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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Perms › 2NC – AT: Perm Create a Branch

Transferring decision rights on designated policy matters from existing branches to one explicitly chartered for future generations is key

Boston 14 [Jonathan Boston, Professor of Public Policy, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, Fulbright Fellow, American University. Governing for the Future: How to bring the long-term into short-term political focus. November 5, 2014. https://www.american.edu/spa/cep/upload/jonathan-boston-lecture-american-university.pdf]

But one other point deserves highlighting: if there is only a limited capacity to change the structure of political demand to incentivize policy-makers to give adequate weight to long-term considerations, then other options must be considered. These include additional legislative constraints on what policy-makers are able to decide and transferring formal decision-rights on designated policy matters to bodies that are partially insulated from short-term political pressures. In each case, of course, the overall desirability of such options must be carefully weighed. Not all constraints and insulating techniques are democratically acceptable.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Perms › 2NC – AT: Perm through the Process

The impact is strike down

Chopra & Khan 20, *Rohit, MBA, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission; & **Lina M., JD, current chair of the Federal Trade Commission, Counsel of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law, US House Committee on the Judiciary. (2020, "The Case for “Unfair Methods of Competition” Rulemaking," University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 87 Iss. 2, Article 4, pg. 367-370, Accessible at: )

And third, rulemaking would enable the Commission to establish rules through a transparent and participatory process, ensuring that everyone who may be affected by a new rule has the opportunity to weigh in on it, granting the rule greater legitimacy.49 APA procedures require that an agency provide the public with meaningful opportunity to comment on the rule’s content through the submission of written “data, views, or arguments.”50 The agency must then consider and address all submitted comments before issuing the final rule. If an agency adopts a rule without observing these procedures, a court may strike down the rule.51

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Perms › 2NC – AT: PDB

[3] COHERENCE– agreement on risk-reduction strategies are key – the perm introduces another veto point which undermines focus on future generations

Boston 14 [Jonathan Boston, Professor of Public Policy, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, Fulbright Fellow, American University. Governing for the Future: How to bring the long-term into short-term political focus. November 5, 2014. https://www.american.edu/spa/cep/upload/jonathan-boston-lecture-american-university.pdf]

While the long-term governance challenge arises in all democratic systems, the evidence also suggests that the magnitude and complexity of the challenge varies. Relevant contextual factors affecting this variability include the constitutional rules, the structure of organized interests and party competition, the degree of ideological polarization, the level of societal trust and reciprocity, the characteristics of particular policy problems and the pay-off structure associated with various policy solutions. There can be little doubt, for instance, that securing agreement on how to address major long-term issues, such as fiscal and environmental sustainability, is much harder when there are multiple veto points, when the policy community is deeply divided ideologically and when trust in government is low. Without at least a modest consensus on long-term policy goals and how best to achieve them, governing well for the future will be difficult - as is readily apparent in the United States at present.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Perms › 2NC – AT: PDB

It must have veto power over other branches – the perm is just an extension of the advisory system

Tremmel 6 [Joerg Chet Tremmel is a Professor for "intergenerationally just policies" at the University of Tuebingen. He is Editor-in-chief of the Intergenerational Justice Review and a visiting lecturer at the Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-University Frankfurt, the University of Stuttgart and the Heinrich-Heine-University in Dusseldorf, Germany. Establishing intergenerational justice in national constitutions. Handbook of Intergenerational Justice. 2006. profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/muniz/intergen/Tremmel%20-%20Establishing%20intergenerational%20justice%20in%20national%20constitutions.pdf]

These kinds of new institutions make sense if they really have the competencies to protect future generations. This means, for instance, that these institutions can veto or at least freeze laws or that they can propose laws themselves. Without this responsibility the advisory system is merely extended. In Germany, for instance, there are already four institutions: the German Advisory Council on the Environment (Sachverstandigenrat fur Umweltfragen, www.umweltrat.de), the German Advisory Council on Global Change (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Umweltregierung fiir Globale Umweltveranderungen, www.wbgu.de), the German Council for Sustainable Development (Rat fur Nachhaltige Entwicklung, www. nachhaltigkeitsrat.de) and the Parliamentary Advisory Council on Sustainable Development (Parlamentarischer Beirat fiir nachhaltige Entwicklung, www.bundestag.de/parlament/parl_beirat/) which was appointed in 2004. They all do not have the necessary power to stop laws which threaten the well-being of future generations.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Perms › 2NC – AT: PDB

[2] INDEPENDENCE – that’s fundamental to success

Smith 15 [Graham Smith, Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development. The Democratic Case for an Office for Future Generations. April 2015. ] Notes: OFG = Offices for Future Generations; Italics in Original

The democratic credentials of an OFG depend very much on how its role and functions are conceived.

At a 2014 conference on Model Institutions fora Sustainable Future,1 there was some disagreement as to the desirability of an independent body. Critics contend that such institutions should be more formally embedded and connected to power: in other words, be part of the parliamentary (and/or executive) infrastructure. This would also ensure explicit democratic legitimacy for the body. For example, the permanent Finnish Parliamentary Committee for the Future has a specific remit to consider the long-term within the work of the Assembly.2

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Perms › 2NC – AT: PDB

Quarrels over authority will weaken the new branch

Tremmel 13 [Joerg Chet Tremmel is a Professor for "intergenerationally just policies" at the University of Tuebingen. He is Editor-in-chief of the Intergenerational Justice Review and a visiting lecturer at the Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-University Frankfurt, the University of Stuttgart and the Heinrich-Heine-University in Dusseldorf, Germany. An extended separation of powers model as the theoretical basis for the representation of future generations. July 26, 2013. https://www.futurejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Paper_Future-Branch_Tremmel.pdf]

Let’s deal with the former first. If a new SO (sustainability organization) is granted real force to act, it is already a variant of the extension of the division of powers model, even if it is not named as such. The only two variants are the “power to assert" and “powerless”. If the representatives of the three established branches quarrel over the new SO, or they make concrete attempts to disempower it, the new SO constitutes a new branch of government - even if at first with a weak power base. The disempowerment of the ombudsman as well as the commission was a clear indicator that these two organisations have already acquired the power to assert.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Perms › 2NC – AT: PDB

[1] Authority– Transferring decision rights is key -- powers need to be explicitly chartered for future generations

Boston 14 [Jonathan Boston, Professor of Public Policy, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, Fulbright Fellow, American University. Governing for the Future: How to bring the long-term into short-term political focus. November 5, 2014. https://www.american.edu/spa/cep/upload/jonathan-boston-lecture-american-university.pdf]

But one other point deserves highlighting: if there is only a limited capacity to change the structure of political demand to incentivize policy-makers to give adequate weight to long-term considerations, then other options must be considered. These include additional legislative constraints on what policy-makers are able to decide and transferring formal decision-rights on designated policy matters to bodies that are partially insulated from short-term political pressures. In each case, of course, the overall desirability of such options must be carefully weighed. Not all constraints and insulating techniques are democratically acceptable.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › OV › 2NC – OV

Anything short of existential impacts – Russia war and pandemics – are small missteps

Bostrom 7 [Nick Bostrom -- come on, you didn't think we wouldn't read at least one of these, right? The Future of Humanity. 2007. https://nickbostrom.com/papers/future.html]

Extinction risks constitute an especially severe subset of what could go badly wrong for humanity. There are many possible global catastrophes that would cause immense worldwide damage, maybe even the collapse of modern civilization, yet fall short of terminating the human species. An all-out nuclear war between Russia and the United States might be an example of a global catastrophe that would be unlikely to result in extinction. A terrible pandemic with high virulence and 100% mortality rate among infected individuals might be another example: if some groups of humans could successfully quarantine themselves before being exposed, human extinction could be avoided even if, say, 95% or more of the world’s population succumbed. What distinguishes extinction and other existential catastrophes is that a comeback is impossible. A non-existential disaster causing the breakdown of global civilization is, from the perspective of humanity as a whole, a potentially recoverable setback: a giant massacre for man, a small misstep for mankind.

An existential catastrophe is therefore qualitatively distinct from a “mere” collapse of global civilization, although in terms of our moral and prudential attitudes perhaps we should simply view both as unimaginably bad outcomes.30 One way that civilization collapse could be a significant feature in the larger picture for humanity, however, is if it formed part of a repeating pattern. This takes us to the second family of scenarios: recurrent collapse.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › 1NC › 1NC – Future Gens CP

Discounting future generations causes extinction – only formalizing a mechanism to weight their concerns solves

Jones et al 18 [Natalie Jones, Mark O'Brien, and Thomas Ryan, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom. Representation of future generations in United Kingdom policy-making. Futures Volume 102, September 2018, Pages 153-163. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328717301179#sec0005]

Global catastrophic and existential risks pose central challenges for intergenerational justice and the structure of our current democracy. The Global Challenges Report 2016 defines global catastrophic risk as risk of an ‘event or process that, were it to occur, would end the lives of approximately 10% or more of the global population, or do comparable damage’ (Global Challenges Foundation & Global Priorities Project, 2016). A subset of catastrophic risks are ‘existential’ risks, which would end human civilisation or lead to the extinction of humanity (Global Challenges Foundation & Global Priorities Project, 2016). Catastrophic and existential risks may be categorised in terms of ongoing risks, which could potentially occur in any given year (e.g. nuclear war; pandemics), versus emerging risks which may be unlikely today but will become significantly more likely in the future (e.g. catastrophic climate change; risks stemming from emerging technologies). Ongoing risks have existed for some time now and are generally well-understood. However, emerging risks, particularly those arising from technological developments, are less understood and demand increasing attention from scientists and policymakers. These technological developments include advances in synthetic biology, geoengineering, distributed manufacturing and artificial intelligence (AI) (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, 2014). Although the impact of these technologies is still very uncertain, expert estimates suggest a non-negligible probability of catastrophic harm.

In this article we rely on two main premises. The first is that future generations are under-represented in current political structures partly due to political ‘short-termism’ or ‘presentism’ (Thompson, 2010). Governments primarily focus on short-term concerns, which mean that they may systematically neglect global catastrophic risks and, accordingly, future generations (Global Priorities Project et al., 2014). The problem of presentism transcends political divisions: people across the political spectrum are concerned about its effects, and should care about mitigating global catastrophic risks. This situation is exacerbated in that the good of mitigating global catastrophic and existential risks is typically global. Individual political actors (even whole countries) bear many costs in providing for such goods, whereas the benefits are dispersed globally. In addition to the benefits of mitigating existential risks being global, many of the beneficiaries are future people who do not exist presently and as such have no voice in the political process. There is a clear lack of incentives to mitigate such risks, and market failure should be expected (Beckstead, 2013).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › 1NC › 1NC – Future Gens CP

Imbuing elected branches with authority grants decision-making authority to present populations – that trades off with future generations – only the cp solves

Tremmel 13 [Joerg Chet Tremmel is a Professor for "intergenerationally just policies" at the University of Tuebingen. He is Editor-in-chief of the Intergenerational Justice Review and a visiting lecturer at the Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-University Frankfurt, the University of Stuttgart and the Heinrich-Heine-University in Dusseldorf, Germany. An extended separation of powers model as the theoretical basis for the representation of future generations. July 26, 2013. https://www.futurejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Paper_Future-Branch_Tremmel.pdf]

And rightly so. The absence of representation of future generations means that conflicts of interest are decided by the majority of eligible voters, not the majority of those affected by the decision. Future people that are relevantly affected by a decision don’t have any influence over it. This ‘representation gap’ is fundamentally different from deficiencies in the participatory rights of other social minorities or interest groups for which representation is also lacking (e.g. women, the elderly, or foreigners). These groups are present here and now; they can take part in political discourse, write opinion-editorials, appear on talk-shows and in many cases participate in elections. None of these options are available to future generations. “The future is another country”, states Posner,8 paraphrasing that the welfare of future generations is as low on the agenda of political incumbents as the welfare of a foreign country.

If future citizens could assert their interests in the political decision-making process, majority outcomes in important political decisions of the present would be different. Energy policy is a good example: Energy production of present generations, which relies heavily on fossil fuels, provides a high standard of living today, but at the expense of creating serious disadvantages for the medium-term future of fifty to a hundred years. Post-1990 - the year in which the IPCC’s First Assessment Report assessed a connection between anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions and climate change with a 90 per cent probability- presently living generations can no longer legitimately claim ignorance of the consequences of their actions. Scientific analyses indicate that current energy policy intensifies the natural greenhouse effect and causes the global average temperature to rise.9 Let’s assume that the future individuals born in the next 200 years could partake in the next general election, in the present. The consequence would be that all parties would rewrite their official party positions on today’s energy policy and implement a much more rapid decline in carbon dioxide emissions. The same effect could be achieved if a future branch were implemented in the set-up of democracies as a fourth power in the separation of powers model.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › EU CP › EU Upgrades and Integration key

EU-U.S. gaps in AI development now --- cant solve without significant changes

Christie ‘22

(E. H. Christie, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe,” European View 2022, Vol. 21(1) 13 –2 //um-ef)

Much has already been achieved in terms of new structures, new initiatives and new policy developments to support the collaborative adoption of AI among NATO Allies and EU member states. In addition to pre-existing structures and mechanisms at both the NATO and EU levels, which have ensured that nations are not starting from scratch, national defence institutions are already able to refer to common policy commitments and to options, whether through NATO or the EDA, for research or capability-development activities. At the same time, ensuring a competitive edge in AI is a truly whole-of-government effort which requires considerable cross-over between the military and civilian realms. Large gaps remain between the US and the EU on certain key indicators. At the same time, the gaps pertaining to research are far smaller. To ensure greater European performance and relevance in AI in general, and its defence applications in particular, it seems desirable to focus on two strategic priorities: investment volumes, both public and private, which need to be significantly increased; and the full use of collaborative mechanisms involving the US. To that end, it would be beneficial for nations on both sides of the Atlantic to ensure that a clear and common vision is set out in forthcoming strategic documents, most notably the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s new Strategic Concept. This should include clear political commitments to increasing investment, both in general and in instruments for promoting collaborative innovation. There are opportunities for ‘more Europe’ through the EDA and the European Defence Fund. But while pursuing those avenues, European capitals should prioritise efforts that complement and enhance transatlantic approaches, in recognition of the reality that the US remains the indispensable ally for Europe’s security.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › Hotlines CP › AT: Perm --- Both

Perm cant avoid the turn --- China freak out comes BEFORE the CP solves --- they wont wait for communication if UUvs are involved

Zhao ‘18

(TONG, PhD in science, technology, and international affairs from the Georgia Institute of Technology is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. His research focuses on strategic security issues, including nuclear weapons policy, arms control, nonproliferation, missile defense, space security, and other international security issues. He was previously a Stanton nuclear security fellow with the Managing the Atom Project and the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He has held a number of other positions, including as a nonresident WSD-Handa fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and working for the Office of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Government of Beijing Municipality. He holds a and received a BS in physics and an MA in international relations from Tsinghua University, “Tides of Change,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Without viable communication mechanisms, Chinese forces protecting SSBNs would have greater difficulty understanding the intentions of U.S. UUVs or USVs.21 During either peacetime or a military crisis, China would have every incentive to interfere with any foreign unmanned system that it detected and that, in its view, posed a potential threat to its SSBNs. After all, clarifying the intentions of unmanned systems would take time (if doing so were somehow possible), and Chinese military commanders might not want to put the SSBNs at risk by waiting to establish communication.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › Hotlines CP › Hotlines CP

CP solves the aff, but not the turn --- UUVs undermine trust in confidence building measures

Zhao ‘18

(TONG, PhD in science, technology, and international affairs from the Georgia Institute of Technology is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. His research focuses on strategic security issues, including nuclear weapons policy, arms control, nonproliferation, missile defense, space security, and other international security issues. He was previously a Stanton nuclear security fellow with the Managing the Atom Project and the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He has held a number of other positions, including as a nonresident WSD-Handa fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and working for the Office of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Government of Beijing Municipality. He holds a and received a BS in physics and an MA in international relations from Tsinghua University, “Tides of Change,” pg online @ //um-ef)

These rules of behavior heavily stress the importance of establishing adequate communication during unplanned encounters at sea, but they have limitations. When submarines are surfaced, they should comply with such rules, but one complication is that when they are underwater, these rules would be irrelevant. Even more problematically, such rules cannot easily be extended to cover unmanned military systems. For instance, compared with manned platforms, unmanned systems are usually designed to be smaller, to be more secretive, and to operate closer to enemy forces. These differences make it more difficult for the two sides to agree on the meaning and implementation of certain CUES provisions, including one that requires vessels to maintain a “safe distance.”20 Another major challenge is communication. Many of the existing communication procedures listed in the CUES—such as the use of sound, light, flag signals, and radio communications—could not be easily implemented with an unmanned system, even if a UUV was piloted remotely, let alone if it could operate autonomously.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › Alternate Sub-Tracking CPs › CP—Surface Systems

Aerial systems allow for better under sea monitoring and a more cohesive strategy

CSIS 16- a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatest challenges. (Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe,” CSIS, July 21, 2016, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160721_Hicks_UnderseaWarfare_Web.pdf)//mcu

Surface systems are often thought of as second-class citizens when it comes to ASW missions. However, they play an important role in the broader ASW system. They can host a wide array of sensors, embark purpose-built ASW aircraft, and may serve as a floating processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) center for a variety of different sensors supporting a theater-level ASW campaign. Planned NATO investments in large surface vessels capable of performing the ASW mission and their respective sensors are likely sufficient to meet current and future threats. These vessels are often not used as the proverbial tip of the spear in ASW operations. That said, NATO and its partners should explore investments and experimentation with afloat PED systems to transform these surface ships into the "quarterbacks" of the ASW mission. The use of unmanned surface vessels (USVs) is a potential growth area in these missions. An example of such a system is the Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) currently being tested by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). There are also a host of commercially available options in this space. Such platforms use their nontraditional designs (the result of not having a crew) to offer unique capabilities in the ASW mission. They are also tremendously difficult for adversaries to counter due to their low acoustic and optical profiles. Desired Effect: Investments in afloat PED systems can help with the creation of a truly integrated multidomain, multiplatform ASW complex. USVs, like their cousins in other domains, may provide novel capabilities and significant capacity at lower costs than a comparable manned system. This increased capacity may be an operational necessity given advances in submarine quieting.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › Alternate Sub-Tracking CPs › CP—Aerial systems

Helicopters are key to NATO ASW

Florentino 18 (Commander Paolo Florentino, “Maritime Rotary Wing,” JAPCC, 2018, https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_J25_screen.pdf)//mcu

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). Although submarine inventories were initially reduced globally after the end of the Cold War, there is a growing trend of non­ Allied submarine operations in all sea areas relevant to NATO operations. In recent years, almost every nation claiming a submarine capability has expanded its cur­ rent inventory with more advanced and less detect­ able submarines. The protection of a maritime force against submarines consists of ‘defence­in­depth’ and close coordination among friendly ships and submarines, helicopters, Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), and shore­based facilities. Maritime ASW helicopters, in particular, have increased in importance due to the decreasing number of MPA available in NATO. These helicopters are equipped with maritime radars optimized to detect submarine snorkels or periscopes. Integrated dipping sonars and dropped active/passive so­ nobuoys can be used to detect and track contacts. Electronic Support Measures (ESM) technology and mounted Magnetic Anomaly Detectors (MAD) are able to confirm the presence of submerged threats, while data link capabilities provide real­time information to the Fleet. Last but not least, ASW helicopters can be fitted with air launched torpedoes, which allow them to attack and destroy enemy submarines.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › Alternate Sub-Tracking CPs › CP—Aerial systems

Tech exists now but it needs to be developed

Perkins 18- US Navy Captain (Captain William A. Perkins, “Unmanned Air Systems in NATO Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW),” JAPCC, 2018, https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_J25_screen.pdf)//mcu

Unmanned systems technology offers potential applications for use in the ASW mission area. Although there are some systems in existence today, most of their sensors are directed at an intelligence­gathering mission and have limited direct application to ASW, although innovative use of tactics to exploit sensor capability should continue to be explored. However, the future is promising for development of unmanned systems which are specifically devoted to the ASW mission. ASW as a mission requires extended sortie durations and sensor dwell times as well as data fusion and data dissemination early in the prosecution, then requires options for submarine engagement when the situation requires. New technology for swarming systems as well as potential developments in a reliable high­bandwidth optical link capability make the future of unmanned systems a viable near-term solution for aiding in the ASW mission. Regardless, there will remain a requirement for unmanned systems to integrate with other elements in the ASW domain, including ships and manned aircraft. While unmanned systems are well suited for detection and tracking phases of prosecution, manned aircraft will, in the near­ term, likely remain necessary for torpedo delivery for lethal effect.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › Alternate Sub-Tracking CPs › CP—Aerial systems

Drones provide necessary ASW capabilities

Larson 21- a Defense Writer based in Europe. He holds a Master of Public Policy and covers U.S. and Russian security, European defense issues, and German politics and culture. (Caleb Larson, “How The U.S. Navy Could Use Drones To Kill Submarines,” February 17, 2021,

Sometime late last year, the U.S. Navy tested one of Northrop Grumman’s remotely piloted helicopters for use as an anti-submarine warfare platform, USNI News reported. During the evaluation, the Fire Scout drone dropped miniaturized sonobuoys into the water, essentially small acoustic devices that listen for enemy movement underwater. As the name suggests, the primary goal of anti-submarine warfare platforms is to hunt down submarines, in effect creating a protective bubble around surface ships that are particularly vulnerable to submarine attack. Though this mission is typically done by much larger manned aircraft, like the MH-60R Sea Hawk, unmanned platforms like the Fire Scout offer advantages in range and endurance compared to their manned counterparts. They’re also cheaper: the loss of a drone is comparatively light and less risky than putting a human pilot or pilots in harm’s way. In addition to deploying a mini hydrophone, an offensive capability could in theory be packed into some drones in the form of similarly miniaturized torpedos, like Northrop Grumman’s Very Lightweight Torpedo. Given the advantages inherent to unmanned anti-submarine warfare platforms, it comes as no surprise that the Navy is interested. And, it’s not the first time the Navy has been evaluating remotely operated platforms for a specialized ASW role. Northrop Grumman’s Fire Scout isn’t the only done that may protect American strike groups. General Atomics, the firm behind the iconic Predator and Reaper drones, is also adapting one of their drones for a submarine-hunting maritime mission. Similar to the Fire Scout, a modified Reaper drone offers advantages in terms of mission endurance and logistics when compared to a piloted anti-submarine warfare platform like the P-8A Poseidon. General Atomics’s drone would be a boon to Navy logistics: the company asserts that their SeaGuardian maritime drone uses 90% less fuel than similar intelligence and surveillance aircraft and that the platform needs 50% fewer operations and support personnel than the Navy’s current anti-submarine warfare platforms require. Northrop Grumman’s Fire Scout would likely offer savings in fuel and personnel as well. Postscript One of the drawbacks to replacing the manned anti-submarine warfare mission with drones is sonobuoy and torpedo capacity. Though the aforementioned drones do offer real advantages in terms of range and logistics, a single drone simply cannot carry the same quantity of munitions as a much larger manned platform like the Poseidon. Still, the move toward unmanned anti-submarine warfare platforms brings new and needed capabilities to the Navy and is a concept worth exploring.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › Alternate Sub-Tracking CPs › CP—Aerial systems

Advancements in aircrafts solve—provide data and forum for interoperability

Shukla 3/30- an Indian journalist and a retired colonel of Indian Army. He writes articles on defense policy, production and acquisition and currently works as consulting editor with Business Standard (Ajai Shukla, “Navy gets second maritime air surveillance squadron,” Business Standard, March 30, 2022, https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/navy-gets-second-maritime-air-surveillance-squadron-122033000064_1.html)//mcu

The Boeing P-8I Poseidon aircraft that INAS 316 will operate is a multi-role, long-range maritime reconnaissance anti-submarine warfare (LRMR ASW) aircraft, that is equipped with a range of air-to-ship missiles and torpedoes. The aircraft is acknowledged to be the world’s most-deadly LRMR-ASW aircraft. It is a derivative of the Boeing 737-800 airliner, fitted with a plethora of sensors and weaponry, that make it is a potent platform for maritime surveillance and strike, electronic warfare missions, search and rescue and providing targeting data to other weapon platforms. It is also the platform of choice for detecting and neutralising enemy ships and submarines in Indian Ocean Region. P-8I Poseidons have played an important role in the two-year stand-off on the Ladakh border with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), stealthily reconnoitring Chinese positions and picking up PLA deployments in rear areas. The aircraft’s sensors include a Raytheon multi-mode radar to detect aircraft, surface ships, and submarines, while another belly-mounted radar looks backwards like an electronic rear-view mirror. A ‘magnetic anomaly detector’ on the P-8I’s tail detects submarines from the magnetic field that large masses of metal (such as submarine hulls) create. Hostile submarines, once detected, are destroyed by on-board Harpoon missiles or Mark 54 torpedoes. Alternatively, the targets are ‘handed on’ digitally to friendly warships, or submarines, which finish the job. Over the years and during joint naval exercises such as Exercise Malabar, Indian P-8I crews have developed joint drills and communication protocols with their foreign counterparts that enable them to take swift and lethal action against hostile warships and submarines. To enhance this interoperability, India has concluded joint agreements with partner countries, such as the US. These include the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for geospatial co-operation. INAS 316 is commanded by Commander Amit Mohapatra, a Boeing P-8I pilot with extensive operational experience.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › Alternate Sub-Tracking CPs › CP—Aerial systems

Aerial systems allow for better under sea monitoring and a more cohesive stratefy

CSIS 16- a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatest challenges. (Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe,” CSIS, July 21, 2016, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160721_Hicks_UnderseaWarfare_Web.pdf)//mcu

Aerial Systems This category encompasses a range of platforms from large MPAs based on commercial airliners to small UAS that can be launched by a single operator. Several European nations are looking to replace or renew their maritime patrol capability. As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, the UK is acquiring several P-8 aircraft and the Norwegians may follow suit. Both Germany and France will likely to have replace their MPA fleets in the 2020s. While a common airframe is unlikely, common payloads could help defer some costs, streamline maintenance, and dramatically improve interoperability. These aerial platforms should have the capability to serve as aerial intelligence processing and dissemi¬nation hubs for a wide range of distributed sensors above, on, and below the sea. NATO and partner nations should also consider how UAS could augment or perhaps replace traditional manned ASW assets. With their exceptionally long loiter times and potentially high payloads, larger UAS seem to be ideal platforms for seeding a range of distributed undersea sensors on short notice. Such platforms could also serve as a networking hub for collecting data from these disturbed sensors and transmitting it to a surface vessel or other central location of processing. From an aerial sensors perspective, NATO and partners should look beyond advanced periscope detection radars and advanced sonobuoys (or sonobuoy-esque systems). Future aerial sensors could potentially include light detection and ranging (LIDAR) systems or advanced magnetic anomaly detectors. Advances in sensor technologies will likely enable smaller systems to be employed for ASW missions, therefore bringing these capabilities to a wider array of platforms. (For example, small patrol vessels less than 100 feet in length may be able to deploy with small ASW UAS, dramatically improving the capabilities of small navies such as in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.) Desired Effect: UAS have the potential to reshape the aerial ASW mission by creating an inherently networked solution, as well as bring ASW abilities to a wider range of platforms. Future sensors may also move away from the acoustic detection paradigm.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › Alternate Sub-Tracking CPs › CP—Space-based systems

SARs solve arctic surveillance

Cooper 13- Lieutenant Commander, United States Coast Guard B.S., United States Coast Guard Academy, 1997 M.S., National Intelligence University, 2006 (Chad Cooper, “Enhancing arctic surveillance with space-based radars,” Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository,

From the evidence provided in Chapter I, it should be clear the United States must be aware of the increasing levels of maritime activity in the Arctic Circle. It is strategically imperative for the long term security of North America to understand what maritime activities that are occurring there in order to use U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power to greatest effect. Moreover, tactical responses to emergent issues such as vessels in distress, hydrocarbon spills, and enforcement of laws and treaties depend on the United States having a sustained information advantage in the Arctic and in particular the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) contained within the Arctic Circle. Chapter II made evident that space-based surveillance is likely the best way and perhaps the only practical way to achieve the level of surveillance required of the Arctic Circle. Given the level of maritime surface area within the Arctic Circle and the applicability of SAR sensors to detecting and characterizing maritime activities, it is sensible that SAR sensors are the answer to the nation’s Arctic surveillance needs. Moreover, a space-based SAR mission supporting U.S. and allied government agencies is consistent with the National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) of 2011 which seeks to strengthen safety, stability, and security; enhance advantages from space; and energize the space industrial base (Department of Defense, 2011). The compelling case for using SARs to meet the long-term surveillance needs of the U.S. government in the Arctic begged a significant technical question: what constellation design of SAR sensors would offer the best return on investment for the United States?