Nationalist populists as leaders of states that possess nuclear weapons undermine the nuclear order and increase nuclear dangers in novel, significant, and persistent ways. Such leaders talk differently about nuclear weapons; they can put nuclear policy making and crisis management in disarray; and they can weaken international alliances and multilateral nuclear institutions. The rise of nationalist populists in nuclear-armed states, including some of the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, shatters the presumed distinction between responsible and irresponsible nuclear powers and complicates attempts to heal rifts in the international order. Policies to wait out populists or to balance their influence in multilateral institutions seem to have had limited success. A sustainable strategy to deal with the challenge posed by populists would need to start by recognizing that we can no longer assume that nuclear weapons are safe in the hands of some states but not in others’. Introduction The rise of nationalist populists1 to power in nuclear-armed states and their allies is undermining the nuclear order and raising the risks of nuclear war. That populists such as Boris Johnson, Narendra Modi, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump were able to take charge of nuclear arsenals, including in some of the nuclear powers recognized under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), challenges the assumption that established nuclear-weapon states behave responsibly. Nationalist populism,2 understood as a nationalist, anti-elitist, illiberal, and anti-pluralist set of ideas and politics conducted in the supposed interests of “the people”—that is, the domestic constituencies of the nationalist-populist leaders—has been on the rise globally since the mid-2000s. It has come to include the leadership of a growing number of countries3 and has begun to influence the effectiveness of time-honored institutions of the nuclear order. We argue that this rise of nationalist populists and their foreign and defense policies weakens the nuclear order in novel, significant, and persistent ways. Three characteristics are typical of nationalist populists’ nuclear policies: they talk differently about nuclear weapons; they have a specific way of getting involved in national decision making on nuclear-weapon issues; and their approach to international alliances and institutions is unique. The fact that nationalist-populist leaders have assumed control over nuclear weapons in countries at the core of the nuclear order shatters the presumed distinction between “responsible” and “irresponsible” nuclear powers. These leaders threaten the nuclear order built on the principled acceptance of a logic of restraint by the nuclear-weapon states. Although it highlights the risks associated with populists’ control over nuclear weapons, this article does not aspire to a radical critique of the nuclear order.4 Our aim is to show that the rise of populists to the centers of power in nuclear-armed states challenges prevailing presumptions about nuclear risks and how they are to be managed. The view that a few responsible nuclear-armed states guard against irresponsible behavior by states mostly peripheral to the nuclear order is no longer defensible, if it ever was. Nationalist populists thus starkly expose the dangers intrinsically linked to nuclear weapons, regardless of regime type and the position of nuclear-weapon possessors in the international system. We understand nationalist populists to be leaders who claim to implement policies to defend the interests of their constituencies, which they brand as “the people,” against supposed foreign and internal elites in order to bolster national sovereignty. Nationalist-populist leaders who had or have nuclear weapons under their control include former US President Donald Trump, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Russian President Vladimir Putin.5 We concentrate our analysis on these four nationalist-populist leaders, who have shaped foreign and defense policies—and particularly nuclear-weapon policies—in key nuclear-possessor states.6 The 2016 election of Donald Trump, a populist by any measure, is of particular significance, since the United States has consistently been the state with the largest ability to uphold and strengthen the institutions and practices that underpin the nuclear order. Former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and Prime Minister Imran Khan of Pakistan are also nationalist populists. Israel, however, has a policy of nuclear opacity, under which it does not acknowledge possession of nuclear weapons.7 This made it impossible for Netanyahu to openly use nuclear weapons as a policy instrument in the same manner as other populists do. In Pakistan, the civilian leadership has only limited influence over nuclear-weapon policies because nuclear command and control rests with the armed forces.8 Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un are also often described as populists.9 Both leaders frequently use nationalist rhetoric, which resembles the populists’ style. However, we do not classify either as a nationalist populist because they do not rely on an internal in-group versus out-group dichotomy to justify their leadership. In autocratic regimes, such as those in China and North Korea, the leader holds absolute power and does not need to appeal to popular sovereignty or to employ other populist strategies. In France, the Front National, now Rassemblement National, is an influential nationalist-populist movement. Opposition leader Marine Le Pen has promised to “restore the full meaning of the ‘force de frappe’” and reinvigorate national sovereignty through nuclear deterrence.10 A populist turn in French nuclear policies therefore remains a distinct possibility. In two of the five nations that host US nuclear weapons under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, populists are in power (Turkey) or part of a government (Italy). In a third host nation, Belgium, a right-wing populist party has very recently been part of the government. In Germany, until the September 2021 parliamentary elections, a right-wing populist party was the strongest parliamentary opposition party.11 While populism, and particularly nationalist populism, has been on the rise in nuclear-armed states, three major developments in the background have reshaped the nuclear order. We understand this order to be characterized by the continuous search for accommodation between the goals of nuclear disarmament, on the one hand, and stability based on nuclear-deterrence relationships, on the other hand, through a policy of restraint and responsible behavior, particularly by the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the NPT.12 First, a more multipolar logic has begun to replace the primarily bipolar Cold War nuclear structure. In particular, the rise of new challengers to US hegemony has produced new power constellations.13 Second, new actors, including transnational non-state groups, are challenging the predominance of governments and pose new threats, particularly if those actors strive to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Third, the emergence of new military technologies has weakened strategic stability. For example, the entanglement of novel conventional and nuclear warfighting capabilities threatens to destabilize long-standing mutual-deterrence relationships, particularly between Russia and the United States, on the one hand, and between China and the United States, on the other hand.14 All three developments, and the interrelations among them, already are increasing nuclear dangers and unsettling the existing nuclear-deterrence relationships. The rise of nationalist populism and populists to power is a recent fourth development that adds to and amplifies these risks. Our examination of the impact of the rise of nationalist populism on the nuclear order meshes with the attention given in academic literature to the role of individuals in nuclear policies. The recent shift toward the first image (that is, the analysis of international relations focusing on the impact of individual leaders as opposed to an analysis at the level of states or the international system)15 is associated with an investigation of how the perceptions and preferences of specific personality types have altered national nuclear policies and the nuclear order. We add to this literature by considering a specific type of leader, the nationalist populist, and his (rarely her) influence on nuclear issues. The role of populism in foreign and defense policy, and particularly on nuclear policies, is seldom treated as a distinct phenomenon. This research gap has not been filled by issue-, country-, or region-specific investigations of the causes and effects of populism, which are more interested in how individual leaders have addressed particular issues than in the broad implications of the rise of nationalist populism.16 Our conception of nationalist populism overlaps with Jacques Hymans’s description of the “oppositional nationalist.”17 Hymans makes a convincing case that this type of leader has a particular affinity for nuclear weapons. However, where Hymans is interested in how leadership traits influence the decision to acquire nuclear weapons, we focus on policies affecting established nuclear arsenals. There is also a difference in framing between our idea of nationalist populism and Hymans’s notion of national-identity conceptions. The concept of “nation” is central to both frames. Yet populists equate the nation with their core domestic constituencies (and perhaps their own selves), while oppositional nationalists mostly view the nation-state as an entity in relation to other nations. Both view politics as the manifestation of an us-versus-them struggle. But nationalist populists and oppositional nationalists have different notions of the “us” (the people/nation) and different concepts of “them” (elites, other people/other nations).18 In our analysis, the Trump administration receives more attention than other nationalist-populist leaderships. This imbalance reflects the extraordinary amount of writing on an atypical US president. A focus on Trump is justified, since the United States remains the most important actor in the nuclear order. Also, Trump is often described as a prototypical populist19 who has inspired others to follow his lead and has generally increased the impact of populists in other countries. With Trump now out of office, this is a good time to take stock of his administration’s impact on the nuclear order: “Trump’s presidency offers, for good or ill, an excellent laboratory to examine whether and to what extent the assumption of government power by populists translates into foreign policy change.”20 We also consider the roles of other nationalist-populist leaders within the nuclear order and offer some observations on the implications of the rise of this phenomenon for nuclear disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation. We hope to provide a number of tentative arguments and conclusions about the distinct, dangerous, and often strange ways that populists are shaping the nuclear order. Populist foreign and defense policy To examine the influence of populism on foreign and defense policy, the idea of populism itself requires definition, or at least approximation. Populism is a fuzzy concept. At the most basic level, populists present themselves as atypical leaders from outside the establishment. Populists like to tell a story of how they are virtually predestined to represent and empower a silent and politically neglected majority (which they label as “the people”). But populism is neither a full-fledged political ideology nor simply a political or rhetorical style. It is rather a “thin-centered ideology.”21 Populism is inherently difficult to pin down, since populists want to maintain maximum flexibility to apply their ideas to, or combine them with, other ideologies—right, left, or drawing upon both—regardless of the underlying political system. The notion of a populist foreign and defense policy is equally hard to delineate. Leaders’ foreign policies reflect their personal characteristics and political behavior, how they interpret the world and their role in it, how they make decisions, and how they interact with others.22 As Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack state, “It is individuals who build the alliances, and create the threats that maintain or destroy balances of power.”23 Populist leadership is especially personalistic; a populist leader’s beliefs and decisions can be assumed to be more influential in shaping foreign and defense policies than those of other leaders. Nationalism, as one of the possible host ideologies of populism, adds another layer. Nationalist and populist discourses overlap; what the nation is to the nationalist, “the people” is to the populist. The concepts of sovereignty and self-determination drive both discourses, but they affect foreign and defense policies through different mechanisms. In principle, there is a clear delineation between a given nation and all other nations. The populists’ idea of “the people” is vaguer. Populists use this ambiguous construct to evoke a group (their “base”) within a polity, juxtaposing it with “elites” at the top. According to populists, these elites are outside the group of the “real” or “true” people. Populist politicians boast about not being part of the elite class (a claim that is rarely true, in economic or educational terms) and thus claim to speak and act in the name of the people from within their ranks, implying that only they can genuinely represent them.24 Nationalist populists not only claim to speak for “the people” but also presume to define the nation. They fuse inward-looking populist discourse with a more outward-oriented nationalist ideology. This shift in the frame of reference portrays the elites as depriving the people of their sovereignty both at home and abroad.25 As Jordan Kyle and Brett Meyer put it, “foreign policy is often collateral damage of populists’ divisive approach to domestic politics.”26 We identify the following characteristics of external policies pursued by nationalist populist leaderships: Polarization. “Us versus them” is the predominant discourse. Restraint, empathy, and compromise are anathema.27 Romanticizing of the historical past. Populists want to revive the “national missions” of their own countries.28 Personalistic leadership. Political authority rests primarily with a single person, often the head of a movement,29 rather than within structures and institutions. Foreign and defense policies are extensions of domestic policy debates. The leader’s political messaging is direct, with “the people,” often via social or new media, while ignoring established channels of interaction with the broader public.30 National sovereignty. Populists view alliances and international institutions as constraining the freedom of nation-states.31 The short-term, narrow interest of the nation is the sole yardstick of success.32 Iconoclasm. Populists want to dismantle international organizations, which they view as the instruments of circles of elites who support international cooperation and integration. They reject cultural and economic globalization and free trade.33 These criteria do not represent a comprehensive account of the nationalist-populist phenomenon, and the checklist is not exhaustive. Some of these traits could also apply to non-populist foreign and defense policies. Nevertheless, taken together, these features of the nationalist-populist approach to international policy issues capture a unique, identifiable phenomenon: if a leader walks like a populist, talks like a populist, and acts like a populist, then he or she most likely is a populist (see Figure 1). Here to stay: the proliferation of populism The rise of nationalist populists to power in nuclear-weapon states is a phenomenon worthy of in-depth analysis for three reasons. First, the development is of an unprecedented scale globally. A recent overview found that there are “more populist leaders and parties in power than at almost any time in history.”34 Individuals and their beliefs and preferences, along with external systemic factors, shape foreign-policy decisions and interactions among states. However, how and to what degree populists influence nuclear policies varies between countries. Populists have risen to power in democracies, electoral autocracies,35 and other hybrid regimes. Depending on the political system, their influence may be constrained by other branches of government and by actors, such as private companies, whose interests may be inconsistent with a populist agenda. Generally speaking, the individual leader has the greatest influence on a state’s decisions and behavior in personalistic systems. By contrast, the checks and balances of pluralistic systems often constrain democratically elected leaders. Even there, however, nationalist populists increase their influence by constantly chipping away at the core values, principles, and procedures of liberal democracy, such as separation of powers, rule of law, political representation, and individual rights and freedoms.36 Second, nationalist populists have risen to power in three of the five nuclear-weapon states. The significance of that development for the nuclear order is particularly great, since these five states bear a special responsibility for maintaining and improving that order and international peace generally.37 In their parallel role as the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, their consent is necessary for enforcement of compliance with the NPT and other multilateral regimes. Their willingness to forgo nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, or their lack of willingness, sets examples for other, less influential states. In the past, Western leaders often dismissed populism as a problem of less developed countries.38 At the same time, nuclear establishments saw the peace movement and other grassroots movements as populist—that is, non-elite groups that were challenging elitist policies supposedly based on rationality and stability.39 To be sure, the time for finger pointing is over. “Populism has not just risen in emerging democracies with weaker political parties and institutions but in systemically important democracies with long institutional histories like the United States and India,” as Kyle and Meyer observe.40 Few if any states now appear to be immune to populist challenges. Consequently, the assumption that the established nuclear-weapon states can protect the nuclear order from less responsible challengers must be revised. Third, populism is here to stay. To be sure, populism is not a new phenomenon, and populists have challenged the nuclear order before in various ways.41 Today’s populism, additionally, is fueled by the perceived inability of states and institutions to attend to the political, economic, and cultural consequences of the global economic crisis of 2008, as well as the increase in xenophobia following the increase in conflict-induced flight and migration into Europe since 2015.42 In the context of “crises of political representation engendered by dislocations caused by globalization and other shifts in international politics” and as a “reaction to concurrent political and economic crises in a rapidly denationalized and deterritorialized world,”43 the rise of populism has been a reaction to perceived insecurity, inequality, depoliticization, and economic stagnation. As a result, a rise of illiberalism and a wave of autocratization can be observed.44 Nationalist populists have come to power in the shadow of the crisis of the liberal international order, benefiting from the crisis and perpetuating it. The impact of nationalist populism is going to stay with us, likely beyond the lifetime of individual nationalist-populist governments. That is partly because the leaders have begun to paralyze, reshape, and dismantle existing bureaucracies. Nationalist populists define themselves as being anti-elitist (even if they themselves are members of the elite). Once they occupy the seats of power, national populists co-opt, exchange, or sideline old elites. The resulting reshuffle in the foreign and defense apparatuses sometimes resembles a purge and can lead to dramatic discontinuities in expertise. It will take time to repair the damage done to governance structures and to heal the wounds caused by political polarization. In the nuclear world, this destabilization of institutions is particularly significant. The nationalist-populist assault weakens the influence of those who are supposed to act as “guardians of the arsenals.” The influence of nationalist-populist leaders on nuclear-weapon policies also has grown.45 When it comes to nuclear-weapon use, the dangers posed by nationalist populists are stark because in most nuclear-weapon states the head of state or government has the legal authority to order the use of nuclear weapons. But there are different shades of gray. In nuclear-armed states with presidential systems (France, Russia, and the United States), launch authority “clearly rests in the hands of one single person,” while in those with parliamentary systems (India, Israel, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom), “the decision to launch a nuclear strike would necessarily not be the sole authority of one individual, even if it is ‘legally’ (i.e. on paper).”46 Three ways populists change the nuclear order Against this background of the characteristics of populists’ foreign and defense policies and the diffusion of populism into nuclear powers’ decision-making centers, we describe three relevant causal mechanisms through which nationalist populists influence the nuclear order. First, nationalist populists have a different way of speaking. “[T]he specific style of rhetoric used by the populists involves adversarial, emotional, patriotic, and abrasive speech through which they connect with the discontented often via grassroots, community-oriented, communicative practices and spaces.”47 For nationalist populists, the domestic audience is the most important recipient of any messaging; everything is said with a communicative purpose to please “the people,” to secure their approval and votes and therefore to retain power. Second, nationalist populists have a particular way of making decisions, sometimes reflective of the fact that delineating “the people” from an “elite” is a constitutive element of populism. Whereas usually a small and closed group of experts and officials prepares and executes decisions in foreign and defense policy, the policy style of nationalist populists is a peculiar mix of laissez-faire on routine issues and very visible leadership when the stakes are high. As Kyle and Gultchin argue, populists seek to convince their supporters that they “see and acknowledge the crisis and that their strong leadership alone can fix it.”48 Third, nationalist populists have a distinct perspective on the international order. They view the world through a “great-power” lens that is consistent with the “realist” logic of foreign and defense policy. At the same time, nationalist populists reject the notion of an international order based on and shaped by bilateral and multilateral agreements and treaties. This is partly because the rise of nationalist populism “has brought a new persona to the global stage—the iconoclast. This deliberate rule breaker disrupts the practice of international relations, a system that depends upon consensus around norms.”49 Talking about nuclear weapons As Alexey Arbatov has observed, “when it comes to nuclear weapons, words are deeds.”50 This is because nuclear weapons have been exploded in war only twice. All other “uses” of nuclear weapons have been limited to verbal actions, policy documents, deployment, testing, and other actions short of direct hostile use.51 Usually, nuclear messaging is the outcome of a careful and deliberate process. For example, heads of state or government typically speak about nuclear arsenals and nuclear strategy on the basis of carefully scripted and meticulously reviewed statements. Exegesis of nuclear-policy documents and speeches is the preoccupation of many nuclear analysts, based on the assumption that, especially in the nuclear world, leaders and officials have thoroughly weighed and consciously selected their words. Nationalist populists, by contrast, often speak loosely about nuclear weapons, which complicates a “reading” of their statements.52 This concerns both style and substance, which coincide with their personalistic style of leadership53 and their desire to flout the rules of what they deride as “political correctness.”54 Donald Trump has again led the way—for example, through his excessive tweeting on nuclear-weapon issues.55 Other nationalist populists have also deviated from previous rhetorical styles by bragging about their nuclear weapons. In April 2019, shortly after an escalation of the Pulwama crisis between India and Pakistan had been averted, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi suggested that his country was ready to use nuclear weapons against Pakistan: “Every other day they used to say ‘we have nuclear button, we have nuclear button’. What do we have then? Have we kept it for Diwali?”56 President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s October 2019 statement that it is unacceptable for Turkey not to have nuclear weapons because “[t]here is no developed nation in the world that doesn’t have them”57 is another typically populist statement, conflating strong views with half-truths or lies. Such loose talk may have several purposes. By emphasizing nuclear weapons, nationalist populists can set themselves apart from the established elite discourse. Donald Trump boasted of having gained knowledge of nuclear weapons not through a formal education but through his uncle, a professor of engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.58 Thus, the US president believed that he did not need to rely on the expertise and experience of the nuclear elite. This ignorance of nuclear lessons by virtue of not “being socialized to the dangers of nuclear weapons”59 derived from the past is a trademark of nationalist populists, but is also part and parcel of a general loss of expertise in executives and parliaments in nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-allied countries.60 Nationalist populists also like to make strong statements on nuclear issues because they may believe that this impresses their main target audience—that is, their domestic power base. Thus, Putin has several times used his regular direct encounters with the Russian public to highlight the importance of nuclear weapons for Moscow’s standing in the world. In March 2018, Putin, in his speech to the Federal Assembly of Parliamentarians, policy makers, religious leaders, public figures, and members of the media, boasted about Russia’s nuclear capabilities and in true populist fashion even invited “[t]hose interested in military equipment … to suggest a name for this new weaponry, this cutting-edge” nuclear-weapon system.61 And Modi made repeated reference to India’s nuclear weapons during the 2019 parliamentary election campaign. As one analyst observed, “The context of Modi’s remarks on nuclear weapons—election rallies—matter[s], of course. With a poor economic track record since 2014, the [Bharatiya Janata Party] has rightly decided to focus on what much of the Indian public perceives as a strength: its management of national security and defense.”62 In a similar vein, nationalist populists may bring religious motives into the nuclear discourse. Thus, Putin seems to believe that “Orthodoxy and the nuclear deterrent are equally important bulwarks of Russian statehood, guaranteeing the nation’s security internally, in the case of the church, and externally, in the case of the nuclear arsenal.”63 Talking about nuclear weapons primarily in order to impress the domestic power base—rather than external actors—can increase nuclear risks in various ways. Nationalist populists tend to trivialize nuclear risks while exaggerating the benefits of having nuclear weapons. This idealization of nuclear weapons can break down (verbal) barriers and incentivize other states to pursue nuclear weapons. The mixing of domestic and external audiences also may make it more difficult for third parties to judge the intentions behind strong statements. When Trump says that he wants to unleash “fire and fury” on North Korea, to whom is he talking?64 External observers may believe that signals are intended for domestic consumption—but they cannot be sure. Populist decision making on nuclear weapons In most nuclear-weapon states and under normal conditions, a small group of experts prepares decisions on the direction of nuclear-weapon policies.65 Routine nuclear policy making often remains remarkably unaffected by changes in political leadership. Secrecy and path dependencies complicate any precise analysis of the impact of the rise of nationalist populism on routine policy making. But a few tentative observations can be offered. Routine decision making on nuclear-weapon-related issues appears to remain mostly below the radar of most nationalist populists in power. The long, deliberative processes behind nuclear-weapon policies do not lead to the quick payoffs in public attention that nationalist populist leaders typically seek. From the perspective of the guardians of the arsenal—the group of “initiated” experts with relevant security clearances—there is little reason to change that. If and when nationalist populists get involved in policy making, their instincts usually favor greater reliance on nuclear weapons. But their unruly approach to politics is not very compatible with the inertia-driven approach of the nuclear establishment. Thus, at a briefing for him at the Defense Department on July 20, 2017, Trump reportedly asked why he didn’t have as many weapons as past presidents did, pointing out that the United States at the height of Cold War had had more than 30,000 nuclear weapons, as opposed to “only” a few thousand by 2017.66 Nationalist populists’ disinterest in and absence from routine policy making may empower officials with radical views. Nuclear doctrines are a case in point. Thus, the February 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) changed the trajectory of US nuclear-weapon policies by introducing new types of nuclear weapons. The NPR widened the scenarios under which nuclear weapons might be used, blurred boundaries between conventional and nuclear scenarios of warfighting, lowered the threshold for nuclear-weapon use, and shifted nuclear-weapon-deployment scenarios in the direction of warfare—that is, away from the idea that the only legitimate use of nuclear weapons is to deter existential threats.67 But “Trump had nothing to do with the [NPR]; it was written almost entirely inside the Pentagon, as previous reviews had been, with still less direction or input than usual from the White House,” as Fred Kaplan observed.68 So the changes can be explained partly by the “resurgence of the nuclear establishment” and its “convergence” with the rise of Trump.69 A similar hands-off attitude may explain the rash nuclear threats that Russian diplomats have issued against third countries. Such bullying appears to be possible only because the Kremlin provides the political space for it by justifying aggressive postures (and annexations) in nationalist terms.70 Thus, the hands-off approach of nationalist-populist leaders to routine issues can also have a disruptive effect on nuclear policies. While the outcome may resemble the policies of hawkish conservatives, the policy process leading to the outcome is markedly different. This difference is relevant to the effect of such policies: nationalist populists’ neglect of detail and their ignorance of strategy can make it harder for others to assess the significance of policy changes and associated messages. Thus, bringing the nationalist populists into decision making on nuclear policy also runs the risk of their instincts ruining and counteracting the results of previous policy making, again adding a degree of unpredictability. A prime example is the January 2019 US Missile Defense Review. The document itself is the product of a multi-year interagency process. One of the key questions was whether the review should revise US and NATO policies so that they would direct missile defenses against the threat of Russian long-range missiles. The potential use of Western missile defenses in that way is a central factor influencing Russian nuclear policies. The review itself did not result in such a change of policy.71 President Trump, however, presenting the review results at a January 17, 2019, press conference, contradicted US policy by stating, “Our strategy is grounded in one overriding objective: to detect and destroy every type of missile attack against any American target, whether before or after launch. When it comes to defending America, we will not take any chances. We will only take action. There is no substitute for American military might.”72 Predictably, Russia seized on the contradictions between policies coming out of the bureaucracy and statements by the president to argue that the Trump administration was seeking to attain military dominance and justify its own expansion of nuclear capabilities.73 Nationalist-populist grandstanding thus can have the indirect effect of paving the way for competitors to react by increasing their own nuclear capabilities. The impact of nationalist-populist decision making and “instincts” during nuclear crises is a particular cause for concern. Nationalist populists by nature tend to be risk takers, and their mistrust of their own nuclear establishments—which tend to be risk averse—may facilitate dangerous moves. Putin’s statements after the annexation of Crimea that Russia “was ready” to put nuclear forces on alert is an indication of his willingness to raise the stakes.74 Erdogan’s decision to cut off power to Incirlik Air Base, where about 50 US nuclear weapons are deployed, during the 2016 coup attempt against him is another example of ignorance of nuclear dangers during a crisis. For nationalist populists such as the Turkish president, the importance of securing the domestic power base overrides all other concerns about nuclear security.75