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2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › AT: N/L – Budget Space

Resources are finite

Harvey 17 Thomas H. Harvey III, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, “Managing Security Assistance To Support Foreign Policy,” statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 9-26-2017, /GoGreen!

Most DoD security assistance programs are bounded by statutory obligations to jointly develop and plan their activities in conjunction with the State Department and to secure Secretary of State concurrence before implementing them. The Department of Defense recognizes the importance, even the essential imperative, of conducting business in this way. In our government, no department has the luxury of pursuing uncoordinated efforts, especially given finite resources and growing threats. While it may not have always been so, I would venture to say that, currently, all DoD's security assistance programs are shaped and approved at some level, and often at multiple levels, by the State Department, from the country team to the regional function bureaus at main State, to the Secretary himself.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › AT: N/L – Budget Space

That’s the whole point of AM&E

Hooper 17 Lieutenant General Charles W. Hooper, US Army, Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Senior Research Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, MPA Harvard University, graduate of the graduate of the U.S. Army War College and United States Military Academy at West Point, “Managing Security Assistance To Support Foreign Policy,” prepared statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 9-26-2017, /GoGreen!

To address these challenges, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation has focused on improving the planning, prioritization, and synchronization of Title 10 programs. These efforts have effectively postured the SC community to address the significant reforms laid out in the FY 2017 NDAA.The FY 2017 NDAA identified SC as a core DoD mission by establishing a new chapter of Title 10. This new SC chapter is meant to enhance flexibility, transparency, oversight, and management of programs and resources; professionalize the SC workforce; and improve the alignment of SC activities with defense strategy. These new authorities provide DoD a unique opportunity to transform SC into a more strategic U.S. national security tool.

Specifically, the FY 2017 NDAA:

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › AT: N/L – Budget Space

No budget space

Kelly 10 Terrence K. Kelly, principal mathematician at the RAND Corporation, former director of the RAND Homeland Security Research Division, formerly served for 20 years as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army, positions included senior national security officer in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, PhD mathematics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Political Scientist at RAND, PhD Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University; Jennifer D. P. Moroney, senior political scientist at RAND, PhD international relations, University of Kent at Canterbury; and Charlotte Lynch, researcher at RAND; “Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team Options for Success,” RAND Corporation, 2010, /GoGreen!

Current world conditions both create significant demands for U.S. security cooperation programs and deplete available resources to carry out these missions. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are occupying the regular, reserve, National Guard, and Special Forces trainers and advisors who would normally be called on to train and advise military counterparts. Furthermore, U.S. allies, who often complement the efforts of U.S. advisors and trainers, are also stretched thin by their own deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › AT: N/L – Plan Funds

Funding is NOT normal means

Thaler 16 David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1438/RAND_RR1438.pdf /GoGreen!

A second general area of concern for DoD’s SC workforce relates to the unpredictability in Title 10 SC funding to enable planning of initiatives and activities and the constraints on application of funds in execution. Many DoD discussants indicated that the DoD strategic planning guidance mandates a five-year planning horizon, yet Title 10 funding is available in much-shorter–term one- or two-year increments. This injects an enormous amount of “guess-work”—according to one discussant, “We are always gaming, guessing how much we think we are going to get”34—into planning and limits predictability and flexibility.35 According to another, “the Department lacks the ability to engage in long-term activities with partner nations…. Programs are episodic, and are generally not sustainable.”36 This has had deleterious effects in a number of ways.

First, the Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) that guide SC, operations, posture, and other activities within a CCMD often are approved despite lack of insight into whether the programs to achieve TCP objectives will be available.37 Strategic guidance mandates that DoD components develop five-year plans and identify how they intend to achieve their theater objectives in that time. But these DoD components do not know how much funding they will receive for SC under Title 10 beyond one or two years and can only speculate on what is possible in the third, fourth, and fifth years. For example, Section 1203, a relatively new authority that allows U.S. general purpose forces (GPF) to train with partner GPF (in a manner akin to the well-regarded JCET program for SOF), is intended to enable training of U.S. forces while furthering partnerships with foreign military forces. Yet it does not come with funding, and must compete for O&M funds that are sorely needed elsewhere, including for operational readiness of U.S. forces.38 Representatives from a number of CCMDs have said they do not use Section 1203 or, if they do, only rarely. With no funding, it is difficult to assume it can be used in planning one year, much less five years, hence.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › AT: N/L – Plan Cheap

Mission creep supercharges the link – plan’s NATO-specific authorization will be stretched by non-NATO planners who game the system

Thaler 16 David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1438/RAND_RR1438.pdf /GoGreen!

Similarly, authorities that restrict activities to specific mission areas are seen as inflexible in the face of quickly emerging threats, making it difficult to build partner capacity in intended mission areas and further impelling SC personnel to “game” the system to achieve their SC objectives. After 2001 and until recently, the priority for U.S. national security strategy and for SC (and DoD activity in particular) has been counterterrorism.24 Congress established Section 1206 and many other recent SC authorities on the basis of the need to rapidly respond (and help partners respond) to threats from al-Qaeda and more recently the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). But as the CT mission area has been addressed in the past ten to 15 years, other missions have emerged that are becoming priorities for the United States and its partners but that are not explicitly covered under the CT rubric (or under “stability operations,” another area addressed in authorities). These other emerging areas include cyber warfare and “hybrid” warfare of the type Russia has utilized to subjugate eastern Ukraine and annex Crimea (gaps are also addressed in a subsequent section of this chapter). Capstone DoD strategic planning guidance that defines priorities and directs the efforts of the CCMDs also identifies nontraditional threats, such as transnational border security, maritime security, and foreign fighters.25 While Congress and the administration have created some specific programs to bolster Ukraine and eastern NATO allies,26 existing authorities do not provide the flexibility for SC personnel to pursue these mission areas in other nations or regions. Thus, they are left with “stretching” existing authorities to achieve key objectives with partners.27

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › AT: N/L – Plan Cheap

Price tags are misleading – that’s the whole point – without AM&E, costs balloon through inefficiency, mismanagement, and extortion

Munson 13 Peter J. Munson, senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation, retired U.S. Marine Corps officer, “The Limits of Security Cooperation,” War On The Rocks, 9-10-2013, /GoGreen!

If SC is incapable in many cases of building meaningful partner capacity or creating real influence, then wonks will argue that SC and especially military aid payments are needed to secure much more black-and-white U.S. interests: overflight and transit agreements and peace treaty compliance. Yet, this is another instance where the bankruptcy of SC ideology is demonstrated. SC funding and services are generally not initiated as a quid pro quo for overflight and transit. Once the flow of cash has started, however, threats of closing off cooperation in the form of overflight, transit, or other agreements become tools of extortion in the hands of the foreign partner. No matter how inefficient or expensive, the U.S. cannot turn the spigot down or off. SC thus is not a tool to condition partner behaviors, but rather an entitlement—a fee for maintaining the status quo—a baseline bribe that creates a market of fees-for-service for the most mundane issues.

SC does work to build capacity in certain, relatively elite units that perceive a real need for improvement and hard training. Likewise, it works to build interoperability between already-capable partner forces and U.S. and coalition militaries. SC in the right doses can be a good way of showing solidarity with allies against other regional threats. But SC is not a panacea and must be applied with significantly more discernment than the usual some-is-good-more-is-better logic of U.S. military spending.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › L – Exercises

So are command post and table-top exercises

O’Mahony 18 Angela O’Mahony, associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND, former assistant professor of international political economy and economic statecraft at the University of British Columbia, PhD political science, UCSD; Ilana Blum, researcher at RAND; Gabriela Armenta, researcher at RAND; Nicholas Burger, senior economist at RAND and director of RAND’s Washington office; Joshua Mendelsohn, researcher at RAND; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Steven W. Popper, researcher at RAND; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Thomas S. Szayna, senior political scientist and former director of RAND's Defense and Political Sciences Department at RAND, MA international relations, Claremont Graduate School; “Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation: A Framework for Implementation,” RR2165, RAND Corporation, 2018, /GoGreen!

Figure S.6 presents a truncated version of this decision tree. In it, we present a notional M&E strategy for Southern Accord, a multilateral exercise held by U.S. Army Africa. We present this example in more detail in Appendixes D and E. As an initial check, the decision tree ties all M&E decisions to planners’ TOCs (boxes 1 and 2). Three decision nodes guided the notional path we outline for Southern Accord. First, is this a recurring activity (box 5)? Southern Accord is a recurring series of multilateral activities, but each one is relatively unique in its execution. As a result, we expect that most planners will view Southern Accord as a nonrecurring activity. In contrast, most training courses would be recurring activities. Second, is this a resource-intensive activity (box 6)? Historically, Southern Accord is a command post and tabletop exercise, which are generally considered medium-cost training exercises—they are much more resource intensive than subject matter exchanges, but are dwarfed by an undertaking such as Pacific Engagement. Third, is this activity a priority? Based on discussions with U.S. Army Africa planners for previous RAND research, Southern Accord was identified as a priority activity.5 Southern Accord, and its associated African Land Forces Summit, provides a valuable forum for U.S. Africa and regional leaders to engage. Based on these decision nodes, we recommend that an activity such as Southern Accord incorporate a monitoring strategy in the activity implementation.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › L – Biotech

Plan drains significant resources

Goodman 21 Matthew P. Goodman, senior vice president for economics and Simon Chair in Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Brooke Roberts, research associate with the Economics Program at CSIS; “Toward a T12: Putting Allied Technology Cooperation into Practice,” CSIS Brief, 10-13-2021, /GoGreen!

The effectiveness of any technology alliance will depend on prioritization. Allies cannot work together on every new technology or address every issue that either enables or impedes cooperation. They will have to make choices, particularly on two questions: Which technologies are most critical for—and amenable to—allied cooperation? And where along the chain of technology development are the greatest opportunities for—and obstacles to—allied cooperation?

WHICH TECHNOLOGIES?

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › L – AI

Plan drains significant resources

Christie 22 Edward Hunter Christie, senior research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, owner of AI Policy Consulting, former NATO deputy head of the Innovation Unit, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe,” European View, 21(1), 3-31-2022, pp.13-21, /GoGreen!

Much has already been achieved in terms of new structures, new initiatives and new policy developments to support the collaborative adoption of AI among NATO Allies and EU member states. In addition to pre-existing structures and mechanisms at both the NATO and EU levels, which have ensured that nations are not starting from scratch, national defence institutions are already able to refer to common policy commitments and to options, whether through NATO or the EDA, for research or capability-development activities. At the same time, ensuring a competitive edge in AI is a truly whole-of-government effort which requires considerable cross-over between the military and civilian realms.

Large gaps remain between the US and the EU on certain key indicators. At the same time, the gaps pertaining to research are far smaller. To ensure greater European performance and relevance in AI in general, and its defence applications in particular, it seems desirable to focus on two strategic priorities: investment volumes, both public and private, which need to be significantly increased; and the full use of collaborative mechanisms involving the US.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › L – Cybersecurity – Hybrid War

Plan’s an enormous drain on resources

Sanger 16 David E. Sanger, White House and national security correspondent and senior writer at The New York Times, senior fellow in The Press and National Security at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, graduate of Harvard College, “As Russian Hackers Probe, NATO Has No Clear Cyberwar Strategy,” New York Times, 6-16-2016, /GoGreen!

Two years ago, NATO declared that it could rule a cyberattack on one of its member states to be the equivalent of an armed attack, which would lead to a commitment by all NATO members to respond.

But when it comes to deterring the kinds of low-level probes, espionage and attacks that flow through European computer networks every week, NATO commanders do not seem prepared to take aggressive countermeasures.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › L – Emerging Tech

Unique legal, policy, and security requirements are perceived as a bottomless pit of time, money AND scarce STEM experts

--AFRL = United States Air Force Research Laboratory

Cellante 21 Tony Cellante, MA candidate, International Affairs – Technology, Management, Columbia University, MBA NYU Stern School of Business, BS Management, Binghampton University; and Andreina Ray, MA candidate, International Affairs, Columbia University, MBA candidate, Columbia Business School, BA International Relations and Affairs, American University; “Advancing American Defense Technology Leadership through AFRL’s International Partnership Network,” Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, 12-13-2021, /GoGreen!

Legal, Policy, Security

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › L – Emerging Tech

SC in emerging tech is particularly resource-intensive

Chollet 20 Derek Chollet, executive vice president and senior advisor for security and defense policy at The German Marshall Fund of the United States, former US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs; Steven Keil, fellow at GMF; and Christopher Skaluba, director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, former principal director for European and NATO Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; “Rethink and replace two percent,” NATO 20/2020, The Atlantic Council, 10-14-2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/nato20-2020/rethink-and-replace-two-percent/ /GoGreen!

In an ideal world, NATO could keep discussions about burden sharing out of the public eye altogether, granting that any organization with thirty democratic members will inevitably have disparities. This would require the US public and political community to recognize what is self-evident to much of the policy community—that the benefits the United States accrues from NATO are worth the costs.

To be clear, NATO’s effectiveness requires capable militaries, and this will be expensive. Tough decisions will always be required. Real work needs to be done to expand defense investment in equipment, readiness, emerging technologies, digitalization, and research and development. Substantial and targeted spending to create effective deterrence, particularly by large European countries like Germany, must remain a priority. We need to do all this in a way that avoids the pitfalls of oversimplification and acrimony that have too often defined the two-percent debate over the last decade.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › L – Off-Budget

Planners can’t handle plan’s unbudgeted, last-minute reprioritization – inflexibility and lack of coordination make disruption disproportionate

Kelly 10 Terrence K. Kelly, principal mathematician at the RAND Corporation, former director of the RAND Homeland Security Research Division, formerly served for 20 years as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army, positions included senior national security officer in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, PhD mathematics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Political Scientist at RAND, PhD Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University; Jennifer D. P. Moroney, senior political scientist at RAND, PhD international relations, University of Kent at Canterbury; and Charlotte Lynch, researcher at RAND; “Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team Options for Success,” RAND Corporation, 2010, /GoGreen!

The RAND research team found that organizations that currently manage security cooperation (Title 10 U.S.C.) and security assistance (Title 22 U.S.C.) work relatively well in most countries where peacetime engagement is the norm. Many sources refer to these organizations collectively as performing “security cooperation” and we will follow this practice, differentiating between them only when needed for clarity. In particular, if security cooperation efforts can be planned in advance and there is no need for significant changes during a given budget year, current practices and authorities suffice. However, as we detail below, there is room for improvement. When unbudgeted requirements arise during a fiscal year, whether they are new programs or significant changes to existing programs, the current system presents difficulties, due to inflexible authorities and funding mechanisms, as well as sometimes less-than-ideal interagency coordination.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › !—TERRORISM › AT: !/D – Nuke Terror

Counterterror cooperation is why cause-of-death stats don’t reflect the inevitability of nuclear terrorism – motive, means, opportunity, and organizational capacity are all growing

Allison 18 Dr. Graham Allison, Professor of Government at Harvard Kennedy School, “Nuclear Terrorism: Did We Beat the Odds or Change Them?” PRISM, 7(3), 5-15-2018, /GoGreen!

Not surprisingly, the book attracted critics as well. The most common objection focused on what skeptics argued was an irresolvable contradiction between the core claims of “inevitable” and “preventable.” If something is preventable, then it cannot be inevitable, they said.

My attempt to answer their point was proving largely ineffective, since for the most part, I just kept repeating the argument stated in the book. But fortunately, I was rescued by none other than Buffett himself. In making judgments about buying stocks, and even more in owning and running several reinsurance companies, Buffett had become a legendary oddsmaker. Those businesses had also forced him to think seriously about nuclear terrorism as one of what investors call “fat tail” risks. He had concluded that such an event was virtually inevitable and that the consequences would be devastating. Thus he prohibited his companies from writing insurance against nuclear terrorism.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › !—TERRORISM › A/O – Terror !

Extinction

Hayes 18 Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, PhD energy and resources, University of California, Berkley, "Non-State Terrorism And Inadvertent Nuclear War," Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 1-18-2018, /GoGreen!

Catalytic nuclear attack Catalytic nuclear attack is a metaphor for the possible malevolent third party who sets out to induce a nuclear war between two other nuclear weapons states. It is based on a metaphor drawn from chemistry whereby a catalyst increases the rate of chemical reaction without catalyst itself being destroyed. Tiny amounts of a catalyst often suffice to bring about such a transformative effect. Such a “catalytic” nuclear attack between nuclear weapons states was a serious policy concern in the nineteen-fifties in the United States where strategists were seized of the notion that a “small” nuclear weapons state (for which read “China”) could start a nuclear war between the United States and the former Soviet Union (FSU). As articulated by the ubiquitous Herman Kahn, the concern was that the small “catalytic” state instigating the conflict would be the least damaged at the end of a nuclear war, and could increase its relative power by starting a war between other nuclear armed states that resulted in their catastrophic destruction. In his classic essay outlining this argument, Donald Kobe derived what he termed to be suspicion, retaliation, destruction, catalytic war utility, and casualty matrices for each country that defined outcomes for each state in a “catalytic nuclear war.”[2] As China began to test its own nuclear weapons and the United States and the FSU began to anticipate its deployment in the sixties, the ability of the two nuclear superpowers, even at this relatively early stage in their rapidly growing nuclear forces, to overwhelmingly retaliate and damage the catalytic state soon allayed this concern. Nonetheless, the concept motivated these two nuclear armed states to strive for nuclear non-proliferation, in part driven by their mutual fear of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism should nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology and materials become freely available—a concern that persisted over the subsequent decades.[3] Is catalytic nuclear terrorism still a serious policy concern? Today, the notion of “catalytic” nuclear war seems archaic in certain respects, and reflected a dismissive view at the time in the United States of the rationality of a state leadership armed with nuclear weapons and facing an overwhelming external adversary—in the case of China, not just one, but soon to be two external nuclear enemies that targeted its cities and nuclear forces. As China’s minimum deterrent posture evolved, and as its nuclear threat rhetoric subsided with the end of the Cultural Revolution, so the fear of catalytic nuclear war also receded. However, the fear of a catalytic nuclear war returned with a vengeance at the end of the Cold War when multiple states found themselves nuclear-armed almost overnight due to the collapse of the former Soviet Union, or proliferated independent nuclear forces in rapid succession in South Asia and in slow motion, North Korea. In the United States and Russia, formal and informal discussion of the importance of avoiding war and nuclear war due to third party nuclear attack, by state or non-state actors, took place in diplomatic, military, and private channels, driven in part by the risk of nuclear “mega-terrorism” as the efforts of various insurgencies and global terrorist networks to acquire and use nuclear weapons came to light. The continued salience of the concept of catalytic nuclear war rests on three nested arguments. The first is that inadvertent nuclear war is possible, that is, the probability is greater than zero albeit unknowable. Multiple “threshold” events that could trigger inadvertent nuclear war are conceivable. In some unknowable combination, such drivers contribute to a probability greater than zero that nuclear war between states will occur, variously estimated at 0.1-1 percent year by strategic analysts—although there is no objective basis for such estimates, simply subjective estimates buttressed by the perception that specific near-nuclear wars punctuated the Cold War and post-Cold War decades, at which time the probability was perceived to be much higher for months at a time. The second is that of all the drivers of inadvertent war, state-supported and non-state nuclear terrorism may be the least “directly controllable” by nuclear weapons states. Moreover, such nuclear terrorist attacks may coincide in the future with the influence of other drivers that could trigger rapid escalation to nuclear first use in conditions of complex nuclear confrontation involving two or more nuclear weapons states. Thus, the non-state terrorist driver of nuclear war may render “normal” positive and negative controls on nuclear use far less stabilizing than in the past when states were the sole concern in nuclear confrontations, depending on how a terrorist nuclear attack might affect the various contributing pathways to inadvertent nuclear war (listed in the next section). The third is that such nuclear terrorist attacks may take many forms, as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1: Types of Nuclear Terrorism from Least to Most Damaging • Credible Threats of Nuclear Terrorism • Hostage Taking • Steal, Smuggle, Acquire Radioactive Material for Dirty Bomb • Steal, Smuggle, Acquire Footloose Fissile Material • Attack Reactors • Attack Spent Fuel • Simultaneous Cyber Attacks Disable Critical Infrastructure Leading to Mass Casualties or to Enable Nuclear Terrorism • Acquire Nuclear Weapon; Detonate Nuclear Weapon Notes to Figure 1: a credible threat not accompanied by one or more actions to realize the threat is the least damage act of terrorism, and rests on the perception of those threatened as to the perpetrator’s intention and capability. Many nuclear terrorism threats are made. Relatively few are credible. The types below “mere” threats are characterized by actions which may (or may not) have been preceded by credible threats. “Footloose” here is shorthand for loss of control of legitimate and authorized control entity, public or private, that is subject to diversion and seizure by a non-state entity. Cyber attacks may be part of the types of nuclear terrorism because a competent terrorist entity will employ cyberattacks as part of a nuclear terrorist attack. However, a cyber attack that disables critical infrastructure at the same time as another type of direct nuclear terrorist attack is conducted would be highly damaging and if it results of itself in mass casualties, may enable and amplify the consequences of dirty bomb or an actual nuclear detonation. In this sense, a cyber attack may be a cyber-multiplier for other types of nuclear terrorism. Of course, a cyber attack aimed at mass casualties and terrorist effects may be undertaken without any form of nuclear terrorism associated with it. Finally, acquisition of radioactive materials or fissile material may occur via theft, purchase, or self-manufacture (the least likely and most difficult of the three acquisition pathways). Some may argue that radiological weapons (dirty bombs) are not nuclear at all in that they do not involve criticality at all, just the radioactive properties of the materials, and may be relatively crude and low technology. However, some nuclear weapons aim to achieve precisely such radiological effects on varying scales and long-term radiological effects, rather than blast and other direct irradiation of targeted humans. Dirty bombs and nuclear bombs exist on a spectrum and where competent, malevolent, and motivated non-state actors might position themselves on that spectrum remains an open question. *** These many types of terrorist nuclear attack present states with starkly different potential damage, greater possible ambiguity or even opacity in terms of precursor indicators as well as identity of the perpetrator. Any of these types of attack may affect nuclear-armed states in unpredictable ways with respect to their own nuclear use decisions at times when inter-state conflict may be more or less likely. These various types of attack by non-state actors reduce into three basic categories of threat and use, as follows: Credible threat of either nuclear detonation or radiological attack with possible massive damages Actual or sub-critical nuclear detonation Actual spent fuel or reactor attack with substantial radiological release. In turn, such categories of terrorist attack might be realized in or against one or more types of targeted state, viz, a nuclear armed state, a nuclear umbrella state that receives nuclear extended deterrence from a nuclear armed state, or a non-nuclear weapons state which may or may not have nuclear fuel cycle facilities in and/or fissile material stored on its territory. (Thus, the target may or may not be a state, a state agency, or a state facility—it might be a civilian target such as a company or a religious entity; but in this paper, all terrorist nuclear attacks are assumed to take place only in places controlled by functioning states). Nuclear terrorism post-cold war: trigger for inadvertent nuclear war? The possible catalytic effect of nuclear terrorism on the risk of state-based nuclear war is not a simple linkage. The multiple types and scales of nuclear terrorism may affect state-nuclear use decisions along multiple pathways that lead to inadvertent nuclear war. These include: Early warning systems fail or are “tripped” in ways that lead to launch-on-warning Accidental nuclear detonation, including sub-critical explosions. Strategic miscalculation in crisis, show of force Decision-making failure (such as irrational, misperception, bias, degraded, group, and time-compressed decision-making) Allied or enemy choices (to seek revenge, to exploit nuclear risk, to act out of desperation) Organizational cybernetics whereby a nuclear command-control-and communications (NC3) system generates error, including the interplay of national NC3 systems in what may be termed the meta-NC3 system. Synchronous and coincident combinations of above.[4] Exactly how, where, and when nuclear terrorism may “ambush” nuclear armed states already heading for or on such a path to inadvertent nuclear war depends on who is targeting whom at a given time, either immediately due to high tension, or generally due to a structural conflict between states. Nuclear armed states today form a complex set of global threat relationships that are not distributed uniformly across the face of Earth. Rather, based on sheer firepower and reach, the nine nuclear weapons states form a global hierarchy with at least four tiers, viz: Tier 1: United States, clear technological supremacy and qualitative edge. Tier 2: Russia, China, global nuclear powers and peers with the United States due to the unique destructive power of even relatively small nuclear arsenals, combined with global reach of missile and bomber delivery systems, thereby constituting a two-tiered global “nuclear triangle” with the United States. Tier 3: France, UK, NATO nuclear sharing and delivery NATO members (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey) and the NATO and Pacific nuclear umbrella states (Japan, South Korea, Australia) that depend on American nuclear extended deterrence and directly and indirectly support US and US-allied nuclear operations even though they do not host nor deliver nuclear weapons themselves. Tier 4: India, Pakistan, Israel, DPRK. The first two tiers constitute the global nuclear threat triangle that exists between the United States, Russia, and China, forming a global nuclear “truel.” Each of these states targets the others; each represents an existential threat to the other; and each has a long history of mutual nuclear threat that is now a core element of their strategic identity. Tier three consists of states with their own nuclear force but integrated with that of the United States (even France!) that expand the zone of mutual nuclear threat over much of the northern and even parts of the southern hemisphere; and states that host American nuclear command, control, communications, and intelligence systems that support US nuclear operations and to whom nuclear deterrence is “extended” (if, for example, Australia’s claim to having an American nuclear umbrella is believed). The fourth tier is composed of smaller nuclear forces with a primarily regional reach and focus. Between most of these nuclear armed states and across the tiers, there are few shared “rules of the road.” The more of these states that are engaged in a specific conflict and location, the more unpredictable and unstable this global nuclear threat system becomes, with the potential for cascading and concatenating effects. Indeed, as the number of nuclear states projecting nuclear threat against each other increases, the notion of strategic stability may lose all meaning. The emergence of a fifth tier—of non-state actors with the capacity to project nuclear threat against nuclear-armed and nuclear umbrella states (although not only these states)—is a critically important possible catalytic actor in the new conditions of nuclear threat complexity that already exist today. Such a layer represents an “edge of chaos” where the attempts by nuclear armed states to exert absolute “vertical” control over the use of nuclear weapons confront the potential of non-state entities and even individuals (insiders) to engage in “horizontal” nuclear terrorism, presenting radically different control imperatives to the standard paradigm of organizational procedures, technical measures, and safeguards of various kinds. This tier is like the waves and tides on a beach that quickly surrounds and then causes sand castles to collapse. In 2010, Robert Ayson reviewed the potential linkages between inter-state nuclear war and non-state terrorism. He concluded: “…[T]hese two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them.”[5] How this linkage might unfold is the subject of the next sections of this essay. Are non-state actors motivated and able to attempt nuclear terrorism? A diverse set of non-state actors have engaged in terrorist activities—for which there is no simple or consensual definition. In 2011, there were more than 6,900 known extremist, terrorist and other organizations associated with guerrilla warfare, political violence, protest, organized crime and cyber-crime. Of these, about 120 terrorist and extremist groups had been blacklisted by the United Nations, the European Union and six major countries.[6] Some have argued that the technical, organizational, and funding demanded for a successful nuclear attack, especially involving nuclear weapons, exceeds the capacity of most of the non-state actors with terrorist proclivities. Unfortunately, this assertion is not true, especially at lower levels of impact as shown in Figure 1; but even at the highest levels of obtaining authentic nuclear weapons capabilities, a small number of non-state actors already exhibit the motivation and possible capacity to become nuclear-armed. Ellingsen suggests a useful distinction that nuclear terrorists may be impelled by two divergent motivations, as shown in Figure 2, creating “opportunistic” and “patient” profiles.[7] The requirements for an opportunist non-state nuclear terrorist tend towards immediate use and the search for short-term payoffs with only tactical levels of commitment; whereas the patient non-state nuclear terrorist is able and willing to sustain a long-term acquisition effort to deal a strategic blow to an adversary in a manner that could be achieved only with nuclear weapons. [FIGURE 2 OMITTED] In turn, many factors will drive how a potential nuclear terrorist non-state organization that obtains nuclear weapons or materials may seek to employ them, especially in its nuclear command-and-control orientations. Blair and Ackerman suggest that the goals, conditions, and capacity limitations that shape a possible nuclear terrorist’s posture lead logically to three types of nuclear terrorist nuclear command-and-control postures, viz: pre-determined (in which the leadership sends a fire order to a nuclear-armed subordinate and no change is entertained and no capacity to effect change is established in the field, that is, the order is fire-and-forget); assertive (in which only the central command can issue a nuclear fire order, central control is maintained at all times, with resulting demanding communications systems to support such control); and delegative (in which lower level commanders control nuclear weapons and have pre-delegated authority to use them in defined circumstances, for example, evidence of nuclear explosions combined with loss-of-connectivity with their central command).[8] An example of such delegative control system was the November 26, 2008 attack on Mumbai that used social media reporting to enable the attacking terrorists to respond to distant controller direction and to adapt to counter-terrorist attacks—a connectivity tactic that the authorities were too slow to shut down before mayhem was achieved.[9] Logically, one might expect nuclear terrorists oriented toward short-term, tactical goals to employ pre-determined nuclear command-and-control strategies in the hope that the speed of attack and minimum field communications avoids discovery and interdiction before the attack is complete; whereas nuclear terrorists oriented toward long-term, strategic goals might employ more pre-delegative command-and-control systems that would support a bargaining use and therefore a field capacity to deploy nuclear weapons or materials that can calibrate actual attack based on communications with the central leadership with the risk of interdiction through surveillance and counter-attack. These differing strategic motivations, timelines, and strategies in many respects invert those of nuclear weapons states that rely on large organizations, procedures, and technical controls, to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used without legitimate authorization; and if they are used, to minimize needless civilian casualties (at least some nuclear armed states aspire to this outcome). The repertoire of state-based practices that presents other states with credible nuclear threat and reassures them that nuclear weapons are secure and controlled is likely to be completely mismatched with the strengths and strategies of non-state nuclear terrorists that may seek to maximize civilian terror, are not always concerned about their own survival or even that of their families and communities-of-origin, and may be willing to take extraordinary risk combined with creativity to exploit the opportunities for attack presented by nuclear weapons, umbrella, and non-nuclear states, or their private adversaries. For non-state actors to succeed at complex engineering project such as acquiring a nuclear weapons or nuclear threat capacity demands substantial effort. Gary Ackerman specifies that to have a chance of succeeding, non-state actors with nuclear weapons aspirations must be able to demonstrate that they control substantial resources, have a safe haven in which to conduct research and development, have their own or procured expertise, are able to learn from failing and have the stamina and strategic commitment to do so, and manifest long-term planning and ability to make rational choices on decadal timelines. He identified five such violent non-state actors who already conducted such engineering projects (see Figure 3), and also noted the important facilitating condition of a global network of expertize and hardware. Thus, although the skill, financial, and materiel requirements of a non-state nuclear weapons project present a high bar, they are certainly reachable. [FIGURE 3 OMITTED] Along similar lines, James Forest examined the extent to which non-state actors can pose a threat of nuclear terrorism.[10] He notes that such entities face practical constraints, including expense, the obstacles to stealing many essential elements for nuclear weapons, the risk of discovery, and the difficulties of constructing and concealing such weapons. He also recognizes the strategic constraints that work against obtaining nuclear weapons, including a cost-benefit analysis, possible de-legitimation that might follow from perceived genocidal intent or use, and the primacy of political-ideological objectives over long-term projects that might lead to the group’s elimination, the availability of cheaper and more effective alternatives that would be foregone by pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the risk of failure and/or discovery before successful acquisition and use occurs. In the past, almost all—but not all—non-state terrorist groups appeared to be restrained by a combination of high practical and strategic constraints, plus their own cost-benefit analysis of the opportunity costs of pursuing nuclear weapons. However, should some or all of these constraints diminish, a rapid non-state nuclear proliferation is possible. Although only a few non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State have exhibited such underlying stamina and organizational capacities and actually attempted to obtain nuclear weapons-related skills, hardware, and materials, the past is not prologue. An incredibly diverse set of variously motivated terrorist groups exist already, including politico-ideological, apocalyptic-millenarian, politico-religious, nationalist-separatist, ecological, and political-insurgency entities, some of which converge with criminal-military and criminal-scientist (profit based) networks; but also pyscho-pathological mass killing cults, lone wolves, and ephemeral copy-cat non-state actors. The social, economic, and deculturating conditions that generate such entities are likely to persist and even expand. In particular, rapidly growing coastal mega-cities as part of rapid global urbanization offer such actors the ability to sustain themselves as “flow gatekeepers,” possibly in alliance with global criminal networks, thereby supplanting the highland origins of many of today’s non-state violent actors with global reach.[11] Other contributing factors contributing to the supply of possible non-state actors seeking nuclear weapons include new entries such as city states in search of new security strategies, megacities creating their own transnationally active security forces, non-states with partial or complete territorial control such as Taiwan and various micro-states, failing states, provinces in dissociating, failing states that fall victim to internal chaos and the displacement effects of untrammeled globalization, and altogether failed states resulting in ungoverned spaces. To this must be added domestic terrorist entities in the advanced industrial states as they hollow out their economies due to economic globalization and restructuring, adjust to cross-border migration, and adapt to cultural and political dislocation. In short, the prognosis is for the fifth tier of non-state actors to beset the other four tiers with intense turbulence just as waves on a beach swirl around sandcastles, washing away their foundations, causing grains of sand to cascade, and eventually collapsing the whole structure. Observed non-state nuclear threats and attacks In light of the constraints faced by non-state terrorist actors in past decades, it is not surprising that the constellation of actual nuclear terrorist attacks and threats has been relatively limited during and since the end of the Cold War. As Martha Crenshaw noted in a comment on the draft of this paper: We still don’t know why terrorists (in the sense of non-state actors) have not moved into the CBRN [chemical,biological, radiological or nuclear ] domain. (Many people think biosecurity is more critical, for that matter.) Such a move would be extremely risky for the terrorist actor, even if the group possessed both capability (resources, secure space, time, patience) and motivation (willingness to expend the effort, considering opportunity costs). So far it appears that “conventional” terrorism serves their purposes well enough. Most of what we have seen is rhetoric, with some scattered and not always energetic initiatives.[12] Nonetheless, those that have occurred demonstrate unambiguously that such threats and attacks are not merely hypothetical, in spite of the limiting conditions outlined above. One survey documented eighty actual, planned attacks on nuclear facilities containing nuclear materials between 1961-2016[13] as follows: 80 attacks in 3 waves (1970s armed assaults, 1990s thefts, post-2010, breaches) High threat attacks: 32/80 attacks posed substantial, verified threat of which 44 percent involved insiders. All types of targets were found in the data set—on reactors, other nuclear facilities, military bases leading Gary Ackerman and to conclude: “Overall, empirical evidence suggests that there are sufficient cases in each of the listed categories that no type of threat can be ignored.”[14] No region was immune; no year was without such a threat or attack. Thus, there is a likely to be a coincidence of future non-state threats and attacks with inter-state nuclear-prone conflicts, as in the past, and possibly more so given the current trend in and the generative conditions for global terrorist activity that will likely pertain in the coming decades. Of these attacks, about a quarter each were ethno-nationalist, secular utopian, or unknown in motivation; and the remaining quarter were a motley mix of religious (11 percent), “other” (5 percent), personal-idiosyncratic (4 percent), single issue (2 percent) and state sponsored (1 percent) in motivation. The conclusion is unavoidable that there a non-state nuclear terrorist attack in the Northeast Asia region is possible. The following sections outline the possible situations in which nuclear terrorist attacks might be implicated as a trigger to interstate conflict, and even nuclear war. Particular attention is paid to the how nuclear command, control and communications systems may play an independent and unanticipated role in leading to inadvertent nuclear war, separate to the contributors to inadvertency normally included such as degradation of decision-making due to time and other pressures; accident; “wetware” (human failures), software or hardware failures; and misinterpretation of intended or unintended signals from an adversary. Regional pathways to interstate nuclear war At least five distinct nuclear-prone axes of conflict are evident in Northeast Asia. These are: US-DPRK conflict (including with United States, US allies Japan, South Korea and Australia; and all other UNC command allies. Many permutations possible ranging from non-violent collapse to implosion and civil war, inter-Korean war, slow humanitarian crisis. Of these implosion-civil war in the DPRK may be the most dangerous, followed closely by an altercation at the Joint Security Area at Panmunjon where US, ROK, and DPRK soldiers interact constantly. China-Taiwan conflict, whereby China may use nuclear weapons to overcome US forces operating in the West Pacific, either at sea, or based on US (Guam, Alaska) or US allied territory in the ROK, Japan, the Philippines, or Australia); or US uses nuclear weapons in response to Chinese attack on Taiwan. China-Japan conflict escalates via attacks on early warning systems, for example, underwater hydrophone systems (Ayson-Ball, 2011). China-Russia conflict, possibly in context of loss-of-control of Chinese nuclear forces in a regional conflict involving Taiwan or North Korea. Russia-US conflict, involving horizontal escalation from a head-on collision with Russian nuclear forces in Europe or the Middle East; or somehow starts at sea (mostly likely seems ASW) or over North Korea (some have cited risk of US missile defenses against North Korean attack as risking Russian immediate response). Combinations of or simultaneous eruption of the above conflicts that culminate in nuclear war are also possible. Other unanticipated nuclear-prone conflict axes (such as Russia-Japan) could also emerge with little warning. Precursors of such nuclear-laden conflicts in this region also exist that could lead states to the brink of nuclear war and demonstrate that nuclear war is all too possible between states in this region. Examples include the August 1958 Quemoy-Matsu crisis, in which the United States deployed nuclear weapons to Taiwan, and the US Air Force has only a nuclear defense strategy in place to defend Taiwan should China have escalated its shelling campaign to an actual attack; the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when a US nuclear armed missile was nearly fired from Okinawa due to a false fire order; the March 1969 Chinese-Soviet military clash and resulting consideration of nuclear attacks by both sides; and the August 1976 poplar tree crisis at Panmunjon in Korea, when the United States moved nuclear weapons back to the DMZ and the White House issued pre-delegated orders to the US commander in Korea to attack North Korea if the tree cutting task force was attacked by North Korean forces. Loss-of-control of Nuclear Weapons As is well known, nuclear armed states must routinely—and in the midst of a crisis—ensure that their nuclear weapons are never used without legitimate authority, but also ensure at the same time that they are always available for immediate use with legitimate authority. This “always-never” paradox is managed in part by a set of negative and positive controls, reliant upon procedural and technical measures, to maintain legitimate state-based command-and-control (see Figure Four). [FIGURE 4 OMITTED] In this framework, Jerry Conley has produced a taxonomy of nuclear command-and-control structures that embody varying notional national “command-and-control” orientations (also referred to as stability points or biases). Each nuclear armed state exhibits a distinct preference for technical and procedural measures to achieve negative and positive control of nuclear weapons. The way that a state constructs its control system varies depending on its size, wealth, technology, leadership, and strategic orientation, lending each state a unique use propensity affected by the information processing and transmission functions of the nuclear command-and-control system, that in part determines the use or non-use decisions made by the leaders of nuclear armed states. The resulting ideal nuclear command-and-control state structures are shown in Table 1. [TABLE 1 OMITTED] These ideal types are summarized with respect to the defining axes of control measure in Figure Five. [FIGURE 5 OMITTED] In Northeast Asia, a four-way nuclear threat system exists that has a three world-class nuclear armed states, the United States, Russia and China, interacting with a fourth tier, barely nuclear armed state, the DPRK. In this quadrilateral nuclear standoff, the DPRK’s simple NC3 system likely is an amalgam of a poorly resourced, militarized, and personalized leadership—which may lead it to oscillate between procedural and technical measures as the basis of control, with a primary emphasis on positive use control, not negative control to avoid unauthorized use. China’s large, centralized NC3 system co-mingles nuclear and conventional communications between national commanders and deployed nuclear forces and may emphasize negative more than positive use controls to ensure Party control. Russia’s highly centralized, complex NC3 system relies on legacy technology and limited economic base for modernization. It too may be more oriented towards negative controls in peacetime, but have the capacity to spring almost instantly to primary reliance on positive controls in times of crisis or tension. The US NC3 system is large, complex and based on wealth and technological prowess. It is under civilian, not military control, at least in principle and in peacetime, and is redundant, diverse, and relatively resilient. Non-state nuclear attack as trigger of inter-state nuclear war in Northeast Asia The critical issue is how a nuclear terrorist attack may “catalyze” inter-state nuclear war, especially the NC3 systems that inform and partly determine how leaders respond to nuclear threat. Current conditions in Northeast Asia suggest that multiple precursory conditions for nuclear terrorism already exist or exist in nascent form. In Japan, for example, low-level, individual, terroristic violence with nuclear materials, against nuclear facilities, is real. In all countries of the region, the risk of diversion of nuclear material is real, although the risk is likely higher due to volume and laxity of security in some countries of the region than in others. In all countries, the risk of an insider “sleeper” threat is real in security and nuclear agencies, and such insiders already operated in actual terrorist organizations. Insider corruption is also observable in nuclear fuel cycle agencies in all countries of the region. The threat of extortion to induce insider cooperation is also real in all countries. The possibility of a cult attempting to build and buy nuclear weapons is real and has already occurred in the region.[15] Cyber-terrorism against nuclear reactors is real and such attacks have already taken place in South Korea (although it remains difficult to attribute the source of the attacks with certainty). The stand-off ballistic and drone threat to nuclear weapons and fuel cycle facilities is real in the region, including from non-state actors, some of whom have already adopted and used such technology almost instantly from when it becomes accessible (for example, drones).[16] Two other broad risk factors are also present in the region. The social and political conditions for extreme ethnic and xenophobic nationalism are emerging in China, Korea, Japan, and Russia. Although there has been no risk of attack on or loss of control over nuclear weapons since their removal from Japan in 1972 and from South Korea in 1991, this risk continues to exist in North Korea, China, and Russia, and to the extent that they are deployed on aircraft and ships of these and other nuclear weapons states (including submarines) deployed in the region’s high seas, also outside their territorial borders. The most conducive circumstance for catalysis to occur due to a nuclear terrorist attack might involve the following nexi of timing and conditions: Low-level, tactical, or random individual terrorist attacks for whatever reasons, even assassination of national leaders, up to and including dirty radiological bomb attacks, that overlap with inter-state crisis dynamics in ways that affect state decisions to threaten with or to use nuclear weapons. This might be undertaken by an opportunist nuclear terrorist entity in search of rapid and high political impact. Attacks on major national or international events in each country to maximize terror and to de-legitimate national leaders and whole governments. In Japan, for example, more than ten heads of state and senior ministerial international meetings are held each year. For the strategic nuclear terrorist, patiently acquiring higher level nuclear threat capabilities for such attacks and then staging them to maximum effect could accrue strategic gains. Attacks or threatened attacks, including deception and disguised attacks, will have maximum leverage when nuclear-armed states are near or on the brink of war or during a national crisis (such as Fukushima), when intelligence agencies, national leaders, facility operators, surveillance and policing agencies, and first responders are already maximally committed and over-extended. At this point, we note an important caveat to the original concept of catalytic nuclear war as it might pertain to nuclear terrorist threats or attacks. Although an attack might be disguised so that it is attributed to a nuclear-armed state, or a ruse might be undertaken to threaten such attacks by deception, in reality a catalytic strike by a nuclear weapons state in conditions of mutual vulnerability to nuclear retaliation for such a strike from other nuclear armed states would be highly irrational. Accordingly, the effect of nuclear terrorism involving a nuclear detonation or major radiological release may not of itself be catalytic of nuclear war—at least not intentionally–because it will not lead directly to the destruction of a targeted nuclear-armed state. Rather, it may be catalytic of non-nuclear war between states, especially if the non-state actor turns out to be aligned with or sponsored by a state (in many Japanese minds, the natural candidate for the perpetrator of such an attack is the pro-North Korean General Association of Korean Residents, often called Chosen Soren, which represents many of the otherwise stateless Koreans who were born and live in Japan) and a further sequence of coincident events is necessary to drive escalation to the point of nuclear first use by a state. Also, the catalyst—the non-state actor–is almost assured of discovery and destruction either during the attack itself (if it takes the form of a nuclear suicide attack then self-immolation is assured) or as a result of a search-and-destroy campaign from the targeted state (unless the targeted government is annihilated by the initial terrorist nuclear attack). It follows that the effects of a non-state nuclear attack may be characterized better as a trigger effect, bringing about a cascade of nuclear use decisions within NC3 systems that shift each state increasingly away from nuclear non-use and increasingly towards nuclear use by releasing negative controls and enhancing positive controls in multiple action-reaction escalation spirals (depending on how many nuclear armed states are party to an inter-state conflict that is already underway at the time of the non-state nuclear attack); and/or by inducing concatenating nuclear attacks across geographically proximate nuclear weapons forces of states already caught in the crossfire of nuclear threat or attacks of their own making before a nuclear terrorist attack.[17] An example of a cascading effect would be a non-state attack on a key node of linked early warning systems that is unique to and critical for strategic nuclear forces to be employable, or the effect of multiple, coincident and erroneous sensor alerts of incoming attacks (as occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis with radar in Florida monitoring Soviet missiles in Cuba that mistakenly fused an erroneous reading of a missile trajectory with a real observation of a Soviet satellite that happened to be passing overhead). An example of a concatenating effect would an attack that leads a nuclear weapons state to target two other states forces because it cannot determine whose forces attacked its own. This circumstance might arise if key anti-submarine forces or an aircraft carrier battle group were attacked and it was impossible to determine in a given waterway or area of ocean whose submarines were present or responsible for the attack, leading the attacked state to destroy all the submarines presenting on-going threat to its strategic forces. As we noted above, a terrorist nuclear shock may take various forms and appear in different places. Ever since an extortion attempt in Boston in 1974 based on the threat of nuclear detonation, the threat of an improvised nuclear device has been credible. For such a threat to be credible, a non-state terrorist entity must release a plausible precursor such as nuclear material or warhead design information, or stage an actual demonstration attack that makes it plausible that the attacker controls a significant quantity of fissile material (most likely plutonium, or simply radioactive materials suitable for a radiological device that might be used to draw in first responders and then detonate a warhead to maximize damage and terror). Such an attack might be combined with a separate attack on critical infrastructure such as a cyberattack. The attacker might retain sufficient material for bargaining and insurance should the initial attack fail. Given the need to adapt to circumstances, such an attacker is likely to be patient and strategic, in the terms defined earlier, and to have extensive organizational and communication capacities; and to be able to operate at multiple targeted sites, possibly in multiple countries. Given its patience and stamina, such an attacker would select a highly symbolic target such as a high level meeting. Such a case would present the targeted state with an exquisite dilemma: bargaining and negotiation with the non-state actor threatening such an attack may be justified given the explicit and plausible nature of the threat, which may be politically impossible while making counter-terrorism operations very risky and only possible with extreme caution. And, such an attacker might well issue a false statement about state-sponsorship to invoke third parties in ways that vastly complicate the response to the threat. If the attacker is less capable and driven for immediate political or other returns, then it may be satisfied with highly delegated delivery with no recall option, and no use of communications to minimize the risk of discovery or interdiction. Such an attacker is also less likely to wait for the circumstances in which inter-state nuclear war is more likely due to inter-state tension; and also less likely to seek third party effects beyond the damage to the immediate target and resulting terror. Should surveillance indicate that an improvised nuclear device is in motion, then an all-out search to interdict the attackers and to retrieve the device or materials would likely ensue. In these two instances of credible threat of non-state nuclear attack, the insider versus outsider perpetrator factor will affect significantly how the attack affects possible inter-state conflicts. In Kobe’s terms, if the perpetrator is confirmed to be an outsider, then a country-of-origin suspicion matrix may cast suspicion onto another state as possible sponsor. For an attack threatened in China, the linkage might be back to Russia, the United States, or North Korea. For an attack threatened in Russia, the linkage might be back to the United States, China, or North Korea. For an attack threatened in North Korea, the linkage might be back to the United States, China, or Russia. And for an attack threatened in one of the umbrella states in the region, South Korea and Japan, such an attack might be linked to each other, as well as to China, North Korea, or Russia. In each case, the shadow of suspicion and possible accusations could tilt decision-making processes in one or more of these states and ways that could worsen pre-existing views about the nuclear use propensity of an opposing nuclear armed state. Should an actual nuclear attack occur, the situation is even more complex and problematic. Such an attack might be purely accidental, due to hardware, software, or human error while nuclear materials or weapons are in transit. In principle, this limits the site of such an event to the nuclear weapons states or their ships and aircraft as neither South Korea nor Japan host nuclear weapons today. If an insider is involved, then the perpetrator may be identified quickly, and whether there is a linkage with another state may become evident (depending on nuclear forensics as well as insight obtained from surviving attackers). If an outsider is the perpetrator, then the suspicion matrix will come into play again, with possibly severe effects on inter-state tension due to accusation, suspicion, and fear of follow-on attacks. During the attack, especially if it is a hostage-taking type of attack, the identity of the perpetrator may be unknown or ambiguous, and maintaining this ambiguity or even opacity as to the attacker may be deliberate—as was the case with the 2008 Mumbai attack in which the controller tried to ensure that all the attackers were killed in the course of the twelve separate but coordinated attacks across the city over four days. Although much progress has been made in establishing local nuclear forensics capability in Japan,[18] China, and South Korea, there is no certainty that it is sufficiently developed to identify the perpetrator of an act of nuclear terrorism, especially if there is a state sponsor and deception involved. Conclusion We now move to our conclusion. Nuclear-armed states can place themselves on the edge of nuclear war by a combination of threatening force deployments and threat rhetoric. Statements by US and North Korea’s leaders and supporting amplification by state and private media to present just such a lethal combination. Many observers have observed that the risk of war and nuclear war, in Korea and globally, have increased in the last few years—although no-one can say with authority by how much and exactly for what reasons. However, states are restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict and/or nuclear war by conventional deterrence, vital national interests, and other institutional and political restraints, both domestic and international. It is not easy, in the real world, or even in fiction, to start nuclear wars.[19] Rhetorical threats are standard fare in realist and constructivist accounts of inter-state nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance, and are not cause for alarm per se. States will manage the risk in each of the threat relationships with other nuclear armed states to stay back from the brink, let alone go over it, as they have in the past. This argument was powerful and to many, persuasive during the Cold War although it does not deny the hair-raising risks taken by nuclear armed states during this period. Today, the multi-polarity of nine nuclear weapons states interacting in a four-tiered nuclear threat system means that the practice of sustaining nuclear threat and preparing for nuclear war is no longer merely complicated, but is now enormously complex in ways that may exceed the capacity of some and perhaps all states to manage, even without the emergence of a fifth tier of non-state actors to add further unpredictability to how this system works in practice. The possibility that non-state actors may attack without advance warning as to the time, place, and angle of attack presents another layer of uncertainty to this complexity as to how inter-state nuclear war may break out. That is, non-state actors with nuclear weapons or threat goals and capacities do not seek the same goals, will not use the same control systems, and will use radically different organizational procedures and systems to deliver on their threats compared with nuclear armed states. If used tactically for immediate terrorist effect, a non-state nuclear terrorist could violently attack nuclear facilities, exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cycle facility security, or use actual nuclear materials and even warheads against military or civilian targets. If a persistent, strategically oriented nuclear terrorist succeed in gaining credible nuclear threat capacities, it might take hostage one or more states or cities. If such an event coincides with already high levels of tension and even military collisions between the non-nuclear forces of nuclear armed states, then a non-state nuclear terrorist attack could impel a nuclear armed state to escalate its threat or even military actions against other states, in the belief that this targeted state may have sponsored the non-state attack, or was simply the source of the attack, whatever the declared identity of the attacking non-state entity. This outcome could trigger these states to go onto one or more of the pathways to inadvertent nuclear war, especially if the terrorist attack was on a high value and high risk nuclear facility or involved the seizure and/or use of fissile material. Some experts dismiss this possibility as so remote as to be not worth worrying about. Yet the history of nuclear terrorism globally and in the Northeast Asian region suggests otherwise. Using the sand castle metaphor, once built on the high tide line, sand castles may withstand the wind but eventually succumb to the tide once it reaches the castle—at least once, usually twice a day. Also, theories of organizational and technological failure point to the coincidence of multiple, relatively insignificant driving events that interact or accumulate in ways that lead the “metasystem” to fail, even if each individual component of a system works perfectly. Thus, the potential catalytic effect of a nuclear terrorist incident is not that it would of itself lead to a sudden inter-state nuclear war; but that at a time of crisis when alert levels are already high, when control systems on nuclear forces have already shifted from primary emphasis on negative to positive control, when decision making is already stressed, when the potential for miscalculation is already high due to shows of force indicating that first-use is nigh, when rhetorical threats promising annihilation on the one hand, or collapse of morale and weakness on the other invite counter-vailing threats by nuclear adversaries or their allies to gain the upper hand in the “contest of resolve,” and when organizational cybernetics may be in play such that purposeful actions are implemented differently than intended, then a terrorist nuclear attack may shift a coincident combination of some or all of these factors to a threshold level where they collectively lead to a first-use decision by one or more nuclear-armed states. If the terrorist attack is timed or happens to coincide with high levels of inter-state tension involving nuclear-armed states, then some or all of these tendencies will likely be in play anyway—precisely the concern of those who posit pathways to inadvertent nuclear war as outlined in section 2 above. The critical question is, just as a catalyst breaks some bonds and lets other bonds form, reducing the energy cost and time taken to achieve a chemical reaction, how would a nuclear terrorist attack at time of nuclear charged inter-state tension potentially shift the way that nuclear threat is projected and perceived in a four or five-way nuclear-prone conflict, and how might it affect the potential pathways to inadvertent nuclear war in such a system? Such a pervasive incremental effect is shown in Figure 6 below. [FIGURE 6 OMITTED] Any one or indeed all of these starting nuclear control profiles may be disputed, as might the control profile at the end of the response arrow. (In Figure 6, each nuclear state responds to a terrorist nuclear attack by loosening or abandoning negative controls against unauthorized use, and shifts towards reliance mostly on positive procedural controls biased towards use). But each nuclear armed state will make its moves in response to the posited terrorist nuclear attack partly in response to its expectations as to how other nuclear armed states will perceive and respond to these moves, as well as their perception that an enemy state may have sponsored a terrorist nuclear attack—and considered together, it is obvious that they may not share a common image of the other states’ motivations and actions in this response, leading to cumulative potential for misinterpretation and rapid subsequent action, reaction, and escalation. It is also conceivable—although intuitively it would seem far less likely–that a terrorist nuclear attack at such a conjuncture of partly or fully mobilized nuclear armed states might induce one or more of them to stand down, slow down its decision making or deployments, establish new communication channels with potential nuclear enemy states, and even make common cause to hunt down and eliminate the non-state nuclear terrorist entity, or coordinate operations to respond to the threat of a second terrorist nuclear attack—the credibility of which would be high in the aftermath of a successful initial non-state nuclear attack. As Robert Ayson concluded: In considering the ways in which a terrorist nuclear attack could (wittingly or unwittingly) spark off a wider nuclear exchange government leaders are entitled to be just as worried about their own actions—how they would respond to a terrorist nuclear attack and how that response might get very catastrophically out of control—as about the terrorist act per se. If so, states need to do more than consider the best ways to prevent terrorists from acquiring, deploying and then detonating a nuclear weapon. They also need to think about how they can control themselves in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack (even if some might suggest this risks handing the terrorist a premature and unnecessary victory by giving them indirect influence over the choices states make).[20]

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › !—TERRORISM › A/O – Terror !

AM&E’s key to global counterterror – and reverse causal

Walther-Puri 21 Andrea Walther-Puri, PhD candidate, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, research focuses on the effects of U.S. military counterterrorism programs on longer-term security governance transformation in the Sahel, “Afghanistan: A Tragic Lesson of the US Military’s Flawed Approach to Capacity Building,” Just Security, 9-6-2021, /GoGreen!

In the wake of Kabul’s collapse, experts and government officials need to answer a pivotal question: why did the United States fail to build a more effective Afghan military? In its misguided focus on training and equipping, the United States failed to prioritize a results-based approach. To avoid a similar fate with other counterterrorism training missions, the United States needs to invest in and empower assessment, monitoring, and evaluation.

Since 2001, as part of U.S. counterterrorism planning in Afghanistan, successive American administrations have prioritized building the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to take over the counterterrorism mission and facilitate a measured withdrawal of American forces. But the U.S. military’s approach was flawed from the start. The United States never conducted an assessment to determine the type of military Afghanistan needed given its human capital, geography, and adversary. Its approach failed to identify clear metrics for building such a force, establish a systematic monitoring and evaluation mechanism, and adequately analyze how Afghan security forces would hold up in direct action against Taliban fighters. These gaps in analysis were laid bare when Afghan security forces completely fell apart in the face of Taliban fighters, only four months after President Joe Biden announced the U.S. withdrawal.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › !—DEMOCRACY › AT: US Thumps

It only demonstrated the resilience of democracy, does NOT thump

Walsh 21 Nate Walsh, Emmy award-winning CNN International Security Editor, “America was lucky to be saved by its democracy -- even if some don't realize it,” CNN, 1-8-2021, /GoGreen!

Even in the aftermath, America might not see how fortunate it is.

Most "attempted coups" elsewhere in the world leave a hangover of giddying uncertainty - shops shuttered, presidents in hiding, the television playing a nature documentary or half the staff in the hotel you are staying in not turning up for work.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › !—DEMOCRACY › AT: !/D – Collective Action

Best studies prove short-termism, truth decay, and weak multilateralism are NOT inherent to democracy, but to backsliding – and democracy’s net better at overcoming collective action problems

Lindvall 21 Daniel Lindvall, researcher at the Climate Change Leadership Initiative at the Department of Earth Sciences in Uppsala University, PhD sociology, “Democracy and the Challenge of Climate Change,” International IDEA Discussion Paper 3/2021, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2021, /GoGreen!

Although democracies do better on average than authoritarian systems, climate change is an issue that poses specific challenges to the governing capacity of democracy. The challenge of climate change is complex and has sometimes been described as a ‘wicked problem’. It is an issue in the interface between natural and human systems, and therefore it affects all spheres of life, but in unpredictable ways. The complexity of climate change is one of the prime reasons why democracies have failed to deal adequately with the crisis. The climate crisis is moreover a global challenge, and democracies have not sufficiently managed to act beyond the constraints of the national states. The short-term focus of most democratic decision-making has been an additional weakness. Democracy is a system limited by time and space, while the problem of climate change runs across generations and national borders. Moreover, the influence of fossil fuel lobbyism, corruption, policy capture and weak institutional capacity have hampered democracies from acting responsibly.

As this paper demonstrates, democracies nevertheless possess several advantages when it comes to tackling the climate crisis. Governing systems that allow civil participation, a free flow of information and processes of assessment and evaluation seem to be more capable than authoritarian regimes in dealing with issues of great complexity. Studies on climate change cooperation have also shown that, in general, democracies are more active in international negotiations and more likely to keep their political commitments. The international cooperation on climate change relies to a great extent on open and democratic societies, providing a base for journalists and civil society organizations covering and reporting on the negotiations and monitoring compliance. Moreover, technological innovation, particularly on renewable energy, has made the solutions to the climate crisis less cross-border intensive and extensive, motivating both individual countries, regions and cities, and companies, communities and individuals, to act on their own. Active engagement by individuals and civil society organizations can create pressure for strong policy responses on a local, national and global level.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › !—DEMOCRACY › AT: !/D – No DPT

Best studies disprove the confounding variables their ev cites and empirically confirm our impacts

Imai 20 Kosuke Imai, Professor of Government and of Statistics at Harvard University; and James Lo, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Southern California; “Robustness of Empirical Evidence for the Democratic Peace: A Nonparametric Sensitivity Analysis,” International Organization, 75, Summer 2021, DOI 10.1017/S0020818321000126, pp.901-919 /GoGreen!

The democratic peace—the idea that democracies rarely fight one another— has been called “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations.” Yet, some contend that this relationship is spurious and suggest alternative explanations. Unfortunately, in the absence of randomized experiments, we can never rule out the possible existence of such confounding biases. Rather than commonly used regression-based approaches, we apply a nonparametric sensitivity analysis. We show that overturning the negative association between democracy and conflict would require a confounder that is forty-seven times more prevalent in democratic dyads than in other dyads. To put this number in context, the relationship between democracy and peace is at least five times as robust as that between smoking and lung cancer. To explain away the democratic peace, therefore, scholars would have to find far more powerful confounders than those already identified in the literature.

The proposition that democratic states do not fight interstate wars against each other is one of the most enduring and influential ideas in international relations. The idea is theoretically rooted in the work of Immanuel Kant, who argued that interactions between states with a republican form of government give “a favorable prospect for the desired consequence, i.e., perpetual peace.”1 This has led to a large literature empirically documenting a negative association between democracy and conflict,2 leading one scholar to comment that the democratic peace is “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations.”3

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › !—DEMOCRACY › A/O – Demo !

Extinction

Haque 22 Umair Haque, economist, former director of the Havas Media Lab, degrees from London Business School and McGill University, “We’re Becoming a Far-Right Planet,” Eudaimonia and Co, 4-15-2022, /GoGreen!

If It Feels Like the 1930’s Are Repeating Themselves — Only With Nukes — That’s Because They Are

There are two ways to think about the Russia’s bloody and brutal and criminal war in Ukraine. One is that Putin is a madman — with nukes. The second is even more chilling. It’s that Putin himself is a mere symptom, of deeper forces. These forces are vast and impersonal — just forces of history, like great currents beneath the waves of oceans. What do I mean? This second way to think — and the more that I reflect on it, the more accurate way, perhaps — goes like this.