2022
SDI
Disadvantage
Affirmative › 2AC – Regulation good
Maliha, 21
[George, MD, is a second-year internal medicine resident at the University of Pennsylvania Health System, 7-13-2021, “To Spur Growth in AI, We Need a New Approach to Legal Liability”, Harvard Business Review, , accessed 7-18-2022, BB]
Artificial intelligence (AI) is sweeping through industries ranging from cybersecurity to environmental protection — and the Covid-19 pandemic has only accelerated this trend. AI may improve the lives of millions, but it also will inevitably cause accidents that injure people or parties — indeed, it already has through incidents like autonomous vehicle crashes. An outdated liability system in the United States and other countries, however, is unable to manage these risks, which is a problem because those risks can impede AI innovations and adoption. Therefore, it is crucial that we reform the liability system. Doing so will help speed AI innovations and adoption.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
Affirmative › 2AC – Regulation good
Stepken, 21
[Axel, chairman of the board of management, October 27, 2021, “AI regulation – why it will boost innovation”, LinkedIn, , accessed 7-18-2022, BB]
Most people tend to flinch automatically at the mention of regulation. However, regulatory agreements and normative requirements are what enable us to benefit from today’s global trade networks. I firmly believe that an assured regulatory framework enhances, rather than impairs, innovation and economic opportunities.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
Affirmative › 2AC – Regulation good
It’s not a question of “who implements AI first” if American AI is bad
Marcus 22 (Gary Marcus, holds a PhD from MIT, founded Geometric Intelligence, a machine learning company purchased by Uber two years later in 2016; "Artificial General Intelligence Is Not as Imminent as You Might Think", 6-6-2022, Scientific American, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/artificial-general-intelligence-is-not-as-imminent-as-you-might-think1/, DOA: 7-18-2022)//ATJ
To the average person, it must seem as if the field of artificial intelligence is making immense progress. According to the press releases, and some of the more gushing media accounts, OpenAI’s DALL-E 2 can seemingly create spectacular images from any text; another OpenAI system called GPT-3 can talk about just about anything; and a system called Gato that was released in May by DeepMind, a division of Alphabet, seemingly worked well on every task the company could throw at it. One of DeepMind’s high-level executives even went so far as to brag that in the quest for artificial general intelligence (AGI), AI that has the flexibility and resourcefulness of human intelligence, “The Game is Over!” And Elon Musk said recently that he would be surprised if we didn’t have artificial general intelligence by 2029.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
Affirmative › 2AC – Regulation good
Scharre 21 (Paul Scharre, holds a Ph.D. in War Studies from King’s College London and an M.A. in Political Economy and Public Policy and a B.S. in Physics, cum laude, from Washington University in St. Louis, Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security, previously worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; "Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory", Texas National Security Review, vol. 4, iss. 3, summer 2021, 121-132, DOI: 10.26153/tsw/13985, DOA: 4-14-2022)//ATJ
Race to the Bottom on Safety A related risk of a “racing” dynamic among competitors could come from an acceleration, not of the pace of operations on the battlefield, but of the process of fielding new AI systems. AI systems today have a host of safety and security problems that can make them brittle, unreliable, and insecure.29 Because machine learning in particular can create new ways in which systems can fail, militaries face novel challenges in adopting AI systems.30 Militaries will have to adopt new methods to test, evaluate, verify, and validate AI systems (also known as TEVV).31 Such concerns related to autonomy are well known in the U.S. defense community,32 although at present they have not been solved to a satisfactory degree. Machine learning introduces additional challenges with regard to testing, evaluation, verification, and validation. A rush to field AI systems before they are fully tested could result in a “race to the bottom” on safety, with militaries fielding accident-prone AI systems. There are strong bureaucratic and institutional imperatives for militaries to field systems that are robust and secure. Indeed, designing systems to military specification standards often means making them more robust for a wider range of environmental conditions and shocks than comparable commercial systems, even at the expense of other aspects of performance, such as size, weight, or usability. AI presents novel challenges, however, in achieving the robustness needed for operating in the complex, hazardous, and adversarial environments that often characterize military operations. Certain AI methods today, such as deep learning, remain relatively immature with significant reliability challenges. A 2017 Department of Defense report by the JASON scientific advisory group explained that deep neural networks are immature as regards the “illities”, including reliability, maintainability, accountability, validation and verification, debug-ability, evolvability, fragility, attackability, and so forth. … Further, it is not clear that the existing AI paradigm is immediately amenable to any sort of software engineering validation and verification. This is a serious issue, and is a potential roadblock to DoD’s [Department of Defense’s] use of these modern AI systems, especially when considering the liability and accountability of using AI in lethal systems.33 The Defense Department’s 2018 AI strategy calls for building AI systems that are “resilient, robust, reliable, and secure.”34 Yet, the current state of technology makes achieving this goal particularly difficult for AI systems that incorporate deep learning, a subfield of AI that has seen significant growth and attention in recent years. While there is active research underway to improve AI safety and security, militaries will have to adapt to the technology as it currently is, at least for the time being. An ideal process would be for militaries to engage in experimentation, prototyping, and concept development, but also to subject AI systems to rigorous TEVV under realistic operational conditions before deployment. Taking shortcuts on testing and evaluation and fielding a system before it is fully tested could lead to accidents, which, in some settings, could undermine international stability. In evaluating new technologies, militaries may be relatively accepting of the risk of accidents, which may lead them to tolerate the deployment of systems that have reliability concerns. In building and fielding new capabilities, militaries have to weigh the possibility of an accident occurring against other concerns, such as forgoing valuable military capabilities. The military operational environment is fraught with risk, in both training and real-world operations. Military institutions balance managing this risk with other factors, such as the need for training, developing new capabilities, or accomplishing the mission. Military institutions view casualties from training accidents or testing new capabilities as a tragic but unavoidable part of the business of preparing for war. Militaries expect high performance from their forces, often while they are performing dangerous tasks, but militaries neither demand nor expect accident-free operations in most settings.35 From 2006 to 2020, over 5,000 U.S. servicemembers were killed in non-war related accidents, the majority of which occurred within the United States. Accidents overall accounted for nearly 32 percent of U.S. servicemember deaths during this period, and even accounted for a significant portion of servicemember deaths in Iraq (19 percent) and Afghanistan (16 percent).36 These accident rates are not unusual for the U.S. armed forces. This is business as usual. Accidents draw the attention of senior military and civilian officials when a spate of accidents occur in a short amount of time — such as a series of aircraft crashes,37 ship collisions,38 or training accidents.39 Yet, as one report on naval accidents from 1945 to 1988 notes, “peacetime naval accidents are a fact of life.”40 The same is true of military air and ground operations. Other nations’ militaries may do an even poorer job of managing risk when it comes to accidents than the U.S. military. For example, the Soviet/Russian submarine community has a much higher accident rate than the U.S. submarine community.41 New technologies in particular present an increased risk of accidents, yet militaries may press ahead out of a desire to develop and field what they perceive to be a valuable capability. For example, the V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft suffered four crashes during development, killing 30 U.S. servicemembers in total, yet the Defense Department continued development.42 The V-22 program manager cited a rush to develop the technology as a factor in the accidents, stating, “Meeting a funding deadline was more important than making sure we’d done all the testing we could.”43 Taking shortcuts on testing in particular appears to have been a factor in at least one fatal crash. According to a Government Accountability Office investigation of the V-22 program, “schedule pressures” led the program to conduct only 33 of 103 planned tests of an aerodynamic phenomenon called a “vortex ring state,”44 a phenomenon that later caused an April 2000 crash that killed 19 servicemembers.45 Absent competitive dynamics, militaries may be able to manage the challenges of fielding safe AI systems to a more-or-less satisfactory degree, albeit with some risk of an accident occurring. However, out of a desire to field AI capabilities ahead of competitors, militaries may be more willing to accept risk than they might otherwise be and to field systems that are prone to mishaps.46 Similar competitive dynamics may have played a role in accidents with self-driving cars and commercial airline autopilot technology, as companies rushed to beat others to market.47 These dynamics, while not an arms race, could lead militaries to engage in a “race to the bottom” on safety. This risk could become particularly acute in wartime. Managing these risks is challenging because assessing them can be difficult, especially when it comes to new technologies. Accident rates may be well-known for mature technologies, but they are unknown for technologies still in development. In the case of the V-22 Osprey development, for example, it is not as though the Defense Department knew that developing it would lead to multiple crashes and 30 fatalities but decided that achieving the capability was worth the cost. Engineers, testers, and program managers are flying in the dark when it comes to new technologies — that is, after all, the point of testing new systems. The concern is not only that organizations may take measured risks to field new capabilities, but also that institutional and bureaucratic imperatives may lead organizations to distort their own perceptions of risk, further contributing to accidents. This sociological phenomenon has been cited as a cause in the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger explosion, for example.48
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
Affirmative › 2AC – No China AI Lead
Greene 21 — Tristan Greene, editor and technology reporter at TNW, 2021 (“Here’s why the US continues to beat China in the AI race,” TNW, June 2nd, Available Online at , Accessed 07-18-2022)
The global AI race was supposed to be a sprint. Back in 2017 when driverless cars and domestic robots were thought to be just around the corner, the promise of deep learning made it seem like we were mere months away from living in an AI-powered utopia.
As it turns out, the global AI race is more of a marathon. And the US has a huge lead that’ll be difficult to overcome for any country, but especially China.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
Affirmative › 2AC – No China AI Lead
Cooper and Kompella 22 — James Cooper, professor of law and director of International Legal Studies at California Western School of Law, research fellow at Singapore University of Social Sciences, J.D. from the University of Toronto (Canada), LL.M. from the University of Cambridge (U.K), and Kashyap Kompella, technology industry analyst and CEO of RPA2AI, a global artificial intelligence advisory firm, Masters in Business Laws from National Law School of India University (India), 2022 (“No, China is not winning the AI race,” The Hill, February 3rd, Available Online at , Accessed 07-19-2022)
The global competition between the United States and China continues apace. Technology is rightly seen as providing unique leverage to win this geopolitical race. The U.S. long has been the global technology powerhouse, but not surprisingly, we have heard much about the Chinese government’s ambition to dominate high-tech industries such as 5G telecommunications, autonomous vehicles, blockchain, and semiconductor chips.
In this light, as a horizontal technology that can be applied across all sectors, artificial intelligence (AI) has become a strategic priority and the Chinese focus on superiority in this field is touted as something about which the U.S. should be concerned. Some have gone so far as to conclude that the West has already lost the AI race.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
Affirmative › 2AC – No China AI Lead
O.I. 22 (Oxford Insights; "Government AI Readiness Index 2021", January 2022, Oxford Insights, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58b2e92c1e5b6c828058484e/t/61ead0752e7529590e98d35f/1642778757117/Government_AI_Readiness_21.pdf, DOA: 7-18-2022)//ATJ
Figure 1: the US firmly leads the AI index, with China coming in at 15th.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
Affirmative › 2AC – No China AI Lead
Ghi et al. 21 (Trung Ghi; Abhishek Srivastava; Arthur D. Little; "The Global AI Arms Race – How Nations can Avoid being Left Behind", January 2021, PRISM, https://www.adlittle.com/sites/default/files/prism/Global%20AI%20article.pdf, DOA: 7-18-2022)//ATJ
There are several country rankings of AI strength across the world. Those that focus on metrics such as patents and research publications tend to list China first, followed by the US, with third place disputed between European and Asian countries including South Korea, Japan and India.
However, taking a broader approach using a composite AI-readiness index (from Oxford Insights) that factors in governance, skills and education, infrastructure and data, and government/public services reveals the top three countries to be Singapore, the UK and Germany. (See Figure 1.)
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › T/N – Miscalc
Hyde-Price 12 Adrian Hyde-Price, Professor of International Politics at the University of Bath, “The Future of the European Security System,” Studia Diplomatica, 65(1), 2012, pp.127-139, JSTOR /GoGreen!
The final scenario envisages a more organic and fluid European security system, evolving without the conscious architectural design of the first three models, and taking shape through a process of mutual give and take. It is a model of a Europe of independent nation-states, defending their national interests but cooperating together for mutual benefit, without attempting to create a hierarchical security architecture or overarching multilateral governance. In this scenario, European security would involve shifting patterns of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral cooperation, with ad hoc groupings (‘coalitions of the willing’) forming to deal with specific problems, and a ‘variable geometry’ of security cooperation developing across the continent. This is a vision of Europe that lacks many committed advocates; indeed, it is one which is widely viewed as the nightmare scenario, involving a ‘renationalisation’ of security policy, multipolar instability, and a situation in which – in Thucydides words – the strong do what they will, and the weak do what they must.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › T/N – Miscalc
Richter 17 Wolfgang Richter, (Colonel ret.) Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, Research Group on Security Politics, “Return to Security Cooperation in Europe: The Stabilizing Role of Conventional Arms Control,” Deep Cuts Working Paper No.11, September 2017, /GoGreen!
No matter how one might assess sub-regional force balances, the assumption that an aggression against a NATO ally could be limited to a sub-regional war seems flawed. Nevertheless, a narrow focus on sub-regional Russian geographical advantages as to quick movements of land forces has been shaping the western discussion on military response options.
But launching a deliberate major aggression against an alliance that disposes at superior conventional forces and positive security guarantees by nuclear powers would entail incalculable risks of a global war. This is not a plausible scenario.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Deficit – Political Sustainability
Skidmore 12 David Skidmore, Drake University, “The Obama Presidency and US Foreign Policy: Where’s the Multilateralism?” International Studies Perspectives, no.13, 2012, pp.43-64, DOI 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00454.x /GoGreen!
Policymakers tend to assume that foreign aid can attract public support only to the extent that it is perceived to serve narrowly focused national interests. Yet, the 1995 survey found that humanitarian rationales for aid attracted the strongest support. Americans were less inclined to favor aid programs designed to reward friendly countries or to win economic benefits for US business. Military aid was also quite unpopular. But majorities ranging from 74% to 91% wanted to maintain or increase aid devoted to ends such as child survival, humanitarian relief, repairing the environment, family planning, and long-term economic development. There existed strong support for targeting aid toward the poorest countries. Americans were skeptical, however, that aid actually reaches those who need it or achieves humanitarian aims. Roughly 80% of respondents believed that too much aid went to undemocratic regimes, that aid is plagued by waste and corruption, and that foreign assistance programs often foster dependence on the part of recipients.11
One obvious implication of these findings is that advocates for increased foreign aid would do well to correct public misperceptions that the United States is bearing a disproportionate burden as compared with other aid-giving countries. Yet, research conducted by the Aspen Institute suggests that the problem is more complicated: ‘‘When informants were confronted with such information, they showed momentary surprise, and then reverted to their old patterns of reasoning. A core rule of strategic frame analysis is at play here: if the facts don’t fit the frame, it is the facts that are rejected, not the frame’’ (Bales 2001:8).
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Deficit – Norm-Setting
Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, /GoGreen!
But ad hoc approaches also pose challenges to organizations like NATO. Madeleine Albright warned against the “three Ds” in the 1990s when she highlighted the risks of de-linking from, or duplicating NATO efforts, as well as discriminating among members.24 These issues remain an important concern—particularly in U.S. policy discussions – when it comes to more recent ad hoc or minilateral formats focused on European defense. A more concerted NATO role in guiding flexible efforts within the alliance could help address this concern to minimize redundancies and buttress cohesion.
NATO should work as much as possible with members and partners to ensure minilateral formats complement, rather than compete with, the alliance. Moreover, NATO should consider how it can more effectively apply the lessons of these formats to its partnership policy to craft a more flexible approach. This includes lessons from previous efforts to create flexible formats within the alliance.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Deficit – Multilat Key
Nunes 20 Isabel Ferreira Nunes, Head of the Research Centre and former Deputy Director of the National Defence Institute, Portugal, PhD Political Science, University of Twente, postdoc International Relations, University of Groningen, “Prospects for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation,” National Defence Institute, June 2020, /GoGreen!
The development of this new European strategic approach reveals a constant tension between two political centres, within which engagement in collaborative crisis management can happen. That of Brussels, calling for further security and defence integration, while cooperating with NATO and that of capable and willing European member states interested in preserving their sovereignty and strategic autonomy. These developments towards what sometimes appears to generate conflicting courses of action, has produced a layered system where cooperation occurs in different configurations. These configurations coexist and sometimes compete with formal organizations such as the EU/CSDP and NATO and the cooperative framework that result from EU-NATO Joint Declarations of 2016 and 2018. This system of security governance is a three-layered system where multilateralism, minilateralism and strategic bilateralism coexist, allowing participants to accommodate goals, benefits and security practices that emanate at the EU and NATO level, with those driven by particular national interests.
Each serves a different collaborative purpose. Multilateralism20 in the framework of cooperative security arrangements comprehends a majority of participants in a given security regime21 for instance that of the UN, NATO or EU, leading to the development of formal and long-lasting cooperation and coordination among states and organizations. Conversely, minilateralism comprises a few like-minded and willing participants, with similar national interests and approaches to foreign and security policy, as well as identical operational output. Distinctive from multilateralism and minilateralism, “strategic bilateralism” (Renard 2016, p. 14) involves particular forms of selective engagement of strategically able and willing participants with self-interested motives in converging security views and policies, whether those are defence and security policies or security issue-based concerns such as terrorism, cyber or hybrid threats.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Deficit – Multilat Key
Thaler 16 David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, /GoGreen!
Three other limitations or gaps have been raised in numerous discussions with SC personnel in DoD. We indicated above that DoD has been limited in some authorities to working only with foreign forces associated with national defense agencies. Emerging transnational threats and mission areas require the ability to work with interior agency forces or other gendarme or civil authorities when their security forces retain primary responsibility for those mission areas or operate in close collaboration with MoDs. For example, in many cases, the ministry or department of interior is responsible for securing national infrastructure and cyber assets; of six countries CENTCOM officials are engaging on infrastructure security, only in Jordan is the military responsible for protecting the country’s infrastructure.66
A second gap in Title 10 authorities is in the flexibility for DoD to work with regional organizations rather than just bilaterally with national governments. Under Title 10, even regional programs (such as the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund [CTPF]) are implemented bilaterally with national governments. There are no mechanisms for training and equipping regional organizations.67 When this limitation is combined with the limitation on U.S. military engagement with non-MoD security forces, it inhibits the U.S. ability to facilitate coordination among agencies with similar responsibilities within and across partners to have regional effects and to address local security threats.68
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › AT: NB – Cohesion – 1AR
Hopkinson 5 William Hopkinson, former visiting researcher at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, read history at Pembroke College Cambridge, “The Atlantic Crises: Britain, Europe, and Parting from the United States,” Naval War College Newport Papers 23, May 2005, /GoGreen!
Even immediately following the attacks, when for the first time in its history NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, its mutual defense commitment, the United States preferred to deal with its allies bilaterally rather than through the alliance. As regards the actual conduct of operations in Afghanistan, it is understandable that the United States did not use alliance machinery; however, that it did not use NATO as a forum for consultation over what it saw (and sees) as the principal security issue confronting itself and others, and the one through which it appears or purports to view most international affairs, raised major questions about the role of the alliance.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › AT: NB – Cohesion – 2AC
Economist 3 “European defence: Divide and fall,” The Economist, 10-23-2003, /GoGreen!
Are Europe and America having doubts about their decades-long habits of common defence? America's ambassador to NATO darkly describes the current spat between NATO and the European Union (and for that matter within the EU itself), over what military things Europeans might plot to do together and where they might plot them, as “one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship”. France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, who started the quarrel by announcing that the EU should build its own operational-planning headquarters in Tervuren, a previously inoffensive suburb of Brussels, claim that causing a rift in the alliance could not be further from their minds. But more is at stake than bricks and mortar. How the row is settled will affect the way Europe and America can work together in the future.
They have supposedly already agreed on many of the basics: that Europe's armies should boost their limited firepower, for example; and that the EU should be able to act independently of NATO in cases where the alliance, with right of first refusal, chooses not to be involved itself. Indeed a painstakingly worked-out formula, finalised in March, enables the EU to use NATO equipment for these sorts of military operations, as is already happening in the Lilliputian mission the Europeans have taken over from NATO in Macedonia. There is even general agreement that the EU should be able to plan for its own military operations.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › AT: Spill-Up
Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, /GoGreen!
Despite this impressive list, NATO’s partnership mechanisms are not currently achieving their full potential and are due for a rethink. Many major issues are being neglected. This is not to say that partners no longer play a role in NATO’s operations and priorities. On the contrary, some—such as Sweden and Finland— are about as closely integrated in NATO’s planning as they could possibly be short of membership. But, as is also true with Georgia and Ukraine, most of these activities take place in bilateral or trilateral formats, although these countries are also part of other, larger partnership frameworks.
This reality reveals some flaws in NATO’s partnership policy. There are not only redundancies, but many of the broader frameworks have lost momentum and purpose. Many formats lack clear processes and goals, lumping together diverse groups of nations that have very different hopes and expectations in how they engage with NATO. In addition, formats like the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which aim to catalyze broader cooperation beyond the traditional Euro-Atlantic area, continue to fall short of their intended purpose and lack a clear agenda for the future. While these frameworks demonstrate their usefulness by building political ties and space for dialogue, they are less effective when it comes to driving actual outcomes that benefit NATO’s interests or strategy, or those of its partner countries.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › AT: Spill-Up
Donaghy 16 Aaron Donaghy, Visiting Scholar 2016-2017 & EU Marie Curie Global Fellow, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, “Panel 3: Europe’s Security and Foreign Policy Challenges,” Summit on the Future of Europe 2016, Europe and the Forces of Disunion, Executive Summary, 2016, /GoGreen!
Rawi Abdelal, Herbert F. Johnson Professor of International Management at Harvard Business School and Director of Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, warned of the trend towards bilateralism at the expense of multilateralism. The ability of European institutions to multilateralize challenges was one of the foundations of its long history of success. Now, however, there is an increasing danger of the United States negotiating bilaterally rather than on collective terms (e.g. defense and trade arrangements), bypassing Brussels in the process. The spread of bilateralism is a growing threat to transatlantic security cooperation, particularly in lieu of recent Russian activities in what it sees as its sphere of influence. Abdelal points out, however, that Russia also has its weaknesses. Chief among them is its heavy dependence on the European market. He cites the example of Gazprom, the state-run gas company, whose supply of fuels to Europe provides Russia with roughly two-thirds of its government revenue.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Perm: Do Both – 1AR
--MDC = multinational defense cooperation
Németh 14 Bence Németh, Teaching fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, “Why won't Europeans use NATO and the EU?” Friends of Europe, 3-19-2014, /GoGreen!
Instead of using NATO and EU institutional frameworks, European nations have recently established a series of new regional ‘multinational defence co-operations’ (MDCs) and reenergised old ones. Although policymakers and analysts support all kinds of defence co-operation, they have not taken into consideration the negative consequences of unstructured defence collaborations. For instance, if the emerging regional MDCs do not prove successful, they will hinder defence co-operation in Europe in general, including within NATO and the EU, as nations become even less willing to work with larger organisations where co-operation is slower and more complicated.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Perm: Do Both – 2AC
--MDC = multinational defense cooperation
Németh 14 Bence Németh, Teaching fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, “Why won't Europeans use NATO and the EU?” Friends of Europe, 3-19-2014, /GoGreen!
Although regional MDCs have been proliferating and strengthening in Europe, they remain fragile and this fragility will have a significant impact on the landscape of European defence. The weakness of regional MDCs is that they are driven mostly by national Ministries of Defence and do not have a well-grounded, strategically sophisticated background for collaboration. Countries often co-operate on defence issues without defining their common foreign policy goals. This can undermine the raison d’être of defence cooperation, even in the short-term, and cause significant problems in situations where participating states of regional MDCs are divided on the necessity of military action.