2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Case-turn --- Info-sharing Bad: Offense › 2NC --- Terminal Impact
Litwak 22 — Robert Litwak, Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies at the Wilson Center, former Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, 2022 (“Russia’s Nuclear Threats Recast Cold War Dangers: The “Delicate Balance of Terror” Revisited,” Wilson Center, May 3rd, Available Online https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/russias-nuclear-threats-recast-cold-war-dangers-delicate-balance-terror-revisited)
Since the Cuban Missile Crisis, assured retaliation—eliminating incentives for a surprise first strike—has been the sine qua non of strategic stability. The risk for crisis stability is that arms race instability could revive those incentives, making the deterrent relationships more “delicate.” With the advent of new technologies, escalation during a crisis could occur in a non-traditional domain—cyber or space—and could misleadingly be viewed as non-escalatory because it would be non-kinetic. But an inadvertent escalatory spiral could be set off by a Russian cyberattack to interfere with U.S. communications with its nuclear systems or an attack on reconnaissance satellites to blind the United States. Hints of that potentiality are already manifest: Russia conducted an anti-satellite missile test last November and, during the Ukraine war, has carried out extensive cyberattacks, often in coordination with its battlefield operations.
In the Ukraine war, as during the Cuban Missile Crisis, inadvertent escalation remains a major risk. Putin is a risk-taker (whose agents used a military-grade nerve agent in a 2018 assassination attempt on a Russian military defector in Britain) and he is prone to miscalculation. His assumptions going in to Ukraine—that the conflict would be short and decisive, that the Zelensky government would fold quickly, and that the West would be feckless in its disunity—were all miscalculations that ironically led many Western officials and analysts to conclude that he would threaten but not invade.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Case-turn --- Info-sharing Bad: Offense › 2NC --- Russia Turn
Smeets 19 — Max Smeets, Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies, 2019 (“Cyber Command’s Strategy Risks Friction With Allies,” Lawfare, May 28th, Available Online at https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyber-commands-strategy-risks-friction-allies)
Much has been written about the fundamental changes in U.S. cyber strategy. U.S. Cyber Command’s vision of “persistent engagement” and the Department of Defense’s new strategy of “defend forward” have, in particular, led to numerous critical remarks about the risks of escalation between the U.S. and its main adversaries in cyberspace.
These debates are worth continuing, including about what the change in strategy means for establishing norms in cyberspace. But commentators have so far ignored a key dimension: The strategy’s main implications may not reside in how it changes the dynamics between the U.S. and its adversaries but, instead, in how it affects broader alliance relationships, especially beyond the Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, the U.K., the U.S. and New Zealand). U.S. Cyber Command’s mission to cause friction in adversaries’ freedom of maneuver in cyberspace may end up causing significant friction in allies’ trust and confidence—and adversaries may be able to exploit that.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Case-turn --- Info-sharing Bad: Offense › 1NC --- Russia Turn
Lonergan and Yarhi-Milo 22 — Erica Lonergan, Assistant Professor in the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, PhD in Political Science from Columbia University, and Keren Yarhi-Milo, Arnold A. Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies in the Political Science Department and the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, former Associate Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, PhD and M.A. from the University of Pennsylvania, 2022 (“Cyber Signaling and Nuclear Deterrence: Implications for the Ukraine Crisis,” War on the Rocks, Available Online at https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/cyber-signaling-and-nuclear-deterrence-implications-for-the-ukraine-crisis/)
However, conducting cyber operations to signal deterrence would, paradoxically, increase risks of escalation. This risk is not just hypothetical, especially in light of Russia’s updated declaratory policy for the first use of nuclear weapons, which may include responses to cyber attacks. Russia has reinforced this message during the war in Ukraine. In early March, a hacking group affiliated with Anonymous claimed that it had shut down the control center of Russia’s space agency. While denying that the attack took place, Russia nevertheless warned that a cyber attack against its satellites would be a justification for war.
The Biden administration should clearly communicate that cyber operations for nuclear signaling are out of bounds, just as it declared restraint in other aspects of this conflict, like the deployment of American troops to Ukraine.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Case-turn --- Info-sharing Bad: Offense › 1NC --- Russia Turn
Healey 22 — Jason Healey, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s School for International and Public Affairs specializing in cyber conflict, Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, 2022 (“Preventing Cyber Escalation in Ukraine and After,” War on the Rocks, March 9th, Available Online at , Accessed on 06-19-2022)
With the world worried about the risk of nuclear escalation between Russia and the West, now might also be a good time to worry about the risk of cyber conflict escalating to war as well.
In recent years, a number of scholars and practitioners have argued that cyber conflict should be seen as an intelligence battle or pressure-release valve rather than something that could escalate into actual conflict or war. Indeed, to date, no state has responded to a rival’s cyber attack with a kinetic reprisal. But that does not mean it will not happen now. As geopolitical circumstances change, the escalatory potential of cyber capabilities is likely to change as well.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Case-turn --- Info-sharing Bad: Offense › 1NC --- Russia Turn
Lewis 15 — James Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Senior Advisor to UN Groups of Governmental Experts on Information Security, PhD from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“The Role of Offensive Cyber Operations in NATO’s Collective Defense,” The Tallinn Papers, Available Online at )
Dissimulation is an essential part of hybrid warfare, and Europe and the US face a propaganda barrage that is much more sophisticated than the clumsy Soviet efforts of the Cold War. Despite this clumsiness, a good portion of the Western public has found it persuasive. Similarly, those critical of NATO will find new complaints about aggression and militarisation credible. Russia has already complained that NATO’s defensive cyber doctrine is destabilising warmongering and part of a larger conspiracy to advance western hegemony.11 The Snowden revelations have lent a powerful impetus to Russian propaganda.
Behind the rhetoric lies both a desire to conceal their own use of cyber operations and a real fear that Russia’s decline leaves it vulnerable to new military technologies. The intent is to hamper and complicate any Western response to Russian efforts to regain control in Crimea and the “near abroad”. The Russian position is that NATO’s new cyber doctrine is destabilising as it threatens to use conventional or even nuclear responses (in the Russian description of the new policy towards low-level cyber attacks).
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Case-turn --- Info-sharing Bad: Defense › 1NC --- Squo Solves
Lewis 15 — James Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Senior Advisor to UN Groups of Governmental Experts on Information Security, PhD from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“The Role of Offensive Cyber Operations in NATO’s Collective Defense,” The Tallinn Papers, Available Online at )
It could be argued, given NATO’s defensive orientation ( pace Russian fears of diabolic plots), that a purely defensive and technical focus for cyber operations is appropriate. The question, however, is whether NATO can field a credible military force without some public linkage to an offensive cyber capability.
Here again, the nuclear precedent offers some suggestions for a way forward. In the NATO phonetic alphabet, “whiskey” (“W”) and “romeo” (“R”) were used by NATO’s command structure in conflict to “warn” capitals that with a deteriorating situation on the ground it would be sending a request to release nuclear weapons for NATO use. Romeo was the actual request for release of nuclear weapons to NATO control. This terminology prepared nuclear capitals to make the decision on release.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Case-turn --- Info-sharing Bad: Defense › 2NC --- Info-Sharing Fails
Jacobsen 21 — Jeppe T. Jacobsen, Visiting Scholar at New York University, former Cyber Coordinator at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark, M.A. in International Politics from the University of London, M.A. in Political Science from the University of Aarhus, 2021 (“Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities,” International Affairs, May, Available Online at )
While NATO and its member states adapted to the new security environment after the end of the Cold War by scaling down the military investments and presence in eastern Europe and by focusing more on crisis management,53 much of the Cold War deterrence language returned when the Russian–Ukrainian conflict broke out in 2014.54 What needs to be deterred today, much of the literature agrees, is not only a full-scale military invasion but to a larger extent the use and support of pro-Russian militant separatists who are willing to apply insurgency tactics in NATO's post-Soviet member states.55 As a result, the allies' military investments have been increasing again,56 a number of initiatives such as the Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States and Poland have been introduced,57 and the discussions—and disagreements—on the nuclear deterrence (of non-nuclear threats) have re-emerged.58 Such responses are often presented as a renewed attempt by NATO to reassert its deterrence and assurance posture by signalling strength, preparedness and willingness to punish ‘bad’ behaviour.59
At first sight, the introduction of CYOC seems to add to these deterrence efforts. NATO added an offensive cyber option to reinforce its ability to impose costs sufficient to dissuade adversaries from acting aggressively. On closer examination, however, it is not self-evident that requesting member states' delivery of offensive cyber effects in NATO operations constitutes a necessary or even a substantial addition to credibly signalling the ability and willingness to punish an adversary. NATO's conventional capabilities are clearly already far superior to Russia's—with or without fully integrated cyber effects. Thus, a deterrence failure, resulting for example in a scenario in one of the Baltic states similar to that which occurred in eastern Ukraine, will not be the result of NATO's lack of available cyber tools in its military toolbox; rather, if the Russian leadership were to consider it in its interest to pursue such a scenario, it would mean that Russia's decision-makers did not believe in the credibility of NATO's article 5 or in NATO's ability to mobilize its forces. The capacity to integrate cyber effects would do nothing to change that.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Case-turn --- Info-sharing Bad: Defense › 2NC --- Info-Sharing Fails
Black and Lynch 20 — James Black, Research Coordinator at RAND, MSc in International Security from Sciences Po, LSE in History from the University of Cambridge, and Alice Lynch, Former Defense and Security Analyst at RAND, M.A. in Applied Security Strategy from the University of Exeter, 2020 (“Cyber Threats to NATO from a Multi-Domain Perspective,” CCDCOE, Available Online at https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/Cyber-Threats-and-NATO-2030_Horizon-Scanning-and-Analysis.pdf)
C. Capability and Force Development Priorities Assuming NATO can overcome conceptual and policy hurdles, significant effort will still be required to develop the necessary forces and capabilities across all domains, but perhaps especially for cyberspace.
Operationalising MDO demands a ‘calibrated force posture’ with multi-domain formations strategically positioned, held at readiness and able to deploy over large distances, trained and equipped to operate across multiple contested domains (Grispen-Gelens, 2020). The vision is for different sensors and shooters to share and fuse data, build a common operating picture, inform rapid decision-making and deliver effects at a time and place of the commander’s choosing and to do so agnostic of domains, nation, service or platform (Niewood, Grant & Lewis, 2019). Forces must operate at pace and against an adversary contesting all domains. This tempo necessitates moving beyond NATO’s past focus on synchronisation of pre-planned effects in individual domains towards more agile targeting and more resilience against hostile attempts at ‘disorganisation’ or ‘systems attack’ (Thomas, 2019; Engstrom, 2018).
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 1NC --- Turn --- Trust Turn
Veenendaal et al 16 (Matthijs Veenendaal has been working for the Netherlands Ministry of Defence since 2006 in various policy positions. He is currently stationed as a researcher at the Strategy Branch of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia. Kadri Kaska is a researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. MAJ Pascal Brangetto is a supply officer in the French Army. “Is NATO Ready to Cross the Rubicon on Cyber Defence?” June 2016 https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/NATO-CCD-COE-policy-paper.pdf)
Given modern armed forces’ dependency on digital technology, it is legitimate to expect that NATO would adapt to this new reality. Since 2002, NATO has invested significantly in improving the defence of its networks. However, NATO has shown little inclination to move away from its current purely defensive posture in cyber defence. At the political level, Allies remain reticent when it comes to discussing the options of using military (offensive) capabilities within a NATO setting. For most of them, cyber operations are generally still uncharted territory in which confusion abounds. Moreover, Allies that have invested heavily in cyber capabilities worry that others might benefit without making a similar investment themselves. Allies therefore remain reluctant to engage in any meaningful discussion on the position and role of cyber capabilities in military operations within the Alliance.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 1NC --- Turn --- Trust Turn
Fidler et al., 13 (David Fidler, Richard Pregent, and Alex Vandurme, Fidler, James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer Schoolof Law; and Senior Fellow, Indiana University Center on Applied Cybersecurity Research., Pregent, Legal Advisor, NATO Allied Command Counterintelligence, Vandurme, Head, Technical Center Engineering, NATO Computer Incident ResponseCapabilit, Fal 2013, accessed on 6-19-2022, Scholarship.law.stjohns, "NATO , Cyber Defense, and International Law", https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=jicl)//Babcii
Concerning the three categories and the potential policy shifting described above, NATO finds itself in a difficult situation that, under current NATO practices, will be hard to escape. In terms of the cyber threat, defense, and technology approaches, NATO reflects behavior that puts the Alliance at a disadvantage. NATO tends to be conservative in terms of legal issues, meaning that the Alliance does not promise to be a fruitful forum for adapting or revising legacy rules to reflect the particular challenges cyber poses. Similarly, with NATO operating on the basis of consensus, the Alliance’s decision-making processes might have difficulty handling governance questions created by the cyber defense approach, such as how “active” should NATO cyber defense be. Operationally, NATO cyber defense appears more static and reactive than active in orientation—a situation that could lead NATO cyber defense to become a cyber “Maginot line” rather than an effective defensive strategy. It is not clear whether NATO members could reach consensus on what more active cyber defense activities would be permissible under international legal principles on sovereignty and non-intervention. As noted earlier, NATO functions with the capabilities its members make available to it, meaning that NATO’s technological capabilities in cyber might not reach cutting-edge status, leaving NATO cyber defense behind the global technological curve in cyberspace. This problem is exacerbated if policy makers in leading powers, such as the United States and China, are placing more reliance on developing, deploying, and using full-spectrum cyber technological capabilities because of the perceived pitfalls of other approaches and the mounting geopolitical competition now affecting cyberspace. NATO members are also extraordinarily sensitive to the Alliance having any offensive cyber capabilities or even discussing the need to think about the value of cyber capabilities and operations in missions NATO might undertake (as NATO has done with other technological developments affecting its military missions).44 The North Atlantic Council has not discussed, let alone authorized, the development of offensive capabilities, doctrine, or rules of engagement in the cyber realm.45 Whether NATO members could agree on what offensive cyber operations international law would permit is also not clear, especially in light of difficulties cyber presents to the international law on armed conflict revealed by the Tallinn Manual and other analyses.46 Events outside the specific context of NATO cyber defense might also adversely affect NATO cooperation. For example, in June 2013, negative European reactions to the disclosure of a secret U.S. surveillance program targeting cyber activities of foreign nationals, code-named PRISM, reflected new transAtlantic tensions on government surveillance in cyberspace, its implications for privacy and other civil liberties, and the potential for European-American cooperation on cybersecurity. The Washington Post reported that “[t]he discontent from Europe pointed to the breadth of fallout from the affair and to the potential for fresh strains between the United States and allies wary of American intrusiveness.”47 Whatever the long-term impact of this political fallout, the short-term consequences will likely not create more willingness among NATO members to become more ambitious with NATO cyber defense.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 1NC --- Turn --- Trust Turn
APRA, 20 (Association for Political Risk Analysis, “The Looming NATO Offensive Cyber Policy’s Challenges of Harmonizing Deterrence and Decision-making”, APRA, Sep 27, 2020, https://www.aprascpo.org/post/the-looming-nato-offensive-cyber-policy-s-challenges-of-harmonizing-deterrence-and-decision-making)//Babcii
Testing Alliance Consensus and Decision-making The Alliance’s decision-making principle of consensus further complicates the negotiations and agreement of a NATO offensive cyber policy. The above-mentioned nuclear example almost exclusively concerns kinetic and state-level physical destruction of massive proportions. The dire consequences of the extremity of possible nuclear proliferation are enough to establish credibility, deterrence, and is a comparatively simpler way in getting its 30 member states on board, especially in the context of Cold War bipolarity. Cyberspace as a domain of war contains a myriad of vested technical issues including the difficulty of attributing attacks to specific adversaries. Even though this is one the most prominent difficulties according to a variety of research in cybersecurity, more recent analyses published by NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence have suggested that the attribution gap is gradually decreasing in size due to heavy research and development investment into web tracing and identification designs largely spearheaded by the US (Burton 11). A dynamic understanding of deterrence in cyberspace as formerly suggested by taking into consideration social and historical context will also alleviate the traditionally ‘impossible’ problem of attribution. While such technical capabilities play a crucial role in swaying the allies’ considerations and decisions, the political and strategic issues of simply conceptualizing an offensive cyber policy are examined in closer detail here. Trust and Transparency The transparency and capability-sharing quality of NATO may give way for disagreement amongst allies. Although the Alliance’s communication on a strategic and policy level is transparent, it still possesses enough opaque room to maneuver on an operational and tactical level. Furthermore, the problem of American supremacy in cyber capabilities and NATO’s reliance on its critical perspective may displease EU member states like France in their pursuit of strategic autonomy aside from its prevailing aversion to today's American leadership. A new demand for cross-alliance intelligence-sharing on offensive cyber capabilities can also exacerbate internal trust issues with the US. The global surveillance disclosures from 2013 onwards revealed allied surveillance and spying activities which damaged confidence in NATO (Smeets; 2018). Discussion of further integrated intelligence-sharing strategy under an offensive cyber policy can create tension between Five Eyes states (Canada, the US, and the UK) and other NATO allies. Doctrine Diversity Another overarching aspect with the potential to determine allies’ reception and leniency towards an offensive cyber strategy is the diversity of threat perception among NATO allies. The diversity across allied standards in defining the parameters of cyberattacks and the lack of overarching offensive cyber policy could result in strategic ambiguity and discourage retaliation (Arts 2). These differences stem from varied threat perceptions and cyber norms. Nationally, both threat perception and cyber norms are influenced by the state’s experience with malicious cyberattacks and its media and public opinion; and externally, the state’s engagement in bilateral and multilateral engagements are the most effective ways in which threat perception and cyber norms are shaped (Lewis 575). This hints at the political interest of near-Russia states like Estonia and Finland to possess well-rounded cyber norms and threat perception. Conversely, policy engagements on offensive capabilities would also shape NATO allies’ understanding as a whole. Without multilateral definitions, allies like Luxembourg and Iceland who have not experienced similar events do not benefit from harmonized knowledge and may not find justification to prioritize the strengthening of cyber capabilities when allocating funds from the common NATO budget. Not to mention the financial commitment issue affects trust in the Alliance overall as well.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 1NC --- Alt Causes
Boffey 18 (Daniel Boffey; Guardian's Brussels bureau chief; ; 6-19-18)
The head of Nato has warned that the deep divisions between the US under Donald Trump and its European allies are not going away and there is no certainty that the transatlantic relationship and its military alliance will survive. Against a backdrop of Trump’s open baiting of the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, over immigration and her domestic difficulties, Jens Stoltenberg has called for all Nato members to work to avoid a disastrous breakdown in western unity. Writing in the Guardian, Nato’s secretary general admits that “political storm clouds” are putting a strain on the ties that bind the Nato allies. But, in an appeal to leaders before the military alliance’s summit in July, the former prime minister of Norway says that “where differences persist, we must limit any negative impact on our security cooperation”. Stoltenberg – who is meeting Theresa May in Downing Street on Thursday as he prepares for the summit in Brussels – writes: “Since the alliance was created almost 70 years ago, the people of Europe and North America have enjoyed an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity. But, at the political level, the ties which bind us are under strain. “There are real differences between the United States and other allies over issues such as trade, climate change and the Iran nuclear agreement. “These disagreements are real and they won’t disappear overnight. In fact, nowhere is it written in stone that the transatlantic bond will always thrive. That doesn’t, however, mean that its breakdown is inevitable. We can maintain it, and all the mutual benefits we derive from it.” Stoltenberg’s intervention comes at a point of extreme tension among the leadership of the western powers. In seeking to defend his administration’s policy of separating children from their parents at the country’s border, Trump launched an extraordinary attack on Merkel and the EU on Tuesday, likening Europe to a “migrant camp” while claiming that “the people of Germany are turning against their leadership as migration is rocking the already tenuous Berlin coalition”. Merkel is embroiled in a tense standoff with her interior minister over immigration. She faces a two-week deadline to find a European solution or risk the collapse of her governing coalition. Trump has already caused a fracture in relations with traditional US allies by reneging on his country’s commitments in both the Paris climate change agreement and the nuclear deal with Iran. He is also threatening a transatlantic trade war with the EU, and has criticised Germany and others for not spending enough on defence and freeloading off the US. Of the 29 Nato members, only eight, including the US and the UK, spend more than 2% of their GDP on defence, a threshold that the alliance agreed should be met by all the countries by 2024. Germany spent €37bn (£32.5bn), or 1.2% of GDP, on defence last year. Asked for his position last month on those countries underspending, Trump warned: “They’ll be dealt with.” Greater “burden sharing” is set to be a theme of the Nato summit in Brussels, along with Stoltenberg’s desire to improve the readiness of Nato forces to deploy in quick order, and to build on the alliance’s counter-terrorism efforts, including through the training of the Iraqi military and an extension of financing for Afghan forces until 2024.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 1NC --- Convergence Now
Smeets, 21 (Max Smeets, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich (Switzerland), Aug 2021, accessed on 6-19-2022, Hcss, "NATO Allies' offensive cyber policy: A growing divide?",
NATO allies have made slow but steady progress when it comes to crafting policy to deal with cyber security challenges. Yet this progress has not always been made in a collaborative fashion. Especially when it comes to the development and deployment of offensive cyber capabilities, NATO allies are increasingly diverging in policy. This is a worrying development and deserves more attention than it has so far received. Steady progress Member states agree on the critical need for a coherent cyber policy. Almost all NATO allies have developed both a cyber security strategy and a cyber defense strategy. Some states have published updated versions over the years to reaffirm cyber security as an issue of national security importance, to tweak institutional responsibilities, or to articulate changes in the threat landscape. In addition, since 2018, most NATO allies have established a military cyber organization (either a command or unit) with a mandate to conduct cyber effect operations – that is, cyber operations intended to disrupt, deny, degrade and/or destroy. There is also shared recognition that international law applies in cyberspace, although allies have yet to spell out the legal procedures for operating in this new “domain of warfare.” These developments have been both reflected in, and aided by, policy progress made at the inter-governmental level. At the Prague Summit in 2002, NATO for the first time recognized that the Alliance should “Strengthen our capabilities to defend against cyber attacks.” In 2008, at the Bucharest Summit, there was another milestone development, when NATO adopted a “Policy on Cyber Defense,” aiming to “protect key information systems in accordance with their respective responsibilities; share best practices; and provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack.” In the same year, the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence – a NATO accredited international research institution – was established in Tallinn, Estonia. In 2016, at the Warsaw Summit, cyberspace was officially recognized as a “domain of operations” and allies made a Cyber Defense Pledge to enhance their cyber defenses. The 2018 Brussels Summit and 2020 London Summit reiterated NATO’s commitment to implement the Cyber Defense Pledge and operationalize the Cyber Operations Center, responsible for situational awareness and the centralized planning of cyber operations and missions. In January 2020, the Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations was published “to plan, execute and assess cyberspace operations (CO) in the context of allied joint operations.”
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 2NC --- Democracy Answers
Mousseau 13 — Michael Mousseau, Professor at the University of Central Florida, teaching International Relations Theory, Political Economy of War and Peace, and Terrorism and Insurgency, former professor at Koç University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Binghamton University and an M.A. in International Studies from the University of Denver, 2013 (“The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It’s the Economy,” International Studies Quarterly, Volume 57, Available Online via Academia at https://www.academia.edu/19753792/The_Democratic_Peace_Unraveled_It_s_the_Economy, Accessed 10-02-2018, pg. 191-193)
Model 2 presents new knowledge by adding the control for economic type. To capture the dyadic expectation of peace among contract-intensive nations, the variable Contract-intensive EconomyL (CIEL) indicates the value of impersonal contracts in force per capita of the state with the lower level of CIE in the dyad; a high value of this measure indicates both states have contract-intensive economies. As can be seen, the coefficient for CIEL ()0.80) is negative and highly significant. This corroborates that impersonal economy is a highly robust force for peace. The coefficient for DemocracyL is now at zero. There are no other differences between Models 1 and 2, whose samples are identical, and no prior study corroborating the democratic peace has considered contract-intensive economy. Therefore, the standard econometric inference to be drawn from Model 2 is the nontrivial result that all prior reports of democracy as a force for peace are probably spurious, since this result is predicted and fully accounted for by economic norms theory.
CIEL and DemocracyL correlate only in the moderate range of 0.47 (Pearson’s r), so the insignificance of democracy is not likely to be a statistical artifact of multicollinearity. This is corroborated by the variance inflation factor for DemocracyL in Model 2 of 1.85, which is well below the usual rule-of-thumb indicator of multicollinearity of 10 or more. Nor should readers assume most economies: While almost all nations with contract-intensive economies (as indicated with the binary measure for CIE) are democratic (Polity2 > 6) (Singapore is the only long-term exception), more than half—55%—of all democratic nation-years have contract-poor economies. At the dyadic level in this sample, this translates to 80% of democratic dyads (all dyads where DemocracyBinary6 = 1) that have at least one state with a contract-poor economy. In other words, not only does Model 2 show no evidence of causation from democracy to peace (as reported in Mousseau 2009), but it also illustrates that this absence of democratic peace includes the vast majority—80%—of democratic dyad-years over the sample period.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 1NC --- Democracy Answers
Doorenspleet 19 — Renske Doorenspleet, Associate Professor in Comparative Politics at the University of Warwick, Former Research Fellow of the Intrastate Conflict Program/International Security Program at the Belfer Center for International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, holds an MA and Ph.D. in political science from Leiden University, 2019 (“Conclusion: The Power and Limits of the Democratic Peace Idea,” Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, Edited by Jean-Paul Gagnon and Mark Chou, Published by Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 9783319916569, p. 98-99)
My chapter, though, did not look for specifc studies which could support one specifc argument (e.g. ‘democracy is a good thing’ or ‘democracy has instrumental value as it brings peace between states’). The aim of the chapter was to investigate the question whether democracy leads to interstate war or peace, by analysing dozens of statistical studies which have been selected in a systematic way. The analyses revealed many caveats.
The first caveat is that none of the studies which have directly tested the democratic peace hypothesis demonstrated that democracy is the only and most important factor when explaining interstate war. Some studies provided evidence that other factors are significant as well, and other studies indicated that alternative explanations are much more powerful, sometimes even showing that the impact of democracy is simply spurious. Geographical and economic factors, for example, play a key role as well, and tend to be far more important, so it is certainly not only democracy which matters.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 2NC --- No Collapse
Mark Weisbrot 8-27-18, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, DC, and president of Just Foreign Policy, “The Transatlantic Alliance Will Survive Trump” https://www.thenation.com/article/the-transatlantic-alliance-will-survive-trump/
Every week, often more than once a week, there’s another article in the major media or in foreign-policypublications about the demise of the post–World War II Anglo-American world order. These analyses typically single out the transatlantic alliance between the United States and Europe―two of the world’s largest economies―for special concern and anxiety as the underpinning of this world order. Not surprisingly, President Trump’s wildly fluctuating comments on NATO (despite the fact that he is expanding it), his unprecedented rudeness to European leaders, and his friendliness with Vladimir Putin at the Helsinki summit have all added to the angst. The basic story behind this moaning and melancholy is that US leaders put together a “rules-based” system based on “open markets” and democracy (the two are sometimes seen as synonymous) that has fostered prosperity and relative stability. The United States was the only sizable industrial economy to emerge not only unscathed but doubled in size following the war. While others might have taken advantage of this unrivaled power for their own gain, the story goes, America’s beneficent rulers constructed a world order for the good of everyone. Trump is seen as a threat to its continued existence. This assessment of the postwar world order leaves out some 3 million dead Vietnamese and half a million dead in Indonesia, who might question the beneficence of this system if it had not killed them. A million dead Iraqis, if they could be heard, would probably also raise objections about whether US dominance has been in the interests of all. And there are hundreds of millions of people in Latin America, Africa, and other parts of Asia who suffered for decades under US-backed dictatorships, as well as US-sponsored wars. Much of the violent dysfunctionality in these countries today is a direct result of these interventions, as well as continuing US influence. In fact, as I write this now, the US military is directly involved in a war that has deliberately produced what the UN has called the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, in Yemen. That war has pushed more than 8 million peopleto the brink of starvation, created the worst outbreak of cholera in modern history, and killed thousands of civilians in bombing raids. Washington is providing midair refueling to the Saudi and UAE bombers, intelligence, targeting assistance, on-the-ground military personnel, and more―constrained only by growing opposition in Congress. But let us ignore these inconvenient truths for a moment, as almost all of these analyses do, and look at the present situation. In fact, the transatlantic alliance is much stronger than most of these analysts recognize. This is mainly because it is not just an alliance of democratic governments with shared values, but also one of the rich countries of the world―their ruling elites, that is―against the poor and middle-income countries of the world. The rules of the World Trade Organization, to which 164 countries are bound, were written by US and European corporations. The WTO’s most significant achievement since its creation in 1995 was to increase US-style patent protection throughout the world, leading to the death of millions of poor people who cannot get access to essential medicines. After years of struggle, some of these rules were rewritten, but much damage remains. The WTO’s rules on agriculture also greatly disadvantage developing countries and seek to prohibit governments from subsidizing domestic production for domestic consumption to feed people who are badly malnourished, for example in India. WTO rules also make it much more difficult for developing countries to employ the industrial policies that high-income countries like the United States used to get where they are today. The International Monetary Fund, an organization that has 189 member countries, is run by the United States and Europe. In fact, for most of the world outside of Europe, the US Treasury Department is in charge. The World Bank, which by custom since 1946 has to have an American as its president, is also controlled by Washington and its allies, and cooperates with the IMF in promoting and imposing economic policies that Washington favors. These policies are often not in the interest of developing countries, as one would expect from organizations that are not accountable to low- and middle-income countries, or to any electorate. These are the institutions of global governance that exercise power in the world, other than the UN Security Council, where the transatlantic alliance must share veto power with Russia and China. The IMF, for most of the past half-century, has been the most important avenue of US influence over low- and middle-income countries. It has sat at the top of a creditors’ cartel, where countries that did not agree to IMF conditions would not get loans from other multilateral lenders (e.g., the World Bank) and sometimes not even from the private sector. This cartel lost influence in most middle-income countries in the first decade of the 21st century, but it has been coming back (e.g., inArgentina), and it still maintains its creditors’ cartel in poor countries. European leaders are quite angry about the Trump administration’s unilateral abrogation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the negotiated agreement with Iran that had put an end to the threat that it would develop nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. Europe clearly has much more of a security risk stemming from Middle East turmoil, which is worsened by Trump’s threatened war with Iran; not to mention all the political problems that have been created by the refugee inflow that was primarily a result of US intervention there. But what did they do about it, after their anxious pleading with Trump failed to move him? Nothing, because these leaders―quite apart from the people of Europe, who have been screwed royally since the Great Recession―need their beloved partner in crime. The United States is the gendarme of the rich countries’ global economic and political order. This is partly because Washington did not suffer the destruction that Europe did in the world wars, and partly because Europeans have developed welfare states that do not allow for the fantastically wasteful military spending that maintains 800 US military bases around the globe. But Washington’s weapons of mass and ordinary destruction are by no means its whole arsenal. The “exorbitant privilege” of being able to print the world’s most important currency, which makes up 60 percent of global reserves held by central banks, is another. When Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008 and the world financial crisis hit, the Federal Reserve arranged currency swaps for its European partners to make sure they didn’t suffer any temporary international liquidity problems. On the other side of the divide, if you are outside Washington’s good graces, the dollarized world financial system allows the United States vast power to enforce sanctions against you (e.g., in the cases of Cuba, Venezuela, and Iran), whether or not the UN approves. Europe’s elites are bound to the rulers of the United States by virtue of their common interest in maintaining dominance over the world economy. This is true despite the fact that their spoils do not trickle down to the citizenry. This transatlantic dominance won’t last forever. Eurasia, the world’s largest land mass, which bred the colonial powers that conquered the world, continues to increase its economic integration, despite Washington’s efforts to counter this world-historical trend with its attempted TPP and TTIP commercial agreements. China’s economy is already 25 percent larger than that of the United States on a purchasing-power-parity basis (this is the measure most often used by economists for international comparisons, since it takes into account price differences between countries). In a decade, it’s projected to be about twice as big as that of the United States. Over time, European countries, led by their corporations and financial institutions, will look more to the East and less to the West as the world becomes more multipolar and the US share of the world economy shrinks. But for the near future, the US and European elite need each other as the global hegemon tries to hang on to its unelected position. Trump can be as rude, crude, and ignorant as he pleases with his European allies, but it won’t make them rebel against the “leader of the free world.”
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 1NC --- No Collapse
Rynning 18 (Sten Rynning is professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Southern Denmark, where he also heads the Center for War Studies. He researches NATO and modern war; ; 9-25-18)
NATO is unraveling and world crisis is upon us, writes Robert Kagan in response to the 2018 NATO summit. Kagan thus starkly depicts the worst-case scenario outlined in this essay. If Trump embodies a fatigue in the U.S. political system with enduring alliances, and if Russia becomes a U.S. partner of choice in tipping the scales of Eurasian land power against China, then NATO as a transatlantic alliance would indeed unravel, and Europe’s peace would be in question. Still, even in this bleak scenario, it is unlikely that NATO would go away. Rather, Britain is likely to step in as continental Europe’s offshore power, though, of course, with diminished capabilities compared to those of the United States. A Europeanized NATO would tie Britain to the continent and perhaps become part of the answer to the troubled British-E.U. relationship. The European Union would not be able to stand still in the face of such a security transformation. France and Germany would likely seek to rescue their institutional project by accelerating the construction of a core that would allow France to extend security guarantees to Germany in return for French access to German financial governance, and which would create an E.U. periphery, notably in Eastern Europe, alongside countries such as Ukraine and Belarus. It is probable that Western Europe could rescue its commitment to collective institutions, including collective defense, but it is unlikely that it could extend security guarantees far eastwards, as NATO today is able to. A revised bargain with Russia will then become necessary, one in which the sovereignty of Eastern European countries will be questioned.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 2NC --- NATO Fails
Christian Whiton, State Department senior adviser George W. Bush administration and Senior Fellow Center for National Interest, “NATO Is Obsolete” July 6, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/nato-obsolete-25167
Before President Donald Trump attempts real diplomacy with Russian President Vladimir Putin at a summit in Helsinki on July 16, he'll first be subjected to another summit. That first summit is a gathering of leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These leaders continually assure the United States they are America's best allies, even as most contribute little to America's defense and rack up huge trade surpluses with the United States. Trump will insist on a better deal but should go farther and wind down U.S. membership in NATO. After the alliance was established in 1949, its first secretary general, Lord Hastings Ismay, summed up its purpose concisely: “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” The unofficial mission matched the time well: Western Europe’s postwar future was clouded by the prospect of a Soviet invasion, American insularity, or German militarism— all possible given the preceding decades of history. Nearly seventy years later, none of these concerns still exist. Furthermore, NATO's opposing alliance during the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact, quit the Soviet Bloc in 1989, and the Soviet Union itself passed into history in 1991 —twenty-seven years ago. Despite endless searches for a new mission to justify its massive burden on U.S. taxpayers, NATO has failed to be of much use since then. As its boosters like to remind us, after 9/11, the alliance invoked its Article 5 mutual-defense provision on our behalf. But action from America’s allies did not follow the grandiose gesture—the NATO mission in Afghanistan relied mostly on U.S. forces and effectively failed. Today, the alliance’s bureaucrats and some member states spotlight a threat from Russia as a reason for keeping the organization alive, along with a laundry list of “train and equip” missions. Yet NATO members' defense budgets don't reflect a real sense of danger from Russia or anyone else. Among the twenty-nine members, only the United States is really serious about its Article 3 obligations to defend itself, spending approximately $700 billion or 3.5 percent of its GDP on defense. No other NATO member comes close to this proportion, and the vast majority fail even to meet the modest, self-imposed requirement to devote at least 2 percent of GDP to defense. Britain and Poland are rare members that meet the 2 percent requirement. One of the worst free-riders is Canada, which spends just 1 percent of its GDP on security, amounting to $20 billion. Furthermore, Germany spends a similarly pathetic 1.2 percent. Compare that to non-NATO members facing real threats, some of which spend 5-10 percent of their GDPs on defense. These include Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who must contend with Iran and spend nearly a combined $100 billion. Israel, which faces the same enemy, adds $15 billion to the equation. Despite protestations of poverty at a time when their economies have never been larger, NATO members are more than willing to rack up additional liabilities, knowing America has their back. Last year, the alliance welcomed Montenegro. It is now poised to admit the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which would mean the United States is pledged to defend a nation that devotes just $120 million per year to its own defense, not quite as much as the Cincinnati Police Department. But the reality is there is no truly capable Russian foe seriously threatening the West. Russia has one million uniformed personnel in its military, the world’s second-largest behind America, but the European Union could easily afford to match that with its combined $17 trillion economy—ten times larger than Russia’s. However, it needn’t bother as Moscow spends just $61 billion on its overwrought military, which doubles as an employment program. Russia’s Vladimir Putin has gotten the most from Russia’s military, occupying parts of Georgia and Ukraine and gaining influence in Syria by backing the Assad regime. Still, his success in all three cases rested heavily on surprises that Moscow seems unlikely to be able to repeat against prepared and adequately funded European militaries. Yer we should expect to hear none of this nuance at the NATO summit, as poohbahs of the dying old European political order gather to tut-tut President Trump in the alliance’s fancy new $1.4 billion headquarters, funded predominantly by American taxpayers. To get out of this abusive relationship, Trump should begin the process of limiting America's role in NATO. A good model is that of Sweden, which cooperates with NATO on some matters and not on others. Such an approach could allow joint training, but end the practice of having overburdened U.S. taxpayers foot the bill for wealthy Europeans' security. As part of this plan, Trump could mothball U.S. bases in Europe and shift most resources spent there and in the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific region, where China and Iran pose real threats to America—and against which NATO is irrelevant. Europe is prosperous and treats America like a patsy. Let it stand on its own.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 2NC --- NATO Fails
Ranhotra 22 — Sanbeer Ranhotra, Political Researcher at TFIGlobal, 2022 (“The irrelevance of NATO is now out in the open,” TFIGlobal, February 25th, Available Online at https://tfiglobalnews.com/2022/02/25/the-irrelevance-of-nato-is-now-out-in-the-open/)
NATO is a headless chicken. It has been reduced into an insignificant entity which when told to shut up by Russia, goes to a corner and quietly sits down – making sure to behave itself. It is quite remarkable how Ukraine thought this organisation would come to its aid in the event of a large-scale Russian invasion. Leave alone military aid, NATO has not even been able to agree on a decisive economic sanctions package that would have an immediate effect on Moscow.
Russia has invaded Ukraine. The world is outraged. The United States and its allies are angry. NATO is infuriated. But here’s the ridiculously painful part: NATO can do nothing but mutely spectate as Russian President Vladimir Putin redefines Eastern Europe. Essentially, NATO has failed. It had one mandate – to protect Europe. It has failed to achieve its primary objective, and this would have lasting consequences for the security alliance.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 1NC --- NATO Fails
Carpenter 22 — Ted Galen Carpenter, Senior Fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Texas, 2022 (“NATO Security Dependents Are Not Useful Allies,” CATO, January 8th, Available Online at )
SINCE THE end of World War II, U.S. officials have had an unduly expansive concept of what constitutes worthwhile strategic allies for the United States. In too many cases, the “allies” that Washington touts are small, weak, often militarily useless dependents. Worse, some of them are on bad terms with more powerful neighboring states. Under those circumstances, the so‐called allies are major liabilities rather than assets to the United States. Indeed, they are potential snares, ones that can entangle America in unnecessary military confrontations.
Washington would do well to become far more selective about which nations it includes in its roster of allies, and U.S. leaders should stop elevating security dependents to the status of allies. When U.S. officials described the regimes that Washington installed through military force in Afghanistan and Iraq as allies, it became clear that they had lost even minimal understanding of the concept. That point became abundantly evident when their Afghan client collapsed almost overnight in the face of the Taliban military offensive. It’s time for U.S. policymakers to do better.