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2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **China** › 2AC China Add-On

The Ukraine situation has exposed China as a threat using information warfare as it’s tool to attack the US

Dwoskin 22 Dwoskin, E. (2022, April 10). Elizabeth Dwoskin focuses on social media and the power of the tech industry in a democratic society. Before that, she was the Wall Street Journal's first full-time beat reporter covering big data, AI, and the impact of algorithms on people's lives. China is Russia's most powerful weapon for information warfare. The Washington Post. Retrieved July 11, 2022, from

Russian propaganda about the war in Ukraine last month after Russian state news channels were blocked in Europe and restricted globally. But in recent weeks, China has emerged as a potent outlet for Kremlin disinformation, researchers say, portraying Ukraine and NATO as the aggressors and sharing false claims about neo-Nazi control of the Ukrainian government. With over a billion followers on Facebook alone, China’s state-controlled channels offer Russian President Vladimir Putin a powerful megaphone for shaping global understanding of — often called a “special operation” in line with Kremlin rhetoric. Since Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, researchers say, Chinese channels have touted the false claim that the United States runs bioweapons labs in Ukraine, have asserted that Ukrainian neo-Nazis bombed a children’s hospital which was in fact bombed by Russian troops, and have suggested that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was being manipulated by U.S. billionaire George Soros. Chinese channels also have given airtime and amplification to high-ranking Russian government officials and to presenters from Russian government channels whose shows have been restricted or blocked. Last month, after a host on Sputnik, the Russian state news outlet, posted a video on his personal YouTube channel discussing how neo-Nazis were on the rise in Ukraine, the clip was tweeted by Frontline, a Chinese government outlet. “With governments and tech platforms moving to censor or limit the spread of Russian propaganda, pro-Kremlin talking points are now being laundered through influencers and proxies, including Chinese officials and state media outlets that obviously do not face the same restrictions that have been placed on Russian state media outlets,” said Bret Schafer, senior fellow and head of the information manipulation team at the Alliance for Securing Democracy, a nonpartisan initiative housed at the U.S. German Marshall Fund that tracks Chinese and Russian state media. “This has allowed the Kremlin to effectively skirt bans meant to limit the spread of Russian propaganda.” Putin’s success in seeding some of these misleading narratives through proxies and allies is casting doubt on the ability of Western governments and the tech giants to effectively rein in the most pernicious forms of authoritarian propaganda. With China’s help, experts say, Russia also is regaining its ability to cloud the narrative around Europe’s biggest conflict since World War II. “While the world’s eyes are still on Ukraine, and the journalists are there, it’s going to be hard for the Russian government to make great progress. But they can make progress on the edges,” said Kate Starbird, an associate professor in the Department of Human Centered Design & Engineering at the University of Washington. “And in the long run, if the public is confused enough about what happened, then we might not give our leadership a clear message to take action.” since the war’s early days, when the European Commission blocked Russian state channels and Twitter, YouTube and Facebook , Russia has raced to create workarounds. Journalists have uncovered a coordinated campaign to pay TikTok influencers to push pro-Kremlin views, while researchers from the data science company Trementum Analytics have documented pro-Russia trolls spamming YouTube videos about Ukraine with pro-Russian comments. The Russian government also has used its embassies to push out misinformation to tens of thousands of followers on Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and the messaging app Telegram. According to the Israeli disinformation research group FakeReporter, Russian embassies have created at least 65 new Telegram channels since the war began. Twitter stopped recommending these accounts this week. Fox News and other right-leaning American outlets also have picked up Russia’s talking points — notably when Fox host Tucker Carlson last month promoted to his prime time audience the baseless claim that Ukraine was developing biological weapons with the assistance of the U.S. government. According to disinformation researchers and the fact-checking group PolitiFact, that claim, which has been circulating for years, is a misleading reference to a public health research partnership between the United States and Ukraine; the White House has called it “preposterous.” Last week, the New York Post wrote an article tying the discredited biolab claim to President Biden’s son Hunter, claiming that the younger Biden had helped secure funds for a start-up that worked on the research biolabs in Ukraine. The Washington Post that Hunter Biden “was not part of a decision" to invest in the start-up. Meanwhile, highly active online communities, such as anti-vaccine activists and adherents of the radicalized movement QAnon, have seized on the biolab claim and other Russian narratives. An of the theory, according to the Anti-Defamation League, was a Virginia man with ties to QAnon. China is, by far, the Kremlin’s biggest promoter, however. The top four Chinese outlets — CGTN, Global Times, Xinhua News and T-House — command a massive audience with a combined follower count on Facebook of 283 million, according to research from the nonprofit Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH). All told, Chinese outlets on Facebook have over 1 billion followers, according to the Alliance for Securing Democracy — far more than the roughly 85 million total followers for Russia’s main channels. Asked how Facebook was addressing China’s emergence as a vector for Russian propaganda, Facebook shared several examples of fact checks applied to misleading pro-Russian content from Chinese state media. The company did not respond to questions about whether it has restricted Chinese state media accounts or has plans to do so. Twitter spokeswoman Madeline Broas said the company had placed some limits on Chinese state media for several years, and that — beginning last Friday — it had begun putting highly-visible labels on any tweet that contained a link to Chinese state media. (Previously, such labels were shown only to people who searched for the account.) YouTube declined to answer questions about Chinese state media. Spokeswoman Elena Hernandez said the company does fact-check misinformation and that it prohibits content that minimizes, trivializes, or denies the existence of well-documented, violent historical events. The Chinese Embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment. China and Russia have long been allies, extending back to the Cold War, and view their alliance as a bulwark against Western power. The two countries strengthened their bond ahead of the Ukraine invasion, issuing a joint statement on Feb. 4 describing their relationship as a “no limits” friendship. Russia has refused to acknowledge the invasion, referring to its actions in Ukraine as a “special operation.” Chinese state media immediately adopted that term, according to the Alliance for Securing Democracy’s tracker, with Chinese accounts using it 180 times between Feb. 24 and March 12. The term “invasion” was mentioned 145 times, but more than the third were references to the U.S. invasion of Iraq — an attempt to equate Russian and American military actions. Chinese media also began to take up neo-Nazi storylines, according to ASD. Chinese diplomats and state media have tweeted about Nazis more than 140 times since the start of the war, according to the tracker. In the year preceding the war, Chinese state- affiliated accounts tracked by the group tweeted about Nazis only twice. The Azov Battalion, a group partially made up of anti-Russian nationalists and neo-Nazis, has been part of Ukraine’s military since 2014. But experts say the does not have major influence in the country whose president, Zelensky, is Jewish. Lately, China has focused more attention on blaming NATO for the conflict, researchers say. A recent Facebook post from T-House, a millennial-focused outlet, compared Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO to Hitler’s attempt to conquer Ukraine, according to research by the Center for Countering Digital Hate. “The moves by the US-led #NATO have pushed the #Russia-Ukraine tension to the breaking point,” said a recent tweet by China’s ambassador to the Asia-Pacific region.In late March, NATO was the tenth most used key phrase in Chinese tweets, according to the ASD tracker. Meanwhile, China’s consul general in Belfast recently tweeted a false claim from Russian state media that Zelensky is hiding in Poland, a NATO member. China also is giving a boost to Russian presenters whose audiences appear to have been limited by Western bans. The personal talk show for U.K. presenter George Galloway, host of the “Mother of All Talk Shows” on Sputnik, been shared numerous times by several large Chinese outlets such as Global Times. Currently, the Sputnik website that hosted Galloway’s show appeared to be blocked in the United Kingdom, according to ASD. But his personal YouTube channel, which does not make visible references to his Sputnik backing, continues to stream it. Galloway did not respond to a request for comment. In a tweet on Wednesday, Galloway tweeted in response to Twitter’s decision to label his account “Russian state media,” saying, “Dear t I am not “Russian State Affiliated media”. I work for NO media. I have 400,000 followers. I’m the leader of a British political party and spent nearly 30 years in the British parliament. If you do not remove this designation I will take legal action.” Experts disagree about how the tech companies should police China and other Russian proxies. The tech companies have cast their crackdowns on Russian media as taken under extraordinary circumstances; they largely do not want to impose blanket bans on state outlets. Experts also have noted that if state outlets are banned for disinformation, the tech companies would face increasing pressure to ban nonstate channels that spread misinformation, such as Fox News. Instead, the tech companies more recently have opted for transparency, such as fact-checking and labeling. In 2018, YouTube began labeling state media outlets. Twitter did so in 2020, as did Facebook. But labeling is premised on the idea that informed users will make wise decisions about whether to trust content, and that has had mixed results. In 2020, George Washington University researchers studying the impact of YouTube labels on content from RT found that they were effective at making people more aware of misinformation, but only when the labels were prominently displayed. A separate study from the Election Integrity Partnership, a consortium of prominent disinformation researchers, found that labeling was inconsistent and that tech platforms failed to prominently show the labels in search results. Since the Ukraine war began, Twitter has added more prominent labels, saying the move has reduced the reach of Russian propaganda by 30 percent. But some advocates said transparency measures are insufficient in the face of China’s global disinformation campaign, and called on the tech giants to do more. “When there is clear disinformation targeted at foreign populations, the tech companies have a perfectly legitimate moral case for limiting or removing that propaganda,” said Imran Ahmed, chief executive of CCDH, which has researched Chinese state media. Not all companies have embraced the same level of transparency. TikTok, whose parent company ByteDance is Chinese-owned, started its first pilot project to label a few dozen Russian state outlets last month, and the company has plans to start labeling Chinese outlets. Researchers say state propaganda probably has a massive presence on its service — but it is difficult to detect with such limited labels and without providing researchers the ability to review the platform’s data. The company it is still developing a state media policy. Rather than adopting ad hoc policies during an emergency like the Ukraine war, platforms should have distinguished long ago between media outlets run by authoritarian governments and outlets, such as PBS or the BBC, that receive support from democratic governments, said Alex Stamos, director of the Stanford Internet Observatory, which is a member of the Election Integrity Partnership. Stamos, who once was Facebook’s chief security officer, argued that social media companies should not give a megaphone to state media outlets from countries, such as China, where free speech is suppressed. Russia would now also fall into that category, he said. “This is the time," Stamos said, “for the tech platforms to finally create rules about state media run by authoritarian governments.”

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **ISIS** › Memetic Warfare Extensions

Memetic warfare and awareness can be used to counter disinformation

Tom Ascott 20 – Ascott is a writer at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. (“How memes are becoming the new frontier of information warfare,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 02-19-20, , Accessed 07-15-22, LASA-KK)

Memes might appear as if they’re just little pranks kids play online, yet they’re anything but. In the 2016 US presidential election, many memes were made by a Russian troll farm to influence the outcome. It wasn’t an isolated incident, either—now troll farms are popping up more frequently. In November last year, an undercover reporter revealed a new one in Poland. The memes it’s producing focus on ‘the aviation and defence industries, and target key decision-makers involved in the awarding of major government defence contracts’. The memeing, it has transpired, was political.

Those memes were a form of information warfare, or what would have been thought of in the past as a psychological operation. Information warfare is often about waging an influence campaign that can change behaviour through ‘unconventional means’, such as social media. Memes play a part in a specific type of information warfare dubbed ‘memetic warfare’.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **ISIS** › Memetic Warfare Extensions

Current strategic communications fail – NATO allies must work together to embrace memetic warfare to counter ISIS and Russia

Jeff Giesea 16 – Giesea is an entrepreneur who has written many papers for NATO. (“It’s time to embrace memetic warfare,” NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 3-1-16, , Accessed 7-17-22, LASA-KK)

The term ‘memetic warfare’ has come into use on the fringes of foreign policy thinkers in the last five years to describe these types of efforts. I believe memetic warfare could be effective in countering Daesh’s recruiting and propaganda efforts and in modern conflict in general, including operations other than war. Trolling, it might be said, is the social media equivalent of guerrilla warfare, and memes are its currency of propaganda. Daesh is conducting memetic warfare. The Kremlin is doing it. It’s inexpensive. The capabilities exist. Why aren’t we trying it?

It’s no secret that the U.S. and NATO allies have done a poor job combating Daesh on social media thus far. In June 2015, the U.S. State Department conducted an internal assessment of its communications efforts that admitted that the NATO-led coalition is losing the social media war with Daesh. Existing efforts like the ‘Think Again, Turn Away’ campaign have proven ineffective against the tide of outreach coming the other way. By mid-2015 there were an estimated 30,000 foreign Daesh combatants, with the majority coming from NATO countries. Experts say Daesh’s recruiting is reaching ‘network effect’ velocity, and much of it is conducted through Twitter, YouTube, and other social media. The need to counter Daesh’s communications onslaught is urgent.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **ISIS** › Memetic Warfare Extensions

A NATO memetic warfare strategy is essential to combat false narratives and constantly adapt to new information warfare developments

Matthew Schleupner 20 – Schleupner is a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer with a focus on Russia and Eastern Europe and holds a master’s degree in international policy, political science, and law. (“The Power of Memes,” George C. Marshall Center, April 2020, , Accessed 07-17-22, LASA-KK)

Strategic messaging in the security space should be viewed as a debate rather than a conversation. There needs to be an aggressiveness to it that seeks to control the narrative space, much like an infantry battalion seeks to hold ground. At the same time, there must be an awareness that ethical standards preclude democracies from creating a traditional Soviet-style propaganda system. Rather, better ways must be sought for spreading the truth in these modern times. At a time when attention spans are shorter because of technology, and the amount of available information has dramatically expanded, NATO needs to redefine the way it works in the memetic space. It understands the problem; it just isn’t very good at trying to solve it. This involves a reframing of NATO’s mindset and that of its member states. NATO as an institution, along with its member states, can begin or improve this with three easy steps.

1. Get on social media

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **ISIS** › ISIL Extensions

ISIS declared it will use disinformation to divide and defeat enemies

Bridget Johnson 22 – Bridget Johnson is a terrorism analyst and editor at Homeland Security Today. (“ISIS Declares ‘Duty’ and ‘War Policy’ to Deploy Disinformation as a Weapon,” Homeland Security Today, 5-6-22, https://www.hstoday.us/featured/isis-declares-duty-and-war-policy-to-deploy-disinformation-as-a-weapon/, Accessed 7-17-22, LASA-KK)

Disseminating disinformation is a “duty” of jihadists in order to deceive and ultimately divide their foes and should be considered “part of the war policy,” ISIS Khorasan declared in a new issue of the group’s English-language magazine.

The article in the fifth issue of Voice of Khurasan on making the use of media and psychological warfare a core tenet of their game plan comes after the group recently emphasized that “social media warfare” is a critical part of their strategy.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **ISIS** › ISIL Extensions

ISIL uses information warfare to spread its influence – makes it harder to govern

Chan Kung 21 - Kung is an expert in information analysis and public policy (“Features of ISIS’ Information Warfare,” Modern Diplomacy, 11-11-21, 7-14-21, LASA-KK)

In the field of information and anti-terrorism, a major concern is the impact of the Internet. The Internet has accelerated the flow of information, and the boundary of truth and falsehood are at times, indistinguishable. At the same time, social conditions can be exaggerated online. Combined with the psychological activities and circumstances of the masses, it is extremely easy to create a larger scale of dissatisfaction which will, to a certain extent, lead to the collapse of the original social ideological and belief systems. The United States and Western countries ignoring the social and stage of countries and regions in the Mediterranean region, Africa, and the Middle East and Central Asian countries, blindly export their ideology, and driven by the amplification effect of the Internet, this process of collapse has been accelerated. A terrorist organization such as ISIS has harnessed the great potentials offered by the Internet, and as such, it laid the foundation for the large-scale development of ISIS’s information warfare. First of all, the Islamic State has established a professional public relations organization, responsible for producing and disseminating content. ISIS has its homepage and accounts on major social networking sites, and even has multi-layered sub-accounts, thereby evading censorship. They launched DABIQ, an attractively designed online magazine with extremely provocative content, and developed a smartphone app called Dawn of Glad Tidings, focusing on the Western “high-end customer base” as their target group to inform them of the latest “news of jihad in real-time”. In addition, the Islamic State has also launched the online game, which creates scenarios for players to attack the U.S. military, police, and civilians, and rewards criminal acts and even terrorist attacks in the game. Today, ISIS can be seen almost on all social media platforms and is accessible in Western countries. It has thousands of accounts on Twitter alone, including both organized public accounts and terrorist personal accounts. ISIS is proficient in the so-called “viral marketing” model in information warfare. Through the user’s network, the information spreads like a virus and spreads to thousands of audiences using rapid replication. The organizer clearly achieves the word-of-mouth “relationship marketing” by providing a certain product or service, allowing others to become “marketing and communication levers” inadvertently. ISIS is often far more professional and sensitive than the government departments of various countries that hold the power of national governance. It has long been keenly aware of the evolution of political discourse from propaganda to information dissemination in contemporary society, and this trend is one of the keys that is enabling it to lead public opinion. Traditional propaganda methods such as sermons and speeches, obviously, lack interaction with the target audience. Therefore, ISIS encourages followers to use various websites as platforms to establish various forms of “self-media”. ISIS also cultivate Internet influencers to encourage netizens to create audio messages, videos and even websites. As ISIS cleverly hides its ambitions behind high-level productions and attractive propaganda, more and more people in the West, especially young people, have been successfully brainwashed, are actively participating in the dissemination of ISIS-related information, even going to the Middle East to become jihadists on the battlefield and gain the satisfaction of realizing their supposed self-worth. This kind of information warfare was so successful that in 2016, the official website of Tsinghua University in China was hacked by ISIS hackers where ISIS recruitment advertisements were posted. In the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has found cases where teenagers as young as 15 years old were recruited by ISIS, and in some cases in the United States, parents even encouraged their children to participate in terrorist organizations. In fact, the information warfare of ISIS is very active and successful not only in Western countries but also in Turkey and Syria. As a result, ISIS has obtained the human resources of thousands of sacrificial young people. The information society and the Internet have created a huge imbalance for the future world, making this world an unbalanced world and a world in transition. The formation of various transnational virtual organizations is now possible using simple network tools. This also means that terrorist organizations like ISIS cannot theoretically be eliminated at all. They can easily evolve into virtualized organizations that exist everywhere and can be found by search engines at any time due to the ubiquity of the information society and the Internet. They will continue to grow, gain popularity, and evolve into a new type of network-based anti-government organization. Terrorist organizations of various types have shifted their focus from the real world to the virtual world, and then back again. This is the enormous governance challenge that the information society will undoubtedly face in the future. Final analysis conclusion: Although ISIS faces restrictions as it is a terrorist organization, it has used the information society and the Internet to launch successful information warfare and has achieved remarkable results worldwide. In an age of information asymmetry, simple and easy network tools have made it possible to establish a variety of transnational virtual organizations. This will pose a huge governance challenge to the future information society.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **ISIS** › ISIL Extensions

That leads to ISIL recruitment that radicalizes and polarizes the west

Eirik Hognestad 17 – Hognestad has a Master of Military Art and Science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (“NATO Cohesion: The Threat Posed by ISIL,” US Army Command and General Staff College, 06-14-19, 07-10-22, LASA-KK)

ISIL seeks to polarize Western and Muslim Communities. The intention of this goal is related to ISIL’s goal of mobilizing potential supporters both in their core areas and globally. By taking “leadership” against Western or external involvement, ISIL is probably seeking to stand out as an attractive, dynamic, and strong organization for rebel movements and terrorist organizations globally. Hence, ISIL seeks to use this objective for recruiting new members and thereby new combat forces. The instruments for achieving the goal are international terrorism, polarizing communication, and delinquency in the form of sectarian violence. By using violent means such as brutal executions that are broadcasted, ISIL sends a message that their actions could potentially hit anyone. ISIL seeks to create fear in the people of Europe and the West for the purpose of indirectly influencing European and Western governments. To achieve this, any mobilized supporter who supports ISIL’s ideology can use a weapon he or she has at hand to attack random or selected targets in Europe. The fact that ISIL deliberately uses extreme violence made the world look when the American journalist James Foley was brutally beheaded, and the video was posted on youtube in 2014 entitled “A Message to America.” The title itself indicates that the message is directed to the entire United States, not just to the governments but to society as a whole. After the decapitation of Foley, 55 ISIL has repeatedly directed bestial and barbaric executions and published these through various media with the same kind of message. The actions in the videos evoke conflicting and different feelings in people. The sense of fear for the barbaric is undeniably awakened intentionally, but feelings such as disgust, empathy for the victims and aggression against ISIL as predators are also prominent. Based on Abrahm’s (2006) theory that terrorism’s actions are unable to communicate a strategic message, one can suggest that if the message ISIL wants to communicate is rooted in the far enemy strategy, the strategic message will drown in the effects of the violence. But at the same time, ISIL succeeds in provoking a polarizing message through this type of communication, which intends to mobilize supporters (Byman 2015, 178). There are several factors that point out that this is exactly what ISIL wants to achieve. The actions are perceived by the West as bestial, medieval, and represent a view of value and humanity that violates all legal, cultural and ethical perception and legitimacy seen in Western eyes. Thus, ISIL becomes an outgroup from the western in-group, and the polarization of “us” and “they” is a fact. We, therefore, see that ISIL not only wants to provoke polarizing conflict lines and a sectarian struggle in the Muslim population but also between itself and the Western world. The purpose is so much like the polarization of Muslim societies; eliminate the gray zone and mobilize supporters to increase their combat power. The final state of this strategic sub-goal is achieved when ISIL has polarized the world map into two groups; “The forces of faith and the forces of atheism,” which gives a clear enemy image and sets the framework for a sectarian struggle between the groups.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **ISIS** › ISIL Extensions

Absent collective action against ISIL’s information operations, ISIL will exploit divisions within NATO

Eirik Hognestad 17 – Hognestad has a Master of Military Art and Science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (“NATO Cohesion: The Threat Posed by ISIL,” US Army Command and General Staff College, 06-14-19, , Accessed 07-10-22, LASA-KK)

ISIL does not have the military power to pose a military threat to NATO. However, as earlier discussed and reflected in the COG analysis, NATO’s weakness is within the organization itself. The question is therefore if ISIL has the capability and intention to exploit the internal critical vulnerabilities directly or indirectly. Different narratives of the threat from ISIL and threat priorities feed into the different member states national strategies, and therefore the political will to commit military and diplomatic power to fight ISIL. Therefore, if ISIL should exploit one of NATO’s critical vulnerabilities, the most dangerous Course of Action (COA) is to use ways and means that will drive a wedge between the different national strategies among the member states. One way of doing this will be to target the narrative of the threat perception of the terror organization. An approach leaning against the “near enemy” strategy may thus be a wise strategy from ISIL’s view because the further away the threat is, the less dangerous it is felt. Thus, it affects the dynamic relationship between the government, the military forces and the population of the different member states. As a result, political will may thus be affected in three ways: 1) the perseverance to continue to send troops and military hardware to ISIL’s core areas when ISIL is not a threat towards the member states, 2) legitimacy to priority funding for a threat that is felt less dangerous than others, and 3) legitimacy of the risk involved in taking casualties. Even though one may argue that reduced political will to fight ISIL is not a threat towards NATO itself, failed concurrence of threat priority is because it affects the cohesion that the alliance is built upon as a source of power. Hence, if one or more member states fails to recognize the threat towards other member states, and thus refuse to commit to the common defense, the alliance may start to disintegrate. Therefore, if ISIL targets one particular member state and focuses all its power against it, the narrative of ISIL as a threat may differ. It may lead to a decline in the mental interoperability that NATO’s cohesion depends on because other member states are more concerned by nearpeer threats such as Russia, China or Iran. This leads to different priorities for use of NATO’s power among the member states and thereby creates internal friction in the alliance. To illustrate; the Eurobarometer survey of 2018 showed a decrease in support for combating terrorism from 41% in April 2018 to 30% five months later, which is a significant reduction from the previous surveys where terrorism issues were at the top of Europeans’ concerns (European Parliament 2018, 68). Only the United Kingdom believed that the fight against terrorism should be one of Parliament’s #1 priority (38%). Among the other member states, “results show a general and significant decline of the number of respondents asking for this policy to be a top priority, led by Italy -19 (29%), Portugal -18 (28%) and Spain -18 (25%)” (European Parliament 2018, 68). As the example shows, NATO members differ widely in the perception of the priority to combat terrorism. Further, the feeling of an unequal share of the burden through participation and funding/investment creates tension within the alliance that may be exploited. The feeling of threat relates to the passion in the population and thus political will to prioritize resources to reduce the threat, to include both human resources (troops), military capabilities, and economical funding. These national resources need to be prioritized against other national strategies on the political agenda. Therefore, a feeling of inequality and unfair share of burden within NATO creates friction and discontent because all 81 member states need to balance their resources to reach their strategical ends to develop their nations according to their political programs and policies. The core of the NATO alliance is common defense, and thus if the feeling of “common” is not met, the passion to support the NATO alliance in the population is reduced which affects political will. By targeting the feeling of inequality of the Alliance, ISIL may disturb the internal cohesion of NATO. Means such as Information Operations directed at specific member states to affect the narrative of the threat from ISIL may lead to different threat perspectives within the Alliance. Further, selectively targeting certain military capabilities and soldiers to increase casualties for a specific member state may affect the population’s support and political will to maintain the use of resources for CT purposes. With the strategic shift to operate within the framework of the “Near Enemy” strategy, and by increasing IO campaigns to include poetry, community projects and religious preaching in contrast to the brutal propaganda acts the world witnessed between 2014-16, ISIL may change the narrative of the group with regards to both the global Muslim community and NATO members. The reduction of violent and bloody propaganda may be appealing to Muslims that, until now, have shied away from ISIL’s brutality, and it may affect the different member states’ perception of the group as a threat. Hence, exploitation of NATO’s critical vulnerabilities related to threat perception may result in different national narratives and priorities of political will and support of the populace. As a result, NATO’s attitude related to perseverance and legitimacy may differ within the different member states, leading to different national strategies prevailing above NATO’s political will. This may lead to a break of the trust upon which 82 the alliance rests, and ultimately the cohesion among the member states. Hence, the COG of NATO may be affected by ISIL.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **ISIS** › 2AC ISIS Add-On

NATO can use meme warfare to counter ISIS recruitment narratives

Robbie Gramer 17 – Gramer reports on diplomacy and national security for Foreign Policy. (“Can NATO Weaponize Memes?,” Foreign Policy, 04-13-17, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/13/nato-cyber-information-warfare-battle-of-ideas-memes-internet-culture/, Accessed 07-17-22, LASA-KK)

But if the most powerful political-military alliance has the real battlefield on lockdown, some worry it’s floundering in the battlefield of the internet, where ideas go to clash, Kremlin trolls go to spread half-truths, and ISIS goes to recruit foreign fighters.

The answer, some experts argue, lies in memes — those strange jokes and references that come out of the internet’s woodworks from seemingly nowhere, and seem to end up everywhere at once. A small contingent of academics and experts want NATO to get in on the action to confront pro-Russian, anti-NATO trolls, or to push back against internet jihadists in the cyber space.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **ISIS** › 2AC ISIS Add-On

Terrorist attacks cause nuclear retaliation

Ayson 10 [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies, Director of Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Senior Research Associate with Oxford’s Centre for International Studies. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2010, pages 571-593]

Washington's early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents' … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that …might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **ISIS** › 2AC ISIS Add-On

ISIS uses misinformation to drive recruitment of home-based fighters that increase the prevalence and frequency of attacks

Bruno Lete, senior fellow at The German Marshall Fund of the United States in Brussels, 2022, “Stopping ISIS from Luring People into Terrorism”, GMFUS, [AWV]

The self-proclaimed Islamic State group has revolutionized the way terrorist organizations recruit people. Where in the past jihadist groups would spend months approaching, evaluating, and radicalizing potential recruits, ISIS succeeded to combine old-fashioned ways of communication, internet-based technologies, and an understanding of the global audience to accelerate a very effective pattern of support. Indeed, it should not only be the broad extent of their reach that should worry us, but also the speed at which they are able to recruit new fighters.

But why would a person feel excited by the things ISIS is doing? Why do they pro-actively seek to offer support, and are often ready to sacrifice their own life to advance the terrorist cause? A recent publication by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence sheds new insights on how ISIS lures people into terrorism.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **European Populism** › 2AC Populism Add-On

Democratic backsliding causes the replacement of democratic instutions and leaders with populist ones which increases the chances of nuclear dangers and hurts international order

Oliver Meier 21 – Oliver Meier is the ACA International Represenative and senior researcher with the Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. ("Upsetting the nuclear order: how the rise of nationalist populism increases nuclear dangers," Taylor & Francis, 12-16-2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2020.1864932, Accessed 7-14-2022, LASA-KS)

Nationalist populists as leaders of states that possess nuclear weapons undermine the nuclear order and increase nuclear dangers in novel, significant, and persistent ways. Such leaders talk differently about nuclear weapons; they can put nuclear policy making and crisis management in disarray; and they can weaken international alliances and multilateral nuclear institutions. The rise of nationalist populists in nuclear-armed states, including some of the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, shatters the presumed distinction between responsible and irresponsible nuclear powers and complicates attempts to heal rifts in the international order. Policies to wait out populists or to balance their influence in multilateral institutions seem to have had limited success. A sustainable strategy to deal with the challenge posed by populists would need to start by recognizing that we can no longer assume that nuclear weapons are safe in the hands of some states but not in others’. Introduction The rise of nationalist populists1 to power in nuclear-armed states and their allies is undermining the nuclear order and raising the risks of nuclear war. That populists such as Boris Johnson, Narendra Modi, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump were able to take charge of nuclear arsenals, including in some of the nuclear powers recognized under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), challenges the assumption that established nuclear-weapon states behave responsibly. Nationalist populism,2 understood as a nationalist, anti-elitist, illiberal, and anti-pluralist set of ideas and politics conducted in the supposed interests of “the people”—that is, the domestic constituencies of the nationalist-populist leaders—has been on the rise globally since the mid-2000s. It has come to include the leadership of a growing number of countries3 and has begun to influence the effectiveness of time-honored institutions of the nuclear order. We argue that this rise of nationalist populists and their foreign and defense policies weakens the nuclear order in novel, significant, and persistent ways. Three characteristics are typical of nationalist populists’ nuclear policies: they talk differently about nuclear weapons; they have a specific way of getting involved in national decision making on nuclear-weapon issues; and their approach to international alliances and institutions is unique. The fact that nationalist-populist leaders have assumed control over nuclear weapons in countries at the core of the nuclear order shatters the presumed distinction between “responsible” and “irresponsible” nuclear powers. These leaders threaten the nuclear order built on the principled acceptance of a logic of restraint by the nuclear-weapon states. Although it highlights the risks associated with populists’ control over nuclear weapons, this article does not aspire to a radical critique of the nuclear order.4 Our aim is to show that the rise of populists to the centers of power in nuclear-armed states challenges prevailing presumptions about nuclear risks and how they are to be managed. The view that a few responsible nuclear-armed states guard against irresponsible behavior by states mostly peripheral to the nuclear order is no longer defensible, if it ever was. Nationalist populists thus starkly expose the dangers intrinsically linked to nuclear weapons, regardless of regime type and the position of nuclear-weapon possessors in the international system. We understand nationalist populists to be leaders who claim to implement policies to defend the interests of their constituencies, which they brand as “the people,” against supposed foreign and internal elites in order to bolster national sovereignty. Nationalist-populist leaders who had or have nuclear weapons under their control include former US President Donald Trump, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Russian President Vladimir Putin.5 We concentrate our analysis on these four nationalist-populist leaders, who have shaped foreign and defense policies—and particularly nuclear-weapon policies—in key nuclear-possessor states.6 The 2016 election of Donald Trump, a populist by any measure, is of particular significance, since the United States has consistently been the state with the largest ability to uphold and strengthen the institutions and practices that underpin the nuclear order. Former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and Prime Minister Imran Khan of Pakistan are also nationalist populists. Israel, however, has a policy of nuclear opacity, under which it does not acknowledge possession of nuclear weapons.7 This made it impossible for Netanyahu to openly use nuclear weapons as a policy instrument in the same manner as other populists do. In Pakistan, the civilian leadership has only limited influence over nuclear-weapon policies because nuclear command and control rests with the armed forces.8 Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un are also often described as populists.9 Both leaders frequently use nationalist rhetoric, which resembles the populists’ style. However, we do not classify either as a nationalist populist because they do not rely on an internal in-group versus out-group dichotomy to justify their leadership. In autocratic regimes, such as those in China and North Korea, the leader holds absolute power and does not need to appeal to popular sovereignty or to employ other populist strategies. In France, the Front National, now Rassemblement National, is an influential nationalist-populist movement. Opposition leader Marine Le Pen has promised to “restore the full meaning of the ‘force de frappe’” and reinvigorate national sovereignty through nuclear deterrence.10 A populist turn in French nuclear policies therefore remains a distinct possibility. In two of the five nations that host US nuclear weapons under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, populists are in power (Turkey) or part of a government (Italy). In a third host nation, Belgium, a right-wing populist party has very recently been part of the government. In Germany, until the September 2021 parliamentary elections, a right-wing populist party was the strongest parliamentary opposition party.11 While populism, and particularly nationalist populism, has been on the rise in nuclear-armed states, three major developments in the background have reshaped the nuclear order. We understand this order to be characterized by the continuous search for accommodation between the goals of nuclear disarmament, on the one hand, and stability based on nuclear-deterrence relationships, on the other hand, through a policy of restraint and responsible behavior, particularly by the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the NPT.12 First, a more multipolar logic has begun to replace the primarily bipolar Cold War nuclear structure. In particular, the rise of new challengers to US hegemony has produced new power constellations.13 Second, new actors, including transnational non-state groups, are challenging the predominance of governments and pose new threats, particularly if those actors strive to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Third, the emergence of new military technologies has weakened strategic stability. For example, the entanglement of novel conventional and nuclear warfighting capabilities threatens to destabilize long-standing mutual-deterrence relationships, particularly between Russia and the United States, on the one hand, and between China and the United States, on the other hand.14 All three developments, and the interrelations among them, already are increasing nuclear dangers and unsettling the existing nuclear-deterrence relationships. The rise of nationalist populism and populists to power is a recent fourth development that adds to and amplifies these risks. Our examination of the impact of the rise of nationalist populism on the nuclear order meshes with the attention given in academic literature to the role of individuals in nuclear policies. The recent shift toward the first image (that is, the analysis of international relations focusing on the impact of individual leaders as opposed to an analysis at the level of states or the international system)15 is associated with an investigation of how the perceptions and preferences of specific personality types have altered national nuclear policies and the nuclear order. We add to this literature by considering a specific type of leader, the nationalist populist, and his (rarely her) influence on nuclear issues. The role of populism in foreign and defense policy, and particularly on nuclear policies, is seldom treated as a distinct phenomenon. This research gap has not been filled by issue-, country-, or region-specific investigations of the causes and effects of populism, which are more interested in how individual leaders have addressed particular issues than in the broad implications of the rise of nationalist populism.16 Our conception of nationalist populism overlaps with Jacques Hymans’s description of the “oppositional nationalist.”17 Hymans makes a convincing case that this type of leader has a particular affinity for nuclear weapons. However, where Hymans is interested in how leadership traits influence the decision to acquire nuclear weapons, we focus on policies affecting established nuclear arsenals. There is also a difference in framing between our idea of nationalist populism and Hymans’s notion of national-identity conceptions. The concept of “nation” is central to both frames. Yet populists equate the nation with their core domestic constituencies (and perhaps their own selves), while oppositional nationalists mostly view the nation-state as an entity in relation to other nations. Both view politics as the manifestation of an us-versus-them struggle. But nationalist populists and oppositional nationalists have different notions of the “us” (the people/nation) and different concepts of “them” (elites, other people/other nations).18 In our analysis, the Trump administration receives more attention than other nationalist-populist leaderships. This imbalance reflects the extraordinary amount of writing on an atypical US president. A focus on Trump is justified, since the United States remains the most important actor in the nuclear order. Also, Trump is often described as a prototypical populist19 who has inspired others to follow his lead and has generally increased the impact of populists in other countries. With Trump now out of office, this is a good time to take stock of his administration’s impact on the nuclear order: “Trump’s presidency offers, for good or ill, an excellent laboratory to examine whether and to what extent the assumption of government power by populists translates into foreign policy change.”20 We also consider the roles of other nationalist-populist leaders within the nuclear order and offer some observations on the implications of the rise of this phenomenon for nuclear disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation. We hope to provide a number of tentative arguments and conclusions about the distinct, dangerous, and often strange ways that populists are shaping the nuclear order. Populist foreign and defense policy To examine the influence of populism on foreign and defense policy, the idea of populism itself requires definition, or at least approximation. Populism is a fuzzy concept. At the most basic level, populists present themselves as atypical leaders from outside the establishment. Populists like to tell a story of how they are virtually predestined to represent and empower a silent and politically neglected majority (which they label as “the people”). But populism is neither a full-fledged political ideology nor simply a political or rhetorical style. It is rather a “thin-centered ideology.”21 Populism is inherently difficult to pin down, since populists want to maintain maximum flexibility to apply their ideas to, or combine them with, other ideologies—right, left, or drawing upon both—regardless of the underlying political system. The notion of a populist foreign and defense policy is equally hard to delineate. Leaders’ foreign policies reflect their personal characteristics and political behavior, how they interpret the world and their role in it, how they make decisions, and how they interact with others.22 As Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack state, “It is individuals who build the alliances, and create the threats that maintain or destroy balances of power.”23 Populist leadership is especially personalistic; a populist leader’s beliefs and decisions can be assumed to be more influential in shaping foreign and defense policies than those of other leaders. Nationalism, as one of the possible host ideologies of populism, adds another layer. Nationalist and populist discourses overlap; what the nation is to the nationalist, “the people” is to the populist. The concepts of sovereignty and self-determination drive both discourses, but they affect foreign and defense policies through different mechanisms. In principle, there is a clear delineation between a given nation and all other nations. The populists’ idea of “the people” is vaguer. Populists use this ambiguous construct to evoke a group (their “base”) within a polity, juxtaposing it with “elites” at the top. According to populists, these elites are outside the group of the “real” or “true” people. Populist politicians boast about not being part of the elite class (a claim that is rarely true, in economic or educational terms) and thus claim to speak and act in the name of the people from within their ranks, implying that only they can genuinely represent them.24 Nationalist populists not only claim to speak for “the people” but also presume to define the nation. They fuse inward-looking populist discourse with a more outward-oriented nationalist ideology. This shift in the frame of reference portrays the elites as depriving the people of their sovereignty both at home and abroad.25 As Jordan Kyle and Brett Meyer put it, “foreign policy is often collateral damage of populists’ divisive approach to domestic politics.”26 We identify the following characteristics of external policies pursued by nationalist populist leaderships: Polarization. “Us versus them” is the predominant discourse. Restraint, empathy, and compromise are anathema.27 Romanticizing of the historical past. Populists want to revive the “national missions” of their own countries.28 Personalistic leadership. Political authority rests primarily with a single person, often the head of a movement,29 rather than within structures and institutions. Foreign and defense policies are extensions of domestic policy debates. The leader’s political messaging is direct, with “the people,” often via social or new media, while ignoring established channels of interaction with the broader public.30 National sovereignty. Populists view alliances and international institutions as constraining the freedom of nation-states.31 The short-term, narrow interest of the nation is the sole yardstick of success.32 Iconoclasm. Populists want to dismantle international organizations, which they view as the instruments of circles of elites who support international cooperation and integration. They reject cultural and economic globalization and free trade.33 These criteria do not represent a comprehensive account of the nationalist-populist phenomenon, and the checklist is not exhaustive. Some of these traits could also apply to non-populist foreign and defense policies. Nevertheless, taken together, these features of the nationalist-populist approach to international policy issues capture a unique, identifiable phenomenon: if a leader walks like a populist, talks like a populist, and acts like a populist, then he or she most likely is a populist (see Figure 1). Here to stay: the proliferation of populism The rise of nationalist populists to power in nuclear-weapon states is a phenomenon worthy of in-depth analysis for three reasons. First, the development is of an unprecedented scale globally. A recent overview found that there are “more populist leaders and parties in power than at almost any time in history.”34 Individuals and their beliefs and preferences, along with external systemic factors, shape foreign-policy decisions and interactions among states. However, how and to what degree populists influence nuclear policies varies between countries. Populists have risen to power in democracies, electoral autocracies,35 and other hybrid regimes. Depending on the political system, their influence may be constrained by other branches of government and by actors, such as private companies, whose interests may be inconsistent with a populist agenda. Generally speaking, the individual leader has the greatest influence on a state’s decisions and behavior in personalistic systems. By contrast, the checks and balances of pluralistic systems often constrain democratically elected leaders. Even there, however, nationalist populists increase their influence by constantly chipping away at the core values, principles, and procedures of liberal democracy, such as separation of powers, rule of law, political representation, and individual rights and freedoms.36 Second, nationalist populists have risen to power in three of the five nuclear-weapon states. The significance of that development for the nuclear order is particularly great, since these five states bear a special responsibility for maintaining and improving that order and international peace generally.37 In their parallel role as the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, their consent is necessary for enforcement of compliance with the NPT and other multilateral regimes. Their willingness to forgo nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, or their lack of willingness, sets examples for other, less influential states. In the past, Western leaders often dismissed populism as a problem of less developed countries.38 At the same time, nuclear establishments saw the peace movement and other grassroots movements as populist—that is, non-elite groups that were challenging elitist policies supposedly based on rationality and stability.39 To be sure, the time for finger pointing is over. “Populism has not just risen in emerging democracies with weaker political parties and institutions but in systemically important democracies with long institutional histories like the United States and India,” as Kyle and Meyer observe.40 Few if any states now appear to be immune to populist challenges. Consequently, the assumption that the established nuclear-weapon states can protect the nuclear order from less responsible challengers must be revised. Third, populism is here to stay. To be sure, populism is not a new phenomenon, and populists have challenged the nuclear order before in various ways.41 Today’s populism, additionally, is fueled by the perceived inability of states and institutions to attend to the political, economic, and cultural consequences of the global economic crisis of 2008, as well as the increase in xenophobia following the increase in conflict-induced flight and migration into Europe since 2015.42 In the context of “crises of political representation engendered by dislocations caused by globalization and other shifts in international politics” and as a “reaction to concurrent political and economic crises in a rapidly denationalized and deterritorialized world,”43 the rise of populism has been a reaction to perceived insecurity, inequality, depoliticization, and economic stagnation. As a result, a rise of illiberalism and a wave of autocratization can be observed.44 Nationalist populists have come to power in the shadow of the crisis of the liberal international order, benefiting from the crisis and perpetuating it. The impact of nationalist populism is going to stay with us, likely beyond the lifetime of individual nationalist-populist governments. That is partly because the leaders have begun to paralyze, reshape, and dismantle existing bureaucracies. Nationalist populists define themselves as being anti-elitist (even if they themselves are members of the elite). Once they occupy the seats of power, national populists co-opt, exchange, or sideline old elites. The resulting reshuffle in the foreign and defense apparatuses sometimes resembles a purge and can lead to dramatic discontinuities in expertise. It will take time to repair the damage done to governance structures and to heal the wounds caused by political polarization. In the nuclear world, this destabilization of institutions is particularly significant. The nationalist-populist assault weakens the influence of those who are supposed to act as “guardians of the arsenals.” The influence of nationalist-populist leaders on nuclear-weapon policies also has grown.45 When it comes to nuclear-weapon use, the dangers posed by nationalist populists are stark because in most nuclear-weapon states the head of state or government has the legal authority to order the use of nuclear weapons. But there are different shades of gray. In nuclear-armed states with presidential systems (France, Russia, and the United States), launch authority “clearly rests in the hands of one single person,” while in those with parliamentary systems (India, Israel, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom), “the decision to launch a nuclear strike would necessarily not be the sole authority of one individual, even if it is ‘legally’ (i.e. on paper).”46 Three ways populists change the nuclear order Against this background of the characteristics of populists’ foreign and defense policies and the diffusion of populism into nuclear powers’ decision-making centers, we describe three relevant causal mechanisms through which nationalist populists influence the nuclear order. First, nationalist populists have a different way of speaking. “[T]he specific style of rhetoric used by the populists involves adversarial, emotional, patriotic, and abrasive speech through which they connect with the discontented often via grassroots, community-oriented, communicative practices and spaces.”47 For nationalist populists, the domestic audience is the most important recipient of any messaging; everything is said with a communicative purpose to please “the people,” to secure their approval and votes and therefore to retain power. Second, nationalist populists have a particular way of making decisions, sometimes reflective of the fact that delineating “the people” from an “elite” is a constitutive element of populism. Whereas usually a small and closed group of experts and officials prepares and executes decisions in foreign and defense policy, the policy style of nationalist populists is a peculiar mix of laissez-faire on routine issues and very visible leadership when the stakes are high. As Kyle and Gultchin argue, populists seek to convince their supporters that they “see and acknowledge the crisis and that their strong leadership alone can fix it.”48 Third, nationalist populists have a distinct perspective on the international order. They view the world through a “great-power” lens that is consistent with the “realist” logic of foreign and defense policy. At the same time, nationalist populists reject the notion of an international order based on and shaped by bilateral and multilateral agreements and treaties. This is partly because the rise of nationalist populism “has brought a new persona to the global stage—the iconoclast. This deliberate rule breaker disrupts the practice of international relations, a system that depends upon consensus around norms.”49 Talking about nuclear weapons As Alexey Arbatov has observed, “when it comes to nuclear weapons, words are deeds.”50 This is because nuclear weapons have been exploded in war only twice. All other “uses” of nuclear weapons have been limited to verbal actions, policy documents, deployment, testing, and other actions short of direct hostile use.51 Usually, nuclear messaging is the outcome of a careful and deliberate process. For example, heads of state or government typically speak about nuclear arsenals and nuclear strategy on the basis of carefully scripted and meticulously reviewed statements. Exegesis of nuclear-policy documents and speeches is the preoccupation of many nuclear analysts, based on the assumption that, especially in the nuclear world, leaders and officials have thoroughly weighed and consciously selected their words. Nationalist populists, by contrast, often speak loosely about nuclear weapons, which complicates a “reading” of their statements.52 This concerns both style and substance, which coincide with their personalistic style of leadership53 and their desire to flout the rules of what they deride as “political correctness.”54 Donald Trump has again led the way—for example, through his excessive tweeting on nuclear-weapon issues.55 Other nationalist populists have also deviated from previous rhetorical styles by bragging about their nuclear weapons. In April 2019, shortly after an escalation of the Pulwama crisis between India and Pakistan had been averted, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi suggested that his country was ready to use nuclear weapons against Pakistan: “Every other day they used to say ‘we have nuclear button, we have nuclear button’. What do we have then? Have we kept it for Diwali?”56 President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s October 2019 statement that it is unacceptable for Turkey not to have nuclear weapons because “[t]here is no developed nation in the world that doesn’t have them”57 is another typically populist statement, conflating strong views with half-truths or lies. Such loose talk may have several purposes. By emphasizing nuclear weapons, nationalist populists can set themselves apart from the established elite discourse. Donald Trump boasted of having gained knowledge of nuclear weapons not through a formal education but through his uncle, a professor of engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.58 Thus, the US president believed that he did not need to rely on the expertise and experience of the nuclear elite. This ignorance of nuclear lessons by virtue of not “being socialized to the dangers of nuclear weapons”59 derived from the past is a trademark of nationalist populists, but is also part and parcel of a general loss of expertise in executives and parliaments in nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-allied countries.60 Nationalist populists also like to make strong statements on nuclear issues because they may believe that this impresses their main target audience—that is, their domestic power base. Thus, Putin has several times used his regular direct encounters with the Russian public to highlight the importance of nuclear weapons for Moscow’s standing in the world. In March 2018, Putin, in his speech to the Federal Assembly of Parliamentarians, policy makers, religious leaders, public figures, and members of the media, boasted about Russia’s nuclear capabilities and in true populist fashion even invited “[t]hose interested in military equipment … to suggest a name for this new weaponry, this cutting-edge” nuclear-weapon system.61 And Modi made repeated reference to India’s nuclear weapons during the 2019 parliamentary election campaign. As one analyst observed, “The context of Modi’s remarks on nuclear weapons—election rallies—matter[s], of course. With a poor economic track record since 2014, the [Bharatiya Janata Party] has rightly decided to focus on what much of the Indian public perceives as a strength: its management of national security and defense.”62 In a similar vein, nationalist populists may bring religious motives into the nuclear discourse. Thus, Putin seems to believe that “Orthodoxy and the nuclear deterrent are equally important bulwarks of Russian statehood, guaranteeing the nation’s security internally, in the case of the church, and externally, in the case of the nuclear arsenal.”63 Talking about nuclear weapons primarily in order to impress the domestic power base—rather than external actors—can increase nuclear risks in various ways. Nationalist populists tend to trivialize nuclear risks while exaggerating the benefits of having nuclear weapons. This idealization of nuclear weapons can break down (verbal) barriers and incentivize other states to pursue nuclear weapons. The mixing of domestic and external audiences also may make it more difficult for third parties to judge the intentions behind strong statements. When Trump says that he wants to unleash “fire and fury” on North Korea, to whom is he talking?64 External observers may believe that signals are intended for domestic consumption—but they cannot be sure. Populist decision making on nuclear weapons In most nuclear-weapon states and under normal conditions, a small group of experts prepares decisions on the direction of nuclear-weapon policies.65 Routine nuclear policy making often remains remarkably unaffected by changes in political leadership. Secrecy and path dependencies complicate any precise analysis of the impact of the rise of nationalist populism on routine policy making. But a few tentative observations can be offered. Routine decision making on nuclear-weapon-related issues appears to remain mostly below the radar of most nationalist populists in power. The long, deliberative processes behind nuclear-weapon policies do not lead to the quick payoffs in public attention that nationalist populist leaders typically seek. From the perspective of the guardians of the arsenal—the group of “initiated” experts with relevant security clearances—there is little reason to change that. If and when nationalist populists get involved in policy making, their instincts usually favor greater reliance on nuclear weapons. But their unruly approach to politics is not very compatible with the inertia-driven approach of the nuclear establishment. Thus, at a briefing for him at the Defense Department on July 20, 2017, Trump reportedly asked why he didn’t have as many weapons as past presidents did, pointing out that the United States at the height of Cold War had had more than 30,000 nuclear weapons, as opposed to “only” a few thousand by 2017.66 Nationalist populists’ disinterest in and absence from routine policy making may empower officials with radical views. Nuclear doctrines are a case in point. Thus, the February 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) changed the trajectory of US nuclear-weapon policies by introducing new types of nuclear weapons. The NPR widened the scenarios under which nuclear weapons might be used, blurred boundaries between conventional and nuclear scenarios of warfighting, lowered the threshold for nuclear-weapon use, and shifted nuclear-weapon-deployment scenarios in the direction of warfare—that is, away from the idea that the only legitimate use of nuclear weapons is to deter existential threats.67 But “Trump had nothing to do with the [NPR]; it was written almost entirely inside the Pentagon, as previous reviews had been, with still less direction or input than usual from the White House,” as Fred Kaplan observed.68 So the changes can be explained partly by the “resurgence of the nuclear establishment” and its “convergence” with the rise of Trump.69 A similar hands-off attitude may explain the rash nuclear threats that Russian diplomats have issued against third countries. Such bullying appears to be possible only because the Kremlin provides the political space for it by justifying aggressive postures (and annexations) in nationalist terms.70 Thus, the hands-off approach of nationalist-populist leaders to routine issues can also have a disruptive effect on nuclear policies. While the outcome may resemble the policies of hawkish conservatives, the policy process leading to the outcome is markedly different. This difference is relevant to the effect of such policies: nationalist populists’ neglect of detail and their ignorance of strategy can make it harder for others to assess the significance of policy changes and associated messages. Thus, bringing the nationalist populists into decision making on nuclear policy also runs the risk of their instincts ruining and counteracting the results of previous policy making, again adding a degree of unpredictability. A prime example is the January 2019 US Missile Defense Review. The document itself is the product of a multi-year interagency process. One of the key questions was whether the review should revise US and NATO policies so that they would direct missile defenses against the threat of Russian long-range missiles. The potential use of Western missile defenses in that way is a central factor influencing Russian nuclear policies. The review itself did not result in such a change of policy.71 President Trump, however, presenting the review results at a January 17, 2019, press conference, contradicted US policy by stating, “Our strategy is grounded in one overriding objective: to detect and destroy every type of missile attack against any American target, whether before or after launch. When it comes to defending America, we will not take any chances. We will only take action. There is no substitute for American military might.”72 Predictably, Russia seized on the contradictions between policies coming out of the bureaucracy and statements by the president to argue that the Trump administration was seeking to attain military dominance and justify its own expansion of nuclear capabilities.73 Nationalist-populist grandstanding thus can have the indirect effect of paving the way for competitors to react by increasing their own nuclear capabilities. The impact of nationalist-populist decision making and “instincts” during nuclear crises is a particular cause for concern. Nationalist populists by nature tend to be risk takers, and their mistrust of their own nuclear establishments—which tend to be risk averse—may facilitate dangerous moves. Putin’s statements after the annexation of Crimea that Russia “was ready” to put nuclear forces on alert is an indication of his willingness to raise the stakes.74 Erdogan’s decision to cut off power to Incirlik Air Base, where about 50 US nuclear weapons are deployed, during the 2016 coup attempt against him is another example of ignorance of nuclear dangers during a crisis. For nationalist populists such as the Turkish president, the importance of securing the domestic power base overrides all other concerns about nuclear security.75

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **European Populism** › 2AC Populism Add-On

Democratic backsliding from Russia’s influence campaign is weaking NATO --- allows Russia to exploit the weaknesses and further undermine the coherence of the alliance

David Deulofeu AntúNez 18 – AntúNez was a former staff writer for the International Affairs Review. He studies and writes about security policy. ("NATO’s Trojan Horse: How Democratic Deconsolidation and Populism are Weakening the Alliance — THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW," INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW, 11-29-2018, https://www.iar-gwu.org/blog/2018/11/29/natos-trojan-horse-how-democratic-deconsolidation-and-populism-are-weakening-the-alliance, Accessed 7-13-2022, LASA-KS)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is facing an internal problem that coauld permanently weaken the Alliance. In recent years, we have seen the rise of a nationalist-populist wave in Europe and the United States: Viktor Orbán of Hungary, the Kaczynski in Poland, and President Donald Trump in America. This rise in illiberal world leaders has led to significant democratic backsliding in NATO countries, which pose a grave threat to NATO’s strength in the face of an aggressive and revisionist Russia. Democratic governance and strong institutions are as much a cornerstone of the Alliance as is collective defense. Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty (also known as the Washington Treaty) stresses the importance of “states’ promises to strengthen free institutions within their borders,” underscoring the vital democratic aspects of the alliance. Within NATO today, however, some states are shifting away from the core tenets of Article II and are actively conspiring to undermine the same institutional channels that brought them to power. These regressions of democracy create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by NATO adversaries, namely the Kremlin. In Hungary, Orbán’s increasingly authoritarian Fidesz government has taken an increasingly pro-Russia stance, doling out energy contracts to the country’s oligarchs and calling for Hungary to model itself a similarly to Russia’s illiberal state. In Turkey, the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdogan has resulted in members of the military being sacked and indiscriminate jailing of journalists and academics, while leaving no real opposition to his rule. This in turn has led to closer ties between Ankara and Moscow, especially in matters of defense and the ongoing Syrian civil war. Poland continues to see Russia as both an adversary and a threat; however, Poland’s judiciary reform has effectively turned the high court into a PiS puppet while media repression has simultaneously turned Poland into both a victim and purveyor of disinformation campaigns, further isolating it from its allies and European partners. Democratic backsliding and increased illiberal leaders in NATO countries have opened the door for Russia to engage in an influence campaign, and to pull those countries away from the Liberal Western Order the Alliance is founded on. Democratic backsliding weakens NATO internally by making cohesion, trust, and operations more difficult. Democracies tend to foster cooperation and trust; autocracies are always looking to blame “the other.” Within NATO, we are seeing bigger wedges being driven into member states, as illiberal regimes criticize their democratic allies, and democracies sanction authoritarian actions. Germany and the EU have become targets of the right-wing populist Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS/Law and Justice) government in Poland. The current government has sought to expunge any guilt the “Polish Nation” incurred during the Second World War by engaging in an aggressive revisionist campaign aimed at denying Poland’s participation in Nazi death camps. Furthermore, Poland’s attempt to sack its Constitutional Court and replace 27 justices with PiS loyalists has alienated it from France, Germany, and the European Commission, which opened an Article 7 investigation last year into Poland’s actions and is currently threatening to take legal action against it. Likewise, Hungary has taken an antagonistic stance with EU members and their efforts to promote rule of law. Budapest has been in an entrenched battle against the EU, in what Orbán has called “liberal forces acting against Central and Eastern European countries,” while actively opposing and restraining EU laws on immigration, entertaining anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, and curtailing individual freedoms within Hungary’s borders. The right-wing populism of both Poland and Hungary, with their villainization of minorities, suppression of dissent, crackdown on civil society, and erosion of democratic norms and institutions, puts them at odds with their NATO allies and EU partners, fostering uncertainty and deep mistrust among them. Poland and Hungary are not the only NATO members breaking down trust. Traditional allies have taken an unprecedented stance on NATO, one which brings its members uncertainty and lack of trust. President Donald Trump has been a vociferous critic of the Alliance, admonishing members for failing to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense while frequently highlighting the “lion’s share” the United States contributes. Trump has gone to the extent of questioning the alliance itself, asking, “What good is NATO…?” in a tweet. Apart from voicing criticism against NATO, Trump has repeatedly insulted NATO members and their leaders, while directing attention to closer relations with Russia, even though there have not been any significant changes in the Kremlin’s commitment to democracy, rule of law, or its meddling in internal processes of other nations. Russia continues to be a U.S. and NATO adversary. These stances from the current U.S. administration encourage anti-EU and anti-NATO rhetoric from other leaders, while at the same time erodes trust among its members and ultimately plays into the Kremlin’s intentions to destabilize the West and undermine the Alliance.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **European Populism** › 2AC Populism Add-On

Russia is killing democracy and eroding trust in politicians in Europe through disinformation campaigns that undermine democratic institutions

Matt Apuzzo and Adam Satariano 19 – Matt Apuzzo teaches journalism at Georgetown University and wrote strories for the New York Times regarding the Justice Department’s Civil Rights efforts. Adam Satariano graduated from the University of California, Santa Cruz. He’s written stories for Bloomberg News and The New York Times on digital policy and the spread of disinformation and censorship by the government. ("Russia Is Targeting Europe’s Elections. So Are Far-Right Copycats. (Published 2019)," New York Times, 5-12-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/12/world/europe/russian-propaganda-influence-campaign-european-elections-far-right.html, Accessed 7-10-2022, LASA-KS)

Less than two weeks before pivotal elections for the European Parliament, a constellation of websites and social media accounts linked to Russia or far-right groups is spreading disinformation, encouraging discord and amplifying distrust in the centrist parties that have governed for decades. European Union investigators, academics and advocacy groups say the new disinformation efforts share many of the same digital fingerprints or tactics used in previous Russian attacks, including the Kremlin’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. Fringe political commentary sites in Italy, for instance, bear the same electronic signatures as pro-Kremlin websites, while a pair of German political groups share servers used by the Russian hackers who attacked the Democratic National Committee. The activity offers fresh evidence that despite indictments, expulsions and recriminations, Russia remains undeterred in its campaign to widen political divisions and weaken Western institutions. Despite online policing efforts by American technology companies, it remains far easier to spread false information than to stop it. Russia remains a driving force, but researchers also discovered numerous copycats, particularly on the far right. Those groups often echo Kremlin talking points, making it difficult to discern the lines between Russian propaganda, far-right disinformation and genuine political debate. Investigators are confident, however, that networks of Facebook profiles, Twitter accounts, WhatsApp groups and websites are spreading false and divisive stories about the European Union, NATO, immigrants and more. Conspiracy theories are peddled freely, including that last month’s Notre-Dame fire was the work of Islamic terrorists, a spy agency, or an elite cabal that secretly runs the world. Often, these messages come directly from Russian news media and are repeated and amplified elsewhere. Others are more carefully cloaked: Facebook shuttered a pair of pages in Italy last week that were concealing far-right political messaging in what appeared to be lifestyle or sports sites unrelated to politics. “The goal here is bigger than any one election,” said Daniel Jones, a former F.B.I. analyst and Senate investigator whose nonprofit group, Advance Democracy, recently flagged a number of suspicious websites and social media accounts to law enforcement authorities. “It is to constantly divide, increase distrust and undermine our faith in institutions and democracy itself. They’re working to destroy everything that was built post-World War II.” The European Parliament elections, which will be held between May 23 and May 26, are regarded as a test of rising populism in the European Union. Populist leaders, many of them sympathetic to Russia, have loosely joined together in hopes of expanding their influence in the Parliament and, in turn, redirecting or subverting policymaking in Brussels. Intelligence officials have not publicly accused the Kremlin of backing specific candidates in Europe in the way that American authorities say that President Vladimir V. Putin sought to promote Donald J. Trump in 2016. But Mr. Putin has long sought to divide the European Union, and has supported populist movements that seek to undermine the bloc from within. It is nearly impossible to quantify the scale and resonance of the misinformation. Researchers say millions of people see the material. Investigators have found hundreds of Facebook and Twitter accounts, more than a thousand examples of WhatsApp messages sharing suspicious materials, and a hodgepodge of dodgy websites that launder varying degrees of misinformation — whether conspiracy theories or polarized slants on the news. A longstanding debate has been whether this material changes behavior or votes, especially as tech companies have worked to stamp it out. But security researchers suggest that swinging elections is a stretch goal for this kind of campaign, if that. The primary point is to muddle the conversation, make people question what is true, and erode trust. Russia dismisses accusations of meddling. “The election has yet to come, and we are already suspected of doing something wrong?” the Russian prime minister, Dmitri A. Medvedev, said in March. “Suspecting someone of an event that has not yet happened is a bunch of paranoid nonsense.” Distinguishing Russian interference from clickbait or sincere political outrage is difficult, even for intelligence services. The digital trail often winds up in one of the internet’s anonymized dead ends. But pro-Russian fingerprints exist.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **Baltics** › Russian/NATO Cohesion Extensions

Russian disinformation leads to indecision and divides NATO

David Grimes 22 - Grimes studies society’s understanding of science ("Russian Misinformation Seeks to Confound, Not Convince," Scientific American, 03-28-22, /, Accessed 07-13-22, LASA-KK)

As the Russia-Ukraine war intensifies, so too will the flow of disinformation. This is an age-old strategy Russia has long history of employing, and a playbook that others, most notably anti-vaccine activists, have borrowed from liberally. Yet, rather than focusing effort on convincing people of a falsehood, the Russian strategy takes a tack reminiscent of a strategy long employed by the tobacco industry: to sow so much doubt about what is true that it sends people into decision paralysis. Faced with a cacophony of wild and conflicting claims, people do nothing, unsure of what is right. Despite constituting only a small part of our media diet, disinformation campaigns, in our digital world, can be devastatingly effective. We are intrinsically biased towards information that is emotionally visceral. We afford more weight to content that frightens or outrages us, with the ability to induce anger serving as the single greatest predictor of whether content goes viral. This propels the most visceral, divisive narratives to the forefront of discourse, creating a sound and fury of passionately debated claims and counter claims. In that atmosphere, it becomes increasingly difficult to ascertain what to believe, and easy to abandon the task of discerning the truth. If we are not to fall victim to such rank dishonesty, it is crucial now that we question our sources more carefully than ever before. Indecision and distraction have long been central to Russia’s dezinformatsiya (disinformation) policy, a term Stalin himself is credited with coining. While an ancient concept, Russia had by the imperial age mastered dark obfuscation techniques refined for the era of mass communication. By the dawn of the Soviet empire, they realized this potential on an industrial scale, establishing the world's first office dedicated to disinformation in 1923. In the 1960s, the KGB covertly sponsored American fringe groups, amplifying conspiratorial narratives about everything from the assassination of president John F. Kennedy to water fluoridation. The goal, as KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin elucidated in 1998, was “not intelligence collection, but subversion: active measures to weaken the West, to drive wedges in the Western community alliances of all sorts, particularly NATO, to sow discord among allies, to weaken the United States in the eyes of the people of Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America....”. Operation INFEKTION, a mid-1980s clandestine effort to spread the myth that AIDS was a CIA-designed bioweapon, was but one infamous exemplar. While utterly fictious, it resonated with communities ravaged by HIV and neglected by the callous indifference of the Reagan administration. Despite Russian intelligence taking responsibility for this lie in 1992, the legacy of AIDS denialism persists to this day worldwide.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **Baltics** › Russian/NATO Cohesion Extensions

Russia will use information warfare to undermine NATO cohesion

Marcus Kolga 21 - Marcus Kolga is an analyst of foreign influence operations and disinformation (“Confusion, Destabilization and Chaos: Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Against Canada and its Allies,” Canadian Global Affairs Institute, October 2021, 07-10-2022, LASA-KK)

Operating in the shadows of the grey zone that lies between war and peace, Russia’s hybrid warfare aims to undermine targeted societies and democracies through a toxic mix of disinformation, cyber-attacks, transnational repression, economic pressure and the use of both regular and irregular military force. These operations are intended to support the Putin regime’s ultimate objectives: to erode Western alliances, re-consolidate Russia’s Soviet-era regional and global influence and remain in power as long as possible. The Russian government’s use of non-kinetic strategies and tactics to advance its interests and gain an advantage over its enemies is not new and can be traced back to the Soviet era. However, evolving technologies, shifting media landscapes and the growing emphasis placed on hybrid warfare in Russia’s modern military doctrine represent a persistent and expanding threat to liberal Western democracies and societies, including Canada. Vladimir Putin’s domestic political authority and legitimacy rely on his regime’s ability to demonstrateand project strength and control –both domestically and geopolitically. Putin’s guiding ambition has been to reverse what he believes is the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century: the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin’s effort to restore Russia’s bygone czarist and Soviet imperial glory is as much a tactical domestic propaganda operation intended to support Putin’s effort to extend his reign to 2036, as it is meant to further enrich Russia’s corrupt oligarchs and kleptocrats. What has so far prevented Putin from fully realizing his goal is a strong and united transatlantic alliance –one that is committed to deterring Putin’s foreign aggression against allied Western democracies. Breaking down our alliances and the cohesion within them is a critical component of the Putin regime’s strategy to survive, compete, and when possible, dominate. Undermining and subverting the democratic processes and societies in NATO member states are part of this strategy. During his first 21 years in office, Putin has frequently challenged unity within the transatlantic community and the commitment to collective defence. Cyber-attacks, influence operations and information warfare are deployed to destabilize and undermine democratic processes and erode Western trust in media, government and societies in allied nations, and those like Ukraine and Georgia, which seek to join them.Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine are extreme examples of Russian hybrid warfare. The mixture of irregularkinetic warfare with information and psychological warfare has resulted in a grinding, low-intensity conflict that is intended to perpetually sabotage Ukraine’s goal of becoming a full member of the transatlantic community.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **Baltics** › 2AC Baltic Add-On

(time depending) BUT building on existing NATO counter-disinformation ensures a stable presence in the Baltics that deters invasion.

Marta Kepe 17, Senior Defense Analyst at the RAND Corporation, M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service June 2017, "NATO: Prepared for Countering Disinformation Operations in the Baltic States?," , RMax

NATO plans to have around 3,000 troops in the Baltic states by the end of May as part of the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) — the largest reinforcement of NATO troops in the region for a generation. This represents a geopolitical shift of focus for NATO, from its earlier Central European theatre vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, further eastwards to the Baltic region vis-à-vis Russia. The aim is to demonstrate the “strength of the transatlantic bond,” reiterating to Russia the message that an attack on one ally would be considered an attack on the whole NATO alliance, an alliance which now includes the three ex-Soviet members of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. These NATO troops will be joining the US troops deployed there as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve that the Pentagon claimed demonstrates continued “US commitment to collective security” in Europe.

Strategic communications planning is part of preparing any military deployment; however, this deployment could face the Kremlin's sophisticated disinformation operations and propaganda in NATO territory. This represents the “geopolitics of disinformation,” currently being tracked by the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), who argue that such Russian “disinformation has specific geopolitical objectives;” namely to try to decrease public support for the NATO deployments in both the troop-sending states and the host nation countries.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **Baltics** › 2AC Baltic Add-On

Baltic invasion goes nuclear.

Hal Brands 19, Hal Brands is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies US foreign policy and defense strategy. Concurrently, Dr. Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion, November 2019, "How Russia Could Force a Nuclear War in the Baltics," https://www.aei.org/op-eds/how-russia-could-force-a-nuclear-war-in-the-baltics/ //AShah

Would the US fight a nuclear war to save Estonia? The question would probably strike most Americans as absurd. Certainly, almost no one was thinking about such a prospect when NATO expanded to include the Baltic states back in 2004.

Yet a series of reports by the nonpartisan RAND Corporation shows that the possibility of nuclear escalation in a conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia over the Baltic region is higher than one might imagine. The best way of averting it? Invest more in the alliance’s conventional defense.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **Baltics** › 2AC Baltic Add-On

Baltics invasion escalates quickly

Brent Eastwood 22, Now serving as 1945s New Defense and National Security Editor, Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer, January 2022, "Forget Ukraine: Could Russia Invade And Conquer The Baltic States?" https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/forget-ukraine-could-russia-invade-and-conquer-the-baltic-states/ //AShah

We’re Focused on Ukraine But Look Out For the Russian Threat to the Baltics: It was a shot heard around the world in the Russian military analysis community. A RAND Corporation simulated wargame in 2016 concluded that the Russian military could reach the suburbs of the Estonian and Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga in less than 60 hours. In the iterations of the exercise, the Estonians and Latvians would need at least seven brigades of troops that include at least three armored brigades to potentially fight the Russians to a standstill.

But it gets worse from here. In another RAND wargame in 2019, the players examined if NATO and Russia would use tactical nuclear weapons during a simulated war in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). The scenario also had Russian conventional forces over-running capitals in the Balkans and NATO having the last fail-safe option to use non-strategic nuclear weapons.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **Baltics** › 2AC Baltic Add-On

Disinformation wrecks NATO decision-making and cohesion and makes a Baltic conflict inevitable – only a shared consensus on cyber response solves

Richard Sokolsky 17 - Richard Sokolsky focuses on U.S. policy for Russia (“The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European Security,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 03-13-17, 7-10-22, LASA-KK)

During the July 2016 NATO summit, the alliance and the EU issued an important joint declaration on a new strategic partnership that pledges to substantially improve cooperation between the two organizations to bolster alliance defenses against hybrid threats. The Baltic states are the first line of defense against Russian hybrid measures, yet their vulnerability to Russian unconventional warfare is the alliance’s Achilles’ heel. It remains unclear whether the Baltic states can make a sustained resource commitment to closing the many gaps in their defenses against Russia’s nonkinetic tools—such as those in their banking and financial sectors, mass communications, and domestic and foreign intelligence and law enforcement. Further, the states may not have the resources to increase investment in underdeveloped areas with large concentrations of ethnic Russians. The United States and the EU should boost funding for the Baltic countries to build their capacity to address their most critical vulnerabilities to Russian hybrid warfare. And NATO and the EU should avoid getting bogged down in theological and bureaucratic disputes over which organization should assume primary responsibility for this mission.

ENHANCE NATO PLANNING FOR HYBRID WARFARE