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2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › UN CP › 2NC

The counterplan models existing IIGOs and centralizes global AI policy

Erdélyi and Goldsmith ‘18 (Olivia, faculty of Law at University of Canterbury and Judy, faculty at University of Kentucky Department of Computer Science, “Regulating Artificial Intelligence Proposal for a Global Situation, Published February 2018, Accessed 7/13/2022, https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3278721.3278731)

Low long-term transaction costs vs. low initial contracting costs: International discussions on AI are just beginning and powerful states will likely have divergent preferences with respect to the regulation of this high-impact field. Compounded with the difficulties discussed in the context of previous tradeoffs, this makes the prospect of reaching a workable international consensus on the short term rather remote. Yet crucially, swift regulatory response is imperative to prevent proliferating unregulated AI applications from causing social harm and to ensure that the opportunity presented by the rise of AI is harvested to humanity’s benefit rather than detriment — an aim best facilitated by lowering initial contracting costs with soft legalization and low institutional formalization. This is not to say that the idea of setting up a more robust regulatory framework with standard operating procedures should be abandoned. On the contrary, such a step has merit but only at a later stage, in possession of sufficient expertise and political consensus to better assess the implications of various policy options and formulate informed policy recommendations. Complex centralized administration vs. minimalistic administrative functions: Similar considerations apply as far as the level of administrative sophistication of the IAIO is concerned. In the initial stage of determining the purpose of the organization, its membership, the issues that need to be regulated, and the backbone of its regulatory agenda, less is probably more. Later, with perhaps binding legal instruments governing selected aspects of AI for a wide membership, work will get more complex, requiring stronger oversight, dispute resolution, and enforcement mechanisms as well as more powerful bureaucratic functions to service them. Routine management vs. crisis/uncertainty management: In view of AI’s novelty, extreme complexity, unforeseeable evolution, and the controversies it is expected to elicit among a very heterogeneous circle of members, we are up against managing an extraordinarily uncertain issue area. Consequently, we need time and soft legalization’s flexibility to establish commonly shared ideas, interests, cooperation mechanisms, and solutions, which can then form the basis of more formalized cooperation arrangements in the future. In summary, at least initially, the IAIO should start out as an IIGO displaying a relatively low level of institutional formality and using soft law instruments, such as non-binding recommendations, guidelines, and standards, to support national policymakers in the conception and design of AI-related regulatory policies. Its interim goal should be to galvanize international cooperation in this domain as early as possible, before states develop their own, diverging policies, which may be hard to rescind without political damage. Whether the international community wishes to move towards more formalized cooperation at some point in the future, remains to be seen. Sometimes informality turns out to be the key to an organization’s success. This seems to be the case with the Bank of International Settlements especially during its initial years of operation and World War II, or the BCBS and the different GGroups at present [2]. Another common trajectory is when initially informal arrangements turn into formal frameworks of cooperation. A case in point is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) gradual transformation into the WTO [1]. Finally, there are examples for remarkably successful, sustained, complementary, and mutually beneficial cooperation between several organizations of varying institutional formality in the same issue area. This sort of relationship is characteristic for the IMF and various G-Groups in financial regulation, or the Australia Group (AG), an IIGO, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), a FIGO, in the regulation of chemical and biological weapons [18]. Our excursus in the domain of international lawmaking shows that beyond the optimal level of legalization and institutional formality, the IAIO must fulfill a number of more subtle requirements to be perceived as a fair and legitimate regulator. While leaving the elaboration of details to future research, we would like to stress the importance of two points: (1) including an interdisciplinary mix of experts (with, e.g., AI, legal, political, and ethics background) in the initial deliberations related to the IAIO’s establishment, modus operandi, and regulatory agenda, and (2) conducting regular, largescale consultation processes with a diverse spectrum of interested stakeholders from public sector, industry, and academia, to ensure due consideration of all relevant perspectives

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › UN CP › 2NC

The creates an IIGO which solves best

Erdélyi and Goldsmith ‘18 (Olivia, faculty of Law at University of Canterbury and Judy, faculty at University of Kentucky Department of Computer Science, “Regulating Artificial Intelligence Proposal for a Global Situation, Published February 2018, Accessed 7/13/2022, https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3278721.3278731)

International institutions are the prevalent vehicles of international cooperation in our interconnected world. When a critical mass of states and/or non-state actors feel that transnational cooperation is necessary to solve a problem that is impossible to tackle by isolated national measures, they establish a new IGO or NGO for that particular purpose. Based on legal and international relations definitions in circulation — see [9, 14, 18] — we define an IGO as a formal entity (1) established by an international agreement governed by international law; (2) with at least three (sometimes two) members — typically states but increasingly also IGOs; and (3) having at least one organ with a will distinct from that of its members. FIGOs’ organizational purpose is laid down in a binding international agreement such as a treaty or a formal legal act of another IGO, their membership is clearly defined in the founding legal act, and they have a permanent and significant institutionalization in place. By contrast, IIGOs operate based on an explicitly shared, but informal expectation about purpose, their membership is not always clear, as members are explicitly associated but only by non-legal mutual acknowledgment, and they do not possess any significant institutionalization. NGOs differ from IGOs in that they are not created by treaty — meaning they are governed by national rather than international law — and their membership is made up of non-state actors. Given the severity and global nature of AI’s anticipated impact on humanity, we expect it to join the long line of issue areas requiring interstate cooperation, raising the question of establishing an IGO at some point in the future. Against this background, we propose the creation of the IAIO as a new IGO, which could initially serve as a focal point of policy debates on AI-related matters and — given sufficient international support — acquire increasing role in their regulation over time. We start by determining the degree of desired institutional formalization by examining, in turn, the six above elaborated tradeoffs in relation to AI.

Binding commitment vs. flexible cooperation arrangements: As pointed out earlier, AI will fundamentally transform human society worldwide. Since this process of transformation is likely to be inescapable for any single state, states will probably wish to cooperate sincerely. Also, violations will be difficult to detect as keeping pace with technological innovation will require considerable technical expertise and capacities, presumably exceeding especially weaker countries’ capabilities and evoking severe power asymmetries. While apart from this latter circumstance, these factors speak for hard legal commitments, it must be kept in mind that AI research and AI-human interactions are relatively young phenomena and their novelty severely restricts our ability to anticipate the spectrum and extent of the impending changes, let alone the dimension of the problems they will raise. Many AI instantiations encroach on our most basic rights, pose an existential threat, or bring up profound ethical and social questions, not to mention that they will utterly and completely upset our legal system. So, we are looking at heated debates among radically diverse parties over a variety of uncertain issues, which may change in rapid and currently unimaginable ways — conditions that, based on past experience, do not exactly favor international consensus. Therefore, we need all the flexibility we can get to acquire familiarity with the issues at hand, sort out differences, and establish common ground, before we can contemplate drawing up a more binding framework for cooperation. Delegation/high sovereignty costs vs. state autonomy/low sovereignty costs: Weaponized AI technologies and certain data mining practices are clearly relevant for national security. As this is a sensitive issue area involving particularly high sovereignty costs, at least initially, states will show reluctance to give up and delegate decisionmaking authority to the IAIO. On the long run, however, powerful collective oversight and enforcement mechanisms will probably be indispensable in order to curb incentives for violations and opportunistic behavior, which should otherwise be high in light of the major shifts in international power constellations triggered by changes in countries’ competitive positions. Also, domestic AI policies will produce significant externalities, affecting other countries. Based on this analysis, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a highly institutionalized organization with binding legislative, dispute resolution, and enforcement authority would be better suited as new international AI regulator. Nevertheless, the political reality remains that until sufficient clarity is reached on the IAIO’s precise purpose, membership, the issues to regulate, and the broad directions to follow, international consensus supporting such a high degree of institutionalization is off the table. Collective control of information vs. close control of information: History shows that states are generally cautious about sharing information on fate-changing technologies, which speaks for close control of information with respect to AI. However, if and when we manage to gather consensus for hard legal commitments (e.g., treaty on certain AI applications), we will probably need to be more forthcoming with certain information to ensure compliance with those instruments. This is again a strong argument in favor of starting cooperation on AI regulation in a softer institutional framework and using soft law instruments, although a move towards harder legalization seems to be desirable over time.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › UN CP › 2NC

The UN can create ethical standards that globally build trust

Fournier-Tombs ’21 (Eleonore, data scientist, researcher and author at United Nations University Institute Macau, “Towards a United Nations Internal Regulation for Artificial Intelligence, Published August 30, 2021, Accessed 7/13/2022, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/20539517211039493)

Ethical frameworks and best practices As we have seen, just like most AI initiatives developed in recent years globally, this work has happened largely without regulatory oversight. However, there have been many attempts within the organisation to set up ethical modes of operation, as well as to influence AI ethics globally. For example, OCHA's Peer Review Framework sets out a method for overseeing the technical development and implementation of AI models (OCHA, 2021b). Its objective is to provide a method for the review of models developed by humanitarian organisations by peers in the same sector, thereby providing a layer of validation that might hitherto not have existed. While there is no legal obligation for developers working with vulnerable populations to use it, it does attempt to increase accountability and transparency of models, in the hope of attenuating its risks and building trust ITU has also sought to encourage ethical uses of AI through its yearly conference entitled AI for Good, which is specifically oriented towards uses of AI that promote the Sustainable Development Goals. Several of AI for Good talks listed for 2021 address the ethics of AI use in specific cases, such as democratic participation or self-driving cars. However, the approach appears more focused on promoting implementations that drive sustainable development, rather than mitigating their possible risks (ITU, 2021). Finally, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has done considerable work in AI ethics, notably by convening intergovernmental meetings since 2019 to articulate a recommendation on the ethics of AI. The 2020 draft of this document focuses on values, such as transparency, gender equity, human rights and fairness, among others. While different from the European Commission's risks-based approach, this is certainly aligned with other United Nations documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Like the various United Nations Conventions, this document is therefore aimed at Member States, and could possibly inform the future United Nations convention on AI (UNESCO, 2020). Going a step further than the recommendation, the convention would be voluntarily ratified by Member States, who would then commit to following its principles in their own jurisdictions. Even without a convention, the United Nations would certainly have an incentive to apply internally its own recommendations to Member States. As such, the UNESCO work, along with other efforts of the ITU, OCHA and other agencies, can certainly be seen as building blocks towards a regulatory framework. However, without legal backing, they are not sufficient to ensure the safety of AI technologies as they are currently being used. Regulation to build trust in implementations In addition, the lack of AI regulation at the United Nations can be considered a barrier for agencies seeking to adopt more effective and novel technologies. While some systems, such as the OCHA-Bucky Model, which predicted COVID-19 cases in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Sudan, have been deployed for humanitarian use (OCHA, 2021d); others appear not to have been integrated into actual decision-making systems. An example of this is the Jetson tool, which was developed by UNHCR to predict the arrival of internally displaced persons to refugee camps in Somalia (UNHCR, 2021). According to the project's public-facing website, the tool has not been updated since 2019. Several of the numerous proof-of-concept projects developed by the UN Global Pulse have also not been deployed into production (Global Pulse Lab, 2021). One of the most important difficulties in deploying these solutions is related to trust, both in terms of internal adoption of the tools by decision makers, as well as acceptance by the target populations. Trust in artificial intelligence systems is notoriously difficult to obtain, particularly in the work in which the United Nations engages, which is highly political and impacts very vulnerable populations. Some of the attempts at promoting transparency in AI, such as the OCHA Peer Review Framework, can be seen as a way to build trust. In fact, there have been other similar initiatives outside of the United Nations, such as Datasheets for Datasets (Gebru et al., 2018) and Model Cards for Model Reporting (Mitchell et al., 2019), as well as IBM's AI Factsheet, which provide tools for technical developers to explain their technologies, and therefore increase public trust in them. As explained by Aicardi et al. (2021), transparency is the most prevalent principle included in AI ethics. In the EU Guidelines on AI, which served to inform the 2021 regulation, transparency is listed as one of the ‘seven requirements in the realisation of a trustworthy AI.’ Rossi (2019) describes lack of trust as one of the key obstacles to the adoption of AI systems, regardless of the potential benefit. The onus has largely been on the technical developers of these tools, such as data scientists, computer scientists and engineers, to develop the credibility of their tools. While the United Nations has invested, and continues to invest, large amounts of money into research labs and private partnerships, unless it is able to build internal and external trust in them, it will also face important barriers in their implementation. A regulatory framework like the one proposed by the European Commission, however, especially with an authorisation procedure like the one described for high-risk activities, would take the pressure off technology developers in the humanitarian sector to individually justify their activities to decision-makers. Instead, agencies or research labs who wanted to develop an AI solution would work towards authorisation, likely quelling many internal doubts as to the effectiveness, safety and accuracy of their system. Given the powerful nature of AI, the risks of research and development initiatives and the threat of unregulated public–private partnerships, an internal, enforceable United Nations regulation on AI is highly recommended. An UN-wide AI regulation would not only protect the risks posed by the technologies to the mission itself of the organisation, but it would also build trust in those applications that are actually supporting its work. This is an opportunity to concretise the efforts of the organisation in AI ethics and best practices, as well as further demonstrate its leadership on an issue of global importance.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › UN CP › 2NC

The UN works within international frameworks, more so than NATO

Fournier-Tombs ’21 (Eleonore, data scientist, researcher and author at United Nations University Institute Macau, “Towards a United Nations Internal Regulation for Artificial Intelligence, Published August 30, 2021, Accessed 7/13/2022, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/20539517211039493)

On 21 April 2021, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation on artificial intelligence (AI) (European Commission, 2021), the first of its kind to attempt to integrate the multi-tentacled beast that is AI. The document enters into detail in terms of definitions and uses of the technologies, as well as very important sections on the forbidden uses of AI and high-risk activities, proposing that the latter go through an authorisation process much like a drug or a car would before being made available to the public. However, as set out in Article 2, the regulation does not apply to international organisations, regardless of whether they are operating in European Union (EU) territory. Naturally, the EU does not have jurisdiction over international organisations such as the United Nations, which is governed by international law (United Nations, 2021). The exclusion therefore does not come as a surprise but does point to a gap in the AI regulation, especially since technologies that are classified as forbidden or high risk for European citizens would presumably be also very risky for all other citizens, regardless of nationality. Furthermore, as explained by Bradford (2020) in The Brussels Effect, the EU is known to set regulatory precedents globally. It is therefore likely that the new regulation will have a ripple effect, which would reach many other countries. In that context, regulating at the United Nations itself would be an important way for the organisation to demonstrate its leadership on this important societal issue. The activities of the United Nations are regulated in a series of legal instruments in international law that have been developed since the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations (United Nations, 1945). The UN Charter sets out the role of the Secretary General, the General Assembly, and the Security Council, as well as the activities of UN Peacekeepers. Since 1945, there have been a few amendments to the Charter, as well as Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on issues that were not considered at the onset of the organisation. The United Nations itself is very likely to develop a convention on AI, which member countries would likely sign and possibly ratify (Garcia, 2020; ). However, such a document, like other United Nations conventions, would consist of a commitment by its member states to more ethical AI practices, rather than a regulation for the organisation itself to follow. This article therefore sets out the rationale for a United Nations Regulation for Artificial Intelligence, which is needed to set out the modes of engagement of the organisation when using AI technologies in the attainment of its mission. It argues that given the increasing use of AI by the United Nations, including in some activities considered high risk by the European Commission, a regulation is urgent. It also contends that rules of engagement for AI at the United Nations would support the development of ‘good artificial intelligence’1, by giving developers clear pathways for authorisation that would build trust in these technologies. Finally, it argues that an internal regulation would build upon the work in AI ethics and best practices already initiated in the organisation that could, like the Brussels Effect, set an important precedent for regulations in other countries. The United Nations’ artificial intelligence ecosystem AI technologies have, over the past decade, been increasingly used by United Nations agencies, funds and programs. Several research and development labs, including the United Nations Secretariat’s Global Pulse Lab (2021), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR's) Jetson initiative (UNHCR, 2021), Innovation Labs (UNICEF, 2021) and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Centre for Humanitarian Data (OCHA, 2021a) have focused their work on developing AI solutions that would support the UN's mission, notably in terms of anticipating and responding to humanitarian crises. These research labs are largely composed of United Nations staff members and consultants trained in data science technologies. Many of the research labs have developed proofs of concept, which are yet to be integrated into the United Nations’ activities.2 They aim, for example, to explore the use of AI modelling in anticipating refugee arrivals (Jetson), predict coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) cases in countries with ongoing humanitarian crises or better understand risks to the Sustainable Development Goals (Global Pulse). United Nations agencies have also used biometric identification to manage humanitarian logistics and refugee claims. For example, Population Registration and Identity Management Ecosystem (PRIMES) was launched in 2018 by UNHCR to provide a centralised platform for the management of refugee data. By the end of 2018, the biometrics of 7.1 million refugees were managed by the platform (UNHCR, 2019). The World Food Programme (WFP) has also used biometric identification in aid distribution to refugees, coming under some criticism in 2019 for its use of this technology in Yemen (Raftree and Steinacker, 2019). In parallel, however, the organisation has begun partnering with private companies that provide advanced analytical services. A notable example is the WFP, that in 2019 signed a USD45-million-dollar contract with Palantir, an American firm which specialised in data collection and AI modelling (Greenwood, 2019). In 2014, the United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) awarded a USD20 billion-dollar contract to Palantir, to track undocumented immigrants in the United States (Woodman, 2017). Their methodology was a classic case of what is called the ‘Mosaic Effect’, which is a technique used by intelligence agencies, which involves using multiple data sources to find personally identifiable information that might otherwise have been obscured. This technique is discussed in some detail by OCHA (OCHA 2021c), which explains that these databases can be used to reidentify highly vulnerable populations such as migrants to expel them from an area, recruit children for warfare, or otherwise threaten their safety. Palantir used this technique as part of its ICE contract by collecting and centralising large numbers of databases to reveal the location of migrants, leading to their eventual expulsion. Several human rights watchdogs, however, including Amnesty International, have raised concerns about Palantir, writing in a September 2020 report that: ‘Given Palantir's increasingly entrenched role in government operations and its multiple contracts across federal agencies, concerns about its human rights record are growing in urgency and deserve scrutiny’ (Amnesty International, 2020).

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › UN CP › 2NC

Debates about AI tend to leave the global South behind—the growing, militarized issue should involve their input.

Eugenio V. Garcia 9/10/2019 (diplomat, AI and global governance researcher, minister-counsellor and Chargé d’affaires ad interim at Conakry Brazilian Embassy, former senior adviser on peace and security, Office of the President of the United Nations General Assembly;Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil; “The militarization of artificial intelligence: a wake-up call for the Global South”; file:///C:/Users/ellaf/Dropbox/PC/Downloads/SSRN-id3452323.pdf//EF)

Artificial intelligence (AI) will have a profound impact upon world politics across the board, as much as upon society generally. Converging technologies that often overlap and affect each other have become drivers of innovation, as in the case of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science (NBIC). Usage of AI in business, government, and everyday life has been developing at breakneck pace, fueled by powerful hardware capacity, abundant data, and online training of self-learning algorithms. As the discipline of International Relations (IR) takes on this expanding research field and its systemic implications, a coming AI race has frequently been portrayed as a perilous trend capable of reshaping the character of international security. 1 An overview of state initiatives, strategies, and related governmental investments in AI reported that at the time of writing less than 20 countries had active AI national plans and, not surprisingly, almost all of them were developed countries.2 Indeed, there is no shortage of analyses focusing upon great-power competition and an epic struggle for AI global supremacy, picturing prominently the United States and China, followed closely by military powers and wealthy nations (Russia, G7 countries, Israel, and others), and a few second-tier, aspiring tech players, which may occupy someday a special place in the AI landscape.3 The Global South, however, is clearly underrepresented in this debate, with many areas of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean completely absent in terms of scholars, politicians, and policymakers engaged in this vital conversation. And yet, when it comes to assess global risks in peace and security and identify where new AI weapons are likely to be deployed in the first place, both researchers and practitioners in the developing world have reasons to be concerned. It is no wonder that proponents of a Global IR have been urging for greater participation from actors of the non-Western world as a means to ‘bring the Rest in’. 4 This article will take as a starting point the fact that the militarization of AI has already begun and will pose many challenges beyond the realm of security itself. I argue that AI governance is also bound to gain traction and the United Nations will eventually get further involved in providing space for international cooperation and facilitating negotiations on how to deal with controversies surrounding AI policymaking. In this context, diplomatic deliberations in Geneva on lethal autonomous weapons systems are a revealing case-study of opportunities and predicaments encountered along the way, insofar as they highlight inter alia how critical it is for the Global South to be abreast of developments in this area, prepare in advance, and act accordingly on distinct fronts.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › UN CP › 1NC

A subcommittee encourages multilateralism and facilitates effective AI governance.

Eugenio V. Garcia 9/10/2019 (diplomat, AI and global governance researcher, minister-counsellor and Chargé d’affaires ad interim at Conakry Brazilian Embassy, former senior adviser on peace and security, Office of the President of the United Nations General Assembly;Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil; “The militarization of artificial intelligence: a wake-up call for the Global South”; file:///C:/Users/ellaf/Dropbox/PC/Downloads/SSRN-id3452323.pdf//EF)

What role for the United Nations? In his address to the General Assembly in September 2018, UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned that ‘multilateralism is under fire precisely when we need it most’. But among the many pressing problems that call for a multilateral approach to be properly addressed, he highlighted two ‘epochal challenges’ in particular: climate change, which is of course of great concern but not covered in this article, and risks associated with advances in technology. Indeed, ‘rapidly developing fields such as artificial intelligence, blockchain and biotechnology have the potential to turbocharge progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals’, Guterres said. On the other hand, new technologies also present serious perils along the way, from mass economic unemployment to cybercrime and malicious use of digital tools.35 Guterres cautioned against the weaponization of AI and the possibility of a dangerous arms race in this domain, including the development of lethal autonomous weapons systems, going so far as to contend that ‘the prospect of machines with the discretion and power to take human life is morally repugnant’. Less oversight over these weapons could severely compromise efforts to contain threats, prevent escalation, and ensure compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law. He urged Member States ‘to use the United Nations as a platform to draw global attention to these crucial matters and to nurture a digital future that is safe and beneficial for all’. To lead by example and engage the UN Secretariat in this enterprise, the SecretaryGeneral launched his own Strategy on New Technologies, with the objective of defining how the UN system will support the use of these technologies to accelerate the achievement of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and to facilitate their alignment with the values enshrined in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the norms and standards of international law. Among the pledges and commitments to pursue this strategy were deepening the UN’s internal capacities and exposure to emerging technologies; increasing understanding, advocacy, and dialogue; supporting dialogue on normative and cooperation frameworks; and enhancing UN system support to government capacity development. 37 In the same vein, the High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation was established by the Secretary-General in 2017 to promote dialogue and look into proposals to build trust and cooperation between countries and other stakeholders, the private sector, research centers, civil society, and academia. In its report, released in June 2019, the Panel envisaged several potential roles for the UN to add value in the digital transformation: as a convener; providing a space for debating values and norms; generating standard setting; holding multi-stakeholder or bilateral initiatives on specific issues; developing the capacity of Member States; ranking, mapping, and measuring cybersecurity; and making available arbitration and dispute-resolution mechanisms. The report put forward various recommendations, such as adopting by 2020 a ‘Global Commitment for Digital Cooperation’ to consolidate in a single political document shared values, principles, understandings, and objectives regarding the governance of cyberspace. Also, it did not shy away from making principled statements of ethical significance, the stipulation that ‘life and death decisions should not be delegated to machines’ being a case in point.38 Most of the UN initiatives on new technologies are focused upon the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, such as the annual ECOSOC’s Science, Technology, and Innovation Forum, which had its fourth edition in May 2019. On the AI front, the flagship UN platform for global dialogue with the wider public is the AI for Good Global Summit, hosted every year in Geneva by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in partnership with other UN agencies, the XPrize Foundation (organization offering incentivize prize competitions) and the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM).39 This interdisciplinary event brings together speakers from governments, industry, academia, media, and the research community to discuss how AI can be utilized to achieve inter alia results in ending poverty, alleviating hunger, promoting health, and identifying development solutions. The UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) established in 2017 a Center for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics in The Hague, with the aim of disseminating information, undertaking training activities, and promoting public awareness. The Center has notably been active in cybercrime, law enforcement, criminal justice, counter-terrorism, and malicious use of AI.40 Also important is UNESCO’s humanistic approach on ethics, policy, and capacity building in response to new emerging challenges related to AI technologies, including philosophical reflections on what it means to be human in the face of disruptive technologies from the ethical perspective. 41 The New York-based Centre for Policy Research of the United Nations University (UNU) has been conducting foresight analyses, developing collaborative research projects with external partners, and convening policy seminars and events. In 2018, the Centre launched an on-line platform on AI and Global Governance to foster cross-disciplinary insights and ‘inform existing debates from the lens of multilateralism’, as a tool for Member States, multilateral agencies, funds, programs, and other stakeholders.42 The UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has a research project on the weaponization of increasingly autonomous technologies since 2013, anchored in the idea that mitigating or reducing potential harms caused by AI will be crucial to harness ‘AI for Good’. 43 More broadly, UNIDIR’s objectives in studying the relationship between AI and international security aim at further clarifying functional concerns in the development and future deployment of autonomous weapons systems, including the risk of accidents; manipulation and other vulnerabilities in weaponization; changes in the nature of conflict and their impact upon strategic stability; commercial development of AI-related technologies and its links with the defense industry; access to sensitive technologies and their use to conduct asymmetric warfare; and the structural effects of the AI revolution on geopolitics and power dynamics in the international system.44 In turn, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), both in New York and in Geneva, has been working to implement the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament (Securing Our Common Future), which includes the consideration of possible challenges posed by new weapon technologies. One of the action points of the Agenda seeks to support efforts by Member States ‘to elaborate new measures, including through political or legally binding arrangements, to ensure that humans remain at all times in control over the use of force’.45 Other initiatives include the UN Innovation Network, connecting a collaborative community of innovators within the UN System, as well as a myriad of projects developed by UN agencies to apply AI tools in their daily practice in the field Despite the relative lack of clarity on the way forward, the future role of the UN will be inextricably linked to the global governance of AI. Research and policy proposals on this topic are beginning to shed light upon the likelihood of international cooperation on transformative AI-related issues, incentives needed for the parties to reach meaningful agreements, proper conditions for compliance, and costs of defection or unilateral, non-cooperative measures. 46 Proposals range from informal mechanisms in narrowly-focused domains to much more ambitious, institutionalized forums, such as the establishment of an international regulatory agency, to be named, for example, the ‘International Artificial Intelligence Organization’ (IAIO), aimed at setting standards and benchmarks across numerous areas to be regulated. However, even the proponents of such broad-spectrum organization concede that reaching a workable international consensus on this idea seems rather a remote possibility in the short term. 47 Another proposition to consider is creating a new body modeled on the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to provide policymakers with technical, neutral assessments, subject to review by states, underlining the opportunities, implications, and potential risks of AI, always through evidence-based research by the tech and scientific communities.48 A case can be made for an ‘Intergovernmental Panel on Artificial Intelligence’ (IPAI), as Miailhe did, to gather a large interdisciplinary group of experts with a mandate to collect, organize, and analyze credible and up-to-date information on AI challenges. 49 As technologies become more and more sophisticated and indecipherable to the layman, sound technical advice will be in high demand if intergovernmental negotiations are to be launched to tackle these thorny issues, separating myth, hype, and misinformation from what is in tune with the body of evidence and human knowledge available so far. Politicians obviously have no need to know technicalities about reinforcement learning, multilayer perceptrons, convolutional neural networks, or Boltzmann machines. But as AI puzzles and their impact upon society become increasingly relevant in the real world, AI researchers cannot deny that suitable communication with the political leadership will be of paramount importance to guide decisionmaking in the right direction. One key challenge is to keep the major players engaged, so that AI governance can be instrumental in providing stability to safeguard the system in everyone’s interest. Even though some proposals may require more time for maturation, others could be implemented in a more straightforward manner, without the need for a fully-fledged, previous commitment from governments on the parameters and preconditions deemed appropriate for establishing new criteria at the international level. Advisory and non-binding settings involving states, the private sector, and civil society could be a first step if focused upon information gathering, independent analyses, and recommendations geared at prevention rather than regulation per se. Traditional, institutionally-based intergovernmental diplomacy seems too slow if compared with the staggering pace of technological innovation. Informal, ad-hoc, plurilateral initiatives spurred by some like-minded countries (‘coalitions of the willing’) may at times promote added value in governance, but they usually lack universal appeal and raise suspicious of their agendas in the eyes of states left outside these groups. A better solution to escape shortterm paralysis [immobilization] is for the UN, with the authority and legitimacy conferred to it by Member States, to take the lead and offer a collective space, open to all, strictly voluntary, to encourage cooperation and work on prevention, capacity-building, and normative recommendations. A good example along these lines would be the creation of a ‘Global Foresight Observatory’ on the convergence of AI with other emerging technologies, under the auspices of the UN, as envisaged in the report of UNU’s Centre for Policy Research, i.e. a multi-stakeholder, inclusive platform to foster cooperation in technological and political preparedness for responsive innovation.50 This sort of initiative fits well with what the UN can do even in hardknock situations. Trying to be too ambitious from the very beginning may backlash and lead nowhere. It is essential not to allow resistance from becoming lethargic and continue exploring alternatives to take concrete steps in AI governance in a robust and comprehensive manner.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Solvency › 1NC—PLAN FAILS

Military adoption of AI fails- insert warrants

Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” EZG]

A challenge for military adoption of AI is that two key risks associated with new technology adoption are in tension. First, militaries could fail to adopt—or adopt quickly enough or employ in the right manner—a new technology that yields significant battlefield advantage. As a recent example, despite the overall growth in the military uninhabited, or unmanned, aircraft market, the adoption of uninhabited vehicles has, at times, been a source of contention within the U.S. defense establishment, principally based on debates over the merits of this new technology relative to existing alternatives.17 Alternatively, militaries could adopt an immature technology too quickly, betting heavily and incorrectly on new and untested propositions about how a technology may change warfare. Given the natural incentive militaries have in ensuring their capabilities work on the battlefield, it may be reasonable to assume that militaries would manage these risks reasonably well, although not without some mishaps. But when balancing the risk of accidents versus falling behind adversaries in technological innovation, militaries arguably place safety as a secondary consideration.18 Militaries may be relatively accepting of the risk of accidents in the pursuit of technological advantage, since accidents are a routine element of military operations, even in training.19 Nevertheless, there are strong bureaucratic interests in ultimately ensuring that fielded capabilities are robust and secure, and existing institutional processes may be able to manage AI safety and security risks with some adaptation. For militaries, balancing between the risks of going too slow versus going too fast with AI adoption is complicated by the fact that AI, and deep learning in particular, is a relatively immature technology with significant vulnerabilities and reliability concerns.20 These concerns are heightened in situations where there may not be ample data on which to train machine learning systems. Machine learning systems generally rely on very large data sets, which may not exist in some military settings, particularly when it comes to early warning of rare events (such as a nuclear attack) or tracking adversary behavior in a multidimensional battlefield. When trained with inadequate data sets or employed outside the narrow context of their design, AI systems are often unreliable and brittle. AI systems can often seem deceptively capable, performing well (sometimes better than humans) in some laboratory settings, then failing dramatically under changing environmental conditions in the real world. Self-driving cars, for example, may be safer than human drivers in some settings, then inexplicably turn deadly in situations where a human operator would not have trouble. Additionally, deep learning methods may, at present, be insufficiently reliable for safety-critical applications even when operating within the bounds of their design specifications.21 For example, concerns about limits to the reliability of algorithms across demographic groups have hindered the deployment of facial recognition technology in the United States, particularly in high-consequence applications such as law enforcement. Militaries, too, should be concerned about technical limitations and vulnerabilities in their AI systems. Militaries want technologies that work, especially on the battlefield. Accordingly, the AI strategy of the Department of Defense (DoD) calls for AI systems that are “resilient, robust, reliable, and secure.”22 This is undoubtedly the correct approach but a challenge, at least in the near term, given the reliability issues facing many uses of algorithms today and the highly dynamic conditions of battlefield use. An additional challenge stems from security dilemma dynamics. Competitive pressures could lead nations to shortcut test and evaluation (T&E) in a desire to field new AI capabilities ahead of adversaries. Similar competitive pressures to beat others to market appear to have played an exacerbating role in accident risk relating to AI systems in self-driving cars and commercial airplane autopilots.23 Militaries evaluating an AI system of uncertain reliability could, not unjustifiably, feel pressure to hasten deployment if they believe others are taking similar measures. Historically, these pressures are highest immediately before and during wars, where the risk/reward equation surrounding new technologies can shift due to the very real lives on the line. For example, competitive pressures may have spurred the faster introduction of poison gas in World War I.24 Similarly, in World War II, Germany diverted funds from proven technologies into jet engines, ballistic missiles, and helicopters, even though none of the technologies proved mature until after the war.25 This dynamic risk might spark a self-fulfilling prophecy in which countries accelerate deployment of insufficiently tested AI systems out of the fear that others will deploy first.26 The net effect is not an arms race but a “race to the bottom” on safety, leading to the deployment of unsafe AI systems and heightening the risk of accidents and instability.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Solvency › 2NC—NO SOLVENCY

Cyber deterrence fails

Whyte 20 Christopher Whyte, 11/25/2020, assistant professor of homeland security and emergency preparedness in the L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs at Virginia Commonwealth University;  Strategic Studies Quarterly, "Poison, Persistence, and Cascade Effect," https://www.jstor.org/stable/26956151 //EZJ

In terms of the strategic logic of engagement in the domain, the PE strategy largely emerges from the work of Richard Harknett and Michael Fischerkeller during their time as scholars attached to Cyber Command. The authors argue that the unique character of cyberspace means that traditional deterrent approaches are doomed to failure.36 Given that deterrence involves strong demonstrations of defense or meaningful statements of punishment, they contend, prospects for developing a sustainable deterrent posture online are limited (or so the architects of the new approach hold).37 It is extremely difficult to demonstrate defensive capabilities at the scale demanded by a national cyber deterrent strategy, and punishment rarely works in the way it is intended. Communicating specific meaning in retaliation is difficult, particularly where the diversity of activities that constitute cyber conflict is immensely high. Moreover, response options are often not ready to execute in the time frame required by policy makers that seek to deter. And conceptual agreement on the significance or role of certain elements of the domain is not easy to come by, with poor understanding of what might be meant—if anything—by sovereignty online being a hallmark of the digital world.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Solvency › 1NC—CANT SOLVE CHINESE AI

CCP State Control guarantees that Chinese AI continues to be unregulated

Zeng ’20 (Jinghan, professor of China and International Studies at Lancaster University, “Artificial intelligence and China’s authoritarian governance”, Published October 13th, 2020, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/96/6/1441/5922010?login=true, Accessed 7/9/2022)

The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to transform our governments and societies. An AI revolution may make future governments more digital, efficient and economic than ever before. Yet despite all the benefits that AI offers when applied in governance, western democratic societies have considerable concerns regarding civil rights. The authoritarian regime in China, on the other hand, has chosen to fully embrace the age of AI. Nowadays, AI has become a buzzword not only in the capital market but also in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To develop AI is now considered China's national strategy, with a clear goal of making the country a leading AI power.1 China's open ambition in this field has alarmed many of its competitors, especially in the United States and Europe, where many view it as an open challenge to American AI supremacy.2 In the context of global power transition, the so-called ‘AI race’ between China and the United States has opened up a new front in their already intense geopolitical competition. The US–China AI race is not only a technological competition but also an ideological one. China's bold practices of applying AI technologies in state governance have further contested the superiority of western liberal democracy.3 This article examines the Chinese governance approach towards AI. It shows that China's bold use of AI practices in governance represents an attempt not only to build a more efficient and capable government to deliver better public services, but also to strengthen state control to ensure the continuation of the authoritarian order. The article argues that the application of AI in China's governance should be understood in the wider context of the CCP's broad and incoherent strategy of adaptation to governance by digital means. The CCP's successful employment of digital technologies to strengthen its governance is made possible by China's unique socio-political environment. China's huge internet market has provided, in effect, unlimited data with which to train and advance AI programs. As the world shifts from ‘the age of expertise to the age of data’,4 data are a strategic resource that lays the foundation for digital technologies such as AI. As Kaifu Lee, one of the most prominent figures in the Chinese internet sector, points out, data—rather than computing power and AI talents—constitute the most important factor to ensure successful AI algorithms, as ‘once computing power and engineering talent reach a certain threshold, the quantity of data becomes decisive in determining the overall power and accuracy of an algorithm’.5 In 2019, China had over 854 million internet users—and, with this representing only 61.2 per cent of its 1.3 billion population, long-term growth potential;6 by comparison, the United States had only 312 million users with less than 10 per cent offline population in which to expand.7 In this respect, as the ‘Saudi Arabia of data’, China has considerable comparative advantage in developing its AI industry.8 Moreover, weak civil awareness within Chinese society, combined with the CCP's strong state power, including a well-resourced domestic security sector, has put the regime in a favourable position not only to exploit its data advantage but also to enhance state control via digital means. For example, China is now leading AI technology in areas such as facial recognition that Europe and the United States have put on hold—or even banned—owing to privacy concerns. In contrast to western democratic societies, for China the key barrier to AI advancement lies in technological rather than legal constraints. More importantly, AI is not just another powerful tech tool to boost China's digital surveillance; AI's automation of decision-making capability without human intervention is unleashing the potential of China's sophisticated digital surveillance network in ways that this article will explore. In this respect, the Chinese approach towards digital technology has to date been successful in furthering state power and capacity.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Solvency › 2NC—SQUO SOLVES AI

Squo solves: EU already has GDPR that enforces AI clarity.

Thelisson et al. 17 - (Eva, Co-founder and CEO of the AI Transparency Institute with a PhD in Law at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland on the General Data Protection Regulation. ANd invited expert at the EU Commission, at the Swiss Government and at international conferences; Kirtan Padh, current PhD Candidate at Helmholtz AI and former graduate from EPFL with a specialization in data analytics and research; Elisa Celis, Assistant Professor of Statistics & Data Science at Yale University)

Despite the incredible boon that computational techniques have been to society, certain red flags have recently appeared which demonstrate that algorithms, in particular AI/ML techniques that rely on data, can be biased. A growing number of global leaders and experts including Bill Gates, Elon Musk, Georges Church and Stephen Hawking have publicly voiced their concern regarding the speed and pervasiveness of the developments of AI/ML. In the US, President Obama’s administration produced a report which states that “big data technologies can cause societal harms beyond damages to privacy” [Executive office of the President et al., 2014]. In particular, it expressed concerns about the possibility that decisions informed by big data could have discriminatory effects, even in the absence of discriminatory intent. The 2017 edition of the World Economics Forum Global Risks Report, which surveyed 745 leaders in business, government, academia and members of the Institute of Risk Management, listed AI as “the emerging technology with the greatest potential for negative consequences over the coming decade”. Many negative instances have now been demonstrated [O’Neil, 2016; Kirkpatrick, 2016; Barocas and Selbst, 2015]. For instance, Google’s online advertising system displayed ads for high-income jobs to men much more often than it did to women [Datta et al., 2015], and ads for arrest records were significantly more likely to show up on searches for distinctively black names or a historically black fraternity [Sweeney, 2013]. Recent events have shown that such algorithmic bias is affecting society in a multitude of ways, e.g., exacerbating systemic bias in the racial composition of the American prison population [Angwin et al., 2016], inadvertently promoting extremist ideology [Costello et al., 2016] and affecting the results of elections [Baer, 2016; Bakshy et al., 2015]. Despite these serious concerns, algorithms, at a fundamental level, pervade everything we do. Simply eliminating them is not an option. Hence it is essential to design algorithmic tools and regulatory mechanisms to empower society at large to mitigate any resulting discrimination, inequality and bias. For AI/ML to remain beneficial, we must build trust in the systems that are transforming our social, political and business environments and are making decisions on our behalf. We consider at the technical aspect of how bias and discrimination can creep into decisions made by AI, often despite the best intentions of the developers of the algorithm, and how can we prevent such negative outcomes. We then outline the necessary regulatory mechanisms and techniques that must be developed in order to prevent such biases in the future.

2 Algorithmic Bias

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Solvency › 2NC—SQUO SOLVES AI

EU regulations means our allies don’t need US assistance

Kop ’21 (Mauritz, Stanford Law School TTLF Fellow at Stanford University and is Managing Partner at AIRecht, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, “EU Artificial Intelligence Act: The European Approach to AI, Accessed 7/9/2022, )

On 21 April 2021, the European Commission presented the Artificial Intelligence Act. As a Fellow at Stanford University’s Transatlantic Technology Law Forum and a Member of the European AI Alliance, I made independent strategic recommendations to the European Commission. President Ursula von der Leyen's team adopted some of the suggestions that I offered them, or has itself arrived to the same conclusions. That is encouraging. This contribution will list the main points of this novel regulatory framework for AI. 1 Mauritz Kop is Stanford Law School TTLF Fellow at Stanford University and is Managing Partner at AIRecht, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 2 Core horizontal rules for AI The EU AI Act sets out horizontal rules for the development, commodification and use of AI-driven products, services and systems within the territory of the EU. The draft regulation provides core artificial intelligence rules that apply to all industries. The EU AI Act introduces a sophisticated ‘product safety framework’ constructed around a set of 4 risk categories. It imposes requirements for market entrance and certification of High-Risk AI Systems through a mandatory CE-marking procedure. To ensure equitable outcomes, this pre-market conformity regime also applies to machine learning training, testing and validation datasets. The Act seeks to codify the high standards of the EU trustworthy AI paradigm, which requires AI to be legally, ethically and technically robust, while respecting democratic values, human rights and the rule of law. Objectives of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act The proposed regulatory framework on Artificial Intelligence has the following objectives: 1. ensure that AI systems placed on the Union market and used are safe and respect existing law on fundamental rights and Union values; 2. ensure legal certainty to facilitate investment and innovation in AI; 3. enhance governance and effective enforcement of existing law on fundamental rights and safety requirements applicable to AI systems; 4. facilitate the development of a single market for lawful, safe and trustworthy AI applications and prevent market fragmentation. Subject Matter of the EU AI Act The scope of the AI Act is largely determined by the subject matter to which the rules apply. In that regard, Article 1 states that: Article 1 Subject matter This Regulation lays down: (a) harmonised rules for the placing on the market, the putting into service and the use of artificial intelligence systems (‘AI systems’) in the Union; (a) prohibitions of certain artificial intelligence practices; (b) specific requirements for high-risk AI systems and obligations for operators of such systems; (c) harmonised transparency rules for AI systems intended to interact with natural persons, emotion recognition systems and biometric categorisation systems, and AI systems used to generate or manipulate image, audio or video content; (d) rules on market monitoring and surveillance.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Solvency › 1NC—SQUO SOLVES AI

Squo solves: NATO has invested $1 billion into an AI strategy

Wiggers ’21 (Kyle, writer about artificial intelligence for VentureBeat, “NATO launches AI strategy and $1B fund as defense race heats up”, Published October 21, 2021, Accessed 7/15/2022, https://venturebeat.com/2021/10/21/nato-launches-ai-strategy-and-1b-fund-as-defense-race-heats-up/)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the military alliance of 30 countries that border the North Atlantic Ocean, this week announced that it would adopt an 18-point AI strategy and launch a “future-proofing” fund with the goal of investing around $1 billion. Military.com  that U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin will join other NATO members in Brussels, Belgium, the alliance’s headquarters, to formally approve the plans over two days of talks. Speaking at a news conference, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that the effort was in response to “authoritarian regimes racing to develop new technologies.” NATO’s AI strategy will cover areas including data analysis, imagery, cyberdefense, he added. NATO said in a July press release that it was “currently finalizing” its strategy on AI” and that principles of responsible use of AI in defense will be “at the core” of the strategy. Speaking to Politico in March, NATO assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges David van Weel  that the strategy would identify ways to operate AI systems ethically, pinpoint military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it’s up to NATO standards.” van Weel said. “Future conflicts will be fought not just with bullets and bombs, but also with bytes and big data,” Stoltenberg said. “We must keep our technological edge.”

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Solvency › 1NC—SQUO SOLVES COOP

Squo CBMs over AI solve coop

Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures Acc 6/6/22 EZG]

One confidence-building measure is already underway: Track II dialogues between academic experts from different countries with expertise surrounding military uses of AI.54 Because these dialogues occur among experts who are not government officials, they are low risk because they do not commit countries to actually doing anything. This also places a cap on their potential benefits. Track II dialogues can nevertheless be useful building blocks for more substantive cooperation among countries and an avenue to explore various potential modes of cooperation without fear of commitment by states. Track II dialogues can help facilitate mutual understanding among expert communities in different states and build shared trust between experts.55 Additionally, if some of those experts transition into government positions in the future, the lessons from these dialogues can improve the prospects for cooperation in more formal venues. While there are risks to misleading statements in the context of formal government dialogues, as discussed below, the consequences of such activities in a Track II context are minimal. The nature of the dialogue is that participants are not government officials and it is to be expected that some of their statements may not be entirely in line with their government’s policies. Thus, Track II dialogues can build trust and be an end in themselves, even as they serve as the means to broader cooperation and understanding.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Solvency › 1NC—NO NATO CONSENSUS

NATO will not agree on universal regulations

Heikkila 21 (Melissa, Journalist for Politico newspaper, “NATO wants to set AI standards.  If only its members agreed on the basics.”, Politico.eu, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/)

The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.” These issues threaten to hamper NATO's standard-setting drive. "I think there’s a certain danger that if NATO doesn’t take this on as a real challenge, that it may be marginalized by other such efforts,” Franke said. She pointed to the U.S.-led, which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context — a forum which could supplant NATO as the standard-setting body. That could have consequences for human rights, too. “NATO… is a great place to responsibly think about how to harness the good parts of this technology and how to prohibit the parts that would be catastrophic for humanitarian law and human rights law, and people at the end of the day,” said Verity Coyle, a senior adviser at Amnesty International, which is part of the campaign. “Without oversight mechanisms to ensure ethical standards and measures, which would guarantee that this technology will operate under meaningful human control” NATO’s strategy could head into an “ethical vacuum,” Coyle said. Franke said it's better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics. “If NATO countries were to cooperate on that, that could create good procedures and set precedents. And I think we should then move on to the more controversial things such as autonomous weapons systems,” she said.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Solvency › 1NC—NATO CAN’T SOLVE

NATO efforts fail to solve for the Global South AND their motives are unethical

Burt ’21 (Peter, researcher at Drone Wars UK working on issues relating to artificial intelligence and autonomy and their role in the future development of drones, “NATO’s new AI strategy: lacking in substance and lacking in leadership”, Published 11/8/2021, Accessed 7/17/2022, )

Whilst publication of the AI strategy is a step in the right direction for NATO, although perhaps not a particularly ambitious one, a number of questions about NATO's position on the use of AI remain unanswered. So far NATO has only published a 'summary' of its AI strategy, raising an obvious question: what does the rest of the document say? Does it expand upon resolving ethical and human rights concerns in more detail and include clear monitoring processes to do this, or does it set out a manifesto for tackling the realities of how NATO expects to take forward the use of AI for military purposes? Running through the strategy is the mantra of interoperability – the desire for different systems to be able to work with each other across NATO's different forces and nations without any restrictions. An article in the NATO Review journal by two of the authors of the strategy, Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Edward Hunter Christie, makes it clear that “the aim of NATO’s AI Strategy is to accelerate AI adoption”, and NATO evidently intends AI to be adopted at all levels within the organisation and across all its roles. Despite the good intentions behind the ethical principles, a key thrust of the new strategy is to enable the uptake of AI for military purposes. In the same article Stanley-Lockman and Christie also talk of AI as an enabler to “out-adapt competitors and adversaries”, and the strategy itself states that collaboration and cooperation on AI among NATO allies is necessary “in order to maintain NATO’s technological edge”. NATO clearly sees the adoption of AI in terms of a zerosum arms race against rivals such as China and Russia, which are also investing heavily in AI, and presumably believes it can win the race. This is problematic, as arms races have the potential to escalate, as has been the case with other weapons. Competition has no absolute end goal—merely the relative goal of staying ahead of the other competitors. Should one player cross an ethical line, such as developing and deploying autonomous weapon systems, others may be expected to follow suit with destabilising consequences. NATO's ethical principles for the responsible use of AI, though welcome, raise several issues. Such statements of principle are now commonplace in the corporate sector and are increasingly being adopted by governments on both a unilateral and multilateral basis. NATO's principles are similar to principles adopted by the US Department of Defense for the ethical use of AI: indeed, in some places the wording is the same as that in the Department of Defense principles. As with many such statements of principle, the NATO principles have no coherent means of implementation or enforcement. Their successful adoption will in many ways depend upon leadership and political and military culture, which is different in each of NATO's 30 member states. Will Turkey, for example, which has been a keen proponent of automated warfare and by some accounts has already developed AI-based loitering munitions with an autonomous capability to identify targets, be willing to follow the same rules as the USA? And would the USA under a second Trump administration follow the same rules as a Biden administration? In the absence of any binding enforcement mechanism NATO's principles may provide useful for public relations purposes but are likely to be less useful in preventing harm to humans, particularly those in the Global South who are already in situations of conflict, and historically marginalised groups. Despite the plethora of corporate statements on ethical principles, those working in the tech sector are skeptical about the prospect that ethical AI design will be adopted as a norm over the next decade. A non-random poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre in early 2021 found that 68% of experts in the field thought that ethical principles focused primarily on the public good will not be employed in most AI systems by 2030. Their concerns recognised that the main developers and deployers of AI are focused on profit-seeking and social control, and that global competition will matter more to the development of AI than any ethical issues. This latter factor will very much influence NATO's future adoption of AI. Although NATO's ethical AI principles are stated to have been developed on the basis of “Allied approaches and relevant work in applicable international fora”, it is not clear whether they draw on views from the wide range of professional disciplines necessary to develop a representative and rounded view of the ethical pitfalls and risks associated for AI, or from a diversity of perspectives. There has certainly been no open consultation on their formulation, and it is possible that the principles may only represent the perceptions of a relatively narrow range of predominantly white male technocrats and military planners drawn from within NATO, member governments (notably the USA), and the arms industry. Ordinary people, particularly marginalised groups and those in the Global South, will ultimately face the consequences and impacts of NATO's decisions on AI systems, yet the public have certainly not been involved in making decisions on this strategy, which will set the framework for NATO's future AI choices. NATO's AI strategy does not discuss the development of AI-driven autonomous weapon systems – a significant omission, given the ethical issues that this application of AI would raise and the challenges to human rights that such weapons would pose. As a bare minimum, the strategy could—and should—have endorsed the 'Guiding Principles' on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons which have recently been adopted by consensus by High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Despite increasing pressure for a ban on the development and use of lethal autonomous weapons, key NATO states including the USA and UK have been lukewarm about the need for a ban, arguing that current laws of war are adequate to regulate any such weapons. This seems optimistic, given the rapid development of AI technology and the push by some states over recent years to redefine the rules that govern use of armed force to suit their own purposes. To date no NATO member states have supported the call for a ban on lethal autonomous weapons. If NATO members were serious about ensuring that the military use of AI adheres to international humanitarian law and human rights law, they would call for and engage in negotiations on a legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems at the CCW; which is expected to take a historic decision on this issue at its Review Conference in December 2021. Investment and innovation in artificial intelligence is being led by the private sector, and not by the world’s militaries. Recognising this, NATO's AI strategy places a premium on engaging with “start-ups, innovative small and medium enterprises, and academic researchers that either have not considered working on defence and security solutions, or simply find the adoption pathways too slow or restrictive for their business models”. NATO wants to “make defence and security a more attractive sector for civilian innovators to partner with”. Aiming to capture the civilian tech sector in this way risks increasing the influence of the military-industrialpolitical complex to an even greater extent than is already the case. Will this really help advance NATO's liberal and democratic values? Conclusion Although NATO's AI strategy contains a few worthwhile nuggets, on balance it is tame and unambitious. It is depressingly clear that NATO sees AI as basically another way of using technology to wage war more effectively, and is not willing to show any real leadership to mitigate the risks that AI poses to human rights and dignity. War is, after all, the highest area of risk when it comes to the potential for human rights abuses, yet NATO's strategy says nothing about measures to effectively govern military AI and autonomous weapon systems. AI has the potential to help humanity tackle intractable 'wicked problems' such as climate change and unsustainable development, and tackle the course of dangerous behaviour which is threatening the survival of our species. But this will only happen if it is employed under wise and decisive human leadership, otherwise it may dramatically compound the problems we face, threatening international security and human rights even more. NATO, unfortunately, seems unwilling to provide that leadership.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 2NC—NATO BAD

Concessions would detract from their pursuit.

Artyom 20, Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok, Russia). He is also Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations. (Lukin, 6-13-20; “The Russia-China entente and its future”, International Politics; Accessible at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7)

Scenario 2. Russia-US rapprochement Even though Russian-American relations are presently at a very low point and unlikely to substantially recover any time soon, in the long term their normalization is not impossible. In fact, the USA will be under increasing structural pressure to make peace with Russia as China looms as by far the biggest threat to America’s positions in the international system. At some point, Washington might be forced to seek Moscow’s collaboration in managing the massive challenge from Beijing. Although Russia is unlikely to participate in any overt containment of China, it might, at least, agree to become a neutral player. However, Washington will have to make some significant concessions to Moscow, such as recognizing Russia’s special interests in Eastern Europe and lifting sanctions. The hypothetical normalization of US-Russia relations would likely have a dual effect on Russia’s policy toward China. First, Russia would relax its systemic balancing of the USA and thus have much less incentive to strategically collaborate with China, especially in the political-military domain. Second, if Russia feels secure on its western borders, it will have more freedom to play its own game in East Asia, rather than siding with Beijing, which would, to a degree, help balance China’s ambitions.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 2NC—NATO BAD

Mutual containment causes a formal alliance.

Artyom 20, Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok, Russia). He is also Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations. (Lukin, 6-13-20; “The Russia-China entente and its future”, International Politics; Accessible at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7)

Scenario 1. The continuation of the Sino-Russian entente It is quite likely that, even seven or 10 years into the future, the forces that currently sustain the Moscow–Beijing axis will remain in place or could even intensify. Russia and China’s rivalry with the USA could grow more acute, while their illiberal autocracies would become even more entrenched. This will result in the continuation of the Sino-Russian entente, with ever tighter political, ideological, military and economic ties between Moscow and Beijing, and could even see the elevation of their ‘strategic partnership’ to the level of a full alliance based on a formal treaty.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 2NC—NATO BAD

NATO forces Russia’s hand to cementing the axis.

Bradley Devlin 22, MA Political Economy from UC Berkeley, 2-11-22, “Thank NATO For The New Russia-China Pact,” , jy

The new partnership between Russia and China is America's chickens coming home to roost.

Russia and China announced the formation of a “no-limits” partnership last week, the predictable consequence of America’s misguided policy towards post-Soviet Russia and ill-advised embrace of a rising China.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—NATO BAD

BUT, stabilization of relations solves a litany of existential threats.

Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky 19, Rumer, former national intelligence officer for Russia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; Sokolsky, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, 6-20-19, “Thirty Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken?” , jy

A military confrontation between the two countries could have profoundly destabilizing and even catastrophic effects on global order and security. In contrast, a more cooperative U.S.-Russian relationship could yield progress on threats to U.S. national security and prosperity—challenges that the United States cannot tackle effectively alone. Preventing further nuclear proliferation, including the complex problem of securing nuclear materials and other components of weapons of mass destruction, will require not only greater U.S.-Russia collaboration but also preserving at least some elements of the remaining arms control framework and inspection regimes. Efforts to combat transnational threats, from terrorist movements to criminal organizations and illicit trafficking, would also benefit from U.S.-Russian cooperation. Likewise, it will not be possible to resolve long-standing regional conflicts, for example on the Korean Peninsula and in Afghanistan, Syria, and Ukraine, without U.S. and Russian cooperation and willingness to negotiate. Finally, the United States and Russia will need to find practical ways to avoid escalation of tensions in cyberspace and outer space, and restrain the growth of Chinese influence.

POST–COLD WAR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS—WHAT WENT WRONG?

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—NATO BAD

Overstretch cedes competition with China, making hotspots escalate.

Nishtha Kaushiki 21, Assistant Prof of International Studies at the Central University of Punjab, 12-10-21, "China: A nemesis that NATO wouldn’t want," https://www.dailypioneer.com/2021/columnists/china--a-nemesis-that-nato-wouldn---t-want.html, jy

The mention of China as a potential challenger to NATO first emerged in one of its documents in 2019, and by 2020-21, it has become its "systemic rival". From a Euro-Atlantic perspective, Russia is a direct military threat that does not shy away from a head-on clash. Its primary focus is on its immediate strategic backyard- Eastern Europe and Central Asia. On the other hand, China has violent tendencies towards its neighbours and politically intimidates the countries of other regions by actively using its economic and political clout. Further, it has forged strategic partnerships with authoritarian countries, attempts to change the existing security architectures by challenging the freedom of navigation of commercial ships by buying or financing strategic assets worldwide. Thus, it has a global strategic agenda and is far more dangerous than Russia for the EU and NATO.

There has been an upward trend of trade between the EU and China. During the first nine months of 2020, the bilateral trade between the two was Euro 425.5 billion. Simultaneously, the EU-US trade saw a downward trend of -11.4 percent for imports and -10 percent for exports. With regard to the Chinese BRI, in 2018, China marked its strategic presence in North-Western Europe with the takeover of Zeebrugge terminal in Belgium and Greece's Piraeus seaport,followed by crucial infrastructural development projects in Spain, Italy and Greece. Germany's Duisburg inland port should not be missed either. The EU and NATO essentially see the 17+1 format as a leapfrog approach by Beijing that threatens the region's security.