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2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › 1AC › 1AC Advantage - NATO

NATO is key to countering this new front of modern warfare – absent adoption multiple theaters of conflict make escalation likely

Lucarelli et al 2021 - Professor at the University of Bologna, member of the Board of Directors of the Forum on the Problems of Peace and War and of the Institute of International Affairs

Sonia Lucarelli Alessandro Marrone Francesco N. Moro “Technological Changes And A Transformed International Security Environment” Nato Decision-Making In The Age Of Big Data And Artificial Intelligence, Nato Allied Command Transformation Università Di Bologna Istituto Affari Internazionali

Digital revolution has substantially transformed the world we live in, providing great opportunities but also making societies more vulnerable and transforming the meaning of state borders. Technology makes external interferences cheaper, faster and all-encompassing: citizens can potentially become direct targets of information warfare, all members of a society can be part of conflicts one way or another. From advanced weaponry to command and control, most security-related domains are undergoing deep transformations as data availability and transmission increase exponentially. This is especially true as the emergence of so-called hybrid tactics contributes to universalize the battlefield. Also, attackers may lose control of their offensive cyber weapons, and ‘collateral damages’ across the private sector and the public worldwide might be more and more difficult to contain. Less visible, yet important challenges connected with Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) also exist. For instance, data overload can create problems for decisionmakers that are unable to detect important signals. Losing sight of how machines make their calculations – a somewhat inherent feature of Artificial Intelligence (AI) – can hinder deeper understanding of phenomena as well as learning, besides having dense ethical implications.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › 1AC › 1AC Advantage - NATO

China and Russia are pursuing military usage of AI now

Parrikar 2022 - Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

By Manohar Parrikar May 30, 2022 “China and Russia are pursuing military usage of AI now” https://www.eurasiareview.com/30052022-natos-ai-push-and-military-implications-analysis/

The technological advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI), machine learning, big data analytics, robotics, quantum computing and virtual reality have led to the rise in use of autonomous systems in military applications. This is changing the face of the battlefield by enabling new forms of military functions, over and above the conventional systems, thus enabling the execution of higher coercive actions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries are also adopting such emerging technologies to maintain their strategic advantage and to mitigate transnational threats.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
NEG › Solvency › Multilat Fails

Multilateralism empirically fails

Naim ‘9 (Moises; 6/21/09; Distinguished Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; “MISSING LINKS Minilateralism The magic number to get real international action,” accessed 6/26/16, http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/21/minilateralism/)

Never say never. Because of the global economic crisis, habits that seemed unalterable are suddenly being altered. Americans are now saving more and consuming less. Financial institutions are no longer betting the house on risky investments they do not understand. Wealthy oil-exporting countries are tightening their belts. At least some emerging markets long prone to financial accidents are behaving with uncharacteristic prudence. Everywhere, change is in the air. Everywhere, that is, except in the way humanity responds to its most menacing threats. You know the list: climate change, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, pandemics, trade protectionism, and more. Not one can be solved, or even effectively contained, without more successful international collaboration. And that is not happening. When was the last time you heard that a large number of countries agreed to a major international accord on a pressing issue? Not in more than a decade. The last successful multilateral trade agreement dates back to 1994, when 123 countries gathered to negotiate the creation of the World Trade Organization and agreed on a new set of rules for international trade. Since then, all other attempts to reach a global trade deal have crashed. The same is true with multilateral efforts to curb nuclear proliferation; the last significant international nonproliferation agreement was in 1995, when 185 countries agreed to extend an existing nonproliferation treaty. In the decade and a half since, multilateral initiatives have not only failed, but India, Pakistan, and North Korea have demonstrated their certain status as nuclear powers. On the environment, the Kyoto Protocol, a global deal aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, has been ratified by 184 countries since it was adopted in 1997, but the United States, the world’s second-largest air polluter after China, has not done so, and many of the signatories have missed their targets. The most recent multilateral initiative successfully endorsed by a large number of countries was in 2000, when 192 nations signed the United Nations Millennium Declaration, an ambitious set of eight goals ranging from halving the world’s extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education—all by 2015. Although some progress toward achieving these goals has been made—mostly thanks to Asia’s spectacular economic performance—the failure of rich countries to fully fund these efforts, execution problems in poor countries, and the global economic downturn make the achievement of the goals by 2015 unlikely. The pattern is clear: Since the early 1990s, the need for effective multicountry collaboration has soared, but at the same time multilateral talks have inevitably failed; deadlines have been missed; financial commitments and promises have not been honored; execution has stalled; and international collective action has fallen far short of what was offered and, more importantly, needed. These failures represent not only the perpetual lack of international consensus, but also a flawed obsession with multilateralism as the panacea for all the world’s ills. So what is to be done? To start, let’s forget about trying to get the planet’s nearly 200 countries to agree. We need to abandon that fool’s errand in favor of a new idea: minilateralism. By minilateralism, I mean a smarter, more targeted approach: We should bring to the table the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem. Think of this as minilateralism’s magic number. The magic number, of course, will vary greatly depending on the problem. Take trade, for example. The Group of Twenty (G-20), which includes both rich and poor countries from six continents, accounts for 85 percent of the world’s economy. The members of the G-20 could reach a major trade deal among themselves and make it of even greater significance by allowing any other country to join if it wishes to do so. Presumably, many would. Same with climate change. There, too, the magic number is about 20: The world’s 20 top polluters account for 75 percent of the planet’s greenhouse gas emissions. The number for nuclear proliferation is 21—enough to include both recognized and de facto nuclear countries, and several other powers who care about them. African poverty? About a dozen, including all the major donor countries and the sub-Saharan countries most in need. As for HIV/AIDS, 19 countries account for nearly two thirds of the world’s AIDS-related deaths. Of course, countries not invited to the table will denounce this approach as undemocratic and exclusionary. But the magic number will break the world’s untenable gridlock, and agreements reached by the small number of countries whose actions are needed to generate real solutions can provide the foundation on which more-inclusive deals can be subsequently built. Minilateral deals can and should be open to any other country willing to play by the rules agreed upon by the original group. The defects of minilateralism pale in comparison with the stalemate that characterizes 21st-century multilateralism. It has become far too dangerous to continue to rely on large-scale multilateral negotiations that stopped yielding results almost two decades ago. The minilateralism of magic numbers is not a magic solution. But it’s a far better bet at this point than the multilateralism of wishful thinking.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
NEG › Solvency › Multilat Fails

Multilateralism fails – countries won’t cooperate, causing fragmentation.

Young et al 13 (Kevin Young, Assistant Professor in the University of Massachusetts Amherst’s Department of Political Science, Thomas Hale, Postdoctoral research fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University, David Held, Professor of politics and international relations at Durham University, “Global Cooperation Buckling Under Past Successes,” The Globalist, Global Cooperation Buckling Under Past Successes, *fc)

A Systemic Crisis While the need for global cooperation continues to grow, the ability of multilateral institutions to deliver the policy coordination we need has not kept pace. The provision of effective global governance isn’t just lacking in one area — like, say, climate change. It is systematically underperforming across a range of issues. These include the management of the global economy to human security and environmental problems. While many have pondered the many pressing global dilemmas facing the world today, there is a paradox accompanying the global situation as a whole. We are failing under the weight of our own success. Decades of multilateral agreements, new institutions and an increasingly robust system of international law have enabled a radical increase in economic globalization, with substantial benefits for a wide range of countries. But our ability to manage all this complexity of progress has not kept pace. Our more integrated global economy demands more, and more effective, collective management. The problems that confront us now are challenges we never would have encountered without the progress made by the existing network of institutions. The various committees based in Basel, the IMF, the G20, and beyond facilitated a sharp deepening of financial interdependence. When the crisis arrived, they proved adequate — albeit just adequate — to coordinate a minimally sufficient series of policy responses to avoid another Great Depression. Instead of an unmitigated disaster we got a mitigated one. They were of course unable to prevent the crisis from occurring in the first place and have not been able to take the measures needed to prevent the next one. Moreover, just as existing international institutions are useful vehicles for cooperation, they can also come to hinder it. International institutions like the IMF, for example, contain a vast array of resources and expertise for addressing global problems. Yet because of their past behavior and the lock-in of US dominance that was secured over six decades ago, many countries do not trust the IMF as a global governor. Newer institutions like the G20 are a testament to successful development of countries like Brazil, India and China, who have been able to strategically engage with economic globalization in recent years. Yet, with a greater plurality of voices at the negotiation table, cooperation becomes more difficult. Fragmentation From Cooperation When institutions proliferate, the overall system may slide toward dysfunctional fragmentation. Our current set of institutions arose from ad hoc crisis management over the postwar period. Each crisis saw the addition of a new committee, a new joint task force or some other institutional addition. But the sum is not greater than the parts. Indeed, the lack of coherence in global economic governance is directly responsible for a number of the challenges we now face. For example, the reform efforts surrounding complex financial instruments like derivatives are as complex as the instruments themselves. There is not one international institution handling the reform process. Rather, there are five different organizations all handling different pieces, separate initiatives at the EU level and a panoply of different countries all acting simultaneously. Some claim that global economic governance has utterly failed, pointing to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression and a sluggish recovery. Others regard global economic governance as “good enough.” They point out that we averted an even worse disaster and — despite a global recession — didn’t collapse. In fact, both views are correct: global economic cooperation is failing under the weight of its own success. Across a range of issue areas, the remarkable success of global cooperation in the last several decades has made human interconnectedness weigh much more heavily on politics and the economy than it did in the past. But that process of growing cooperation has now stalled, unable to manage the deep interdependence it has created.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
NEG › Disease › AT Science Diplomacy

Science diplomacy fails

Dickson, 10 (David, director of SciDev.net (science for the developing world) and 20+ years in science policy journalism, 6/28/10, “Science in diplomacy: “On tap but not on top,” https://scidevnet.wordpress.com/2010/06/28/the-place-of-science-in-diplomacy-%E2%80%9Con-tap-but-not-on-top%E2%80%9D/)

There’s a general consensus in both the scientific and political worlds that the principle of science diplomacy, at least in the somewhat restricted sense of the need to get more and better science into international negotiations, is a desirable objective. There is less agreement, however, on how far the concept can – or indeed should – be extended to embrace broader goals and objectives, in particular attempts to use science to achieve political or diplomatic goals at the international level. Science, despite its international characteristics, is no substitute for effective diplomacy. Any more than diplomatic initiatives necessarily lead to good science. These seem to have been the broad conclusions to emerge from a three-day meeting at Wilton Park in Sussex, UK, organised by the British Foreign Office and the Royal Society, and attended by scientists, government officials and politicians from 17 countries around the world. The definition of science diplomacy varied widely among participants. Some saw it as a subcategory of “public diplomacy”, or what US diplomats have recently been promoting as “soft power” (“the carrot rather than the stick approach”, as a participant described it). Others preferred to see it as a core element of the broader concept of “innovation diplomacy”, covering the politics of engagement in the familiar fields of international scientific exchange and technology transfer, but raising these to a higher level as a diplomatic objective. Whatever definition is used, three particular aspects of the debate became the focus of attention during the Wilton Park meeting: how science can inform the diplomatic process; how diplomacy can assist science in achieving its objectives; and, finally, how science can provide a channel for quasi-diplomatic exchanges by forming an apparently neutral bridge between countries. There was little disagreement on the first of these. Indeed for many, given the increasing number of international issues with a scientific dimension that politicians have to deal with, this is essentially what the core of science diplomacy should be about. Chris Whitty, for example, chief scientist at the UK’s Department for International Development, described how knowledge about the threat raised by the spread of the highly damaging plant disease stem rust had been an important input by researchers into discussions by politicians and diplomats over strategies for persuading Afghan farmers to shift from the production of opium to wheat. Others pointed out that the scientific community had played a major role in drawing attention to issues such as the links between chlorofluorocarbons in the atmosphere and the growth of the ozone hole, or between carbon dioxide emissions and climate change. Each has made essential contributions to policy decisions. Acknowledging this role for science has some important implications. No-one dissented when Rohinton Medhora, from Canada’s International Development Research Centre, complained of the lack of adequate scientific expertise in the embassies of many countries of the developed and developing world alike. Nor – perhaps predictably – was there any major disagreement that diplomatic initiatives can both help and occasionally hinder the process of science. On the positive side, such diplomacy can play a significant role in facilitating science exchange and the launch of international science projects, both essential for the development of modern science. Europe’s framework programme of research programmes was quoted as a successful advantage of the first of these. Examples of the second range from the establishment of the European Organisation of Nuclear Research (usually known as CERN) in Switzerland after the Second World War, to current efforts to build a large new nuclear fusion facility (ITER). Less positively, increasing restrictions on entry to certain countries, and in particular the United States after the 9/11 attacks in New York and elsewhere, have significantly impeded scientific exchange programmes. Here the challenge for diplomats was seen as helping to find ways to ease the burdens of such restrictions. The broadest gaps in understanding the potential of scientific diplomacy lay in the third category, namely the use of science as a channel of international diplomacy, either as a way of helping to forge consensus on contentious issues, or as a catalyst for peace in situations of conflict. On the first of these, some pointed to recent climate change negotiations, and in particular the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as a good example, of the way that the scientific community can provide a strong rationale for joint international action. But others referred to the failure of the Copenhagen climate summit last December to come up with a meaningful agreement on action as a demonstration of the limitations of this way of thinking. It was argued that this failure had been partly due to a misplaced belief that scientific consensus would be sufficient to generate a commitment to collective action, without taking into account the political impact that scientific ideas would have. Another example that received considerable attention was the current construction of a synchrotron facility SESAME in Jordan, a project that is already is bringing together researchers in a range of scientific disciplines from various countries in the Middle East (including Israel, Egypt and Palestine, as well as both Greece and Turkey). The promoters of SESAME hope that – as with the building of CERN 60 years ago, and its operation as a research centre involving, for example, physicists from both Russia and the United States – SESAME will become a symbol of what regional collaboration can achieve. In that sense, it would become what one participant described as a “beacon of hope” for the region. But others cautioned that, however successful SESAME may turn out to be in purely scientific terms, its potential impact on the Middle East peace process should not be exaggerated. Political conflicts have deep roots that cannot easily be papered over, however open-minded scientists may be to professional colleagues coming from other political contexts. Indeed, there was even a warning that in the developing world, high profile scientific projects, particular those with explicit political backing, could end up doing damage by inadvertently favouring one social group over another. Scientists should be wary of having their prestige used in this way; those who did so could come over as patronising, appearing unaware of political realities. Similarly, those who hold science in esteem as a practice committed to promoting the causes of peace and development were reminded of the need to take into account how advances in science – whether nuclear physics or genetic technology – have also led to new types of weaponry. Nor did science automatically lead to the reduction of global inequalities. “Science for diplomacy” therefore ended up with a highly mixed review. The consensus seemed to be that science can prepare the ground for diplomatic initiatives – and benefit from diplomatic agreements – but cannot provide the solutions to either.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
NEG › Disease › AT Food Wars

No ag impact

Steven Pinker 11, Prof @ Harvard, Steven Pinker: Resource Scarcity Doesn’t Cause Wars,

Once again it seems to me that the appropriate response is “maybe, but maybe not.” Though climate change can cause plenty of misery… it will not necessarily lead to armed conflict. The political scientists who track war and peace, such as Halvard Buhaug, Idean Salehyan, Ole Theisen, and Nils Gleditsch, are skeptical of the popular idea that people fight wars over scarce resources. Hunger and resource shortages are tragically common in sub-Saharan countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, but wars involving them are not. Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004) do not generally lead to conflict. The American dust bowl in the 1930s, to take another example, caused plenty of deprivation but no civil war. And while temperatures have been rising steadily in Africa during the past fifteen years, civil wars and war deaths have been falling. Pressures on access to land and water can certainly cause local skirmishes, but a genuine war requires that hostile forces be organized and armed, and that depends more on the influence of bad governments, closed economies, and militant ideologies than on the sheer availability of land and water. Certainly any connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be underemployed lower-middle-class men, not subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification, distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. In a regression analysis on armed conflicts from 1980 to 1992, Theisen found that conflict was more likely if a country was poor, populous, politically unstable, and abundant in oil, but not if it had suffered from droughts, water shortages, or mild land degradation. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) Reviewing analyses that examined a large number (N) of countries rather than cherry-picking one or toe, he concluded, “Those who foresee doom, because of the relationship between resource scarcity and violent internal conflict, have very little support from the large-N literature.”

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
NEG › Disease › AT Bioterror

No impact to bioterror

Jefferson, et al, 14 [ Catherine, 21 August 2014 | doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2014.00115, Synthetic biology and biosecurity: challenging the “myths”, Catherine, Jefferson, imageFilippa Lentzos and imageClaire Marris* Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine, King’s College London, London, UK, Catherine joined SSHM in January 2013. Before joining the department, she worked as a senior policy advisor for international security at the Royal Society, where she led a project on Neuroscience, Conflict and Security. Prior to this she was a research fellow with the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons at the University of Sussex, where she also obtained her DPhil. Catherine’s research interests are focused on the intersection of science and security policy, with a particular emphasis on chemical and biological security, dual use governance of emerging technologies and the growth of the amateur biology community. She is currently involved in research on the social dimensions of synthetic biology within theCentre for Synthetic Biology and Innovation, ]

Challenges to Myth 5 There are two dimensions to Myth 5. The first is about the intention of would-be terrorists, and the assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of twentieth century state-level bioweapons programs. While most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and very present, they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be very small (65). This is backed up by historical evidence. The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past were small-scale, low casualty events aimed at causing panic, and disruption rather than excessive death tolls: (i) the Rajneesh cult’s use of Salmonella on salad bars in local restaurants to sicken potential voters and make them stay away from the polls during Oregon elections in 1984; (ii) the 1990–95 attempted use of botulinum toxin and anthrax by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult; (iii) and the “anthrax letters” sent to media outlets and members of US Congress in 2001 resulting in at least 22 cases of anthrax, five of which were fatal (66, 67). The second dimension to Myth 5 is the implicit assumption that producing a pathogenic organism equates producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage, and developing a suitable dissemination method. These processes present significant technical and logistical barriers. Drawing from her in-depth study of the Iraqi, Soviet, and US bioweapons programs (3, 4), Ben Ouagrham-Gormley explains: Scaling up fragile microorganisms that are sensitive to environmental conditions and susceptible to change — and viruses are more sensitive than bacteria — has been one of the stiffest challenges for past bioweapons programs to overcome, even with appropriate expertise at hand. Scaling-up requires a gradual approach, moving from laboratory sample, to a larger laboratory quantity, to pilot-scale production, and then to even larger-scale production. During each stage, the production parameters need to be tested and often modified to maintain the lethal qualities of the agent; the entire scaling-up process can take several years (68). The dissemination of biological agents also poses difficult technical challenges. Whereas persistent chemical agents such as sulfur mustard and VX nerve gas are readily absorbed through the intact skin, no bacteria and viruses can enter the body via that route unless the skin has already been broken. Biological agents must either be ingested or inhaled to cause infection. To expose large numbers of people through the gastrointestinal tract, possible means of delivery are contamination of food and drinking water, yet neither of these scenarios would be easy to accomplish. Large urban reservoirs are usually unguarded, but unless terrorists added massive quantities of biological agent, the dilution effect would be so great that no healthy person drinking the water would receive an infectious dose (66). Moreover, modern sanitary techniques such as chlorination and filtration are designed to kill pathogens from natural sources and would probably be equally effective against a deliberately released agent. Bacterial contamination of the food supply is also unlikely to inflict mass casualties. Cooking, boiling, pasteurization, and other routine safety precautions are generally sufficient to kill pathogenic bacteria. The most likely way to inflict mass casualties with a biological agent is by disseminating it as a respirable aerosol: an invisible cloud of infectious droplets or particles so tiny that they remain suspended in the air for long periods and can be inhaled by large numbers of people. A high-concentration aerosol of B. anthracis or some other pathogen, released into the air in a densely populated urban area, could potentially infect thousands of victims simultaneously. After an incubation period of a few days, depending on the type of agent and the inhaled dose, the exposed population would experience an outbreak of an incapacitating or fatal illness. Although aerosol delivery is potentially the most lethal way of delivering a biological attack, it involves major technical hurdles that most terrorists would be unlikely to overcome. To infect through the lungs, infectious particles must be microscopic in size – between 1 and 5 μm in diameter. Terrorists would therefore have to develop or acquire a sophisticated delivery system capable of generating an aerosol cloud with the necessary particle size range and a high enough agent concentration to cover a broad area. Overall, an important trade-off exists between ease of production and effectiveness of dissemination. The easiest way to produce microbial agents is in a liquid form, yet when such a “slurry” is sprayed into the air, it forms heavy droplets that fall to the ground so that only a small percentage of the agent is aerosolized. In contrast, if the bacteria are first dried to a solid cake and then milled into a fine powder, they become far easier to aerosolize, yet the drying and milling process is technically difficult. The Aum Shinrikyo cult struggled with dissemination (67, 69, 70). In one of its anthrax dissemination attempts, it sprayed unknown, but probably very large, quantities of a liquid aerosol (most likely crude culture, unprocessed in any way) of B. anthracis from the roof of the Aum’s headquarters building in Tokyo. For the dissemination, the Aum set up two sprayers on the roof of the eight-story building, each within a large round cooling tower. Pipes were extended from the cooling towers to tanks below, which were filled with a liquid suspension of B. anthracis. The device worked poorly, producing large droplets rather than the very fine aerosol needed for effective transmission of anthrax. It also appears the spore concentration was very low (at least five orders of magnitude below that necessary for a highly infectious wet aerosol). In another dissemination attempt, targeting the area around the Kanagawa prefectural office and the Imperial Palace, the Aum equipped vehicles with spraying devices, but according to prosecutors’ statements, the nozzle of the sprayer clogged and the operation failed. Despite its 200 m2 laboratory containing, amongst other equipment, a glove box, incubator, centrifuge, drier, DNA/RNA synthesizer, electron microscope, two fermenters each having about a 2,000 litre capacity, and an extensive scientific library, and despite its repeated attempts at dissemination, the Aum was unsuccessful in causing any disease, and in retrospect it is clear that the cult did not even make the first substantive step toward an effective bioweapon. If, despite the odds, aerosolization was achieved, the effective delivery of biological agents in the open air is highly dependent on atmospheric and wind conditions, creating additional uncertainties. Only under highly stable atmospheric conditions would the aerosol cloud remain close to the ground where it can be inhaled, rather than being rapidly dispersed. Moreover, most microorganisms are sensitive to ultraviolet radiation and cannot survive more than 30 min in bright sunlight, limiting their use to night-time attacks. One major exception is anthrax, which can be induced to form spores with tough outer coats that enable them to survive for several hours in sunlight. Terrorists could, of course, stage a biological attack inside an enclosed space such as a building, a subway station, a shopping mall, or a sports arena. Such an attack, if it involved a respiratory aerosol, might infect thousands of people, but even here the technical hurdles would by no means be trivial. Finally, even if a biological weapon had been disseminated successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who are exposed to the agent, and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical professionals detected and were able to respond to the resulting outbreak. A prompt response with effective medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack. Simple, proven ways to curtail epidemics, such as wearing face masks, hand washing, and avoiding hospitals where transmission rates might soar, can also prove effective in stemming the spread of a disease. Indeed, this aspect of a bioterrorism attack is often underplayed in scenarios like Tara O’Toole’s “Dark Winter” and “Atlantic Storm,” where the rates of contagion used are often significantly higher than those in historical cases of natural outbreaks (71).

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
NEG › Disease › AT Bioterror

Bioterrror fails

Pinker 18 – Steven Arthur Pinker is a Canadian-American cognitive psychologist, Professor at Harvard University. [Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, Viking, Penguin Group]//BPS

Biological agents are particularly ill-suited to terrorists, whose goal, recall, is not damage but theater (chapter 13).58 The biologist Paul Ewald notes that natural selection among pathogens works against the terrorist’s goal of sudden and spectacular devastation. 59 Germs that depend on rapid person-to-person contagion, like the common-cold virus, are selected to keep their hosts alive and ambulatory so they can shake hands with and sneeze on as many people as possible. Germs get greedy and kill their hosts only if they have some other way of getting from body to body, like mosquitoes (for malaria), a contaminable water supply (for cholera), or trenches packed with injured soldiers (for the 1918 Spanish flu). Sexually transmitted pathogens, like HIV and syphilis, are somewhere in between, needing a long and symptomless incubation period during which hosts can infect their partners, after which the germs do their damage. Virulence and contagion thus trade off, and the evolution of germs will frustrate the terrorist’s aspiration to launch a headline-worthy epidemic that is both swift and lethal. Theoretically, a bioterrorist could try to bend the curve with a pathogen that is virulent, contagious, and durable enough to survive outside bodies. But breeding such a fine-tuned germ would require Nazi-like experiments on living humans that even terrorists (to say nothing of teenagers) are unlikely to carry off. It may be more than just luck that the world so far has seen just one successful bioterror attack (the 1984 tainting of salad with salmonella in an Oregon town by the Rajneeshee religious cult, which killed no one) and one spree killing (the 2001 anthrax mailings, which killed five).60 To be sure, advances in synthetic biology, such as the gene-editing technique CRISPR-Cas9, make it easier to tinker with organisms, including pathogens. But it’s difficult to re-engineer a complex evolved trait by inserting a gene or two, since the effects of any gene are intertwined with the rest of the organism’s genome. Ewald notes, “I don’t think that we are close to understanding how to insert combinations of genetic variants in any given pathogen that act in concert to generate high transmissibility and stably high virulence for humans.”61 The biotech expert Robert Carlson adds that “one of the problems with building any flu virus is that you need to keep your production system (cells or eggs) alive long enough to make a useful quantity of something that is trying to kill that production system. . . . Booting up the resulting virus is still very, very difficult. . . . I would not dismiss this threat completely, but frankly I am much more worried about what Mother Nature is throwing at us all the time.”62 And crucially, advances in biology work the other way as well: they also make it easier for the good guys [public protectors] (and there are many more of them) to identify pathogens, invent antibiotics that overcome antibiotic resistance, and rapidly develop vaccines.63 An example is the Ebola vaccine, developed in the waning days of the 2014–15 emergency, after public health efforts had capped the toll at twelve thousand deaths rather than the millions that the media had foreseen. Ebola thus joined a list of other falsely predicted pandemics such as Lassa fever, hantavirus, SARS, mad cow disease, bird flu, and swine flu.64 Some of them never had the potential to go pandemic in the first place because they are contracted from animals or food rather than in an exponential tree of person-to-person infections. Others were nipped by medical and public health interventions. Of course no one knows for sure whether an evil genius will someday overcome the world’s defenses and loose a plague upon the world for fun, vengeance, or a sacred cause. But journalistic habits and the Availability and Negativity biases inflate the odds, which is why I have taken Sir Martin up on his bet. By the time you read this you may know who has won.65

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
NEG › Disease › AT Disease

No extinction – their impacts are all media fear-mongering – ebola proves

Dean 14 [Alex, "Fear Not, Ebola Won't Wipe Us Out", Spiked, 8/6/14, www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/fear-not-ebola-wont-wipe-us-out/15549#.VaAbVvlViko] // SKY

Whenever a disease breaks out, we are bombarded with doomsday predictions. Coverage of ebola has conformed to this pattern. Major newspapers have bombarded us with page after page of pharmaceutical puffery; some journalists speak as though we are headed for an apocalypse. Commentary has been speculative, pessimistic and quick to apportion blame. The Guardian’s West Africa correspondent says that ‘new hotspots have flared up, fuelled by cross-border trade’, while US Republican politician Phil Gingrey has been making unsubstantiated rants about ‘illegal immigrants carrying deadly diseases’. The head of the World Health Organisation stoked panic with his statement that the virus ‘is moving faster than efforts to control it’. We must compare this reportage, all these ‘the end is nigh’ performances, with the reality. A quick look at hard science shows there is a dramatic mismatch and that commentators have wildly exaggerated the threat ebola poses. We are not headed for extinction. John Oxford, a virologist at the University of London, has explained that the hysteria surrounding ebola is disproportionate to the threat. He points out that ebola ‘doesn’t spread very easily’, and that the virus’s reproductive number - how many people are infected by each carrier - is very low. Where measles has a reproductive number of 12, ebola’s number is 1. Moreover, virologists have been quick to point out that ebola is very easily destroyed, for a virus. A quick wash of the hands and it’s gone. Ebola can devastate families and communities, yes, but when you consider that it has a low death toll compared with other viruses in Africa, we must conclude that reports have been hyperbolic and scaremongering. Yet this disproportionate panic over ebola was to be expected. We saw similar responses when swine flu broke out and the UK’s chief medical officer predicted 65,000 deaths and the media swallowed it up, and again when the House of Lords told us that 65,000 Britons would die from bird flu. Perhaps political and medical bodies have a duty to err on the side of caution – to over-prepare and over-predict – but the media and some of the public also gobbled up these doomsday predictions with relish. What’s the explanation for this? Why do some observers seem to be ravenously awaiting the next big pandemic? Why do we want these viruses to be worse than they are? I think some people long for doomsday predictions because they want their anti-progress attitudes to be validated. Ours is an era in which we are told to fear other people for their unpredictability and to see our fellow humans as a threat. Relationships are sometimes described as ‘toxic’ - such is our misanthropy that we now even describe our ultimate forms of intimacy in the language of disease. Today’s anti-human scaremongers are desperate for their attitudes to be affirmed, and so they exaggerate viruses which are spread through human contact and movement. People convince themselves that ebola is the result of immigration and human contact and modern forms of travel because then their regressive attitudes feel truer, more real. They don’t see the hectic globalised world as exciting; they see it as unnerving and are thrilled when a virus gives them reason to complain about it. These ridiculous attitudes have found no real affirmation, though. Humankind will deal with ebola, and a disease spread through contact should never serve as a reason to despise that contact: intimacy makes life worth living and immigration and trade are the seeds of social and economic progress. We must not allow the fearmongers to undermine our rational convictions. Pay no attention to the miserablists. Fear not, humankind – we are doing okay.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
NEG › Disease › AT Disease

Selective pressures and UN reports mean risk is low.

Farquhar et al. 17 – Sebastian Farquhar, DPhil student at Oxford specializing in Cyber Security and AI. John Halstead, doctorate in political philosophy. Owen Cotton-Barratt, DPhil in pure mathematics. Stefan Schubert, Oxford's department of experimental psychology. Haydn Belfield, degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from Oriel College. Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Director of Research at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, MS in biomathematics. [Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, Global Priorities Project 2017]//BPS

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
NEG › Disease › AT Disease

Disease doesn’t cause extinction.

Halstead 19 – John Halstead, doctorate in political philosophy. [Cause Area Report: Existential Risk, Founders Pledge, https://founderspledge.com/research/Cause%20Area%20Report%20-%20Existential%20Risk.pdf]//BPS

However, there are some reasons to think that naturally occurring pathogens are unlikely to cause human extinction. Firstly, Homo sapiens have been around for 200,000 years and the Homo genus for around six million years without being exterminated by an infectious disease, which is evidence that the base rate of extinction-risk natural pathogens is low.82 Indeed, past disease outbreaks have not come close to rendering humans extinct. Although bodies were piled high in the streets across Europe during the Black Death,83 human extinction was never a serious possibility, and some economists even argue that it was a boon for the European economy.84 Secondly, infectious disease has only contributed to the extinction of a small minority of animal species.85 The only confirmed case of a mammalian species extinction being caused by an infectious disease is a type of rat native only to Christmas Island. Having said that, the context may be importantly different for modern day humans, so it is unclear whether the risk is increasing or decreasing. On the one hand, due to globalisation, the world is more interconnected making it easier for pathogens to spread. On the other hand, interconnectedness could also increase immunity by increasing exposure to lower virulence strains between subpopulations.87 Moreover, advancements in medicine and sanitation limit the potential damage an outbreak might do.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
NEG › Disease › AT Disease

Disease can’t cause extinction

Dr. Toby Ord 20, Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University, DPhil in Philosophy from the University of Oxford, The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, Hachette Books, Kindle Edition, p. 124-126

Are we safe now from events like this? Or are we more vulnerable? Could a pandemic threaten humanity’s future?10

The Black Death was not the only biological disaster to scar human history. It was not even the only great bubonic plague. In 541 CE the Plague of Justinian struck the Byzantine Empire. Over three years it took the lives of roughly 3 percent of the world’s people.11

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Cap K › Transition Wars

Alt fails---transition wars and domestic pressure means the alt abandons fidelity to the environment.

Smith '19 [Noah; 4/5/19; Bloomberg Opinion columnist, former assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University; "Dumping Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet," https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-05/capitalism-is-more-likely-to-limit-climate-change-than-socialism]

It has become fashionable on social media and in certain publications to argue that capitalism is killing the planet. Even renowned investor Jeremy Grantham, hardly a radical, made that assertion last year. The basic idea is that the profit motive drives the private sector to spew carbon into the air with reckless abandon. Though many economists and some climate activists believe that the problem is best addressed by modifying market incentives with a carbon tax, many activists believe that the problem can’t be addressed without rebuilding the economy along centrally planned lines.

The climate threat is certainly dire, and carbon taxes are unlikely to be enough to solve the problem. But eco-socialism is probably not going to be an effective method of addressing that threat. Dismantling an entire economic system is never easy, and probably would touch off armed conflict and major asdasd upheaval. In the scramble to win those battles, even the socialists would almost certainly abandon their limitation on fossil-fuel use — either to support military efforts, or to keep the population from turning against them. The precedent here is the Soviet Union, whose multidecade effort to reshape its economy by force amid confrontation with the West led to profound environmental degradation. The world's climate does not have several decades to spare.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Cap K › Perm

The perms solve best – restructuring capitalism is possible

Mazzucato ’21 [Mariana; Jan 28; Professor in the Economics of Innovation and Public Value at University College London where she is the founding director of the UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose; “Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism,” p. 204-10]

This book has applied what I believe is the immensely powerful idea of a mission to solving the ‘wicked’ problems we face today. In it, I have argued that tackling grand challenges will only happen if we reimagine government as a prerequisite for restructuring capitalism in a way that is inclusive, sustainable and driven by innovation.

First and foremost, this means reinventing government for the twenty-first century – equipping it with the tools, organization and culture it needs to drive a mission-oriented approach. It also means bringing purpose to the core of corporate governance and taking a very broad stakeholder position across the economy. It means changing the relationship between public and private sectors, and between them and civil society, so they all work symbiotically for a common goal. The reason for the emphasis on rethinking government is simple: only government has the capacity to bring about transformation on the scale needed. The relationship between economic actors and civil society shows our problems at their most profound, and this is what we must unravel.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Cap K › Cap S Biotech

Pharma industry solves disease spread.

Sachs 14 — Jeffrey D. Sachs, professor of sustainable development, health policy, and management at Columbia University, director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, special adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Millennium Development Goals, 8-18-2014 (“Important lessons from Ebola outbreak”, Business World Online, http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Opinion&title=important-lessons-from-ebola-outbreak&id=92924)

Ebola is the latest of many recent epidemics, also including AIDS, SARS, H1N1 flu, H7N9 flu, and others. AIDS is the deadliest of these killers, claiming nearly 36 million lives since 1981. Of course, even larger and more sudden epidemics are possible, such as the 1918 influenza during World War I, which claimed 50-100 million lives (far more than the war itself). And, though the 2003 SARS outbreak was contained, causing fewer than 1,000 deaths, the disease was on the verge of deeply disrupting several East Asian economies including China’s. There are four crucial facts to understand about Ebola and the other epidemics. First, most emerging infectious diseases are zoonoses, meaning that they start in animal populations, sometimes with a genetic mutation that enables the jump to humans. Ebola may have been transmitted from bats; HIV/AIDS emerged from chimpanzees; SARS most likely came from civets traded in animal markets in southern China; and influenza strains such as H1N1 and H7N9 arose from genetic re-combinations of viruses among wild and farm animals. New zoonotic diseases are inevitable as humanity pushes into new ecosystems (such as formerly remote forest regions); the food industry creates more conditions for genetic recombination; and climate change scrambles natural habitats and species interactions. Second, once a new infectious disease appears, its spread through airlines, ships, megacities, and trade in animal products is likely to be extremely rapid. These epidemic diseases are new markers of globalization, revealing through their chain of death how vulnerable the world has become from the pervasive movement of people and goods. Third, the poor are the first to suffer and the worst affected. The rural poor live closest to the infected animals that first transmit the disease. They often hunt and eat bushmeat, leaving them vulnerable to infection. Poor, often illiterate, individuals are generally unaware of how infectious diseases -- especially unfamiliar diseases -- are transmitted, making them much more likely to become infected and to infect others. Moreover, given poor nutrition and lack of access to basic health services, their weakened immune systems are easily overcome by infections that better nourished and treated individuals can survive. And “de-medicalized” conditions -- with few if any professional health workers to ensure an appropriate public-health response to an epidemic (such as isolation of infected individuals, tracing of contacts, surveillance, and so forth) -- make initial outbreaks more severe. Finally, the required medical responses, including diagnostic tools and effective medications and vaccines, inevitably lag behind the emerging diseases. In any event, such tools must be continually replenished. This requires cutting-edge biotechnology, immunology, and ultimately bioengineering to create large-scale industrial responses (such as millions of doses of vaccines or medicines in the case of large epidemics).

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Cap K › Cap S Biotech

Stable regs key to pharma innovation.

Michel and Battalgia 20 – Chief Judge Michel appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in March of 1988 by President Ronald Reagan, an accomplished first-chair trial lawyer, appellate lawyer, and former US Justice Department lawyer who has successfully tried to verdict a broad array of civil and criminal cases, (Paul and John, “Pandemics and the Need for U.S. Patent Laws That ‘Promote … Progress’ and Invention: The Federal Circuit, En Banc, Can Fix This,” IP Watchdog, 4-12-20, , Accessed 7-4-20, LASA-AH)

Needless to say, no one involved in U.S. patent law or policy wants the pandemic or its multi-faceted consequences. Nor would a contrary ruling in Athena, supra, have meant that an innovator would have had at the ready the desired diagnostic testing for coronavirus. Nor a ready-made or known treatment, cure or vaccine. That said, the famous Burkean wisdom of course applies here. To paraphrase, “evil” or horrendous things can prevail if good people stand by and do nothing—and allowing bad precedents to go uncorrected has consequences. Unfortunately, we are seeing those consequences play out with U.S. patent law in real time. For nearly 15 years, the Supreme Court’s IP opinions that have had the effect of de-valuing U.S. patent rights, making it increasingly difficult (for example) for U.S. intellectual-property owners to obtain injunctive relief against those who infringe, trespass on, or otherwise steal their patented ideas and property rights. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). (By contrast, the patent laws of China have made such injunctive relief available as a matter of course, with some reporting that prevailing patentees there obtain injunctions for nearly 90% of all requests.) And through the years, whether by Supreme Court precedent or other law-making, it has become increasingly easy to invalidate U.S. patents, see, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 US 398, 415 (2007), and to render the subject matter of a patent ineligible for protection under §101. (We do not tackle here the separate pitfalls created by the 2011 America Invents Act.) This includes ineligibility not just for diagnostic testing, but for software, business methods, and quite possibly anything else in a patent claim that can be subjectively deemed “directed to” an “abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomena”; and doesn’t reflect an “inventive concept,” per the Supreme Court’s Mayo-Alice “framework” for Section101. To be sure, this is not an article focused on Supreme Court Section101 precedent and the harms to innovation that it has wrought, though that has certainly played a major or even primary role in the harm to U.S. innovation. (And indeed, the proper analysis of that Section 101 precedent is a subject that warrants separate, in-depth treatment.) The larger point here is that, given the expanding uncertainty with the case law on U.S. patents—and whether, for example, they’ll protect the subject matter of a million- (or even billion-) dollar investment—U.S. investment in R&D has dropped. And perhaps most notably, it has dropped among innovative bio-pharmaceutical companies. See, e.g., Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on Pharmaceutical Innovation, by Christopher M. Holman, 76 Mo. L. Rev. 645, 663-64 (summer 2015) (“In recent years, major innovative pharmaceutical companies have experienced two pronounced and significant trends: a decreasing output of innovative new drugs and cutbacks in research and development (R&D) investment”). And innovation—the lifeblood of the American economy—has dropped with it. See, e.g., id. (explaining that the “high level of unpredictability in today’s patent law is a significant impediment to the development of new medicines” and cause of the “R&D crisis”); Bloomberg Innovation Index (2018); The U.S. Drops out of the Top 10 in Innovation Ranking, Bloomberg News (Jan. 22, 2018), by Michelle Jamrisko & Wei Lu, available at (visited March 28, 2020).

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Cap K › Cap S Biotech

Capital is crucial for biotechnology – solves a laundry list of impacts

Chris Edwards ’21, Director of Tax Policy Studies and Editor, Down​siz​ing​Gov​ern​ment​.org, “The Triumph of Biotechnology and Private Capital”, CATO, 9/24/21, https://www.cato.org/commentary/triumph-biotechnology-private-capital

People often claim that capitalism focuses only on short-term profits. But the venture capitalists and angel investors who fund firms such as Moderna and BioNTech are hugely patient, and they lose money on most of their investments. Typically, their model rests on the calculation that a small percentage of their investments will generate a sufficiently high return on going public or being sold to both “pay” for those that — as will often be the case in a very tricky sector — lose money (or make very little) and make the sort of good money that they and their clients are expecting when putting together an investment portfolio.

In biotechnology and other leading-edge industries, after-tax investor gains are often reinvested in the next round of risky startups, thus creating a virtuous cycle. If the government had taxed away the Struengmanns’ capital gains from selling Hexal, they might not have had the cash or incentive to invest in BioNTech. One of the reason that nearly all high-income countries keep capital-gains taxes low is to help ensure that investors and entrepreneurs are incentivized to take the risk of committing time and resources to ventures that can offer no promise of a good return, the sort of ventures, in other words, so typical of ventures relying on scientific and technical innovation. Those who take high risks should be rewarded, if that risk works out, with high rewards.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Cap K › Cap S War

The spread of capitalism causes world peace!

Mousseau, 19—Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida (Michael, “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual World Peace,” International Security, Volume 44, Issue 1, Summer 2019, p.160-196, dml)

Is war becoming obsolete? There is wide agreement among scholars that war has been in sharp decline since the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, even as there is little agreement as to its cause.1 Realists reject the idea that this trend will continue, citing states' concerns with the “security dilemma”: that is, in anarchy states must assume that any state that can attack will; therefore, power equals threat, and changes in relative power result in conflict and war.2 Discussing the rise of China, Graham Allison calls this condition “Thucydides's Trap,” a reference to the ancient Greek's claim that Sparta's fear of Athens' growing power led to the Peloponnesian War.3

This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime. Drawing on economic norms theory,4 I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Cap K › Sustainability

Spreading capitalism creates global prosperity and environmental sustainability. Abandoning it is disastrous.

Rhonheimer, 20—teaching professor at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross (Martin, “Capitalism is Good for the Poor – and for the Environment,” , dml)

It is not social policy but capitalism that has created today’s prosperity.

What is important is that what made today’s mass prosperity possible – a phenomenon unprecedented in history – was not social policy or social legislation, organised trade union pressure, or corrective interventions in the capitalist economy, but rather market capitalism itself, due to its enormous potential for innovation and the ever-increasing productivity of human labour that resulted from it.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Unilat CP › Multilat Key – Biotech

A coordinated framework is necessary to check the dual-use aspects of biotech.

Cummings '21 [Christopher L., Kaitlin M. Volk, Anna A. Ulanova, Do Thuy Uyen Ha Lam & Pei Rou Ng, “Emerging Biosecurity Threats and Responses: A Review of Published and Gray Literature” in Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology, pp 13–36]

Biosecurity threats include biological weapons and accidental releases as demonstrated in the Sverdlovsk anthrax event, but they have also become more diversified and complicated as researchers develop and utilize advanced biotechnology techniques for the betterment of society across other sectors. Gene drives for mosquito population control, engineered algae for biofuel creation, and recreation of extinct pathogens for novel vaccine development have unique and potentially unknown associated risks. The envisioned coordinated biosecurity framework would allow for beneficial innovation to proliferate while simultaneously reducing anticipated and unanticipated risk of harm to humans, animals, agricultural, and the environment (Trump et al. 2020b; Wells et al. 2020).