2022
SDI
Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › UNIQUENESS › AT Thumpers
Lesser, 21 -- vice president at The German Marshall Fund of the United States
[Ian, "Great Optimism in the EU and NATO as Brussels Looks to Biden," GMFUS, xx-xx-xxxx, https://www.gmfus.org/news/great-optimism-eu-and-nato-brussels-looks-biden, accessed 6-4-2022]
After years of transatlantic stress, officials and observers in Brussels believe that a Biden administration holds the prospect of profound change in style and policy. There will continue to be areas of disagreement. But the overall approach from Washington is sure to be more engaging and closer to mainstream European policy preferences. From economics to security, Europe values predictability in U.S. leadership, something that has been in remarkably short supply under the Trump administration.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › UNIQUENESS › AT Thumpers
Soare, 21 -- Research Fellow for Defence and Military Analysis
[Simona, "Algorithmic power, NATO and artificial intelligence," IISS, 11-19-21, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/11/algorithmic-power-nato-and-artificial-intelligence, accessed 6-4-2022]
NATO has formally approved its first Artificial Intelligence (AI) strategy as it seeks a leading position in the adoption of AI for defence, but it may face some critical hurdles ahead in implementing the strategy, according to Simona Soare.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › UNIQUENESS › AT Thumpers
Livingston, 22 -- Texas Tribune Washington bureau chief
[Abby Livingston, "Texas Republicans who opposed resolution supporting NATO criticize and question its language," Texas Tribune, 4-6-22, https://www.texastribune.org/2022/04/06/congress-nato-support-texas-representatives/, accessed 6-4-2022]
That alliance is having a renaissance in Europe, as the United States and its allies are trying to prevent the Russian invasion from spilling into NATO countries. Most mainstream foreign policy experts credit NATO’s efficacy for containing the Russian aggression to Ukraine.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › UNIQUENESS › AT UQ Outweighs
Wormuth, 22 -- US Secretary of the Army
[Christine, "NATO allies must not take their unity on Ukraine for granted, says Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth," Atlantic Council, 6-2-22, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/nato-allies-must-not-take-their-unity-on-ukraine-for-granted-says-secretary-of-the-army-christine-wormuth/, accessed 6-4-22]
And so how do you see the US sustaining this level of support for Ukraine in a way that could actually make a difference in embattled regions like the Donbas, which is suffering significantly right now?
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › UNIQUENESS › UQ: Focus
Mizokami, 22 -- Popular Mechanics defense and security issues correspondent
[Kyle, "Every Single Weapon Europe Is Sending to Ukraine (So Far)," Popular Mechanics, 3-2-22, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a39281936/weapons-europe-is-sending-to-ukraine/, accessed 6-4-22]
Ukraine’s western backers are sending more than 1,000 Stingers in all. The missiles have so far not seen much use, as Russia’s Air Force is flying fewer missions at higher altitudes than originally anticipated. Analysts believe, however, that as Russia exhausts its inventory of precision-guided weapons, it will be forced to drop unguided bombs from lower altitudes, bringing them within Stinger’s engagement envelope. The Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania all sent an unknown number of Stinger missiles before the war.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › UNIQUENESS › UQ: Capabilities
Petrequin, 22 -- Associated Press reporter in Brussels
[Samuel Petrequin, "NATO to boost its forces, equipment on eastern flank," AP News, 6-16-2022, https://apnews.com/b2e087a113f0fe50249ccd6087cee435, accessed 6-19-2022]
NATO to boost its forces, equipment on eastern flank
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › UNIQUENESS › UQ: Unity
Erlanger, 22 -- NY Times chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe
[Steven Erlanger, "Fear of Russia Brings New Purpose and Unity to NATO, Once Again," NY Times, 1-14-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/14/world/europe/nato-russia-ukraine-europe.html, accessed 6-19-2022]
Fear of Russia Brings New Purpose and Unity to NATO, Once Again
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › UNIQUENESS › UQ: Unity
Guyer, 22 -- Vox senior foreign policy writer
[Jonathan, "NATO was in crisis. Putin’s war made it even more powerful," Vox, 3-25-2022, https://www.vox.com/22994826/nato-resurgence-biden-trip-putin-ukraine, accessed 6-4-2022]
When President Joe Biden landed in Europe this week, it was a different continent than he had last visited in the fall of 2021.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › UNIQUENESS › UQ: Unity
Livingston, 22 -- Texas Tribune Washington bureau chief
[Abby Livingston, "Texas Republicans who opposed resolution supporting NATO criticize and question its language," Texas Tribune, 4-6-22, https://www.texastribune.org/2022/04/06/congress-nato-support-texas-representatives/, accessed 6-4-2022]
That alliance is having a renaissance in Europe, as the United States and its allies are trying to prevent the Russian invasion from spilling into NATO countries. Most mainstream foreign policy experts credit NATO’s efficacy for containing the Russian aggression to Ukraine.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › CORE › Overview: Impact Calc
Crowley, 22 -- NY Times Washington Bureau diplomatic correspondent
[Michael Crowley and Steven Erlanger, "For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally," NY Times, 5-30-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html, accessed 6-19-2022]
For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › CORE › Overview: Impact Calc
Abshire, 9 -- Center for Strategic and International Studies co-founder
[David, former US Ambassador to NATO, "NATO’s Survival Depends on Afghanistan," The Ambassadors Review, Fall 2009, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/ambrev/ambrev627/f_0017761_15212.pdf, accessed 6-19-22]
Third, the Alliance inefficiently operates under a laborious consensus decision making process that requires total unanimity. This policy remains, despite NATO’s massive expansion (from 16 to 28 members) since the end of the Cold War. Because of this, NATO lacks the ability to act decisively. While NATO can break out of this decision making process when it comes to a humanitarian mission or counter-piracy operations, NATO continues to follow this inefficient procedure when it comes to making decisions regarding the war in Afghanistan. Recently retired Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, General Bantz J. Craddock, has stated that because of this policy it took NATO over a year to adopt a coherent countemarcotics strategy. This policy tragically undermines NATO’s ability to fight a war.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › CORE › 1NC — NATO Cohesion DA
Pettyjohn, 22 -- Center for a New American Security defense program director
[Stacie L., and Becca Wasser, fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security, "A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear," Foreign Affairs, 5-20-22, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear, accessed 5-26-22]
A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › CORE › 1NC — NATO Cohesion DA
Walsh, 13 -- President of the Emerging Science and Technology Policy Centre
[Eddie Walsh, Senior Fellow at the School of Foreign Service – Georgetown University, "Danger of Emerging Technologies Dividing NATO," Atlantic Council, 8-16-2013, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/danger-of-emerging-technologies-dividing-nato/, accessed 6-4-2022]
Converging technologies also pose fundamental human security challenges. As Francis Fukuyama once argued in Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution, converging technologies could inequitably transform the world we live in and, in the process, undermine the very foundations that underpin liberal democracies. Whether or not such a future unfolds, it is clear that their application raises serious ethical and moral issues that are proving divisive for allies and enemies alike (eg: the debates over armed drones and cyber espionage). Even where common approaches can be achieved (eg: combatting designer drugs), converging technologies are growing “faster than our ability to legislate or regulate” them.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › CORE › 1NC — NATO Cohesion DA
Gojowsky, 18 -- U.S. Army officer
[Torsten; Ben Haspels is a Royal Netherlands Army officer; Flemming Haar is a Danish Navy officer; and Sebastian Koegle is a German officer; Sverre Wetteland is a Norwegian officer, "Resistance to Innovation in NATO," Strategy Bridge, 8-16-2018, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/8/16/resistance-to-innovation-in-nato, accessed 6-4-2022]
Resistance to Innovation in NATO
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
NATO COHESION DA › CORE › 1NC — NATO Cohesion DA
Jash, 22 -- Manipal Academy Geopolitics and International Relations professor
[Amrita Jash, "Unity on Ukraine war deters China," Taipei Times, 3-27-2022, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2022/03/27/2003775514, accessed 6-4-2022]
Unity on Ukraine war deters China
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › Deficit – Delay
Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, /GoGreen!
Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department:
The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › Deficit – Conditionality
Sadler 21 Brent Sadler, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology, Center for National Defense, The Heritage Foundation, MA Jochi University, MS National War College; and Janae Diaz, member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation; “Don’t Shift Security Cooperation To State Dept.,” Breaking Defense, 6-28-2021, /GoGreen!
America spends billions each year on security cooperation and assistance programs, but the results do not match the investment. To help improve efficiencies, the Center for American Progress recently proposed consolidating all these programs within the State Department.
That would be a big mistake, because it would minimize the Pentagon’s role in shaping and directing security assistance and, ultimately, the program’s military objectives would be subordinated to State Department interests, such as judicial reform and humanitarian programs. Those are not the values by which such security assistance programs should be solely judged.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › Deficit – DoS Bureaucracy
Ross 17 Tommy Ross, senior associate with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Congressional Oversight on Security Assistance,” Commentary, 9-26-2017, /GoGreen!
Who’s in charge? As the Obama administration issued and then sought to implement Presidential Policy Directive 23 on security sector assistance, and as DoD’s security assistance profile has grown in recent years, debates both within and outside the government have recently been asking the “who’s in charge” question from an interagency perspective. Yet, the question is equally—and perhaps more—important inside the State Department itself.
Responsibility for security assistance is muddled and disjointed. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) leads a planning process around FMF and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, but the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources makes final decisions about funding allocations, and regional bureaus exercise substantial influence on how resources are divvied up within their assigned regions. PM’s power can seem to range somewhere between facilitation and administration.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › Deficit – Capacity
Neptune 16 Neptune, veteran owned and operated strategy and advisory firm, “U.S. Security Cooperation Review,” February 2016, /GoGreen!
Title 10 vs. Title 22. State perceives authority to have shifted in two basic ways: 1) new DoD authorities (i.e. 2282) that undercut State’s lead responsibility for security assistance planning, and 2) new DoD authorities that extend beyond assistance to “armed forces,” whereby DoD now has authority to train non-security forces. Generally speaking, Defense sees this as a necessary evolution of the security assistance system given the shifting nature of global threats. Specifically, Defense sees Title 22 authorities as diplomatic in nature, focused on relationship building as they have always been. By contrast, DoD sees the new Title 10 authorities as critical to filling real capability gaps that have a direct connection to U.S. national security interests. Moreover, they cite, in a time of significant budget constraints, increasing pressure and need to rely on partners and coalitions in this way. Finally, a very real connection exists between Title 10 and Title 22 authority growth and the relative level of activity (or inactivity) between the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees. State has not seen an authorizations bill in a decade, and the evolution of their authorities has not kept pace with the evolution of Defense committees. Many of the State authorities are relatively outdated, but their committees have not been successful in moving State authorization legislation through the system. Finally, and above all, Defense continues to stress the pragmatic urgency of the current situation, and State’s inability (due to lack of resources, not incompetence) to do industrial scale security cooperation work. For instance, Defense personnel typically concede that it is undesirable for U.S. military forces to be training civilian security personnel, but that this is better than it not being done, or the training being done by incompetent contractors.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Readiness !
John Mueller 21, Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, "Proliferation, Terrorism, Humanitarian Intervention, and Other Problems," in The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency, Chapter 7, 02/17/2021, pg. 183-184.
Over the course of the last several decades, alarmists have often focused on potential dangers presented by rogue states, as they came to be called in the 1990s. These were led by such devils du jour as Nasser, Sukarno, Castro, Gaddafi, Khomeini, Kim Il-sung, Saddam Hussein, Milosˇevic´, and Ahmadinijad, all of whom have since faded into history’s dustbin.66 Today the alarm has been directed at Iran as discussed in Chapter 6 and also at North Korea as discussed in this one. However, neither country really threatens to commit major direct military aggression. Iran, in fact, has eschewed the practice for several centuries.
Nonetheless, it might make some sense to maintain a capacity to institute containment and deterrence efforts carried out in formal or informal coalition with concerned neighboring countries – and there are quite a few of these in each case. However, the military requirements for effective containment by their neighbors, by the United States, and by the broader world community are far from monumental and do not necessarily require the United States to maintain large forces-in-being for the remote eventuality.