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2022 MGC Affirmative

Reuters 2/28/2022

“Cyberattack on NATO could trigger collective defence clause – official”, -- ECM

LONDON/WASHINGTON, Feb 28 (Reuters) - A cyberattack on a NATO member state could trigger Article 5, its collective defence clause, a NATO official said on Monday, amid concerns that chaos in cyberspace around Russia's invasion of Ukraine could spill over into other territories.

The military alliance has for years made clear that a serious cyberattack could trigger the clause, but such a scenario has so far been largely hypothetical.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Taddeo & Floridi 18

NATURE | VOL 556 | 19 APRIL 2018, Mariarosaria Taddeo is a research fellow and deputy director of the Digital Ethics Lab at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, UK; and a Turing fellow of the Alan Turing Institute, London, UK. Luciano Floridi is professor of philosophy and ethics of information at the University of Oxford, UK; director of the Digital Ethics Lab at the Oxford Internet Institute; and chair of the Data Ethics Group at the Alan Turing Institute. “Regulate artificial intelligence to avert cyber arms race”, --ECM

International dialogue and action must resume. NATO could pave the way through its forthcoming guidelines, although it is currently unclear what their scope will be.

Meanwhile, research on AI for cyberdefence is progressing quickly. The United States is in the lead, technologically. It aims to incorporate AI into its cyberdefence systems by 2019 (ref. 3). The US Department of Defense (DOD) has earmarked $150 million for research. The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is developing the techniques and strategies. Steps have already been taken. In DARPA’s 2016 Cyber Grand Challenge competition, seven AI systems, developed by teams from the United States and Switzerland, fought against each other. The systems identified and targeted their opponents’ weaknesses while finding and patching their own.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Mahoney 4/30/2022

Casey Mahoney is a U.S. Institute of Peace–DoD Minerva Peace & Security Scholar and a Ph.D. Candidate in political science at the University of Pennsylvania. “Shared Responsibility: Enacting Military AI Ethics in U.S. Coalitions.”, -- ECM

In March 2021, Google’s Eric Schmidt and former Department of Defense (DoD) deputy secretary Bob Work wrote in their preface to the 756-page report of the bipartisan National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI), “America is not prepared to defend or compete in the AI era.” As chair and vice-chair of the NSCAI, respectively, they summarized the commission’s solution: “America needs to enlist its oldest allies and new partners to build a safer and freer world for the AI era.”

Though the U.S. military is taking pains to ensure AI does not erode its ideal to fight wars ethically, it cannot afford to leave its allies and partners behind in this endeavor. DoD is working to ensure the U.S. military can deter and fight AI-infused armed conflicts as part and likely leader of future coalitions using ethical, or “responsible,” AI. Efforts have focused on establishing broad principles for AI development and use and have targeted the technical enablers of multinational uses of AI, like standardizing data-labeling processes and pursuing data-sharing agreements with partners.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Mahoney 4/30/2022

Casey Mahoney is a U.S. Institute of Peace–DoD Minerva Peace & Security Scholar and a Ph.D. Candidate in political science at the University of Pennsylvania. “Shared Responsibility: Enacting Military AI Ethics in U.S. Coalitions.”, -- ECM

Until now, the department has not needed to understand how its vast network of partner governments and militaries are absorbing a general-purpose technology like AI. A February 1 DoD memorandum identifies roles the CDAO and the undersecretaries for Policy, Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S), and Research and Engineering (R&E) will play in international cooperation on AI. But, DoD lacks a cross-cutting process for collecting technical and policy knowledge derived from these international interactions and integrating it into coalition policy, planning, or technical cooperation efforts on a country-by-country or weapons system-by-system basis.

The DoD should task the CDAO, Policy, A&S, and R&E offices to create one. These offices should establish metrics in R&D, TEVV, and acquisitions processes that incentivize the bureaucracy to prioritize technical and organizational interoperability and consider unique requirements that might arise from ethical or policy questions likely to arise in multinational use scenarios. This would help channel international partner input to relevant points of contact across the department, optimizing the value of the international “responsible AI ecosystem” to U.S. coalition efforts.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Stanley-Lockman & Trabucco 3/22

Zoe Stanley-Lockman & Lena Trabucco , “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs”, Zoe Stanley-Lockman Nanyang Technological University, Lena Trabucco University of Copenhagen, Center for Military Studies The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance Edited by Justin Bullock, Yu-Che Chen, Johannes Himmelreich, Valerie M. Hudson, Anton Korinek, Matthew Young , and Baobao Zhang Subject: Political Science, Political Institutions Online Publication Date: Mar 2022DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.013.69 – ECM

NATO structures around strategic and policy planning both set Allied ambitions and priorities and have the competency to implement them through its many consultative bodies, coordination formats, and albeit to a lesser extent, technology foresight capacities. NATO has facilitative power among Allies, both for defense planning and for the conduct of operations. A cornerstone in modern architecture of international security is coalition warfare—or, more broadly, joint operations. Working with military partners has become a critical feature of modern security policy, where there is more power in enhancing numbers, but also in having allies that lend political and practical legitimacy to deterrence and operations.49 NATO is vital to that effort for many reasons, but also because NATO’s facilitative power is significant to promote coordination and cooperation. Simply put, partners and allies are a necessary feature of modern military behavior, and strategic and policy planning are necessary functions to encourage and underpin cohesion in alliance settings. This is important for AI governance because the nature of AI poses new strategic challenges and will require multilateral approaches and some degree of cohesion to effectively incorporate RRI frameworks in policy planning. As such, the necessity of working with security partners extends to the AI-policy frontier.

A number of NATO entities carry out strategic and policy planning, recognizing the importance of policy alignment to sustain political strength and military effectiveness. As relates to S&T, allies’ representations to NATO, defense ministries, and policy entrepreneurs from the relevant entities summarized in Table 69.1 support and negotiate how the Alliance approaches EDTs. NATO’s strategic documentation and forward-looking policy analysis incorporates hints of technological determinism, including noting how technological change inevitably shapes the future strategic and operating environment. Further, the connections between technology and competitive advantage over adversaries and competitors are embodied in the Alliance’s desire to maintain its “technological edge” as the “foundation upon which NATO’s ability to deter and defend against potential threats ultimately rests.”50 This places technology squarely within NATO’s core purpose of deterrence and defense—and while this signals NATO’s express commitment to technology through these channels, this reliance on technology also obscures whether NATO’s governance capacity will be adaptive, anticipatory, or participatory. This position of technological determinism may result in more limitations for AI governance.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Building interoperability with allies is key. This bolsters the possibility for coop with China down the road.

Sullivan 10/4/2021

Ryan Sullivan Army pilot studied at the prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar graduate-level work in the field of Artificial Intelligence to deliver an in-depth study of the critical elements of U.S.-China competition in Artificial Intelligence, “The U.S., China, and Artificial Intelligence Competition Factors”, – ECM

Diverging values between the CCP and liberal democracies represent the greatest obstacle to U.S.-China collaboration or cooperation on AI. Today, the gulf between these values is widening. While AI itself does not have values, competition involving technology is not value neutral. Collaboration between the U.S. and China in AI applications now occurs in academia and medical research; however, national security concerns and growing mistrust between our nations puts even these in jeopardy. The way forward will require clear boundaries and new mechanisms to address values competition and the resolution of disputes over appropriate AI standards will require innovative approaches to diplomacy. While military-to-military cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief seem the most likely area for the U.S. and China to find common ground and opportunities to collaborate in the security sphere, in the near-term, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) should remain focused on building interoperability with allies to promote data sharing and pursue AI’s ethical applications in these alliance and partnership military frameworks. With those agreements, processes, and standards in place, then the potential for future military engagements and outreach involving AI applications with China would prove more beneficial.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Haenel 18

June, Fabio Haenel currently works at the Global and European Studies Institute, University of Leipzig. Fabio does research in Information Technology and Politics, Human Rights and Foreign Policy. “The Prospects and Dangers of Artificial Intelligence on International Security: The Case of a Sino-American Arms Race.”, – ECM

2.5. The Ultimate Weapon: Is AI Determined to Fuel a Sino-American Arms Race?

But it is not necessary to venture that far down the line of what destructive force might and might not be deducted from AI in the future as contemporary autonomous weapons already are an integral part of the armories of modern armies. “The technology to deploy autonomous weapons is largely in place, and the engineering tasks seem to be easier than those involved in creating self -driving cars,” stated the UK Ministry of Defense in 2016.58 Non-proliferation activists argue that the development of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) is particularly worrying given the parallel development of privately accessible autonomous drones, effectively introducing the use of precise lethal weapons anywhere and anytime, not just on dedicated battlefields, and thus further tear at an already crumbling sense of security within industrialized societies. Three leading computer scientists and philosophers thus ask, “are autonomous weapons likely to reduce political aversion to conflict, or perhaps result in accidental battles or wars? Would such weapons become the tool o choice or oppressors or terrorists?”59 And, most importantly, who will be held responsible or autonomous attacks legally, if not ethically, given that it is only software that calculates who to kill?

2022 MGC Affirmative

Pamlin 15

Dennis Pamlin, Executive Project Manager of the Global Risks Global Challenges Foundation, and Stuart Armstrong, James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute of the Oxford Martin School at University of Oxford, Global Challenges Foundation, February, http://globalchallenges.org/wp-content/uploads/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact.pdf

If a safe artificial intelligence is developed, this provides a great resource for improving outcomes and mitigating all types of risk.585 Artificial intelligence risks worsening nanotechnology risks, by allowing nanomachines and weapons to be designed with intelligence and without centralised control, overcoming the main potential weaknesses of these machines586 by putting planning abilities on the other side. Conversely, nanotechnology abilities worsen artificial intelligence risk, by giving AI extra tools which it could use for developing its power base.587 Nanotechnology and synthetic biology could allow the efficient creation of vaccines and other tools to combat global pandemics.588 Nanotechnology’s increased industrial capacity could allow the creation of large amounts of efficient solar panels to combat climate change, or even potentially the efficient scrubbing of CO2 from the atmosphere.589 Nanotechnology and synthetic biology are sufficiently closely related 590 (both dealing with properties on an atomic scale) for methods developed in one to be ported over to the other, potentially worsening the other risk. They are sufficiently distinct though (a mainly technological versus a mainly biological approach) for countermeasures in one domain not necessarily to be of help in the other. Uncontrolled or malicious synthetic pathogens could wreak great damage on the ecosystem; conversely, controlled and benevolent synthetic creations could act to improve and heal current ecological damage.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Tzimas 21

Themistoklis, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Faculty of Law, “Chapter 2: The Expectations and Risks from AI,” Legal and Ethical Challenges of Artificial Intelligence from an International Law Perspective, Springer, 2021, pp. 9–32 Open WorldCat, – ECM

Therefore, it is only natural to be at least skeptical towards a future with entities possessing equal or superior intelligence and levels of autonomy; the prospect even of existential risk looms as possible.7

AI that will have reached or surpassed our level of intelligence make us wonder why would highly autonomous and intelligent AI want to give up control back to its original creators?8 Why remain contained in pre-defined goals set for it by us, humans?

2022 MGC Affirmative

Haenel 18

June, Fabio Haenel currently works at the Global and European Studies Institute, University of Leipzig. Fabio does research in Information Technology and Politics, Human Rights and Foreign Policy. “The Prospects and Dangers of Artificial Intelligence on International Security: The Case of a Sino-American Arms Race.”, – ECM

Multiple arguments for the rapid development of Artificial Intelligence outpace any skepticism towards the fledgling technology, their pressing nature however showcases the necessity to do so safely. First, delaying the advancement of a technology that could help to solve contemporary and future social and scientific problems, e.g. by increasing the efficiency of energy consumption or outright help to invent entirely new methods and materials to produce sustainable energy, or by reducing traffic through automatic and interconnected private and public transportation systems, carries a high opportunity cost to delay these achievements to occur later, or never, rather than sooner.43 This becomes even more apparent if we consider the AI-assisted scientific breakthroughs such as in medicine where machines already outperform certified and experienced doctors in detecting selected diseases accurately to the benefits o the patients.44 Second, stalling investments in research and development of AI by individual powerful actors will only give advantage to a competing state or corporation which is willing to fund and pioneer the technology. Reasons to delay include the monetary costs o innovating a field dependent on highly-skilled labor and benefiting most rom an academic and industry in restructure that is locally accessible, or the lack o conviction of its use in the near future among term- or profit-constrained government and business leadership.

These contradictions reveal a striking paradox of the technology’s geopolitical quality: Similar to the development and manipulation of nuclear power in the 1940s, succeeding first in realizing powerful AI capable of prioritizing the economic or strategic interests of its developers will reset the political spheres of interests globally, and thus now has captured the attention of regional and global political and economic powers. However, newly developed software can also be much more easily misused by rogue actors than nuclear weapons because of its decentralized, inexpensive accessibility, and any further delay in developing AI robustly could invite “bad actors” such as states, terrorist groups, or corporations to exploit it unilaterally.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Harper 20

(Jon Harper Has a Masters Degree in National Foreign Studies from Georgetown—Received Bachelors Degree at Yale in History. He is the Managing Editor for National Defense Magazine. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/1/24/industrial-base-could-struggle-to-surge-production-in-wartime /) A$

The U.S. industrial base would be challenged to ramp up production to meet wartime requirements in the event of a protracted great power conflict, analysts and Pentagon officials say. The National Defense Industrial Association’s new report, “Vital Signs: The Health and Readiness of the Defense Industrial Base,” said 27 percent of critical defense supplier industries would likely experience shortages in the event of a surge in demand for combat-essential products. (See story) That finding is of particular concern in the new strategic environment. In the decades following the Cold War, the United States was focused on regional wars such as Iraq and Afghanistan, noted Mark Cancian, senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “For the most part, losses [of equipment] have been low and your existing industrial base could handle it,” he said. But in recent years “the focus changed to great power conflict with China and Russia, and in such a conflict attrition might be very high and the industrial base is not designed to handle that kind of demand” for more systems. Susannna Blume, director of defense programs at the Center for a New American Security, noted that China has been investing heavily in its missile forces. “Those forces are designed to cripple the U.S. military,” she said. “That’s a huge concern. The ability to reconstitute quickly could be critical in prevailing in that kind of conflict.” Cancian said that, based on historical analysis of attrition rates in large conventional wars, the U.S. Army could be reduced to just two armored brigades in the first nine months of a fight against another great power. Similar rates of attrition would be expected to be sustained by aircraft and other major systems, he added. The Defense Department would struggle to replace losses or expand its force structure in such a scenario, analysts say. “The industrial base has been designed to produce equipment in peace time as efficiently as possible, so much of the spare capacity has been squeezed out in order to reduce costs,” Cancian said. “It is not a worthwhile business strategy to have a lot of unused capacity, and DoD has not been willing to pay for it.” Maiya Clark, a research assistant at the Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense, said the capacity problem is widespread. “Generally speaking, I would say that the U.S. defense industrial base really is poorly positioned for a production surge at this time,” she said. “We’re barely meeting the needs of our military in peace time. So it’s definitely a great concern in pretty much every sector, although depending on the sector, the particular issues are different.” Cancian said replacing destroyed or damaged ships would be especially challenging because it takes years to construct major battle force vessels such as destroyers or aircraft carriers. Clark said another issue is the shortage of skilled technical labor for people who have the training to do specialized tasks such as welding and electrical work. The limited number of vendors is another problem, noted the Defense Department’s 2018 report titled, “Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency.” The document is often referred to as the 13806 Report after the executive order that led to it. Today, the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base consists primarily of seven shipyards owned by four companies, plus their suppliers, the report noted. The number of vendors supplying specific types of platforms is even fewer. For example, only one firm — Huntington Ingalls Industries — currently builds aircraft carriers. “In the case of a surge, we would be really poorly placed to increase our production capacity,” Clark said. The aircraft manufacturing sector faces similar workforce and supplier base issues. Six companies provide the majority of platforms and possess the full range of capabilities to bring a new weapon system from the research, design and development phases into full production, according to the 13806 Report. The big three — Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman— have a virtual monopoly in many areas, Clark noted. For example, Northrop Grumman is the only firm currently building bombers. Industry consolidation across a number of sectors is already an issue that would only be exacerbated during a great power war, Clark noted. “These are all problems that we can see now … but if there were to be a surge required, all those problems would become massively obvious.” Vehicle manufacturing is one sector where the industrial base has recently demonstrated an ability to ramp up production to meet urgent wartime requirements. During the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, improvised explosive devices wreaked havoc on U.S. forces. In response, the Pentagon contracted for thousands of mine resistant, ambush-protected vehicles to transport troops around the battlefield. Production increased from 82 trucks per month in June 2007, to 1,300 a month in December of that year, Clark said. “That was a pretty massive surge that we managed successfully,” she said. “We had multiple manufacturers involved with that effort and ended up producing around 24,000 vehicles.” However, other platforms wouldn’t be as easy to churn out, Cancian noted. “If we were in a great power conflict with heavy attrition, we would surge all of the tank production that we could, but of course that’s not going to be able to replace most” of the losses, he said. Technologies that are also produced in the civilian sector will be less of a problem to replace such as small arms, trucks and some types of communication systems, he said. “It’s those areas that are uniquely military where there’s no civilian analogue that will be most vulnerable.” Munitions production is another area for concern. Advanced air-, ground- and sea-launched weapons are a key component of the military’s operating concepts. In the Trump administration’s fiscal year 2020 budget request, the Defense Department proposed buying several critical munitions at maximum production rates, Blume noted. “If we are maxing our production capacity in peace time for critical munitions, what does that say for our ability to produce those munitions in a moment where we could be expending many, many, many of them very, very rapidly?” Blume asked. Cancian said the United States can’t count on replicating the production successes it accomplished during the last great power conflict when civilian industry was converted to military manufacturing. “In World War II we had several years to get ready before we actually got involved in the fighting. And even once we got involved in the fighting, we had several years before we went toe-to-toe with the main forces of our opponents,” he said. “During that time it was our allies for the most part who were holding the line, and we won’t have that luxury in a future conflict.” The U.S. economy has also changed significantly since the 1930s and 1940s, and is now much more oriented toward services than manufacturing, he noted. Blume said defense equipment is also more specialized in the 21st century. “In World War II you had major industrial conglomerates like Ford producing war material. They were making tanks and there was a lot of … industrial capacity in the United States that could be thrown towards the war effort,” she said. “The composition of the defense industrial base is not the same today. You tend to have more highly specialized defense companies … and there just aren’t that many of them.” Cancian said China and Russia would also face challenges replacing equipment and growing their forces during a war with the United States. But they might not be in as tough a spot. “The Chinese have, I think, a much larger military industrial base and they’re producing more weapons than the United States,” he said. “So they might have an advantage there.” Russia, meanwhile, might have larger quantities of older equipment in storage that it could draw from, he added. However, there are a number of steps that the U.S. government can take now to ameliorate the surge problem, analysts say. One is to ensure that the Defense Department has sustained and consistent funding. Budget instability, including a series of continuing resolutions and threats of government shutdowns in recent years, have hurt the industrial base and driven away suppliers, Clark noted. Multi-year contracts would also help to establish predictable funding, she said. “Without that reliability, these companies end up shutting their doors, they end up consolidating and our capacity to meet current and potentially larger future needs is compromised,” Clark said. While sole-source risk can occur at the prime level, it more often manifests itself at the sub-tier, the 13806 Report noted. Clark said: “There’s just a lot of different examples where these little companies are very adversely affected by the unpredictability of DoD funding. It may look like a little company, but it can have drastic results for U.S. national security.” Cancian said it would be prudent to identify and address the most severe bottlenecks in industry so that production in wartime could be increased as much as possible. Targeted investments could have an outsized impact on the ability to surge. Clark noted that the government could provide funding to selected industries that are in jeopardy under authorities provided in the Defense Production Act. (See story) For planning purposes, the Pentagon should determine what surge production capabilities would be needed in a global war with China or Russia, and where the shortfalls are, Clark said. “You need to know … which holes need to be plugged first,” she said. “The information that we have that would lead us to draw conclusions about our surge capacity would lead us to say we’re not all that prepared, but actually the degree to which we are prepared or unprepared is hard to know without more information.” Tom Spoehr, director of Heritage’s Center for National Defense, said more government visibility into industry’s resourcing needs would also be helpful. Using contracting to elicit that information would be one option. “If we’re contracting for a hundred planes a year, the contractor … [could be required to] advise the government what resources are required to get to 200 a year or something like that,” he said. “Right now that’s not part of it, and so everybody’s kind of flying blind on this topic.” The Pentagon will need to give companies financial incentives if it wants them to boost their production capacity, he noted. Firms are focused on maximizing shareholder value and profit, and maintaining extra facilities is generally looked upon as wasteful in that context. “Companies will not typically maintain one iota of additional capacity more than what they’ve been contracted or can foreseeably need in the next couple of years,” he said. Blume said new manufacturing techniques could enhance industry’s capabilities. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Will Roper is pushing a new Digital Century Series concept that calls for using digital design and engineering to improve the way aircraft are produced, she noted. “If he’s right and there is a way to build airplanes, for example, without a lot of heavy, highly specialized tooling or skilled labor, that has significant implications for … the ability to restart or expand production capacity faster,” Blume said. The Defense Department can invest and push for industry to embrace the kinds of technologies that will make it easier to surge, she added. “It’s not as though the only solution to this problem is just building more factories and letting them sit unproductive,” Blume said. “You can design weapons systems in a way such that they can be built more quickly and more easily using technologies like digital [engineering], etc.” Cancian said if the balloon goes up and the U.S. military finds itself in a shooting war with China or Russia, it might have to buy foreign systems or take older, less capable systems out of storage to help replace equipment losses. It would also . Meanwhile, Pentagon officials are well aware of many challenges the nation would face trying to execute a wartime surge. “I have a lot of concerns,” Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Kevin Fahey told reporters recently. “But the other thing I’d tell you is industry never ceases to amaze … when you end up with a requirement that is funded, how quickly they can ramp up.” Fahey noted that he played a role in the effort to surge mine resistant, ambush-protected vehicle production. However, the MRAP was basically just “a really big truck,” he said. Other types of equipment surges would be more difficult. For example, “we already have bottlenecks given what we’ve got at the shipyards,” he said. “If you wanted to ramp our production [that] would be harder to do.” It wouldn’t be impossible, but it would “probably take a little bit of time,” he added. The Trump administration is trying to tackle the issues that were highlighted in the 13806 Report, including surge capacity and supply chain vulnerabilities, he said. “We did a great job of actually for the first time … not only identifying what we believe our problems were in the industrial base, but what were we going to do about it,” he said. “We have a lot of executive orders to actually work on some of these major problems.”

2022 MGC Affirmative

Beckley 12

Michael Assistant professor of political science at Tufts. “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure.” International Security 36(3): 41-78.

One danger is that declinism could prompt trade conflicts and immigration restrictions. The results of this study suggest that the United States benefits immensely from the free flow of goods, services, and people around the globe; this is what allows American corporations to specialize in high-value activities, exploit innovations created elsewhere, and lure the brightest minds to the United States, all while reducing the price of goods for U.S. consumers. Characterizing China’s export expansion as a loss for the United States is not just bad economics; it blazes a trail for jingoistic and protectionist policies. It would be tragically ironic if Americans reacted to false prophecies of decline by cutting themselves off from a potentially vital source of American power.

Another danger is that declinism may impair foreign policy decisionmaking. If top government officials come to believe that China is overtaking the United States, they are likely to react in one of two ways, both of which are potentially disastrous.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Beckley 15

(Michael Beckley is a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and Internatio nal Affairs., “The Myth of Entangling Alliances Michael Beckley Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts”, )

The finding that U.S. entanglement is rare has important implications for international relations scholarship and U.S. foreign policy. For scholars, it casts doubt on classic theories of imperial overstretch in which great powers exhaust their resources by accumulating allies that free ride on their protection and embroil them in military quagmires.22 The U.S. experience instead suggests that great powers can dictate the terms of their security commitments and that allies often help their great power protectors avoid strategic overextension. For policy, the rarity of U.S. entanglement suggests that the United States’ current grand strategy of deep engagement, which is centered on a network of standing alliances, does not preclude, and may even facilitate, U.S. military restraint. Since 1945 the United States has been, by some measures, the most militarily active state in the world. The most egregious cases of U.S. overreach, however, have stemmed not from entangling alliances, but from the penchant of American leaders to define national interests expansively, to overestimate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention. Scrapping alliances will not correct these bad habits. In fact, disengaging from alliances may unleash the United States to intervene recklessly abroad while leaving it without partners to share the burden when those interventions go awry.

2022 MGC Affirmative

That makes war inevitable. Collapse of US Heg means the no allies comes to the US aide.

Ataman 9/29/2021

Prof. Muhittin Ataman graduated from the Faculty of Political Science in the Department of International Relations at Ankara University. “Global leadership crisis: The U.S. hegemony vs. China”, -- ECM

Therefore, it can easily be assumed that the Chinese challenge for global hegemony is in the making. The only reason why China has not claimed global hegemony is timing. In other words, according to the Chinese leadership, China is not yet ready for global hegemony. When China begins to involve itself in the political and economic affairs of other countries and steer them away from the U.S., a global confrontation will become inevitable. At that time, the U.S. is not sure how many countries will continue to remain on its side. Many European countries may remain indifferent to a possible confrontation between the U.S. and China in the Indo-Pacific region.

2022 MGC Affirmative

China victory in AI risk overturning unipolarity – AI is the KEY internal link between unipolarity and multipolarity. That EXPANDS the risk international competition and instability.

Sullivan 10/4/2021

Ryan Sullivan Army pilot studied at the prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar graduate-level work in the field of Artificial Intelligence to deliver an in-depth study of the critical elements of U.S.-China competition in Artificial Intelligence, “The U.S., China, and Artificial Intelligence Competition Factors”, – ECM

Henry Kissinger once wrote that “the stability of any international system ultimately relies on what he termed ‘generally accepted legitimacy.”371 Any international framework needs buy-in from the powers within it”, and the U.S. must play a central role in shaping the AI world order.372 This chapter focuses on AI competition between the U.S. and China for legitimacy to lead efforts “conforming to recognized principles or accepted rules and standards.”373 The international contest over global leadership occurs when China’s rise challenges U.S. hegemony in a liberal world order created without participation from the CCP. AI and other emerging technologies will disrupt traditional measures of power. While the U.S. and China will remain the strongest poles, the emerging world order will be more multipolar than bipolar in design, as AI enables regional powers to seek greater input over norms and standards.374 China perceives and desires multipolarity to limit U.S. power and influence to the degree that the U.S.’s preferred values and political institutions are not dictated to others. While some rush to make comparisons to the Cold War or the space race, a CNAS report suggests that “competition in the AI arena could be even more intense. The space race was fundamentally a bipolar competition – a subset of the broader Cold War... Competition in AI, on the other hand, may be much more intense because it will be much more multipolar and multisector.”375 This chapter focuses on AI competition in an increasingly multipolar world structure where values and influence with rising middle powers and developing nations “lend authority or respectability” to a nation’s leadership position on AI.376 However, for China, there is a domestic element of legitimacy competition related to Sino-American values competition in the first chapter of this monograph. For China, legitimacy also addresses the CCP’s concern over maintaining domestic legitimacy as the sole power in a single-party system. The CCP’s domestic problems reflect legitimacy in terms of “popular acceptance of a government, political regime or system of governance.”377 This definition highlights an area where competition over legitimacy and values overlap and should be understood by readers when viewing China’s actions in the global setting. There are two audiences for the CCP, the international community, and its domestic base, who want to see an emergent China take on a larger leadership role.

2022 MGC Affirmative

The SQ is unsustainable – maintain AI advantages requires alliance buy in. Absent adaption China fills in.

Sullivan 10/4/2021

Ryan Sullivan Army pilot studied at the prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar graduate-level work in the field of Artificial Intelligence to deliver an in-depth study of the critical elements of U.S.-China competition in Artificial Intelligence, “The U.S., China, and Artificial Intelligence Competition Factors”, – ECM

The paper assesses that the U.S. is well-positioned to maintain competitive advantage with China in the AI domain. However, American advantage hinges on forming flexible and overlapping alliances based on values and committing the required domestic resources to address legitimate national concerns over science-technology engineering-math (STEM) education, gaps in domestic manufacturing, obstacles to attracting foreign talent, and ethical concerns over data AI application. If the U.S. does not adapt in these areas, China can quickly narrow the AI gap. Moreover, while the U.S. and China remain the two nations best positioned to benefit from increased adoption of AI across society, this paper concludes that their competition is not just binary for it exists within concentric circles of overlapping international partnerships and agreements. Such an environment is as malleable as it is uncertain for the international community today as all governments struggle with challenges over data privacy, the role of AI-empowered multinational companies, and critical choke points in supply chains that impact the AI industry and threaten national security interests. The importance of global trade, the dual-use nature of AI, and the emergence of technology clusters and critical supply components outside of the U.S., illustrate the complex web that both the U.S. and China must navigate to extend influence to pursue desired objectives with AI.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Taddeo & Floridi 18

NATURE | VOL 556 | 19 APRIL 2018, Mariarosaria Taddeo is a research fellow and deputy director of the Digital Ethics Lab at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, UK; and a Turing fellow of the Alan Turing Institute, London, UK. Luciano Floridi is professor of philosophy and ethics of information at the University of Oxford, UK; director of the Digital Ethics Lab at the Oxford Internet Institute; and chair of the Data Ethics Group at the Alan Turing Institute. “Regulate artificial intelligence to avert cyber arms race”, --ECM

Cyberattacks are becoming more frequent, sophisticated and destructive. Each day in 2017, the United States suffered, on average, more than 4,000 ransomware attacks, which encrypt computer files until the owner pays to release them1 . In 2015, the daily average was just 1,000. In May last year, when the WannaCry virus crippled hundreds of IT systems across the UK National Health Service, more than 19,000 appointments were cancelled. A month later, the NotPetya ransomware cost pharmaceutical giant Merck, shipping firm Maersk and logistics company FedEx around US$300 million each. Global damages from cyberattacks totalled $5 billion in 2017 and may reach $6 trillion a year by 2021 (see go.nature.com/2gncsyg).

Countries are partly behind this rise. They use cyberattacks both offensively and defensively. For example, North Korea has been linked to WannaCry, and Russia to NotPetya.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Moniz & Nunn 18

Ernest Sam Ernest Moniz, the former US secretary of energy, and Sam Nunn, a former US senator, are co-chairmen of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Cyber attacks and rising risks of an accidental nuclear war” 02-03-2018. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/cyber-attacks-and-rising-risks-of-an-accidental-nuclear-war

The world has crossed over to a new nuclear era in which a fateful error, rather than intentional aggression, is the most likely catalyst to nuclear catastrophe. American leaders have been warned more than once of incoming Russian missiles - in each case, it was a false alarm resulting from technical or human error. Former Russian president Boris Yeltsin was mistakenly alerted to a possible United States missile strike after the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket. After every incident, we deceive ourselves that we can solve the problem with better technology and training, or we reassure ourselves that the combination of diligence and good luck we experienced during the Cold War will continue. But do we really believe we can prevent a nuclear catastrophe indefinitely in a world that has nine states with nuclear weapons and significant suspicion and hostility in many of their mutual relationships? The risks of human error involving nuclear weapons are compounded by the potential for deliberate cyberthreats to warning and command-and-control systems. Hackers could insert a false warning of a nuclear attack into national warning and alert systems and falsely attribute that attack to an innocent country. At a time of heightened global tensions, with too little communication or cooperation between nuclear rivals and only minutes of decision time, how would leaders of states with nuclear weapons respond? The Trump administration recently declared plans to broaden the role of nuclear weapons in national defences beyond deterring nuclear attacks on the United States and its allies. Its new National Security Strategy states that the arsenal is now "essential" to preventing not just a nuclear attack but also "non-nuclear strategic attacks, and large-scale conventional aggression". A leaked draft of its forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review has similar language. Expanding the range of threats against which nuclear weapons might be used - which implies, for example, "strategic" cyber attacks - will greatly increase the risks of miscalculation or blunder. If a cyber attack took out a major part of our electrical grid, would we be able to quickly and confidently identify the attacking country? If Russia, China, India, Pakistan and others adopt similar policies, are we moving down a path where nuclear use becomes highly probable? Every country with nuclear weapons perceives its geopolitical circumstances differently, but we all face substantially increasing nuclear risks. Every country with nuclear weapons perceives its geopolitical circumstances differently, but we all face substantially increasing nuclear risks. Individually, where necessary, and together where possible, they must move with urgency on policies that can reduce these risks for all nations.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Goodman 18

Ryan The Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. He served as Special Counsel to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense (2015-16). He is also a Professor of Politics and Professor of Sociology at NYU. “Cyber Operations and the U.S. Definition of “Armed Attack”” Just Security. 03-08-2018. https://www.justsecurity.org/53495/cyber-operations-u-s-definition-armed-attack/

A widely accepted view of the UN Charter is that a State can use force in self-defense only in response to an “armed attack,” which is importantly defined as the gravest forms of force in scale and effects. In contrast, the United States has long maintained that a State can use force in self-defense in response to any amount of force by another State. The U.S. view might have worked well when it came to bombs and battleships. There are reasons, however, to think that the application of the U.S. view in the cyber realm may risk unintended, accidental, and unnecessary militarized conflicts. That’s partly because of the uncertainty of the law in cyberspace and partly because of the uncertainty of facts when cyber operations occur. The U.S. position, one might think, reduces the overall risk of militarized conflicts between States. One reason to recommend the U.S. view is that it might enable a government to prevent escalation—for example by using cyber-ops to impede another State’s test missiles—in response to the latter’s low-level uses of force, and thus buy more time for diplomacy to avoid a larger battle. What’s more, if a State’s hands are tied such that it cannot use force to respond to a low-level use of force by an aggressor, it will put pressure on governments to expand what is meant by an “armed attack,” which has potentially dangerous precedential effects in the future. Those concerns, however, may not be as relevant for the United States, which, above and beyond other States, has a broader range of potential diplomatic, economic, and other non-forcible, non-military means to defend its interests. More important is deterrence. In favor of the U.S. view of the law is that a lower threshold for triggering the right of self-defense can deter aggressors from acting in the first place. In terms of defensive posture, the United States deters others who know that the American military can use its mighty arsenal in response to any illegal use of force. That empirical claim, however, is weaker in a world in which States very frequently engage in low-level uses of force in cyber, or might be thought to have done so by their adversaries. In that world, many States will have the legal right to use force in self-defense against others on an ongoing basis. Also, consider the U.S. offensive posture. The greater extent to which the United States, in particular, is engaged in cyber activities across the world that will be considered a use of force by other States, the greater license the United States may be handing those States to use force—whether in the cyber or kinetic realm—in response. That is, if those States adopt a view similar to the United States that “the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force.” It may have been more satisfying to the United States to operate in world in which it maintained the legal prerogative to adopt a forcible response in reaction to any illegal use of force while other States did not maintain that position. Our legal world may be changing, however. Witness, for example, Japan’s recent shifts toward the U.S. position. Taken in light of Mutual Defense Agreements, in which the United States has accepted an obligation to support other States who have been subject to an “armed attack,” and the kinds of calculations of what makes the world safer and better protects U.S. national security must surely shift. More specifically, if more U.S. allies start moving toward the U.S. view of “armed attack,” the United States may be drawn into far-flung cyber conflicts as an unintended consequence. Now add to this mix the legal uncertainties that exist in this specific area of cyber law. The legal definition of what exactly is a use of force in the cyber realm is far less settled than in the kinetic realm. What’s more, it is safe to assume that several States around the world are frequently engaging in actions that others might consider a use of force. Is the laying of specific types of malware on the systems of another State in preparation for possible future activation analogous to laying landmines in another State’s territory? The Tallinn Manual’s definition of cyberattacks (at least in the context of jus in bello) may lead one to think so, but widespread State practice would appear to contradict that conclusion. So which is it? Also, could the alteration or destruction of data count as a use of force or attack? This is an area where views are developing in one direction, but what happens in the limbo period between now and then, when some States and legal authorities hold one view and others hold different ones? That seems like a dangerous period for calibrating the use of force in cyber. And those are just two examples of legal uncertainties out of many that one could describe. These types of legal uncertainties are compounded by factual uncertainties in the cyber realm. While the United States appears to have an increasingly impressive ability to determine attribution, many other States lack that sophistication and are thus more likely to make costly errors. State D may mistake a cyber operation launched by a rogue hacker or organized non-State group operating out of country Y as being perpetrated by State Y itself. And governmental or non-governmental cyber hackers in a third country may very purposefully make it look like State Y conducted a cyberattack. Another difficulty in the cyber realm is determining whether certain effects of a hostile cyber operation were intended by the attacker. For example, State D may detect an imminent threat of malware in its systems that appears would at least temporarily compromise its most sensitive military arsenal—but is that what the perpetrator intended (and how, as a legal issue, should that question of intentionality matter)? In cyberspace, many of these actions and interactions will take place at greater speeds thanks, in part, to artificial intelligence. These conditions may shrink the window of time for political and military leaders to make decisions, and place pressure on them to pre-authorize or create automated responses. It is not hard to imagine tit-for-tat uses of force quickly ascending a ladder of escalation. And there is no legal reason the rungs of that ladder will remain confined to the cyber realm.

2022 MGC Affirmative

NATO recently agreed that a cyber-attack CAN trigger Article 5 – but ambiguity exist over when and how. NATO will respond militarily if it deems a violation has occurred.

Laity 3/2/2022

Mark Laity, senior director at the StratCom Academy and former head of NATO’s military SHAPE Communications Division. ”Would a cyberattack on a NATO country trigger Article 5?”, -- ECM

When a NATO official told Reuters that a cyberattack could be considered an armed attack and trigger “Article 5,” it was a significant moment. How significant is harder to judge.