Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Answers to Add-Ons › A2: North Korea Add-On

Status quo cooperation maintains balance and strategic stability with North Korea

Kim 20 – (Duyeon, Senior Adviser, North East Asia & Nuclear Policy for International Crisis Group, supplies research, analysis, and policy recommendations regarding the Korean Peninsula, north-east Asian relations including with the United States, nuclear nonproliferation, and arms control, 7/7, “Korean Tensions: An Unexpected Pause in an Uncertain Time,” [accessed 8/30/20], , see)

After weeks of ratcheting up tensions on the Korean peninsula, including lodging near-daily threats against South Korea in reaction to some of its citizens sending anti-Pyongyang leaflets across the border, North Korea has decided to pause. On 24 June, North Korean state media reported that Kim Jong-un opted to defer plans to take certain military actions, after considering an unspecified “prevailing situation” during a virtual preliminary meeting of the Worker’s Party Central Military Commission over which he presided. For now, one can only guess at the reasons for the sudden pause. Did reported U.S. B-52 bomber flyovers near Japan on 24 June, coupled with three U.S. aircraft carriers operating in the region, deter North Korea? Did Seoul or even Beijing make a backdoor deal with Pyongyang to provide aid in exchange for the pause? Did Kim feel that he had vented enough frustration about the leaflets and decide to pace himself until the U.S. presidential election? Or perhaps North Korea never intended to take the calibrated military actions it had threatened in the first place. There is always the risk of miscalculation that could trigger an inadvertent and dangerous escalation. Whatever the case may be, the reasons why North Korea escalated tensions have not dissipated. The regime remains frustrated, though it remains unclear how it will channel these feelings. Pyongyang may simply be waiting to see what Seoul and Washington do before deciding on its next move, keeping tensions simmering on the peninsula – for domestic political purposes and to gain leverage in any future negotiations – until after the U.S. election. Even so, and although Pyongyang’s threats and demolition of the inter-Korean liaison office on its side of the border on 16 June appear to have been undertaken mainly for their shock value, there is always the risk of miscalculation that could trigger an inadvertent and dangerous escalation. Pyongyang might also abruptly engage in confrontational actions during what appears to be a quiet time – something it has done in the past. Beijing, Seoul, Washington and other countries with an interest in stability on the Korean peninsula should be prepared for all these scenarios during this uncertain period. On 17 June, North Korea’s military announced that it was studying plans to deploy soldiers and “firepower sub-units” to the Mount Kumgang tourism area and Kaesong industrial zone, restore guard posts at the demilitarised zone, deploy artillery units and troops to the “front lines” (near or around the border) and conduct exercises there, and provide military assistance for “scattering leaflets against the south”. Kim Jong-un’s influential sister, Kim Yo-jong, also threatened to scrap the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement to cease hostilities on land, air and sea. A close look at these possible plans reveals that none would pose physical harm to South Korea. Arguably, Kim might have opted for a pause precisely because he concluded there was little to gain from moving forward with plans that he realised would have minimal impact. After all, the Mount Kumgang tours and Kaesong Industrial Complex have been shut down since 2008 and 2016, respectively. Remilitarising the demilitarised zone and sending military forces to the “front lines” would expose North Korean troop positions. Scattering fliers across South Korea would do no damage to people or property. Pyongyang’s threatened leaflet war was expected to kick off around the 70th anniversary of the Korean War on 25 June. It was interrupted, however, by Korea’s rainy season and winds blowing from south to north that are common during the summer. (Early summer tends to be when South Korean activists and North Korean defectors float anti-Kim messages northward in balloons that also contain information about the outside world and democracy, while North Koreans typically send their propaganda fliers in the winter when wind currents blow south.) Pictures of the North Korean materials released by state media show a defaced image of South Korean President Moon Jae-in. Scribbling on the face of its leader was aiming for South Korea’s jugular in the eyes of the North, where doing the same to Chairman Kim would be viewed as an unforgivable insult. North Korea’s declaration of a “leaflet war” against South Korea may seem silly to the outside world. But to Pyongyang, the information South Korean fliers convey, and the way in which they counter regime propaganda directed at the North’s people, are most threatening. In her 17 June statement, Kim’s sister said the South Korean bulletins “dared defame the dignity of our supreme leadership, our Chairman whom we hold most sacred as the central core, and mocked at all our people at the same time”. Against this backdrop, the announcement of preparations to bombard South Korea with millions of paper fliers may have been intended primarily to boost morale at home and to shore up internal unity. While not necessarily a cause for concern in the South, the move likely would have been well received by North Korean elites who are Kim’s key constituents. To retain power, Kim needs to be attentive to domestic political objectives including maintaining regime legitimacy, diverting attention from the country’s domestic policy failures and satisfying his constituents. North Korea’s justification for ramping up tensions was what it sees as broken promises and hostile acts by South Korea. According to North Korean media, Pyongyang rejected Seoul’s 15 June offer to send a special envoy to smooth over tensions, demanding actions rather than words. But behind the rage appears to be a North Korean leadership desperate to find solutions for the country’s economic difficulties. Pyongyang’s proximate reason for threatening South Korea was the leaflets, which it saw as violating a prior commitment. The two Korean leaders had agreed in their 2018 Panmunjom Declaration to cease “as of May 1 this year … all hostile acts and eliminating their means, including broadcasting through loudspeakers and distribution of leaflets, in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line”. The Moon government ended loudspeaker broadcasts, but for two years has been unable to stop South Koreans from sending fliers. When Kim Yo-jong publicly demanded a legal ban on leaflets, the Moon government and ruling-party lawmakers vowed to prosecute and take legal action against activist groups. This response was met with harsh domestic and international criticism that such actions would violate South Koreans’ constitutional rights and democratic freedoms. Pyongyang evidently judged Seoul’s promises insufficient, proceeding to demolish the inter-Korean liaison office. Destroying the liaison office was a symbolic and calculated move. The office was of no unique value to Kim – cross-border communications are possible without it – but it was the prized symbol of Moon’s engagement policy and cost South Korean taxpayers about 9.7 billion won ($8.6 million). It was not functioning properly due to strained relations, was vacant because of the pandemic, and was located in North Korean territory. Pyongyang knew the explosion would not invite retaliation as it was not an attack on South Korea. At the core of recent threats and building destruction is the regime’s apparent frustration over its domestic difficulties. Beyond the leaflets, at the core of recent threats and building destruction is the regime’s apparent frustration over its domestic difficulties. The North’s economic stagnation, which started with post-2016 international sanctions intended to pressure it to return to diplomatic negotiations and to dry up funding for its nuclear weapons program, was unexpectedly compounded by the pandemic. The pandemic has halted nearly all trade with China, which had been Pyongyang’s most trusted lifeline, enabling the regime until now to defy collapse in the face of famines, natural disasters, sanctions and other challenges. The best way for the regime to divert attention from Kim’s performance at home is to deflect his constituents’ gaze outward. Placing blame on the virus itself could be harder: it would not fit the regime’s self-legitimising narrative, which holds sanctions responsible for the country’s economic woes, or match Pyongyang’s official position that COVID-19 has not infected any North Koreans. Moreover, Pyongyang may want to avoid possibly annoying Beijing, which might see blaming the virus as a way of subtly pointing to the trade slowdown with China as the source of North Korea’s economic difficulties. Instead, it is easier to take the traditional route of placing the onus on sanctions, and easier still to target South Korea than to take on the U.S., which holds the cards regarding North Korea’s future. At the same time, North Korean statements for over a year, taken together, suggest that Pyongyang feels betrayed by Seoul’s confident assertions that it could persuade Washington to relax some sanctions and allow the beginning of cross-border economic projects. The September 2018 Pyongyang Joint Declaration between the two Korean leaders stipulates that Pyongyang was willing to dismantle nuclear facilities at its Yongbyon nuclear complex “as the United States takes corresponding measures in accordance with the spirit of the June 12 U.S.-DPRK Joint Statement” that resulted from the historic Singapore summit between Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump. But five months later, Kim discovered at the follow-up summit in Hanoi that the Trump administration was not willing to trade the sanctions relief he was seeking for Yongbyon. Against this backdrop, Kim is now increasing pressure on the South, implying (however fancifully) that Seoul could persuade Washington to lift sanctions by placing a higher priority on the pursuit of pan-Korean nationalism – something Moon has promised to do – even at the expense of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. North Korea might be taking a breather at the moment, but Moon is still faced with one of the most serious predicaments of his single-term presidency. His dream of inter-Korean rapprochement and peace is in crisis. Moon will try to please both Pyongyang and Washington unless one side or the other gives him no option but to choose. Maintaining this balance will not be politically easy, as Moon’s nationalist supporters want him to privilege inter-Korean ties over all else, especially because they blame Washington for soured Korean relations. It will bolster their case if Trump continues to pressure Seoul to pay more for hosting U.S. troops or makes a flippant remark that makes the quiet undercurrent of anti-American sentiment in South Korea erupt. On 24 June, Pyongyang stressed that it had merely suspended its military plans, and not cancelled them, warning that it could always “reconsider” the postponement. While the tone of the statement in Korean was subdued, it nevertheless raises the question of whether the world will witness a North Korean “October surprise” that would destabilise the peninsula in the run-up to the U.S. presidential election. While that possibility cannot be excluded, North Korea’s interests might point it in a different direction. Pyongyang likely would prefer Trump’s re-election because the president has shown such personal interest in making a deal with Kim. This preference would presumably lead it to refrain from actions that would not only risk a harsh response from Washington but could also highlight that Trump’s negotiations with Kim have met with little success (notwithstanding his earlier boasts to the contrary) and confront him with a foreign policy crisis in advance of the November polls. Pyongyang will also likely be prudent enough to avoid any act that could result in South Korean injuries or casualties, since Seoul would almost certainly retaliate in kind. That said, there is always a risk of miscalculation. Still, Pyongyang might take other provocative measures – including testing weapons, firing artillery or other shows of force. Steps like these are not always aimed at grabbing Washington’s attention. Often, Pyongyang is driven by domestic political objectives, military imperatives relating to perfection of its weaponry, or the desire to commemorate milestones such as the 75th anniversary of its Workers’ Party in October. Pyongyang might also take such actions to send a message – for example, to protest U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises, including those scheduled for August, which Moon also promised to end in his 2018 agreement with Kim. In virtually all these cases, an overarching goal is to create divisions between the U.S. and its regional allies and maintain tensions on the Korean peninsula for leverage in any future negotiations, which seem unlikely to resume until after the U.S. election. Washington and Seoul will need to engage in a delicate dance that avoids providing any pretext for North Korea to act out militarily, while sustaining readiness and deterrence. Until then, Washington and Seoul will need to engage in a delicate dance that avoids providing any pretext for North Korea to act out militarily, while sustaining readiness and deterrence on the Korean peninsula and seeking opportunities to advance nuclear negotiations. In this spirit, the Trump administration should continue to express interest in diplomacy even as it and other governments continue to enforce UN sanctions. Countries with influence over North Korea and an interest in peninsular stability, starting with China, should continue to call on Pyongyang to refrain from escalation and instead engage in dialogue. Furthermore, if Pyongyang nevertheless takes potentially destabilising steps, Washington and Seoul should have a game plan for responding in a measured way; in particular, they should signal that they will beef up joint military drills if Pyongyang escalates. Through these measures, the parties can serve their mutual interest in promoting peninsular and regional stability while managing the security situation during an uncertain time.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Answers to Add-Ons › A2: North Korea Add-On

North Korea won’t escalate – it’s just saber rattling

Waldman 20 – (Elliot, senior editor of World Politics Review, master’s degree in international relations and international economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a bachelor's degree in international affairs from the George Washington University, 6/19, “Why North Korea Blew Up Its Détente With the South,” [accessed 8/30/20], , see)

What a difference two years makes. The spring and summer of 2018 saw an extraordinary rapprochement between the two Koreas, as their leaders held successive face-to-face meetings, culminating in a landmark visit by South Korean President Moon Jae-in to Pyongyang. The flurry of diplomacy produced a number of joint declarations, agreements, hotlines and other confidence-building measures, including an inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong, just 6 miles into North Korean territory from the Demilitarized Zone. It was the first full-time communication channel and served as a de facto embassy between the two sides, which are technically still at war having not signed a peace agreement after the Korean War ended in 1953. Much of the progress of the past two years came crashing down this week when North Korea used controlled explosives to destroy the liaison building, which had been largely unused since January due to the coronavirus pandemic. The blast, powerful enough to shatter windows of nearby buildings, was clearly designed to send a message. “The decision to demolish the liaison center is significant in the sense that it was done dramatically, and with finality,” Frank Aum, senior expert on North Korea at the United States Institute of Peace, said in an email. Pyongyang could have simply mothballed the building, he added, but the fact that it instead chose a path of no return “certainly suggests there are more provocations coming down the pike.” The move comes amid renewed efforts by the North to escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula. On June 8, Pyongyang cut off all communication lines with the South and announced that it would start treating its neighbor as an “enemy.” The supposed reason for its anger is a South Korean campaign, largely run by activists and defectors from the North, to send propaganda leaflets across the border via hydrogen balloons. The leaflets, which often describe Kim as a cartoonish dictator squandering his country’s resources on nuclear weapons, are a genuine irritant for a regime that views information control as paramount to its survival. Pyongyang claims the campaign violates a 2018 agreement between Moon and Kim to halt their respective propaganda efforts. In an effort to preserve good relations, South Korea has promised a thorough crackdown on those responsible, introducing a law to ban the leaflets and even suing some of the activists. The fact that those efforts did little to mollify North Korea suggests that ultimately, Kim is seizing on the leaflets to manufacture a crisis. He has been dissatisfied with the diplomatic process ever since his failed Hanoi summit with President Donald Trump in February 2019, which collapsed without a hoped-for deal to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program in exchange for easing economic sanctions. “I don’t think it’s surprising to see North Korea taking actions that demonstrate its frustration with the current situation,” Aum said in a recent interview. “Pretty much since Hanoi, they haven’t been able to achieve what they want in terms of sanctions relief, in terms of some of the things that they consider aspects of a hostile U.S. policy.” He pointed to Seoul’s recent purchases of American-made military hardware like the RQ-4 Global Hawk reconnaissance drones, which are equipped with powerful radar and surveillance equipment, as an irritant for the North. “The decision to demolish the liaison center is significant in the sense that it was done dramatically, and with finality,” suggesting that “there are more provocations coming.” Moon, who has staked his presidency on a policy of engagement with North Korea, has tried to keep cross-border diplomacy alive through various proposals to increase humanitarian aid and tourism exchanges. On Monday, Seoul proposed sending two senior officials to Pyongyang for talks. The North, which has long made clear that its priority is major sanctions relief, rejected what it called the “tactless and sinister proposal” and instead proceeded to blow up the liaison office. It also announced it would redeploy troops to frontline areas that were demilitarized two years ago, including Kaesong and Mount Kumgang, both of which had previously hosted joint economic projects designed to boost inter-Korean cooperation. The public face of North Korea’s bellicosity is Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong. Much of the harsh rhetoric directed toward Seoul in state media has been attributed to her, leading many analysts to suspect that she is being positioned as a potential stand-in or even a successor to her 36-year-old brother, who is overweight and a heavy smoker, with a history of health problems. He went missing from public view for several weeks recently, only to reemerge last month, leading to swirling rumors that he had suffered a medical emergency. Or it could simply be that Kim Yo Jong is serving as attack dog so that her brother can easily step back into the role of peacemaker should tensions subside in the future. For now, though, the Kim regime’s hostility seems aimed at trying to stay in the headlines and force more concessions. Its harsh criticism of Moon, whom Kim Yo Jong has mocked as a flunky of the Americans, may also be an effort to capitalize on tensions between the United States and South Korea due to Trump’s demands that the Moon administration pay billions of dollars more to support U.S. military bases in South Korea. North Korea is “always looking for ways to break up the Washington-Seoul alliance,” David Maxwell and Matthew Ha, of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, wrote recently. “A violent act that will leave some calling for retaliatory action and others looking to find ways to calm Pyongyang down is a great way to do that.” Moon, who took office in 2017, has certainly adopted one of the most accommodationist stances toward the North of any South Korean president in recent memory. But he is still unlikely to do anything that would potentially undermine relations with the U.S., particularly as he enters the final stretch of his single 5-year term. And nuclear talks between Pyongyang and Washington will probably remain stalled at least until November, as Trump campaigns for reelection with cascading domestic crises on his hands. With diplomacy in a holding pattern, then, Pyongyang looks set to continue ratcheting up tensions. A return to testing nuclear weapons or intercontinental ballistic missiles seems improbable, as that would provoke the ire of North Korean allies like China and Russia, whose assistance is all the more critical as Pyongyang grapples with the fallout of COVID-19. Instead, a test of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, or more artillery drills and short-range projectile launches, could be in the offing. North Korea also has a long history of bloody provocations against the South. In 2010, during a time of heightened tensions on the peninsula, it sank a South Korean naval ship with a torpedo, killing 46 sailors. That same year, it shelled a South Korean island near a disputed maritime border, killing four people—including two civilians—and injuring at least 18 more. While most analysts see such large-scale attacks as unlikely in the current climate, the North has always been willing to take extraordinary risks to achieve its objectives. Alternatively, it could try a lower-grade attack along the lines of a 2015 incident, in which Seoul accused North Korean soldiers of sneaking over to its side of the border and placing land mines near a South Korean guard post, causing two soldiers to lose their limbs. North Korean state media has also ramped up threats in recent weeks against defectors in the South, threatening to “force the betrayers and human scum to pay the dearest price for their crimes.” Given Pyongyang’s track record of carrying out assassinations on foreign soil—most notably using a powerful nerve agent to kill Kim’s half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, at a crowded airport terminal in Malaysia in 2017—it could try similar tactics against defectors. South Korean authorities claimed to have intercepted at least one such attempt in 2011 to kill Park Sang-hak, a prominent defector and activist who was involved in the recent propaganda leaflet campaign. Looking ahead, much will depend on how Moon responds to the North’s saber-rattling. The Defense Ministry in Seoul promised the North will “certainly pay the price” should it follow through on threats of military action. But Moon has invested tremendous amounts of political capital into a policy of inter-Korean détente and peacebuilding. He could still try to find ways to reconcile with the North, even as his dreams of a durable peace seem to be collapsing—literally and figuratively—before his eyes.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Answers to Add-Ons › A2: NATO Add-on

NATO is obsolete—not necessary to solve conflict.

Christian Whiton, 7/6/2018 (State Department senior advisor in the Donald Trump and George W. Bush administrations, “NATO Is Obsolete,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

Despite endless searches for a new mission to justify its massive burden on U.S. taxpayers, NATO has failed to be of much use since then. As its boosters like to remind us, after 9/11, the alliance invoked its Article 5 mutual-defense provision on our behalf. But action from America’s allies did not follow the grandiose gesture—the NATO mission in Afghanistan relied mostly on U.S. forces and effectively failed. Today, the alliance’s bureaucrats and some member states spotlight a threat from Russia as a reason for keeping the organization alive, along with a laundry list of “train and equip” missions. Yet NATO members' defense budgets don't reflect a real sense of danger from Russia or anyone else. Among the twenty-nine members, only the United States is really serious about its Article 3 obligations to defend itself, spending approximately $700 billion or 3.5 percent of its GDP on defense. No other NATO member comes close to this proportion, and the vast majority fail even to meet the modest, self-imposed requirement to devote at least 2 percent of GDP to defense. Britain and Poland are rare members that meet the 2 percent requirement. One of the worst free-riders is Canada, which spends just 1 percent of its GDP on security, amounting to $20 billion. Furthermore, Germany spends a similarly pathetic 1.2 percent. Compare that to non-NATO members facing real threats, some of which spend 5-10 percent of their GDPs on defense. These include Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who must contend with Iran and spend nearly a combined $100 billion. Israel, which faces the same enemy, adds $15 billion to the equation. Despite protestations of poverty at a time when their economies have never been larger, NATO members are more than willing to rack up additional liabilities, knowing America has their back. Last year, the alliance welcomed Montenegro. It is now poised to admit the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which would mean the United States is pledged to defend a nation that devotes just $120 million per year to its own defense, not quite as much as the Cincinnati Police Department. But the reality is there is no truly capable Russian foe seriously threatening the West. Russia has one million uniformed personnel in its military, the world’s second-largest behind America, but the European Union could easily afford to match that with its combined $17 trillion economy—ten times larger than Russia’s. However, it needn’t bother as Moscow spends just $61 billion on its overwrought military, which doubles as an employment program. Russia’s Vladimir Putin has gotten the most from Russia’s military, occupying parts of Georgia and Ukraine and gaining influence in Syria by backing the Assad regime. Still, his success in all three cases rested heavily on surprises that Moscow seems unlikely to be able to repeat against prepared and adequately funded European militaries. Yer we should expect to hear none of this nuance at the NATO summit, as poohbahs of the dying old European political order gather to tut-tut President Trump in the alliance’s fancy new $1.4 billion headquarters, funded predominantly by American taxpayers. To get out of this abusive relationship, Trump should begin the process of limiting America's role in NATO. A good model is that of Sweden, which cooperates with NATO on some matters and not on others. Such an approach could allow joint training, but end the practice of having over-burdened U.S. taxpayers foot the bill for wealthy Europeans' security. As part of this plan, Trump could mothball U.S. bases in Europe and shift most resources spent there and in the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific region, where China and Iran pose real threats to America—and against which NATO is irrelevant. Europe is prosperous and treats America like a patsy. Let it stand on its own.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Answers to Add-Ons › A2: NATO Add-on

NATO doesn’t solve conflict—just makes war more likely:

MEDEA BENJAMIN, 12/6/2019 (co-founder of CODEPINK for Peace, “Why NATO should be obsolete,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

The three smartest words that Donald Trump uttered during his presidential campaign are “NATO is obsolete.” His adversary, Hillary Clinton, retorted that NATO was “the strongest military alliance in the history of the world.” Now that Trump has been in power, the White House parrots the same worn line that NATO is “the most successful Alliance in history, guaranteeing the security, prosperity, and freedom of its members.” But Trump was right the first time around: Rather than being a strong alliance with a clear purpose, this 70-year-old organization that is meeting in London on December 4 is a stale military holdover from the Cold War days that should have gracefully retired many years ago. NATO was originally founded by the United States and 11 other Western nations as an attempt to curb the rise of communism in 1949. Six years later, Communist nations founded the Warsaw Pact and through these two multilateral institutions, the entire globe became a Cold War battleground. When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the Warsaw Pact disbanded but NATO expanded, growing from its original 12 members to 29 member countries. North Macedonia, set to join next year, will bring the number to 30. NATO has also expanded well beyond the North Atlantic, adding a partnership with Colombia in 2017. Donald Trump recently suggested that Brazil could one day become a full member. NATO’s post-Cold War expansion toward Russia’s borders, despite earlier promises not to move eastward, has led to rising tensions between Western powers and Russia, including multiple close calls between military forces. It has also contributed to a new arms race, including upgrades in nuclear arsenals, and the largest NATO “war games” since the Cold War. While claiming to “preserve peace,” NATO has a history of bombing civilians and committing war crimes. In 1999, NATO engaged in military operations without UN approval in Yugoslavia. Its illegal airstrikes during the Kosovo War left hundreds of civilians dead. And far from the “North Atlantic,” NATO joined the United States in invading Afghanistan in 2001, where it is still bogged down two decades later. In 2011, NATO forces illegally invaded Libya, creating a failed state that caused masses of people to flee. Rather than take responsibility for these refugees, NATO countries have turned back desperate migrants on the Mediterranean Sea, letting thousands die. In London, NATO wants to show it is ready to fight new wars. It will showcase its readiness initiative—the ability to deploy 30 battalions by land, 30 air squadrons and 30 naval vessels in just 30 days, and to confront future threats from China and Russia, including with hypersonic missiles and cyberwarfare. But far from being a lean, mean war machine, NATO is actually riddled with divisions and contradictions. Here are some of them: French President Emmanuel Macron questions the U.S. commitment to fight for Europe, has called NATO “brain dead” and has proposed a European Army under the nuclear umbrella of France. Turkey has enraged NATO members with its incursion into Syria to attack the Kurds, who have been Western allies in the fight against ISIS. And Turkey has threatened to veto a Baltic defense plan until allies support its controversial incursion into Syria. Turkey has also infuriated NATO members, especially Trump, by purchasing Russia’s S-400 missile system. Trump wants NATO to push back against China’s growing influence, including the use of Chinese companies for the construction of 5G mobile networks—something many NATO countries are unwilling to do. Is Russia really NATO’s adversary? France’s Macron has reached out to Russia, inviting Putin to discuss ways in which the European Union can put the Crimean invasion behind it. Donald Trump has publicly attacked Germany over its Nord Stream 2 project to pipe in Russian gas, but a recent German poll saw 66 percent wanting closer ties with Russia. The UK has bigger problems. Britain has been convulsed over the Brexit conflict and is holding a contentious national election on December 12. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, knowing that Trump is wildly unpopular, is reluctant to be seen as close to him. Also, Johnson’s major contender, Jeremy Corbyn, is a reluctant supporter of NATO. While his Labour Party is committed to NATO, over his career as an anti-war champion, Corbyn has called NATO “a danger to world peace and a danger to world security.” The last time Britain hosted NATO leaders in 2014, Corbyn told an anti-NATO rally that the end of the Cold War “should have been the time for NATO to shut up shop, give up, go home and go away.” A further complication is Scotland, which is home to a very unpopular Trident nuclear submarine base as part of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. A new Labour government would need the support of the Scottish National Party. But its leader, Nicola Sturgeon, insists that a precondition for her party’s support is a commitment to close the base. Europeans can’t stand Trump (a recent poll found he is trusted by only 4 percent of Europeans!) and their leaders can’t rely on him. Allied leaders learn of presidential decisions that affect their interests via Twitter. The lack of coordination was clear in October, when Trump ignored NATO allies when he ordered U.S. special forces out of northern Syria, where they had been operating alongside French and British commandos against Islamic State militants. The U.S. unreliability has led the European Commission to draw up plans for a European “defense union” that will coordinate military spending and procurement. The next step may be to coordinate military actions separate from NATO. The Pentagon has complained about EU countries purchasing military equipment from each other instead of from the United States, and has called this defense union “a dramatic reversal of the last three decades of increased integration of the transatlantic defence sector.” Do Americans really want to go to war for Estonia? Article 5 of the Treaty states that an attack against one member “shall be considered an attack against them all,” meaning that the treaty obligates the U.S. to go to war on behalf of 28 nations—something most likely opposed by war-weary Americans who want a less aggressive foreign policy that focuses on peace, diplomacy, and economic engagement instead of military force. An additional major bone of contention is who will pay for NATO. The last time NATO leaders met, President Trump derailed the agenda by berating NATO countries for not paying their fair share, and at the London meeting, Trump is expected to announce symbolic U.S. cuts to NATO’s operations budget. Trump’s main concern is that member states step up to the NATO target of spending 2 percent of their gross domestic products on defense by 2024, a goal that is unpopular among Europeans, who prefer that their tax dollars go to nonmilitary items. Nevertheless, NATOSecretary-General Jens Stoltenberg will brag that Europe and Canada have added $100 billion to their military budgets since 2016—something Donald Trump will take credit for—and that more NATO officials are meeting the 2 percent goal, even though a 2019 NATO report shows only seven members have done so: the U.S., Greece, Estonia, the UK, Romania, Poland and Latvia. In an age where people around the world want to avoid war and to focus instead on the climate chaos that threatens future life on earth, NATO is an anachronism. It now accounts for about three-quarters of military spending and weapons dealing around the globe. Instead of preventing war, it promotes militarism, exacerbates global tensions and makes war more likely. This Cold War relic shouldn’t be reconfigured to maintain U.S. domination in Europe, or to mobilize against Russia or China, or to launch new wars in space. It should not be expanded, but disbanded. Seventy years of militarism is more than enough.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Answers to Add-Ons › A2: Democracy Add-on

Democratic peace theory is flawed:

Kathrine Lane, 7/21/2020 (Government Contract Specialist Coordinator at Insight Global, “Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory: Summary,” , Retrieved 8/4/2021)

The article “Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory” by Sebastian Rosato, offers a new perspective on the logic behind the democratic peace theory. The author first explains the literal definition behind the theory itself. Theorist believe that with the increase of democracies, there will be a decrease of the probability of war. They also believe that it is important to spread the ideology of democracy. Reason for decrease of war relies on two main factors: norm-externalization and trust and respect. Meaning that because they trust and respect other democracies, they are willing to work with each other to mend any conflicts. Rosato debunks this myth by providing historical examples like the Cold War and the Great Powers. The Democratic Peace Theory continues on to explain that non-democratic countries are neither trusted or respected. Non-democratic countries are not respected because their domestic system is deemed unjust in the eyes of democracies. “Extreme lack of public respect or trust is one of the major features that distinguishes re- lations between liberal and nonliberal societies from relations among liberal societies.” In addition, nondemocratic countries are often more likely to extract power by attacking or using harsh forces. An important yet tragic example of this was displayed in Tiananmen Square in China. War was another topic that Rosato related democratic peace theory to. Rosato explained that democratic countries will often fight non-democratic counties but they still remain at peace with one another. Democratic Peace Theory also claims that there are far fewer reasons to go to war when there are more democracies but it’s important to note that they justify war in cases where their country’s safety is at risk. Rosato debunks this claim by mentioning Germany and the United States conflict in World War II. As Germany progressively changed their beliefs and policies, the relationship between Germany and the United States started to diminish. American leaders justified the war on Germany because they stopped viewing Germany as a democracy. This contradicts the claim of the Democratic Peace Theory. This proves that whether or not a country was a democracy was not a determinant for foreign affairs and relations. This also proves that there is no clear definition of a true “democratic” country because affairs and opinions are constantly changing. Rosato provides concrete details that war and opposing opinions are going to occur whether or not a country is a democracy. No two countries are in fact the exactly the same, therefore they will not always come to an equal verdict on issues, causing a repercussion that sometimes lead to war, famine or new polices implemented. Personally, I thoroughly enjoyed reading this article, in fact it is one of my favorites. The theory of democratic peace comes from an idea with historical background. As a logical thinker, I enjoy looking at supporting evidence when forming an opinion. Thus, I enjoyed hearing Rosato argument. Rosato used many cases of historical evidence to support his claim that the Democratic Peace Theory has no true supporting evidence. I also enjoyed how he mentioned that public opinion is not a determinate on whether or not democracies will go to war, because if democracies did care about public opinion then they would care about being peaceful and having good relationships with all countries not just other democracies. This is an interesting point but also very valid. Often times democratic countries only communicate with other democratic counties, and if they do communicate with nondemocratic counties, they do it in an effort of forcing their views on other countries. Two great examples of this that I can think of are Vietnam and more recently in Libya.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Answers to Add-Ons › A2: Democracy Add-on

Studies prove that democratic peace theory is flawed:

Femke E. Bakker, 4/20/2020 (assistant professor at the Institute of Political Science @ Leiden University, “The microfoundations of normative democratic peace theory. Experiments in the US, Russia and China,” , Retrieved 8/4/2021)

Democratic peace theory is built on the assumption that liberal-democracy has a pacifying effect on people, a socialization process that is assumed to lack within autocracies. This paper uses an experimental approach to investigate the microfoundations of democratic peace theory among decision-makers of the US, Russia and China. It builds on and extents previous experimental studies by conceptualizing and measuring the presence and influence of liberal norms, by controlling for the perception of threat as induced by the conflict, and by testing the influence of hawkishness. The results show that the microfoundations of democratic peace theories do not find support. Neither regime-type, nor liberal norms are of influence on the willingness to attack the opponent, and also the assumed difference in liberal norms between individuals of different regime types is unsupported. Moreover, hawkish decision-makers are more likely to go to war. The results show that democratic peace theory, which aims to explain why democracies do not fight with each other, cannot be used as has been done till today and should be revised. The paper concludes with suggestions for new research avenues.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Solvency › 1NC — Solvency

3. NATO norms alone will fail—China and Russia must come to the table.

John R. Allen, 3/24/2021 (President of the Brookings Institution, “It is time to negotiate global treaties on artificial intelligence,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

In addition, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, and other regional security alliances are undertaking consultations designed to create agreed-to norms and policies on AI and other new technologies. This includes effort to design ethical principles for AI that govern algorithmic development and deployment and provide guardrails for economic and military actions. For these agreements to be fully implemented though, they will need to have the active participation and support of China and Russia as well as other relevant states. For just as it was during the Cold War, logic should dictate that potential adversaries be at the negotiating table in the fashioning of these agreements. Otherwise, democratic countries will end up in a situation where they are self-constrained but adversaries are not.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Solvency › 1NC — Solvency

2. US-European cooperation on AI faces numerous obstacles.

Christie Lawrence & Sean Cordey, 2020, (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence,” , Retrieved 6/12/2022)

Challenges to Collaboration & Recommendations Full US-EU collaboration faces five distinct, but interconnected obstacles (see Figure 1 below). At the highest level, the United States and European Union have some diverging geopolitical interests (section A) illustrated by: America’s increasing isolationism, the European Union’s rebalancing to become a third power, the European Union’s resistance to adversarial discourse about China, and domestic political demands to focus resources on COVID-19 responses. Flowing out of the geopolitical landscape and political interests are three overarching considerations that are bolstered by differing beliefs about the role and size of government and can fuel US-EU disagreements around AI. These US national interests and EU common priorities are (section B): AI’s impact on national security and economic interests, as well as the ethics and values that guide AI’s development and use. Finally, aspects of the AI operating environment (sections C, D, and E), such as regulation and governance (including standards and operationalizing principles), funding, data spaces, hardware, and computing resources, provide tactical areas for disagreement or misalignment.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Solvency › 1NC — Solvency

1. NATO standards are ineffective in establishing interoperability on AI.

Erica Pepe, 2020 (Senior Coordinator for Research and Conflict, Security and Development Analyst, “NATO and collective thinking on AI,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

NATO could play an important role in establishing interoperability standards and norms of use in the military application of artificial intelligence. But will allies be able to adopt a common approach in the use of AI for defence and security and keep the Western technological edge? By the end of 2020, NATO may have in place broad thinking on artificial intelligence (AI) as part of a wider implementation strategy on how to benefit from emerging technologies. The Alliance could play an important role in establishing interoperability standards along with supporting norms of use in the military application of AI. NATO, however, has not always been successful in establishing standards, nor in getting member states to comply. This makes the recently set-up NATO Innovation Board, and its intended year-end emerging-technologies implementation strategy, potentially all the more important. An AI White Paper, including a proposed five-year roadmap, is already with Alliance governments, having been submitted in July. This could lead to a more detailed NATO AI strategy emerging sometime in 2021. The AI challenge The Alliance has the advantage of having 30 members spending some US$1 trillion (2020) on defence. Its wide membership, however, is also a possible weakness if even a top-level common approach to AI cannot be agreed. The Innovation Board’s chair, NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană, has the task of coordinating ongoing AI-related work across the Alliance in attempting to shape a shared vision of how to utilise AI. This will include working to identify capability needs and potential projects for collaboration. NATO already has some AI-related projects under way, including the Military Uses of Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and Robotics project and the NATO Data Science Centre. The former project is part of the United States-led Multinational Capability Development Campaign and is intended to look at possible applications in areas such as air and missile defence. The Data Science Centre’s aim is to bring together existing data-science expertise within NATO under one structure. The Alliance views AI as one of several of what it calls ‘emerging and disruptive technologies’, which it considers will likely have the greatest impact in combination. NATO’s March 2020 ‘Science & Technology Trends 2020-2040’ report pointed to the mix of autonomy, big data and AI, for example being used to generate decision-relevant information from vast quantities of raw data, as having far-reaching implications for defence and security. The report also identified an array of ‘serious challenges’ that NATO faces in managing AI, including policy, legal, ethical and interoperability issues. It further identified the need for a common approach to how the performance of AI-software-based systems is verified, and in turn how the verification process is itself validated. In some ways NATO might seem a natural forum for these deliberations, not least in a transatlantic context. It also has a lot of experience, going back to the Cold War, in working towards standardisation and interoperability among allies. However, the results achieved have been mixed, which underscores the challenges the Alliance now faces: not only 30 members with disparate levels of capability, but also a backdrop of rapid technological advances where some of its competitors and potential adversaries may hold significant advantages. Interoperability issues may be thorny, but they need to be resolved if AI-dependent capability gaps between members are not to widen. Early discussions regarding the establishment of common technical standards on the design and development of military-applicable AI would at least reduce this risk.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Conflict Resolution Answers › Extensions #4: NPT Solving Now

NPT is successful now:

Michael O'Hanlon, 3/3/2020 (Director of Research and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy program @ Brookings Institution, “Experts assess the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 50 years after it went into effect,” , Retrieved 3/30/2022)

Michael O'Hanlon headshotMichael O’Hanlon (@MichaelEOhanlon), Director of Research and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy program: There are still more than 10,000 nuclear warheads on Earth. But I think the NPT, on balance, has been enormously successful. Current arsenals are big, but they are only about one-fifth the size of what they were a half-century ago. While superpower arms control, and the end of the Cold War, deserve most of the credit for the reductions (along with restraint by China, in particular, in not building up too much), the NPT created some of the broader political context and moral pressure that led to these reductions. While it sought to prevent non-nuclear states from ever getting the bomb, its main bargain also required the existing nuclear weapons states to reduce and ultimately eliminate their arsenals to hold up their own ends of the bargain.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Conflict Resolution Answers › Extensions #4: NPT Solving Now

Nuclear proliferation is in check and the NPT is tightening its inspection regimes:

Frank A. Rose, 3/3/2020 (Senior Fellow, Security and Strategy, Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, “Experts assess the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 50 years after it went into effect,” , Retrieved 3/30/2022)

The arsenals of the United States and Russia still account for more than 90% of the total number of warheads on Earth today. The United Kingdom, France, China, India, and Pakistan each likely possesses between 150 and 300, with Israel’s unconfirmed arsenal totaling almost 100 bombs. North Korea probably has a couple dozen nuclear weapons, with enough fissile material to make a few dozen more. That said, the situation is not entirely grim. While nuclear proliferation continues, and nine countries are known to possess nuclear weapons, the fear once expressed by John F. Kennedy that at least a couple dozen countries could have the bomb by the 21st century has not panned out. And of course, nuclear weapons have not been used again in combat. An additional achievement, for which a few of my colleagues here deserve some of the credit, is the tightening of inspection regimens under the NPT. In particular, the so-called “Additional Protocol” has created the right for inspectors to go to places where they suspect monkey business, even if those sites are not officially declared by the country in question. This arrangement tends to work only if national intelligence capabilities, and/or whistleblowers, provide information about suspicious activities. But at that point, inspectors can be more effective than in the years before the Additional Protocol concept was developed and legitimated. It has helped make the nuclear inspections in the Iran nuclear deal much more effective (even if other aspects of that deal have proven highly controversial). A similar concept would almost surely be used in any nuclear deal with North Korea in the years ahead.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Conflict Resolution Answers › Extensions #3: Cyber-Attack Defense

No cyber-attacks versus critical infrastructure:

Taylor Armerding, 4/15/2016 (contributing writer, “Catastrophic cyber attack on U.S. grid possible, but not likely,” , Retrieved 4/1/2022)

Catastrophic cyber attack on U.S. grid possible, but not likely Anything is possible in the cat-and-mouse game of probing and protecting the online weaknesses of the nation’s critical infrastructure. But security experts say the U.S. grid is resilient enough to make a “cyber Pearl Harbor,” highly unlikely Share on Facebook Share on Twitter Share on LinkedIn Share on Reddit Share by Email Print resource Taylor Armerding By Taylor Armerding Contributing writer, CSO | APR 15, 2016 3:45 AM PDT power transmission towers David R. Tribble (Creative Commons BY or BY-SA) Warnings about U.S. critical infrastructure’s vulnerabilities to a catastrophic cyber attack – a cyber “Pearl Harbor” or “9/11” – began more than 25 years ago. But they have become more insistent and frequent over the past decade. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned in a 2012 speech of both a “cyber Pearl Harbor” and a “pre-9/11 moment.” They have also expanded from within the security industry to the mass media. It was almost a decade ago, in 2007, that the Idaho National Laboratory demonstrated that a cyber attack could destroy an enormous diesel power generator – an event featured in a 2009 segment on the CBS news magazine “60 Minutes.” [ Keep up with 8 hot cybersecurity trends (and 4 going cold). Give your career a boost with top security certifications: Who they're for, what they cost, and which you need. | Sign up for CSO newsletters. ] Late last year, retired “Nightline” anchor Ted Koppel warned in his book "Lights Out" of possible catastrophe – thousands of deaths – if the U.S. grid is ever taken down by a major cyber attack. And just this month, the FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) launched a national campaign to warn U.S. utilities and the public about the danger from cyber attacks like the one last December that took down part of Ukraine’s power grid. The worst-case scenario, according to some experts and officials, is that major portions of the grid could go down for months, or even a year. Yet, nothing close to that has happened yet – the damage over the past decade from natural disasters like hurricanes, tornadoes and earthquakes has been much more significant than any cyber events. [ Learn how IT can harness the power and promise of 5G in this FREE CIO Roadmap Report. Download now! ] All of which raise the obvious question: Why? If a hostile nation state like Iran could deal the “Great Satan” a crippling blow, why wouldn’t it? There are several theories to explain it. One is that even countries like Iran or a rogue state like North Korea would not want to take down the U.S. economy because it would have a drastic negative effect on the world economy. “The same interdependencies that exist in the global economy could have unintended global consequences, were any nation to suffer widespread disruption to foundational systems,” said Anthony Di Bello, director of strategic partnerships for Guidance Software. If any large country truly becomes a national security threat to another large country (a cyber attack) may well be far more likely than it would be in today's climate. anthonydibelloAnthony Di Bello, director, strategic partnerships, Guidance Software Another is that hostile nation states are more interested in espionage than an attack, in the hope that knowledge of U.S. infrastructure systems will give them some leverage in foreign policy disputes, or prevent a country like the U.S. from ever attacking them with conventional weapons. The Never-ending Story of Emotet and the Dangers for Financial Services SponsoredPost Sponsored by Akamai The Never-ending Story of Emotet and the Dangers for Financial Services Emotet, described as among the most dangerous types of malware for financial services organizations, has returned. Yet another is that if other countries are inside U.S. systems, the U.S. must be inside of theirs, which creates the equivalent of a cyber “balance of terror” – the U.S. could do as much or more damage to them in response to an attack. As Jason Healey, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, put it, “cyber deterrence is working. They (hostile nation states) haven’t attacked our cyber systems for many of the same reason they haven’t sent nuclear-tipped missiles: They have no reason to unless the world is in a serious crisis, not least because they know there would be a dangerous counterattack from the U.S.” Indeed, there is general agreement that destructive cyber attacks are unlikely unless hostile nations are heading into war – an armed conflict. Cyber deterrence is working. They (hostile nation states) haven’t attacked our cyber systems for many of the same reason they haven’t sent nuclear-tipped missiles. jasonhealeyJason Healey, senior fellow, the Atlantic Council “If any large country truly becomes a national security threat to another large country it may well be far more likely than it would be in today's climate,” Di Bello said. “Barring that, it would be unlikely.” For that reason, major cyber attacks are much more likely in areas where there is already armed conflict, or the potential for it. Robert M. Lee, cofounder of Dragos Security and a former U.S Air Force cyber warfare operations officer, noted that the attack on Ukraine’s grid, widely attributed to Russia, was, “simply an extension of what was going on with the military. That, he said, would increase the likelihood of attacks between countries like North and South Korea, or between Iran and Israel – “traditional conflict areas,” as he put it. Of course that leaves out terrorist organizations that don’t represent any nation state and which give no indication that it would trouble them at all to take down the world economy. [ MORE: Protecting vital electricity infrastructure ] SponsoredPost Sponsored by HPE Take Your IT Asset Management to the Next Level Here are 6 best practices for improving the efficiency of your IT asset management strategy. But Lee and other experts said this week that smaller organizations – even lethal terrorist groups like ISIS – don't have the same capability as nation states. They say while the U.S. grid and other industrial control systems (ICS) have significant weaknesses – and U.S. adversaries are constantly probing those weaknesses – launching an effective, sustained attack is not as easy as some people, including high government officials, suggest. “It is significantly more difficult to do a high-confidence attack on ICS than people think,” Lee said “It doesn’t just involve the cyber component – it’s the engineering piece as well.” Al Berman, president of Disaster Recovery Institute, agreed. He said one reason is that, over the past decade, there has been “tremendous sharing” about threat information among utility companies. The ICS ISAC (Information Sharing and Analysis Center) is “enormously strong,” he said. A second is that most ICSs are not completely automated. “The big ones still require manual intervention,” he said. “There are manual bypasses occurring all the time – people are manning centers around the clock.” That, he said, makes it more difficult for attackers to get control of a system remotely. Third, he said, is that most utilities are privately owned and have different software, applications and system designs. That diversity makes it much more difficult to launch a coordinated attack on multiple systems. Dr. Paul Stockton, managing director at Sonecon, made that point in a recent paper titled “Superstorm Sandy: Implications for designing a post-cyber attack power restoration system.” He wrote that the diversity of systems would likely impede recovery efforts after a major attack, but would also have the benefit of making large-scale attacks much more difficult in the first place. We’re in an arms race. We continue to strengthen resilience, but we need to accelerate our efforts to defend and respond. paulstocktonDr. Paul Stockton, managing director, Sonecon “The enormous diversity of ICS software and control system components among utilities greatly complicates the task of conducting a ‘single-stroke’ attack to black out an entire interconnect or the U.S. grid as a whole,” he wrote. And according to Lee, even with all that diversity, critical infrastructure systems are relatively simple to defend. “They are among the few networks on the planet that are defensible,” he said. Added to that, said Lila Kee, chief product officer at GlobalSign, is that utility providers are very much aware of the threats, and highly motivated to defend against them. “Grid providers don’t want to be any more regulated than they are, and they understand if they don’t address cyber security vulnerabilities, the government will do it for them,” she said. “It’s also important to note that grid providers have a self interest around protecting generation and transmission systems.” Grid providers have a self interest around protecting generation and transmission systems. lilakeeLila Kee, chief product officer, GlobalSign Berman contends that “the mundane things – like cable backhoes – cause us more problems than cyber.” While the risks are real, “I spend a lot of time with utility people,” he said, “and they are dedicated and understand where attacks are taking place. I tend to be an optimist – I’m not so sure we’re as ill-prepared as everybody thinks.” All this, experts hasten to add, does not mean that ICS defenses are adequate. As has been noted many times, they were not originally designed to face the Internet. And the interconnection of ICS networks to gain automation and efficiency has simply expanded the attack surface. And, as both Lee and Stockton note, if there is a major cyber attack, responding to it will be much more complicated than to a natural disaster like Superstorm Sandy. In that case, other providers who came to assist those that had been damaged by the storm, knew they would not confront the same storm themselves. With a cyber attack, as Lee put it, “the adversary will be fighting your responders,” in much the same way that terrorist groups sometimes detonate one bomb, wait for others to rush in to assist victims, and then detonate another one. The most crucial point, Lee said, is that, “everything that everyone is talking about is speculation, because we’ve never seen it (a major attack).” Another problem he sees is that there were no collective, international warnings to the perpetrators of the Ukraine attack. “We didn’t even have to say we knew who did it,” he said, “but we should have said that whoever did it, be warned that this is an unacceptable act that will bring severe consequences. “This was an attack on a completely civilian infrastructure, and now it is seen as permissible. It’s going to embolden attackers.” Stockton also warns that while terrorist organizations may lack the capability to launch a crippling cyber attack now, that may not always be true. “They have access to Dark Web and zero days to increasing extent,” he said. “And they are becoming increasingly sophisticated. We’re in an arms race. We continue to strengthen resilience, but we need to accelerate our efforts to defend and respond.” Lee agreed, saying that while things are improving in securing critical infrastructure, “it’s not happening nearly as fast as it should be.”

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Conflict Resolution Answers › Extensions #3: Cyber-Attack Defense

No impact to cyber-attacks:

Lewis 20 (James Andrew Lewis is a senior vice president and director of the Technology Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C "Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe," Center for Strategic and International Studies. August 2020. )

A catastrophic cyberattack was first predicted in the mid-1990s. Since then, predictions of a catastrophe have appeared regularly and have entered the popular consciousness. As a trope, a cyber catastrophe captures our imagination, but as analysis, it remains entirely imaginary and is of dubious value as a basis for policymaking. There has never been a catastrophic cyberattack. To qualify as a catastrophe, an event must produce damaging mass effect, including casualties and destruction. The fires that swept across California last summer were a catastrophe. Covid-19 has been a catastrophe, especially in countries with inadequate responses. With man-made actions, however, a catastrophe is harder to produce than it may seem, and for cyberattacks a catastrophe requires organizational and technical skills most actors still do not possess. It requires planning, reconnaissance to find vulnerabilities, and then acquiring or building attack tools—things that require resources and experience. To achieve mass effect, either a few central targets (like an electrical grid) need to be hit or multiple targets would have to be hit simultaneously (as is the case with urban water systems), something that is itself an operational challenge. It is easier to imagine a catastrophe than to produce it. The 2003 East Coast blackout is the archetype for an attack on the U.S. electrical grid. No one died in this blackout, and services were restored in a few days. As electric production is digitized, vulnerability increases, but many electrical companies have made cybersecurity a priority. Similarly, at water treatment plants, the chemicals used to purify water are controlled in ways that make mass releases difficult. In any case, it would take a massive amount of chemicals to poison large rivers or lakes, more than most companies keep on hand, and any release would quickly be diluted. More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are: Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe. There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals. There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.) No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare. State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not start a war. This has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred. The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation. The United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a similar attack on the United States. Iran is improving and may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States. Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. North Korea has not yet developed this kind of capability. One major failing of catastrophe scenarios is that they discount the robustness and resilience of modern economies. These economies present multiple targets and configurations; they are harder to damage through cyberattack than they look, given the growing (albeit incomplete) attention to cybersecurity; and experience shows that people compensate for damage and quickly repair or rebuild. This was one of the counterintuitive lessons of the Strategic Bombing Survey. Pre-war planning assumed that civilian morale and production would crumple under aerial bombardment. In fact, the opposite occurred. Resistance hardened and production was restored.1

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Conflict Resolution Answers › Extensions #2: Emerging Tech Won’t Lead to Arms Control

Conflicts have to be solved for nuclear disarmament to become feasible--

Michal Onderco & Madeline Zutt 21—Associate Professor, International Relations, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Research Associate, Erasmus University Rotterdam, "Emerging Technology and Nuclear Security: What Does the Wisdom of The Crowd Tell Us?" Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 42, Issue 3, pg. 299-302, 2021, , Retrieved 3/30/2022)

There has been an increase in debates on nuclear disarmament, spurred by developments such as the Humanitarian Initiative giving rise to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Among deterrence experts, these debates have ushered in discussions on the conditions necessary for nuclear disarmament. Roberts (2019) notes that some of these conditions include the resolution of regional geopolitical conflicts that encourage adversarial states to acquire nuclear weapons, more sophisticated verification measures and increased transparency of nuclear capabilities. The recent U.S.-led initiative on Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament echoes many of these views (Gibbons, 2019). Müller (2020) argues that nuclear disarmament “will lead to the desired result only when it is embedded in a supporting institutional framework” (p. 151). Importantly, Müller recognizes that in order for non-nuclear peace to be achieved “the real, alleged or perceived war-prevention functions of nuclear deterrence” would have to “be taken over by other means” (pp. 151–152). To be sure, there is much less research on emerging technologies and nuclear disarmament through the substitution path, even though the replacement of nuclear weapons has been, as we indicated above, on the agenda for decades.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Conflict Resolution Answers › Extensions #1: Accidents

The risk of nuclear accidents is extremely low—nuclear armed nations have spent vast sums of money trying to prevent them.

Michael Horowitz, Dec. 2019, (Political Science Prof @ University of Pennsylvania, “A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence,” Retrieved Apr. 28, 2022 from )

Furthermore, as Albert Wohlstetter found, the threat of mutual destruction “offer[ed] every inducement to both powers to reduce the chance of accidental war.”11 While there are no known instances of accidental war, there are historical examples of unintended escalation, either in pre-conflict crises or once a conflict is underway.12 Accidental escalation is when a state unintentionally commits an escalatory act (i.e. due to technical malfunction, human error, or incomplete control over military forces).13 Inadvertent escalation can also occur, whereby a state unknowingly commits an escalatory act (i.e., an intentional act that unknowingly crossing an adversary’s red line).14 Accidents have increased tensions between countries on numerous occasions, but have not led to escalation.15 Nuclear-armed states have expended vast resources to minimize the risk of unintentional escalation, knowing that it could lead to catastrophe should it occur.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Conflict Resolution Answers › Extensions #1: Accidents

AI integration into military systems is inherently destabilizing.

James Johnson, 2020 (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonprolifera¬tion Studies, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, “Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?”)

Non-human decision-making As AI systems become more integrated into the strategic decision-making process, the potential vulnerabilities and risks associated with military autonomy will likely increase. According to former DARPA director Arati Prabhakar, despite AI’s potential tactical and operational impact, the technology remains “fundamentally limited” due to its propensity to misidentify objects and be easily spoofed.19 Prab¬hakar adds that decision-making errors committed by AI systems are often inex¬plicable and unlike errors humans would make. In one example, Prabhakar demonstrated how a picture of a baby holding a toothbrush was misidentified by a machine-learning algorithm as a baby with a baseball bat.20 Unpredictable errors and decisions made by AI systems deployed at scale and across multiple domains and combat theaters would be inherently destabilizing.21

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Conflict Resolution Answers › Extensions #1: Accidents

AI won’t have a stabilizing impact on nuclear relations between states.

James Johnson, 2020 (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonprolifera¬tion Studies, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, “Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?”)

In a world of revisionist and dissatisfied nuclear-armed states, it seems improb¬able that improvements in intelligence collection and analysis derived from advances in AI would have a stabilizing impact.43 For this to happen, equal access to intelligence and shared confidence in the accuracy and credibility of these systems would be required. Furthermore, the intentions of all parties would need to be benign for any reassurances or confidence-building efforts to succeed. Because nuclear interactions increasingly involve the complex interplay of nuclear and non-nuclear (and state and non-state) actors, the leveraging of AI in this multipolar context will increasingly place destabilizing pressures on nuclear states. Taken together, these interactions will likely complicate escalation man¬agement efforts during future crises or conflict—especially involving China and the United States.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Conflict Resolution Answers › Extensions #1: Accidents

AI capabilities in military situations increase the risk of inadvertent escalation and instability.

James Johnson, 2020 (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonprolifera¬tion Studies, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, “Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?”)

A broader point here is that under crisis and conflict conditions, the deterrent effect of AI is predicated on the perceived risks associated with a particular capa¬bility it enables or enhances. The higher the uncertainty generated by a capacity, deploying AI-augmented capabilities in a crisis might actually encourage an adversary to act more cautiously, and in turn, bolster stability. Thus, the uncertainty caused by the introduction of AI into a situation might incentivize states (especially those facing a superior adversary) to delegate decisions to machines for the per¬ceived deterrence effect.26 Because of the diffi¬culty of demonstrating a posture like this before a crisis or conflict, however, this implicit threat could equally worsen crisis instability. AI systems that are pro¬grammed to aggressively pursue tactical and operational advantages, for example, might misperceive (or ignore) an adversary’s bid to deescalate a situation as prelude to an imminent attack. These dynamics would increase the risks of inad¬vertent escalation and first-strike instability.27

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Conflict Resolution Answers › Extensions #1: Accidents

AI increases the risk of miscalculation.

Mark Fitzpatrick, 2019 (former deputy assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation, “Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Command and Control,” Survival, June-July 2019)

The QuantumAI aspect of the exercise was one manifestation of what the background paper described as a ‘black box model extraction’ vulner-ability. Such an extraction reverse-engineers an AI system to determine its parameters. An adversary may be able to use this information to enhance the effectiveness of future operations against the system by stealing intel-lectual property; identifying sensitive or proprietary information related to the system’s training data or objectives; or developing ‘adversarial inputs’ to be covertly introduced into the original AI system. Such inputs confuse the system’s classifiers or its pattern-recognition function, thereby causing it to miscalculate, misclassify or misinterpret elements in its oper¬ational environment.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Conflict Resolution Answers › Extensions #1: Accidents

AI destabilizes nuclear stability—risking escalation to all out nuclear war.

James Johnson, 2020 (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonprolifera¬tion Studies, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, “Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?”)

The destabilizing conditions that AI could impose have the potential to under¬mine global nuclear (or strategic) stability. The concept of nuclear or strategic stability emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century, and despite being theoretically and politically contested to this day, it has proven a useful intellec¬tual tool for analyzing the potential of technically advanced weapons to under¬mine stability. While strategic stability has no single, universally accepted definition, contributing factors, or even agreed-upon metrics to measure it,33 it can be best thought of as a situation wherein no country has incentives to launch a nuclear first strike—thus reducing the danger of a crisis caused by miscal¬culation or misperception escalating into all-out war.34 It is ultimately a product of a complex interplay of political, economic, and military dynamics in which tech¬nology performs several functions.35 The role of technological change and stra¬tegic stability is part of a complex interaction of disruptive forces which, during periods of heightened geopolitical rivalry, great power transitions, and strategic surprise, may erode strategic stability and make conflict more likely.36 Two existing conditions for nuclear instability likely to be exacerbated by AI are nuclear multipolarity and differing escalation risk tolerance between military powers. The coalescing of these conditions in the presence of the inherently desta¬bilizing military AI systems, described earlier, will lead to an interplay of forces ripe for mis¬calculations and misperceptions between nuclear-armed states, increasing the dangers of escalation and deterrence failure under the nuclear shadow.