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Core Limiting Terms › **NATO** › NATO = Members
Jacobson 12 Alice Jacobson, member of Task Force 2012, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, “Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring,” Chapter 13.3, Can NATO React to the Arab Spring? Democracy, Human Rights, & the Rule of Law, 2-27-2012, /GoGreen!
Human rights violations as outlined in broad terms in the 2011 World Report, and pressure from organizations such as Human Rights Watch most certainly add to the international pressure on NATO to intervene. This has led to the discovery that military power may not be a useful instrument in dealing with specific country by country issues in the region. NATO is a group of democratic countries who in turn each have an individual agenda when dealing in the Middle East and North Africa, and are tied to the region by their oil dependency; but protection of human rights as justification for military intervention must be across the board or not at all. Military intervention in Libya was completed swiftly based largely on the economic incentives of NATO’s democratic powers, whereas in Syria, NATO has been immobilized as more people die everyday.
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Core Limiting Terms › **NATO** › NATO = Members
Masters 22 Jonathan Masters, Deputy Managing Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, MA social theory, the New School, BA political science, Emory University, “What Is NATO?” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, last updated 5-4-2022, /GoGreen!
Established during the Cold War, NATO is a transatlantic security alliance composed of thirty member countries, including the United States.
NATO has focused on deterring Russian aggression in recent years, but it has also conducted security operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Somalia.
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Core Limiting Terms › **NATO** › NATO = Institution
Tsuruoka 10 Michito Tsuruoka, Senior Research Fellow, Regional Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies, “Japan–Europe Security Cooperation: How to “Use” NATO and the EU,” English translation from the original Japanese version with the same title published in Boei Kenkyusho Kiyo, 13(1), October 2010, /GoGreen!
The first section will examine the value of NATO as a security partner for Japan from the following four perspectives: 1) a political partner; 2) an operational partner; 3) as a means of cooperation with the US; and 4) a multilateral school. The second section will use a similar method to examine the significance of security cooperation with the EU, viewing it from the following three perspectives: 1) a political partner; 2) an operational partner; and 3) as a “non-American” partner.
There are two things to be mentioned before going into substantial discussions below. First, from the perspective of “mutually using the other,” it would be necessary to examine the value of Japan as a partner for Europe. However, it goes beyond the scope of this article, which is focused on the Japanese side of the story. That said, it needs to be mentioned that it is necessary for Japan to be prepared and willing to be used by Europe as long as Japan wants to use Europe and that letting Europeans understand the value of Japan as a partner is in Japan’s interest.
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Core Limiting Terms › **NATO** › NATO = Institution
Johnston 19 Seth A. Johnston, Fellow of the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, former chief of international security cooperation for intelligence at the U.S. Army Europe, former Task Force Commander in NATO’s Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan, PhD international relations, MA comparative politics, Oxford University, “NATO’s Lessons from Afghanistan,” Parameters, The US Army War College Quarterly, Autumn 2019, /GoGreen!
Today’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization is no Cold War alliance. Few developments illustrate NATO’s capacity for adaptation more than its 21st century role in Afghanistan.1 NATO allies invoked the collective defense provision—Article 5—of its founding treaty for the first and only time just one day after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.2 Few present at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 could have imagined it would be invoked by European countries and Canada seeking to support the United States or that the Alliance’s largest and longest military operation would occur in central Asia. Fewer still might have predicted NATO allies would agree to the mission so soon after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, a crisis the then US ambassador to NATO described as a “near death experience” for the Alliance.3 Yet NATO assumed control of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003 and has remained in Afghanistan for the better part of two decades.
As the United States has begun negotiating a political settlement to the Afghanistan conflict with a view to the eventual withdrawal of international forces there, an assessment from the overall NATO perspective will complement the national initiatives.4 This effort will also support ongoing efforts to reassess NATO’s priorities in the face of other security challenges.5
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Core Limiting Terms › **With** › With = Whole
OED 89 Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition, “with, prep., (adv., conj.),” 1989, /GoGreen!
24. a. Accompanied by; having as an addition; having in one's company. Often connecting the two ns. or prons.: = ‘and in addition’, ‘and besides’, or simply ‘and’. Occas. in compound place-names: = cum. †with the mare (Sc. obs.): = and more, and something over: see more B. 4d.
c1200 Ormin 14792 Faraon wiþþ all hiss ferd comm affterr~warrd. a1300 E.E. Psalter ciii. 27 [civ. 25] Bestes smaller with þe mare. 1370–80 Visions St. Paul 247 in O.E. Misc. 230 Þer as was wepyng wiþ muche vnseeþe. c1380 Wyclif Sel. Wks. I. 205 Þe Sixte, wiþ Clementyns, done myche harm to Goddis lawe, and enfeblen bileve. 1432–50 tr. Higden (Rolls) I. 367 The water was so habundante that hit pereschede þe woman with here childe. 1494 Acta Audit. (1839) 205/2 Alexander‥tuk fra him out of his maling vxx of ȝowis with the may. 1502 Reg. Privy Seal Scot. I. 112/2 Half a ȝere, with the mare, befor the date hereof. 1563 T. Wilson Logic 54 Beauuis with Alexander are comprehended vnder manne, as their kinde and speciall. a1706 Evelyn Hist. Relig. (1850) I. 410 The permitting female slaves to be corrupted by their masters, with the like. 1719 De Foe Crusoe i. (Globe) 296 We readily agreed to follow him, as did also twelve other Gentlemen, with their Servants. 1859 Geo. Eliot A. Bede xviii, These grey pews, with the buff-washed walls, gave a very pleasing tone to this shabby interior. 1911 Act 1 & 2 Geo. V c. 6 §1 Imprisonment with or without hard labour.
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Core Limiting Terms › **With** › With = Participation
Gregory 15 Gregory, Circuit Judge, with Harris, Circuit Judge, and Hamilton, Senior Circuit Judge, delivering the Opinon of the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, in United States of America v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, No. 14–4086, decided 8-19-2015, /GoGreen!
The second textual limitation—the fact that commerce must be “with foreign Nations”—requires a nexus between the United States and a foreign country. See Goodno, supra, at 1202 (observing that dictionaries contemporary to the Constitutional Convention defined “with” as “noting the means” or “noting connection” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The use of the word “with” in the foreign clause, instead of the word “among” as used in the interstate clause, merely suggests the obvious: Congress cannot regulate commerce “among” foreign nations because other nations do not submit their sovereignty to our regulatory powers.
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Core Limiting Terms › **Security Cooperation** › SC = Peacetime
Szayna 4 Thomas S. Szayna, senior political scientist and former director of RAND's Defense and Political Sciences Department at RAND, MA international relations, Claremont Graduate School; Adam Grissom, senior political scientist at RAND; Jefferson P. Marquis, senior political scientist and former manager of the International and Security Policy Group at RAND; Thomas-Durell Young, Brian Rosen, and Yuna Huh, research assistants at RAND; website description of the Monograph: “U.S. Army Security Cooperation Toward Improved Planning and Management,” RAND Corporation, 2004, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG165.html /GoGreen!
In the realm of security cooperation — peacetime activities undertaken by the U.S. armed services with other armed forces and countries — the U.S. Army’s current planning process is exceedingly complex, involving a multitude of actors, problematic incentive systems, an incomplete information exchange, and a lack of effective measures of effectiveness. Even some of the stakeholders understand only certain aspects of the process and/or have only partial visibility into it. The drivers and demanders of peacetime cooperative activities undertaken by the U.S. Army with other countries and militaries (Army International Affairs, or AIA) tend to have an incomplete understanding of the resourcing problems and the tradeoffs involved in making AIA choices. In turn, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) — the supplier of AIA resources — has an incomplete understanding of the benefits of AIA, and the Army’s own resourcing tools are not easily amenable to an in-depth understanding of the resources it commits to AIA. The demand for AIA is fundamentally predicated on the amount of AIA supply provided by HQDA, as opposed to the latter being the product of policy, strategy, and resource guidance. Indeed, incrementalism and continuity, rather than policy and strategy, are the principal driving agents in the development of AIA resource priorities. In the post-September 11 security environment, the planning system of AIA needs greater flexibility and efficiency as a crucial component of the global war on terrorism. The need to have flexibility and adaptability in security cooperation, and to seize opportunities that may be short-lived, has made reform of the security cooperation planning and implementation process essential.
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Core Limiting Terms › **Security Cooperation** › SC = Includes Treaties
Cooper 21 R. Clarke Cooper, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council, former assistant secretary at the Department of State, and US Army combat veteran, “American security cooperation needs an ‘integrity check’,” New Atlanticist, The Atlantic Council, 9-3-2021, /GoGreen!
Since World War II, US presidents have understood the tremendous value of security cooperation, prompting them to invest in alliances and partnerships. These are, after all, significant components of US national security, and as President Joe Biden recently noted, “America’s alliances are our greatest asset.”
Yet successful security cooperation—which includes arms transfers, training, security assistance, treaties, or agreements—is built around two key principles: trust and integrity of commitment, both of which are at risk today thanks to the haphazard US withdrawal from Afghanistan.
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Core Limiting Terms › **Security Cooperation** › SC = Encompasses SA
Army 11 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Foreign Internal Defense ,” Field Manual, FM 3-05.2 (FM 3-05.137/FM 3-05.202), September 2011, /GoGreen!
1-22. Security cooperation is all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a HN. Security cooperation, security assistance, and FID are closely related. DOD Directive 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, sets the policy and assigns responsibilities under the GEF, 10 USC, 22 USC, Executive Orders, Guidance for the Development of the Force, and policies relating to the administration of security cooperation, to include security assistance. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction 3141.01D, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans, states that “The Joint Staff Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, (DJ-5), is responsible for developing recommendations on strategy, strategic concepts, and political-military matters to include security cooperation, security assistance, and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations.”
1-23. The GEF consolidates and integrates DOD planning guidance into an overarching document that supersedes security cooperation guidance. The GEF transitions DOD planning from a contingency-centric approach to a strategy-centric approach with a broader theater emphasis on the regional ends as opposed to the means. The GEF places emphasis on steady-state activities to achieve end states and objectives that reflect the centrality of security cooperation activities listed in national strategy documents. The centerpiece of the GEF is the requirement for combatant commanders to develop joint campaigns that translate national and theater strategy into “joint” operational concepts to ensure steady-state activities and operations are integrated and synchronized for achieving and attaining the regional or functional end states specified in the GEF (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning). Joint operation planning includes all activities that must be accomplished to develop courses of action (COAs) for contingency or anticipated operations—the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of forces. Planners recommend and commanders define criteria for the termination of joint operations, and they link these criteria to the transition to stabilization and achievement of the end state (JP 3-05, Special Operations). The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) process and the joint operation planning process promote coherent planning across all levels of war and command echelons, easing the transition to crisis action planning. Joint planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve a specified end state. The military’s contribution to national strategic planning consists of joint strategic planning and its three subsets—
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Core Limiting Terms › **Security Cooperation** › SC = Encompasses SA
Cooper 21 R. Clarke Cooper, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council, former assistant secretary at the Department of State, and US Army combat veteran, “American security cooperation needs an ‘integrity check’,” New Atlanticist, The Atlantic Council, 9-3-2021, /GoGreen!
Since World War II, US presidents have understood the tremendous value of security cooperation, prompting them to invest in alliances and partnerships. These are, after all, significant components of US national security, and as President Joe Biden recently noted, “America’s alliances are our greatest asset.”
Yet successful security cooperation—which includes arms transfers, training, security assistance, treaties, or agreements—is built around two key principles: trust and integrity of commitment, both of which are at risk today thanks to the haphazard US withdrawal from Afghanistan.
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Core Limiting Terms › **Security Cooperation** › SC = AT: Lists
GAO 17 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State Security Assistance Efforts,” GAO-17-255R, 3-24-2017, /GoGreen!
House Armed Services Committee Report 114-102, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 (H.R.1735), includes a provision for us to report on an inventory of DOD security cooperation programs intended to build partner security capabilities.3 DOD defines these programs as including DOD-administered State security assistance activities. According to DOD and State officials, no sanctioned U.S. government inventory of security cooperation and security assistance efforts exists.4 In this report, we provide a fiscal year 2016 inventory of DOD security cooperation and State security assistance efforts that may be used by the U.S. government to build foreign partners’ capacity to address security-related threats, including each effort’s name, description, associated legal authorities, and agency involvement as required by the associated authorities. This inventory includes efforts that have building partner capacity (BPC) to address security-related threats as a primary goal as well as efforts that may have BPC as an ancillary goal or effect.
[FOOTNOTE 4]
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Core Limiting Terms › **Security Cooperation** › SC = Title 10
Epstein 18 Susan B. Epstein, Coordinator, Specialist in Foreign Policy, Congressional Research Service; and Liana W. Rosen, Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics, Congressional Research Service; “U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding Trends,” CRS Report for Congress, R45091, 2-1-2018, /GoGreen!
Appendix B. Major DOD Security Cooperation Authorities/Programs23
This appendix describes DOD security cooperation programs:
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Core Limiting Terms › **Security Cooperation** › SC = Title 10
Serafino 16 Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, Congressional Research Service, “Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense,” CRS Report for Congress, R44444, 5-26-2016, /GoGreen!
This report uses “security assistance” in its generic sense of assistance to foreign military and other security forces as the default term for assistance provided and activities conducted under U.S. Code Title 22 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse) and Title 10 (Armed Forces), as well as under provisions of an annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) when both are discussed. (Assistance provided under both Title 10 and NDAAs are collectively referred to as “Title 10 authorities.”)
When only Title 10 authorities are involved, the term “security cooperation” is used. Where possible, this report uses specific terms, for instance, “military assistance” for programs that involve only foreign military forces, or “humanitarian assistance” for DOD programs that provide disaster relief and other forms of humanitarian aid to foreign populations.
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Core Limiting Terms › **Security Cooperation** › SC = DoD Adminstration
Lopez 21 C. Todd Lopez, writer and editor at the U.S. Department of Defense, internally quoting Heidi Grant, Director, and Jedidiah P. Royal, Deputy Director, of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency; “DOD Recognizes 50 Years of Security Cooperation,” DOD News, 9-3-2021, /GoGreen!
There have been relations between America's military and the militaries of other nations since the United States first became a country. However, it wasn't until 1971 that the Defense Department created the Defense Security Assistance Agency — later renamed the Defense Security Cooperation Agency — to make security cooperation a formal function of the Defense Department.
Now a half century later, as DSCA turns 50 years old, it is still focusing on its original mission to build enduring partnerships between U.S. and partner nation militaries, making both participants stronger.
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GAO 17 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State Security Assistance Efforts,” GAO-17-255R, 3-24-2017, /GoGreen!
House Armed Services Committee Report 114-102, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 (H.R.1735), includes a provision for us to report on an inventory of DOD security cooperation programs intended to build partner security capabilities.3 DOD defines these programs as including DOD-administered State security assistance activities. According to DOD and State officials, no sanctioned U.S. government inventory of security cooperation and security assistance efforts exists.4 In this report, we provide a fiscal year 2016 inventory of DOD security cooperation and State security assistance efforts that may be used by the U.S. government to build foreign partners’ capacity to address security-related threats, including each effort’s name, description, associated legal authorities, and agency involvement as required by the associated authorities. This inventory includes efforts that have building partner capacity (BPC) to address security-related threats as a primary goal as well as efforts that may have BPC as an ancillary goal or effect.
[FOOTNOTE 4]
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Kerr 18 Alexandra Kerr, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, “Defense Institution Building in the U.S. Context,” Connections, 17(3), Summer-Fall 2018, pp.23-38, JSTOR /GoGreen!
Finally, in the U.S. government, “security cooperation” and “security assistance”—which are the chief lines of effort in the U.S. toolkit to help partners bolster their security and work with the United States to support common security objectives—are overlapping but not necessarily interchangeable. The distinction between “security cooperation” and “security assistance” activities has to do with the agency administering the program: in simplest terms, it is either an activity of the Department of Defense (security cooperation) or the Department of State (security assistance).
DOD and the Department of State (DOS) have shared responsibility for engaging with foreign partner militaries since the mid-twentieth century, with the bulk of congressional security assistance funding allocated to DOS. Any security assistance administered by DOD—whether funded under Title 10 (Armed Services) or Title 22 (Foreign Affairs) of the U.S. Code—is a “security cooperation” activity.21 After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the legal framework for the funding and administration of such activities evolved in response to emerging threats. Congress increasingly granted funding and authorities directly to DOD under Title 10 for security cooperation.22 Therefore, while DOS security assistance programs can include DIB components, the majority of DIB-specific programming is currently funded under and implemented by the Department of Defense and is thus considered security cooperation.
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DoD 16 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” 12-29-2016, /GoGreen!
G.2. DEFINITIONS. Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this issuance.
country-specific security cooperation section. A section of the theater campaign plan in which the GCCs articulate their intent to apply time, money, and effort through security cooperation programs in a specific country to further U.S. defense objectives or set the theater for a potential contingency in their campaign plan. Country-specific security cooperation sections serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and inform and are informed by corresponding Integrated Country Strategies.
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Dyekman 7 Gregory J. Dyekman, Colonel, U.S. Army, Chief of Effects Assessment and Targeting in the Strategic Operations Directorate, MultiNational Force Iraq., Master of Strategic Studies, Army War College, MS Management, Troy State University, “SECURITY COOPERATION: A KEY TO THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21st CENTURY,” Strategic Studies Institute, November 2007, /GoGreen!
Current doctrine states: “Security cooperation is the means by which the Department of Defense encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with us to achieve strategic objectives.”16 The experience in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) makes clear that the transnational nature of the challenges the United States faces precludes achieving our strategic objectives without the cooperation of allies and partners. To achieve unity of effort, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) proposes that, “Whenever possible, the United States works with or through others: enabling allied and partner capabilities, building their capacity, and developing mechanisms to share the risks and responsibilities of today’s complex challenges.”17 No one country can solve GWOT problems; partnerships and cooperation with friendly nations are essential to winning a “Long War” on terror.
[ENDNOTE 16]
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White 14 Taylor P. White, Major, USMC, Joint Doctrine Development Officer with the Joint Staff J7, “Security Cooperation: How It All Fits,” Joint Force Quarterly 72, 1-1-2014, /GoGreen!
Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation activities support or are combined with other assistance programs and often are a part of nation assistance. This often occurs in a manner that may appear confusing or convoluted to the joint warfighter. This article portrays how the programs and activities converge. Although the various terms and activities in show in the accompanying figure appear to have simple names and meanings, they in fact have strict definitions based on funding and authorities. While some of the activities directly support one another, others have distinct boundaries between their definitions and functions. The joint community is beginning to address the framework of security cooperation in a new joint doctrine publication, Joint Publication (JP) 3-XX, Security Cooperation. It is important to embark with clear definitions and understanding of the complex relationship among these terms to facilitate understanding by the joint force.
Security cooperation is referred to in both joint professional military education programs and joint staffs as a tool to be employed by combatant commands. However, in other settings, it is a set of programs managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Extensive review of joint doctrine and policy reveals that the definition of security cooperation appears to encompass these areas and more. After expanding our understanding of security cooperation, other terms such as security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and security assistance provide additional specificity for the tasks being conducted, yet some of these actions fall outside security cooperation. Even though security cooperation spans the range of military operations and is inclusive of large-scale operations conducted in support of foreign nations, it is not all-encompassing of security related support from U.S. agencies other than DOD.
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DA – AI Arms Racing › Affirmative › 2AC – R&D turn
Hoffman, 20
[Daniel, retired clandestine services officer and former chief of station with the Central Intelligence Agency. His combined 30 years of government service included high-level overseas and domestic positions, 7-13-2020, “The US cannot compete with China if our military doesn’t invest in R&D”, The Hill, , accessed 7-18-2022, BB]
The Department of Defense (DOD) last month declared that 20 Chinese companies, including telecommunications firm Huawei and video surveillance company Hikvision, are a threat to U.S. national security because of their relationship with the Chinese military. DOD emphasized that Chinese president Xi Jinping’s military-civilian fusion strategy of exploiting high-technology is the blueprint for “China’s global ‘return’ to military preeminence.”