2022
UTNIF
Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › UQ › U---China-Focus High
Wilkinson 22 (Tracy Wilkinson, “Remember the ‘pivot’ to Asia? U.S. wants to reassure Pacific allies it’s still on,” Los Angeles Times, 2022, )
Like many U.S. governments before it, the Biden administration intended a foreign policy “pivot” toward China and Asia. Instead, Washington quickly faced war in Gaza, a chaotic pullout from Afghanistan and a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine. On Wednesday, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken arrived in Melbourne, Australia, for a regional tour that will see him try to reassert U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific against a rising China and to reassure allies worried that their issues are being given less priority in Washington. Blinken is scheduled to meet with his Australian, Indian and Japanese counterparts, whose nations, together with the U.S., form the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, an on-again, off-again group established as a counterbalance to Beijing. Speaking to reporters traveling with him, Blinken insisted that the Biden administration has maintained a “sustained focus” on the region despite an all-consuming and urgent mission to prevent Russia from invading Ukraine. He said he was on the phone in consultations over Ukraine during the long flight from Washington to Australia — the latest of some 200 engagements in recent weeks — and acknowledged that video-conferences and calls between Washington and European capitals on the crisis would continue to hum in the background of the talks in Melbourne. “Having said that, the world is a big place, our interests are global and you all know very well the focus that we have put on the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific region,” Blinken said. Blinken and the Quad representatives will tackle an “increasingly broad and deep agenda,” he said. It will be dominated by what most other countries in the region see as Chinese aggression on land and sea, as well as other issues such as emerging technologies that can also be threatened by Beijing. Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne welcomed Blinken’s arrival and that of the other Quad ministers, saying that by gathering here they were “voting with their feet in terms of the priority that they accord to [Indo-Pacific] issues.” Target fine lines and wrinkles while visibly firming skin with our anti-aging treatment for men. Kiehls first all-in-one anti-aging moisturizer for men is specifically formulated for men's thicker, coarser skin. This revitalizing anti-wrinkle... U.S. officials tacitly acknowledge a pep talk is in order. Blinken “will demonstrate the strength and the credibility of America’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region,” Daniel Kritenbrink, the assistant secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific affairs, said ahead of the trip. “We intend to demonstrate that our partnerships deliver, and they deliver practical and real benefits to our own peoples and to the peoples of the region.” Some in Asia expected greater interaction with President Biden, who campaigned on a shift to “strategic competition” with China as a pillar of his foreign policy. During Biden’s eight years as vice president, the Obama administration had also promised a “pivot” to Asia as its diplomatic focus. Instead, as crises erupted around the world, full-on engagement was delayed. In the meantime, Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has converted himself into leader for life, continued to claim Beijing’s sovereignty over disputed islands in the South China Sea; pushed its massive “Belt and Road” program, which spends billions of dollars in development money to gain influence in Europe, Africa and Latin America; and ignored international criticism of its treatment of the Muslim Uyghur minority, which the U.S. has called a genocide. This week, China again took the global center stage by hosting the Winter Olympics. The U.S. and several Western countries refused to send government delegations, but Russian President Vladimir Putin attended, striking a masterfully symbolic pose with Xi as the leaders of a new post-democratic alignment. The two men issued statements lavishing support on one another. “A much more powerful and assertive Xi government increasingly sees U.S. geopolitical strategy and activities in Asia through a very similar lens as [the one through which] Putin has long viewed American activities in Europe,” Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group, said in an analysis of Blinken’s tour. “To China, the Quad feels a lot like NATO encroachment does to Putin.” One potential flashpoint is China’s claim on Taiwan, which Beijing considers a breakaway republic much as Putin views post-Soviet Ukraine. Despite its stated focus on the region, the Biden administration still seems to be seeking its footing in Asia policy, said Michael Green, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington. The Trump administration receives credit for designating China as a strategic competitor, Green said, although it did not follow through with policy. Biden “has picked up and amplified” that decision, “but has essentially no economic strategy for Asia.”
2022
UTNIF
Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › UQ › U---Assistance High
Wong and Schmitt 22, (Edward Wong, analysts at NYT, and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Speeds Up Reshaping of Taiwan’s Defenses to Deter China,” New York Times, 2022,
The Biden administration has accelerated its efforts to reshape Taiwan’s defense systems as it projects a more robust American military presence in the region to try to deter a potential attack by the Chinese military, current and former U.S. officials say. Russia’s war in Ukraine has made American and Taiwanese officials acutely aware that an autocrat can order an invasion of a neighboring territory at any moment. But it has also shown how a small military can hold out against a seemingly powerful foe. U.S. officials are taking lessons learned from arming Ukraine to work with Taiwan in molding a stronger force that could repel a seaborne invasion by China, which has one of the world’s largest militaries. The aim is to turn Taiwan into what some officials call a “porcupine”— a territory bristling with armaments and other forms of U.S.-led support that appears too painful to attack. Taiwan has long had missiles that can hit China. But the American-made weapons that it has recently bought — mobile rocket platforms, F-16 fighter jets and antiship projectiles — are better suited for repelling an invading force. Some military analysts say Taiwan might buy sea mines and armed drones later. And as it has in Ukraine, the U.S. government could also supply intelligence to enhance the lethality of the weapons, even if it refrains from sending troops. American officials have been quietly pressing their Taiwanese counterparts to buy weapons suitable for asymmetric warfare, a conflict in which a smaller military uses mobile systems to conduct lethal strikes on a much bigger force, U.S. and Taiwanese officials say.
2022
UTNIF
Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › UQ › U---Assistance High
Yeager and Gerichten 22 (Maj. Jake Yeager is an intelligence officer in the U.S. Marine Corps, assigned to 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit. He was previously detailed to the intelligence community where he focused on China and Taiwan. William Gerichten works for the U.S. Defense Attaché Service as a civilian attaché and serves in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves as an intelligence officer, a foreign area officer specialized in China and Taiwan, and a Marine attaché, “REESTABLISH THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP-TAIWAN,” War on the Rocks, 2022,
The United States has a nasty habit of firing resources at a military problem first and asking questions about effective implementation later — as recently demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan — but that does not have to be the case with Taiwan. U.S. officials are starting to get more serious about supporting Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. They debate competing policy stances on defending Taiwan (ambiguity versus clarity) but largely agree that “bolstering Taiwan’s self-defenses is an urgent task and an essential feature of deterrence,” as recently stated by the Pentagon’s top official for Asia. Experienced U.S. officials are raising the alarm that China may attempt forceful unification with Taiwan later this decade if deterrence continues to erode. In the 1970s, the United States used triangular diplomacy to gain leverage over the Soviet Union by opening relations with China and eventually switching diplomatic recognition from Taipei, which Washington had previously recognized as the seat of the legitimate Chinese state and government, to Beijing. Prior to this switch in 1979, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group-Taiwan was the central hub for planning, coordinating, and executing defense cooperation initiatives. It served as the eyes, ears, and voice of the U.S. military to the Taiwanese armed forces. It possessed the requisite staff and planning horsepower to facilitate the large-scale military arms transfers, training, and advising that contributed to decades of Taiwanese military superiority over China, which has since evaporated. U.S.-Taiwanese defense initiatives are ramping up — to levels unseen since 1979 — due to legitimate concerns about Chinese designs on the island. However, the thick military organizational connective tissue that existed prior to 1979 is no longer in place to facilitate this cooperation. Without a military organization focused on the island, the U.S. personnel, funding, and materiel poured into supporting Taiwan may be inefficiently applied and generate limited return on investment — defined in terms of deterrence and lethality in conflict. To help to deter Chinese aggression, the United States should establish a 21st century version of this often forgotten advisory group to provide the staff capacity, synchronization, and interagency integration required to facilitate increasingly robust U.S.-Taiwanese military collaboration, bolster Taiwan’s defenses, and strengthen its will to fight. Despite inevitable Chinese government counterpressure, reestablishing this organization would probably not trigger military conflict and would be consistent with the U.S. commitment to the One China policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.
2022
UTNIF
Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › 1NC › DOD 1NC --- Generic
Pettyjohn and Wasser 22, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security. Becca Wasser, fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs, 2022,
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late.
2022
UTNIF
Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › 1NC › DOD 1NC --- Generic
Sacks 22 (David Sacks, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where his work focuses on U.S.-China relations, U.S.-Taiwan relations, Chinese foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, and the political thought of Hans Morgenthau, “Don't Pivot From the Pivot to Asia,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022,
With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, major war has returned to Europe and with it calls for the United States to prioritize countering the present threat posed by Russia over the threat China could one day pose. But Russia’s ineffectiveness on the battlefield, paired with the increasing investments European nations are making in their defense, gives the United States a better opportunity than ever to finally pivot to Asia and focus on the more formidable challenge China represents. A failure to do so could embolden China and give Beijing an opening to increase its influence, to the detriment of U.S. security and prosperity. Over a decade ago, President Obama announced the “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia in a speech to the Australian Parliament, declaring “the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.” The president’s speech followed an essay by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton entitled “America’s Pacific Century,” where she argued for a “strategic turn to the region.” All too often, however, the United States has failed to pair this ambitious rhetoric with policies that reflected the region’s importance. Now, Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has led to a growing consensus that the United States needs to view Russia as its primary geopolitical challenge and shift resources to Europe. But such a reorientation of U.S. strategy would again delay the pivot to Asia just when it is both more necessary and more viable than ever. The reasoning may be counterintuitive but holds all the same. The war in Ukraine has revealed Russia’s military is incapable of waging modern warfare and does not have the ability to fundamentally threaten NATO. Russia failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine, its logistics are in shambles, and morale among its soldiers is reportedly dangerously low. The defining image of this war thus far is of a stalled Russian convoy stretching forty miles on a road leading to Kyiv. Overcoming these issues will take years and require a fundamental overhaul of Russia’s military culture and doctrine. Russia will have to undertake these difficult reforms with its military in tatters. While it is difficult to know exactly how many casualties Russia has suffered in Ukraine, it is well into the thousands, and the Russian military will likely suffer far greater losses if it attempts to take Kyiv. Russia has lost some of its most advanced fighter jets, helicopters, tanks, and artillery, while depleting its munitions. It will take a long time for Russia to rebuild its material strength, a prospect that will be even more daunting given the sanctions that are in force. The crisis in Ukraine has also forced European countries to awaken from their slumber, and they are now willing to shoulder a greater burden for their defense. Most consequentially, Germany has announced it will increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP and purchase 35 F-35 fighter jets, which will increase interoperability with NATO forces. Sweden is also looking to increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP, while support for joining NATO has surged in the country. Denmark has pledged to meet the 2 percent target, while Latvia, Poland, and Romania have signaled they will boost defense spending to exceed that target. A depleted and exhausted Russian military and increased European investments in their defense mean the United States can meet its obligations to its NATO allies while shifting resources to Asia. As such, the Department of Defense should continue to identify China as the pacing challenge given its military might and its regional ambitions. Taiwan should remain the pacing scenario, as it is the most difficult one for the United States to address and therefore if the United States gets that right it will be well-positioned to respond to other regional contingencies. Capabilities most relevant for a Taiwan scenario should be prioritized, in particular long-range missiles and submarines, while the United States should continue to distribute its military presence throughout the region. With NATO’s conventional capabilities set to improve, once this crisis passes the United States should withdraw the seven thousand troops it sent to Europe following Russia’s invasion and review its force posture on the continent, where it currently has ninety thousand service members based. While Putin has upended European security, nothing has occurred since the war in Ukraine began that reduces the challenge that China poses for the United States. China’s military spending shows no sign of slowing down and is projected to increase by over 7 percent this year. It is continuing to invest in capabilities designed to prevent the United States from successfully intervening on behalf of its allies and is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. China’s economy is set to grow by 5.5 percent this year and it is pulling additional economies into its orbit with the entry into force of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and ongoing Belt and Road Initiative investments. While the United States certainly needs to deal with the urgent threat to European security, it cannot lose sight of the more serious and multidimensional challenge coming from Beijing. Indeed, if the perception takes root that the United States is pivoting away from Asia and toward Europe this could prompt China to conclude it has a window of opportunity for remaking the regional order.
2022
UTNIF
Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › 1NC › DOD 1NC --- Generic
Yeager and Gerichten 22 (Maj. Jake Yeager is an intelligence officer in the U.S. Marine Corps, assigned to 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit. He was previously detailed to the intelligence community where he focused on China and Taiwan. William Gerichten works for the U.S. Defense Attaché Service as a civilian attaché and serves in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves as an intelligence officer, a foreign area officer specialized in China and Taiwan, and a Marine attaché, “REESTABLISH THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP-TAIWAN,” War on the Rocks, 2022,
Bilateral military initiatives are reportedly expanding, in accordance with the growing threat posed by China. Washington is reportedly considering using special operators to help Taipei to conduct irregular warfare, including establishing resistance networks and countering an amphibious landing. This could support Taiwan’s grassroots efforts to mount a whole-of-society defense of the island, integrating civilian militias with active-duty and reserve military personnel. Earlier this year, the United States and Taiwan signed a coast guard cooperation agreement. Taiwan is fielding coast guard vessels capable of carrying anti-ship missiles and envisions its coast guard as a second navy during wartime. Taiwan is also revamping its military reserve system. These are complex undertakings that would benefit from substantial U.S. advice and assistance — especially if they are to be realized this decade. Congress is also pushing for more tangible U.S. support to Taiwan’s defensive preparedness, beyond routine U.S. arms sales. The recently introduced Taiwan Deterrence Act and Arm Taiwan Act would authorize $2 billion and $3 billion a year respectively in foreign military financing for Taiwan. This could help Taipei to purchase relevant defense articles like survivable communications systems, coastal defense cruise missiles (including in shipping containers), small missile boats, sea mines, loitering munition swarms, and mobile air defenses. The Taiwan Partnership Act would establish a partnership between the U.S. National Guard and Taiwan’s military. Taiwan’s plan to spend an extra $9 billion on domestically manufactured missiles and other capabilities may also generate demand for increased U.S. military assistance.
2022
UTNIF
Evidence
AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22 › Defense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC › AT: EU Cred – ! D – Turkey PIC – 2AC
Kay 12 (Sean Kay, professor of international relations at Ohio Wesleyan University he is Mershon Associate at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State University, “A new kind of NATO” 1/11/12) http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/11/a_new_kind_of_nato
First, declare victory! Europe is experiencing unprecedented sustained peace. If there ever was a moment to take advantage of that climate, it is now. The risks of defense re-nationalization are next to zero and potential conventional threats far over the horizon. Meanwhile, austerity programs are incentivizing Europe to economize military spending via deeper integration -- as Britain and France commenced in 2010. The European security dilemmas that required a heavy American military presence have long been resolved. As but just one recent example, late in 2011, Polish Foreign Minister Radislaw Sikorski stated that: "I will probably be the first Polish foreign minister in history to say so, but here it is: I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity."
2022
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Evidence
AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22 › Defense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC › AT: EU Cred – ! D – Turkey PIC – 2AC
Dirk Messner 07 [“EU as Protagonist of Multilateralism,” March, www.fes.de/ipg/arc_07_d/01_07_d/pdf/03_A_Messner_GB.pdf]
Four Weaknesses on the Way to Becoming a Cooperative World Power However, a number of weak points must be set against these assets in terms of the eu setting itself up as a cooperative world power. First, Europe’s only limited economic, technological, and scientific attractive- ness in comparison with the usa (and in future possibly also China and India) implies a loss of »soft power«which should not be underestimated. The capacity to act globally is based not only, perhaps not even principally, on military power, but on top of that on political, economic, and cultural attractiveness. Europe can therefore in future only become a relevant »co- operative world power« if it at the same time overcomes its economic weaknesses and becomes a motor of innovation in the world economy. Secondly, despite the »European Security Strategy« of 2003 the eu has still not managed to develop pan-European interests – which can even be opposed to individual national interests – and, on that basis, common strategies for helping to shape the international system, which can also withstand »heavy storms and a bumpy journey.« The crisis of the eu in the run-up to the Iraq war showed that in difficult international crises it is still the nation states and their capital cities, not the eu, Brussels, or the European Council of Foreign Ministers which ultimately are the relevant actors. The dispute between some European member states con-cerning the reform of the Security Council last year only strengthened this impression. The eu is the most developed regional cooperation project in the world, but still »work in progress«: no longer merely the sum of nation states, more than an association of states, but still clearly not a federal state of Europe. Moreover with the crisis of the European constitution the project of a more effective common eu foreign policy remains blocked for the time being. If this blockade and the loose co- operation between the foreign policies of the member states, as well as of the Commission, remains in place the eu’s global influence will ulti- mately remain very limited. Only a common European foreign policy would provide the opportunity to play a major role in global politics. Thirdly, although the eu is regarded worldwide as a »benevolent player« on the international stage, at the same time it is considered a po- litical actor which, in the context of the troubled further development of the European cooperation and integration project, is preoccupied above all with itself, its complicated decision-making processes and its confused institutional structures. The breath-taking political and economic dy- namics in parts of Asia contrast with the often finickyand stolid machinery of the European Union. And while the usa is reproached with exhibiting the hubris of power the eu must often give the appearance of being in- volved internationally »with the handbrake on.« Over against Europe’s good international reputation overall must be set the not unjustified observation that the eu is still not a truly globally thinking and capable »cooperative world power.« Fourthly, the eu’s efforts to develop its global capacity to act continue to be undermined by the internationally widespread image of »Fortress Europe«. Two things in particular which contribute to this image of the walled-in fortress are, on the one hand, the disputed immigration and migration policy of the Union which in the context of rising refugee move- ments from Africa have gained in importance in recent months; and, on the other hand, above all European agricultural policy is a symbol of the protectionism which inflicts great damage on the image of a cosmopolitan actor with a far-sighted interest in global issues. For example, Europe’s intransigence on agricultural questions in the negotiations with Mercosur on a free trade zone have harmed Europe’s standing in South America. This sketch of the eu’s strengths and weaknesses shows that it has a good starting position from which to gain significance as a global power without giving rise to international worries about an aggressive Europe, or one solely orientated towards its own, narrow interests. On the other hand, the economic, political and institutional construction work is vis- ible on which the eu must build in order to translate its global-gover-nance potential into an effective capacity to act.
2022
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Evidence
AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22 › Defense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC › AT: EU Cred – ! D – Turkey PIC – 2AC
Dempsey, 11
Judy Dempsey, Int'l Herald Tribune Europe Senior Correspondent, 9/28/11, The Failure of Soft Power, carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=45617
Europeans have long believed soft power to be the best instrument to promote their values and their security. They have a strong sense of moral superiority about it, particularly when looking at hard, or military, power. Military action is something that the Europeans leave to the United States, Britain, and France. Even if it wanted to, the European Union cannot do it. It lacks the basic capabilities, such as heavy airlift and logistics. It lacks an integrated defense policy for armament procurement. It also lacks a security strategy that includes the use of hard power as an option. The soft power instruments Europeans have used over the years consist of development aid and civilian assistance, such as training the police and judiciary in some countries. The Europeans also sometimes couple soft power with trade incentives or with sanctions. Above all, they pride themselves on basing their actions on the defense of human rights which are, at least officially, at the core of Europe’s value system. But Europe’s record in making soft power the cornerstone of its security strategy has been patchy. It has been worked incredibly well in Eastern Europe. Enlargement with its plethora of promises and incentives is soft power at its most powerful. But Europe cannot enlarge to the rest of the world. That is where Europe’s soft power policies have had so little, if any success. Take Iran. Years of negotiations with Iran to get it to abandon its nuclear ambitions have gotten the Europeans nowhere. Promises of technical assistance and closer economic cooperation have had no impact on the regime in Teheran, even though some of the sanctions are biting. The reason why the Europeans have failed is because Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is just too stubborn. He seems determined to develop a nuclear military capability for Iran’s own geo-strategic interests no matter what the cost to his people. Soft power can find no grip there. Bosnia-Herzegovina is another case where the instrument has failed. Fifteen years after the Dayton accords that ended the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia is mired in corruption and misrule. This is despite the presence of a large EU police force, not to mention the billions of euros the European taxpayer has poured into this tiny country. The state that the EU is trying to build has never really been accepted by the ethnic communities living there. And the EU is not prepared to stop the bullying and separatist tactics of the Bosnian Serbs in particular. Afghanistan is another stain on the EU’s soft power record. There, the Europeans have done too little and too late, wasting the initial good will of the Afghan people after the Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001. While the U.S. and its coalition forces were distracted by the war in Iraq, the Europeans did little to fill the gap left in Afghanistan. Europe’s most abject failure is its police-train ing mission there. It is still under-financed and under-staffed. What a shame for what should have been a stellar example of the EU’s use of soft power.
2022
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Evidence
AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22 › Defense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC › AT: NATO Cred – ! D – Turkey PIC – 2AC
Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute , 4/22/13 “NATOs Lack of Any Serious Purpose Means It Should Retire”
The most plausible continuing NATO role is to train the militaries of friendly nations to empower them to handle military contingencies in their own neighborhoods. But that doesn’t require a formal military alliance constantly looking for new wars to fight. The biggest challenge facing the alliance is shrinking national force structures. The NATO visitor acknowledged that “all Europeans are cutting their militaries, including the big spenders.” Defense Secretaries Robert Gates and Leon Panetta both lamented Europe’s waning efforts. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently admitted: “if European defense spending cuts continue, Europe’s ability to be a stabilizing force even in its neighborhood will rapidly disappear.” There’s no reason to believe the reductions won’t continue. Last year the Brookings Institution published a report reviewing widespread cutbacks across the continent. Explained Clara Marina O’Donnell: “current military spending trends are reducing the ability of most NATO allies to contribute to international security.” Troop numbers are coming down sharply. Moreover, recently reported Stars and Stripes, “Cuts by countries as large as Germany and as small as Latvia have resulted in program cancellations, changed equipment orders and, in the case of Britain, a plan to mothball a new aircraft carrier.” Earlier this year Rasmussen declared that “There is a lower limit on how little we can spend on defense.” Where is it? In 2006 the NATO members promised to spend two percent of GDP on the military. Today the Europeans collectively spend 1.5 percent of GDP on defense, compared to America’s five percent. Americans spend $2333 per person on the military, compared to just $503 by Europeans. Despite the much-maligned budget sequester, Washington continues to account for roughly 40 percent of the entire globe’s military outlays. The visiting official recognized the problem. If we take Secretary Gates’ formulation “that NATO is dead if members don’t spend two percent of GDP, then NATO is dead as they will not spend two percent of GDP.” Thus, he complained that “focusing burden-sharing on finances doesn’t get us anywhere.” Instead, he suggested giving “burden-sharing a different spin.” He argued that despite Europe’s diminishing commitment to the alliance, America still benefited. “The European allies may be useless for many things, but they still provide legitimacy and the continent acts as a worldwide operational hub.” However, that legitimacy is of little account if Washington believes a vital issue to be at stake. The American people don’t care; they will support their government even in the face of widespread international opposition, evident in Vietnam and Iraq, for instance. What turned the U.S. public against these wars were the reality of casualties and the perception of failure. Where legitimacy seems to be important, either the United Nations or a coalition of the willing would prove sufficient. Nor is a formal alliance necessary for base access and logistical backing. Washington could forge replacement arrangements with individual European states as well as any continental European military alliance. Given the deep differences of opinion which emerged over such issues as Iraq, Libya, and Syria, less formal cooperative mechanisms would reduce political tensions. A country could offer operational support without providing combat units or even endorsing a particular conflict. Funding for a nation’s military would not be undercut by participation in an unpopular international conflict.¶ Despite its problems at home, NATO bizarrely is seeking to expand abroad. Rasmussen recently traveled to Japan and South Korea to promote NATO cooperation in Asia. How can a European alliance increasingly incapable of defending Europe play a role in Asia? There are opportunities for non-military cooperation: sharing expertise on civil emergencies, advancing cyber-security, and promoting non-proliferation. However, these relationships could as easily involve the European Union as NATO. Noted Richard Weitz of the Hudson Institute, “while NATO has adopted a global perspective, its main activities beyond Europe and Afghanistan thus far have consisted primarily of dialogue.”¶ Alliances should be based on international circumstance. Rasmussen recently argued that “The need for a strong military alliance between Europe and North America has never been stronger.” That is nonsense. Neither continent faces an existential military threat. Neither faces a significant global competitor. Neither has a compelling interest to meddle in regional conflicts. While there is much about which the U.S. and Europe should cooperate, there is no need for an American-dominated transatlantic military alliance. Thus, what is needed is U.S. burden-shedding rather than allied burden-sharing. Europeans could provide forces sufficient to defend themselves, patrol the Mediterranean, aid the Central Asia states, and protect their interests in North Africa and the Middle East. If they chose not to do so, no worries for America. But they shouldn’t expect Washington to step in. And U.S. officials then could stop their unproductive whining about Europe’s defense choices. America’s Cold War security policy shielded war-torn allies until they could recover and gain the economic means and political stability to defend themselves. That policy was a great success. Now Washington should celebrate by turning NATO over the Europeans.
2022
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Evidence
AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22 › Defense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC › AT: NATO Cred – ! D – Turkey PIC – 2AC
NYT 11 “Talking Truth to NATO”¶ Published: June 10, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/opinion/11sat1.html?_r=0
America’s key strategic alliance throughout the cold war is in far deeper trouble than most members admit. The Atlantic allies face a host of new and old dangers. Without more and wiser European military spending — on equipment, training, surveillance and reconnaissance — NATO faces, as Mr. Gates rightly warned, “a dim if not dismal future” and even “irrelevance.”¶ The secretary is retiring at the end of this month, which is likely one of the reasons he jettisoned the diplomatic niceties. But not the only one. As he made clear, this country can no longer afford to do a disproportionate share of NATO’s fighting and pay a disproportionate share of its bills while Europe slashes its defense budgets and free-rides on the collective security benefits.¶ NATO’s shockingly wobbly performance over Libya, after the Pentagon handed off leadership, should leave no doubt about the Europeans’ weaknesses. And while America’s NATO partners now have 40,000 troops in Afghanistan (compared with about 99,000 from the United States), many have been hemmed in by restrictive rules of engagement and shortages of critical equipment. Too many are scheduled for imminent departure.¶ The free-rider problem is an old one but has gotten even worse over the last two decades. During most of the cold war, the United States accounted for 50 percent of total NATO military spending; today it accounts for 75 percent. Mr. Gates was right when he warned of America’s dwindling patience with allies “unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.”¶ Decades of underinvestment, poor spending choices and complacent denial about new challenges have created what Mr. Gates called a “two-tiered alliance.” He is right that too many of its members limit themselves to “humanitarian, development, peacekeeping and talking tasks,” and too few are available for the combat missions the alliance as a whole has agreed to assume.¶ Libya, a mission much more directly linked to the security of Europe than of the United States, strikingly illustrates the consequences.¶ Fewer than half of NATO’s 28 members are taking part in the military mission. Fewer than a third are participating in the all-important airstrikes. British and French aircraft carry the main burden. Canada, Belgium, Norway and Denmark, despite limited resources, have made outsized contributions. Turkey, with the alliance’s second-largest military, has remained largely on the sidelines. Germany, NATO’s biggest historic beneficiary, has done nothing at all.¶ Even fully participating members have failed to train enough targeting specialists to keep all of their planes flying sorties or to buy enough munitions to sustain a bombing campaign much beyond the present 11 weeks.¶ That should frighten every defense ministry in Europe. What if they had to fight a more formidable enemy than Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s fractured dictatorship?¶ Combat is not always the best or only solution. NATO needs those European development and peacekeeping capabilities. All alliance members must also have at least the basic military capacities to meet common threats. Without that, the alliance will grow increasingly hollow — a fact that enemies will not miss.¶ Mr. Gates was right to speak out. We hope his likely successor, Leon Panetta, will keep pushing hard. A two-tiered military alliance is really no alliance at all.
2022
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Evidence
AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22 › Defense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC › No Kickout – Link D – Turkey PIC – 2AC
Cagaptay and Hills 21 (Soner, a Senior Fellow with Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Carol, Senior Producer and Host for The World, "Turkey's Erdoğan strategically backtracks threat to expel Western diplomats, political analyst explains," World from PRX, October 25, https://theworld.org/stories/2021-10-25/turkeys-erdo-strategically-backtracks-threat-expel-western-diplomats-political)
Now, it's interesting since these embassies put out statements saying they won't be interfering in Turkey's internal affairs. Does it appear that they were pressured into backing down over this case?
No, I would actually say the opposite. I think this is a step back for President Erdoğan. It's the first time he's stepping down away from confrontation because he actually threatened to expel these ambassadors. He said it was a done deal over the weekend. And of course, now I think that his administration has walked back the stated policy. These ambassadors look like they won't be expelled. So, this is one of the first instances we see Erdoğan is stepping down in the face of a united front of Western countries — US and European countries acting together. It's quite significant. Erdoğan, I think in recent years, has benefited from a strongman image domestically, and a step back, of course, would be a big dent in his strongman image.
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Evidence
AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22 › Defense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC › No Kickout – Link D – Turkey PIC – 2AC
Rubin 5/26 (Michael, Senior Fellow @ American Enterprise Institute, Specializes in Iran, Turkey, and the broader Middle East, "The Real Reason Turkey Will Never Voluntarily Leave NATO", American Enterprise Institute - AEI, May 26, 2022, )
Turkey does not belong in NATO, but there is no formal mechanism to expel wayward members. At a minimum, Erdogan gets power by forcing the United States and other NATO members on one hand, and Russia on the other to bid for its support. Erdogan’s animosity toward the United States is famous, however. If ideology rather than material gain motivates him, however, he gains more from being a Trojan horse in the consensus-governed alliance than from voluntarily exiting it.
Back to Mitsotakis: the power of the maps he provided in his meetings cannot be overstated. There have been hundreds of Turkish violations of Greek airspace. Such violations are not neutral: Turkey cannot provide any instance of Greek violations of its airspace or unsanctioned overflights of its territories. After the United States began utilizing the port of Alexandroupolis, Turkey began violating airspace over that location as well. Turkey has also threatened military force against the Greek island of Kastellorizo.
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Evidence
AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22 › Offense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC › Kickout Bad – Turkey PIC – 2AC
Pry 19 (Peter, Chief of Staff of the Congressional EMP Commission and served on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee and @ the CIA, "Expelling Turkey from NATO would create a dangerous foe", The Hill, October 23, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/466747-expelling-turkey-from-nato-would-create-a-dangerous-foe/)
is right to try to accommodate Turkey’s legitimate security interests on the Syrian border, while protecting the Kurds, in order to keep Turkey in NATO.
After the United States, Turkey has the second-largest standing armed forces in NATO, with more soldiers (639,000 military, paramilitary and civilian personnel), tanks (3,200), armored fighting vehicles (9,500), artillery (2,400) and military aircraft (1,067 fighter jets, attack helicopters and transports) than Germany, France or the United Kingdom. Turkey’s navy comprises 194 ships, mostly frigates, corvettes and coastal gunships but including 12 submarines.
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Evidence
AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22 › Offense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC › Kickout Bad – Turkey PIC – 2AC
Hess 6/22 (Maximilian, Central Asia fellow @ the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “Why the West Should Make Peace With Erdogan Now”, Foreign Policy, June 22, 2022, )
However, the reality is that the West needs Erdogan more than ever. Russia’s brutal, all-out war against Ukraine has vastly raised Turkey’s profile on the geostrategic chessboard. Ankara has emerged as a key supplier of drones to Kyiv—shipments it has luckily shown no intention of halting. Ukraine’s chances of victory would be significantly improved if Turkish arms deliveries were expanded. Erdogan, who controls access to the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, crucially shut the passage to warships in late February.
At the same time, Ankara has also been willing to cooperate with Moscow on Ukraine where Erdogan sees an opportunity. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu discussed plans to secure a route for Ukrainian grain exports with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Ankara on June 8, reportedly asking for a 25 percent discount on Turkish grain purchases as part of the deal. Without Ankara on board, any Western proposals to break the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports are dead on arrival.
2022
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Evidence
AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22 › Offense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC › NATO Reunification – L/T – Turkey PIC – 2AC
Şahin and Sözen ‘22 - Devrim Şahin is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science and International Relations as well as the research assistant in Cyprus Policy Center at Eastern Mediterranean University; Ahmet Sözen is professor of International Relations. He is the Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations as well as the Founding Director of the think tank Cyprus Policy Center at Eastern Mediterranean University (Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 74, “The Complexity Effect in U.S.-Turkey Relations”, March 8, 2022, )//RG
In the recent decade, the U.S. has pursued a strategy to support armed Kurdish groups to repel radical Islamic terror groups, particularly ISIS. Nevertheless, Turkey has become increasingly concerned about the strengthening of the Kurdish administration and its nationalist ambitions. These concerns are pushing Turkey into the arms of U.S. rivals in the region. Both Iran and Russia are expanding their authority in the region by establishing political and military support for radical regimes such as Assad’s in Syria and political and militant movements like Hezbollah. These strategic policies are increasingly connecting Iran’s and Russia’s allies in an ever-strengthening regional security complex. Given these regional circumstances, Turkey finds itself flip-flopping between these rival regional security complexes. The primary cause for current problems in U.S.-Turkey relations is not simply the recent actions of the two countries. The complex view of the IR system facilitates the understanding that the U.S.-Turkey relationship is shaped by the feedback loops generated under both regional and global circumstances. The complexity of the international system can trigger a dramatically different evolution of relations between U.S. and Turkey as a feedback (reaction) caused by the U.S. For example, the U.S. does not hesitate to use methods like arming the YPG, even if these methods hurt former allies such as Turkey. As a result, U.S.-Turkish relations continue to be vulnerable to the U.S. approach toward minority, rebel groups which have problematic bonds with Turkey. The international roles that the U.S. and Turkey pursued for themselves in the post-9/11 era have had consequences for perceptions of historical friendship or hostilities – what the Regional Security Complex Theory ties to cooperative or non-cooperative behavior of states. There were hostility perceptions among Turkish military and Foreign Service chiefs in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union when the U.S. sought to maintain its global supremacy role. Given its resources, the U.S. cannot help but be superior to smaller, poorer states that do not have Washington’s military capacity. The issue is the way in which the U.S. dominates – that is, its treatment of its allies, not considering their strategic security concerns, etc. Turkey was deeply concerned with events in northern Iraq following the 1991 Iraq war. These events amounted to challenge Turkey’s priority of preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. The hostility perceptions in Turkey turned to be reciprocal between the U.S. and Turkey thanks to the feedback loops generated by the 9/11 attacks. The unilateral U.S. reaction to the 9/11 attacks during the Bush administration undermined the U.S.-led liberal international order and played no small role in the inauguration of Trump as a president who questions this order and views local U.S. allies as burdens on the U.S. If we acknowledge that the complexity of the international relations system is at play here, the causal logic of the complexity approach leads us to expect that Turkey’s internal characteristics can pressure systemic transformation – something other than the predictions generated by the regional security complex approach.83 A U.S. that operates with a systemic moral conscience could assist Turkey in managing its affairs. Facing complexity invokes improving diplomacy and collaboration, adopting multilateral solutions and soft power and constructing some advanced strategic partnerships. If the U.S. chooses to nurture its relationships with allies such as Turkey, the erosion of the U.S. position of influence could be mitigated and the U.S. still could be the primary actor in maintaining stability in the Middle East. The underlying message of this paper is that the U.S. and Turkey are rebuilding their alliance due to various factors. Both countries could form a revised alliance as an important constituent of the regional peace system. Neither of them desires the continuation of the Syrian chaotic status-quo and its accompanying insecurity nor do they desire Iran to dominate with a greater role in Syria or in the Middle East. Clearly, the security of the region is in a state of greater flux today than it has been in the past, yet tackling the present challenges in the Middle East depends on the effective involvement of regional U.S. partners.
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Evidence
AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22 › Offense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC › NATO Reunification – L/T – Turkey PIC – 2AC
Beyoghlow ‘20 – adjunct professor of international security at the George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs, where he teaches courses on Turkish politics and foreign policy (Kamal, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, “TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE BRINK: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AND THE US-TURKISH STRATEGIC AND MILITARY PARTNERSHIP”, January 2020, )//RG
While the current standoff between Turkey and the United States appears to be moving from bad to worse, it has yet to reach a breaking point or a point of no return. Although tensions and policy differences continue to plague US-Turkish relations, efforts by well-meaning policymakers within the US government and Turkey’s civilian and military establishment point to perhaps better days to come, given the resilience and endurance of the ties that bind the two nations together. The US perspective on Turkey could be traced to many factors, starting with the refusal of the Turkish Parliament to allow US forces to transit Turkish territory to attack Iraq in 2003 and the slow Turkish support for the US-led coalition against ISIS. Turkey is also being put on notice by the United States for feuding against other NATO allies—namely, Germany, the Netherlands, Cyprus, France, and Greece. In the last case, tensions have been brewing in recent months over new border disputes in the Aegean and the refusal of Greece to extradite a group of Turkish officers allegedly involved in the failed coup. Although resolving the Cyprus issue remains high on the US agenda, tensions between Turkey and Cyprus over oil and gas exploration rights and access off the coast of Cyprus are forcing the United States and the European Union to side with Cyprus and even entertain sending US naval ships to protect Cypriot gas and oil tracks at sea. Despite these and other policy differences over Syria and other domestic problems facing Turkey, both sides seem reluctant to cause irreparable damage to their alliance. The United States, which has traditional ties with Turkey, does not want a military confrontation with the country over Syria. The most hopeful sign of addressing some of the protracted problems currently facing US-Turkish relations stems from the fact that Turkey is still seen by the United States as important to America’s national security interests, especially given Turkey’s geostrategic location and cultural familiarity with its volatile neighbors. Turkey is currently self-absorbed with its ambitions and Muslim neo-Ottoman nationalist revivalism, but its unique ballot-box democracy, albeit imperfect by Western standards, will work toward increasing harmonization toward the United States and its NATO allies in the long run. This can only happen through a sustained strategic dialogue. The idea is to keep Turkey and the United States engaged while trying to find solutions to the issues that separate them, because once the current tactical posturing is stripped away, the strategic alliance becomes more visible. There is indeed current evidence for better US-NATO-Turkish cross-cultural communication techniques to manage and resolve outstanding policy and strategic differences. In short, Turkey is not yet lost, but there are challenges facing America and its NATO partners in how to bridge the growing gap between them and Turkey. This challenge touches on a fundamental question: What kind of strategic relation- ship do the United States, NATO, and Turkey want or desire? Clearly, they are at a policy and strategic cross- road. The answer lies in the need for the United States to craft a new strategy toward Turkey and vice versa that takes into account the new realities of Turkish, NATO, and American domestic political dynamics, their changing nature and character, as well as Tur- key’s quest for regional influence and ambitions and its goal of becoming a great regional power. Turkey, NATO, and the United States share Western values, and these values, although not equal for all partners, are keys to better multicultural harmony if applied properly across the board.
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Evidence
AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22 › Offense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC › NATO-Turkey Coop Good – Turkey PIC – 2AC
Ellehuus 19 (Rachel, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow with Europe Program @ Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving", Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 12, )
The first of these is the Black Sea, where Turkey, as well as fellow NATO Black Sea littoral states Romania and Bulgaria, are trying to balance an increasing Russian military presence. While previously resistant to a greater NATO role in the Black Sea for fear it would dilute its own influence in the region, Turkey now sees the dangers of leaving Russian influence and presence in Black Sea unchecked. With its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and entry into the Syrian civil war in 2015, Russia has significantly increased its presence and combat capabilities in both the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.
NATO now faces an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubble that restricts allies’ freedom of maneuver in the Black Sea, with Russia capable of attacking from both land and sea. To effectively counter this, NATO should establish a more continuous presence in the Black Sea, revive the idea of a permanent NATO maritime fleet in the Black Sea, and consider basing more counter-A2/AD capabilities in Turkey and Romania. Importantly, Turkey holds unique power to control access to the Black Sea thanks to the 1936 Montreux Convention, which governs naval passage through the Turkish Straits, limiting the number of foreign vessels that can enter the Black Sea via the Straits and how long these vessels can stay. This access is important to both Russia and NATO. Whereas Turkey has proven to be an impartial and reliable enforcer of the treaty, Russia has pushed the boundaries of Montreux repeatedly since the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 and, more recently, impeded the course of NATO vessels that have entered and departed the Black Sea in compliance with the treaty. More behavior along these lines, or a Russian attempt to leverage its new, closer relationship with Turkey to secure more favorable access to the Black Sea, would likely increase Turkey’s unease and lead it to rely more on NATO as a counterbalance.
2022
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Evidence
AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22 › Offense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC › NATO-Turkey Coop Good – Turkey PIC – 2AC
Çoban and Akar 20 (Samet, Research Fellow @ Beyond the Horizon ISSG, Furkan, Research Intern @ Beyond the Horizon ISSG, “NATO-Turkey Relations in a Turbulent Environment: The Military Dimension of NATO-Turkey Relations”, NATO-Turkey Relations Policy Brief, Beyond the Horizon ISSG, December 2020, )
Unlike political turmoil, military relations between Turkey and NATO are on track. What most analysts agree about is that there is no shrinkage of Turkish military contribution to NATO. Turkey (still) provides substantial contributions to the NATO and EU-led operations. As Flanagan and Wilson point out "engagement slowed somewhat in the immediate months after the coup, almost 95 per cent of planned operations and activities with US Army Europe forces resumed the following year. In fact, the TSK [TAF] participated in ten US Army Europe exercises during 2016, which was a significant increase over previous years."
Along with these operations, Turkey contributes to the NATO Response Force (NRF) substantially, e.g. hosting an NRDC Headquarters in Istanbul and providing naval vessels to SNMG-2 and SNMCMG-2 that are maritime components of the NRF.
2022
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Evidence
AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22 › Offense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC › NATO-Turkey Coop Good – Turkey PIC – 2AC
Jeffrey 6/15 (James, Former ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS, "The NATO Accession Crisis Risks Final Collapse of the Alliance-Turkey Relationship" June 25, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nato-accession-crisis-risks-final-collapse-alliance-turkey-relationship)
A month ago, Washington hosted Turkish Foreign Minister Melvut Cavusoglu and signaled a new bilateral strategic dialogue. This included possible sales of F-16’s to Ankara, symbolically ending the bitter dispute over a Turkish Russian missile purchase, and Washington’s subsequent cutting Turkey from the F-35 program. Turkey was also following analogous rapprochement with Arab states, Israel, Greece, and Armenia, and now plays a central role in the Ukrainian conflict providing weapons, closing the Straits to Russian naval reinforcements and pressing on various diplomatic exchanges. Then almost overnight Ankara lashed out against Finland and Sweden, threatening to block their NATO accession if they did not cut real and alleged ties to the PKK, and followed up with the aforementioned threats in Syria and escalation in the Aegean. Predictably, American commentators reacted vigorously, even suggesting once again for Turkey to be thrown out of NATO.
Shifting attitudes toward Turkey