, the rise of China, and COVID-19. None of these issues were addressed in the 2010 Strategic Concept in any meaningful way. Although it is 40 pages long, the words “pandemic” and “China” do not appear. Of course, Russia will be the main focus of the new document, but it will be equally interesting to see how other issues such as China and engagement with the Middle East will be addressed.
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Coffey 6/25/22 [Luke Coffey is the director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation.; “NATO’s chance to chart a new path for its future”; Arab News; June 25, 2022; https://www.arabnews.com/node/2110366]//eleanor
NATO leaders will meet in Madrid next week at a crucial time for the transatlantic alliance. It will be their first summit since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February and NATO’s defeat and withdrawal from Afghanistan last year. The main focus of the meeting will be Ukraine. Russia’s invasion has completely altered the geopolitical landscape of the transatlantic community. The consequences of this war will not be fully felt or understood for years. The alliance will want to take steps to deal with the fallout from the conflict and to prepare for new security challenges in the future. Also, considering the fragile security situation in Europe, it will be very important for all 30 NATO members to show cohesion and unity. While some who have cozy economic relations with Russia have caused some bumps in the road for the alliance, for the most part NATO members have been unified in their response to Russia.
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Shankar 6/25/22 [Priyanka Shankar is an independent journalist with a keen interest in press freedom, human rights and podcasting.; “Nato poised to harden position on China as support for Russia deepens distrust”; Yahoo! Money; June 25, 2022; https://money.yahoo.com/nato-poised-harden-position-china-093000314.html]//eleanor
As Nato leaders prepare to convene in Madrid next week for their annual summit, observers say the world's largest defence alliance is likely to harden its stance towards China over its position on Russia's war in Ukraine. China is expected to be identified for the first time in Nato's new strategic concept, a key document charting the 30-member bloc's future security trail and military development to be adopted at the summit. A recent Nato survey across all member states found China was viewed as a security threat by 52 per cent of respondents, an increase of 11 percentage points from 2021. Do you have questions about the biggest topics and trends from around the world? Get the answers with SCMP Knowledge, our new platform of curated content with explainers, FAQs, analyses and infographics brought to you by our award-winning team. "China is openly contesting the rules-based international order," Nato chief Jens Stoltenberg told an event organised by media firm Politico in Brussels this week, in a sharp departure from his tone a year ago. Chinese investments in new modern military equipment and desire to control critical infrastructure in Europe had made it all the more important for Nato to develop a stronger stance, the secretary general said.
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Xu 6/25/22 [Yifan Xu is a reporter at China Daily; “Russia to dominate Western agenda”; China Daily; June 25, 2022; http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202206/25/WS62b624d5a310fd2b29e68796.html]//eleanor
At the upcoming G7 and NATO summits, Russia will be No 1 on the agenda, while China will also be a focus, experts said. Because of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, "the focus fundamentally will remain on Russia at these summits", Sourabh Gupta, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Institute for China-America Studies, told China Daily. He said the issue of China would also be brought into the spotlight, for the two groups "had already been thinking a little bit about China for a few years". "That's why this issue of China being big into the NATO Strategic Concept was something which was cooking for a couple of years," Gupta said. The G7 group will hold its 48th summit at Schloss Elmau in Germany between Saturday and Monday. The NATO summit will take place in the Spanish capital Madrid on the last two days of June. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said the summit would update the NATO Strategic Concept, and will include China in this document for the first time. On Tuesday, the Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a news briefing call previewing the two summits. During the call, Matthew Goodman, senior vice-president for economics at the CSIS, said the two summits are "a pretty challenging set of meetings" for the United States. "The good news is that President (Joe) Biden has some wind at his back because he was able to mobilize this group of allies and partners to take on the Russia-Ukraine challenge initially. But the question is: Can he move the ball forward on these two — at these two meetings," Goodman said. "There are some pretty significant headwinds here. you have Ukraine bogged down. You've got inflation raging, you know, a series of crises from food to energy to health to climate. Obviously, Ukraine is going to loom large and the big question is around whether this group is going to be able to take forward the sanctions."
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Kojala and Kulys 6/19/22 [Linas Kojala, Director of the Eastern Europe Studies Center, Lithuania. Justinas Kulys, Policy Analyst / Project Manager, Eastern Europe Studies Center, Lithuania.; “Lithuania Hopes NATO’s Strategic Concept Leads To More Heavy Metal And Boots On The Ground – Analysis”; Eurasia Review; June 19, 2022; https://www.eurasiareview.com/19062022-lithuania-hopes-natos-strategic-concept-leads-to-more-heavy-metal-and-boots-on-the-ground-analysis/]//eleanor
For decades the Baltic States and Poland have been the most vocal advocates of the threat posed by Russia’s aggressive foreign policy to the peace and stability of Eastern Europe and beyond. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine there is a feeling that testing NATO’s resolve in the Baltic states and Poland may well be the next move. Thus, they are convinced that a greater NATO presence and enablers capable of deterring and, if necessary, defending the area are urgently needed. History taught Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia the lessons of living in a tough neighbourhood with Russia. After gaining independence in the 1990s they focused their foreign and security policies on two main goals: joining both the EU and NATO. First, these two goals determined their geopolitical will to become an official part of the vital Western alliances, showing a willingness to follow the Western way of life and its values. Secondly, they had practical implications as they helped build a framework for economic development and offered official security guarantees from the West. To become members of NATO, the Baltic states not only reformed and strengthened their armed forces (with material and expert support from the Nordic countries) but also contributed to NATO missions in many of the period’s hotspots, such as Bosnia and Hercegovina and Iraq. The greater or lesser but constant physical menace from Russia felt by the Baltic States has led them to mainly focus on conventional threats as they are both real and existential. Yet the shifts in modern warfare witnessed in Ukraine starting from 2014 also require focusing on hybrid threats, as they can be used during peacetime or as a preparation prior to aggression. Given Russia’s regional military advantage, aggressive rhetoric against the Baltic States and possibly permanent Russian troop deployments in Belarus, it is essential for NATO to enhance its defensive capabilities in the region, moving away from an enhanced forward presence towards forward defence. This is the crucial reason why the Baltic States are focused on more practical military solutions (to be described in this article) during the upcoming NATO Strategic Concept and NATO Summit in Madrid.
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Simon 22 [Prof. Luis Simón is director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute, and director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) at the Brussels School of Governance.; “The Madrid Strategic Concept and the future of NATO”; NATO Review; June 2, 2022; https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/06/02/the-madrid-strategic-concept-and-the-future-of-nato/index.html]//eleanor
Initial discussions on the next Strategic Concept revolved around the need to prepare the Alliance for a world characterised by the return of inter-state threats and great power competition. This alone marked a sharp contrast with the Alliance’s post-Cold War focus on transnational challenges and non-peer competitors. What would the return of great power competition entail for the evolving balance between NATO’s so-called three core tasks (i.e. collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security)? How should NATO balance a renewed focus on inter-state threats and great power competitors with the ongoing relevance of transnational threats and challenges, like terrorism or the climate-security nexus? When thinking about great power competition, how much emphasis should NATO put on Russia’s immediate threat to Europe, as opposed to the more systemic challenge represented by China’s strategic rise? And what should be the right balance between the military and non-military aspects of great power competition? The latter question becomes particularly relevant in light of the growing salience of “hybrid” forms of warfare and emerging disruptive technologies, which compel the Alliance to emphasise societal resilience at home and step up its efforts to innovate technologically. The war in Ukraine – and ongoing debates about how the Alliance can assist Ukraine while strengthening deterrence in Eastern Europe – have become important topics in Strategic Concept discussions. In a way, the current war vindicates the view that we do indeed live in an increasingly competitive world, and that inter-state threats are back. On the other hand, the overt and direct nature of Russia’s invasion challenges some of the pervading assumptions about how future conflict was likely to unfold in indirect and hybrid ways.
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Atlantic Council 6/16/22 [ is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and a research fellow at National Defense University, 6-16-2022, Visualizing the NATO Strategic Concept: Five ways to look at the Alliance's future, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/trackers-and-data-visualizations/visualizing-the-nato-strategic-concept/] Eric
The Madrid Strategic Concept will redefine the Alliance’s core tasks. The focus will be on defense and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic, but cooperative security and relations with partners are still relevant given the myriad non-traditional challenges posed by climate, technology, and authoritarianism. Cooperative security is a means of strengthening the Alliance’s relationships with these global innovation and climate leaders, and leveraging their strengths and experiences to help shape and sustain the rules-based international order.
Jim Garamone 22 [Jim Garamone, 6-16-2022, NATO Defense Leaders Set Stage for Alliance Decisions at Madrid Summit, U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3065892/nato-defense-leaders-set-stage-for-alliance-decisions-at-madrid-summit/] Eric
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Hamilton ‘20
(Daniel, Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Distinguished Fellow and Director of the Global Europe Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC . He is also a faculty member at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies . He previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for NATO and Nordic-Baltic affairs, and as Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff for two U .S . Secretaries of State, “Transatlantic Futures: Towards #NATO2030,” Latvian Institute for International Affairs, https://www.academia.edu/47604415/Between_War_and_Integration_NATO_and_Russia_towards_2030)
How to Achieve It A NATO Summit no later than late spring/early summer 2021 can set the stage with allied heads of state and government affirming their mutual commitments to each other under the North Atlantic Treaty . At that summit, leaders should initiate a process leading to a new Strategic Concept to be unveiled at a bookend summit within 12 months . A new Strategic Concept is an opportunity to get all allies back on track in a NATO that is more cohesive politically, more capable militarily, more balanced between North American and European contributions, and more resilient in the face of disruptive dangers to our societies .
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Uniqueness › Thumpers › AT: NATO Expansion/Nordic Thumper
Richard Milne 22, Richard Milne was a capital markets editor, European business correspondent, correspondent in both Frankfurt and Paris as well as a graduate trainee, 6/13/22, “Nato chief says he had ‘no reason to believe’ Turkey would block Nordic membership,” Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/80039389-1d2b-4eca-9cf6-476a2a6ca0ac
Nato’s secretary-general insisted he had “no reason to believe” Turkey would block Finland and Sweden’s bids to join the military alliance when he promised the Nordic countries a quick accession process in April.
Jens Stoltenberg told the Financial Times that it was still possible to overcome Ankara’s “legitimate” concerns over terrorism and arms sales “within a reasonable time”. The former Norwegian prime minister added: “Earlier in the process, we had no reasons to believe there would be any problems.
The Turkish concerns are not new. Türkiye is an important ally, and when an ally raises security concerns, we have to address them.” Nato officials promised Finland and Sweden that the first stage of their Nato bid would only take one or two weeks, before Turkey raised objections over terrorism and support for the Kurds just as the two Nordic nations applied last month after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
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Uniqueness › Thumpers › AT: Greece/Turkey Thumper
Tasos Kokkinidis 22, Greek Reporter who studied poly sci at University of Newcastle upone Tyre, 6/17/22, “Greece and Turkey Agree to Reduce Tension in the Aegean” Greek Reporter, , JH
Greece and Turkey agreed to reduce tension and keep communication channels open during a meeting between the countries’ defense ministers on Thursday.
Greek National Defense Minister Nikos Panagiotopoulos held a brief meeting with his Turkish counterpart Hulusi Akar on the sidelines of the NATO defense ministers summit held in Brussels.
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Uniqueness › Thumpers › AT: France/U.S. Fights Now
ANI 21, ANI is South Asia's leading Multimedia News Agency providing content to TV, newspapers, digital platforms, mobile apps and news consolidators as complete digital media solutions, 6/12/21, “Washington, Paris 'on same page': Biden tells Macron,” Yahoo News https://sg.news.yahoo.com/washington-paris-same-page-biden-172254604.html
The United States and France are "on the same page" and can work together to further strengthen NATO, US President Joe Biden told his French counterpart on Saturday, adding that he felt strongly about ensuring NATO's "cohesion."
"As we say back in the States, we're on the same page," Biden told Macron during a televised conversation on the margins of the ongoing G7 summit in the UK.