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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Democracy Impacts
Nanda ‘20
Biren Nanda was the Ambassador of India to the Republic of Indonesia, Timor Leste and ASEAN from 2008 to 2012 and High Commissioner of India to Australia from 2012 to 2015. He has previously served as as a diplomat in Indian Missions in Singapore, Beijing, Shanghai, Washington, D.C., and Tokyo. He was the Consul General of India in Shanghai from 1996–2000, Deputy Chief of Mission in the Embassy of India in Tokyo from 2000–2004. He was a Senior Fellow in the Delhi Policy Group from 2016 to 2019. The Geopolitical Consequences of a pandemic – The Interpreter -Published 16 Jun 2020 - - https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/geopolitical-consequences-pandemic
A once-in-a-century pandemic has the potential to unleash an epochal geopolitical churn. There are major risks from potential conflict triggered by tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran or from a conflict of interests between the US and Russia in the Middle East. Iran might exacerbate existing tensions by moving perceptibly closer towards a nuclear weapons capability or by activating its proxies as a response to extreme stress from the sanctions and the pandemic. Such a conflict might draw in the US and Israel, leading to a wider conflagration.
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Hybrid War Bad
Bert Chapman, Government Information, Political Science, and Economics Librarian and Professor of Library Science at Purdue University, “Recent U.S. and International Assessment of Baltic Security Developments”, Security and Defence Quarterly ISSN 2300-8741 eISSN 2544-994X 2019 September Volume 26 Number 4, https://securityanddefence.pl/Recent-U-S-and-International-Assessment-of-Baltic-Security-Developments,112252,0,2.html
Various U.S. military branches also recognize the importance of the Baltic to emerging U.S. national security interests, with this being reflected in their analyses of European geopolitical trends since 2014. A 2016 compilation published by National Defense University Press noted that Russian leaders could engage in military intervention to “protect” Russian minorities in neighboring states such as the Baltics, that Russian territorial seizure of territory in the Baltics would impose a military escalation burden on the United States including using nuclear weapons, that NATO countries must strike a delicate balance between reassuring Baltic allies and deterring Russian miscalculation while also calming tensions, and noting that Russia has recently deployed short-range SS-26 Iskander ballistic missiles to Kaliningrad adjacent to the Baltics. This work asserted that Russian attempts to destabilize the Baltics with a Crimean variant hybrid operation could result in NATO’s Article 5 being invoked, that Russia could overrun the Baltic countries within 48-72 hours but with the price of prompting a NATO response that Moscow could not maintain and shake Finnish and Swedish neutrality, that NATO battalions should have forward-based ground units possessing short-range air defense capability and the ability to eliminate offensive Russian military action from Putin’s strategic calculus, that Russian air defenses at Kaliningrad, Severomorsk, and St. Petersburg cover airspace encompassing and endangering Finland, the Baltic States, northern and southern Sweden, northern Norway, Poland, and eastern Germany, and the belief of Nordic states that hybrid war in the Baltics is the most likely regional flashpoint between the West and Russia (Charting a Course: Strategic Choices for a New Administration 2016, pp. 4, 103, 209, 238, 240-241, 360).
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Hybrid War Bad
Łukasz Kulesa, Research Director at the European Leadership Network, “Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability”, Feb 2018, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/180213-Envisioning-a-Russia-NATO-Conflict.pdf
“Hybrid” scenarios: trigger for conflict? One can envisage a number of “hybrid” scenarios of Russia-NATO conflict where operations which started in the cyber, economic, criminal, or “active measure” domains, below the threshold of conflict, trigger a military response or are followed by the physical use of force. As noted in the discussion on the definitions of a conflict, the threshold between crisis and military conflict may not be explicitly stated or otherwise clear to all sides; and it may also be ignored during a crisis. This aspect is especially relevant in the current period of increased interference in the internal affairs of NATO countries attributed to Russia and of the high volume of information ‘warfare’ between Russia and NATO countries. Russia remains vigilant about foreign interference in its internal affairs and the threat of subversion leading to a severe destabilization of the regime. In the past, Moscow has made accusations about foreign sponsorship of Chechen and radical Islamic terrorists targeting Russia, and has alleged the existence of training camps on the territories of NATO states for activists planning colour revolutions in Ukraine and Belarus. In the extreme circumstances of a crisis, if the Russian leadership became convinced that a non-military campaign against it (which might also involve cyber activities and what Russia calls attempts to instigate colour revolutions) had intensified, this could lead to a military response. “One needs to be wary of interpreting all disturbing developments as part of a grand Russian plan.” With regards to NATO, some of its members’ views mirror the Russian assessment that we are already in a state of conflict, in which the boundary between peace and war is blurred, and that their defences are being actively attacked through nonmilitary means. They are thus concerned about a scenario in which Russia initiates an attack that moves swiftly from non-military to military means. This scenario should be not dismissed. At the same time, one needs to be wary of interpreting all disturbing developments as part of a grand Russian plan culminating in a provocation or use of force. So there should be prudence before any country presses the “panic button” at the national or NATO / European Union level. There should also be close analysis of early warning indicators related to the gravity, intensity and diversity of incidents and to connections between them. The overall political context and state of the RussiaNATO relationship would also be important: what would be the political and strategic reasons for Russia to move from sub-threshold to abovethreshold activities? Individual NATO countries would have a decisive role in how some of the “hybrid” scenarios would play out. An Ally can choose to play down or up the importance of certain developments and incidents; it can seek NATO and/or EU support, decide to respond individually (including through actions that are escalatory), or use a mix of both approaches. The Ally’s overall reputation and patterns of international behaviour can matter for determining whether its “frontline” intelligence and assessments are to be trusted. But given the danger of alliance entrapment, NATO also needs to have multiple channels for corroborating the evidence and assessing developments. Escalation: Can a NATO - Russia conflict be managed? Once a conflict was under way, the “fog of war” and rising unpredictability would inevitably set in, complicating the implementation of any predetermined theories of escalation, deescalation and inter-conflict management. The actual dynamics of a conflict and the perceptions of the stakes involved are extremely difficult to predict. Simulations and table-top exercises can give only limited insights into the actual decisionmaking processes and interactions. Still, Russian military theorists and practitioners seem to assume that a conflict with NATO can be managed and controlled in a way that would bring it to a swift end consistent with Russian aims. The Russian theory of victory would seek to exploit weak points in an Alliance war effort. Based on the conviction that democracies are weak and their leaders and populations are risk-averse, Russia may assume that its threats of horizontal or vertical escalation could be particularly effective. It would also try to bring home the notion that it has much higher stakes in the conflict (regime survival) than a majority of the NATO members involved, and thus will be ready to push the boundaries of the conflict further. It would most likely try to test and exploit potential divisions within the Alliance, combining selective diplomacy and activation of its intelligence assets in some NATO states with a degree of selectivity in terms of targets of particular attacks. Any NATO-Russia conflict would inevitably have a nuclear dimension. The role of nuclear weapons as a tool for escalation control for Russia has been thoroughly debated by experts, but when and how Russia might use (and not merely showcase or activate) nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an open question. Beyond catch phrases such as “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” there are a wider range of options for Russian nuclear weapon use. For example, a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal. It could be directed against a purely military target or a military-civilian one. Detonation could be configured for an EMP effect. A “false flag” attack is also conceivable. These options might be used to signal escalation and could significantly complicate NATO’s responses. Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. It is less clear how far the Alliance would be willing to escalate the conflict to achieve these goals, and what mechanisms and means it would use while trying to maintain some degree of control over the conflict. The goals and methods of waging a conflict with Russia would probably have to be limited in order to avoid a massive nuclear exchange. Such limitations would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an approach could put too much restraint on NATO’s operations: the Russian regime’s stability may ultimately need to be threatened in order to force the leadership into terminating the conflict. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve, and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover, individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation. With regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on nuclear targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the threshold after first use. Relying on concepts of escalation control and on lessons from the Cold War confrontation might be misleading. The circumstances in which a Russia -NATO conflict would play out would be radically different from the 20th century screenplay. Moreover, instead of gradual (linear) escalation or salami tactics escalation, it is possible to imagine surprizing “leap frog” escalation, possibly connected with actions in different domains (e.g. a cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Hybrid War Bad
Max Fisher, American journalist and columnist based in Washington, D.C. in the field of political science and social science, June 29th 2015,“How World War III became possible: A nuclear conflict with Russia is likelier than you think” https://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war
VI. How it would happen: The fog of hybrid war In early 2015, Pew pollsters asked citizens of several NATO states the exact question that analysts and policymakers from Washington to Moscow are gaming out: "If Russia got into a serious military conflict with one of its neighboring countries that is our NATO ally, do you think our country should or should not use military force to defend that country?" The numbers from Western Europe were alarming: Among Germans, only 38 percent said yes; 58 percent said no. If it were up to German voters — and to at least some extent, it is — NATO would effectively surrender the Baltics to Russia in a conflict. This poll is even worse than it looks. It assumes that Russia would launch an overt military invasion of the Baltics. What would actually happen is something far murkier, and far more likely to leverage European hesitation: the playbook from Ukraine, where Russia deployed its newly developed concepts of postmodern "hybrid war," designed to blur the distinction between war and not-war, to make it as difficult as possible to differentiate grassroots unrest or vigilante cyberattacks from Russian military aggression. Putin may already be laying the groundwork. In March of 2014, shortly after Russia had annexed Crimea, Putin gave a speech there pledging to protect Russians even outside of Russia, which many took as a gesture to the substantial Russian minorities in the Baltics. Then, in October, Putin warned that "open manifestations of neo-Nazism" had "become commonplace in Latvia and other Baltic states" — repeating the language that he and Russian state media had earlier used to frighten Russian speakers in Ukraine into taking up arms. This April, several Russian outlets issued spurious reports that Latvia was planning to forcibly relocate ethnic Russians into Nazi-style ghettos — an echo of similar scaremongering Russian propaganda broadcast in the runup in Ukraine. Martin Hurt, a former senior official of the country's defense ministry, warned that his country's ethnic Russian minority could be "receptive to Kremlin disinformation." Moscow, he said, could generate unrest "as a pretext to use military force against the Baltic states." In early 2007, Estonia's parliament voted to relocate a Soviet-era military statue, the Bronze Soldier, that had become a cultural symbol and annual rallying point for the country's ethnic Russians. In response, Russian politicians and state media accused the Estonian government of fascism and Nazi-style discrimination against ethnic Russians; they issued false reports claiming ethnic Russians were being tortured and murdered. Protests broke out and escalated into riots and mass looting. One person was killed in the violence, and the next day hackers took many of the country's major institutions offline. Russia could do it again, only this time gradually escalating further toward a Ukraine-style conflict. NATO is just not built to deal with such a crisis. Its mutual defense pledge, after all, rests on the assumption that war is a black-and-white concept, that a country is either at war or not at war. Its charter is from a time when war was very different than it is today, with its many shades of gray. Russia can exploit this flaw by introducing low-level violence that more hawkish NATO members would consider grounds for war but that war-averse Western European states might not see that way. Disagreement among NATO's member states would be guaranteed as they hesitated over where to declare a moment when Russia had crossed the line into war. Meanwhile, Russian state media, which has shown real influence in Western Europe, would unleash a flurry of propaganda to confuse the issue, make it harder to pin blame on Moscow for the violence, and gin up skepticism of any American calls for war. Germany, which is widely considered the deciding vote on whether Europe would go to war, would be particularly resistant to going to war. The legacy of World War II and the ideology of pacifism and compromise make even the idea of declaring war on Russia unthinkable. German leaders would come under intense political pressure to, if not reject the call to arms, then at least delay and negotiate — a de facto rejection of NATO's collective self-defense. In such a scenario, it is disturbingly easy to imagine how NATO's European member states could split over whether Russia had even crossed their red line for war, much less whether to respond. Under a fog of confusion and doubt, Russia could gradually escalate until a Ukraine-style conflict in the Baltics was foregone, until it had marched far across NATO's red line, exposing that red line as meaningless. But the greatest danger of all is if Putin's plan were to stumble: By overreaching, by underestimating Western resolve to defend the Baltics, or by starting something that escalates beyond his control, it could all too easily lead to full-blown war. "That kind of misperception situation is definitely possible, and that’s how wars start," Saideman said, going on to compare Europe today with 1914, just before World War I. "The thing that makes war most thinkable is when other people don’t think it’s thinkable."
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Hybrid War Impacts --- Populism
Manfred Kohler 20, founder of the Regulatory Institute, “The Need for Global Protections Against Existential Risks,” The Regulatory Review, 6/11/20, https://www.theregreview.org/2020/06/11/kohler-need-global-protections-against-existential-risks/
As bad as the social and economic impact of the new coronavirus is, it could be worse. It could kill everyone it infects. A scenario with such a fully fatal virus would be known as an existential risk because it would threaten all human life on the planet.
Global nuclear war and climate change might also be other possible existential risks—although some contention still exists over the degree to which these would annihilate the entire planet. But almost no one disputes that a meteorite crashing into Earth could do so by suddenly and drastically altering the climate. Furthermore, experts also agree that still more deadly pathogens—viruses and bacteria—could pose such an existential risk.
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Hybrid War Impacts --- Populism
Maya Kandel and Caroline Gondaud 19, Kandel is a French policy planner, in charge of U.S. and transatlantic issues, and associate researcher at Université Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3, Gondaud is a French policy planner, dealing with European issues, “POPULISM, THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS, AND THE FUTURE OF E.U. FOREIGN POLICY,” War on the Rocks, 6/11/19, https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/populism-the-european-elections-and-the-future-of-e-u-foreign-policy/
Populism has never been so scrutinized, analyzed, and questioned. One aspect of populism, however, remains less studied: its impact on countries’ foreign policies and on their interstate relations in an international system in flux. There is no single “populist foreign policy,” but populism impacts foreign policies: It holds a particular vision of international relations, a vision that carries increasing weight amid today’s tumultuous attempts to redefine the international system.
In this article, we consider populism not just as a rhetorical expression of protest, but as a political project, both illustrating and responding to a crisis of politics within contemporary democracies — in short, as a phenomenon carrying a political vision. We view populism in foreign policy as offering an alternative view of international relations, one that articulates the main criticism of the contemporary international system, its institutions, and its operating rules — what is commonly referred to as the “liberal international order.” In this sense, populism in foreign policy also encompasses challenges to this order brought by “revisionist” states, especially Russia and China.
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Hybrid War Impacts --- Populism
Scott Lawless 20, MA in international security, University of Denver, Summer 2020, “American Grand Strategy for an Emerging World Order,” https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-14_Issue-2/Lawless.pdf
The liberal order faces political challenges that involve unconventional political warfare to weaken democratic regimes as well as a “clash of social models” between liberal and neo-authoritarian states.16 Political warfare “refers to the employment of military, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and other means short of conventional war to achieve national objectives.”17 Its current “hybrid” adaptation is unconventional in that it involves tactics such as the weaponization of traditional and social media, sophisticated propaganda, and the widespread use of disinformation campaigns to sway public opinion, discredit liberal politicians, and sow distrust for democratic institutions. Russia, for instance, is actively “exploit[ing] European and transatlantic fissures and support[ing] populist movements to undermine European Union and NATO cohesion.”18 Meanwhile, China is targeting the United States’ companies, government, and allies as part of its ongoing cyber-espionage campaign to steal trade secrets, intellectual property, and advanced technology. What’s more, the political order is experiencing a clash of social models in which states such as Russia and China “believe in the virtues of a strong central government and disdain the weaknesses of the democratic system.”19 Thus, collective political convergence has never been realized because autocratic leaders “concluded that if the liberal order succeeded globally, it would pose an existential threat to their regimes.”20
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Russia War Terminals
Sebastian Farquhar 17, leads the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective Altruism, et al., 2017, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf
The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter.
According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns.
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › A2: No Hybrid War
George Beebe 19, vice president and director of studies at the Center for the National Interest, a nonpartisan think tank in Washington. He is also the former head of Russia analysis at the CIA, “We’re More at Risk of Nuclear War With Russia Than We Think,” Politico, 10/7/19, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/10/07/were-more-at-risk-of-nuclear-war-with-russia-than-we-think-229436
In the 1950s and 1960s, Americans genuinely and rightly feared the prospect of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Schoolchildren regularly participated in air raid drills. Federal, state and local governments prepared for operations in the event of a nuclear emergency. More than a few worried citizens built backyard bomb shelters and stockpiled provisions.
Today, that old dread of disaster has all but disappeared, as have the systems that helped preclude it. But the actual threat of nuclear catastrophe is much greater than we realize. Diplomacy and a desire for global peace have given way to complacency and a false sense of security that nuclear escalation is outside the realm of possibility. That leaves us unprepared for—and highly vulnerable to—a nuclear attack from Russia.
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- NATO Cohesion Impacts
Fisher 15 – Fisher, Vox Foreign Affairs Editor (Max, “How World War III Became Possible”, 6-29, )
Europe today looks disturbingly similar to the Europe of just over 100 years ago, on the eve of World War I. It is a tangle of military commitments and defense pledges, some of them unclear and thus easier to trigger. Its leaders have given vague signals for what would and would not lead to war. Its political tensions have become military buildups. Its nations are teetering on an unstable balance of power, barely held together by a Cold War–era alliance that no longer quite applies. If you take a walk around Washington or a Western European capital today, there is no feeling of looming catastrophe. The threats are too complex, with many moving pieces and overlapping layers of risk adding up to a larger danger that is less obvious. People can be forgiven for not seeing the cloud hanging over them, for feeling that all is well — even as in Eastern Europe they are digging in for war. But this complacency is itself part of the problem, making the threat more difficult to foresee, to manage, or, potentially, to avert. There is a growing chorus of political analysts, arms control experts, and government officials who are sounding the alarm, trying to call the world's attention to its drift toward disaster. The prospect of a major war, even a nuclear war, in Europe has become thinkable, they warn, even plausible. What they describe is a threat that combines many of the hair-trigger dangers and world-ending stakes of the Cold War with the volatility and false calm that preceded World War I — a comparison I heard with disturbing frequency. They describe a number of ways that an unwanted but nonetheless major war, like that of 1914, could break out in the Eastern European borderlands. The stakes, they say, could not be higher: the post–World War II peace in Europe, the lives of thousands or millions of Eastern Europeans, or even, in a worst-case scenario that is remote but real, the nuclear devastation of the planet.
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- NATO Cohesion Impacts
Binnendijk 19 “5 consequences of a life without NATO”Hans Binnendijk - Distinguished Fellow, Transatlantic Security Initiative, March 19, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/19/5-consequences-of-a-life-without-nato/
NATO’s retirement would thirdly exacerbate divisions within Europe. NATO’s glue not only holds European militaries together — it provides the principal forum to discuss and coordinate security issues. The European Union is unlikely to substitute for NATO in this respect because it has no military structure, few capabilities and no superpower leadership to bring divergent views together.
Germany and France already seek a plan B should NATO collapse, but without the United Kingdom in the European Union, an all-European approach is likely to fail. The added insecurity of NATO’s collapse would also amplify current populist movements in Europe. The consequence could be renationalization of European militaries, a system that brought conflict to the 19th and early 20th centuries.
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- NATO Cohesion Impacts
Klare 17 – Michael Klare, Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College, “Escalation Watch: Four Global Hotspots for Trump”, Asia Times, 1-20, http://www.atimes.com/article/escalation-watch-four-global-hotspots-trump/
Within months of taking office, President Donald Trump is likely to face one or more major international crises, possibly entailing a risk of nuclear escalation. Not since the end of the Cold War has a new chief executive been confronted with as many potential flashpoints involving such a potential for explosive conflict.
This proliferation of crises has been brewing for some time, but the situation appears especially ominous now given Trump’s pledge to bring American military force swiftly to bear on any threats of foreign transgression. With so much at risk, it’s none too soon to go on a permanent escalation watch, monitoring the major global hotspots for any sign of imminent flare-ups, hoping that early warnings (and the outcry that goes with them) might help avert catastrophe.
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- NATO Cohesion Impacts
Brzezinski 6/1 - Ian Brzezinski is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council focusing on the Transatlantic Security Initiative and the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is the Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy, 2020 (“NATO’s role in a transatlantic strategy on China”, available online at , The Atlantic Council)
On the eve of the NATO Summit in London last December, the Alliance’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg addressed the need for a collective response to China’s emergence as a global power. “This is not about moving NATO into the South China Sea,” he stated, “but it’s about taking into account that China is coming closer to us—in the Arctic, in Africa, investing heavily in our infrastructure in Europe, in cyberspace.” At the summit, NATO heads of state diplomatically declared that China has become a concern: “we recognize that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.”
Indeed, it is hard, if not impossible, for NATO to avoid China. Beijing presents a full spectrum challenge to the transatlantic community—a challenge whose potential mirrors, if not surpasses, that once posed by the former Soviet Union. China’s $14 trillion economy is expected to soon surpass that of the United States, and Beijing exercises that might in a predatory fashion around the globe, including in the United States and Europe. China threatens to boycott companies and countries that criticize its policies, leverages its debt instruments against poor nations, and is buying up critical infrastructure around the world. Its acquisition of European ports has raised concerns of top NATO commanders who warn that such ownership could adversely affect the Alliance’s ability to use those facilities in times of crisis.
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- NATO Cohesion Impacts
Dr. A. Wess Mitchell 10, President of the Center for European Policy Analysis, Doctorate in Political Science from the Otto Suhr Institut für Politikwissenschaft at Freie Universität, Master’s Degree from the Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and Robert Kron, Research Association at the Center for European Policy Analysis, 2/1/2010, “Counting the Costs of Insecurity in North Central Europe”, http://www.cepa.org/ced/view.aspx?record_id=219
America’s deprioritization of allies creates opportunities for revisionist powers. Such transition is recurrent in geopolitics; international relations are always characterized by uncertainty. Policy makers have to navigate a landscape that is often difficult to delineate, full of strategic actors whose purposes are often obscure and whose power is difficult to assess. Intentions are notoriously hard to divine, in part because rival states obfuscate them but in part because often the states themselves do not have a clear and consistent perception of what they want to achieve. Uncertainty arises also out of a more quantifiable source of knowledge, an assessment of hard power, which is imperfect and results in widely different estimates. It is sufficient to recall the challenges of assessing Soviet power throughout the Cold War.
Moments characterized by alleged large shifts in relative power present particularly acute problems of assessing power and intentions, adding an additional layer of ambiguity and uncertainty. Rumors of change put in doubt the relatively well- known, or at least familiar, geopolitical situation. All parties involved are unsure about their position relative to the others, the extent of their political sway, and the match between their commitments and their power. The established great powers may have a crisis of confidence, while emboldened rising states are uncertain how far their influence extends as well as how solid and credible is the power reach of their weakening rival. Revisionist powers now openly but cautiously question what was the grudgingly accepted geopolitical status quo.
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Attribution K2 NATO Cohesion
Brunner 22 --- Isabella Brunner, PhD Candidate in International Law, Researcher and Lecturer at University of Vienna, “The Prospects for an International Attribution Mechanism for Cyber Operations – An Analysis of Existing Approaches”, Date written: Date Written: July 3, 2020, Date Published: 11 Feb 2022, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3986297
To summarise, there is potential within the EU’s Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox and its newly adopted sanctions regime, NATO’s alliance and the US Cyber Deterrence Initiative, to tackle the ‘attribution problem’. These collective mechanisms might help release the burden of attribution by one state and increase the political pressure on the alleged wrongful state, which might even perhaps deter future ‘malicious’ cyber incidents. However, the biggest issue for collective attribution seems to be a lack of trust between states, which, in turn, hinders them to take collective action. Without having the possibility to assess the evidence regarding attribution by other states themselves and the fact that states usually underline that there is no international obligation to share evidence, 65 states will most likely be reluctant to support attribution claims. Closely interlinked with this is the question whether common evidentiary standards might be helpful to solve this problem. In any event, states will tend to refuse to attribute if doing so could potentially harm their international relations with the alleged wrongful state. The lack of technical expertise and insecure cyber defence systems within some states compared to other technologically well-equipped states does not help with building trust either. Hence why capacity-building is crucial, also for a collective attribution effort. To conclude, although there seems to be potential within the above-mentioned mechanisms, it is questionable whether states will make use of them or remain fairly reluctant to attribute.
2022
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Attribution K2 NATO Cohesion
Brunner 22 --- Isabella Brunner, PhD Candidate in International Law, Researcher and Lecturer at University of Vienna, “The Prospects for an International Attribution Mechanism for Cyber Operations – An Analysis of Existing Approaches”, Date written: Date Written: July 3, 2020, Date Published: 11 Feb 2022, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3986297
In cases of cyber operations below the threshold of an armed attack, Article 4 of the Washington Treaty calls on the NATO members to ‘consult together’ if the ‘territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened’. 47 Here as well, attribution is important. The process of consultation includes exchanging information and opinions, 48 and might also be used to discuss the attribution of the act to a state prior to launching a collaborative NATO operation. Article 4 thus likewise enables the sharing of intelligence especially in the context of cyber attribution.49 At least once, NATO has arguably already joined a collective attribution initiated by the Dutch and British governments in the cyber context, condemning the Russian hacking activities against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in 2018.50 There is, however, no public information available whether NATO resorted to Article 4 in this context, nor whether it considered adhering to any evidentiary standards for attributing the act to Russia.
The consultation process can, in some circumstances, lead to a joint decision or action, 51 which may include condemning acts of the wrongful state (after having attributed the activity successfully). It is clear, however, that this would have to happen in consensus with all NATO allies, which could require that – especially in the context of attribution – all NATO members are equally equipped with the necessary information and capacities to make a profound decision. To build this community of trust where NATO members can share information without hesitation, the NATO Cyber Defence Pledge was adopted at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, where member states pledged to invest in the improvement of their national cyber defence capabilities. According to the NATO website, ‘almost all Allies have upgraded their cyber defences’ since adopting the Pledge.52 Measures such as these further facilitate intelligence sharing between states, as states with a higher level of security will trust other ‘more cyber capable Allies’ more than those with less secure cyber defense mechanisms. 53
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › A2: Attribution Bad --- Increases Attack Risk
Lindsay 15 --- Jon Lindsay, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto “Tipping the scales: the attribution problem and the feasibility of deterrence against cyberattack”, Journal of Cybersecurity, Volume 1, Issue 1, September 2015, Pages 53–67, https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyv003 Published: 28 November 2015 https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/1/1/53/2354517
Furthermore, attribution is not required for punishment. A minefield, if advertised, protects an area from intruders whether they are known to the defender or not, since the trespasser selects a very specific punishment by the act of stepping on a mine. Defensive deception similarly turns the attacker’s ability to penetrate a system against the attacker, by enabling the intruder’s effort to trigger his own punishment or simply creating paranoia that he may have done so [ 16 ]. States often punish whole villages or classes of people when individual guerrillas cannot be brought to justice. This is not only unpopular but also expensive because a lot more force must be expended over a larger area. Indiscriminate punishment is usually a less effective deterrent or warfighting instrument in civil war than targeting killing [ 72 ], and may even counterproductively embolden insurgents, but it certainly does not depend on attribution. Likewise, a victim of cyber attack who wanted to punish some attackers could cease digital transactions with all trading partners or start attacking all suspects. Doing so, however, would quickly undermine the benefits that made internet exchange worthwhile in the first place and would be very unpopular. Inflicting even small punishments on a large number of suspects can be difficult to execute (so to speak) as well as politically illegitimate.
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › A2: Attribution Bad --- Increases Attack Risk
Lindsay 15 --- Jon Lindsay, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto “Tipping the scales: the attribution problem and the feasibility of deterrence against cyberattack”, Journal of Cybersecurity, Volume 1, Issue 1, September 2015, Pages 53–67, https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyv003 Published: 28 November 2015 https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/1/1/53/2354517
Attribution is not the same as punishment. It might be if the attacker really cares about a reputation for integrity: concerns about plausible deniability in covert action often turn on executive worries about blowback from domestic constituents, political rivals, and friendly allies as much as sanctioning by the victim. However, since retaliation can be costly for the one administering the punishment as well as the punished, a victim may decide not to do anything even after attribution if the costs and risks of punishing are too great. China conducts pervasive cyber espionage against Western interests, and there is good evidence available publicly and in US intelligence circles that the Chinese state is responsible, but so far naming and shaming actions have had little effect. The USA has had no stomach for more serious sanctions thus far, even as it routinely attributes Chinese (or Russian or Iranian) intrusions.
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › A2: Attribution Impossible
Susan Davis 19. United States, General Rapporteur. Science and Technology Committee (STC). NATO in the Cyber Age: Strengthening Security & Defence, Stabilising Deterrence. . 148 STC 19 E rev. 1 fin. https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2019-10/REPORT%20148%20STC%2019%20E%20rev.%201%20fin%20%20-%20NATO%20IN%20THE%20CYBER%20AGE.pdf
15. However, in recent years, governments, private companies, and research organisations have increased their ability to attribute attacks at higher levels of confidence. Forensic tools have improved, and private and state analysts have built up databases and characteristic patterns for known intruders. On a technical level, truly harmful cyber attacks are very complicated and involve many moving pieces. Thus, the more complicated the cyber attack, the more likely the attacker is to commit mistakes along the way, enabling a forensics expert to trace the origin of the attack (Lindsay, 2015). Indeed, governments within the Alliance and beyond are increasingly attributing malicious cyber incidents to states and their proxies. Such transparency on cyber incidents is increasingly collective, coordinated in policy and time, and independent of the scale, nature, or impact of the incident (Giles and Hartmann, 2019). The Rapporteur supports this emerging policy of naming and shaming perpetrators and encourages further conversations at the NATO level.
16. Even if states and their proxies could be confident they will remain anonymous, truly convincing strategic rationales for large-scale surprise attacks are lacking. Anonymous cyber attacks are not well-suited for coercion, for example. Coercion only works if the attacked entity knows whom to yield or make concessions to. As one analyst points out succinctly, “[p]urely anonymous coercion is almost impossible because communicating and understanding the power to hurt implies that there is someone doing the hurting and a target concerned about avoiding getting hurt” (Lindsay, 2015). As a result, if an opponent wishes to coerce through cyber attacks, he cannot hide himself. This would defeat the purpose. How can the victim give in to demands if it does not know who the attacker is? (In contrast, cyber criminals want to stay anonymous when, for example, they attempt to extort money from victims.)
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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › A2: Attribution Impossible
Siim Alatalu 18. Member of NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence’s Strategy Branch, where he is in charge of cyber strategy and policy research and training related to NATO and the EU, as well as providing subject matter expertise to the Centre’s other flagship projects. Prior professional career includes several advisory and managerial positions at the Estonian Ministry of Defence since 2001. “NATO’s responses to Cyberattacks.” https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_148.pdf
Thirdly, NATO’s particular advantage in cyber defence could stem from cooperation with its partner countries and with other international organisations, especially the European Union. Neither the Alliance nor the Union is an island on its own when it comes to cyber threats and vulnerabilities. The EU can do a lot in areas that are relevant for NATO, such as cybersecurity certification of devices imported into and used in European markets. Dependence on non-EU and non-NATO software could become a critical national security concern, as illustrated by for instance the Kaspersky case in the US.24 As highlighted by the recent attributions, there could be a global will for cooperation between NATO and non-NATO countries as any of them could become a target, as well as a bridgehead for further spreads of malicious cyber activities, as demonstrated by the WannaCry and NotPetya attacks.