2022
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Unilat Threaten CPs › Top Shelf › Solvency---Tariffs---AT: Backlash Turn---Thumper
Josh Boak 18, Editor at The Associated Press. “US might tie NATO contributions to tariff exemptions.” Defense News. 3-10-2018. https://www.defensenews.com/news/2018/03/10/us-might-tie-nato-contributions-to-tariff-exemptions/ //EM
WASHINGTON — U.S. allies seeking to avoid the steel and aluminum tariffs approved by President Donald Trump might be asked to step up their financial commitments to NATO.
Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin told CNBC in a Friday interview that the president will consider national security, noting that Trump wants to be sure that NATO gets more funding from European allies who Trump has previously criticized for not contributing enough.
2022
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Unilat Threaten CPs › Top Shelf › PDCP---2NC
Office of the Secretary of Defense 21. “Justification for Security Cooperation Program and Activity Funding.” 2021. https://open.defense.gov/Portals/23/Documents/Security_Cooperation/Budget_Justification_FY2021.pdf //EM
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2017 defines security cooperation as “any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the Department of Defense with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows:
• To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations
2022
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Unilat Threaten CPs › Top Shelf › 1NC --- Tariffs Threats CP Shell
Marc Thiessen 22. Twice-weekly column for The Post on foreign and domestic policy and contributes to the PostPartisan blog. . “Thiessen: Trump’s tough stance proves effective on NATO, tariffs.” Columbian. 6-2-2022. https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:2S3jHtr-eucJ:https://www.columbian.com/news/2018/jul/31/thiessen-trumps-tough-stance-proves-effective-on-nato-tariffs/+&cd=24&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us //EM
Give President Trump credit. When he chastised NATO allies over their failure to spend adequately on our common defense, his critics said he was endangering the Atlantic alliance. Instead, his tough stance persuaded allies to spend billions more on defense, strengthening NATO instead.
Now, Trump is doing the same on trade. At the Group of Seven summit in Quebec, Trump was roundly criticized for publicly berating allies over their trade practices and provoking a needless trade war. Well, once again, it appears Trump is being proved right. On Wednesday, he and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker announced a cease-fire in their trade war and promised to seek the complete elimination of most trade barriers between the United States and the European Union. “We agreed today . . . to work together toward zero tariffs, zero non-tariff barriers, and zero subsidies on non-auto industrial goods,” declared the two leaders in a joint statement.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › China › Solvency --- Taiwan
Yau 22 [Dr. is an associate professor of strategy and international affairs as well as the director of the Graduate Institute of International Security at the National Defense University in Taiwan. Their views expressed in this analysis neither represent the official positions of the current or past affiliation of their institutions nor their respective governments, 6-5-2022, Can America Prevent a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan?, National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-america-prevent-chinese-invasion-taiwan-202783?page=0%2C2] Eric
McKinney and Harris believe that deterrence by denial will fail, but deterrence by punishment will succeed. It seems that at a certain point in time, any of the U.S. deterrence strategies in stopping the occurrence of a war over the Taiwan Strait may very likely be destined to fail. This assessment is predicated on not only China promoting a nationalist dogma, but also the structural development in China’s growing ambitions and modernization of its military strength. It is not about whether China would want to use its force against Taiwan, but when China—under CPC rule—will feel that the conditions are conducive to doing so. However, it would be a misconception to quickly equate U.S. “strategic clarity” to a great power war as McKinney and Harris maintained.
As exemplified by the Russia-Ukraine war, while the United States and NATO are undecided to confront Russia directly, there are indirect ways that the international community could provide continuous support to Ukraine without creating an escalated conflict. The objective of traditional deterrence is to prevent a war—not to win a war. Nevertheless, deterrence across the Taiwan Strait may be less about stopping the CPC’s ambitions, but more about prolonging the war and deterring the People’s Liberation Army’s triphibious invasion.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Russia › Solvency --- Disinformation
Morgus 22 [Robert Morgus is a Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council, 2-3-2022, Foreign Disinformation: What the US Government Can Start Doing Now, Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/80057/foreign-disinformation-what-the-us-government-can-start-doing-now/] Eric
On the issue of social media, for example, the CSC and Aspen agree that the federal government should push for greater transparency on how social media platforms sort, moderate, and remove on their platforms. The unique position of platforms in the information ecosystem allots them an outsized opportunity to exert positive influence over the media and information environment. But rather than trying to regulate content on these social media platforms, lawmakers and regulators should endeavor to establish clearer transparency expectations and guidelines for social media companies related to labeling advertisements and paid content, bots, and content created by foreign registered agents. In addition, the two commissions argue that the federal government should work with social media companies so that the American public better understands the various platforms’ policies on content moderation and takedowns.
In addition, both the CSC and the Aspen Commission agree that Congress should take action to ensure that third-party researchers can access data to better understand, identify, and – most importantly – explain foreign disinformation campaigns to the American public. The federal government could support these research efforts through grants to nonprofit centers, such as the Alliance for Securing Democracy’s Hamilton 2.0 dashboard and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Russia › Solvency --- Disinformation
Morgus 22 [Robert Morgus is a Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council, 2-3-2022, Foreign Disinformation: What the US Government Can Start Doing Now, Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/80057/foreign-disinformation-what-the-us-government-can-start-doing-now/] Eric
The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), a law passed in 1938 in response to Nazi propaganda, provides a framework to promote transparency regarding the sources of information available to the American public. However, many of the rules created by the law are antiquated, and FARA must be reformed to ensure that all agents of foreign adversaries, including such media organizations, register. In the last Congress, Representative (and CSC Co-Chair) Mike Gallagher (R-Wisc) proposed the Chinese Communist Party Influence Transparency Act, which would require all Chinese corporations to register under FARA. Congress should look at expanding this effort to include corporations domiciled in other adversaries like Russia and Iran. In addition, Congress should amend the definition of “informational materials,” which registered foreign agents are required to both label as such and report to the Department of Justice, in FARA to make clear that social media and email communications are included. In addition, Congress should provide greater specificity regarding the types of social media and email communications that need to be included in FARA filings to ensure that the Department of Justice adopts a records system that better captures the dynamism and interactiveness of digital media and communications, allowing, for example, for social media posts filed to be maintained along with, for example, comments on or replies to a post, while preserving appropriate privacy protections.
Combatting disinformation also requires imposing costs on adversaries responsible for influence operations – what the CSC refers to as a strategy of layered cyber deterrence in the information landscape. For example, the U.S. government should continue to engage in robust “defend forward” operations to dismantle adversary disinformation infrastructure and cause friction in adversary disinformation campaigns, as it did, for , with the Internet Research Agency around the 2018 midterm election.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Russia › Solvency --- Disinformation
Crovitz 22 [L. Gordon Crovitz, a former publisher of the Wall Street Journal, is co-CEO of NewsGuard, which rates news websites based on their journalistic reliability, 04-29-2022, Opinion, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/03/29/law-counter-putins-propaganda-unused-00020805] Eric
The first invasion by Russia was not dispatching his military into Ukraine. It was the malignant propaganda the Kremlin skillfully deployed to poison public opinion in the U.S. and Europe. The Biden administration — specifically Attorney General Merrick Garland — should now enforce a longstanding law requiring that propaganda from hostile foreign governments be labeled as such so that Americans know who’s feeding them the news. Silicon Valley should atone for its role as Putin’s long-time enabler by pledging to give users the information they need to know when they see propaganda in their social media feeds and search results.
Russian falsehoods about its role in Syria, American bioweapons and Ukraine reached millions of people in Western democracies, including through Facebook, Google, YouTube, TikTok and Twitter. Moscow myths included that Ukraine politics is dominated by Nazis (reported by Russian government sites RT and TASS), that the government in Kyiv committed genocide against ethnic Russians in its Donbas region (Sputnik News and TASS) and that Western governments staged the coup in 2014 that led to the resignation of Ukraine’s pro-Russian president (RT and Sputnik News). This disinformation continues to find an audience in the U.S. and Europe and is being far-right and far-left commentators. The Kremlin seeks a moral equivalence between Moscow and Washington, hoping to undermine Western resolve to defend Ukraine.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Russia › Solvency --- Cyberattacks
Alperovitch and Charap 22 [Dmitri Alperovitch is chairman of the Silverado Policy Accelerator, is on the board of directors of Dragos, Inc. and is the former chief technology officer of CrowdStrike and Samuel Charap is a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, 4-14-2022, Perspective, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/04/15/us-russia-cyber-attacks/] Eric
The United States and Europe have already implemented a large-scale campaign of diplomatic isolation and economic pressure against Russia and allocated unprecedented military aid to Ukraine in response to Moscow’s unprovoked invasion — yet so far, these steps have not fundamentally changed Putin’s calculus. A response to cyberattacks that relies on those same tools to incrementally increase the economic and military pain to the Russians is likewise unlikely to cause the Kremlin to stop.
Unlike sanctions or kinetic attacks, a carefully executed cyberattack on specific targets is relatively easy to implement and, more importantly, easy to end without causing lasting damage. Assuming the initial Russian actions do not lead to loss of life — if they did, then expect Washington to take the gloves off — it would be beneficial for the United States to tailor a response that can provide a powerful demonstration to the Kremlin of U.S. capabilities but avoid widespread destruction that could lead to escalation. Combined with a clear public and private message that the United States will go much further in the cyber arena if Russia attacks again, such a move would demonstrate America’s resolve while creating an off-ramp for Moscow to end its cyber aggression.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Solvency---Unilateral › Solvency --- ASATs
Bateman 20 [Aaron Bateman is a Ph.D. student in the history of science and technology at Johns Hopkins University. Previously, he served as a U.S. Air Force intelligence officer, 7-30-2020, America Can Protect Its Satellites Without Kinetic Space Weapons, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/america-can-protect-its-satellites-without-kinetic-space-weapons/] Eric
The United States should be able to prevent China and Russia from using their space-based capabilities without transforming them into hazards that could impede American, allied, and commercial space operations. Using non-kinetic space weapons has long been on the minds of senior national security officials. When Ford authorized the development of a new kinetic anti-satellite system in 1977, he also for “a non-nuclear anti-satellite capability, including means for electronic nullification.” Today, the emphasis should only be non-kinetic weapons with reversible effects.
Most importantly, the objectives of the Defense Space Strategy can be achieved through the use of non-kinetic space weapons like the Space Force’s Instead of destroying communications satellites, they can be jammed. Rather than developing weapons to completely eliminate adversary intelligence satellites, the United States can invest in that could “blind” them.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Solvency---Unilateral › Solvency --- ASATs
Chow and Kelly 22 [Brian Chow has Ph.D. in physics, MBA with distinction, and Ph.D. in finance. He is an independent policy analyst with over 160 publications. He can be reached at . Brandon Kelley is the director of debate at Georgetown University, and a graduate student in the Security Studies Program. He can be reached at , 5-12-2022, Op-ed, SpaceNews, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-u-s-antisatellite-test-ban-reveals-a-new-approach-for-security-and-sustainability-in-space/] Eric
On April 18, Vice President Kamala Harris a U.S. commitment to forgo “destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing.” This carefully designed ban has the potential to be the first step in a new approach to security and sustainability in space. If so, the United States will be well-positioned to ensure peace and prosperity in space in the emerging era. However, if the U.S. continues its present course, it is unlikely to counter the range of space threats emerging over this decade and beyond.
To succeed, the new U.S. approach must be characterized by three elements.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Solvency---Unilateral › Solvency --- AI Innovation
Desouza 22 [Kevin C. Desouza is a professor of Business, Technology and Strategy in the School of Management at the QUT Business School. He is a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Governance Studies Program at the Brookings Institution and is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the China Institute for Urban Governance at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2-3-2022, How the U.S. can dominate in the race to national AI supremacy, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/02/03/how-the-u-s-can-dominate-in-the-race-to-national-ai-supremacy/] Eric
The U.S. can create a partnership with a country that has an ample supply of talent (which the U.S. lacks) but who lacks adequate funding (which the U.S. has in abundance). In this option, we view a potential partnership with India as a dream scenario. At present, are increasingly frayed and India is openly worried about an increasingly assertive China. to the U.S. and India, jointly facing a common challenger may make sense. As U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken , “…the U.S. has few better options than India for managing a rising China.”
From an AI standpoint, a joint U.S.-India partnership makes a great deal of sense. India produces far more STEM graduates than the U.S., and the U.S. invests far more in technology infrastructure than India does. A U.S.-India partnership eclipses China in both dimensions and a successful partnership could allow the U.S. to quickly leapfrog China in all meaningful aspects of AI.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Solvency---Unilateral › Solvency --- AI Innovation
Desouza 22 [Kevin C. Desouza is a professor of Business, Technology and Strategy in the School of Management at the QUT Business School. He is a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Governance Studies Program at the Brookings Institution and is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the China Institute for Urban Governance at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2-3-2022, How the U.S. can dominate in the race to national AI supremacy, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/02/03/how-the-u-s-can-dominate-in-the-race-to-national-ai-supremacy/] Eric
The Russian launch of the world’s first manned space flight on April 12, 1961, shook the U.S. to its core. Prior to the launch, the U.S. and Russia had already been engaged in a race to space, but those investments were driven as much by . But the Soviet launch put the spotlight on the uncomfortable reality that the US had fallen far behind in the space race and significant educational investments were necessary to close the gap. Life magazine, writing about the state of the US educational system at that time said, “.” As a result, in the 20 years after Sputnik, the National Science Foundation invested five hundred million dollars (in 1960 dollars) into teacher and classroom development. According to , “by connecting the quality of scientific training to the survival of the nation, NSF was able to increase its fellowship budgets more than 100% immediately after Sputnik.” Congress also passed the National Defense Education Act which also infused more than a billion dollars (in 1960 dollars) into science education.
In an age where the race to AI has become a critical gamechanger, we suggest that China’s emergence as the leader in the race to AI dominance should necessitate the same singular national focus as the Russian launch of Sputnik in the 1960s. To produce the talent necessary to achieve its national AI strategies, the U.S. must dramatically reinvigorate its approach to STEM education and force a focus on computer science at very early ages. , currently proposed in Congress, is an excellent step in this direction. Failure to invest in STEM technology has the potential to relegate the U.S. to a second-tier nation when it comes to innovation and the labor force in AI.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Solvency---Unilateral › Solvency---5G---Leadership---Innovation
James Lewis 18. Senior Vice President and Director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic Studies and International Studies. December 2018. “How 5G Will Shape Innovation and Security.” //EM
The United States can manage 5G risk using two sets of policies. The first is to ensure that American companies can continue to innovate and produce advanced technologies and face fair competition overseas. American and “like-minded” companies routinely outspend their Chinese competitors in 5G R&D and hold 10 times as many 5G patents. Chinese companies still depend on the western companies for the most advanced 5G components.
▪ The second is to work with like-minded nations to develop a common approach to 5G security. The United States cannot meet the 5G challenge on its own. When the United States successfully challenged Chinese industrial policy in the past, it has been done in concert with allies.
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Unilat Non-SC CPs › Solvency---Unilateral › Solvency---5G---Leadership
James Lewis 21. Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic Technologies Program Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. “Accelerating 5G in the United States.” CSIS. 3-1-2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/accelerating-5g-united-states //EM
The United States is more than holding its own in 5G. 5G is more than cellular telephony. It is a central part of a new digital environment that blends artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and 5G networks to enable new services and products. 5G meets the growing demand to create and move data and new knowledge faster and more efficiently to support an increasingly digital and interconnected economy.
This 5G strategy offers a comprehensive approach to network technologies, building on the strength of the United States to innovate and invest while designing government policies to support and complement those strengths. The report is the work of a group of experts and provides ideas and recommendations on how to speed infrastructure deployment, how to ensure supply chain security, and how to accelerate 5G use. Our recommendations include:
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Michigan
Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Solvency---Unilateral › Solvency---5G---Leadership
Carisa Nietsche & Martijn Rasser 20. Research Associate in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security; Senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. He is a former CIA officer and AI start-up executive. “Washington’s Anti-Huawei Tactics Need a Reboot In Europe.” Foreign Policy. 4-30-2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/30/huawei-5g-europe-united-states-china/ //EM
A coronavirus-induced economic crisis could send Europe bargain-shopping for critical infrastructure—in ways that might be dangerous. Europe’s argument on moving forward with the implementation of Huawei 5G technology against U.S. objections has long centered on cutting costs. The U.S. calls for a ban of the Chinese telecommunications firm’s 5G equipment in European networks have failed to gain traction in most European capitals. Just a handful of countries have echoed U.S. demands for tougher restrictions to supplement the recently released EU toolbox for 5G security, and even fewer have called for an outright ban.
The United States has highlighted the risks that Huawei poses to national security, including the threat of espionage. Given the Chinese Community Party’s effective control of Huawei, there is concern over data integrity. More serious is the potential to debilitate critical infrastructure. 5G will be the backbone of communications and controls needed for power grids, water supplies, and transportation infrastructure. In January, the United Kingdom announced it would allow Huawei equipment on 35 percent of its 5G networks—a decision that could provide top cover for Germany, France, and others to do the same.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Solvency---Unilateral › Solvency---5G---Cyber---Hardening
Robert Spalding 21. Founder and CEO of SEMPRE, a technology company committed to securing critical U.S. infrastructure. Prior to his role at SEMPRE, Gen. Spalding served in senior positions of strategy and diplomacy within the Defense Dept. and State Dept. for more than 26 years. He was the chief architect of the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and served as the Senior Director for Strategy to the president at the National Security Council. “U.S. military must resolve widespread security threats to harden commercial 5G for the warfighter.” Military Embedded. 10-20-2021. https://militaryembedded.com/comms/communications/us-military-must-resolve-widespread-security-threats-to-harden-commercial-5g-for-the-warfighter //EM
The deployment of 5G networks by the U.S. military will be an historic moment for today’s warfighter. From improved C5ISR [command, control, computers, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] readiness and geolocation accuracy to more effective enemy engagement and perimeter defense, 5G gear will enable scalable, extremely low-latency, mobile radio platforms and an Internet of Things edge-sensor network that puts the power of real-time AI and machine learning into the hands of the combat soldier. This future state is achievable, but not without confronting a blunt reality: 5G is an open architecture designed for commercial applications and as such suffers from a great many security vulnerabilities. To build a resilient, secure, survivable 5G military communications network, we must first harden and future-proof the COTS [commercial off-the-shelf]-based hardware, software, and firmware that are the foundation of today’s civilian 5G infrastructure.
As commercial 5G service rolls out across the U.S. with the promise of 100 times greater speeds than its 4G predecessor, it’s time to examine how the U.S. military can equip the modern warfighter with an upgrade to today’s outmoded battlefield communications infrastructure.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Solvency---Unilateral › Solvency---ASW---AT: Links to Net Benefit---NATO Bad
David Auerswald 20. Professor of security studies at the U.S. National War College in Washington, D.C. He has published books on International Security Assistance Force operations, Congress and national security, Congress and civil-military relations, the politics of coercive diplomacy, and the Kosovo conflict. “NATO in the Arctic: Keep Its Role Limited, For Now.” War on the Rocks. 10-12-2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/nato-in-the-arctic-keep-its-role-limited-for-now/ //EM
Nevertheless, individual NATO members with territory or territorial waters in the Arctic (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and the United States) have taken the initiative to advance their Arctic interests. Recently, the United States has taken a more assertive role in the region. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called out Russian and Chinese Arctic behavior at the May 2019 Arctic Council ministerial meeting, the U.S. Air Force has stationed more fifth-generation fighter planes in Alaska than exist in any other location on the planet, and the U.S. Navy reactivated the Second Fleet with responsibilities for the North Atlantic. The Defense Department and individual services have released, or will release, several Arctic strategies. The U.S. Coast Guard published an Arctic Strategic Outlook in April 2019, followed by an Arctic strategy from the Defense Department in June 2019 and the U.S. Air Force in July 2020. The Navy and Army are expected to follow suit with revised Arctic strategies in late 2020 and 2021 respectively.
So far, all of those strategies reference the value of regional partnerships with like-minded states, which begs the question — should NATO play a greater role in the Arctic? Some argue yes, saying that NATO should create an Arctic security forum with Russia or engage in visible contingency planning. Others disagree, believing that since there is no consensus within the alliance on actions in the Arctic, the matter should be left to individual member states. Camille Grand, NATO’s assistant secretary general for defense investment, said when asked about the topic in an a recent interview, “I don’t think we are there yet.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Solvency---Unilateral › Solvency---ASW---AT: DoD Processing Fails
Michael C. Horowitz & Lauren Kahn 22. American author and professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania; Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Why DoD’s New Approach to Data and Artificial Intelligence Should Enhance National Defense.” Council on Foreign Relations. 3-3-2022. https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-dods-new-approach-data-and-artificial-intelligence-should-enhance-national-defense //EM
The ability of the United States to compete in the 21st century depends on U.S. leadership in data and artificial intelligence (AI). In response, the Department of Defense (DoD) is taking a new and much-needed approach to U.S. defense efforts in data and AI. David Spirk, the departing Chief Data Officer of the Pentagon, made clear yesterday that the office of the Chief Digital and AI Officer (CDAO), in addition to its other functions, will be the successor organization for and replace DoD’s much-touted Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC). While the JAIC symbolized DoD’s efforts to get smart on AI beginning in 2018, the integration of data and AI represents a maturation of the U.S. AI approach—one that elevates the importance of AI in national defense. The JAIC itself was not as important as what the JAIC stood for—DoD’s commitment to U.S. defense AI leadership. In paving the way forward and getting AI on the agenda, the JAIC succeeded. From this point on, a more cohesive approach to AI and data through the CDAO is more likely to accelerate AI adoption throughout the U.S. military because it links DoD’s AI efforts with data, the fuel AI requires. For U.S. defense AI adoption, in particular, aligning these organizations could be game-changing. Addressing DoD’s siloed data, standardizing and improving its quality and access, is a precondition to having the data necessary to train algorithms for many defense uses, and any future technologies that rely on collecting, processing, and using information. Implementation will be critical and heavily dependent on two things. First, to catalyze AI adoption, the CDAO will need to develop close relationships with the military services and combatant commands. Second, the CDAO will need to coordinate with DoD’s research and development organizations, such as the Defense Innovation Unit, leading on AI experimentation and research. There is hard work ahead, but the new organizational design is promising.
The office of the CDAO brings together previously independent components of DoD: the JAIC, the office of the Chief Data Officer, the Defense Digital Service (DDS), and the Office of Advancing Analytics (ADVANA). The office of the Chief Data Officer is in charge of data management and coordination, DDS finds digital solutions for internal data and security issues, and ADVANA aggregates data and conducts data analytics. The combination of these offices raised questions about whether an independent JAIC was necessary for U.S. defense AI leadership. Departing CDO Spirk says that the CDAO will be “taking the best parts of all the organizations it is overseeing and redistributing them for faster and better decision-making.” We agree. At present, not only is DoD’s data siloed but its AI efforts and initiatives are as well. According to the company Govini, in FY21, fifteen separate departments and organizations funded and worked on AI and AI-adjacent technologies, often without formal coordination or throughlines. This has led to redundancies, gaps, inconsistencies in application and access to data and resources, and an overall hodge-podge of AI efforts. DoD has acknowledged this and is making organizational changes necessary to accelerate AI adoption even more by restructuring its AI approach from the ground up. Now, CDAO will have teams working on policy and governance, technology development, and rolling out data and AI for the Pentagon and the military services, to avoid bureaucratic duplication and confusion that could undermine the CDAO’s overall authority. In particular, bringing the data and AI teams together will improve the data DoD needs for AI development.
2022
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Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Solvency---Unilateral › Solvency --- Black Sea
Joja 20 [Iulia-Sabina Joja is project director of , director of the , and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. lulia’s research and teachings focus primarily on European and Black Sea security, 4-8-2020, US engagement in the Black Sea and Middle East. What more can be done?, Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/us-engagement-black-sea-and-middle-east-what-more-can-be-done] Eric
US defense assistance to Ukraine has more than quadrupled from USD 91 million in 2014 to USD in 2019. It has been the only NATO power to significantly contribute, providing approximately 90 percent of the military assistance received by Ukraine. But this hasn’t been without hurdles. The Trump-Ukraine scandal, which saw the president block US military assistance to Ukraine and ultimately face impeachment proceedings, shocked the global community.
While Ukraine has received lethal and non-lethal equipment worth more than USD 1.5 billion since Crimea’s annexation, this has been insufficient in deterring Russian aggression. Counter-battery radar systems may have helped Ukrainian fatalities but Ukrainian armed forces are struggling to defend themselves against Russian attacks. In November 2018, Russia attacked Ukrainian military and seized three Ukrainian naval vessels at the Kerch Strait – a passage connecting the Black Sea with the much smaller, land-locked Azov Sea. The incident led to massive economic loss for Ukraine, which depends on maritime access, and has had a significant economic impact for Western trade partners.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Unilat Non-SC CPs › Solvency---Unilateral › Solvency---ASW---Black Sea
Kris Osborn 21. Defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. “Inside the Russian Navy's Recent Black Sea Exercises.” National Interest. 12-10-2021. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/inside-russian-navys-recent-black-sea-exercises-197611 //EM
These Russian exercises underscore the significance of the undersea threat the country poses. Russia’s Navy is smaller and less capable compared to the U.S. Navy, yet its submarine fleet is extremely advanced, lethal and sophisticated. Russian cruise-missile-armed attack submarines could potentially attack the coastal areas along Romania and Bulgaria and inland military infrastructures. The U.S. Navy regularly uses its destroyers to conduct security and stability missions in the Black Sea in support of exercises at times including U.S. Coast Guard vessels.
It would be unsurprising if the Defense Department were to send additional anti-submarine warfare assets to the Black Sea to track and ultimately counter Russian submarines. Such an initiative could take the form of large, sub-hunting surveillance planes such as the P-8 Poseidon or surface drones tasked with towing sonars to track activity beneath the surface. Then there is the possibility that U.S. Navy submarines could conduct clandestine undersea surveillance missions or launch smaller, quieter and less detectable undersea drones capable of surveilling sensitive and high-risk areas for potential threats. It’s important to operate with the ability to track moving Russian submarines because they can launch cruise missiles prior to quickly taking off to prevent enemies from finding the launch location.