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2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Internal Link/Impact › Offense – Heg Unsustainable

Heg is unsustainable---retrenchment is gradual now, but recommitting makes it violent and forced.

Kupchan 20, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Charles A., 10-21-2020, "America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President", Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/21/election-2020-smart-retrenchment/)

As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner. Much of the debate surrounding the next administration’s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world. And it’s true: Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement. What’s been largely missing from this debate, however, are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation’s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes. The American electorate has turned sharply inward in response to military overreach in the Middle East, the economic dislocations brought about by innovation and globalization, and the national calamity caused by COVID-19. The nation’s next president would be wise to take note—and craft a brand of global statecraft that is effective but also politically sustainable. Otherwise, the strategic pullback that needs to take place will occur by default rather than by design, risking that U.S. overreach could turn into even more dangerous underreach. Indeed, that’s what’s been happening during Trump’s presidency. He seems to have understood the need to retrench. But his troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Germany have been haphazard, making a hash of the effort. Retrenchment cannot be done by tweet, in unpredictable fits and starts, and couched in an abrasive “America first” unilateralism that has alienated allies and set the world on edge. Democratic candidate Joe Biden is far better suited to restore an equilibrium between the nation’s foreign policy and its political will. Throughout his career, he has been a pragmatic and prudent internationalist; looking forward, pragmatism and prudence will require a more selective and discriminating internationalism, not restoration of the status quo ante. Three-quarters of the American public want U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan and Iraq—it is time to downsize the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. U.S. foreign policy has become over-militarized—the next administration should reallocate priorities and resources, putting more emphasis on diplomacy, cybersecurity, global public health, and climate change. Washington should also return to being a team player if it is to lighten its load; retrenchment and multilateral engagement go hand in hand. Meeting the threat posed by China, managing international trade and finance, preventing nuclear proliferation, addressing pandemics—these and other urgent challenges all require broad international cooperation. And as the United States pulls back from its role as global policeman, it will want like-minded partners to help fill the gap. These partnerships become stronger through diplomacy and teamwork. The top priorities of the next president will be at home: taming the pandemic, repairing the economy, and reviving democratic institutions and norms. Only if the country’s democratic lights come back on can it effectively deal with the rest of the world. In the meantime, the next administration needs to continue Trump’s effort to downsize the nation’s foreign entanglements—but in a smart and measured way. The United States needs to step back without stepping away. “Build back better” applies abroad just as much as it does at home.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Internal Link/Impact › Internal Link Turn – Abandoning NATO wrecks Heg

Abandonment/unilateralism Wrecks US hegemony – removes network of diplomatic and military capabilities and forecloses agenda-setting power to new regional blocs

Kaufmann, Hertie School of Governance; Laius, Postdoctorate at Otto Suhr Institute; 17 (Sonja, Mathis, “Ever closer or lost at sea? Scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations,”

The decline of American hegemony has been proclaimed many times, but the US has continued to be the sole superpower on the block. Yet the 2016 election might go down in history as the turning point – if the new administration follows through with its plan to put ‘America First’ and withdraws from international responsibilities. This policy change puts European collective action capacity to a test, leaving the EU to carry on the torch of liberal values and democracy in the global world order. Following the Brexit shock, EU leaders agree on a communications and legitimacy offensive to fend off populist movements in the wake of Brexit. Europe’s foreign policy apparatus evolves. As the EEAS gains experience and fine-tunes its working relationship with member states and the EU Commission, the changes intended by the Lisbon treaty begin to materialize in practical terms. The center of gravity for day-to-day foreign policy moves to the European level, not least because EU mxembers are happy to consolidate expensive foreign operations. At the same time, the United States decrease their footprint in terms of both diplomatic and military capabilities abroad. US foreign policy focuses on core regions and tasks, which means cutting back on large-scale diplomatic initiatives, early warning and conflict resolution, or intelligence analysis. These policy shifts draw heavy criticism from European allies and the transatlantic relationship suffers − also because the new US administration uses a different tone and style towards the old allies. These organizational and strategic changes are reflected in policy choices. In United Nations negotiations on climate change, the EU is the only actor that comes close to China’s willingness and capacity for leadership. Participants in transatlantic working groups discover that their goals are not aligned. In addition, US negotiators are much less enthusiastic about investing political capital and resources in global governance. UN operational budgets across the board are sharply reduced reflecting a reduction in US contributions that cannot be compensated by others. Thus, while the UN remains a forum for deliberation, its agencies lose practical relevance in global governance. At the same time, the member states of the European Union come to terms with the fact that their transatlantic partner seems less willing to assume a leadership role. A number of governments and the foreign-policy institutions in Brussels take on more responsibility in regional and global affairs. As a result, EU policymakers focus more heavily on inter-regional cooperation with organizations from Africa, Latin America and Asia. A number of so-called ‘intensive partnership’ treaties with regional blocs and individual emerging powers address cross-border issues, such as migration and the fight against crime. In trade and investment, regional arrangements increasingly replace the WTO, which is in hibernation due to the United States’ refusal to champion further trade liberalization on a global scale. NATO suffers from funding cuts and is strictly limited to its core mandate for territorial defense, while the UN Security Council drops from gridlock to paralysis. Military interventions still take place – but only based on ad-hoc coalitions. For the EU this means creating a more deeply integrated but still voluntary defense framework with a focus on security in the near abroad and African countries of strategic interest. A first indicator for this scenario is a shift in US foreign policy from a global leadership role to a few selected initiatives. American agenda-setting power on the global stage is reduced as foreign-policy priorities change, but also because European allies in turn focus on other partners and opportunities. EU-internal changes in the institutional setup and practice of foreign policy are another indicator to consider. The clearest sign of this scenario, however, would be bolder and more controversial European actions on the global arena – both diplomatically and militarily.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Internal Link/Impact › Internal Link Turn – Abandoning NATO wrecks Heg

Lack of American leadership in NATO collapses US hegemony and democracy – power vacuum and global war!

Berlinski 18 – Claire Berlinski is an American journalist, author, and holds a doctorate in International Relations, [“Europe’s Dependence on the U.S. Was All Part of the Plan,” Politico, 7/15/2018,

What Trump fails to understand is that the disparity in spending, with the U.S. paying more than its allies, is not a bug of the system. It is a feature. This is how the great postwar statesmen designed it, and this immensely foresighted strategy has ensured the absence of great power conflict—and nuclear war—for three-quarters of a century. The open, liberal world order we know today was built in the wake of World War II and expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By design, it is led by the United States; by design, it ensures permanent U.S. military hegemony over Eurasia while uniting Europe under the U.S.’ protection. The goal of this American grand strategy is to prevent any single power from dominating the region and turning on the United States and its allies. American hegemony serves, too, to quell previously intractable regional rivalries, preventing further world wars. Dean Acheson, George Marshall and the other great statesmen of their generation pursued this strategy because they had learned, at unimaginable cost, that the eternal American fantasy of forever being free of Europe—isolationism, or America Firstism, in other words—was just that: a fantasy. Four hundred thousand American men lost their lives in the European theaters of the First and Second World Wars. (American fatalities in all of the other 20th-century conflicts—including Vietnam, Korea and the Persian Gulf—do not total one-quarter of that number.) Our postwar statesmen were neither weak nor incompetent. They were the architects of the greatest foreign policy triumph in U.S. history. So successful was this policy that Americans now—most of whom weren’t alive to witness the enormity of these wars—see peace, unity, prosperity and stability as Europe’s natural state. This is an illusion. For centuries, Europe was the fulcrum of global violence. With the age of global exploration, it became the globe’s primary exporter of violence, the tempo and horror of the carnage rising every century with improvements in technology for violence. The Scramble for Africa, the division and colonization of that continent by Europe, is a case in point. The 1884-85 Berlin West Africa Conference, which assembled the representatives of 13 European powers to settle their colonial claims to Africa by diplomacy in place of arms, did lead to peace in Europe for several years. Africans, however, would not recall these years for their exceptional comity. For example, the conference indulged King Léopold II’s claim that the Congo Free State was his private property. Ten million Congolese souls perished under his ministrations. In recognizing this history of blood, however, we must recognize something equally true: In the wake of World War II, liberal democracy saw its fullest realization in the West. This flourishing of peace and human rights cannot be explained by a sudden outbreak of European pacifism. (Consider the 1956 Suez expedition, crushed by an infuriated President Dwight Eisenhower; or the 1954-62 Franco-Algerian War.) It happened because during World War II, Europe destroyed itself, leaving the United States overwhelmingly powerful by comparison, its only rival the Soviet Union. Through the application of economic, diplomatic and military force majeure, the United States suppressed Europe’s internal security competition. This is why postwar Europe ceased to be the world’s leading exporter of violence and became, instead, the world’s leading exporter of luxury sedans. Only America, and massive power as the U.S. exercised it, could have pacified and unified Europe under its aegis. No other continental country possessed half the world’s GDP. No other country had enough distance from Europe to be trusted, to a large extent, by all parties and indifferent to its regional jealousies. No other country had a strategic, moral and economic vision for Europe that its inhabitants could be persuaded gladly to share. Indeed, Europeans cooperated with the U.S. program because it created conditions under which both the United States and Europe flourished. The United States assisted Europe’s postwar economic recovery with $13 billion of aid in the form of the Marshall Plan. (In today’s dollars, roughly $113 billion.) It midwifed the groupings and treaties that would become the European Union. It brought Europe under the U.S. security umbrella with the NATO treaty. Article V of the treaty, its most important element, declares that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all members. These policies were intended not only to counter the Soviet Union, but to condition Europe’s prosperity upon its integration into a single market, with free movement of goods, capital and labor. The founders of these institutions fully intended them to be the foundations of a United States of Europe, much like the United States of America. Profound economic interdependence, they believed, would make further European wars impossible. At the same time, the United States built an open, global order upon an architecture of specific institutions: the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the International Court of Justice. This order is in many respects an empire—a Pax Americana—but it is more humane than any empire that preceded it, with institutions that are intended to benefit all parties. Postwar U.S. statesmen believed that prosperous, liberal democracies that traded freely with each other would neither go to war with each other nor the United States. They ascribed, in other words, to the so-called Democratic Peace theory—a theory with overwhelming empirical support. The U.S. military was always an integral part of the plan to unite and rebuild Europe from the rubble. Since World War II, U.S. troops have been deployed in Eurasia to ensure the continent cannot be dominated by a single power capable of monopolizing its resources and turning them against the U.S. The United States has built overwhelmingly massive military assets there to deter local arms races before they begin, and it has simultaneously assured those under U.S. protection that there is no need to begin local arms races, for their safety is guaranteed. American grand strategy rests upon the credibility of its promise to protect American allies; this credibility rests, in turn, upon U.S. willingness to display its commitment. (The Berlin Airlift, when U.S. troops airlifted supplies to Berlin during a Soviet blockade, was precisely such a display.) In return for the United States’ commitment, U.S. allies have accepted America’s dominant role in the international system. In the postwar era, just as now, the enemies of liberal democracy sought to undermine the order the U.S. was building. Precisely because the Marshall Plan would strengthen and unite the West under the United States’ protection, the Soviet Union’s propaganda organs cranked into overdrive to denounce it. A cartoon, for example, published in Isvestia in 1949, depicted the Marshall Plan’s administrator, Paul Hoffman, as a fat capitalist bent on destroying the sovereignty of European nations. The French paper L'Humanité, which reliably parroted Moscow’s line, wrote, “After disorganizing the national economies of the countries which are under the American yoke, American leaders now intend conclusively to subjugate the economy of these countries to their own interests.” The Soviet Union’s criticism of the Marshall Plan and other American involvement in Europe was eerily similar to the language Russia’s now uses in its campaign to undermine NATO and the EU. The vocabulary and tropes of Russian propaganda are widely echoed, wittingly or unwittingly, by far-right, far-left and other antiliberal politicians, parties and movements throughout the West. With the men who built the postwar world order now in their graves, and the memory of carnage and horror buried with them, a very sizable constituency of Americans has forgotten that their country built this system for a reason—that the United States does not maintain its alliances as an act of foolish largesse. The loudest exponent of the idea that the U.S. is getting rolled, that the European Union was “created to destroy us,” and that multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization assault the “sovereignty” of the nations concerned is, unfortunately, the president of the United States. It’s hard to understate how foolish and reckless these notions are. History can be shoved down the memory hole, for a time, but reality is never so cooperative. Global free trade sustains modern economic life. An interruption to this trade—carried out chiefly on global shipping lanes safeguarded by the U.S. military—would bring modern life to an end. The Second World War proved not only that isolationism and American-Firstism were fantasies, but exceptionally childish and dangerous ones, at that. In the age of hyperglobalized trade, international air travel, the internet, nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, these fantasies are even more childish and dangerous. The U.S. may be on another continent, but it is not on another planet. It is true that the U.S. spends more on its military, in absolute dollars and as a percentage of GDP, than any European country. That was always part of the deal. The U.S. is a global superpower. It can fight a war anywhere in the world, invade any country at will, and (at least in theory) fight multiple simultaneous major wars—even in space. Of course this costs more. It is in America’s advantage to be the only power on the planet that can do this. Conversely, it is not remotely in America’s advantage for other countries to spend as much money on their militaries as we do. Europe is America’s biggest export market, as designed. We want Europeans to spend their money enjoying U.S. goods and services, not razing Flanders to the ground yet again. Yet Trump’s refusal to deter our shared enemies and protect our allies risks provoking a regional European arms race—exactly what the U.S. has sought to avoid for 74 years. It is an invitation to adventurism from Putin. Trump’s refusal to adopt the encouraging language of past presidents toward European integration, language that until now has been transformed into policy by professional and experienced State Department employees, puts further strain on an already-weakened Europe. Above all, Trump’s overt support for sordid, Kremlin-backed actors who seek to undermine Europe’s unity is unfathomable: How could it be in Europe’s interest, or in ours, for the American president to lend the United States’ prestige and support to Europe’s Nazis, neo-Nazis, doctrinal Marxists, populists, authoritarians, and ethnic supremacists, particularly since all of them are ideologically hostile to the United States? The damage Trump has deliberately inflicted on Europe’s stability comes at a uniquely dangerous time. Democracy’s so-called third wave—the global blossoming of open political systems after the Cold War—has long since receded. A threat to liberal democracy, in the form of a distinct, rival ideology—illiberal democracy—is ascendant. We see it today in Russia and Turkey—a corrupt, oligarchic, kleptocratic and hollow form of democracy that spreads and consolidates itself through the new technologies of the 21st century. The global order the U.S. built was based on the principle that only a world of liberal democracies can be peaceful and prosperous. That principle is correct. Should the unraveling of the order the U.S. built proceed at this pace, the world will soon be neither peaceful nor prosperous. Nor will the effects be confined to regions distant from the United States. America will feel them gradually, and then, probably, overnight—in the form of a devastating, sudden shock.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Link › Link Turn - Cyberterror

Turn: NATO key to ward off cyber terrorism

Kupochan 19 – Charles Kupochan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, ["NATO Is Thriving in Spite of Trump," Mar 20, 2019, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-20/nato-thriving-spite-trump]

A VALUABLE ALLIANCE NATO is entering its eighth decade in quite good health because it succeeds admirably in advancing the shared interests of its members. Russian aggression in Ukraine has brought back into focus NATO’s traditional mission of territorial defense. At its 2016 summit, NATO took the prudent step of deploying combat-ready battalions in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The United States has augmented its presence on the eastern flank, and the Trump administration has agreed to increase spending on European defense and deploy additional U.S. troops on the continent. At its 2018 summit, NATO established two new commands to enhance the security of maritime connections between North America and Europe and improve force mobility within Europe. NATO helped end ethnic conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s and has kept troops there ever since to guard the peace. Despite the difficulties and dangers of the mission in Afghanistan, since 2003 NATO has stayed the course, standing by its first and only invocation of Article 5—the commitment to collective defense—which followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The alliance has contributed significantly to the campaign against the Islamic State (or ISIS), providing surveillance aircraft and helping train Iraqi forces. NATO has deployed ships to the Aegean and the Mediterranean to help provide maritime security and address the migration crisis. In addition to these missions, NATO works continuously to build capacity among its many partners. The Partnership for Peace offers training and exercises to Euro-Atlantic nonmembers. Through the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, NATO advises many countries in the broader Middle East, including Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. NATO has cooperation agreements with its global partners, which include Australia, Japan, Korea, and Pakistan. The alliance has already opened the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and is in the midst of establishing a new Cyberspace Operations Centre.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Link › Link Turn – European Security

Turn: Increasing NATO cooperation is imperative – spreading democratic norms, near-perfect HR record, and decades of international peace prove.

Horesh 6/4/22 - Theo Horesh is the author of four books on the psychosocial dynamics of globalization, including The Fascism This Time: And the Global Future of Democracy and a newly revised version of The Holocausts We All Deny: The Crisis Before the Fascism Inferno. He is a democracy advocate who has written hundreds of articles on genocide, climate change, fascism, and human rights. He frequently writes for the Kyiv Post. And he is currently completing his PhD at the University of Leeds, with a thesis on The Retreat from Globalism: And the Reconstruction of the Cosmopolitan Imaginary, [“NATO’s Role in a Peaceful and Socially Democratic Europe,” Modern Diplomacy, 6/4/2022, ]RA

NATO brought peace to the most violent continent on the planet by binding its states together in a collective security pact that forbid them from fighting each other and committed them to coming to one another’s defense. In this way, the emphasis on NATO as a hedge against Russian aggression overlooks its role in bringing peace to its member states and gives the false impression of a zero-sum relationship wherein Russia can win only if Europe loses. Since its establishment in 1949, NATO has created a hedge against potential Russian aggression, but it is far from its only purpose. In keeping Europeans from killing one another, NATO opened the continent to trade and the free movement of peoples, thereby paving the way for the European Union, as Timothy Andrew Sayle points out in his epic history of NATO, Enduring Alliance. It made social-democratic institutions like universal health insurance and paid family leave possible by sharing the costs of defense among a multitude of states. It helped spread democracy by demonstrating that democracies are safe and secure, prosperous and peaceful, in their relations with one another. Thus, an ever increasing array of states sought entry into the club of wealthy democracies as a refuge from violence and disorder. And in bringing such a diversity of peoples together, NATO helped transform some of the most militaristic and nationalistic societies in the world into some of its most peaceful and cosmopolitan. In this way, it probably also played a part in transforming colonial regimes like Britain and France, Portugal and Spain, into normal nation states. If the vast majority of us have forgotten what a danger European states were to one another and how militaristic European societies could be, it is largely due to the way collective security arrangements allowed them to let their guards down. Thus, the idea that NATO is an imperialistic military organization bent on expansion misses the point. NATO was always a critical hedge against the Soviet Union, but when the Berlin Wall fell it remained essential to the institutional architecture at the heart of the European Union. Its abandonment would have come coupled with dramatic increases in military budgets and corresponding decreases in social safety net programs. And it would have brought about the remilitarization of Europe’s most vulnerable states, which it would have set on a quest for new protectors, thereby spurring the creation of new power blocks. In so doing, it might have spelled an end to the fledgling European Dream. Of course, collective security pacts also send a signal to would be aggressors that if they ever did attack, they would be up against several states at once, and in the case of NATO dozens. But NATO has been an astonishingly peaceful military pact. Over the course of its near three-quarters of a century existence, it has carried out only three military interventions, a statebuilding mission in Afghanistan, and a small counter-terrorism operation in Iraq. It stopped the Bosnian Genocide, which had already killed well over hundred thousand people, through a limited bombing campaign in 1995, which killed only 27 civilians. It halted the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, which threatened to displace hundreds of thousands of people, through a more extensive bombing campaign in 1999, which according to Human Rights Watch killed up to 529 Serbian civilians. Finally, NATO helped bring down the Gaddafi regime after he embarked on the most intensive killing spree of any leader in the Arab Spring and then threatened to go “door to door” hunting down the rest. According to Libya’s own ambassador to the United Nations, who Secretary General Ban Ki Moon described as begging the U.N. to intervene in an unprecedented display of sobbing before the General Assembly, Gaddafi had just given the signal for his troops to commit genocide. According to Gallup, 75 percent of Libyans told pollsters a year after the intervention that they had wanted NATO to intervene, in spite of the intervention having killed 60 civilians, according to the UN Human Rights council. It was only three years later in 2014, following the degeneration of the world order brought about by Putin’s unanswered theft of the Crimea and Assad’s unanswered obliteration of his own country, that Britain and France would allow the Libyan statebuilding mission to fall apart as the country slipped into civil war. All in all, over the course of its three-quarter century history, NATO military missions were probably directly responsible for less than a thousand civilian deaths spread out over three humanitarian interventions, the vast majority of which involved a state that is now an associate of NATO, which is on track for entry into the European Union in three years. The only other major campaign it engaged in was a humanitarian mission in Afghanistan, where member states mostly helped with statebuilding, police trainings, financial management, and the provision of aid following the United States’ unilateral invasion in 2001. In a remarkable act of coordination, NATO member states each took on a different element of the statebuilding mission in Afghanistan, with only the United Kingdom engaging in heavy fighting in one small province, which they had committed to keeping secure. If these campaigns are remembered as being vastly more violent, and if a narrative has emerged that sees NATO as an expansionist imperial force, it is mostly because NATO missions are often confused in our collective memory with those of the United States and the former empires of Europe. It is also the result of Russian propaganda, which claims a “sphere of influence” tied to its former imperial possessions, many of which have joined NATO. And this points to another misunderstanding about how NATO actually works. Potential members request to join it, and far from being pressured, they have to demonstrate a commitment to democracy and the rule of law if they are to be let in. States have the right to join whatever international associations they want, and spheres of influence are a dated claim seldom invoked today outside of the Putin regime and Trump administration. Meanwhile, states on the periphery of Russia have a better reason for seeking entry into NATO than ever before. Yet, in overlooking the way collective security pacts foster the peaceful relations and prosperity of their member states, we help foster a narrative that sees NATO as an expansionist military organization locked in a zero-sum competition with Russia. Yet, Russians will only win when they establish genuinely democratic institutions, the rule of law, and the domestic respect for human rights. If Putin has overplayed his hand as much as it seems, they might soon find themselves lining up for NATO membership as well. And if that turns out to be the case, it would not be a reason to disband NATO but rather extend the order it has brought to Europe to Russia as well. This vision of a liberal internationalist order, wherein democratic states extend the rule of law and a respect for human rights to an ever increasing array of voluntary members, may appear utopian amid the threats and crimes against humanity of autocrats today. But it is no more fantastic than the “European Dream” of a peaceful continent of democratic states would have appeared at the end of the Second World War. Stranger things have been known to occur than democracy breaking out following the downfall of fascist strongmen and peace breaking out after war.Published 2 weeks ago on June 4, 2022By Theo Horesh

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Link › Link Turn – Emerging tech counters revisionist powers/Cyber

Turn: Increasing allied cooperation in (AI/Cyber/Bio)-technology is the only way to effectively combat rising powers without risking primacy.

Rasser and Lamberth 21 – Martijn Rasser and Megan Lamberth are foreign policy experts and contributors to Center for a New American Security, [“Taking the Helm A National Technology Strategy to Meet the China Challenge,” CNAS, 1/13/21, ]RA

How the United States Should Compete Today The United States is competing with China in technology with one hand tied behind its back.78 While the United States has leading technology companies, the government is underperforming in its role as a critical catalyst of S&T innovation. The federal government has played a more active role in protectionist measures relating to Chinese tech in recent years, including export controls, investment screening, and executive orders banning Chinese firms, but the government has yet to bring to bear its substantial tools to help stoke the fires of American innovation. For the first time in nearly a century, the United States confronts a strategic rival that is capable of overtaking it as the world’s leading economic, military, and technological power, and one that is economically entangled with the United States. Policymakers in Congress and the White House need to recalibrate U.S. government involvement in the country’s innovation ecosystem to maximize advantages and opportunities and to successfully address the challenges that the United States will face in the global technology contest. The nature of this competition is fundamentally different from what America has faced since the 1940s. For the first time in nearly a century the United States confronts a strategic rival that is capable of overtaking it as the world’s leading economic, military, and technological power, and one that is economically entangled with the United States. China is leveraging comprehensive state-directed efforts such as Made in China 2025, Standards 2035, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Digital Silk Road to guide its technology development at home and push its goals of making Chinese technology and technology standards dominant worldwide. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin attend a meeting during the Belt and Road International Forum, an initiative aimed at pursuing dominance in a number of key technology areas. The United States must respond with policies that focus on research and development, patenting, and standard setting. (The Russian Presidential Press and Information Office/Wikimedia) The hallmarks of these initiatives include strategic goals and plans backed with substantial financial resources for R&D, patenting, and standard setting. Neither the United States nor any of the tech-leading democracies has anything equivalent, setting the stage for an uneven competition where Beijing is better positioned to have the upper hand over the long term. This is not to say the United States should emulate China’s top-down approach. Many aspects of China’s approach, such as the creation and promotion of national champions; the coddling of inefficient state-owned enterprises; export subsidies, forced technology transfers, and other illiberal trade practices; and the lack of accountability and oversight are anathema to the American system. At the same time, Beijing’s policies have had impressive results. China is the world’s largest trader, accounting for 12.4 percent of global trade in 2018.79 China’s R&D spending has grown at an average of 15 percent annually since 1998. It is on track to overtake the United States in total R&D spending by the mid-2020s and is at the forefront of foundational technologies such as AI, 5G, and quantum computing.80 The U.S. response has been largely protectionist and unilateral, focused on export controls, tariffs, and repatriation of manufacturing, while R&D spending remains flat as a percentage of GDP and policies to attract and retain high-skilled foreigners become increasingly restrictive. American policymakers must emphasize what is lacking so far: the proactive policies American policymakers can put in place to bolster America’s ability to outcompete. To effectively compete with China, the United States needs a technology strategy for the 21st century and a new approach to multilateral cooperation and collaboration. The United States has an unmatched strategic advantage over China in this technology competition: a global network of allies and partners. Harnessing this network for multilateral collaboration is critical to the success of a national technology strategy. The United States does not enjoy a monopoly over the technologies that will drive the 21st-century economy, but the United States also does not have to go it alone. By partnering with other tech-leading nations, the United States and its allies and partners can bring far more financial and human resources to bear in this competition than China can alone. Opportunities for multinational collaboration on technology policy abound. The United States could look to existing groupings such as the Five Eyes, the National Technology and Industrial Base, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to enhance such collaboration. There are also proposals to create new groupings: U.K. government officials have proposed a “Democracy 10” to tackle 5G and other technology issues; and former U.S. government officials have proposed alliance frameworks to tackle a range of technology policy issues.81 A recent CNAS report by an international group of researchers lays out what countries should comprise such a grouping, how it should be organized and structured, how it should function, and what its top priorities should be.82 Recommendations A strategy’s success hinges on implementation. No expression of strategic direction is complete without actionable recommendations. As the initial framing document for a series of publications that will define and outline a U.S. national technology strategy, this report lays out the four pillars that comprise the actions necessary to execute it. The pillars are to promote America’s ability to compete; protect key U.S. technological advantages; partner with allies to maximize success; and plan effectively to reevaluate and adjust the strategy as needed. This section offers recommendations for each pillar. They include the highest priority actions U.S. policymakers should undertake to safeguard long-term U.S. technological competitiveness. It is by no means an exhaustive list. Rather, it is an opening salvo meant to underscore the scope and scale of the challenge, highlight the urgency with which the United States must act, and stimulate ideas for a broader set of necessary actions. Taken together, these pillars and the recommendations that underpin them are guidelines for a 21st-century industrial policy. The American experience with industrial policy throughout its history shows that it is beneficial and necessary to have government involvement in technology development and that it is feasible to do so in a manner that encourages rather than constrains innovations by the private sector. The recommendations that follow are crafted with that spirit in mind and are the baseline for American success in the global technology competition. Promote America’s Capacity to Compete The U.S. government needs to take comprehensive and urgent action to lay the groundwork for long-term and comprehensive structural improvements to its science and technology base. There are four categories of recommendations to promote U.S. competitiveness: 1. Increase investments in research and development in the United States. While tech-leading countries around the world have increased their R&D spending, the United States has kept steady as a percentage of GDP for decades. The U.S. share of global R&D fell from 69 percent in 1960 to 28 percent in 2016.83 During that period, the share of R&D investments by the federal government shrank by more than half, meaning that private industry is now driving R&D to a much greater extent. In response, Congress should act by: Raising federal government spending on R&D to at least 2 percent of GDP by 2030, up from around 0.7 percent in 2020. This spending is critically important to maintaining long-term capacity for technological leadership and innovation. The U.S. government remains the largest funder of basic research, which is foundational to game-changing technological achievements.84 Promoting an increase of total national (public and private) R&D expenditures to at least 4.5 percent of GDP by 2030, from under 3 percent in 2020, to keep in line with other leading technology nations. Tax incentives, targeted grants and contracts, and prize competitions all serve to stimulate private-sector investments.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Link › No link – China

China’s motivations are too dissimilar for comparison – NATO is not its threat

Scobell and Yang 22 - Dr. Andrew Scobell is a distinguished fellow with the China program at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He focuses on U.S.-China relations, China’s armed forces and defense policy and China’s foreign relations with countries and regions around the world — with a particular emphasis on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Lucy Stevenson-Yang is the senior program assistant for the China and North Korea teams at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). At USIP, Stevenson-Yang's research examines China’s impact on international peace and security. Her work also focuses on how to strengthen diplomacy and support peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, [“China is not Russia. Taiwan is not Ukraine.”, 3/4/2022, United States Institute of Peace, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/03/china-not-russia-taiwan-not-ukraine]RA

China Is Not Russia Russia under Putin has repeatedly dispatched its armed forces for combat missions overseas to a range of countries, including Georgia, Syria and Ukraine, as well as conducted major military interventions against other states, most recently Kazakhstan (albeit at the invitation of that country’s president). Moscow has also actively supported armed groups and militias in some of these same countries and others. Although China has also been active and assertive in the use of its armed forces beyond its borders in recent years, Beijing has eschewed large-scale combat operations. Around its periphery, China has engaged in provocations, confrontations and even violent clashes. But China, unlike Russia, has refrained from massive interventions, invasions or occupations of other countries since it invaded Vietnam in 1979. China’s largest deployments of troops overseas in the post-Cold War era have been on U.N. Peacekeeping missions. Whereas Russia has more than 20 military installations beyond its borders, to date, China has only one official military base on foreign soil — in Djibouti (established in 2017) — and a handful of other facilities it does not formally acknowledge. Of course, Beijing has a history of using its potent armed forces and muscular coercive apparatus within China’s borders to repress vigorously peaceful protesters, political dissidents and disaffected ethnic minority peoples. The locations of these operations include Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as Hong Kong. China has also not hesitated to employ armed force and a wide array of coercive instruments around its periphery. This includes building roads and bunkers in remote frontier areas of the high Himalayas along its contested border with India and constructing artificial islands and military installations in disputed waters of the South China Sea. In recent years, China’s armed forces have also engaged in deadly clashes and violent confrontations with Indian army units along the disputed Line of Actual Control and harassed and rammed the fishing boats and coast guard vessels of Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries. Putin appears to relish projecting the image of a strongman who is routinely willing to thumb his nose at the rest of the world. By contrast, Xi — at least to date — has mainly sought to cultivate a statesmanlike image on the global stage. At times he has given speeches attempting to cast China as a more responsible, less meddlesome and values-free version of the United States. And Xi has invested a lot of time and resources in promoting a set of high-profile international efforts intended to demonstrate that China is a constructive and proactive great power. Employing positive rhetoric touting “win-win” solutions and aspirations to build a “community with a shared future for mankind,” China under Xi’s leadership has launched ambitious efforts such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Putin, by contrast, has made no real effort to offer an alternative to U.S. global leadership beyond delivering vague grandiose declarations (often in tandem with Xi) and has offered the world little in the way of economic stimulus beyond the prospect of more energy exports and hype about the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Despite consisting of only a handful of Soviet successor states, the EAEU is touted as Russia’s answer to China’s BRI. In terms of geostrategic activism, Russia’s major multilateralist initiatives have tended to involve China. These include the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and the formation of the BRICS grouping in 2010. The former is a security community with a Central Asian focus consisting of Russia, China and four Central and two South Asian states. The latter is a loose association of some of the world’s largest “emerging economies”: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. However, Moscow’s most significant geostrategic maneuver under Putin has been to strengthen Russia’s strategic partnership with China. Both Beijing and Moscow insist that their relationship is not an alliance and their 2001 treaty of friendship — which was renewed in 2021 — does not commit either signatory to come to the defense of the other in case of military conflict. Yet, the Sino-Russian relationship is a clearly consequential alignment that has grown closer in recent years, particularly as their respective relationships with the United States have deteriorated. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put China in a very uncomfortable position: Beijing does not want to antagonize Moscow but neither does it want to damage its relations with Washington and European capitals. Consequently, China has equivocated in its statements and actions. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called for peace but has stopped short of condemning Russia or calling upon Moscow to withdraw its military. The lengthy joint statement of February 4, 2022, issued by Putin and Xi during the Russian leader’s visit to Beijing on the eve of the Winter Olympics, makes no mention at all of Ukraine — and China has pointedly abstained on all U.N. Security Council resolutions related to Russia’s invasion. Xi appears to have asked Putin to delay any military action against Ukraine until after the Olympics. Russia’s invasion poses other difficulties for China both in terms of running counter to Beijing’s long espoused principles in foreign affairs and its adverse impact on China’s national interests in Ukraine. Russia’s actions clearly contradict China’s cornerstone foreign policy principles of noninterference in other countries’ affairs and respecting territorial integrity. Moreover, China has sizable economic investments in Ukraine and is a good customer of Ukraine’s armaments industry. In 2020, Ukraine signed the BRI cooperation agreement, which further bolstered the economic relationship between the two countries and marked Ukraine as an important partner in Beijing’s signature foreign policy and economic initiative. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine The fact that Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was almost certainly a decisive factor in Putin’s calculus to invade Ukraine. Russia’s commander in chief knew that his invading forces would likely not have to contend with the militaries of any other countries. And if there were any lingering doubts in the Kremlin about the disposition of the most powerful member of NATO, U.S. President Joe Biden stated publicly that the United States would not send military forces to help defend Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Biden administration has taken strong steps to reinforce NATO allies in Eastern Europe and provide robust military assistance to Ukraine. By contrast, Xi and his Politburo colleagues have long been convinced that Taiwan has the resolute support of the world’s most capable military. The People’s Liberation Army — as all branches of China’s armed forces are known — continues to assume that if it launches an invasion of Taiwan, the U.S. military will swiftly and decisively intervene. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship, while technically “unofficial” due to the One China policy, has strengthened in recent years. On February 28, the Biden administration sent an unofficial delegation of former U.S. defense and national security officials to Taiwan as a signal to China of that commitment. It remains true that the greatest deterrence to a massive Chinese military attack on the island is Beijing’s assumption that war with Taiwan also means a war with the United States. However, there is no formal military alliance between the United States and Taiwan. The defense pact binding Washington to Taipei was formally abrogated in 1979. So why is Beijing convinced that Washington has an ironclad alliance-like relationship with Taiwan? There are at least two reasons. First, successive U.S. administrations have publicly committed themselves to support Taiwan against Chinese aggression and have regularly sold arms to the island’s armed forces. Second, although there is no language in the1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that explicitly commits the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack on the island by China, many in Washington believe that such a commitment exists. While there are different interpretations as to what the TRA means, the most significant fact is that the vast majority of U.S. political and military leaders are fully convinced that this legislation binds the United States to a de facto alliance with Taiwan. China’s increased military assertiveness and greater level of armed provocations in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere around China’s periphery in recent years have only served to strengthen the conviction in Washington that the island is a staunch democratic partner worthy of U.S. support as it tries to defend tiny Taiwan against efforts by Beijing to coerce the island into unwanted unification with China. However, Taiwan, unlike Ukraine, is not a member of the United Nation. While Ukraine has ambassador-level diplomatic relations with more than 180 countries, including China and the United States, Taiwan only has full diplomatic ties with approximately a dozen countries and none of these are major powers. Yet, thanks to the TRA, Taipei enjoys robust quasi-diplomatic relations with Washington, and thanks to Taiwan’s pragmatic ingenuity, the island possesses a vibrant worldwide network of de facto diplomatic missions. Although Ukraine’s diplomatic standing is far superior to Taiwan’s, the European country’s military alliance status is less impressive — Ukraine is not a member of NATO, although it is a very active member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative. While Taiwan also has no formal military allies, the island has several close and consequential security partners, most notably the United States.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Link › No Link –Russia

Political competition and perceived anti-Russian sentiment drives Russian diplomacy, NATO’s not key

Popova and Shevel 22 - Maria Popova is Jean Monnet Chair and Associate Professor of Political Science at McGill University, working on democracy and rule of law in the post-Communist region. Oxana Shevel is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Tufts University’s School of Arts and Sciences. Her research and teaching focus on the post-Communist region surrounding Russia, [“Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Is Essentially Not About NATO," Just Security, 2-24-2022, https://www.justsecurity.org/80343/russias-new-assault-on-ukraine-is-not-entirely-maybe-not-even-largely-about-nato/]RA

This assumption contradicts events of recent months and the historical record. While Vladimir Putin has claimed that his goal is keeping Ukraine out of NATO, he also insisted that he was just conducting military exercises. Instead, he is invading Ukraine again. He likewise insisted in 2014 that he wasn’t capturing Crimea, despite the presence of his unidentified “Little Green Men” and his subsequent annexation of the peninsula, or that he was not fighting in Ukraine’s Donbas area in the east all these years, despite all evidence to the contrary. There is no reason to take Putin at his word. His Feb. 21 diatribe conferring Russian recognition of independence for the two eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and his order for Russian troops to move in as ostensible “peacekeepers” shows clearly his disdain for diplomatic resolutions. Moreover, this is not even primarily about NATO. NATO’s eastward expansion may have played a role in straining the relationship between Russia and the West, but mainly because, for Russia, seeing former satellites eagerly abandon it for the greener pastures of Euro-Atlantic integration stung. However, Putin’s rhetoric and actions over almost two decades reveal that his goals extend beyond imposing neutrality on Ukraine or even staving off further NATO expansion. The larger objective is to re-establish Russian political and cultural dominance over a nation that Putin sees as one with Russia, and then follow up by undoing the European rules-based order and security architecture established in the aftermath of World War II. Given these goals, Ukrainian neutrality is a woefully insufficient concession for Putin. If Russia’s main concern had been NATO enlargement, it would have reacted with rhetoric and/or hostile actions in its neighborhood after each step in the NATO expansion process. The largest wave of NATO’s eastward expansion took place in March 2004, when seven Eastern European countries joined, including the formerly Soviet Baltic states. Russia “grumbled,” as the New York Times put it then, by adopting a Duma resolution criticizing the expansion, but no hostile and sustained rhetoric followed about NATO enlargement as a Western plot against Russian interests. In 1997, Ukraine’s President Leonid Kuchma signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, and in 2002, he publicly declared Ukraine’s interest in NATO membership, to little opposition from Russia. The NATO membership issue has ebbed-and-flowed within Ukraine, as presidents alternated in power who were either more pro-Western or more pro-Russian. Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko advocated during his 2005-2010 tenure for Ukraine to be granted a NATO membership action plan (MAP), a program of preparation for entry into the alliance, while successor President Viktor Yanukovych backed away from the idea after 2010. Russia did not respond to any of these pro-NATO moves by Ukrainian presidents with military threats and aggression. Russia knows further NATO expansion to the east is highly improbable because certain alliance members have long balked at the prospect, making the required consensus impossible to attain. Russia also has an authoritarian ally within NATO, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who can help stave off any future consensus, and other NATO members such as Germany and France do not support membership for Ukraine, Georgia, or other post-Soviet states. The security guarantee that Russia demands now goes much further than membership issues. Putin’s Feb. 21 speech shows he perceives any security cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, from modernization of airports to training exercises, as a “knife to [Russia’s] throat.” Even after a new pro-Western government in Ukraine that followed the 2014 incursions again embraced the goal of NATO membership and Ukrainian public support for such a move rose, Ukraine’s accession was that much more unlikely because of the alliance’s reluctance to embrace new members embroiled in territorial disputes. If Putin’s main concern now was to keep Ukraine out of NATO, he had nothing to fear in 2014, when he first invaded Ukraine and had even less to fear in 2021, when he embarked on the current escalation. If Not NATO, What is Putin’s Escalation About? A longer look at Putin’s two decades in power shows that, above all, he fears political competition in the neighborhood. When mass protests over rigged elections swept across the post-Soviet space in 2003-2005, toppling the Georgian and Kyrgyz incumbents and preventing the pro-Russian candidate from taking office in Ukraine, the Kremlin exploded with fiery rhetoric about Western-backed anti-Russian plots. A recent book on conspiracy theories in the Russian media since 1995 shows that the 2003-2005 “color revolutions” were the top source of conspiratorial, anti-Western narratives. All 1997-2002 NATO enlargement summits are lower in the ranking of analyzed events. American realists have long argued that Russia was too weak to strike back with actions, but evidence shows that the Kremlin did not react with strong rhetoric either. Instead of decrying NATO expansion, Russia prioritized complaints about Western political “meddling” in its neighboring countries, by which Russia meant U.S. and European support for domestic democratization drives. In 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and instigated an armed insurgency in eastern Ukraine, NATO membership for Ukraine hadn’t even been on the agenda. Rather, the spark for Russia was the ouster of the increasingly authoritarian pro-Russian President Yanukovych, following months of street protests. Those “Euromaidan” protests had erupted after Yanukovych backpeddled, following pressure and bribery from Russia, from signing a trade agreement with the European Union. So why was 2014 so concerning to Russia that it chose to invade? Given Putin’s rhetoric about Euromaidan as a Western-backed plot, the most obvious conclusion is that he was afraid that regime change and democratization in Ukraine might reach – – or at least set an example for — Russian society and destabilize Putin’s increasingly consolidated authoritarianism. Research on the color revolutions and on the third wave of democratization in the region shows that this neighborhood effect was real. In other words, it’s not NATO at its doorsteps that’s so concerning to the Kremlin, but political competition, because it threatens authoritarian stability and introduces prospects of democratization.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Link › No Link – generic/no burden sharing

Their burden sharing arguments are wrong – all countries benefit from NATO stability

Kupochan 19 – Charles Kupochan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, ["NATO Is Thriving in Spite of Trump," Mar 20, 2019, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-20/nato-thriving-spite-trump]

Trump’s diatribes are not the only cause of the unease. A broadening chorus of realist strategists claims that the United States is overdue for a major strategic retrenchment and that it is past time for Europe to tend its own garden. Even staunch defenders of NATO express doubts about its future. Some worry that the growing U.S. preoccupation with East Asia will lure the United States away from its Atlantic calling and generate transatlantic tensions over how to deal with the rise of China. Others fear that democratic backsliding among members is compromising the alliance’s values-based solidarity. Close NATO watchers are concerned that EU efforts to more deeply integrate European foreign and defense policy could ultimately weaken the Atlantic link. And debate rages on both sides of the Atlantic as to whether NATO enlargement has enhanced or eroded European stability and whether to continue expansion despite the costs to the West’s relationship with Russia. These worries are unwarranted: NATO at 70 is actually in remarkably good shape. Yes, European allies have been laggards on defense spending, and some members—Hungary, Poland, and Turkey in particular—have tarnished democratic credentials. But NATO has demonstrated an impressive ability to adapt to the changing geopolitical environment since the Cold War’s end, ensuring that the United States and Europe remain each other’s go-to partners. The alliance opened its doors to the new democracies that emerged from the former Soviet bloc, helping to anchor security and democracy in a wider Europe. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, members have taken important steps to strengthen deterrence against the Kremlin’s adventurism. NATO has struck partnerships across the globe and carried out ambitious missions well beyond the territory of member states—most notably in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya. All the while, the alliance has retooled to address new hazards such as cyberthreats, terrorism, hybrid warfare, and migration. Precisely because NATO has been so nimble and effective, it enjoys strong political support on both sides of the Atlantic, leaving Trump virtually alone as a vociferous critic.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Uniqueness › Non-Unique – AI/Cyber/Biotech

The link is not unique or NATO’s quantum and DIANA plans should have caused the impact – affects entire emerging tech sector

Naujokaityte and Burke 22 - Goda Naujokaitytė and Fintan Burke are frequent contributors to Science|Business and emerging technology analysts, [“NATO to launch €1B fund for high tech start-ups in dual use technologies," Science|Business, 4/1/2022, https://sciencebusiness.net/news/nato-launch-eu1b-fund-high-tech-start-ups-dual-use-technologies]RA

NATO has launched a new research programme called DIANA to bring industry, start-up companies and academia together to research new dual-use technologies that address both societal problems and national security issues. The Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is focusing on technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, autonomy, biotechnology, novel materials and space. In its initial stage, DIANA will run a network of more than 10 accelerator sites and over 50 test centres in innovation hubs across NATO alliance countries. The aim is to give innovators the means to bring dual use technologies closer to the market. No budget for the network has been announced yet, but pilot activities will start as early as summer 2023, with the aim of being fully up and running in 2025. There is also a complementary €1 billion venture capital fund for early stage start-ups. Tomas Jermalavičius, head of studies at the Estonia-based think tank International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), says this marks a notable shift in the alliance’s stance on innovation. “It‘s almost a revolutionary step. Creating this NATO structure shows flexibility and ability to take advantage of all the capacities that exist in the private sector, where innovations are born,“ he said. Until this point, the alliance has only supported applied research through the Collaboration Support Office in Paris, leaving a gap in support for translating technologies to the market. The bid to spruce up its innovation capabilities predates the Russian invasion and was agreed on at the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels. The fleshed out plans for DIANA were published last week, following a meeting of NATO defence ministers. This is not the only military research announcement to pop up in the past weeks, with the US, Australia and UK setting out the AUKUS Quantum arrangement which eyes expanded quantum, hypersonic and other joint weapons research. Technology dominance The nine technologies NATO wants to advance are AI; data and computing; autonomy; quantum-enabled technologies; biotechnology and human enhancements; hypersonic technologies; space; novel materials and manufacturing; and energy and propulsion. These are all strategic for NATO if it is to maintain technological dominance. Losing grip was one of the drivers for DIANA, Jermalavičius says. The bid for technology dominance over countries like China and Russia is also a driver for DIANA‘s goal of shortening the technology development cycle, especially when it comes to software, AI and quantum. “It’s a long horizon, but capabilities do not appear overnight,” said Jermalavičius. The plan is for DIANA to launch challenge calls for non-dilutive financing that does not require start-ups to give up equity or ownership in their company. Mentoring, technology testing and potential contract opportunities will be available to go hand in hand with the financing. This will be delivered through network of innovation hubs across the alliance. One such site is the Big Data for Smart Society Institute (GATE) based in Bulgaria. An official at GATE said that the institute’s work in DIANA will focus on digital health, intra governmental communications and using data in industry and city infrastructure. One focus will be on disinformation research. However the official noted DIANA is still in its early stages. Talks are ongoing with NATO to flesh out exactly how cooperation will work between research centres, the national government, and the NATO secretariat. The approved charter stipulates some details, though others are still to be discussed, for example the affiliated centres of the network and the points of contact between them. The official said that many of these are likely to be finalised at a meeting at the end of June. Host institutions Last week, the UK and Estonia were announced as the hosts of the European part of DIANA. The Estonian accelerator will be based in Tallinn, while Imperial College London will host the UK headquarters at its Translation & Innovation Hub, from where the Institute for Security Science and Technology will lead Imperial’s work in DIANA. The UK headquarters is also supported by the UK Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA), which funds projects that have uses in defence and security. The accelerator works with major defence companies and the US Department of Defence’s Tri-Service Office. The UK and Estonian accelerators are to support start-ups working on dual-use technologies with funding and expertise. Researchers will also be able to use facilities such as the Defence BattleLab in Dorset, UK, a test centre that has air and sea ranges to test defence equipment. A DASA representative said research at the UK headquarters is likely to focus first on AI and autonomy, which is a focus of DIANA as a whole. Over time the UK site could to expand into biotechnology and materials. Nine accelerators are foreseen in Portugal, UK, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Turkey, Greece, and Czech Republic. Most European NATO members will host test sites, of which there will be 47 in total, except for France, Lithuania, and five Balkan countries, Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia. Quantum in Denmark Denmark is leading DIANA’s quantum bid, with an accelerator to be located at the Niels Bohr Institute at Copenhagen University. The Technical University of Denmark, Aarhus University and the Danish National Metrology Institute will also provide test centres and manufacturing facilities. For now, the goal is to augment the overall quantum capacities in the alliance, rather than focus on dual-use technologies. “The main mission here is to augment the entire NATO alliance within quantum technology,” said Jan Westenkær Thomsen, head of the Niels Bohr Institute. Denmark has been one of the leaders in quantum physics since the 1920s, when Bohr and his colleague Max Planck put forward the quantum theory. This deep expertise in quantum has resulted in many spin out companies, Thomsen noted. In the coming months, Thomsen and his colleagues will be hashing out the details of the centre with NATO. One of the universities’ goals is to use the know how of Denmark’s biotechnology accelerator at the Copenhagen Bio Science Park to reinforce the quantum counterpart. There will also be cooperation with other DIANA centres. “This was already an integral part. I’m hoping this will be a main theme in negotiations with NATO,” said Thomsen. Thomsen hopes the DIANA project will start delivering in five to ten years time, and he is positive about its potential. “It’s of course difficult to say at this stage, but it’s a great idea to pull resources from the whole NATO alliance together,” he said. “I’m pretty sure this will really change something for the better.” Multi-sovereign venture capital Before DIANA is up and running, the €1 billion Innovation Fund is expected to start making awards to start-ups developing dual-use technologies at the beginning of next year. NATO says the fund will be, “the world’s first multi-sovereign venture capital fund”. It will be a patient investor, giving companies uninterrupted support for 15 years to scale up innovations. NATO also intends to invest in the funds of venture capital firms that are already investing in technologies the alliance wants to promote.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Uniqueness › Non-Unique – AI/Cyber/Biotech

Non-unique: 15 years of plans and increasing cooperation in tech sectors should have triggered the impact

Maigre 4/6/22 - Merle Maigre is the senior cybersecurity expert at e-Governance Academy in Estonia. In 2017–2018, she served as director of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (CCDCOE)in Tallinn; in 2012–2017 as the security policy adviser to Estonian Presidents Kersti Kaljulaid and Thoomas Hendrik Ilves, [“NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security," GMFUS, 4-6-2022, https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-role-global-cyber-security]RA

The Alliance’s Achievements in Cyber So Far Over the past fifteen years, NATO’s approach to cyber issues has evolved from addressing cyber defense in primarily technical terms to viewing it as essential to the alliance’s strategic context. The need to “strengthen capabilities and to defend against cyberattacks” was first acknowledged by allied leaders at their 2002 summit meetings in Prague.1919NATO, Prague Summit Declaration, November 21, 2002. However, after Estonia’s digital infrastructure was hit by cyberattacks in 2007, NATO admitted that a confrontation between states might involve a cyber dimension, and at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 adopted its first cyber-defense policy. The 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia demonstrated that cyberattacks have the potential to become a major component of conventional warfare. In parallel, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) was accredited as a NATO Centre of Excellence in 2008. Since then, it has grown into a strong, international knowledge hub for cyber defense, bringing together top cyber experts across fields—government, military, industry, and academia—from 29 nations for interdisciplinary research, training, and exercises in four focus areas: technology, strategy, operations, and law. The center connects a trusted community of like-minded states who wish to share information and expertise in cyber security. CCDCOE’s best-known projects are Locked Shields, one of the world’s largest and most comprehensive cyber-defense exercises; the annual cyber conference CyCon; and the Tallinn Manual, which looks at cyber operations within the context of international law. At the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, allied leaders reaffirmed their commitment to improving the alliance’s cyber defenses by bringing all of NATO’s networks under centralized protection. At the 2014 Wales summit, NATO recognized that international law applies in cyberspace and declared that, since the impact of a cyberattack could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack, cyber defense is a part of NATO’s collective defense mandate. Thus, NATO acknowledged that cyberspace is an operational domain for potential adversaries. NATO’s 2016 Warsaw summit resulted in a declaration recognizing that cyberspace has evolved into a separate domain of military operations, in which the alliance “must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea.” The subsequent roadmap included the drafting of a NATO cyber operations doctrine, as well as the development of military cyber capabilities. In January 2020, the Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations was published “to plan, execute, and assess cyberspace operations in the context of allied joint operations.”2020NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations, January 2020. At the Warsaw summit, NATO heads of state and government signed a Cyber Defence Pledge, in which they outlined how nations protect their cyber networks. NATO developed detailed questionnaires and metrics related to the pledge and uses them to regularly report on how each nation delivers on its cyber commitments. Allies also discussed how to strengthen the cyber component of NATO’s Command Structure. The Command Structure is the military backbone of the alliance; it is what makes NATO unique. NATO has continuously adapted its Command Structure over the past decades to take account of a changing security environment. In February 2018, NATO defense ministers established the Cyberspace Operations Centre (CyOC) as part of NATO’s SHAPE Command Structure, with the aim of integrating the allies’ cyber capabilities into NATO military-operations planning. The “eyes and ears” of the respective commanders in cyberspace, CyOC aims at enhancing situational awareness in cyberspace and helping integrate cyber into NATO’s planning and operations at all levels. CyOC is the first cyber-dedicated entity within the Command Structure. The “eyes and ears” of the respective commanders in cyberspace, CyOC aims at enhancing situational awareness in cyberspace and helping integrate cyber into NATO’s planning and operations at all levels. While CyOC operates within the existing NATO frameworks, its main aim is to equip the Supreme Allied Commander Europe with any necessary tools to operate in cyberspace.2121Wiesław Goździewicz, “Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by Allies (SCEPVA),” Cyber Defense, November 11, 2019. As CyOC moves toward initial then final operating capacity, it will be critical that it is staffed with sufficient—and sufficiently expert—personnel.2222NATO, NATO's Role in Cyberspace, February 19, 2019. During NATO’s July 2018 summit, the allies affirmed, for the first time, their determination “to employ the full range of capabilities, including cyber, to deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats,” shifting away from securing cyberspace with defensive measures only. The “full range” of cyber capabilities means that both defensive and offensive capabilities can be deployed by NATO, in line with its defensive mandate and in accordance with international law. As NATO will not develop or acquire any offensive capabilities, it will rely, like in other operational domains, on the voluntary contributions of allies. In late 2020, a team of experts appointed by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and chaired by Thomas de Maiziere of Germany and Wes Mitchell of the United States gave their recommendations on how NATO could enhance its political role and better coordinate military tasks and political strategies among its members. In 2021, Stoltenberg’s NATO 2030 included eight of those recommendations to guide the revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept.23

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Impact › Turns Disease

NATO causes famine and disease – North Africa proves, fueling the war

Muhawesh 17 – Mnar Muhawesh is the founder, CEO, and editor in Chief of MintPress News, [“NATO’s ‘War On Terror’ Leaves Famine, Disease in its Wake in Africa,” 8/1/2017, Mint Press News ]

Despite living in a time where there is a global surplus of food, millions of people around the world are still suffering from famine. If you follow mainstream media coverage about these humanitarian disasters, they’re most likely presented through the lens of climate change, high food prices and taxes. But in places like Yemen, South Sudan, the Lake Chad basin of West Africa and Somalia, where images of skeletal children have become commonplace several countries in Africa and the Middle East, it is perhaps no coincidence that the epidemic of famine is directly linked to modern-day colonialism and imperialism led by the U.S. It is in this part of the world where resource exploitation, the war on terror, military occupation and destabilization combine to create one of the most dire humanitarian crises of the modern era. While environmental factors do play a role, policies set by powerful oil companies and state actors have created and reinforced the present situation. In Somalia, where the U.S. has been waging a covert drone war, people have become accustomed to famine. In a span of just one year, between 2011 and 2012, over 260,000 people died, half of them under the age of 5, marking the worst famine in the last 25 years. According to data from Somalia’s Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), 4.6 percent of the total population and 10 percent of children under 5 died in southern and central Somalia alone. The organization Somalia’s Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) found that “the result was widespread livestock deaths, the smallest cereal harvest since the 1991-94 civil war, and a major drop in labor demand, which reduced household income.” Compounding environmental burdens were the wider impacts of British colonialism in Somalia, as well as U.S. militarism. While the United States plundered Somalia for resources by way of mineral excavation and so-called oil exploration, past and present administrations have also applied their full military might. In 1993, during the Clinton presidency, images of famine and war were used to convince Americans that U.S. military efforts were necessary. “We went [to Somalia] because only the United States could help stop one of the great human tragedies of this time,” Clinton said. “In a sense, we came to Somalia to rescue innocent people in a burning house.” What Bill Clinton didn’t disclose was that the United States was one of the reasons why the house was on fire to begin with, and military efforts would not help to put out the flames.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Impact › Heg Solves Conflict

Wars only escalate in a multipolar world.

Nilsson 21 – Marcon Nilsson is an Associate Professor of political science at the School of Education and Communication at Jonkoping University, [“The Magnitude of Warfare Revisited—System Polarity and War Duration”, 2021 , acc 7/18/21]

21 Accordingly, this article presents the first theoretical discussion of the connection between polarity and war duration. Contrary to Haas and Levy, it argues that multipolarity is more likely to be associated with increasing war duration. The argument is based on a two-stage process derived from the realist and rational-choice perspectives. The first stage determines what types of wars are likely to emerge given different forms of systemic polarity, while the second stage determines how fast a bargaining space potentially emerges to resolve these conflicts. In the first stage, systemic polarity has an impact on what types of wars are likely to erupt. As Monteiro pointed out, unipolarity often produces conflict “between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers.” 22 Such a selection bias is likely to create an imbalance in the belligerents’ military capabilities, which makes it easy for the unipole to defeat the minor power. Examples of such asymmetric confrontations that give rise to short wars include the Kuwait War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003. This selection bias is unlikely to be as great in bipolarity because of the strict alliance structures or spheres of interest that the two poles’ conflicting interests can create. For example, an attack on Iraq and the Kuwait War became possible only after the weakening of the Soviet Union led to a foreign policy change in Moscow and ultimately to the end of the Cold War. However, with more poles, external balancing by means of alliances becomes more flexible as the number of available alliance partners increases. As Snyder argued, “in a multipolar system, who allies with whom is structurally indeterminate…each state is logically eligible to be either friend or enemy of any other state.” 23 Indeed, if unipolarity increasingly brings asymmetric conflicts, the role of a balancer becomes more prominent in multipolarity, which creates symmetric wars. Especially after the Napoleonic wars, and even earlier, Great Britain played the role of a balancer within the European multipolar system and could throw its support behind one side at one time, and behind another side at another time. 24 Such balancing in multipolarity increases war duration by creating symmetric conflicts in which the warring parties are more equal in power and find it difficult to quickly defeat each other. While asymmetric conflicts can end without long negotiations, as the stronger side can quickly override the weaker side, symmetric conflicts more often involve the process of creating a bargaining space, that is, finding a mutually acceptable negotiated solution. Polarity can affect the duration of this process, as the amount of information that the systemic structure provides about the expected outcome of a war varies. Mearsheimer argued that the international state system “is peaceful when it is obvious that the costs and risk of going to war are high, and the benefits of going to war are low” and that the distribution of power between states “is at the heart of this incentive structure.” 25 Fearon further developed this rational-choice perspective, claiming that as fighting is costly and risky, “rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of war.” 26 His answer to this puzzle of why rational states start wars relies on the widespread uncertainty in anarchy: Rational state leaders start wars when they miscalculate due to both a lack of information and disagreement about relative power.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Impact › Ext/Turns Case – Conflict/Generic

Heg decline triggers spheres-of-influence leading to insecurity and great power wars – turns the aff because they make conflict inevitable

Twining 17 – Daniel Twining is director of the Asia Program at The German Marshall Fund of the United States, based in Washington, DC, MPhil & PhD degrees from Oxford University, [“Abandoning the Liberal International Order for a Spheres-of-Influence World is a Trap for America…," Medium, 3-21-2017, https://medium.com/out-of-order/abandoning-the-liberal-international-order-for-a-spheres-of-influence-world-is-a-trap-for-america-7bfcdbb83df4]RA

The liberal world order is under assault. Polls suggest an American ambivalence about upholding the rules-based global system. Populists are besieging governing elites in the West while Russia works strategically to destabilize European and American governments through propaganda and proxies. A rising China wants to create a global system that is not U.S.-centric, one in which smaller powers defer to bigger ones and norms of democracy and rule of law do not prevail. Meanwhile, the U.S. alliance system looks adrift while competitors in China and Russia appear to be on the march. If it holds, this trend could produce a spheres-of-influence world — which many, including the current presidents of the United States, China, and Russia, find intuitively attractive. But were such an order to replace one based on global integration and American leadership in the geopolitical cockpits of Europe and Asia, it would only engender insecurity and conflict. In a spheres-of-influence world, great powers order their regions. The United States would go back to a “Monroe Doctrine” version of grand strategy; Russia would dominate the former Soviet space; China would govern East Asia, and India South Asia. The problem with this kind of order, however, is several-fold. Too many spheres overlap in ways that would generate conflict rather than clean lines of responsibility. Japan would oppose Chinese suzerainty in East Asia, including by developing nuclear weapons; India and China would compete vigorously in Southeast Asia; Russia and China would contest the resources and loyalties of Central Asia; Europe and Russia would clash over primacy of Central and Eastern Europe. The Middle East would be an even more likely arena for hot war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Turkey would contest regions also claimed by Russia, Europe, and possibly China. Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it, would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. A spheres of influence world would also sharpen great power competition outside of each region. Regional hegemony is a springboard for global contestation. China would be more likely to challenge the United States out-of-area if it had subdued strategic competition in its own region. Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it, would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. (The fact that Russian troops marched through Paris during the Napoleonic Wars demonstrates that the limits of Russian power need not be confined to the former Warsaw Pact). American leaders have long understood that a “Fortress America” approach is a source of national insecurity. Franklin Roosevelt made this case in a series of “fireside chats” in the run-up to America’s participation in World War II — even before the advent of the far more sophisticated power-projection technologies that exist today. Roosevelt and his generals well understood that the United States could not be safe if hostile powers controlled Europe and Asia, despite the wide oceans separating North America from both theaters. A spheres-of-influence world would also crack up the integrated global economy that underlies the miracle in human welfare that has lifted billions out of poverty in past decades. It would replicate the exclusive economic blocs of the 1930s, including an East Asia “co-prosperity sphere,” seeding conflict and undercutting prosperity. A real-world and real-time example of what happens when American power retreats in an effort to encourage regional powers to solve their own problems is the mess in Syria. It has produced the greatest refugee crisis since 1945 — a stain on the consciousness of human civilization — and has led many to conclude that the Middle Eastern order of states dating to the end of World War 1 is collapsing. President Obama pursued an express policy of retracting American military power from the Middle East, including withdrawing all troops from Iraq and refusing to intervene militarily when President Assad used chemical weapons against his own people, despite a red-line injunction from the United States not to do so. Obama and his White House political advisors believed that American withdrawal from the Arab Middle East (if not from the ironclad U.S. commitment to Israel) would lead a new balance of power to form, one policed by regional powers rather than by America. This flawed, amoral, and un-strategic approach has led to a series of hot wars — in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen — the collapse of Arab allies’ confidence in the United States as an ally, as well as an intensified cold war with Iran. Despite the international agreement freezing Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s support for terrorism and hostile insurgencies targeting American allies across its region actually intensified during this period. A spheres-of-influence world leaves weaker states to become the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring variable of American military guarantees and presence This experience underlines a core problem with a spheres-of-influence world. It leaves weaker states to become the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring variable of American military guarantees and presence. It emboldens American adversaries and leads American allies to take self-help measures that themselves may undercut American security interests. A spheres-of-influence world would also produce contestation of the open global commons that are the basis for the unprecedented prosperity produced by the liberal international economic order. Should the Indian and Pacific Oceans, or the Arctic and Mediterranean Seas, become arenas of great-power conflict (like the South China Sea already has thanks to China’s militarization and unilateral assertion of sovereignty over it) as leading states seek to incorporate them into their privileged zones of control, economic globalization would collapse, harming the economies of every major power. The United States, because of its sheer power and resource base as well as its relative geographical isolation, might do OK in a spheres-of-influence world. Most of America’s friends and allies would not. Their weakening and insecurity would in turn render the United States weaker and more insecure — since U.S. allies are force-multipliers for American hard and soft power, and since norms like freedom of the global commons are in fact underwritten by that power. More broadly, such a transition would also likely lead to the kind of hot wars that reorder the international balance of power, including by incentivizing aggressive states to push out and assert regional dominion, knowing that America does not have the will or interest to oppose them. The fact that U.S. competitors such as Russia, China, and Iran — all of whom want to weaken the American-led world order — would welcome a spheres-of-influence world is another reason for Americans to oppose it. It would also be ironic if the United States were to back away from its historic commitment to shaping a world that is an idealized vision of America itself — one ruled by laws, norms, institutions, markets, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Internal Link › No Alt to Heg

Decline causes war—Thucydides’ trap

Allison 15 – Graham Allison is a former director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a former U.S. assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans, [“The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?”, 2015, ]

And yet 100 years on, World War I offers a sobering reminder of man’s capacity for folly. When we say that war is “inconceivable,” is this a statement about what is possible in the world—or only about what our limited minds can conceive? In 1914, few could imagine slaughter on a scale that demanded a new category: world war. When the war ended four years later, Europe lay in ruins: the kaiser gone, the Austro-Hungarian empire dissolved, the Russian tsar overthrown by the Bolsheviks, France bled for a generation, and England shorn of its youth and treasure. A millennium in which Europe had been the political center of the world came to a crashing halt. The defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides’s Trap. The Greek historian’s metaphor reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling power—as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain a century ago. Most such contests have ended badly, often for both nations, a team of mine at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs has concluded after analyzing the historical record. In 12 of 16 cases over the past 500 years, the result was war. When the parties avoided war, it required huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part of not just the challenger but also the challenged. Based on the current trajectory, war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not. Moreover, current underestimations and misapprehensions of the hazards inherent in the U.S.-China relationship contribute greatly to those hazards. A risk associated with Thucydides’s Trap is that business as usual—not just an unexpected, extraordinary event—can trigger large-scale conflict. When a rising power is threatening to displace a ruling power, standard crises that would otherwise be contained, like the assassination of an archduke in 1914, can initiate a cascade of reactions that, in turn, produce outcomes none of the parties would otherwise have chosen.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Internal Link › Unipolarity Key

unipolarity generates great power peace

Daniel W. Drezner 14, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, 2014, “Bucks for the Bang? Assessing the Economic Returns to Military Primacy,” in A Dangerous World?: Threat Perception and U.S. National Security, ed. Preble and Mueller, p. 201-205

William Wohlforth has made the strongest theoretical argument for that position in the post-Cold War era. He argues, contrary to balance-of-power theorists, that unipolarity is the most stable and peaceful of all possible international systems: "Unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leading state's power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance of power politics among the major states."47 Wohlforth has expanded on that argument in later work, applying social identity theory to explain the durability and peaceful nature of unipolarity.48 Regardless of the causal mechanism, once a military hegemon emerges, all of those international relations theories posit that the world should be much more secure, peaceful, and prosperous. With a preeminent military superpower, other states have less incentive to engage in arms races, brinksmanship, or security rivalries. Consequently, more resources are allocated for economic growth, which creates a virtuous circle of greater growth and greater peace.

The empirical evidence for that causal mechanism is stronger than for the imperial rents argument—although there are significant qualifiers. On one hand, the literature rejects the notion that hegemony is a necessary condition for an open global economy.'1" Indeed, the existence of a liberal hegemon alone is not even necessarily a sufficient condition; supporter states also play a crucial role in the spread of economic openness.50 Although the precise causal mechanisms remain disputed, it is, nevertheless, true that hegemonic eras are strongly correlated with lower trade barriers and greater levels of globalization.51

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Internal Link › Heg Sustainable

Unipolarity is durable—China and Russia’s strategies backfire.

Sears 16 – Nathan A. Sears is a PhD Candidate in International Relations at the University of Toronto, [“China, Russia, and the Long ‘Unipolar Moment’”, 4/27/16, ]

In 1990, Charles Krauthammer declared a “,” arguing that “the center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States.” To many observers, the word “moment” (or “”) seemed an apt description of the durability of U.S. hegemony. International Relations (IR) theory—especially —predicts that the unbalanced power of a unipolar international system should catalyze the emergence of new great powers and a quick return to balance-of-power politics, in order to limit the power of the preeminent state and restore the system to its “natural” state of multipolarity. Today, believe that this neorealist prophecy is coming true and that unipolarity is —even if the “moment” lasted longer than originally expected. The 2008 global financial crisis revealed cracks in the of U.S. hegemony, especially when compared to a number of more spritely “emerging economies.” The United States also shows signs of “” after over a decade of military escapades in Afghanistan and Iraq—evidenced by its more restrained military policy with respect to political instability in the Middle East (e.g. Libya and Syria), and the transition of its “War on Terror” into a waged from a Nevada bunker. Most importantly, the long-awaited return to balance-of-power politics has finally arrived: two champions, China and Russia, have emerged to counter-balance the United States and restore proper equilibrium to the international system. Right? Wrong. Despite the “,” China and Russia’s balancing strategies have backfired: they are not leading to multipolarity, but are actually reinforcing unipolarity. The reason is that China and Russia’s balancing strategies have focused on regional “revisionism,” which has provoked powerful responses in East Asia and Europe to contain them. This modern version of is a diffuse reaction by China and Russia’s threatened neighbors, but it has centered on strengthening the U.S.-led alliance systems in East Asia and Europe in order to maintain the regional status quos. The United States is therefore the main strategic beneficiary of Chinese and Russian balancing, which is likely to lead to a long “unipolar moment.”

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Internal Link › Ext. – Generic/AT multipolarity

US hegemonic decline leads to nuclear war and extinction

Varisco 13 – Andrea Varisco holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs, Peace, and Conflict Studies from the Australian National University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and holds a Master’s Degree in Politics and Comparative Institutions from the University of Milano, [“Towards a Multi-polar International System: Which Prospects for Global Peace?”, 6/3/13,” ]RA

A return to multi-polarity will therefore imply more instability among great powers. But great power rivalry will not be the only source of possible instability for the future multi-polar world. The current distribution of power allows not only great powers but also middle, small powers and non-state actors to have military capabilities that could threaten the global security. In particular, the presence of nuclear weapons constitutes a further reason of concern and implies that the future world could carry not only the potential instability of multi-polarity and great powers rivalry, but also the dangers entailed in nuclear proliferation. The future multi-polar world will thus be potentially more unstable than all the other multi-polar periods history has experienced until nowadays: for the first time in history, the world could become both multi-polar and nuclear. While some scholars argue that nuclear deterrence “could reduce the war-proneness of the coming multi-polar system” (Layne, 44-45), the majority of them consider the presence of nuclear weapons as a source of instability (McNamara; Rosen; Allison). In particular, regional powers and states that are not great powers armed with nuclear capabilities could represent a cause of concern for global security. A nuclear Iran could for example attack – or be attacked – by Israel and easily involve in this war the rest of the world (Sultan; Huntley). A war between Pakistan and India, both nuclear states, could result in an Armageddon for the whole Asia. An attack from the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) on Japan or South Korea will trigger an immediate reaction from the US and “a nuclear proliferation ‘domino effect’ in East Asia” (Huntley, 725). Terrorists armed with nuclear weapons could wreak havoc and target the heart of the most powerful countries of the world (Bunn and Wier). Iran, Pakistan, DPRK, terrorist groups will rarely be great powers or poles in a future multi-polar world. Nevertheless, the effects of their actions could easily reverberate all over the globe and represent another cause of potential instability. For the first time in history, the stability of the future world will therefore depend not only on the unpredictable effects of the rivalry among great powers, but also on the dangerous potential of middle and small powers and non-state actors armed with nuclear weapons.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Link › AT: Uniqueness Overwhelms the Link/NATO not a concern

NATO has historically been a massive security concern – dates back to the end of WW2.

Masters 22 - Jonathan Masters leads writers and editors who produce wide-ranging content for CFR.org, including Backgrounders, visual stories, and events. He also writes on foreign policy and national security and his work has appeared in Foreign Affairs, the Atlantic, and Bloomberg. Masters has a BA in political science from Emory University and an MA in social theory from the New School, ["Why NATO Has Become a Flash Point With Russia in Ukraine," Council on Foreign Relations, , 1-20-2022]RA

Did the United States promise the Soviet Union that it would freeze NATO expansion? Russian officials say that the U.S. government made a pledge to Soviet leaders not to expand the alliance’s eastern borders, a commitment they say came during the flurry of diplomacy following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and surrounding the reunification of Germany in 1990. Proponents of this narrative often cite the words that U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker said to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in February 1990, that “there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.” They say the United States and NATO have repeatedly betrayed this verbal commitment in the decades since, taking advantage of Russia’s tumultuous post-Soviet period and expanding the Western alliance several times, all the way to Russia’s doorstep in the case of the Baltic states. However, many Western analysts and former U.S. officials involved in these discussions dispute what they say is a selective view of history. They point out that, in early 1990, the focus of the diplomacy between the so-called Two Plus Four (East and West Germany plus the United States, France, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom) was the future of Germany and the question of whether the soon-to-be unified country would be part of NATO. (West Germany was already an alliance member, while East Germany was part of the Soviet-aligned Warsaw Pact.) They say that the discussions were not about NATO’s long-term plans for eastward expansion, which would have made little sense at that time; the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union still existed, and there was scant indication they would dissolve as quickly as they did, in a matter of months. In a 2014 interview, Gorbachev said as much: “The topic of ‘NATO expansion’ was never discussed. It was not raised in those years.” The diplomacy between U.S. and Soviet leaders during this period focused on Germany and included discussions of various post-unification security options, including the potential for Germany to become part of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, for Germany to be nonaligned, and even for the Soviet Union to join NATO. Early in the talks, Soviet leaders insisted that a unified Germany never become part of NATO, though they eventually accepted Germany’s right to decide for itself. Similarly, the United States stepped back from Baker’s initial language on not expanding “NATO’s jurisdiction,” which he reportedly used only in the discussion about whether NATO troops would be based in what was then East Germany. In the end, the treaty recognizing German unification that the Two Plus Four powers signed in the summer of 1990 stipulated that only German territorial (non-NATO) forces could be based in East Germany while Soviet forces withdrew. After that, only German forces assigned to NATO could be based there, not foreign NATO forces. The treaty doesn’t mention NATO’s rights and commitments beyond Germany. How did NATO feature in diplomacy between U.S. and post-Soviet Russian leaders? Some experts point to another pivotal moment to help explain the mistrust between Russia and NATO today: the 1993–94 discussions between the Bill Clinton administration and the Russian government led by Boris Yeltsin. By this point, the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union had collapsed, and the Clinton administration was seeking to craft a new security architecture in Europe that would help foster and fortify the continent’s fledging, post-Soviet democracies, including Russia. Some in the Clinton government, as well as Central European countries such as the Czech Republic and Poland, wanted to move quickly and start expanding NATO’s membership eastward. However, most Clinton officials reportedly did not, being wary that expansion would rankle Russian leaders at a fragile, transitional moment and detract from other U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as nuclear arms control. Instead, Clinton chose to develop a new NATO initiative called the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which would be nonexclusive and open to all former Warsaw Pact members, as well as non-European countries. Seeing this non-membership framework as a compromise of sorts, in October 1993, U.S. diplomats proposed it to Yeltsin, who eagerly accepted. (Just days before, Yeltsin, with the Russian military’s support, forcefully put down an attempt by parliament to oust him.) NATO launched PfP at its annual summit in January 1994, and more than two dozen countries, including Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine, joined in the following months. However, Clinton soon began speaking publicly [PDF] about expanding NATO’s membership, saying in Prague just days after the launch of PfP that “the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.” Yeltsin warned Western leaders at a conference in December of that year that “Europe, even before it has managed to shrug off the legacy of the Cold War, is risking encumbering itself with a cold peace.” Clinton subsequently made efforts to allay Yeltsin’s concerns: pushing off enlargement until after the Russian leader was reelected in 1996, inviting Russia to join the Group of Seven, and establishing a formal, non-adversarial forum for Russia-NATO diplomacy. But analysts say that NATO’s expansion in the ensuing years would leave deep scars on the Russian psyche. “For many Russians, most importantly Vladimir Putin, the 1990s were a decade of humiliation, as the United States imposed its vision of order on Europe (including in Kosovo in 1999) while the Russians could do nothing but stand by and watch,” James Goldgeier, an expert on NATO-Russia relations, wrote for War on the Rocks. The Russian government, led by Putin, continued to be wary of NATO expansion in the 2000s. Putin expressed doubts that the alliance, which grew its fastest in 2004, would be effective in tackling the security challenges of the day, including international terrorism and the conflict in Afghanistan. Many new members, particularly the Baltic countries, saw NATO membership as a shield against their former Soviet rulers. In the years that followed, Putin grew increasingly outspoken in his displeasure at NATO’s inroads into Eastern Europe, saying at a high-profile speech in Munich in 2007 that “it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.” In the summer following NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit, where NATO stated its intent to admit Georgia and Ukraine, Russia invaded the former. Six years later, as Kyiv stepped closer to an economic partnership with another Western bloc, the European Union, Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Link › AT: Uniqueness Overwhelms the Link/NATO not a concern

Sole concern – Russia invasion of Ukraine proves.

Ellyat, 2/1/22 - Holly Ellyatt writes for CNBC.com focusing on European macro-economics and politics. She has led digital coverage of the European financial crisis, U.K. politics and Brexit, and Russia. Holly joined CNBC in 2012, having worked previously in digital, radio and film production. She studied European Social and Political Studies at University College London (UCL) and then completed a MA in Broadcast Journalism at City University, [ “Putin says the West has ignored Russia’s security concerns over NATO and Ukraine,” 2-1-2022, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/01/putin-the-west-has-ignored-russian-security-concerns-on-nato-ukraine.html]RA

President Vladimir Putin accused Western nations of ignoring key Russian security concerns, following the U.S.′ refusal last week to concede to Moscow’s demands over Ukraine and NATO. “It’s already clear now ... that fundamental Russian concerns were ignored,” Putin said at a press conference Tuesday, according to a Reuters translation. Putin said that the U.S. wanted to “contain Russia” and that it was using Ukraine to do that, as he reiterated Russia’s position that any possible membership of Ukraine in NATO would “undermine Russia’s security.” “Let’s imagine that Ukraine is a NATO member, it is fully packed of weapons, it gets advanced attack means like those in Poland and Romania and it starts an operation in Crimea,” Putin said, describing Crimea, a part of Ukraine annexed by Russia in 2014, as a “sovereign Russian territory.” “Let’s imagine that Ukraine is a NATO member state and it initiates a military operation. What should we do then, [should we] fight against the NATO bloc? Did anyone think at least something about that? Apparently not.” Nonetheless, Putin said he hoped dialog over Ukraine would continue and that a way needed to be found to, as he put it, “protect everyone’s security.” His comments followed talks with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, with whom Putin shares friendly ties, in Moscow. It’s the first time that Putin has commented publicly about the geopolitical crisis in weeks, despite a flurry of diplomatic meetings and calls between Russian and Western officials. While over 100,000 Russian troops remain stationed at various points along Russia’s border with Ukraine, there remains heightened concerns that Putin could be poised to give his troops a greenlight to invade Ukraine. Russia has denied it is planning an invasion, but trust in Russia’s word has been low ever since it annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, and supported pro-Russian separatists in the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine. Political analysts believe that Russia wants to maintain its sphere of influence and power over former Soviet states and to stop Ukraine’s gravitation toward the West. Russia has insisted that it just wants to protect its security interests, particularly in the face of an expanded NATO that has deployed military hardware to eastern Europe. On the build-up of troops along its border with Ukraine, Putin has previously insisted late last year that Russia has a right to move its troops wherever it likes within its territory. The Kremlin has accused the West of stirring up “hysteria” over Ukraine. Putin’s comments comes after Russia made a series of security proposals to the U.S. in December, including its main demands that NATO does not expand further to the east or admit Ukraine to the military alliance. It would also like to see NATO rollback its military deployments in eastern Europe. Putin echoed that position on Tuesday, stating that missile launchers in Romania and Poland, both of whom are NATO members, “are a threat to Russia.” Last week, the U.S. responded to those demands, refusing to accept Russia’s key proposals over Ukraine and NATO. Still, it signaled a willingness to continue discussions aimed at calming tensions, and said there could be room for compromise in some areas potentially. On Tuesday, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was due to speak to Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Russia’s official response to the U.S. remains unknown, at this point, although it has reportedly delivered a written response to the U.S. Putin’s meeting with Orban Tuesday comes as European leaders step up their engagement with Moscow with Putin already having spoken to French President Emmanuel Macron and Italy’s Prime Minister Mario Draghi this week. On Wednesday, he is due to speak to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who was visiting Ukraine Tuesday. Putin has not publicly commented on Ukraine since Dec. 23, according to the New York Times, which noted that he had chided a British journalist who asked, during Putin’s annual news conference, whether he would guarantee that Russia would not invade Ukraine. “It was the United States that came with its missiles to our home, to the doorstep of our home,” Putin said.