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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms Ups › No Link - FoPo

Foreign policy doesn’t matter in midterms, no soldiers invested

Charlie Cook 22 ("Foreign Policy Unlikely To Save Democrats in the Fall," Cook Political Report, 2-24-2022, )//Finn p

As the situation on the Russian-Ukrainian border intensifies, I wonder how many people like me are checking the news several times an hour, wondering whether Russia has finally attacked its smaller neighbor. Of course, no one can know where this is headed, how long it will dominate the news, what role the U.S. and its NATO allies will play, or what sanctions will be levied on Russia. We know what kind of shape President Biden and his party were in going into this crisis (pretty bad); we just can’t know how either will look coming out the other end. In the last several months, Biden’s job-approval numbers have mostly stabilized, largely fluctuating between 40 and 44 percent in the and poll averages. The released its monthly polling covering the first half of February, putting Biden’s approval rating at 41 percent, a point above his 40 percent in January. That’s 2 points better than Donald Trump’s 39 percent at this point, but 9 points below Barack Obama’s 50 percent and 12 points below Bill Clinton’s. In the final Gallup poll before their first midterm elections, Trump had a 43 percent approval rating (resulting in a net loss of 40 House seats), Obama was at 45 percent approval (losing 52 seats), and Clinton at 46 percent (losing 64 seats). We can put George W. Bush’s numbers to the side, given their stratospheric increase after 9/11. But his stood at 62 percent at this stage and 63 percent going into the 2002 midterms, en route to Republicans gaining eight seats in the House. Biden’s 41 percent overall approval rating in Gallup was bracketed by a , 36 percent on handling “the situation with Russia,” 37 percent on the economy, and 40 percent for foreign policy. Given how monolithic partisans are in their approval ratings and actual voting, it is always useful to look only at independents, the ‘jump ball’ Americans. Biden’s overall rating among them was 35 percent (5 points below his approval among all adults). His best marks were on dealing with the coronavirus (45 percent approval), followed by foreign policy (37 percent), Russia (35 percent), and the economy (30 percent). It is pretty clear the president and his administration’s denial of the threat of inflation and slow reaction to it was exceedingly damaging to him. (While we are on the subject, it is fascinating to see Senate Democrats, after so passionately advocating for more infrastructure spending this past year, propose suspending the gasoline tax for the rest of the year, no matter that the gas tax is the primary regular funding source for transportation infrastructure. Panic is never pretty.) While we don’t know the trajectory that the Russia/Ukraine crisis will take, and there are , we do know that in the absence of a large number of U.S. military deaths, Americans rarely vote on foreign-policy issues, particularly in midterms. The state and direction of the economy, particularly , is far more determinative. Turnout and the relative levels of enthusiasm between the two parties’ bases is key. There was a big gap heading into the 2018 midterm elections with, as usual, the party out of power much more motivated going into the fall of that year—though the Brett Kavanaugh Supreme Court nomination did a lot to close the gap in predominantly rural areas, which helped Republicans actually score a net gain in the Senate while getting hosed (a political science term) in the House. Right now, Democrats are the party suffering from a lack of motivation among their base. If someone wanting a read on a midterm is only going to watch two things, it should be a president’s approval rating and the , both pretty good barometers of which way the wind is blowing and whether it’s light, moderate, or heavy. In my view, Biden and his team are handling this incredibly challenging crisis far better than many other things over the last year. But this is unlikely to save Democrats from what is increasingly looking to be a pretty horrible midterm election.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms Ups › GOP win

Democrats need to win at least three more seats

Trende 7/13 (Sean Trende is the Senior Elections Analyst for RealClearPolitics. He is the author of "The Lost Majority: Why the Future of Government Is Up for Grabs and Who Will Take It," and co-authored the Almanac of American Politics 2014. Before becoming a full-time political analyst, Sean practiced law for eight years at Kirkland & Ellis LLP, and Hunton & Williams LLP, where he represented clients in a variety of contexts, from state trial courts to the Supreme Court of the United States. Sean earned a juris doctorate from Duke University, a master's degree in political science from Duke University and bachelor's degree from Yale University. 7-13-2022, "Republicans Are Favored to Win the Senate," JY).

That leaves Georgia and Arizona. Former Heisman Trophy winner Herschel Walker is a weak candidate with a penchant for outlandish comments, and Sen. Raphael Warnock is a charismatic incumbent. But this is still a seat that Warnock barely won against another weak candidate in a low turnout 2020 runoff, and he will have to convince a large number of voters who disapprove of the president to vote for him. Arizona is an under-polled race with a late primary. We don’t yet know what kind of candidate Blake Masters, the seemingly likely victor of the GOP primary, is going to be, although recent comments about the possibility that the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol was an FBI false flag operation aren’t particularly promising. But again, all he has to do to win is convince about 80% of the Arizona voters who disapprove of President Biden to vote for him.

In short, the battle for the Senate comes down to Democrats’ ability to win at least three of four seats that would likely be highly competitive if President Biden’s job approval were about ten points higher than it is today. But in a situation where Senate outcomes correlate heavily with presidential job approval in the state, that’s a tough row to hoe. While we should give more than a cursory nod to the possibility that Democrats will hold the Senate (unlike the possibility that Democrats will hold the House, which is barely worth that nod), we should also say with some confidence that Republicans are the favorites to win.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms Ups › GOP win

Democrats are losing seats and ballots – can’t catch up.

Trende 7/13 (Sean Trende is the Senior Elections Analyst for RealClearPolitics. He is the author of "The Lost Majority: Why the Future of Government Is Up for Grabs and Who Will Take It," and co-authored the Almanac of American Politics 2014. Before becoming a full-time political analyst, Sean practiced law for eight years at Kirkland & Ellis LLP, and Hunton & Williams LLP, where he represented clients in a variety of contexts, from state trial courts to the Supreme Court of the United States. Sean earned a juris doctorate from Duke University, a master's degree in political science from Duke University and bachelor's degree from Yale University. 7-13-2022, "Republicans Are Favored to Win the Senate," JY).

The president’s party has performed better in open seats that lean toward the opposition in presidential elections, but even then they are just 3 for 35 in the past 40 years. Republicans won an open seat in Minnesota in 2002, while Democrats won the Indiana Senate seat in 1998 and held the West Virginia Senate seat in 2010. But these three pickups all involved some combination of strange circumstances (the death of Sen. Paul Wellstone shortly before the election in 2002), an extremely popular president (1998 and 2002), or unusually strong candidates for the opposition (Evan Bayh, Joe Manchin, and, arguably, Norm Coleman). We might posit that Fetterman qualifies as an unusually strong candidate, but that remains to be seen; his endorsement of Bernie Sanders and his health issues are potential minefields for him to navigate.

In any event, it isn’t impossible for Democrats to flip one of these seats. It would just be unusual, especially with a president whose job approval sits in the 30s, and we should treat the possibility as such.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms Ups › GOP win

Republicans currently have the upper hand, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin are red.

Trende 7/13 (Sean Trende is the Senior Elections Analyst for RealClearPolitics. He is the author of "The Lost Majority: Why the Future of Government Is Up for Grabs and Who Will Take It," and co-authored the Almanac of American Politics 2014. Before becoming a full-time political analyst, Sean practiced law for eight years at Kirkland & Ellis LLP, and Hunton & Williams LLP, where he represented clients in a variety of contexts, from state trial courts to the Supreme Court of the United States. Sean earned a juris doctorate from Duke University, a master's degree in political science from Duke University and bachelor's degree from Yale University. 7-13-2022, "Republicans Are Favored to Win the Senate," JY).

Recently there has been a spate of stories about Republicans’ difficulties in taking over the Senate. These analyses typically focus on candidates’ poor polling numbers in key states and the weakness of the Republican recruiting class.

These aren’t absurd analyses; I’ve referred to the battle between the overall electoral environment and Republican candidate quality as “the irresistible force versus the immovable object” in previous columns. Had the Republican Party fielded its A-team in states like Georgia, Pennsylvania and Arizona, we probably would not be talking about Democrats even having a shot at retaining the Senate.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms Ups › GOP won’t win

Republicans won’t win the senate—extreme candidates wreck chances

Schoen, 22 (Douglas E. Schoen is a political consultant who served as an adviser to former President Clinton and to the 2020 presidential campaign of Michael Bloomberg, 7-17-2022, "Fringe GOP nominees give Democrats hope for the midterms," Hill, //Finn p

Republicans have every reason to be optimistic about their party’s political prospects in this year’s midterm elections.

Democrats are widely blamed for soaring inflation, President Biden’s approval rating just hit a and the GOP has a 2-point advantage in the generic ballot for Congress. On top of that, the party of the president has House seats in every midterm election — except for two — since 1946 and has only gained Senate seats in four.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › China Ups › Economic Decline Impact – Taiwan-China War

Domestic economic downturn triggers Taiwan – China war – extremist politics

Park 22 (Joshua Namtae Park is senior researcher at ISA(Institute for Asian Strategy, Seoul), ROK navy captain, retired, Ph.D. from U.S. Texas A&M University. He had various experiences at sea duties, worked for ROK MND and recently KIDA (Korea Institute for Defense Analyses). Currently, he is staying in Taipei, Taiwan as a visiting scholar. His primary research interests are Chinese security and military issues. 7-9-2022,"Why China Can't Afford to Attack Taiwan," National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-china-cant-afford-attack-taiwan-203504 JY)

Taiwan’s domestic issues must also be considered. Taiwan is a young democratic country that is vulnerable to demagoguery by politicians trying to win elections. Generally speaking, in a democratic country, extremist lines can easily win support from the public during economic downturns. Much as Adolf Hitler came to power when the German people were struggling with unbearable reparations after World War I, it is possible that a Taiwanese political leader could promote independence as a solution to Taiwan’s worsening economic situation. In this situation, China will have no choice but to respond militarily. As with any society, Taiwan faces many internal problems. First, low wages and high housing costs are affecting the marriage rate and leading to decreases in fertility. It is true that Taiwan’s economy is currently healthy despite the stress of the Covid-19 pandemic. However, if the economic situation worsens and unemployment and inflation rise, the domestic problems mentioned above may be the straw that broke the camel’s back. In November, Taiwan will have local council elections and two years later, there will be a presidential election. What if politicians running for election take an extreme position on independence to boost their popularity? It is likely that the Taiwanese will respond to the political slogan of politicians, and desire independence from China as a blueprint for a hopeful future.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › China Ups › Turns Case – Taiwan War impacts causes misapplication of resources

Misinterpreting China’s intention towards Taiwan causes misapplication of US resources

Ullman 22, Senior Advisor of the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he served in combat in assignments in Vietnam. (Harlan, 2/18,2022, “Reality Check #10: China will not invade Taiwan,” , Accessed 7/23/2022, CC

Nevertheless, given China’s size, strength, autocratic government, ambitions, and commitment to “one China,” the United States cannot totally rule out the possibility of an amphibious assault. Focusing US resources primarily on such a scenario would be a grave mistake, however. If the danger of Chinese aggression against, and indeed an invasion of, Taiwan is considered among the likely or plausible scenarios, the response must be to plan to defeat that outcome. Any military conflict with the United States beyond a Taiwan scenario would be a home game for China and an away game for the United States and those who might be persuaded to join the fight. Substantial resources would be needed to compensate for the disadvantages of geography and external lines of communications. Taiwan is only 100 miles off the Chinese coast. With China’s DF-21 and other missiles with ranges of 1,500-2,000 miles, a reinforcing naval force would come under fire for at least two or more day’s steaming before reaching the combat area. They would also have to avoid submarine and other maritime threats. The same problem applies to aviation units that would enter China’s air defense zones. To complicate this matter of reinforcement and coming to Taiwan’s defense, some polls show that Americans are more worried about a Chinese invasion than are the Taiwanese. Defending a friend is more difficult when that friend is less preoccupied or concerned with the threat than US citizens are. The United States cannot be successful in defending Taiwan if it regards the Chinese threat as more dangerous than the country it intends to protect. Finally, fixating on an unlikely scenario, no matter how compelling it sounds, skews US resources and force levels. An expeditionary force designed to protect Taiwan may not fit more relevant roles such as supporting formal treaty allies, responding to other contingencies, and influencing China by force dispositions—especially if there is no appetite to invade in the first place. It was no accident that Napoleon and Hitler failed to cross the 25-mile wide English Channel! The United States must consider and plan for many contingencies with respect to Taiwan. China has options other than a full-scale amphibious invasion. It could seize small islands belonging to Taiwan, such as Kinmen and Matsu, to exert leverage. It could impose economic and financial embargoes. It could impose a physical blockade with its maritime militia physically denying access to the island. It could attempt a regime change from within, using the equivalent of Russia’s “Little Green Men” who seized the Crimean Parliament in 2014. China could infiltrate the political parties and Taiwanese government and use influence operations to change public support. It could contrive or provoke a crisis to force Taiwan to accept a settlement that could lead to annexation. It could obliterate Taiwan under a rain of missiles. However, unless Taiwan were to declare independence, it is very unlikely that—barring a crisis—China would attempt any direct annexation. Moreover, an amphibious assault is not now a serious or feasible option. Misunderstanding an adversary in developing a strategy leads to failure, or worse. Hitler thought Russia would fold in 1941. The Japanese thought Pearl Harbor would force an American capitulation. Gen. Douglas MacArthur did not believe the Chinese would intervene in Korea as his forces raced toward the Yalu River in late 1950. Washington believed it could bomb North Vietnam into submission, that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and that Iraqis could easily takeover governing their country after Saddam Hussein had been overthrown. The Pentagon’s civilian leaders have declared China to be “the pacing challenge for the US military.” Many Americans are fearful that a rising China’s increasing diplomatic assertiveness, military buildup, militarizing small islets in the China Seas, and pursuit of the ambitious Belt-and-Road Initiative is a danger not only to the United States, but to much of the world. However, the nature of the specific threats is not clear. A possible Taiwan invasion must be plausible and based on why and how China could or would embark on that course of action. Thus far, no US administration has explained how such an invasion would be carried out.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › China Ups › No Taiwan War

Xi’s re-election

Joshua NamTae Park 22 [Senior Researcher at Institute for Asian Strategy, Seoul, worked for Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 7/9/22, “Why China Can’t Afford to Attack Taiwan”, , accessed 7/23/22, DC]

I believe that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be difficult at this time. First, consider the difficulty of starting a war amid political uncertainty. At the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) upcoming National Congress in the fall, President Xi Jinping must be approved for his third term by 2,287 CCP delegates from all over China. Although the vote of approval is merely a symbolic process, Xi would not want his remarkable achievements to be overshadowed by hostile acts before the fall. Therefore, the use of military force against Taiwan would not be an optimal choice.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › China Ups › No Taiwan War

China lacks force capability

Harlan Ullman 22, Senior Advisor of the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he served in combat in assignments in Vietnam. He holds an MA, MALD, and PhD from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, 2/18,2022, “Reality Check #10: China will not invade Taiwan,” , Accessed 7/23/2022, CC

The Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) was substantially predicated on preventing two faits accomplis: a Russian invasion of the Baltics and a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan. To what degree these scenarios will survive the Biden administration’s soon-to- be-released strategic review remains to be seen. The most likely outcome is that “integrated deterrence,” Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s term—for now more a slogan than a strategic concept that attempts a more “wholistic” all-of-government effort—will become prominent, as will a greater focus on the “deter” element rather than on “defeat” as was the last NDS. Defining what defeat means and how it would be achieved remains elusive. Some observers believe that how the United States handles the Ukraine crisis will be closely watched by China. That is true. But, as this paper argues, the Ukraine crisis will not influence Chinese decisions on whether or not to launch a full-scale amphibious invasion because, given the force demands, China simply lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. The and heads of Indo-Pacific Command have warned about China’s building the necessary forces to invade and conquer Taiwan, possibly by decade’s end. Given China’s long-standing determination to make Taiwan part of the mainland and achieve “one China,” a military takeover of Taiwan sounds plausible. However, this notion is based on a fundamental misperception regarding China’s capability to launch a major amphibious assault. If China were to launch such a military attack on Taiwan, what would that take in terms of forces and force levels? Does China possess the requisite numbers and capabilities? If not, when, if at all, might it build those forces that, if history counts, would number in the hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of ships and maritime assault vehicles? Current and past studies do not successfully or specifically address these questions. These studies focus on the how, but not on the specific manpower requirements of what would be required to carry out an invasion. The definitive document on what size force would be required to seize Taiwan in a full-out landing was drafted by the US military in the late stages of World War II in the Pacific. In 1944, was the US plan for retaking Formosa, as it was then called, from 30,000 starving Japanese soldiers. The planned invasion force was double the size of Operation Overlord, the Normandy landing: 400,000 soldiers and marines deployed on 4,000 ships. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, China would need to deploy over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million). Many thousands of ships would be required to land all those forces, and doing so would take weeks. How many occupation forces would be required to pacify the Taiwanese? Surely the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq are not lost on the PLA leadership. China possesses a small fraction of the necessary ships to execute a landing of that size and lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. Nor are there any current plans suggesting China is intent on procuring such a force, though that could change.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › China Ups › No Taiwan War

Past US military buildup

Park 22 (Joshua Namtae Park, Joshua NamTae Park is senior researcher at ISA(Institute for Asian Strategy, Seoul), ROK navy captain, retired, Ph.D. from U.S. Texas A&M University. He had various experiences at sea duties, worked for ROK MND and recently KIDA (Korea Institute for Defense Analyses). Currently, he is staying in Taipei, Taiwan as a visiting scholar. His primary research interests are Chinese security and military issues. 7-9-2022,"Why China Can't Afford to Attack Taiwan," National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-china-cant-afford-attack-taiwan-203504 JY)

The third is Taiwan’s determination to defend itself. Taiwan at this stage is focusing its efforts on self-reliance without provoking China. The current Tsi Ing-wen government does not chant slogans about independence to ease concerns on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, the Taiwanese government is keen to acquire weapon systems that are essential for defense. Taiwan has continued to increase its defense spending in recent years, especially for defensive systems. The United States is also actively supporting Taiwan in this respect. Thanks to the current military build-up, Taiwan could survive a sudden Chinese attack which makes Beijing hesitant to launch a preemptive but costly military action.

What are the unexpected factors in China’s calculations to use force in the future? Two important factors relate to President Xi. Among the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi might think that unification is something only he can achieve. Neither Mao Zedong, who founded a new country nor Deng Xiaoping, a reform pioneer, could do it. If Xi succeeds in unifying Taiwan with the mainland, he will outrank Mao Zedong. His private ambitions are unlikely to be easily observed publicly, though.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Heg Ups › Heg Sustainable

Economic strength and alliance structures

Robert Kagan and Ivo Daalder 16, Kagan is a Stephen and Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow, Daalder is a Former Ambassador to NATO specializing in Foreign Policy, “The U.S can’t afford to end its global leadership role”, 4/25/2016, , accessed 7-23-22, Wpeng

The economic, political and security strategy that the United States has pursued for more than seven decades, under Democratic and Republican administrations alike, is today widely questioned by large segments of the American public and is under attack by leading political candidates in both parties. Many Americans no longer seem to value the liberal international order that the United States created after World War II and sustained throughout the Cold War and beyond. Or perhaps they take it for granted and have lost sight of the essential role the United States plays in supporting the international environment from which they benefit greatly. The unprecedented prosperity made possible by free and open markets and thriving international trade; the spread of democracy; and the avoidance of major conflict among great powers: All these remarkable accomplishments have depended on sustained U.S. engagement around the world. Yet politicians in both parties dangle before the public the vision of an America freed from the burdens of leadership.

What these politicians don’t say, perhaps because they don’t understand it themselves, is that the price of ending our engagement would far outweigh its costs. The international order created by the United States today faces challenges greater than at any time since the height of the Cold War. Rising authoritarian powers in Asia and Europe threaten to undermine the security structures that have kept the peace since World War II. Russia invaded Ukraine and has seized some of its territory. In East Asia, an increasingly aggressive China seeks to control the sea lanes through which a large share of global commerce flows. In the Middle East, Iran pursues hegemony by supporting Hezbollah and Hamas and the bloody tyranny in Syria. The Islamic State controls more territory than any terrorist group in history, brutally imposing its extreme vision of Islam and striking at targets throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. None of these threats will simply go away. Nor will the United States be spared if the international order collapses, as it did twice in the 20th century. In the 21st century, oceans provide no security. Nor do walls along borders. Nor would cutting off the United States from the international economy by trashing trade agreements and erecting barriers to commerce.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Heg Ups › Heg Sustainable

Democracies can self-correct and relative economic strength

Roman Darius 20, Writer for The Strategist, “Don’t Panic: America Will Still Dominate the World After Coronavirus”, 6/19/2020, , accessed 7-23-22, Wpeng

The conspicuous absence of American leadership during the pandemic has emboldened the narratives about the United States’ decline and the weakening of the international order. The result has been a proliferation of commentary on the reconfiguration of global power, and America’s diminished position.

The predictions range from the crisis reshaping the world order and ending the transatlantic relationship, to China becoming the world’s dominant geopolitical player.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Heg Ups › Heg Unsustainable

US hegemony’s unsustainable --- shifts in power means no country is willing to follow the US.

Mathew Burrows and Robert Manning 20, Burrows is a former worker at the CIA and the State Department and the director of the Strategic Foresight Initiative, Manning is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and formerly served as a senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary for Asia, “What Happens When America Is No Longer the Undisputed Super Power?”, 8/17/2020 , accessed 7-23-22, Wpeng

THE TRIFECTA of the worst pandemic in a century, the worst economic crisis since the 1930s, and civil unrest not seen since the 1960s are inspiring predictions of the diminution of American power and an accelerated fin de siècle breakdown of the post-Cold War order. This predicament has given rise to a panoply of essays and reports, a series of them in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs alone, debating “The World After the Pandemic,” with variations on how the United States must, phoenix-like, shape a new order. One recent example that is emblematic of the Washington foreign policy mainstream emanates from the Council on Foreign Relations. It is entitled The End of World Order and American Foreign Policy, by Robert Blackwill and Thomas Wright.

While it articulately sketches the damage wrought by COVID-19, a collapsed economy, and the challenges ahead, like many of its predecessors, it rests on some dubious assumptions. It also appears to substantially discount both the role of the United States as a causal factor—not least, the cost of Donald Trump’s systematic efforts to undo the multilateral system—and the degree of difficulty of repairing a broken U.S. political system that is an impediment to restoring U.S. stature. Similarly underestimated are the costs to the moral authority and legitimacy of U.S. leadership resulting from U.S. political tribalism and behavior in the world this century, qualitatively worsened by the wrecking ball of the current president. Moreover, their recommendations often consist of well-trodden bromides that fail to acknowledge the difficult reforms required to achieve them.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Climate Change Ups › No Extinction

Adaptation solves the impacts of climate change---Executive action solves

Wetzel 22, (Corryn Wetzel is a freelance science journalist based in Brooklyn. Her work has also appeared in Audubon magazine, National Geographic and others.“We Are Changing Climate Faster Than We Can Adapt, New IPCC Report Warns”, 3-2-2022, Smithsonian Magazine, 7-23-2022)///LD

Humans are changing the climate too rapidly for nature to keep up, according to a new United Nations (UN) report released on Monday. Unless greenhouse gas emissions are quickly slashed, both humans and wildlife will no longer adapt to the dangers of a warming planet. The latest report from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is based on years of research from hundreds of scientists and follows previous landmark assessments on the global threat of climate change. The new 3,675-page report authored by 270 researchers from nearly 70 nations, concluded that human-caused climate change is happening faster and causing more damage than researchers previously expected, according to Sara Kiley Watson for Popular Science. The report is the second of three reviews from the IPCC. “With fact upon fact, this report reveals how people and the planet are getting clobbered by climate change,” says UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in a statement. “Nearly half of humanity is living in the danger zone—now. Many ecosystems are at the point of no return—now. Unchecked carbon pollution is forcing the world’s most vulnerable on a frog march to destruction—now.” Climate change is not a future abstract threat, per the new report, and is already harming communities and ecosystems around the world. In 2019, extreme weather like storms and floods displaced more than 13 million people across Asia and Africa, according to Brad Plumer and Raymond Zhong for the New York Times. Heat and drought are threatening the food and water supply for millions of people, and rising sea levels are encroaching on coastal communities. In recent years, more individuals have been forced to deal with extreme weather events linked to climate change, like the deadly heatwave that hit the western United States last summer. Anthropogenic warming increased the likelihood of floods that swept through parts of Europe last year by up to nine times and made Australia's devastating fire seasons 30 percent more likely.

“One of the most striking conclusions in our report is that we’re seeing adverse impacts that are much more widespread and much more negative than expected,” Camille Parmesan, an ecologist at the University of Texas, Austin, and one of the researchers involved in the report, tells the Times. The report found some regions are feeling the impacts of climate change more than others. Between 2010 and 2020, floods, droughts, and storms killed 15 times more people in very vulnerable parts of Africa, South Asia, and Central and South America, than in other parts of the world, per Matt McGrath for BBC. A warmer planet also presents new health risks, including the spread of mosquito-borne illnesses like dengue fever to billions more people. “This report is a dire warning about the consequences of inaction,” says Hoesung Lee, chair of the IPCC, in a statement. “Half measures are no longer an option.” The new analysis comes roughly 100 days since the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow, where scientists and world leaders aimed to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius and stave off the worst effects of climate change. Since humans started burning fossil fuels in the 19th century, global temperatures have climbed an average of 1.1 degrees Celsius, or 2 degrees Fahrenheit. Currently, the world is currently on pace to warm somewhere between 2 degrees and 3 degrees Celsius by the end of the century, and a few degrees can have a big impact on the planet.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Climate Change Ups › No Extinction

Climate change won’t cause extinction---Recent decrease in natural disasters proves.

Puckett 21, (Jakob, An energy-policy analyst and a Young Voices associate contributor. “Don’t Buy the U.N. Climate Change Conference’s Scary Stories”, National Review, 10-30-2021, https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/10/dont-buy-the-un-climate-change-conferences-scary-stories/ 7-23-2022)///LD

Starting tomorrow, on Halloween, government leaders from around the world will meet in Glasgow, Scotland, for the annual U.N. Climate Change Conference, which this year will feature some of its  stories yet. The only problem is that when you take the mask off the harrowing claims that climate change poses an imminent existential threat to humanity, they don’t hold up. The most dire climate-change predictions, which fuel the apocalyptic discourse that surrounds the issue, stem from a climate model known as RCP 8.5. According to RCP 8.5, by the year 2100, the Earth will  4.3 degrees Celsius, causing sea levels to surge and making many countries too hot to inhabit. But models are only as solid as the assumptions on which they rest, and RCP 8.5’s assumptions are wild, to put it mildly. The model  that, despite coal’s declining market position and , and despite  that it will , worldwide per capita coal use will  three- to six-fold over the next 50 years, coming to once again power our economies and heat our homes. It assumes that  will even fuel our cars. It  that the rebirth of the coal industry will power so much growth that, by 2100, the poorest country on Earth today will have a higher GDP than today’s wealthiest countries currently do (while paradoxically also being too hot to inhabit). And it assumes that economic growth will be much  energy-efficient than it is , which would represent the reversal of a decades-long trend. It should go without saying that none of these are even remotely safe assumptions. Similarly, many dire predictions about climate change’s effects on weather patterns are overwrought. It is true that the  from the U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change notes that fire weather, heavy precipitation, ecological and agricultural droughts, and heat waves are  in frequency. But it is also true that while heat waves have become more frequent since 1960, the Dust Bowl era of the 1930s remains the  period of extreme heat in the U.S. Similarly, while weather conducive to wildfires has become more frequent, the global land area burned by wildfires has steadily  since the early 1900s, and much of the recent  has been due to poor forest-management practices. What’s more, there’s plenty of good news that can’t be fit into a spooky climate-change story. The IPCC’s most recent report notes in flooding, hydrological and meteorological droughts, hurricanes, tornadoes, winter storms, extreme winds, thunderstorms, lightning, or hail. And humanity is better protected than it once was from those natural disasters that do happen: A recent study published in the peer-reviewed journal Global Environmental Change found that economic losses caused by climate-related disasters 80 percent from 1980 to 2016. If you can ignore the overblown rhetoric, there are fundamental truths to be reckoned with: Climate change is real, and human activity does indeed contribute to it. But irresponsible fearmongering only makes the problem harder to address. According to the best evidence, the world is on track to hit emissions and warming levels that, as of a couple of years ago, would have been considered a success. For instance, according to leading , energy-related-emissions projections are in line with the (much cooler) climate RCP 4.5, which the 2018 U.S. National Climate Assessment as a policy-success scenario. It’s likely that global “peak per capita CO2 emissions” were reached several years ago. Major independent energy-research organizations such as the International Energy Agency predict that annual per capita CO2 emissions will in the decades to come, and it’s that global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels are on the brink of a long plateau. The best computer models that by 2100, the Earth will be 2.2 degrees Celsius warmer than it was in 1850. That will certainly cause environmental changes, but it doesn’t constitute an existential threat. Nor are we humans without tools to ameliorate the problem. Adaptive engineering, – and  markets, and the continued growth of more environmentally conscious ways of producing the goods and services needed for modern life can all lessen climate change and its effects. So, as Halloween arrives amid the U.N. Climate Change Conference this year, leaders should ditch the Grim Reaper costumes and don more reasonable attire. With level heads and the right policies, they can both protect the environment and provide a better life for billions around the globe.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Econ Ups › AT: Military Keynesianism

Military Keynesianism is wrong---war fails to generate enough growth and other methods solve.

Walt 20, Stephen Walt is the Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?,” 5/13/2020, , AJS

Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure.

I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is hard to imagine any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Econ Ups › AT: Diversionary Theory

Diversionary theory is wrong---too big a gamble and countries weak

Walt 20, Stephen Walt is the Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?,” 5/13/2020, , AJS

One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose.

This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Econ Ups › AT: Decline Causes War

No impact to recession---COVID proves

The Investopedia team 22 (Investopedia contributors come from a range of backgrounds, and over 20+ years there have been thousands of expert writers and editors who have contributed, last updated (no publish date) 6/16/22, accessed 7/23/22, “A Review of Past Recessions”, investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/past-recessions.asp) KCabrera

The Own Goal Recession: May 1937–June 1938 Duration: 13 months GDP decline: 10% 5 Peak unemployment rate: 20% 5 Reasons and causes: Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies had secured a recovery from the Great Depression after 1933, albeit an uneven and incomplete one. In 1936-1937 policymakers changed course, more preoccupied with cutting budget deficits and heading off inflation than with the dangers of a depressive relapse. 5 Following a tax increase in 1935 and Social Security payroll deductions starting in 1937, the budget deficit shrank from 5.4% of GDP in 1936 to 0.1% of GDP by 1938. 6 7 Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve in 1936 doubled the reserve requirement ratios for banks, thus curbing lending with the stated aim of preventing "an injurious credit expansion." 5 Perhaps most damagingly of all, the U.S. Treasury began the same year to sterilize gold inflows, ending brisk money supply growth that had supported the expansion. 8 Industrial production began falling in September; it would decline 32% in the course of the recession. The stock market crashed in October. The recession ended after policymakers rolled back the increase in reserve requirements and gold sterilization as well as fiscal austerity. 5 The V-Day Recession: February 1945–October 1945 Duration: Eight months GDP decline: 10.9% 9 Peak unemployment rate: 3.8% 10 Reasons and causes: The 1945 recession reflected massive cuts in U.S. government spending and employment toward the end and immediately after World War II. Federal spending fell 40% in 1946 and 38% in 1947 while the private sector's output grew rapidly. 11 The severity of the downturn remains open to question because much of the eliminated spending represented wartime production that did not serve to increase living standards. 12 The elimination of price controls in 1946 artificially depressed output as adjusted for inflation, while the unemployment rate remained low in part because women left the workforce in large numbers (and often unwillingly). 13 14 15 The Post-War Brakes Tap Recession: November 1948–October 1949 Duration: 11 months GDP decline: 1.7% 16 Peak unemployment rate: 7.9% 17 Reasons and Causes: The first phase of the post-war boom was in some ways comparable to the economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Amid a backlog of consumer demand suppressed during the war and a shortage of production capacity, the collapse of wartime price controls fueled an abrupt surge of inflation by mid-1946. 18 The annualized inflation rate rose from 3.3% in June 1946 to 11.6% two months later and 19% at its peak in April 1947. 19 Policymakers only responded in the second half of 1947, and when they did their efforts to tighten credit ultimately led to a relatively mild recession as consumers and producers retrenched. 20 The M*A*S*H* Recession: July 1953–May 1954 Duration: 10 months GDP decline: 2.7% 16 Peak unemployment rate: 5.9% 17 Reasons and causes: The wind-down of the Korean War caused government spending to decline dramatically, lowering the federal budget deficit from 1.7% of GDP in fiscal 1953 to 0.3% a year later. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy in 1953. 21 The Investment Bust Recession: August 1957–April 1958 Duration: Eight months GDP decline: 3.7% 16 Peak unemployment rate: 7.4% 17 Reasons and causes: The end of the Korean War unleashed a global investment boom marked by a surge in exports of U.S. capital goods. 22 The Fed responded by tightening monetary policy as the inflation rate rose from 0.4% in March 1956 to 3.7% a year later. 21 19 Fiscal policy focused on limiting budget deficits produced a surplus of 0.7% of GDP in 1957. 21 The 1957 Asian Flu pandemic killed 70,000 to 100,000 Americans in 1957, and industrial production slumped late that year and early in 1958. 23 The dramatic drop in domestic demand and evolving consumer expectations led to the failure of the Ford Edsel, the beginning of the end for Detroit's auto industry dominance. 24 The sharp worldwide recession contributed to a foreign trade deficit. The recession ended after policymakers eased fiscal and monetary constraints on growth. 21 The 'Rolling Adjustment' Recession: April 1960–February 1961 Duration: 10 months GDP decline: 1.6% 16 Peak unemployment rate: 6.9% 17 Reasons and causes: This relatively mild recession was named for the so-called "rolling adjustment" in U.S. industrial sectors tied to consumers' diminished demand for domestic autos amid growing competition from inexpensive imports. Like most other recessions, it was preceded by higher interest rates, with the Fed increasing the federal funds rate from 1.75% in mid-1958 to 4% by the end of 1959. 25 Fiscal policy also tightened at the end of President Dwight Eisenhower's second term, from a deficit of 2.6% of GDP in 1959 to a surplus of 0.1% a year later. 26 The Guns and Butter Recession: December 1969–November 1970 Duration: 11 months GDP decline: 0.6% 16 Peak unemployment rate: 5.9% 17 Reasons and causes: Military spending increased in the late 1960s amid growing U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and alongside high expenditures on domestic policy initiatives. 27 As a result, the federal budget deficit rose from 1.1% of GDP in 1967 to 2.9% in 1968, while inflation increased from 3.1% in 1967 to 4.3% a year later and 5.3% by 1970. The Federal Reserve increased the federal funds rate from 5% in March 1968 to more than 9% by August 1969. By early 1971, the Fed had lowered the federal funds rate back below 4%, aiding the recovery. 26 The Oil Embargo Recession: November 1973–March 1975 Duration: 16 months GDP decline: 3% 28 Peak unemployment rate: 8.6% 17 Reasons and causes: This long, deep recession began following the start of the Arab Oil Embargo, which would quadruple crude prices. That tipped the balance for an economy struggling with the devaluation of the dollar amid high U.S. trade and budget deficits and slipping domestic crude output. 29 The collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement fixing currency exchange rates contributed to a rise in U.S. inflation from 2.4% in August 1972 to 7.4% a year later, causing the Fed to double the federal funds rate to 10% between late 1972 and mid-1973. 19 30 After increasing the federal funds rate to 13% in the first half of 1974, the Fed cut it to 5.25% in under a year. 28 Inflation and unemployment remained elevated after the recession ended, ushering in stagflation. Unemployment reached 9% in May of 1975, after the declared end of the recession. 17 The Iran and Volcker Recession, Part 1: January 1980–July 1980 Duration: Six months GDP decline: 2.2% 31 Peak unemployment rate: 7.8% 17 Reasons and causes: Accommodative monetary policy aimed at alleviating rising unemployment pushed U.S. inflation to 7% by early 1979, just before the Iranian Revolution caused oil prices to double. 32 The Federal Reserve was already raising rates when Paul Volcker was named Fed chair in August 1979, and the rate went from 10.5% at the time of his appointment to 17.5% by April 1980. 33 This short recession formally ended as the Fed dropped the fed funds rate back down to 9.5% by August of 1980, but inflation stayed high and the Volcker Fed wasn't done. Part 2 of Double-Dip Recession: July 1981–November 1982 Duration: 16 months GDP decline: 2.9% 31 Peak unemployment rate: 10.8% 17 Reasons and causes: By the fourth quarter of 1980 inflation was up to 11.1%, prompting the Federal Reserve to raise the fed funds rate to 19% by July 1981. 33 As the downturn worsened and joblessness climbed, Volcker resisted repeated demands in Congress to change course. 34 By October 1982 inflation had declined to 5%, while unemployment would remain above 10% until mid-1983. 35 17 Most economists today accept Volcker's arguments at the time that failure to control inflation and restore the Fed's credibility would have led to continued economic underperformance. 36 The Gulf War Recession: July 1990–March 1991 Duration: Eight months GDP decline: 1.5% 37 Peak unemployment rate: 6.8% 17 Reasons and causes: This relatively mild recession began a month before Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the resulting oil price shock may have contributed to a frustratingly lackluster recovery. The Fed had raised the federal funds rate from 6.5% in February 1988 to 9.75% in May 1989 in an effort to contain inflation, which rose from 2.2% in 1986 to 3.9% for 1990. 38 The Dot-Bomb Recession: March 2001–November 2001 Duration: Eight months GDP decline: 0.3% Peak unemployment rate: 5.5% 17 Reasons and causes: The collapse of the dotcom bubble contributed to one of the mildest recessions on record following what was then the longest economic expansion in U.S. history. 39 The Fed raised the fed funds rate from 4.75% in early 1999 to 6.5% by July 2000. The Sept. 11 attacks and the associated economic disruptions may have hastened the recession's end by encouraging the Fed to keep cutting the fed funds rate. The benchmark rate reached a low of 1% by mid-2003. 40 The Great Recession: December 2007–June 2009 Duration: Eighteen months GDP decline: 4.3% 41 Peak unemployment rate: 9.5% 41 Reasons and causes: The nationwide downturn in U.S. housing prices triggered a global financial crisis, a bear market in stocks that had the S&P 500 down 57% at the lows, and the worst economic downturn since the recession of 1937-38. 41 Global investment flows into the U.S. had kept market rates low, likely encouraging unscrupulous mortgage underwriting and mortgage-backed securities marketing practices. 42 Oil prices spiked to record highs by mid-2008 and then crashed, depressing the U.S. oil industry. The COVID-19 Recession: February 2020–April 2020 Duration: Two months Reasons and causes: The COVID-19 pandemic spread to the U.S. in March 2020, and the resulting travel and work restrictions caused employment to plummet, triggering an unusually short but sharp recession. 43 The unemployment rate climbed from 3.5% in February 2020 to 14.7% in April 2020 but was back below 4% by the end of 2021, capped by $5 trillion in pandemic relief spending. 17 44 In addition, quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet from $4.1 trillion in February 2020 to nearly $9 trillion by the end of 2021, complementing a federal funds rate that remained near zero until March 2022. 45 What Is the Average Length of a Recession? The U.S. has experienced 34 recessions since 1857 according to the NBER, varying in length from two months (February to April 2020) to more than five years (October 1873 to March 1879). The average recession has lasted 17 months, while the six recessions since 1980 have lasted less than 10 months on average. 1 Which Stocks Tend Fare Better During a Recession? Companies in the consumer staples, health care, and utilities sectors, which see relatively small fluctuations in demand for economic reasons, tend to fare best during recessions, and their stocks have outperformed during past downturns as a result. 46 47 Do Recessions Always Coincide With Bear Markets? A bear market is commonly defined as a sustained drop of 20% or more from a market peak. Of the 25 bear markets since 1928, 14 have overlapped with recessions. 48 ***image omitted*** The Bottom Line As the history of recessions over the past century suggests, they're almost always preceded by monetary policy tightening in the form of rising interest rates. Fiscal contractions, whether they involve lower government spending, higher taxes, or both, have also played a role. This is not to automatically deprecate such policies when they lead to a recession. In some cases, as during the 1970s, the long-run alternative to immediate economic pain may be even less palatable. In others, as with the end of World War II and the Korean War, there may be no easy way or no will to find immediate alternatives to high military spending. That doesn't change the fact that most modern recessions have occurred in response to some combination of rising interest rates, lower budget deficits, and higher energy prices.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Econ Ups › AT: Decline Causes War

Economic decline doesn’t cause war---Covid has weakened countries.

Walt 20, Stephen Walt is the Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?,” 5/13/2020, , AJS

But war could still be much less likely. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Barry Posen has already considered the likely impact of the current pandemic on the probability of war, and he believes COVID-19 is more likely to promote peace instead. He argues that the current pandemic is affecting all the major powers adversely, which means it isn’t creating tempting windows of opportunity for unaffected states while leaving others weaker and therefore vulnerable. Instead, it is making all governments more pessimistic about their short- to medium-term prospects. Because states often go to war out of sense of overconfidence (however misplaced it sometimes turns out to be), pandemic-induced pessimism should be conducive to peace.

Moreover, by its very nature war requires states to assemble lots of people in close proximity—at training camps, military bases, mobilization areas, ships at sea, etc.—and that’s not something you want to do in the middle of a pandemic. For the moment at least, beleaguered governments of all types are focusing on convincing their citizens they are doing everything in their power to protect the public from the disease. Taken together, these considerations might explain why even an impulsive and headstrong warmaker like Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman has gotten more interested in winding down his brutal and unsuccessful military campaign in Yemen.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Econ Ups › No, Recession

No recession---impossible to coordinate the next one and responses solve

Cristino et al 20 (Cláudio Tadeu Cristino, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Validation, Visualization, Writing – review & editing, Piotr Żebrowski, Conceptualization, Methodology, Supervision, Writing – review & editing, Matthias Wildemeersch, Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Methodology, Supervision, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing, published 5/7/20, accessed 7/23/22, “Assessing the time intervals between economic recessions”, ) KCabrera

Recessions are economic contractions following a period of economic expansion. They are part of the business cycle, and do not feature a regular periodicity. Market adjustments and policy measures are capable to revitalize the economy and turn around the trend of economic decline. In the modern economic history of the U.S., policy makers have tried time and time again to address unemployment and declining incomes with recovery measures in the New Deal, the employment act, new institutional frameworks, the Bretton Woods agreement, etc. [1, 2]. In addition to reforms and new regulations, different instruments of fiscal control can be activated, such as adjustments in taxation, public expenditure and debt management to foster economic growth [3]. The efficiency of all these policies can be measured with so-called fiscal multipliers, which behave differently during expansions and recessions [4, 5]. However, these multipliers do not allow us to estimate the time and probability of the next recession. The lifetime of a system is defined as the time that a system can carry out its function before going into a failure state [6, 7]. In this work, the failure state corresponds with a recession event, and the age of the system is the time that the system has already worked properly, i.e., the time that the economy is in expansion. There are multiple approaches to predict business cycle turning points, such as econometric techniques [8], the spread between short-term and long-term interest rates captured in the yield function [9], or stochastic simulation [10, 11]. Typically, the probability of a recession is determined based on the several indicator variables, such as stock prices, credit market activity, or employment and interest rate [11]. These techniques are valuable, but they do not capture explicitly the effect of system age, system aging, or the effects of policy and market interventions on the state of the economy. There is in fact evidence that the termination probability of recessions is dependent on its duration [12, 13]. This dependence can be captured by different types of survival models, such as the proportional hazard model [14] and the accelerated failure time model [15], which include the effect of covariates in the hazard function. Aforementioned models are however not able to include the effect of interventions following an event on system age. Business cycle durations have typically been modeled using Markov switching processes [16, 17]. Here, we use an alternative approach based on Generalized Renewal Processes (GRP) to model the inter-arrival times of recessions. This method allows us to integrate explicitly the effect of policy interventions and to determine if aging is a real process happening in economic systems. GRPs integrate simultaneously two sources of stochastic variability in system performance: deterioration through aging and restoration by means of policy interventions. System deterioration can occur through different types of aging processes. No aging indicates that the age of the system has no effect on the residual lifetime. The no-aging property implies a system with no memory, a constant failure rate, and lifetimes distributed according to the exponential distribution. In reliability analysis, positive aging is much more common and means that the expected residual lifetime decreases with age. System restoration deals with repair actions that improve the system after failure. The literature often distinguishes between perfect repair and minimal repair [18]. Perfect repair is applicable, for instance, to engineering systems that consist of a single component that can be replaced, resulting in a system as good as new. Minimal repair requires the replacement of only these components that failed; minimal repair is a reasonable assumption for systems consisting of multiple components all of which have their own failure properties, leaving the system in a state as bad as before the failure. Minimal repair and perfect repair are however specific cases and in realistic settings the degree of restoration can be better described by general repair and the corresponding stochastic process, the GRP. The effectiveness of interventions in general repair can take arbitrary values, and general renewal theory extends the classical renewal theory by including the notion of rejuvenation, indicating the performance of the system after interventions. This idea was firstly presented in [19] and requires to introduce the concept of virtual age, a function that reflects how interventions affect the real age of the system. In the literature, a Weibull-GRP (WGRP) model is usually fitted to observed data in order to infer lifetime probabilities [20–23]. The restoration process is commonly captured by a rejuvenation parameter [22, 24, 25], whereas the deterioration of the system is reflected by the shape and scale parameters of the Weibull distribution regardless of the restoration process [20–22]. The GRP can also be used in an optimization context, where policies are searched for that minimize intervention costs while maintaining certain levels of system performance [24, 26–28]. In reliability analysis and engineering, the Weibull distribution has typically been used to describe the functioning of a serial system that operates well as long as all components operate correctly [29]. In this work, we propose to model the arrival time of recessions by means of a GRP based on the Gumbel distribution. The Gumbel distribution is able to describe a parallel system that stops operating once all components fail, and we use the abstraction of a parallel system as a stylized representation of the economy. The duration of an expansion period is affected by market adjustments taking place during the preceding recession as well as by the policies and reforms introduced to mitigate the causes of this recession. We therefore argue that the periods between consecutive recessions do not constitute a stationary process. We deduce the distribution of the GRP based on the Gumbel distribution, and show how the parameters of the statistical model can be estimated. Importantly, we propose a novel goodness of fit test to demonstrate that the observed recessions of the American and European markets can be represented by the Gumbel-based GRP. We show that the GRP outperforms several stationary distributions, and in addition to the recession incidence rate over time, we also estimate the expected time of the next recession.