2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2NC --- Iran Answers
Kaye 10 (Dalia, , RAND senior political scientist, “Dangerous But Not Omnipotent”, , ldg)
To accurately gauge the strategic challenges from Iran over a ten- to fifteen-year horizon, this study sought to assess the motivations of the Islamic Republic, not just its capabilities. This approach, although difficult given the complexities of the Iranian system, is critical in identifying potential sources of caution and pragmatism in Iran’s policy formulation. Our exploration of Iranian strategic thinking revealed that ideology and bravado frequently mask a preference for opportunism and realpolitik—the qualities that define “normal” state behavior. Similarly, when we canvassed Iran’s power projection options, we identified not only the extent of the threats posed by each but also their limitations and liabilities. In each case, we found significant barriers and buffers to Iran’s strategic reach rooted in both the regional geopolitics it is trying to influence and in its limited conventional military capacity, diplomatic isolation, and past strategic missteps. Similarly, tensions between the regime and Iranian society—segments of which have grown disenchanted with the Republic’s revolutionary ideals—can also act as a constraint on Iranian external behavior. ¶ This leads to our conclusion that analogies to the Cold War are mistaken: The Islamic Republic does not seek territorial aggrandizement or even, despite its rhetoric, the forcible imposition of its revolutionary ideology onto neighboring states. Instead, it feeds off existing grievances with the status quo, particularly in the Arab world. Traditional containment options may actually create further opportunities for Tehran to exploit, thereby amplifying the very influence the United States is trying to mitigate. A more useful strategy, therefore, is one that exploits existing checks on Iran’s power and influence. These include the gap between its aspiration for asymmetric warfare capabilities and the reality of its rather limited conventional forces, disagreements between Iran and its militant “proxies,” and the potential for sharp criticism from Arab public opinion, which it has long sought to exploit. In addition, we recommend a new U.S. approach to Iran that integrates elements of engagement and containment while de-escalating unilateral U.S. pressure on Tehran and applying increased multilateral pressure against its nuclear ambitions. The analyses that informed these conclusions also yielded the following insights for U.S. planners and strategists concerning Iran’s strategic culture, conventional military, ties to Islamist groups, and ability to influence Arab public opinion.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1NC --- Iran Answers
Tabatabai ‘17 (Adnan Tabatabai is co-founder and CEO of the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient, “Why Iran-US war of words won't turn physical”, Al-Monitor, February 9, 2017, , accessed 6/29/2017,)
As much as the United States' new tone toward Iran is worrisome, and as much as the Islamic Republic's Jan. 29 ballistic missile test is disconcerting, Tehran and Washington are unlikely to collide directly. In both capitals, decision-makers see an urgent need for harsh rhetoric — albeit for different reasons. The Iranians see a need to show resilience vis-a-vis an explicitly hostile US administration. Meanwhile, the latter wants to make clear to both its domestic and international audience that the Obama era is over. This involves signaling that the easing of tensions with Iran has ended. It also involves reassuring regional allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel that Washington would not engage in a rapprochement with Tehran at their expense. Indeed, it should not come as a surprise that US national security adviser Michael Flynn's warning that Iran "is officially on notice" came shortly after lengthy phone calls between the White House and both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Saudi Arabia's King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud. But escalating rhetoric aside, the reality is that US policy toward Iran has largely remained intact. In the 13 months since the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran has repeatedly conducted ballistic missile tests. And it is entitled to do so. In UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231, which endorses the nuclear deal, Iran is "called upon" not to carry out tests of missiles "designed" to carry nuclear weapons. There is no legally binding prohibition of such launches, unlike in UNSCR 1929 — the last and most harsh UN resolution against Iran over its nuclear program — which is superseded by UNSCR 2231. To be clear, the nuclear deal does not address Iran's missile program. Moreover, the world powers with which Iran negotiated UNSCR 2231 — apart from the United States — did not display any appetite to insert legally binding text on Iran's missile tests. Thus, as provocative as the missile tests may be, it is hard to see them providing a legal basis for the United States to spearhead new multilateral sanctions, leaving Washington with the option of adopting unilateral sanctions, which it did on Feb. 3. While it took the Trump administration less than two weeks to slap sanctions on Iran, the idea that there was a sanctions freeze in Obama's final year in office is inaccurate. In fact, the latest sanctions were prepared by the previous administration. In January 2016, not long after the implementation of the nuclear deal, changes were made to the Visa Waiver Program, which excluded Iranian dual nationals and anyone who had visited Iran in the preceding five years. Moreover, last December, Obama refrained from moving to veto the congressional vote on a 10-year extension of the Iran Sanctions Act. While these sanctions are unrelated to Iran's nuclear program, they undoubtedly undermine the impact of the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions. Iran has reacted to the escalating rhetoric and sanctions by stressing that its missile program is defensive in nature, promising retaliatory sanctions, and by carrying out new military drills. Yet, there is little incentive for Iran to greatly alter the status quo. Iranian leaders see the JCPOA as much more than just about the United States. It is an international arrangement with world powers — including the European Union, which Iran holds in high regard as a multinational institution. They see this arrangement as beneficial to Iran's economic and security calculations. Foreign investment, albeit limited due to remaining US sanctions, is trickling in. The EU oil embargo has been lifted and major contracts in the area of petrochemicals, civic aviation and transport are increasingly sealed. Additionally, the JCPOA provides a sense of security to Iran. It is highly unlikely for any party to the agreement to green-light military action by another party against Iran. Hence, Iran has little incentive not to abide by the nuclear deal. As such, while the cycle of escalating rhetoric is discomforting at a time of deep uncertainty and conflict in the Middle East, it is important to see that it has its limits. Short of outright regime change, the United States has in fact rather limited options to weaken and contain Iran. Given its experiences in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, it is unlikely that the United States will launch full-scale unilateral military action against Iran. It could move to arm a third country to hit Iranian infrastructure. This was tried with Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Today, Saudi Arabia could be such a third country. But given the lack of appetite in Riyadh for direct confrontation with Tehran, and considering the downward spiral in the Saudi military intervention against Yemen — the poorest country in the region — it is unthinkable that Saudi Arabia would take such a step. Israel has repeatedly threatened to attack Iranian nuclear sites. But considering the low chances of success and the potentially dire consequences, including retaliatory attacks by Lebanon's Hezbollah movement, it can be argued that such threats primarily serve a political purpose. Less costly measures aimed at weakening and containing Iran, such as sanctions, have been tried and tested. The Obama administration managed to put in place an unprecedented multilateral sanctions regime targeting Tehran. Yet, it was under those very sanctions that Iran’s nuclear program evolved into what the international community came to perceive as a major threat to global security. Consequently, the Obama administration tried diplomacy. And it worked. The JCPOA reduced the capacity and increased the transparency of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions. And as the International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly certified, the deal is working. Bearing in mind the nuclear deal is fulfilling its objectives, the limited military options to contain Iran, and perhaps most of all the likely US inability to forge an international consensus against Iran in case of its unilateral breach of the accord, the security establishments of both Israel and Saudi Arabia have publicly urged Washington not to dismantle the JCPOA. While reveling in the newfound reassurances from Washington, it can thus be argued that Riyadh and Tel Aviv understand the limits of the cycle of escalation and mostly take solace in Trump's unwillingness to realize their nightmares under Obama. In this vein, the Trump administration can be expected to do whatever it can to minimize the economic benefits Iran will reap under the JCPOA. It will likely seek to discredit Iran's regional policies to prevent the normalization of the Islamic Republic's ties with the world, while also diminishing the political capital the deal affords Iran. But it will do this short of breaching the accord. Thus, while likely to squabble about respective obligations and further drift away from rapprochement, neither Iran nor the United States has the incentive or ability to take the new cycle of tension to a military confrontation.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2NC --- Terror Answers
Mueller and Stewart 10/29/18 [John Mueller is Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, and adjunct professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington. Mark G. Stewart is Professor of Civil Engineering and Director of the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at The University of Newcastle in Australia. Terrorism and Bathtubs: Comparing and Assessing the Risks. October 29, 2018. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2018.1530662?journalCode=ftpv20]
However, there is of course no guarantee that things will remain that way, and the 9/11 attacks inspired the remarkable extrapolation that, because the terrorists were successful with box cutters, they might soon be able to turn out weapons of mass destruction— particularly nuclear ones—and then detonate them in an American city. For example, in his influential 2004 book, Nuclear Terrorism, Harvard’s Graham Allison relayed his “considered judgment” that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not.”11 Allison has had a great deal of company in his alarming pronouncements. In 2007, the distinguished physicist Richard Garwin put the likelihood of a nuclear explosion on an American or European city by terrorist or other means at 20 percent per year, which would work out to 91 percent over the eleven-year period to 2018.12 Allison’s time is up, and so is Garwin’s. These off-repeated warnings have proven to be empty. And it is important to point out that not only have terrorists failed to go nuclear, but as William Langewiesche, who has assessed the process in detail, put it in 2007, “The best information is that no one has gotten anywhere near this. I mean, if you look carefully and practically at this process, you see that it is an enormous undertaking full of risks for the would-be terrorists.”13 That process requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. Nor have terrorist groups been able to steal existing nuclear weapons—characteristically burdened with multiple safety devices and often stored in pieces at separate secure locales—from existing arsenals as was once much feared. And they certainly have not been able to cajole leaders in nuclear states to palm one off to them—though a war inflicting more death than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined was launched against Iraq in 2003 in major part under the spell of fantasies about such a handover.14 More generally, the actual terrorist “adversaries” in the West scarcely deserve accolades for either dedication or prowess. It is true, of course, that sometimes even incompetents can get lucky, but such instances, however tragic, are rare. For the most part, terrorists in the United States are a confused, inadequate, incompetent, blundering, and gullible bunch, only occasionally able to get their act together. Most seem to be far better at frenetic and often self-deluded scheming than at actual execution. A summary assessment by RAND’s Brian Jenkins is apt: “their numbers remain small, their determination limp, and their competence poor.”15 And much the same holds for Europe and the rest of the developed world.16 Also working against terrorist success in the West is the fact that almost all are amateurs: they have never before tried to do something like this. Unlike criminals they have not been able to develop street smarts. Except perhaps for the use of vehicles to deliver mayhem (though this idea is by no means new in the history of terrorism), there has been remarkably little innovation in terrorist weaponry or methodology since 9/11.17 Like their predecessors, they have continued to rely on bombs (many of which fail to detonate or do much damage) and bullets.18
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2NC --- Terror Answers
Neely 13—Meggaen Neely, The George Washington University Master of Arts (M.A.), Security Policy Studies 2012—2014 (expected) Baylor University Master of Arts (M.A.), Public Policy and Administration 2010—2012, Richard D. Huff Distinguished Masters Student in Political Science (2012) Baylor University Bachelor of Arts (B.A.), Political Science and Government, Research Assistant, Elliott School at George Washington University, Research Intern, Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Communications Intern at Federation of American Scientists Graduate Assistant at Department of Political Science, Baylor University [March 21, 2013, “Doubting Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism,” http://csis.org/blog/doubting-deterrence-nuclear-terrorism]
Because of the difficulty of deterring transnational actors, many deterrence advocates shift the focus to deterring state sponsors of nuclear terrorism. The argument applies whether or not the state intended to assist nuclear terrorists. If terrorists obtain a nuclear weapon or fissile materials from a state, the theory goes, then the United States will track the weapon’s country of origin using nuclear forensics, and retaliate against that country. If this is U.S. policy, advocates predict that states will be deterred from assisting terrorists with their nuclear ambitions. Yet, let’s think about the series of events that would play out if a terrorist organization detonated a weapon in the United States. Let’s assume forensics confirmed the weapon’s origin, and let’s assume, for argument’s sake, that country was Pakistan. Would the United States then retaliate with a nuclear strike? If a nuclear attack occurs within the next four years (a reasonable length of time for such predictions concerning current international and domestic politics), it seems unlikely. Why? First, there’s the problem of time. Though nuclear forensics is useful, it takes time to analyze the data and determine the country of origin. Any justified response upon a state sponsor would not be swift. Second, even if the United States proved the country of origin, it would then be difficult to determine that Pakistan willingly and intentionally sponsored nuclear terrorism. If Pakistan did, then nuclear retaliation might be justified. However, if Pakistan did not, nuclear retaliation over unsecured nuclear materials would be a disproportionate response and potentially further detrimental. Should the United States launch a nuclear strike at Pakistan, Islamabad could see this as an initial hostility by the United States, and respond adversely. An obvious choice, given current tensions in South Asia, is for Pakistan to retaliate against a U.S. nuclear launch on its territory by initiating conflict with India, which could turn nuclear and increase the exchanges of nuclear weapons. Hence, it seems more likely that, after the international outrage at a terrorist group’s nuclear detonation, the United States would attempt to stop the bleeding without a nuclear strike. Instead, some choices might include deploying forces to track down those that supported the suicide terrorists that detonated the weapon, pressuring Pakistan to exert its sovereignty over fringe regions such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and increasing the number of drone strikes in Waziristan. Given the initial attack, such measures might understandably seem more of a concession than the retaliation called for by deterrence models, even more so by the American public. This is not an argument against those technologies associated with nuclear forensics. The United States and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should continue their development and distribution. Instead, I question the presumed American response that is promulgated by deterrence advocates. By looking at possibilities for a U.S. response to nuclear terrorism, a situation in which we assume that deterrence has failed, we cast doubt on the likelihood of a U.S. retaliatory nuclear strike and hence cast doubt on the credibility of a U.S. retaliatory nuclear strike as a deterrent. Would the United States launch a nuclear weapon now unless it was sure of another state’s intentional sponsorship of nuclear terrorism? Any reasonable doubt of sponsorship might stay the United States’ nuclear hand. Given the opaqueness of countries’ intentions, reasonable doubt over sponsorship is inevitable to some degree. Other countries are probably aware of U.S. hesitance in response to terrorists’ use of nuclear weapons. If this thought experiment is true, then the communication required for credible retaliatory strikes under deterrence of nuclear terrorism is missing.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1NC --- Terror Answers
Daniel Benjamin 14, Nonresident Senior Fellow @ the Brookings Institute, current Director of the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding @ Dartmouth, “Hawks Exaggerate Islamic State Threat to the United States,” 8/17, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/08/17-hawks-exaggerate-islamic-state-threat-benjamin
To judge by the doom-laden prophecies cascading in from Washington, the United States faces a towering and imminent threat in the form of the militant group calling itself the Islamic State, or ISIS. “They are coming here,” Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina intoned on Fox News Sunday. “I think of an American city in flames because of the terrorists’ ability to operate in Syria and Iraq.” Senator Graham’s friend Sena tor John McCain is no less alarmist. Calling for immediate air strikes in Iraq and Syria, he declared, “They are getting stronger all the time . . . And their goal . . . is destruction of the United States of America.”Stoking the panic has been a very excitable press. On CNN last week, I was asked if Islamic State fighters represented an “existential threat” to the United States. Set aside that absurdity; no terrorist group threatens our existence. (America has faced one existential threat in modern times — the Soviet nuclear arsenal — and that is it.) But is the Islamic State a huge and menacing terrorist threat? Certainly not to the United States today. The danger to Iraq and its neighbors is real. The Islamic State has shown itself to be a formidable insurgency. Its focus is on ripping apart Iraq and Syria, sowing sectarian conflict, and creating in its midst a new jihadist state or caliphate. (That very word seems to incite fearmongers: “Every day that goes by, ISIS builds up its caliphate, and it becomes a direct threat to the United States,” said New York Representative Peter King, conjuring an image of a new Golden Horde with nuclear-tipped scimitars.) If the insurgency grows, and the threat to Jordan or Lebanon increases, we may have to act. But, for now, it’s important to understand that even if marauding operatives in Land Cruisers may be humiliating Iraq’s hollowed-out military, that doesn’t mean they have genuine terrorist skills. Consider the details: The Islamic State has never carried out a significant attack outside of its neighborhood. In 2005, when its operatives were still part of Al Qaeda in Iraq, operatives carried out hotel bombings in Jordan and tried and failed to attack an American warship in the Red Sea. More recently, four people were killed in an apparent lone-wolf attack at the Jewish museum in Brussels by a young man trained in Syria. In other words, we’ve seen no demonstrated ability to carry out the kind of complex international strike that kills dozens or hundreds, let alone engulfs a US city in flames.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2NC --- Meltdowns Answers
Adams, 12 (Rod, Former Submarine Engineering Officer also Founder of Adams Atomic Engines Inc., "Has Apocalyptic Portrayal of Climate Change Risk Backfired?", 5-2-12, , accessed 10-9-12)
Not only was the discussion enlightening about the reasons why different people end up with different opinions about climate change responses when presented with essentially the same body of information, but it also got me thinking about a possible way to fight back against the Gundersens, Caldicotts, Riccios, Grossmans and Wassermans of the world. That group of five tend to use apocalyptic rhetoric to describe what will happen to the world if we do not immediately start turning our collective backs on all of the benefits that abundant atomic energy can provide. They spin tall tales of deformed children, massive numbers of cancers as a result of minor radioactive material releases, swaths of land made “uninhabitable” for thousands of years, countries “cut in half”, and clouds of “hot particles” raining death and destruction ten thousand miles from the release point. Every one of those clowns have been repeating similar stories for at least two solid decades, and continue to repeat their stories even after supposedly catastrophic failures at Fukushima have not resulted in a single radiation related injury or death. According to eminent scientists – like Dr. Robert Gale – Fukushima is unlikely to EVER result in any measurable increase in radiation related illness. One important element that we have to consider to assess cancer risks associated with an accident like Fukushima is our baseline risk for developing cancer. All of us, unfortunately, have a substantial risk of developing cancer in our lifetime. For example, a 50-year-old male has a 42% risk of developing cancer during his remaining life; it’s almost the same for a 10-year-old. This risk only decreases when we get much older and only because we are dying of other causes. It’s true that excess radiation exposure can increase our cancer risk above baseline levels; it’s clear from studies of the survivors of the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of people exposed to radiation in medical and occupational settings, and of people exposed to radon decay products in mines and home basements. When it comes to exposures like that of Fukushima, the question is: What is the relative magnitude of the increased risk from Fukushima compared to our baseline cancer risk? Despite our fears, it is quite small. If the nuclear industry – as small and unfocused as it is – really wanted to take action to isolate the apocalyptic antinuclear activists, it could take a page from the effective campaign of the fossil fuel lobby. It could start an integrated campaign to help the rest of us to remember that, despite the dire predictions, the sky never fell, the predicted unnatural deaths never occurred, the deformations were figments of imagination, and the land is not really irreversibly uninhabitable for generations. The industry would effectively share the story of Ukraine’s recent decision to begin repopulating the vast majority of the “dead zone” that was forcibly evacuated after the Chernobyl accident. It would put some context into the discussion about radiation health effects; even if leaders shy away from directly challenging the Linear No Threshold (LNT) dose assumption, they can still show that even that pessimistic model says that a tiny dose leads to a tiny risk. Aside: My personal opinion is that the LNT is scientifically unsupportable and should be replaced with a much better model. We deserve far less onerous regulations; there is evidence that existing regulations actually cause harm. I hear a rumor that there is a group of mostly retired, but solidly credentialed professionals who are organizing a special session at the annual ANS meeting to talk about effective ways to influence policy changes. End Aside. Most of us recognize that there is no such thing as a zero risk; repeated assertions of “there is no safe level” should be addressed by accepting “close enough” to zero so that even the most fearful person can stop worrying. The sky has not fallen, even though we have experienced complete core meltdowns and secondary explosions that did some visible damage. Nuclear plants are not perfect, there will be accidents and there will be radioactive material releases. History is telling me that the risks are acceptable, especially in the context of the real world where there is always some potential for harm. The benefits of accepting a little nuclear risk are immense and must not be marginalized by the people who market fear and trembling.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1NC --- Meltdowns Answers
Bradley 16 (Arthur, PhD in Electrical Engineering, former NASA engineer, “Would A Long-Duration Blackout Cause Nuclear Armageddon?” February 3, http://www.thesurvivalistblog.net/would-a-long-duration-blackout-cause-nuclear-armageddon/)
The risks of nuclear power are many, but two stand above the rest. The first is that the fuel assemblies in the reactor might overheat. That would only occur if the fission process became uncontrolled or if the cooling system failed. Should overheating occur, the fuel rods’ zirconium cladding and nuclear materials could both melt, resulting in a nuclear sludge akin to molten lava. That slag would be so hot that it might melt through the bottom of the reinforced reactor. Eventually, it would cool enough to harden, but not before it had spewed nuclear contaminants into the air. Melting zirconium also releases hydrogen, which could lead to an explosion that might actually expel the nuclear material into the surrounding area—think Fukushima. The good news is that nuclear fission can be stopped in under one second through the insertion of control rods. Those control rods are automatically inserted near the fuel rods either by a hydraulic system or through the use of an electromagnetic deadman switch that activates when power is removed. That means that when the electrical grid goes down or an emergency shutdown is initiated, fission would automatically stop one second later. That’s a good thing, but it doesn’t make the reactor inherently safe. Even without fission, the fuel rod assemblies remain incredibly hot, perhaps a thousand degrees C. If they were not actively cooled, pressure and temperatures would build in the reactor until something breaks—not good. After three days of active cooling, however, the reactor would be thermally cool enough to open, should it be deemed necessary to remove the fuel rod assemblies. The second major risk has to do with cooling of the spent fuel rod assemblies. Nuclear fuel rod assemblies have a usable life on the order of 54-72 months (depending on reactor type). Every 18-24 months, the reactor is brought down and serviced. While it is down, the fuel rod assemblies are removed, and 1/3 of them are replaced with fresh assemblies. Think of this like rotating cans of food in your emergency pantry. In the U.S., fuel rods are not refurbished like in other countries. Instead, they are carefully stored in giant pools of water laced with boric acid—imagine a swimming pool at your local YMCA that is 75-feet deep. Those spent fuel rod assemblies are still incredibly radioactive, and they continue to generate heat. Water in the pool must therefore be circulated to keep them cool. How long must the fuel rods be cooled? According to Mr. Hopson, the answer is 5-7 years. After that, the rods are cool enough to be removed and stored in reinforced concrete casks. Even then, the rods continue to be radioactive, but their heat output can be passively managed. Nuclear plants obviously require electricity to operate their cooling pumps, not to mention their control systems. That power is normally tapped off of the electricity that the reactor generates. If the plant is offline, the power is provided by the electrical grid. But what happens when the grid itself goes down? The short answer is that large on-site diesel generators automatically activate to provide electricity. And if those should fail, portable diesel generators, which are also on-site, can be connected. Recent standardization has also ensured that generators can be swapped between plants without the need to retrofit connectors. There are also a couple of additional emergency systems that can be used specifically to cool the reactor. These include the turbine-driven-auxiliary-feedwater pump, which uses steam generated by the reactor to power a cooling turbine. The pump requires an operator, but it runs completely without electricity. This system, however, is meant only for emergency cooling of the reactor during those critical first few days when the fuel rod assemblies are being brought down in temperature, not for long-term cooling. And finally, in the worst case, most plants have a method of bringing in river or ocean water to flood the reactor. This typically damages the cooling system, but again, it helps to cool and cover the reactor core should all else fail. Unlike in other countries, permission from the federal government is not required to flood the reactor. With backup systems to the backup systems, it would seem that there’s nothing to worry about, right? Under all but the direst of circumstances, I think that assessment is correct. However, one could imagine a scenario in which the grid was lost and the diesel generators ran out of fuel. Speaking of fuel, how much is actually stored onsite? It depends on the plant, but at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, for example, there is enough fuel to run the emergency diesel generators for at least 42 days. I say at least because it would depend on exactly what was being powered. Once the reactor was cooled down, a much smaller system, known as the Residual Heat Removal System, would be all that was required to keep the fuel assemblies cool, both in the reactor and the spent fuel rods pool. The generators and onsite fuel supply could power that smaller cooling system for significantly longer than if they were powering the larger reactor cooling system. Even if we assumed a worst case of forty-two days, it’s hard to imagine a scenario in which that would not be enough time to bring in additional fuel either by land, water, or air. Nonetheless, let’s push the question a little further. What would happen in the unlikely event that the diesel fuel was exhausted? Even with the reactor having been successfully cooled, the biggest risk would continue to be overheating of the fuel rod assemblies, both in the reactor and the spent fuel rods pool. Without circulation, the heat from the fuel rod assemblies could boil the surrounding water, resulting in steam. In turn, the water levels would drop, ultimately exposing the fuel rods to air. Once exposed to air, their temperatures would rise but not to the levels that would melt the zirconium cladding. Thankfully, that means that meltdown would not occur. The steam might well carry radioactive contaminants into the air, but there would be no release of hydrogen and, thus, no subsequent explosions. The situation would certainly be dangerous to surrounding communities, but it wouldn’t be the nuclear Armageddon that many people worry about.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2NC --- Grid Collapse Answers
Perera 14 [David Perera, cybersecurity reporter for POLITICO Pro, “U.S. grid safe from large-scale attack, experts say,” September 10, 2014, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/power-grid-safety-110815.html#ixzz3fEZeVZrQ]//JIH
The specter of a large-scale, destructive attack on the U.S. power grid is at the center of much strategic thinking about cybersecurity. For years, Americans have been warned by a bevy of would-be Cassandras in Congress, the administration and the press that hackers are poised to shut it down. But in fact, the half-dozen security experts interviewed for this article agreed it’s virtually impossible for an online-only attack to cause a widespread or prolonged outage of the North American power grid. Even laying the groundwork for such a cyber operation could qualify as an act of war against the U.S. — a line that few nation-state-backed hacker crews would wish to cross. None denied that determined hackers could penetrate the networks of bulk power providers. But there’s a huge gap between that and causing a civilization-ending sustained outage of the grid. Electrical-grid hacking scenarios mostly overlook the engineering expertise necessary to intentionally cause harm to the grid, say experts knowledgeable about the power generators and high voltage transmission entities that constitute the backbone of the grid — what’s called the bulk power system. There’s also the enormity of the grid and diversity of its equipment to consider. “The grid is designed to lose utilities all the time,” said Patrick Miller, founder and director of the Energy Sector Security Consortium. “I’m not trying to trivialize the situation, but you’re not really able to cause this nationwide cascading failure for any extended duration of time,” he added. “It’s just not possible.”
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2NC --- Grid Collapse Answers
Chow 14 - Eugene K. Chow, journalist for the Week January 28, 2014 "Forget hackers: Squirrels are a bigger threat to America's power grid" theweek.com/articles/452311/forget-hackers-squirrels-are-bigger-threat-americas-power-grid
While American lawmakers and security officials repeatedly warn of a catastrophic cyberattack that will cripple [devastate] the nation's power grids, in reality, squirrels and tree branches are proving more troublesome than hackers when it comes to actual power outages.¶ According to numerous reports and headlines: America's power grid is "too vulnerable to cyberattack;" thousands will die if terrorists attack the grid; cyber attacks could keep America in the dark for nine to 18 months; and electric companies face "daily" cyber attacks, which over a month can build to 10,000.¶ With cyber security so abysmal, incentive so high, and attacks constant, why hasn't there been a massive hacker-triggered power failure yet? Simply put, because it's not that easy.¶ To be clear, attacks on the power grid would be disastrous and there are significant gaps that must be addressed — procedures improved, vulnerabilities patched, software updated — but even with these glaring weaknesses, an ordinary hacker wouldn't be able to take down the electrical grid. Turning America's lights off remotely is a complex operation that requires not only hacking expertise but an array of intelligence and analysis — something only the most sophisticated terrorist organizations or nation states can muster.¶ Take one of the grid's greatest cyber vulnerabilities, SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) software. It allows utility companies to remotely monitor and control facilities, which has the unfortunate consequence of also giving hackers the ability to sabotage the grid from afar.¶ While terrifying in theory, cyber security expert Bruce Schneier explains that SCADA vulnerabilities are "overblown" and the reports are "hype." Actually hacking into SCADA software and causing physical damage to a system is exceptionally difficult. In fact, the only known SCADA attack to cause damage was the Stuxnet virus, which was created after years of intensive research and espionage by Israel and America's most advanced spies and engineers to damage a secret Iranian nuclear facility.¶ Veteran intelligence officer Michael Tanji points out in Wired just how complex such an attack would be. For starters SCADA systems are "rarely connected directly to the public internet," which makes "gaining access to grid-controlling networks a challenge for all but the most dedicated, motivated and skilled — nation-states, in other words."¶ If hackers were somehow able to enter the system, to actually cause physical damage Tanji explains, they would still need to have advanced intelligence gathering abilities to learn which SCADA software utilities are running, how they are connected, what the generator blueprints look like, which weaknesses exist in equipment, how to exploit those weaknesses, which machines are linked, how to override safety mechanisms and keep engineers or automatic safeguards from stepping in, and much more.¶ In other words, "a purely online approach is simply not going to provide you with the type and volume of information you are going to need to accomplish your mission," Tanji said. "You're going to have to deploy national-level resources."¶ Meanwhile, as lawmakers worry over these highly sophisticated hypothetical attacks, the nation's aging power grid is falling apart all by itself.¶ In its annual report on US infrastructure, the American Society of Civil Engineers gave the electric grid, some of which dates back to the 1880s, a "D-plus" as the number of power failures continues to rise.¶ According to a study by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, between 1965 and 1988, there were three major power failures. From 2000 to 2005, there were 11 and from 2006 to 2009, there were 33. The primary cause of these failures was weather.¶ More troubling is the fact that the second largest blackout in history, the 2003 Northeast blackout that left more than 50 million without power for two days, was caused by power lines brushing against tree branches in Ohio.¶ Even squirrels are proving to be, well, a squirrelly problem. No one really knows how much damage the rodents do, but it's certainly more than hackers manage. A cursory analysis in The New York Times found that over a four month span last year, squirrels caused at least 50 power outages across the country — and those were just the ones that made the news. And while no one knows how many people are affected by squirrel-related outages each year, in just two days last June, four squirrel-related incidents left more than 18,000 homes in four different states in the dark. How do squirrels manage such mayhem? They simply chew through wires or scamper over fragile electrical equipment.¶ If squirrels weren't troublesome enough, on the more malicious end, there has been a sharp increase in the number of physical attacks on America's energy infrastructure and authorities are struggling to find who's responsible.¶ Last year, Arkansas suffered three separate attacks on the electrical grid that left thousands without power including a substation being lit on fire, the chopping down of two key utility poles with a stolen tractor, and an attempt to use a train to pull down a 100-foot transmission tower.¶ Meanwhile in California, an individual entered a substation and cut several cables, knocking out 911 calls, landlines, and cell service in the area before firing a high-powered rifle at transformers, which ultimately shut down the transformer bank.¶ Military-grade hackers could certainly trigger a blackout for the ages, but with saboteurs waltzing into power stations and causing mayhem with impunity, tree branches leaving millions in the dark, and squirrels wrecking havoc, there are more clear and present dangers to worry about.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1NC --- Grid Collapse Answers
Pollet 14 - JONATHAN POLLET, founder of Red Tiger Security, and a 17 year veteran of the US ciritcal infrastructure Nov. 23, 2014 "Here's What Chinese Hackers Can Actually Do To The US Power Grid Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/what-hackers-can-do-to-our-power-grid-2014-11#ixzz3hTq8klee" www.businessinsider.com/what-hackers-can-do-to-our-power-grid-2014-11
There’s been a lot of discussion lately about the risks posed by hackers to America’s critical infrastructure systems, with terms like “cyber-Pearl Harbor” and “cyber-9/11” being bandied about by government officials and other prominent figures.¶ Invariably, one of the worst scenarios often depicted by these cyberwar predictions is an attack on the US power grid that would cause a widespread blackout.¶ In his testimony before the House Intelligence Committee on November 20th, NSA Director Adm. Michael Rogers went into some detail on those risks:¶ House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers: “It was determined that malware was on those (critical infrastructure) systems. Can you be a little more definitive about what does that mean? If I’m on that system and I want to do some harm, what does that do … ? Do the lights go out? Do we stop pumping water? What does that really mean? And the fact that it was there, does that mean they already have the capability to ‘flip the switch’ if they wanted to?”¶ Admiral Michael Rogers: “Well let me address the last part first. There shouldn’t be any doubt in our minds that there are nation-states and groups out there that have the capability to do that. To enter our systems, to enter those industrial control systems, and to shut down, forestall our ability to operate, our basic infrastructure. Whether it’s generating power across this nation, whether it’s moving water and fuel … Once you’re into the system and you’re able to do that, it enables you to do things like, if I want to tell power turbines to go offline and stop generating power, you can do that. If I wanted to segment the transmission system so that you couldn’t distribute the power that was coming out of the power stations, this would enable you to do that. It enables you to shut down very segmented, very tailored parts of our infrastructure.”¶ A number of media outlets interpreted these comments as a claim by the NSA that a country like China could take down our nation’s power grid. But is that what the NSA director really said? And is a widespread, national blackout caused by hackers a realistic scenario?¶ While it’s easy to draw that conclusion from the generalized nature of Adm. Rogers’ responses, it’s important to re-read the last line in that exchange: “It enables you to shut down very segmented, very tailored parts of our infrastructure.” (Emphasis added.)¶ This line is important because it clarifies the types of risks we’re actually talking about when it comes to the electric grid. No, hackers can’t take down the entire, or even a widespread portion of the US electric grid. From a logistical standpoint, this would be far too difficult to realistically pull off - and it’s not what we should be devoting our attention to. What is more realistic is for a cyber attack to cripple [devastate] an individual utility, causing a blackout or disruption of service at the local level.¶ The power grid is vulnerable to attack — there’s no question about that. In my own work, testing the security readiness of US and global energy companies and utilities, I regularly find serious vulnerabilities on these networks and I am often called in to deal with compromises that have already taken place — including cyber-espionage activities by state-sponsored groups.¶ Adm. Rogers testimony is extremely important as it provides a strong authoritative voice to what is an urgent problem facing this country right now: America’s critical infrastructure is vulnerable to attack, it’s a complicated problem to fix it and an attack is eminent. But the notion that a hacker could basically turn off the country’s power with the ‘flip of a switch,’ as Rep. Rogers called it, is more science fiction than reality.¶ Here’s why:¶ The US energy grid is owned and operated by hundreds of various regional utilities that all use different hardware and software. That means hackers would have to tunnel into hundreds of diverse networks, which would take several years, and then write custom exploits which are unique for each specific environment they’re targeting. For those who would argue that China or Russia have the money, time and capability to do that, try to understand that developing a functional exploit, getting it placed on the exact part of the network that it needs to be on in order to have the desired effect (i.e., specific programmable logic controllers that run the utility’s machinery), then keeping it hidden on that network over a period of months or years while security teams try to hunt it down, and doing all of this at the same time on hundreds of networks is extremely difficult. To put it in perspective, it would be like trying to rob a hundred different banks at the exact same time.¶ However, even if a hacker group was able to pull this off, there is a catch-all that would create yet another hurdle. There are high-voltage DC interconnects at various points that were specifically designed to prevent widespread outages.¶ By clarifying what we mean when we warn about attacks on the electric grid and other critical infrastructure, I’m not trying to downplay this risk at all. US critical infrastructure networks, which include the electric grid, utilities, oil/gas refineries and pipelines, water treatment plants, transportation networks, etc., are all highly vulnerable to cyber attacks, and this threat should be prioritized at the highest level by the federal government.¶ In the meantime, the individual asset owners who are the ones technically responsible for securing their networks and facilities need to start taking more aggressive steps immediately to guard against highly sophisticated cyber actors. But the real risk when it comes to the electric grid specifically is of localized disruptions in service — not a widespread outage. It would be extremely difficult for hackers, without an almost superhuman effort, to cause a power outage that stretched across the country.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2NC --- Cyber War Ansers
Tertrais 17 – Deputy Director at the Paris-based Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (Foundation for Strategic Research).
Bruno, 2017, “On The Brink”—Really? Revisiting Nuclear Close Calls Since 1945,” The Washington Quarterly, https://www.frstrategie.org/web/documents/publications/autres/2017/2017-tertrais-twq-on-the-brink.pdf
The short answer? If we are to discard Pope John Paul II’s explanation (“Divine Providence”),5 it is that the system worked and that, with rare exceptions, those in charge of nuclear weapons have been responsible, prudent, and careful. “Close calls” have ranged in fact from “not-so-close” to “very distant.”
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1NC --- Cyber War Answers
Oliver & Baklitskiy 18 – *Directs the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. **Arms control and nonproliferation consultant at PIR Center, Moscow. Olga & Andry, 2-20-18, "The Nuclear Posture Review and Russian ‘De-Escalation:’ A Dangerous Solution to a Nonexistent Problem," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/nuclear-posture-review-russian-de-escalation-dangerous-solution-nonexistent-problem/
There is a in the West that an “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear strategy, which for nuclear weapons use to a terrifyingly low level. Importantly, it’s referenced as fact in the Trump administration’s new which argues that the United States itself therefore needs new low-yield nuclear weapons to deter Russia at lower levels of conflict. But the evidence of a dropped threshold for Russian nuclear employment is weak. Moreover, even if this was Russia’s doctrine, a shift to more American reliance on lower-yield nuclear weapons would be the wrong solution to the problem. Understanding Russian Doctrine What do people mean when they say “escalate to de-escalate?” The words themselves are not particularly helpful. Any action that is neither a perfectly symmetrical nor smaller response to adversary action is escalation. Any threat (nuclear or otherwise) to raise the costs of conflict is a threat of escalation. And countries both escalate and threaten to do so fairly regularly as they seek to convince adversaries to rethink plans. The fact is that most escalation is intended to, well, de-escalate. Western analysts have developed a range of descriptions of Russian nuclear strategy that all fall, with varying degrees of consistency and contradiction, under the “escalate to de-escalate” umbrella. The and political scientist hold that Russia intends to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict to attain an advantageous battlefield outcome. So does current Pentagon official Russia would turn to nuclear weapons in the face of imminent battlefield defeat: e.g., to make up for conventional inferiority in a conflict with the NATO alliance. that Russia simply likes escalation, nuclear and otherwise. The notion that Russia might use nuclear weapons on the battlefield may originate in arguments in a 1999 paper published in the Russian military journal Voennaia Mysl. The authors, military officers and analysts V. I. Levshin, A. V. Nedelin, and M. E. Sosnovskii, that the use of nuclear weapons in a heretofore conventional conflict could demonstrate credibility and convince the adversary to stand down for fear of further escalation. The argument for more nuclear steps on the escalation ladder has been made more recently as . It was even promised by a senior Russian official prior to the release of a new military doctrine almost a decade . However, neither thatnor the one that followed it in (the most recent) in fact lowers the nuclear use threshold. As one of us has argued , the official statements, followed by a doctrine that did not deliver on them, suggest that proponents of a lowered threshold ultimately lost a bureaucratic fight. To this day, Russian “escalation” advocates occasionally publish an article, still hoping to change the policy — but continue to fail. Nor does Russian doctrine call for the use of nuclear weapons if Moscow is losing a conventional conflict. To the contrary, military doctrine clearly states that nuclear weapons will be used only in response to an adversary using nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction and/or “when the very existence of the state is ” One can argue what does and does not qualify as existential jeopardy, but the scenarios in which Western analysts envision Russian nuclear escalation — most of which involve ending a conventional conflict — seem to fall short by most definitions. In the past, Russia’s bar for nuclear use has been both higher and lower. In 1993, it inherited from the Soviet Union. In 2000, however, following the NATO air campaign in Yugoslavia, Russia’s new military doctrine allowed for first use in case of large-scale conventional aggression against Russia or its . It is plausible that at this time, plans indeed looked something like “escalate to de-escalate.” But soon after that, proponents of reliance on nuclear weapons found their views eclipsed by Russian government decisions to instead invest in conventional . At the time, this was mainly because Russia believed . Today, however, Russia is that its conventional capabilities can play at least some of the strategic deterrence roles historically played by nuclear weapons. A Secret Plan to Escalate? Those who believe in a lowered Russian threshold for nuclear use thus believe that Russia’s formal doctrine is intentionally disingenuous. Indeed, speculation about a secret annex to the doctrine that clandestinely lowers the nuclear threshold . But as in in War on the Rocks, if Russia’s goal is deterrence, a stated strategy of restraint at odds with a real strategy of escalation seems counterproductive. Deterrence works best when the adversary understands which actions will trigger an undesirable response. Three categories of evidence are offered to support the argument that Russia’s true nuclear threshold today is lower than its doctrine indicates: exercises, capability, and rhetoric. Like other nuclear states, Russia runs exercises that involve . The vast majority of these test strategic readiness, command and control, and interoperability. In a handful of recent cases, various sources use was simulated in otherwise conventional Russian exercises, supposedly boosting the evidence for “escalate to de-escalate.” It does not, however, appear that scenarios for these exercises fit the model of a small-scale nuclear strike early in a conflict—as one of us has argued in the . If one believes the strikes happened, conditions of a battlefield defeat posing an existential threat to the state are more plausible. However, as Bruno Tertrais explains, the evidence for simulated nuclear use in large conventional exercises is itself not fully . Importantly, Russia’s most recent large-scale military exercise focused on its Western flank, Zapad 2017, did not have any evident nuclear , despite positing a conflict with the NATO alliance. Then there’s Russian capability, specifically smaller-scale, shorter-range nuclear capabilities suitable for the battlefield. Russia maintains a substantial legacy of nonstrategic weapons, which some may believe suggests a willingness to use them. Moreover, in recent years, Moscow has emphasized the development of new warfighting systems that can be deployed with either nuclear or conventional firepower, the oft-touted Iskander being one . Russia is also working on hypersonic . Finally, the “accidental” leak of plans (in the form of a presentation slide) for a nuclear in 2015 fueled speculation that Russia is thinking creatively about nuclear warfighting (although the destructive power of the purported weapon would surely have strategic, not merely “de-escalatory,” effects). Some may argue that capability is evidence enough of possible “escalate to de-escalate” plans, and the West should therefore respond in kind. This is wrong, for two reasons: First, weapons can be used for all sorts of things, and one cannot plan for all possible contingencies — only those that seem plausible. Russia could also, in principle, plan to set off all of its nuclear weapons at once, or fire some of them into space. If a possible strategy is not supported by the evidence, it should not drive planning. Second, the argument that capabilities prove intent works both ways. The United States also has low-yield nuclear capabilities (and will have more if proponents have their way). Should Russia therefore expect the United States to use nuclear weapons first if American conventional forces were losing, say in a fight against Russia over Ukraine? Indeed, such an approach would be consistent with the American doctrine outlined in the new Nuclear Posture Review. But while the review may make this scenario less ludicrous than it was in the past, Russia would still be dangerously paranoid to base its planning on the possibility. There is no evidence of U.S. plans to start an offensive war against a major nuclear power like Russia or China, much less to use a preemptive nuclear strike to “de-escalate” a conventional conflict once it went wrong. So what is Russia’s very large nonstrategic arsenal for, and why is it emphasizing dual-use systems? First, as regards the nonstrategic arsenal as a whole, Russia is quite simply loath to give up something it has a lot of without getting something else in return. Second, Moscow knows that its nuclear capabilities make Brussels and Washington nervous. Russians did not discuss a nuclear role for the Iskander—and, indeed, rejected the possibility—until the Western press started describing the system as To be blunt, if not reassuring, Moscow has noticed that an emphasis on dual-capable systems keeps the West off-balance, and sees that as a clear benefit. This brings us to the last category of evidence for a clandestine lowered threshold: Russian rhetoric. While some Russian pundits recklessly talk of turning countries to , senior officials, including President Vladimir Putin, have been far more careful with their threats. Putin may that the Crimea crisis could, in some contingencies, have led him to place nuclear weapons on alert. However, this never happened, and it is something of a stretch to interpret that as meaning he would have used a tactical nuclear weapon to end a conventional conflict. Moreover, in the face of recent nuclear from America’s own president, the comments Putin has made seem almost circumspect. Putin’s rhetoric is meant not to signal plans to use nuclear weapons recklessly, but rather to remind any who may have forgotten that Russia is a nuclear weapons state. While this is prospectively destabilizing, it does not indicate a deep occult doctrine, much less a doctrine that has been consistently and publicly rejected. Russian rhetoric reflects the fact that Russia, much like the Soviet Union before it, sees NATO posing a threat that needs to be deterred. Moscow continues to believe, and Russian generals in private conversations emphasize, that any conventional conflict with NATO risks rapid escalation without “de-escalation” — into all-destroying nuclear war. It must therefore be avoided at all costs. This logic is consistent with that put forward by American scholars who have d nuclear weapons kept the peace during the Cold War. The success of the nuclear peace, in this view, lay in the threat of extreme escalation, not the bespoke step-by-step deterrence the Nuclear Posture Review seems to advocate and that the postulated Russian “de-escalation” doctrine would implicitly endorse.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1NC --- Turn --- OCOs Bad
Valeriano & Jensen 19 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Bren Chair of Military Innovation at the Marine Corps University, serves as Senior Advisor for the Cyber Solarium Commission; Associate professor at the Marine Corps University and a scholar‐in‐residence at American University’s School of International Service
Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, “The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint,” The CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 862, January 2019, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint
New policy options proposed by Cyber Command and the Trump administration risk exacerbating fear in other countries and creating a self-reinforcing spiral of tit-for-tat escalations that risk war even though each actor feels he is acting defensively—or, as it is called in the scholarly literature, a security dilemma.52 As shown above, most cyber operations to date have not resulted in escalation. The cyber domain has been a world of spies collecting valuable information and engaging in limited disruptions that substitute for, as well as complement, more conventional options. Shifting to a policy of preemptive offensive cyber warfare risks provoking fear and overreaction in other states and possibly producing conflict spirals. Even limited-objective cyber offensive action defined as “defending forward” can be misinterpreted and lead to inadvertent escalation.53 As the historian Cathal Nolan puts it, “intrusions into a state’s strategically important networks pose serious risks and are therefore inherently threatening.”54
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1NC --- Turn --- OCOs Bad
Valeriano & Jensen 19 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Bren Chair of Military Innovation at the Marine Corps University, serves as Senior Advisor for the Cyber Solarium Commission; Associate professor at the Marine Corps University and a scholar‐in‐residence at American University’s School of International Service
Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, “The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint,” The CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 862, January 2019, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint
The Myth of the Offense
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1NC --- Turn --- OCOs Bad
Slayton ’17 (Rebecca; 2/2017; PhD in chemical biology from Harvard University, Masters in chemistry and chemical biology from Harvard University, Bachelor’s in chemistry from Westmont College, author of Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, winner of the Computer History Museum Prize, author of Shadowing Cybersecurity, winner of a 5-year National Science Foundation CAREER award, project lead on research funded by the Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence’s Critical Infrastructure Resilience Institute; “Why Cyber Operations Do Not Always Favor the Offense,” ; Date Accessed: 7/10/2017; DS)
Creating Unnecessary Vulnerabilities Prioritizing offensive operations can increase adversaries’ fears, suspicions, and readiness to take offensive action. Cyber offenses include cyber exploitation (intelligence gathering) and cyberattack (disrupting, destroying, or subverting an adversary’s computer systems). An adversary can easily mistake defensive cyber exploitation for offensive operations because the distinction is a matter of intent, not technical operation. The difficulty of distinguishing between offensive and defensive tactics makes mistrustful adversaries more reactive, and repeatedly conducting offensive cyber operations only increases distrust. A focus on offensive operations can also increase vulnerabilities; for example, secretly stockpiling information about vulnerabilities in computers for later exploitation, rather than publicizing and helping civil society to mitigate those vulnerabilities, leaves critical infrastructure vulnerable to attack. The skills and organizational capabilities for offense and defense are very similar. Defense requires understanding how to compromise computer systems; one of the best ways to protect computer systems is to engage in penetration testing (i.e., controlled offensive operations on one’s own systems). The similarity between offensive and defensive skills makes it unnecessary to conduct offensive operations against adversaries to maintain offensive capability. Thus, rather than stockpiling technologies in the hope of gaining offensive advantage, states should develop the skills and organizational capabilities required to innovate and maintain information and communications technologies. Managing Complexity The complexity of information systems gives the offense certain advantages for purely probabilistic reasons. Imagine a race: offense and defense go hunting for randomly distributed vulnerabilities, with the offense attempting to exploit those vulnerabilities and the defense aiming to patch them. The number of vulnerabilities grows with the size and complexity of the computer system, as do the technological advantages of offense—at least in principle. With a vast number of vulnerabilities, it is unlikely that the defense will be able to find and patch every vulnerability before the offense finds and exploits it. Technology is, however, embedded in social organizations, and organizations can help the defense better manage complexity. Those that develop software can check for common errors before making hardware-software systems available for use. The defender has complete access to its computer system, whereas the attacker has a more limited set of attack vectors. Organizations can help skilled defenders by establishing good cybersecurity processes, such as continually scanning for vulnerabilities and updating software. Assessing Kinetic Effects To date, failures of cyber defense have largely been failures of management, and the successes of offense are a result of its relatively simpler goals. Offense, like defense, becomes more difficult as its goals become more complex. In particular, the advantages that complexity offers the offense in cyberspace diminish in the physical world. Computers controlling physical machinery can be hacked, but achieving particular physical effects, such as covertly sabotaging nuclear enrichment facilities, requires knowledge of the physical processes that the computers control, not merely knowledge of the computers. Much of the detailed knowledge needed to run an industrial control system is tacit, passed from one engineer to another but never written down, let alone stored on a computer. Gathering such information requires traditional espionage by humans on the ground, which is both expensive and risky. A cost-benefit analysis of Stuxnet for both the offense and the defense demonstrates why damaging physical infrastructure is more costly than simply infiltrating information networks. The costs of Stuxnet were likely far greater for the offense (the United States and Israel) than for the defense (Iran), and Stuxnet was relatively ineffective, setting back Iran’s nuclear program by fewer than three months. The great expense of Stuxnet was intelligence; though digital espionage can be used to obtain some kinds of information, the knowledge needed to disrupt a physical control system, such as the detailed methods and settings used to control pressure in Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, is not generally held in computers. The costs for both sides are dominated not by technology but by skilled labor—for example, hackers who identify and exploit zero-day vulnerabilities, systems administrators who manage and defend computer systems, and the nuclear engineers who understand enrichment processes and the means of disrupting them. In addition, assessing costs alone is misguided: the perceived benefits of attacking with and defending from Stuxnet (i.e., the value of Iran’s nuclear weapons program) greatly exceeded the costs for both the offense and the defense. This is one reason not to be complacent about the need to secure industrial control systems and critical infrastructure: though cyberattacks on such systems will be costly, a determined adversary may be willing to pay the cost to achieve its aims. Conclusion The common assumption that the offense dominates cyberspace is dangerous and deeply misguided. The offense-defense balance can be assessed only for specific operations, not for all of cyberspace, as it is shaped by the capabilities of adversaries and the complexity of their goals in any conflict. When it comes to exerting precise physical effects, cyberspace does not offer overwhelming advantages to the offense. Because the capabilities of offense and defense are similar, improving defensive operations allows preparation for cyber offense without risking geopolitical instability or increasing vulnerability to attack.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1NC --- Turn --- OCOs Bad
Healey, 22 (Jason Healey, Healey is a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s School for International and Public Affairs, 3-9-2022, accessed on 6-19-2022, War on the Rocks, "Preventing Cyber Escalation in Ukraine and After - War on the Rocks",
Second, Western offensive cyber operations might spark war. U.S. cyber espionage and operations against Putin, his cronies, or Russia’s military forces will appear far more ominous to Putin if he believes they are aimed at regime change. Could Putin turn the other cheek if the United States were to electronically raid the cryptocurrency wallets of Russia’s sanctions-avoiding kleptocrats? He might feel the need to escalate his own cyber operations as part of his own version of defending forward. Escalation could happen on the battlefield as well. , teams from U.S. Cyber Command are “in place to interfere with Russia’s digital attacks and communications.” Other teams are almost certainly collecting digital intelligence on the location and intent of Russian combat forces. The United States is sharing such intelligence with the Ukrainians but . That may change soon, as the United States seeks to alleviate intensifying attacks on civilians. And with his KGB-bred paranoia, Putin might already see the presence of U.S. defensive and intelligence teams operating on or against Russian military networks as evidence of direct U.S. involvement in the war. Confirming his apparent belief that Ukraine is just a NATO puppet, this might force a response, either inside or outside of cyberspace. Further, if Western governments have infiltrated Russia’s operational military networks, they may feel pressure to disrupt those networks to prevent civilian massacres. Because cyber capabilities are billed as non-lethal, reversible, and non-escalatory, tub-thumping newspapers may push decision-makers to take shots they might not otherwise: “We can’t create a no-fly zone but .” Some may succumb to this pressure, potentially causing a larger conflict. Future Risks Even if Russia and the West avoid direct conflict this time, they might not be so lucky the next. As relations worsen, future disruption of critical Western infrastructure by Russian intelligence, such as the and attacks, are less likely to be viewed as mere crimes. Repeated crises bordering on war may further erode the tacit agreements and relative restraint of quieter times. After repeated iterations of intensifying cyber operations, both Russia and the West may feel their backs to the wall with few options left other than military force when the next crisis — physical or cyber — emerges. Under extreme conditions, some of the same characteristics that lead cyber capabilities to be a pressure release might have the opposite effect, a mechanism that Bob Jervis and I have described as the . If Putin believes a direct conflict with NATO is likely and expects its adversaries to , he could conclude that the best possibility for success is to launch a massive preemptive cyber attack. Since the U.S. military may seem otherwise unbeatable, this Russia to “compensate with audacity in order to redress the balance.” The more the United States brags about its overwhelming offensive cyber advantage, but frets over weak defenses, the more any adversary might feel the need to .
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1NC --- Alt causes
Collier, 20 (Jamie Collier, Writer for war on the rocks, “CYBER RESERVES ARE NOT A SILVER BULLET”, war on the rocks, may 22, 2020, )//babcii
The most significant long-term challenge facing American and British cyber agencies is not China or Russia — it’s a shortage of cyber talent. This workforce deficit isn’t only affecting intelligence agencies. One looked at 11 countries’ cyber skill shortages and extrapolated that the global deficit of qualified personnel sits at over four million unfilled positions and argues that the workforce needs to grow by a staggering 145 percent. Government agencies struggling to match the lucrative private sector salaries on offer naturally find themselves on the back foot. Cyber reserves, conscription models, and are often touted as a panacea for boosting government recruits. Yet, are not enough. Cyber reserve models are often impractical and fail to materially address nascent policy challenges. While cyber reserves can certainly play a limited role in improving security, states such as Britain and the United States should instead continue to focus on policy initiatives that are better aligned with their political cultures and operational requirements. Working with the private sector provides more scalable reinforcements and enables a coordinated approach to protecting what is often predominantly privately-owned infrastructure. Both approaches can certainly co-exist, yet robust public-private collaboration will often trump the whims of volunteers. Practical Limitations of Cyber Reserves Calls for underestimate the logistical challenges of implementation. This has led to failing to address the nature of cyber operations or the lengthy timelines often involved. As much as anything, both offensive operations and securing networks are a collection of practices that require full-time staff and an organized approach. Most large government departments defend their networks 24 hours a day. Security operations centers run around-the-clock monitoring for potential threats. Likewise, vulnerability management programs, used to patch high-severity flaws, require constant vigilance and active coordination in order to stay ahead of the threat. Within these contexts, full-time staff who have experience working together develop continuity and established workflow patterns to ensure threats aren’t missed. Cyber espionage campaigns are no different. It is assumed that operations conducted by prominent state espionage groups, often , rely on technical wizardry alone. Yet, rather than their ability to exploit flashy zero-day vulnerabilities or deploy highly bespoke malware, it is often their operational capabilities that make the difference. This was captured by National Security Agency and former cyber security White House advisor Rob Joyce, who . This is largely due to the involved in cyber operations. This can include extensive open source research on employees ahead of sending phishing emails, putting in the hours to fully understand a target’s infrastructure, or waiting for the right moment to move laterally within a network. Crucially, successful operations often come down to gritty abrasion. Full-time staff, shift patterns, and established routines are at the foundation of a successful campaign. Supplementary staff waltzing in with the occasional weekend or evening to spare might be able to contribute, yet these operational realities limit their ability to substantially move the needle.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2NC --- Squo Solves
Rynning 20, is Professor of War Studies and Vice Dean for Research at the faculty of business and social sciences, the University of Southern Denmark (SDU) in Odense, Denmark. Sten Rynning founded the Center for War Studies at SDU in 2011 and headed it until 2019. (Sten, “Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice,” NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies, 2020, https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/43303/2021_Book_NLARMSNetherlandsAnnualReviewO.pdf)
Deterrence by denial (i.e., an ability to deny Russian objectives by defensive measures) is only possible for NATO at the lower rungs of this ladder, and NATO has not been idle here either. In fact, most of the early measures taken by NATO in response to the annexation of Crimea fall into the deterrence of denial category and centre on rapid reaction capacities, especially in the shape of a NATO Response Force (NRF) upgraded for deterrence purposes. The NRF now has a reinforced, quicker spearhead—a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force potentially up to 13,000 troops strong, and then two complementing brigades with support (each 13,000 strong) forming a layered, sizeable reaction force explicitly linked to collective defence purposes and regularly exercised in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states.35 In 2016, in response to the foreseeable difficulties of projecting mainly Western forces into zones of conflicts close to Russia, NATO decided to established an “enhanced forward presence”—four multinational battalion-sized battle groups —in the Baltic states and Poland, and a “tailored forward presence”—mainly naval forces—in the Black Sea region. Whether these forces can credibly “deny” Russian objectives in the case of limited war is a bone of contention. Most observers and sometimes NATO itself employ the descriptor “tripwire” to these forces, thus indicating that they are triggers that promise to unleash NATO’s big guns and therefore part and parcel of deterrence by punishment. However, US diplomats (interviewed on background) feel more confident that the US battalion embedded (in Poland) in the collective forward presence posture would actually be able to fight and survive, and thus deny Russian objectives. That may be so, in which case the conclusion is that NATO has a moderate-to-low—and geographically focused—capacity for deterrence by denial and then a more general and impressive capacity for deterrence by punishment. NATO’s unquestionable capacity for deterrence by denial is rather found at the level of grey zone, non-kinetic conflict. In this regard, NATO has upgraded not only its cyber defences and enhanced intelligence coordination, as mentioned, but has enhanced coordination with the European Union on hybrid threats, with a 2016 joint declaration leading to a common work program and a collaborative Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, located in Helsinki, the 2016 adoption of societal resilience benchmarks that, while mostly falling outside NATO’s political-military remit, nations must meet, and finally the decision in 2018 to organize counter-hybrid support teams that can tailor assistance to individual allies and circumstances.36 NATO’s full range of actions in response to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea —a range to which this brief overview can do only limited justice—thus combines deterrence by denial (grey zone conflict, societal resilience, reaction and forward deployed forces to counter limited land grabs) and deterrence by punishment (the full chain of reaction and deployable forces, from conventional to nuclear). NATO’s strong suit is the military piece of this posture, but it has considerably adapted to grey zone conflict scenarios in an effort to achieve a comprehensive deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia’s unified (kinetic and non-kinetic) and uninterrupted (all domains, in war and peace) doctrine of “new generation warfare”.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2NC --- Squo Solves
Oguz 16 – Ph.D, Security Expert at the International Strategic and Security Research Center
Safak, 2016, “The New NATO: Prepared for Russian Hybrid Warfare?” Insight, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26300458.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A54f0cb5a96b9cf9c79b2b9b43d8623b9
The Special Operations Forces are expected to provide strategic and operational support for the Alliance’s efforts, most especially in effectively countering irregular warfare elements, as they are more effective in this realm than regular forces. For this reason, the integration of special forces into the NRF and VJTF constitute another key measure adopted in the New Strategy. The first demonstration of this integration took place during the Noble Jump exercise of June 2015, when NATO deployed VJTF based on scenario that Poland was under threat of irregular warfare. The deployment made clear in terms of potential aggression against Alliance members, Russian irregular warfare is seen as far more likely than conventional warfare.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1NC --- Squo Solves
Oguz 16 – Ph.D, Security Expert at the International Strategic and Security Research Center
Safak, 2016, “The New NATO: Prepared for Russian Hybrid Warfare?” Insight, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26300458.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A54f0cb5a96b9cf9c79b2b9b43d8623b9
NATO was caught off guard when the crisis started in Ukraine. At the beginning, Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy of deception, ambiguity, and denial complicated attribution and response, and rendered the decision-making process more difficult for NATO. The Alliance did not manage to assess the environment correctly.27 As Major General Gordon Davis, the United States general in charge of operations and intelligence at NATO’s military headquarters in Belgium during the Ukrainian crisis, admitted, it took some time for the Alliance to determine the “size and the scale” of the troop reinforcement, which was continuously denied by the Russians.28