2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Less Highlighted) › 1AC — Alliance Fragmentation Advantage
Ford and Goldgeier 21 — Lindsey W. Ford, David M. Rubenstein Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Adjunct Lecturer in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, former Richard Holbrooke Fellow and Director for Political-Security Affairs at the Asia Society Policy Institute, former Special Assistant for the US-ASEAN Defense Forum in the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, holds an M.A. in Public Affairs and Asian Studies from the University of Texas-Austin, and James Goldgeier, Visiting Fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, Professor of International Relations at American University, former Professor and Director of the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, former Director for Russian, Ukrainian, and Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-Berkeley, 2021 (“Retooling America’s alliances to manage the China challenge,” The Brookings Institution, January 25th, Available Online at https://www.brookings.edu/research/retooling-americas-alliances-to-manage-the-china-challenge/, Accessed 07-10-2022)
Beyond building collective capacity to operate more seamlessly in response to today’s crises, the U.S. must also think more closely about building alliance innovation ecosystems for the future. With China set to overtake the U.S. in research and development spending — it already spends more on R&D than Japan, Germany, and South Korea combined — the U.S. and its allies will need to treat defense innovation as a combined task. Rising techno-nationalism and the lack of allied innovation networks will make this difficult absent intentional policy leadership. Looking forward, Washington should further expand new bureaucratic mechanisms such as allied R&D pools or defense innovation hubs that could better harness emerging technologies being developed across allied capitals. While the Defense Department is focused on initiatives that will improve America’s sclerotic acquisition and innovation processes, these efforts need an alliance-centric approach from inception, rather than treating allies as an add-on to existing American plans. NATO, for example, might consider establishing an allied version of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in which key allies could collaborate on emerging technologies, as proposed by the 2017 GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative. Indo-Pacific allies such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea could be incorporated in this initiative through their role as NATO “global partners.”
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Less Highlighted) › 1AC — Alliance Fragmentation Advantage
Mundell 22 — Ian Mundell, Innovation Reporter at Science|Business—a network of universities, companies, and research and policy organisations promoting innovation, 2022 (“The Ecosystem: in Europe, defence innovation is the new black,” Science|Business, June 7th, Available Online at https://sciencebusiness.net/news/ecosystem-europe-defence-innovation-new-black, Accessed 07-03-2022)
Suddenly, it seems, everyone cares about Europe’s defence innovation ecosystem. NATO is setting up the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic, or DIANA, with a significant presence in Europe. The European Commission is working on the EU Defence Innovation Scheme, EUDIS. And last month, Amazon Web Services announced it is setting up a private defence accelerator in the UK.
But details of the DIANA and EUDIS initiatives have been slow to emerge, leading to concerns that gaps and barriers to innovation remain to be addressed. EUDIS in particular leaves a lot of questions unanswered.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Less Highlighted) › 1AC — Alliance Fragmentation Advantage
Besch 21 — Sophia Besch, DAAD/AICGS Research Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Reform (Germany), Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council Europe Center, Ph.D. Candidate in European Studies and Defence Studies at King's College London (UK), holds an M.Sc. in International Relations from The London School of Economics and Political Science (UK) and an M.A. in International Security from Sciences Po (France), 2021 (“Rebooting the U.S.-EU Defense Relationship,” American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, December 22nd, Available Online at https://www.aicgs.org/publication/rebooting-the-u-s-eu-defense-relationship/, Accessed 07-10-2022)
2. Align EU-NATO work on defense innovation and find new formats of engagement
Both the United States and the EU have an interest in investing in new and emerging defense technologies and to maintain interoperability, particularly in the context of the U.S. technology race with China. The United States, through AUKUS, has established an innovation partnership with just one European ally, the UK (for now). Meanwhile, NATO has launched a new defense innovation fund and a defense innovation accelerator (DIANA). The UK, which post-Brexit has given itself the guidance to ‘Think NATO,’[7] was a supporter of the Fund, but the United States and France are not members. At the same time, France often argues that the EU should be in the lead on emerging technologies and is pushing for the creation of an Innovation Defense Hub within the European Defense Agency. These defense innovation efforts pursued in parallel by both organizations are already leading officials to complain about NATO duplicating the EU and vice versa. Both Americans and Europeans should try to prevent a rehashing of this unproductive talking point.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Less Highlighted) › 1AC — Alliance Fragmentation Advantage
Speranza and Jans 21 — Lauren Speranza, Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, former Deputy Director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council, holds an M.A. in International Security from the Brussels School of International Studies (Belgium), and Karlijn Jans, Defence Policy Advisor at the British Embassy in The Hague (Netherlands), former Strategic Analyst at the The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (Netherlands), holds an M.A. in European Studies from King's College London (UK) and an M.A. in European Studies from the Humboldt Institute of Berlin (Germany), 2021 (“Bridging the Gap: Time for an EU-NATO Strategic Dialogue on Defense Tech,” Center for European Policy Analysis, February 17th, Available Online at https://cepa.org/bridging-the-gap-time-for-an-eu-nato-strategic-dialogue-on-defense-tech/, Accessed 07-10-2022)
To stay secure, the transatlantic community must take on emerging and disruptive technologies together.
Today’s transatlantic security hinges on technology. On both sides of the Atlantic, our militaries, societies, economies, and information systems require increasingly advanced technologies to stay better, faster, and stronger than our adversaries and competitors. To retain their advantage and address vulnerabilities, the United States and Europe must work in lockstep to harness emerging and disruptive technologies for their collective defense. The key is to employ NATO and the European Union (EU) in unison for strategic effect.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Less Highlighted) › 1AC — RMA Advantage
Kliman and Thomas-Noone 18 — Daniel Kliman, Senior Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, former Senior Adviser for Asia Integration at the U.S. Department of Defense, former Senior Advisor at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, holds a Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University, and Brendan Thomas-Noone, Research Fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney (Australia), former Research Associate in the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute (Australia), holds an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Melbourne (Australia) and an M.Sc. in Global Politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science (UK), 2018 (“Now is the time to take DIUx global,” Defense News, May 24th, Available Online at https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2018/05/23/now-is-the-time-to-take-diux-global/, Accessed 07-11-2022)
The Defense Innovation Unit Experimental — the Pentagon’s signature effort to engage commercial technology startups ― is primed to go global. In fact, DIUx could become a key platform by which the United States and its allies and partners come together to address shared military challenges ― if its next managing director and supporters in the Pentagon and Congress are prepared to seize the moment.
Launched in 2015, DIUx reflected a growing realization that the U.S. military needs to more effectively leverage innovations developed in the commercial technology sector. Intended as a workaround to a sclerotic defense acquisitions process, DIUx came to rely on an obscure contracting authority to rapidly award prototype projects to innovative companies ― a welcome change to the Pentagon business models that never managed to align with the technology industry’s far faster pace.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Less Highlighted) › 1AC — RMA Advantage
Cook and Dowd 22 — Cynthia R. Cook, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Senior Management Scientist and Director of the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center at the RAND Corporation, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Harvard University, and Anna M. Dowd, Co-Founder of Digital Innovation Engine—an organization working on technology innovation, Adjunct Scholar at the RAND Corporation, former Principal Officer for Strategic Partnerships and Head of Industry Relations at the NATO Communications and Information Agency, former Fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (France), holds an M.A. in International Relations from the Warsaw School of Economics (Poland) and a joint M.A. in European Studies from the Warsaw School of Economics (Poland) and Sciences Po (France), 2022 (“How to Get NATO Forces the Technology They Need,” War on the Rocks, May 13th, Available Online at https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-to-get-nato-forces-the-technology-they-need/, Accessed 07-12-2022)
In a Feb. 26 Twitter post, Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s vice prime minister and minister for digital transformation, asked the SpaceX chief executive, Elon Musk, to provide Ukraine with Starlink terminals to enable satellite-based communications. In less than 48 hours, Starlink user kits arrived in Ukraine, immediately improving the command-and-control ability of Ukraine’s military.
For those of us who study the NATO acquisition process, it is almost impossible to imagine the alliance identifying a requirement and adopting a solution so quickly, no matter how urgent the circumstances. Among the many challenges would be the alliance’s elaborate, consensus-based governing structure, as well as the divergent interests and funding mechanisms among the 30 member states. This is why, in 2016, the International Board of Auditors concluded that NATO struggles to provide commanders with required capabilities on time and estimated that common-funded capabilities required an average of 16 years from development to delivery.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Less Highlighted) › 1AC — RMA Advantage
Long 22 — James E. Long, Colonel in the United States Air Force, National Security Fellow with the Defense Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, holds an M.S. in Space Studies from the American Military University, 2022 (“How the US Can Assist NATO and its European Alliance Members in Addressing the China Security Challenge,” Harvard University Belfer Center Defense Project Paper, June, Available Online at https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/DefenseProject_National%20Security%20Fellowship_v3_220624.pdf, Accessed 06-25-2022, p. 24-25)
4. The US should help NATO create R&D centers and defense innovation hubs to harness emerging technologies being developed by allies.
As was noted in the NATO 2030 Reflection Group, China is making rapid advancements in telecommunications, space, cyberspace, and other new technologies with the intent to be the world leader in AI by 2030 and the world’s leading global technological superpower by 2049.96 In response, NATO issued its 2030 Agenda that seeks to increase NATO transatlantic innovation and technological edge while preventing innovation gaps among allies.97 Moreover, the NATO Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDT) issued a 2020 report citing pathways for NATO to become an EDT-ready organization, recommending that NATO establish a network of innovation centers [or defense innovation hubs] throughout NATO with funding to match.98
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Less Highlighted) › 1AC — RMA Advantage
Nelson 21 — Nicholas Nelson, Non-Resident Senior Fellow for Emerging Tech and Policy with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, Senior Technology Advisor at the Georgia Tech Research Institute, 2021 (“Getting NATO Innovation Right,” Center for European Policy Analysis, June 18th, Available Online at https://cepa.org/getting-nato-innovation-right/, Accessed 07-03-2022)
The Defense Innovation Accelerator and NATO Innovation Fund announced at the NATO Summit are welcome developments, but they require new authorities and differentiated talent.
Swift technological change has meant governments and the military created new organizations and approaches to innovation and rapid acquisition. Unfortunately, many do not have the necessary authority, budget, or workforce to succeed, meaning that meaningful change and impact have been sacrificed for theater. For the newly announced Defense Innovation Accelerator North Atlantic (DIANA) – with planned locations in Toronto and Cambridge, UK – and the NATO Innovation Fund (NIF) to succeed, they must address authority and budget concerns, and then bring in the right personnel to lead and staff them.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Less Highlighted) › 1AC — RMA Advantage
Dowd 22 — Alan W. Dowd, Senior Fellow in the Center for America's Purpose at the Sagamore Institute—a think tank, Senior Fellow at the Fraser Institute and the American Security Council Foundation, Contributing Editor and Columnist at the American Legion Magazine, former Adjunct Professor of American Foreign Policy at Butler University and Anderson University, 2022 (“Putin’s war, NATO’s unity, Ukraine’s valor,” American Legion Magazine, March 15th, Available Online at https://www.legion.org/landingzone/255256/putin%E2%80%99s-war-nato%E2%80%99s-unity-ukraine%E2%80%99s-valor, Accessed 04-04-2022)
[*** Note: 9/11 refers to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States; 11/9 refers to the November 9, 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall.]
Vladimir Putin’s “unprovoked, unjustified, unconscionable war” has taken thousands of lives, destroyed much of Ukraine’s modern infrastructure and ancient landmarks, and created the largest tidal wave of refugees in Europe since World War II. Yet amidst all these horrors, there’s a flicker of hope: The NATO alliance is more united than at any time since 9/11 – and more important than at any time since 11/9. This is the very opposite of what Putin expected.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Less Highlighted) › 1AC — RMA Advantage
Hodges 21 — Ben Hodges, Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis, Retired Lieutenant General in the U.S. Army where he served as Commanding General of the United States Army Europe, Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies (UK), 2021 (“Defense Technologies… for What? Speed, Speed, Speed!,” Center for European Policy Analysis, February 17th, Available Online at https://cepa.org/defense-technologies-for-what-speed-speed-speed/, Accessed 07-10-2022)
Giving our armed forces the proper technologies to perform their mission will ultimately ensure that deterrence never fails.
The key to effective deterrence for the transatlantic alliance is speed: speed of recognition of the Kremlin’s malign activities; speed of decision to start necessary deployments, movements and related activities; and speed of assembly to move faster than the Kremlin to pre-empt attacks and signal our preparedness to act. Fortunately, a wide range of new technologies are emerging and evolving that can improve speed, if they are properly integrated into our armed forces and into our plans.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Less Highlighted) › 1AC — RMA Advantage
Kroenig 21 — Matthew Kroenig, Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Director of the Global Strategy Initiative and Deputy Director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, former Special Government Employee and Senior Policy Adviser to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capability/Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense, former Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-Berkeley, 2021 (“Will Emerging Technology Cause Nuclear War?: Bringing Geopolitics Back In,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Volume 15, Issue 4, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCO Open Access Journals, p. 64-70)
[*** Note: 4IR = “The world is experiencing a fourth industrial revolution (4IR) in which a wave of new and transformative technologies is being developed, including artificial intelligence (AI), additive manufacturing, quantum information technology, hypersonic missiles, biotechnology, and directed energy.4 While these technologies are expected to have profound implications for societies and economies, most are dual use and will also affect national security, including nuclear strategic stability.” (p. 59) ***]
New Tech Arms Race
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Overhighlighted) › 1AC — Alliance Fragmentation Advantage
Pettyjohn and Wasser 22 — Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, Adjunct Professor in the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, former Senior Political Scientist and Director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program of Project AIR FORCE at the RAND Corporation, holds a Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia, and Becca Wasser, Fellow in the Defense Program and Co-Leader of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security, Adjunct Instructor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, former Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation, former Program Officer and Research Analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (UK), holds an M.S. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, 2022 (“A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear: War-Gaming Reveals How a U.S.-Chinese Conflict Might Escalate,” Foreign Affairs, May 20th, Available Online at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear, Accessed 07-12-2022)
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe.
A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Overhighlighted) › 1AC — Alliance Fragmentation Advantage
Colby 22 — Elbridge Colby, Co-Founder and Principal of The Marathon Institute—a policy initiative focused on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power competition, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, former Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development at the U.S. Department of Defense, Recipient of the Distinguished and Exceptional Public Service Awards from the U.S. Department of Defense and of the Superior and Meritorious Honor Awards from the U.S. Department of State, holds a J.D. from Yale Law School, 2022 (“China, Not Russia, Still Poses the Greatest Challenge to U.S. Security,” The National Interest, July 1st, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-not-russia-still-poses-greatest-challenge-us-security-203228, Accessed 07-12-2022)
American foreign policy after—indeed, during—the Russo-Ukrainian War should promptly head to the world’s most decisive region: Asia. This will require that American foreign and defense policy genuinely put Asia first—in our military investments, in our allocation of political capital and resources, and in our leaders’ attention.
Nothing that has happened since Russia’s abominable invasion of Ukraine has changed a set of facts: Asia is the world’s largest market area, and it is growing in global share. Located in the middle of Asia is China which, alongside the United States, is one of the world’s two superpowers. China’s behavior has become increasingly aggressive and domineering and appears oriented toward establishing Beijing’s hegemony over Asia. If Beijing achieves this goal, the resulting consequences for American life will be dire.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Overhighlighted) › 1AC — Alliance Fragmentation Advantage
Ford and Goldgeier 21 — Lindsey W. Ford, David M. Rubenstein Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Adjunct Lecturer in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, former Richard Holbrooke Fellow and Director for Political-Security Affairs at the Asia Society Policy Institute, former Special Assistant for the US-ASEAN Defense Forum in the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, holds an M.A. in Public Affairs and Asian Studies from the University of Texas-Austin, and James Goldgeier, Visiting Fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, Professor of International Relations at American University, former Professor and Director of the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, former Director for Russian, Ukrainian, and Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-Berkeley, 2021 (“Retooling America’s alliances to manage the China challenge,” The Brookings Institution, January 25th, Available Online at https://www.brookings.edu/research/retooling-americas-alliances-to-manage-the-china-challenge/, Accessed 07-10-2022)
Beyond building collective capacity to operate more seamlessly in response to today’s crises, the U.S. must also think more closely about building alliance innovation ecosystems for the future. With China set to overtake the U.S. in research and development spending — it already spends more on R&D than Japan, Germany, and South Korea combined — the U.S. and its allies will need to treat defense innovation as a combined task. Rising techno-nationalism and the lack of allied innovation networks will make this difficult absent intentional policy leadership. Looking forward, Washington should further expand new bureaucratic mechanisms such as allied R&D pools or defense innovation hubs that could better harness emerging technologies being developed across allied capitals. While the Defense Department is focused on initiatives that will improve America’s sclerotic acquisition and innovation processes, these efforts need an alliance-centric approach from inception, rather than treating allies as an add-on to existing American plans. NATO, for example, might consider establishing an allied version of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in which key allies could collaborate on emerging technologies, as proposed by the 2017 GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative. Indo-Pacific allies such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea could be incorporated in this initiative through their role as NATO “global partners.”
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Overhighlighted) › 1AC — Alliance Fragmentation Advantage
Mundell 22 — Ian Mundell, Innovation Reporter at Science|Business—a network of universities, companies, and research and policy organisations promoting innovation, 2022 (“The Ecosystem: in Europe, defence innovation is the new black,” Science|Business, June 7th, Available Online at https://sciencebusiness.net/news/ecosystem-europe-defence-innovation-new-black, Accessed 07-03-2022)
Suddenly, it seems, everyone cares about Europe’s defence innovation ecosystem. NATO is setting up the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic, or DIANA, with a significant presence in Europe. The European Commission is working on the EU Defence Innovation Scheme, EUDIS. And last month, Amazon Web Services announced it is setting up a private defence accelerator in the UK.
But details of the DIANA and EUDIS initiatives have been slow to emerge, leading to concerns that gaps and barriers to innovation remain to be addressed. EUDIS in particular leaves a lot of questions unanswered.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Overhighlighted) › 1AC — Alliance Fragmentation Advantage
Besch 21 — Sophia Besch, DAAD/AICGS Research Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Reform (Germany), Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council Europe Center, Ph.D. Candidate in European Studies and Defence Studies at King's College London (UK), holds an M.Sc. in International Relations from The London School of Economics and Political Science (UK) and an M.A. in International Security from Sciences Po (France), 2021 (“Rebooting the U.S.-EU Defense Relationship,” American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, December 22nd, Available Online at https://www.aicgs.org/publication/rebooting-the-u-s-eu-defense-relationship/, Accessed 07-10-2022)
2. Align EU-NATO work on defense innovation and find new formats of engagement
Both the United States and the EU have an interest in investing in new and emerging defense technologies and to maintain interoperability, particularly in the context of the U.S. technology race with China. The United States, through AUKUS, has established an innovation partnership with just one European ally, the UK (for now). Meanwhile, NATO has launched a new defense innovation fund and a defense innovation accelerator (DIANA). The UK, which post-Brexit has given itself the guidance to ‘Think NATO,’[7] was a supporter of the Fund, but the United States and France are not members. At the same time, France often argues that the EU should be in the lead on emerging technologies and is pushing for the creation of an Innovation Defense Hub within the European Defense Agency. These defense innovation efforts pursued in parallel by both organizations are already leading officials to complain about NATO duplicating the EU and vice versa. Both Americans and Europeans should try to prevent a rehashing of this unproductive talking point.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Overhighlighted) › 1AC — Alliance Fragmentation Advantage
Speranza and Jans 21 — Lauren Speranza, Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, former Deputy Director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council, holds an M.A. in International Security from the Brussels School of International Studies (Belgium), and Karlijn Jans, Defence Policy Advisor at the British Embassy in The Hague (Netherlands), former Strategic Analyst at the The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (Netherlands), holds an M.A. in European Studies from King's College London (UK) and an M.A. in European Studies from the Humboldt Institute of Berlin (Germany), 2021 (“Bridging the Gap: Time for an EU-NATO Strategic Dialogue on Defense Tech,” Center for European Policy Analysis, February 17th, Available Online at https://cepa.org/bridging-the-gap-time-for-an-eu-nato-strategic-dialogue-on-defense-tech/, Accessed 07-10-2022)
To stay secure, the transatlantic community must take on emerging and disruptive technologies together.
Today’s transatlantic security hinges on technology. On both sides of the Atlantic, our militaries, societies, economies, and information systems require increasingly advanced technologies to stay better, faster, and stronger than our adversaries and competitors. To retain their advantage and address vulnerabilities, the United States and Europe must work in lockstep to harness emerging and disruptive technologies for their collective defense. The key is to employ NATO and the European Union (EU) in unison for strategic effect.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Overhighlighted) › 1AC — RMA Advantage
Kliman and Thomas-Noone 18 — Daniel Kliman, Senior Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, former Senior Adviser for Asia Integration at the U.S. Department of Defense, former Senior Advisor at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, holds a Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University, and Brendan Thomas-Noone, Research Fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney (Australia), former Research Associate in the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute (Australia), holds an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Melbourne (Australia) and an M.Sc. in Global Politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science (UK), 2018 (“Now is the time to take DIUx global,” Defense News, May 24th, Available Online at https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2018/05/23/now-is-the-time-to-take-diux-global/, Accessed 07-11-2022)
The Defense Innovation Unit Experimental — the Pentagon’s signature effort to engage commercial technology startups ― is primed to go global. In fact, DIUx could become a key platform by which the United States and its allies and partners come together to address shared military challenges ― if its next managing director and supporters in the Pentagon and Congress are prepared to seize the moment.
Launched in 2015, DIUx reflected a growing realization that the U.S. military needs to more effectively leverage innovations developed in the commercial technology sector. Intended as a workaround to a sclerotic defense acquisitions process, DIUx came to rely on an obscure contracting authority to rapidly award prototype projects to innovative companies ― a welcome change to the Pentagon business models that never managed to align with the technology industry’s far faster pace.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Overhighlighted) › 1AC — RMA Advantage
Cook and Dowd 22 — Cynthia R. Cook, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Senior Management Scientist and Director of the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center at the RAND Corporation, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Harvard University, and Anna M. Dowd, Co-Founder of Digital Innovation Engine—an organization working on technology innovation, Adjunct Scholar at the RAND Corporation, former Principal Officer for Strategic Partnerships and Head of Industry Relations at the NATO Communications and Information Agency, former Fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (France), holds an M.A. in International Relations from the Warsaw School of Economics (Poland) and a joint M.A. in European Studies from the Warsaw School of Economics (Poland) and Sciences Po (France), 2022 (“How to Get NATO Forces the Technology They Need,” War on the Rocks, May 13th, Available Online at https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-to-get-nato-forces-the-technology-they-need/, Accessed 07-12-2022)
In a Feb. 26 Twitter post, Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s vice prime minister and minister for digital transformation, asked the SpaceX chief executive, Elon Musk, to provide Ukraine with Starlink terminals to enable satellite-based communications. In less than 48 hours, Starlink user kits arrived in Ukraine, immediately improving the command-and-control ability of Ukraine’s military.
For those of us who study the NATO acquisition process, it is almost impossible to imagine the alliance identifying a requirement and adopting a solution so quickly, no matter how urgent the circumstances. Among the many challenges would be the alliance’s elaborate, consensus-based governing structure, as well as the divergent interests and funding mechanisms among the 30 member states. This is why, in 2016, the International Board of Auditors concluded that NATO struggles to provide commanders with required capabilities on time and estimated that common-funded capabilities required an average of 16 years from development to delivery.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Overhighlighted) › 1AC — RMA Advantage
Long 22 — James E. Long, Colonel in the United States Air Force, National Security Fellow with the Defense Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, holds an M.S. in Space Studies from the American Military University, 2022 (“How the US Can Assist NATO and its European Alliance Members in Addressing the China Security Challenge,” Harvard University Belfer Center Defense Project Paper, June, Available Online at https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/DefenseProject_National%20Security%20Fellowship_v3_220624.pdf, Accessed 06-25-2022, p. 24-25)
4. The US should help NATO create R&D centers and defense innovation hubs to harness emerging technologies being developed by allies.
As was noted in the NATO 2030 Reflection Group, China is making rapid advancements in telecommunications, space, cyberspace, and other new technologies with the intent to be the world leader in AI by 2030 and the world’s leading global technological superpower by 2049.96 In response, NATO issued its 2030 Agenda that seeks to increase NATO transatlantic innovation and technological edge while preventing innovation gaps among allies.97 Moreover, the NATO Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDT) issued a 2020 report citing pathways for NATO to become an EDT-ready organization, recommending that NATO establish a network of innovation centers [or defense innovation hubs] throughout NATO with funding to match.98