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2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—NATO BAD

That causes Russia and China to create an Axis of Evil against the US.

Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky 22, Rumer, former national intelligence officer for Russia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; Sokolsky, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; 3-23-22, “Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front,” , jy

Putin’s war against Ukraine, preceded by his demands for the United States and its NATO allies to fundamentally alter post–Cold War European security arrangements, has dispelled all doubts—to the extent that any remained—about the primacy of Europe as the principal theater where Russia’s strategic interests reside, from where the principal threats to the country’s security emanate, and where the principal efforts to defend it from those threats are concentrated. As a critical strategic theater, Asia pales in comparison with Europe. The attack on Ukraine demonstrates the dominance of Europe and the unimportance of Asia—beyond China—in Russian strategic thinking.

Prior to the war in Ukraine, the view that Russian strategic thinking was myopic and misguided was widespread in the U.S. national security community. According to this view, the real threat to Russia in the medium and long term would emerge from China rather than the West. Sooner or later, the Russian strategic community would realize that. And the sooner it could be disabused of its mistaken approach to China, the better for the United States, whose interests would be best served by preventing Russia from becoming an ally and force multiplier of China. U.S. policy, therefore, should de-emphasize rivalry with Russia and instead seek to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. In other words, it was a policy prescription for a partnership with Russia on the basis of perceiving a shared threat from China.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—MILITARY AI TURN

Military AI lack of human cognition psychology card- not great but could be useful- doesn’t necessarily bad just says scary which is fair tbh

Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures Acc 6/6/22 EZG]

The widespread adoption of AI could have a net effect on international stability in other ways. AI systems could change strategy in war, including by substituting machines for human decision-making in some mission areas, and therefore removing certain aspects of human psychology from parts of war.11 Warfare today is waged by humans through physical machinery (rockets, missiles, machine guns, etc.), but decision-making is almost universally human. As algorithms creep closer to the battlefield, some decisions will be made by machines even if warfare remains a human-directed activity that is fought for human political purposes. The widespread integration of machine decision-making across tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare could have far-reaching implications. Already, AI agents playing real-time computer strategy games such as StarCraft and Dota 2 have demonstrated superhuman aggressiveness, precision, and coordination. In other strategy games such as poker and go, AI agents have demonstrated an ability to radically adjust playing styles and risk-taking in ways that would be, at best, challenging for humans to mimic for psychological reasons. AI dogfighting agents have similarly demonstrated superhuman precision and employed different tactics because of the ability to take greater risk to themselves.12 In many ways, AI systems have the ability to be the perfect strategic agents, unencumbered by fear, loss aversion, commitment bias, or other human emotional or cognitive biases and limitations.13 While the specific algorithms and models used for computer games are unlikely to transfer well to combat applications, the general characteristics and advantages of AI agents relative to humans could have applications in the military domain. As in the case of speed, the net consequence of machine decision-making on the psychology of combat could change the character of warfare in profound ways.14

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—MILITARY AI TURN

Further adoption of AI into military means hyperwar- even if not LAWS- causes escalation

Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures Acc 6/6/22 EZG]

It is reasonable and, in fact, vital to examine whether the integration of AI into warfare might also pose risks that policymakers should attend. Some AI researchers themselves have raised alarm at militaries’ adoption of AI and the way it could increase the risk of war and international instability.5 Understanding risks stemming from military use of AI is complicated, however, by the fact that AI is not a discrete technology like missiles or submarines. As a general-purpose technology, AI has many applications, any of which could, individually, improve or undermine stability in various ways. Militaries are only beginning the process of adopting AI, and in the near term, military AI use is likely to be limited and incremental. Over time, the cognization of warfare through the introduction of artificial intelligence could change warfare in profound ways, just as industrial revolutions in the past shaped warfare.6 Even if militaries successfully manage safety and security concerns and field AI systems that are robust and secure, properly functioning AI systems could create challenges for international stability. For example, both Chinese and American scholars have hypothesized that the introduction of AI and autonomous systems in combat operations could accelerate the tempo of warfare beyond the pace of human control. Chinese scholars have referred to this concept as a battlefield “singularity,”7 while some Americans have coined the term “hyperwar” to refer to a similar idea.8 If warfare evolves to a point where the pace of combat outpaces humans’ ability to keep up, and therefore control over military operations must be handed to machines, it would pose significant risks for international stability, even if the delegation decision seems necessary due to competitive pressure. Humans might lose control over managing escalation, and war termination could be significantly complicated if machines fight at a pace that is faster than humans can respond. In addition, delegation of escalation control to machines could mean that minor tactical missteps or accidents that are part and parcel of military operations in the chaos and fog of war, including fratricide, civilian casualties, and poor military judgment, could spiral out of control and reach catastrophic proportions before humans have time to intervene. Even if militaries successfully manage safety and security concerns and field AI systems that are robust and secure, properly functioning AI systems could create challenges for international stability. The logic of a battlefield singularity, or hyperwar, is troubling precisely because competitive pressures could drive militaries to accelerate the tempo of operations and remove humans “from the loop,” even if they would rather not, in order to keep pace with adversaries. Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work succinctly captured this dilemma when he posed the question, “If our competitors go to Terminators ... and it turns out the Terminators are able to make decisions faster, even if they’re bad, how would we respond?”9 While this “arms race in speed” is often characterized tactically in the context of lethal autonomous weapon systems, the same dynamic could emerge operationally involving algorithms designed as decision aids. The perception by policymakers that war is evolving to an era of machine-dominated conflict in which humans must cede control to machines to remain competitive could also hasten such a development, particularly if decision makers lack appropriate education about the limits of AI. In extremis, the shift toward the use of algorithms for military decision-making, combined with a more roboticized battlefield, could potentially change the nature of war. War would still be the continuation of politics by other means in the broadest sense, but in the most extreme case it might feature so little human engagement that it is no longer a fundamentally human endeavor.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—MILITARY AI TURN

Military a goes bad- can escalate scenarios & other warrants

Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures Acc 6/6/22 EZG]

Even if military AI systems are adequately tested, the use of AI to enable more autonomous machine behavior in military systems raises an additional set of risks. In delegating decision-making from humans to machines, policymakers may de facto be fielding forces with less flexibility and ability to understand context, which would then have deleterious effects on crisis stability and managing escalation. While machines have many advantages in speed, precision, and repeatable actions, machines today cannot come close to human intelligence in understanding context and flexibly adapting to novel situations. This brittleness of machine decision-making may particularly be a challenge in pre-conflict crisis situations, where tensions among nations run high. Military forces from competing nations regularly interact in militarized disputes below the threshold of war in a variety of contested regions (e.g., the India-Pakistan border, China-India border, South China Sea, Black Sea, Syria, etc.). These interactions among deployed forces sometimes run the risk of escalation due to incidents or skirmishes that can inflame tensions on all sides. This poses a challenge for national leaders, who have imperfect command-and-control over their own military forces. Today, however, deployed military forces rely on human decision-making. Humans can understand broad guidance from their national leadership and commander’s intent, such as “defend our territorial claims, but don’t start a war.” Relative to humans, even the most advanced AI systems today have no ability to understand broad guidance, nor do they exhibit the kinds of contextual understanding that humans frequently label “common sense.”27 Militaries already employ uninhabited vehicles (drones) in contested areas, which have been involved in a number of escalatory incidents in the East China Sea, South China Sea, Syria, and Strait of Hormuz.28 Over time, as militaries incorporate more autonomous functionality into uninhabited vehicles, that functionality could complicate interactions in these and other contested areas. Autonomous systems may take actions based on programming that, while not a malfunction, are other than what a commander would have wanted a similarly situated human to do in the same situation. While the degree of flexibility afforded subordinates varies considerably by military culture and doctrine, humans have a greater ability to flexibly respond to complex and potentially ambiguous escalatory incidents in ways that may balance competing demands of ensuring national resolve while managing escalation.29 Autonomous systems will simply follow their programming, whatever that may be, even if those rules no longer make sense or are inconsistent with a commander’s intent in the given situation. This challenge is compounded by the fact that human commanders cannot anticipate all of the possible situations that forward-deployed military forces in contested regions may face. Employing autonomous systems in a crisis effectively forces human decision makers to tie their own hands with certain pre-specified actions, even if they would rather not. Unintended actions by autonomous systems in militarized disputes or contested areas are a challenge for militaries as they adopt more autonomous systems into their forces. The complexity of many autonomous systems used today, even ones that rely on rule-based decision-making, may mean that the humans employing autonomous systems lack sufficient understanding of what actions the system may take in certain situations.30 Humans’ ability to flexibly interpret guidance from higher commanders, even to the point of disregarding guidance if it no longer seems applicable, is by contrast a boon to managing escalation risks by retaining human decision-making at the point of interaction among military forces in contested regions.31 Unintended escalation is not merely confined to lethal actions, such as firing on enemy forces. Nonlethal actions, such as crossing into another state’s territory, can be perceived as escalatory. Even if such actions do not lead directly to war, they could heighten tensions, increase suspicion about an adversary’s intentions, or inflame public sentiment. While in most cases, humans would still retain agency over how to respond to an incident, competing autonomous systems could create unexpected interactions or escalatory spirals. Complex, interactive dynamics between algorithms have been seen in other settings, including financial markets,32 and even in situations where the algorithms are relatively simple.33 Another problem stems from the potential inability of humans to call off autonomous systems once deployed. One reason for employing autonomous functionality is so that uninhabited vehicles can continue their missions even if they are operating without reliable communication links to human controllers. When there is no communication link between human operators and an autonomous system, human operators would have no ability to recall the autonomous system if political circumstances changed such that the system’s behavior was no longer appropriate. This could be a challenge in de-escalating a conflict, if political leaders decide to terminate hostilities but have no ability to recall autonomous systems, at least for some period of time. The result could be a continuation of hostilities even after political leaders desire a cease-fire. Alternatively, the inability to fully cease hostilities could undermine truce negotiations, leading to the continuation of conflict. These problems are not unique to autonomous systems. Political leaders have imperfect command-and-control over human military forces, which has, at times, led to similar incidents with human-commanded deployed forces. For example, the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812 was fought after a peace treaty ended the war because of the slowness of communications to deployed forces.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—REGS BAD

AI regulations hurt US-European geopolitical standing—current regulation views are divergent

Samuel Stolton, 1/15/2020 (Euractiv; “Avoid heavy AI regulation, White House tells EU”; )

The US administration has urged European lawmakers to avoid heavy regulation frameworks in the future rollout of Artificial Intelligence technologies on the continent. The call comes ahead of the European Commission’s planned presentation of its AI strategy, set to be announced early this year. On Tuesday (7 January), the White House put forward a set of regulatory principles aimed at avoiding the overregulation of Artificial Intelligence technologies in the private sector. In a statement, the US said AI regulation should not be pursued until risk assessment exercises and cost-benefit analyses have been carried out, adding that the government hopes its European counterparts would adopt a similar approach. “Europe and our allies should avoid heavy-handed innovation-killing models, and instead consider a similar regulatory approach,” a statement from the White House read. “The best way to counter authoritarian uses of AI is to make sure America and our international partners remain the global hubs of innovation, shaping the evolution of technology in a manner consistent with our common values.” In a call with reporters ahead of the news, the US’s Chief Technology Officer Michael Kratsios said America is leading the way in shaping the AI revolution “in a way that reflects our values of freedom, human rights, and civil liberties.” “We encourage Europe to use the U.S. AI principles as a framework,” Kratsios said, referring to the Commission’s forthcoming AI strategy. “The best way to counter authoritarian uses of AI is to make America and our national partners remain the global hub of innovation, advancing our common values,” he added, revealing that he brought up the issue with the EU’s digital tsar Margrethe Vestager during their meeting at Lisbon’s Web Summit in November. Kratsios is set to formally announce America’s AI principles on Wednesday at the CES convention in Las Vegas. European landscape Meanwhile, European countries continue to pursue a divergent approach to AI technologies. Over the weekend, a report from the German weekly news magazine Der Spiegel revealed that a draft law by the interior ministry is set to expand the competencies of the federal police force, in rolling out facial recognition technologies at 135 train station and 14 airports across the country. This introduction of the draft law follows a series of testing periods in the country over the past few years that have seen a number of tech firms taking part in the process, including German outfits IBM Deutschland, Funkwerk, and the G2K Group, in addition to Japan’s Hitachi consortium – featuring several multinational tech companies. Elsewhere in Europe, concerns have been raised about facial recognition technologies by data protection authorities in Sweden and France, as well as the EU’s European Data Protection Supervisor. There has also been a sense of disquietude in France surrounding the country’s new ID programme, ‘Alicem’, which will employ facial recognition technologies for identity verification purposes. However, France’s Secretary of State for Digital Cédric O has recently adopted a more cautious approach to the project’s take-off in France, in an interview with . In Brussels, a report published  by the Commission’s High-Level Group on AI suggested that the EU  should consider the need for new regulation to “ensure adequate protection from adverse impacts.” This could include issues arising from biometric recognition, the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), AI systems built on children’s profiles, and the impact AI may have on fundamental rights. In terms of how AI technologies could impact consumer rights, Justice Commissioner Didier Reynders told his parliamentary hearing in October he would advocate for an ‘ethics-by-design’ approach, whereby products and services using AI take into account ethical guidelines at the earliest possible stage in their development. For her part, the EU’s digital chief, Margrethe Vestager, told  in November that “great opportunities come with great risks,” but that she has “strong reservations” with the ‘blanket’ application of some technologies in Artificial Intelligence technologies in particular, such as facial recognition software. The US statement on Tuesday follows the recent passing of new rules to restrict the exports of American Artificial Intelligence technologies, which the administration hopes will keep rival governments from taking advantage of US innovation. The new measures, which came into force on Monday (6 January), mean that firms exporting types of geospatial imagery software from the US have to apply for a license to send it abroad.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—REGS BAD

Overregulation kills new AI innovations—existing ones move to less regulated countries

Mark Minevich, 5/15/2021 (‘Going Global Ventures’ president, Boston Consulting Group adviser, IPsoft digital fellow and AI expert, digital cognitive strategist, venture capitalist; Tech Crunch; “European AI Needs Strategic Leadership, Not Overregulation”; )

The EU Commission recently proposed a , citing an urgent need. With the global race to regulate AI officially on, the EU published a detailed proposal on how AI should be regulated, explicitly banning some uses and defining those it considers “high-risk,” planning to ban the use of AI that threatens people’s rights and safety. We can all agree with the , the European Commission executive vice president, when she said that when it comes to “artificial intelligence, trust is a must, not a nice to have,” but is regulation the most effective and efficient way to secure this reality? The  are incredibly in-depth, but the ones that make the most sense to me are those that stress regulated AI should aim to increase human well-being. However, regulation should not overly constrain experimentation and development of AI systems. High-risk AI systems should always have unalterable built-in human oversight and control mechanisms. AI systems intended to interact with people or to generate content, whether high-risk or not, should be subject to specific transparency obligations. In addition, AI-based remote biometric systems in publicly accessible places shall be only authorized by EU or member state law and serve the objective of preventing, detecting or investigating serious crime and terrorism. Partnership between AI and humanity The set of laws and legal framework enacted in Europe will have a profound impact on AI regulation around the world, similar to the effects the GDPR regulations created over the past decade. But will these laws assist us in moving away from the EU-wide haphazard regulatory approach toward a singularity of common classification? In my opinion, this will cripple AI development in the EU while China and the United States leap forward. It would limit the use cases and innovation of artificial intelligence and put the EU in a technologically inferior position globally. In the U.S, AI is being optimized to maximize corporate profitability and efficiency. In China, AI is being optimized to maximize the government’s grip on the population with the preservation of power. The overly regulated environment in the EU will lead to complete chaos when regulations in various EU bodies start contradicting. Negative effects on EU entrepreneurship A lack of investment in AI in the EU is a major factor why the EU is . There are currently about 446 million people living in the EU and 331 million people living in the U.S. But in the EU, $2 billion was  in AI in 2020, while in the U.S., $23.6 billion was invested. If the EU continues pushing with aggressive regulations and lack of funding, it will enjoy global leadership in AI regulations, but I won’t be surprised if many European entrepreneurs decide to launch their startups in more AI-friendly countries. To create an EU that is friendly to innovation and entrepreneurs, we must create a collaborative network of AI pioneers to lead the way. In turn, other nations will take advantage of the EU’s push toward strict regulations by fostering innovation and generating a stronger hold on the future of global technology. A recent World Bank report showed the  With policies this stringent and burdensome to companies, it should be no surprise if innovators and entrepreneurs begin to move to more business-friendly parts of the globe. Regulation leads to relegation The regulation proposal suggests fines of up to of the AI provider for noncompliance. If we consider prior EU legislation and subsequent lack of digital innovation, these proposed regulations will cause chronic stagnation of digital innovation and adoption in the EU bloc. In short, if these regulations become law, the EU will not become a pioneer but a laggard. The “real” use cases of AI are yet to emerge, uncovering the true potential of AI. The massive bureaucracy for high-risk use cases will undercut any entrepreneurship or bottom-up innovation efforts. With historical markers trending to the , now is not the time to stifle innovation. If AI is to be broadly accepted, we need a human face showing AI helping people solve their problems and challenges. We must highlight engaging stories that are true and showcase the real people behind them. For the population at large to accept the potential of AI, they must see people like themselves benefiting from the goodness of AI. AI funding means, above all, startup funding. Startups form the bridge between the discovery and development of disruptive technologies to their everyday use by the general public. Europe is already doing a significant amount of planning, but must accelerate. . Fast-growing startups are mostly dependent on American and Asian investors. This requires a rethinking of the investment culture and sensible promotion of a dynamic investment environment; for example, through the targeted relaxation of investment restrictions on the part of institutional investors. We’re living during the age of “moonshots,” a time when entrepreneurs and scientists are able to go further than ever before. Competing in the next economy requires playing a new innovation game, one whose goal is to boost innovation tenfold. In order to reach this level, incremental optimizations do not help. The focus needs to pivot to big innovations — moonshots. Taking risk is acceptable and implementation of a large and risky idea should become normal. To create an EU that is friendly to innovation and entrepreneurs, we must create a collaborative network of AI pioneers to lead the way. Entrepreneurs and data science leaders must use their energies to focus on AI for good to improve the world in the longer term and advocate for deregulation. To accomplish this, we need to set up a global AI pioneers council on AI for good, consisting of participants from leading research institutions, businesses, the public sector and civil society to develop a shared understanding of best practices. AI is no longer just a tool for optimizing corporate systems and societal infrastructures; its potential reaches much further into solving the various crises facing mankind, from climate change to uncontrolled pandemics. Responsible AI and AI for good application across all the world’s superpowers can address these crises. The EU cannot afford to be the region of the globe disincentivizing innovation and discouraging entrepreneurship. The EU must move not toward super regulation, but toward strategic leadership of AI based on AI for good. The path of overregulation leads to the depths of stagnation. It is up to the EU to decide what it wants its future to look like.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 2NC—NO RUSSIA IMPACT

Ukraine means Russia won’t be able to develop AI.

Bendett 4/15 (Samuel Bendett, 4-15-2022, Defense One, Samuel Bendett is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an Adviser at the CNA Corporation; "Russia’s Artificial Intelligence Boom May Not Survive the War", https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/04/russias-artificial-intelligence-boom-may-not-survive-war/365743/ AY)

Ever since Putin the development of robotic combat systems in the new State Armaments Program in 2020, the Russian Ministry of Defense has been hyper-focused on AI. We have learned more about the Russian military’s in the past year thanks to several public revelations. But talk of AI has been muted since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Apart from the widespread for and target acquisition and a single of a mine-clearing robot—all of which are remote-controlled—there is no overt evidence of Russian AI in C4ISR or decision-making among the Russian military forces, other than a single public attempt to discredit the Ukrainian government. That does not mean AI isn’t used, considering how Ukrainians are now artificial intelligence in data analysis—but there is a notable absence of larger discussion about this technology in open-source Russian media. The gap between Russian military aspirations for high-tech warfare of the future and the of war today is becoming clear. In January 2021, Colonel-General Vladimir Zarudnitsky, the head of the Military Academy of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, wrote that the development and use of unmanned and autonomous military systems, the “robotization” of all spheres of armed conflict, and the development of AI for robotics will have the greatest medium-term effect on the Russian armed forces’ ability to meet their future challenges. Other MOD military experts also the impact of these emerging technologies on the Russian military and future balance of forces. Russia continued to upgrade and replace Soviet-made systems, part of the MOD’s from “digitization” (weapons with modern information technologies for C4ISR) to “intellectualization” (widespread implementation of AI capable of performing human-like creative thinking functions). These and other developments were covered in detail during Russia’s “, with AI as a key element in C4ISR at the tactical and strategic levels. Meanwhile, Russian military developers and researchers worked on AI-enabled robotics projects, including the “” concept unmanned ground vehicle and its autonomous operation in groups and with UAVs. Toward the end of 2021, the state agency responsible for exporting Russian military technology even to offer unmanned aviation, robotics, and high-tech products with artificial intelligence elements to potential customers this year. The agency emphasized the equipment is geared toward defensive, border protection, and counter-terrorism capabilities. Since the invasion, things have changed. Russia’s defense-industrial complex—especially military high-tech and AI research and development—may be affected by the international and cascading effects of Russia being cut off from semi-conductor and microprocessor imports. Throughout 2021, the Russian government was pushing for the adoption of its AI civilian initiatives across the country, such as nationwide aimed at different age groups with the aim of making artificial intelligence familiar at home, work, and school. The government also pushed for the digital transformation of science and higher education, emphasizing the development of AI, big data, and the internet of things. Russian academic AI R&D efforts drove predictive analytics; development of chat bots that process text and voice messages and resolve user issues without human intervention; and technologies for working with biometric data. Russia’s development of technology continued apace, with key efforts implemented across Moscow and other large cities. AI as a key image recognition and data analytical tool was used in many dealing with large data sets. Russian government officials their country’s efforts in promoting the ethics of artificial intelligence, and expressed confidence in Russia’s continued participation in this UN-sponsored work. The Russian Council for the Development of the Digital Economy has for a ban on artificial intelligence algorithms that discriminate against people. Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development was asked to “create a mechanism for assessing the humanitarian impact of the consequences of the introduction of such [AI] technologies, including in the provision of state and municipal services to citizens,” and to prepare a “road map” for effective regulation, use, and implementation. the council, citizens should be able to appeal AI decisions digitally, and such a complaint should only be considered by a human. The council also proposed developing legal mechanisms to compensate for damage caused as a result of AI use. In October, Russia’s leading information and communications companies the National Code of Ethics in the Field of AI; the code was recommended for all participants in the AI market, including government, business, Russian and foreign developers. Among the basic principles in the code are a to the development of this technology and the safety of working with data. AI workforce development was spelled out as a key requirement when the government officially unveiled the national AI roadmap in 2019. A 2021 government that tried to gauge the level of confidence in the government’s AI efforts showed that only about 64 percent of domestic AI specialists were satisfied with the working conditions in Russia. The survey reflected the microcosm of AI research, development, testing, and evaluation in Russia—lots of government activity and different efforts that did not automatically translate into a productive ecosystem conducive for developing AI, some major efforts notwithstanding. Among some of the in 2021 that Russia was lagging behind in the development of artificial intelligence technologies were the personnel shortage and the weakness of the venture capital market. The civilian developer community also noted the low penetration of Russian products into foreign markets, dependence on imports, slow introduction of products into business and government bodies, and a weak connection between AI theory and practice. Russia’s likely plans to concentrate on these areas in 2022 were revised or put on hold once Russia invaded Ukraine. The sudden of major IT and high-tech companies from Russia, coupled with a of Russia’s IT workers, and the high-tech sanctions against the Russian state may hobble domestic AI research and development for years to come. While the Russian government is trying to its AI and high-tech industry with subsidies, funding, and legislative support, the impact of the above-mentioned consequences may be too much for the still-growing and evolving Russian AI ecosystem. That does not mean AI research and development will stop—on the contrary, many 2021 trends, efforts, and inventions into the Russian economy and society in 2022, and there are domestic high-tech companies and public-private partnerships which are to fill the left by the departed global IT majors. But the effects of the invasion will be felt in the AI ecosystem for a long time, especially with so many IT workers the country, either because of the massive impact on the high-tech economy, or because they disagree with the war, or both. One of the most-felt sanctions aftereffects has been the severing of international cooperation on AI among Russian universities and research instructions, which earlier was enshrined as one of the most important drivers for domestic AI R&D, and reinforced by support from the Kremlin. For most high-tech institutions around the world, the impact of across Ukraine by the Russian military greatly outweighs the need to engage Russia on AI. At the same time, much of the Russian military AI R&D took place in a siloed environment—in many cases behind a classified firewall and without significant public-private cooperation—so it’s hard to estimate just how sanctions will affect Russian military AI efforts. While many in Russia now as a substitute for departed global commercial relationships and products, it’s not clear if Beijing could fully replace the software and hardware products and services that left Russian markets at this point. Recent events may not stop Russian civilians and military experts from discussing how AI influences the conduct of war and peace—but the implementation of these deliberations may become increasingly more difficult for a country under global high-tech isolation.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—NO RUSSIA CONFLICT

No US-Russia war– 7 reasons

Peck 14 [ (Contributor on defense and national security for Forbes); “7 Reasons Why America Will Never Go To War Over Ukraine”; 3/05/2014; http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/03/05/7-reasons-why-america-will-never-go-to-war-over-ukraine/]

America is the mightiest military power in the world. And that fact means absolutely nothing for the Ukraine crisis. Regardless of whether Russia continues to occupy the Crimea region of Ukraine, or decides to occupy all of Ukraine, the U.S. is not going to get into a shooting war with Russia. This has nothing to do with whether Obama is strong or weak. Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan would face the same constraints. The U.S. may threaten to impose economic sanctions, but here is why America will never smack Russia with a big stick: Russia is a nuclear superpower. Russia has an estimated 4,500 active nuclear warheads, according to the . Unlike North Korea or perhaps Iran, whose nuclear arsenals couldn’t inflict substantial damage, Russia could totally devastate the U.S. as well as the rest of the planet. U.S. missile defenses, assuming they even work, are not designed to stop a massive Russian strike. For the 46 years of the Cold War, America and Russia were deadly rivals. But they never fought. Their proxies fought: Koreans, Vietnamese, Central Americans, Israelis and Arabs. The one time that U.S. and Soviet forces almost went to war was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Neither Obama nor Putin is crazy enough to want to repeat that. Russia has a powerful army. While the Russian military is a shadow of its Soviet glory days, it is still a formidable force. The Russian army has about 300,000 men and 2,500 tanks (with another 18,000 tanks in storage), according to the “ from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Its air force has almost 1,400 aircraft, and its navy 171 ships, including 25 in the Black Sea Fleet off Ukraine’s coast. U.S. forces are more capable than Russian forces, which did not perform impressively during the . American troops would enjoy better training, communications, drones, sensors and possibly better weapons (though the latest Russian fighter jets, such as the T-50, could be trouble for U.S. pilots). However, better is not good enough. The Russian military is not composed of lightly armed insurgents like the Taliban, or a hapless army like the Iraqis in 2003. With advanced weapons like T-80 tanks, supersonic AT-15 Springer anti-tank missiles, BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers and S-400 Growler anti-aircraft missiles, Russian forces pack enough firepower to inflict significant American losses. Ukraine is closer to Russia. The distance between Kiev and Moscow is 500 miles. The distance between Kiev and New York is 5,000 miles. It’s much easier for Russia to send troops and supplies by land than for the U.S. to send them by sea or air. The U.S. military is tired. After nearly 13 years of war, America’s armed forces need a breather. Equipment is worn out from long service in Iraq and Afghanistan, personnel are worn out from repeated deployments overseas, and there are still about 40,000 troops still fighting in Afghanistan. The U.S. doesn’t have many troops to send. The U.S. could easily dispatch air power to Ukraine if its NATO allies allow use of their airbases, and the aircraft carrier George H. W. Bush and its hundred aircraft are patrolling the Mediterranean. But for a ground war to liberate Crimea or defend Ukraine, there is just the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit sailing off Spain, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment in Germany and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. While the paratroopers could drop into the combat zone, the Marines would have sail past Russian defenses in the Black Sea, and the Stryker brigade would probably have to travel overland through Poland into Ukraine. Otherwise, bringing in mechanized combat brigades from the U.S. would be logistically difficult, and more important, could take months to organize. The American people are tired. Pity the poor politician who tries to sell the American public on yet another war, especially some complex conflict in a distant Eastern Europe nation. Neville Chamberlain’s words during the 1938 Czechoslovakia crisis come to mind: “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing.” America‘s allies are tired. NATO sent troops to support the American campaign in Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. Britain sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. It is almost inconceivable to imagine the Western European public marching in the streets to demand the liberation of Crimea, especially considering the region’s sputtering economy, which might be snuffed out should Russia stop exporting natural gas. As for military capabilities, the Europeans couldn’t evict Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi without American help. And Germans fighting Russians again? Let’s not even go there.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—NO RUSSIA CONFLICT

No Russia war

Bandow ‘16 (Doug, Senior Fellow, the Cato Institute, “Western Paranoia Aside, Russia Unlikely to Attack the Baltics,” 2/16, , CMR)

Yet the surging fear over Russian adventurism distorts Moscow's interests and ambitions. Vladimir Putin is a nasty fellow, brutal at home and abroad. However, he seems to well represent much of his country's power elite and public. There is little apparent support for Western-style liberalism. Oust Putin and "le deluge" to follow would not likely be pretty. Putin's behavior is bad, but poses little threat to America, "old" Europe, or even most of Russia's neighbors. He is behaving like a traditional Tsar, not a reincarnated Joseph Stalin or Adolf Hitler. He has taken Moscow back to the Russian Empire, not the Soviet Union. His government is not interested in an ideological crusade and sees no inherent conflict with the West. Rather, Moscow demands respect for its status], protection of Russia's borders, and consideration of its interests. In pursuing these ends Putin is practical and measured, if perhaps imprudent and myopic--and, of course, dismissive of the cost to others. Mikhail Saakashvili's Georgia was actively anti-Russian, pursued close ties with America, and sought membership in NATO--all certain to antagonize Moscow. Abkhazia and South Ossetia had resisted Georgian control in the past, giving Russia an easy means to weaken Tbilisi and pay back NATO over the latter's dismemberment of Serbia, with historic ties to Moscow. (Russia's defense of Belgrade helped turn an assassination into World War I.) Ukraine always mattered more to Moscow than Georgia or the Baltics for historical and cultural reasons, as well as the naval base of Sebastopol. Nevertheless, Russia accepted an independent Ukraine, even when ruled by the hostile, incompetent Viktor Yushchenko, who also pushed for his nation's membership in the alliance--then opposed by the majority of Ukrainians. Yushchenko's failure opened the way for the election of Viktor Yanukovich, nominally pro-Russian, though he resisted Moscow's control. Putin acted only after Europe pushed a trade agreement to reorient Ukraine away from Russia and both Brussels and Washington backed a street revolution against Yanukovich. Even then, Putin sought to weaken, not conquer, Ukraine. He seized Crimea, historically part of Russia, and backed ethnic Russian separatists in the east. Despite numerous predictions, Moscow did not absorb the Donbass, create a land bridge to Crimea, stage a coup de' main against Kiev, or launch a general assault on Ukraine. His brutal response was murderous and unjustified, but militarily on par with U.S. interventions. Putin continues to demonstrate no interest in ruling those likely to resist Russia's tender mercies. Ukrainians and Georgians would not likely act like docile Russian citizens today. Indeed, the former resisted the restoration of Soviet control after German forces were expelled in World War II. Nor was occupation necessary to bar those nations' way to NATO. Seizing the Baltic states likely would generate similar resistance. They developed separate identities under the Russian Empire and enjoyed brief independence between World Wars I and II. They also have the advantage of having joined NATO before Moscow could cause much trouble. Moreover, as weak nations currently containing no foreign troops, the Baltics pose no potential threat to Russia. Ukraine in NATO would look very different. Finally, the Baltic ethnic Russian populations, though significant, demonstrate little sentiment for joining Mother Russia. They prefer cultural connection to political affiliation, creating a poor target for the sort of destabilizing tactics deployed against Ukraine. Wrote Robert Person, a professor at West Point: "the Baltic Russians are not particularly amenable to Russian hybrid warfare. Though they have many lingering grievances over language, cultural and citizenship policies, these grievances have not translated into separatism." So what would Russia gain from attacking the Baltics? A recalcitrant, majority non-ethnic Russian population. A possible temporary nationalist surge at home. A likely short-lived victory over the West. The costs would be far greater. Grabbing the Baltics likely would spur population exodus and trigger economic collapse. Launching a war without the convincing pretext present in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine might leave the Russian public angry over the retaliation certain to come. Worse, Moscow certainly would rupture economic and political relations with the U.S. and Europe and probably start a losing conventional war with NATO. Even more frightening would be the prospect of a nuclear conflict, whether intentional or inadvertent. Russia has destroyed Europe's peaceful equilibrium, but everything about Putin's presidency so far argues against reckless war for no rational purpose against the Baltics. Of course, they should act to reduce even minimal chances of such a war. However, the U.S. should not launch a multi-billion dollar allied build-up, one which, ironically, would create a perceived threat to Russia where none currently exists. Could NATO lose a war over the Baltics? As Rand warned, yes, at least in the short-term. But the allies could defeat Russia if they were prepared for World War III. That would be beyond foolish for Washington--another reason why the U.S. should stop making defense promises which serve the interests of other nations rather than America. If the Europeans, in contrast, are ready to make that commitment, they should be preparing their own defense.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—NO RUSSIA CONFLICT

Russia can’t escalate crisis --- low military spending

Stratfor ‘19- American geopolitical intelligence platform and publisher founded in 1996 in Austin, Texas, by George Friedman, who was the company's chairman. Chip Harmon was appointed president in February 2018. Fred Burton is Stratfor's chief security officer (“Russia's Defense Industry Finds Itself in a Tailspin,” Strafor Worldview,

Russia's defense industry is face to face with a major foe, but it's not a foreign military power. The Kremlin has been striving to modernize all branches of the Russian military, but the country's defense industry is struggling thanks to decreasing volumes of orders, difficulties in attracting high-skilled talent and limits to its technological capabilities. According to recent figures, the performance of Russia's aerospace sector is declining precipitously. In 2018, for instance, Russian aircraft and spacecraft makers produced 13.5 percent less than in 2017. And there's been no letup in 2019 either: In the first two months of the year, aerospace output plummeted 48 percent year on year. The decline in Russia's defense output raises concerns about the competitive strength of Russia's defense industry in general, whose health is critical if the country is to project itself as a military power in the longer term. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov attributed the reduction in output to a slowdown of orders for military systems, but projections suggest the slowdown is not just a short-term fluctuation; in fact, it's expected to become even worse in the future. The downturn in oil prices has taken a bite out of Russia's bottom line, squeezing spending for the military — all at a time when the country's arms manufacturers have lost their competitive edge in the global arms market. Together, these factors ensure that Russia's defense industry will struggle to get out of its funk. Suffering From a Dearth of Funds This dire picture stands in stark contrast to Russia's frequent presentation of sensational new platforms. In reality, however, just a few of the big-ticket weapon systems — such as the T-14 main battle tank or the Su-57 fighter aircraft — find buyers, as the rest remain mere prototypes. Russia has prioritized some hardware, such as the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, due to their strategic relevance to the country's overall military posture, but Moscow has failed to fully develop other programs or only introduced them on a limited scale. Under pressure from a limited government budget, the Kremlin even started reducing its military spending in 2017 — a strong indicator that, despite the modernization push, Russia's financial challenges are taking a toll on the country ambitions. Economically, the plunge in oil prices at the end of 2014 hurt Russia's bottom line, depriving the country of essential revenue and forcing it to dip into its reserves to bridge the gap. Today, more than four years on, Russian oil revenues are rising, yet the country is continuing to deal with the consequences of the lean years. Beyond that, low revenues from taxes, which have forced Russia to raise taxes and the retirement age, and Western sanctions over Moscow's activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, have shrunk the financial pool available to military planners. Low oil prices, declining revenues from taxes and Western sanctions have taken a chunk out of the financial pool available to Russia's military and the broader defense industry. But the Kremlin's problems don't end there. In the past, Russia has benefited from its position as a major global arms exporter to fuel further military development. During the 1990s, for example, such sales were critical to the country as it faced severe economic hardship. While Russia remains the world's second-largest arms exporter (only the United States sells more), the actual value of those exports has been decreasing significantly. Between 2014 and 2018, their total value dropped by as much as 17 percent. Again, budgetary limits are somewhat to blame: In the past, Russia frequently used arms exports as a political tool, offering weapons at a heavy discount, if not entirely free. But with Russia no longer able to offer customers a good deal on its fighter jets and other defense products, the country is losing business.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC –NO POPULISM

EU populism makes it inevitable

Maher 17 (Richard Maher, Research Fellow, Global Governance Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. “Why populism is still a threat in Europe.” World Economic Forum. 12 Jun 2017 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/populism-is-still-a-threat-in-europe-heres-why)

Has the populist tide sweeping Europe crested? Six months ago, many European leaders worried that the wave of popular discontent that led to the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and propelled Donald Trump into the White House could empower nationalist, anti-immigrant and anti-EU parties across Europe, shaking the very foundations of the bloc. Since then, however, populist movements have been turned back in Austria, the Netherlands and France. German Chancellor Angela Merkel looks likely to win her fourth term as chancellor in national elections this September. And with a young, energetic, pro-EU French president now in the Élysée Palace, some are predicting that the bloc is actually poised for a comeback. But it would be a mistake to think that populism no longer represents a serious threat to Europe and the EU. Populist authoritarians are in power in Hungary and Poland. Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Front captured a third of the vote in the run-off of France’s election last month, and Geert Wilders’s anti-Islam Freedom Party is the second most powerful seat-holder in Holland’s parliament. Even in Germany, long thought to be resistant to right-wing populist currents, the anti-immigrant party Alternative for Germany (AfD) seems poised to gain parliamentary representation for the first time following national elections this year. And with early parliamentary elections scheduled for October 15 in Austria, it appears likely that the far-right Freedom Party, which was formed in the 1950s by former Nazis, will enter into a government coalition with the centre-right Austrian People’s Party. A rise in populism since the 1960s Post-war Europe has seen populist movements of both the left and the right, but they have mainly operated on the margins of national politics. While no populist party or politician has been able to actually win a national election in Western Europe over the past seven decades, research shows that populism has been advancing slowly yet steadily in Europe since the 1960s. Today, virtually every European country has a populist party represented in national or regional parliaments. Most are right-wing, like Vlaams Belang in Belgium, the National Front in France, Golden Dawn in Greece, Lega Nord in Italy, the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, the Sweden Democrats and the Swiss People’s Party. These parties’ aims and agendas are driven by different national histories, traditions and circumstances, but all are anti-immigrant and anti-EU. Populism’s appeal remains too small to actually win elections in most of Europe, but it is shaping national and European politics in various ways, reframing debates on immigration, the Eurozone and national security, among other examples. Political views once considered extreme or taboo are now firmly present in mainstream political discourse. In response, some mainstream politicians have co-opted parts of the populists’ message or have felt pressure to move to the right on some issues to blunt the populist advance. To counter Wilders’s anti-immigrant message, for example, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte took a more hardline stance on immigration and refugees in the weeks leading up to parliamentary elections in March. Even Angela Merkel has placed limits on Germany’s absorption of new refugees in light of criticism from both the AfD and the Christian Social Union, the Bavarian sister party of her Christian Democratic Union. The period from the second world war to the present has been a remarkably stable one for Western Europe. Governments have largely alternated between the centre-right and the centre-left. With the rise of populist movements and candidates, we are, in a way, restoring the historical norm: for much of Europe’s modern history, liberals and social democrats have competed with populists of various stripes in national elections. What’s the plan? To effectively contain populism, Europe must accurately diagnose how and why it emerged in the first place. This means they cannot just ignore populists and their supporters, or ascribe their grievances as the product of envy, resentment or blind rage. Those in power must acknowledge constituents’ genuine worries and anxieties about immigration, national identity and terrorism, for example. Globalisation has produced rapid economic and social disruptions. It has contributed to economic displacement, rising income and wealth inequality, and what seems to some people to be the homogenisation of national cultures. Many people today face a level of economic insecurity that their parents or grandparents did not experience. And with large-scale immigration, they have legitimate concerns about the cultural and demographic future of their countries. The sources for such concerns are not likely to disappear, so populism is more of a long-term challenge than a temporary crisis. As Harvard’s Yascha Mounk has said, “the past two decades have represented not a populist moment but rather a populist turn — one that will exert significant influence on policy and public opinion for decades to come.”

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC -- HEG RESILIENCE

Renewed US leadership counters Russia and reinvigorates US hegemony

Brands and Beckley, 22 (made the, 3-14-2022, accessed on 6-18-2022, American Enterprise Institute - AEI, "The Return of Pax Americana? | AEI", https://www.aei.org/articles/the-return-of-pax-americana/)

The United States and its allies have failed to prevent Russia from brutalizing Ukraine, but they can still win the larger struggle to save the international order. Russia’s savage invasion has exposed the gap between Western countries’ soaring liberal aspirations and the paltry resources they have devoted to defend them. The United States has declared great-power competition on Moscow and Beijing but has so far failed to summon the money, the creativity, or the urgency necessary to prevail in those rivalries. Yet Russian President Vladimir Putin has now inadvertently done the United States and its allies a tremendous favor. In shocking them out of their complacency, he has given them a historic opportunity to regroup and reload for an era of intense competition—not just with Russia but also with China—and, ultimately, to rebuild an international order that just recently looked to be headed for collapse.

This isn’t fantasy: it has happened before. In the late 1940s, the West was entering a previous period of great-power competition but had not made the investments or initiatives needed to win it. U.S. defense spending was pathetically inadequate, NATO existed only on paper, and neither Japan nor West Germany had been reintegrated into the free world. The Communist bloc seemed to have the momentum. Then, in June 1950, an instance of unprovoked authoritarian aggression—the Korean War—revolutionized Western politics and laid the foundation for a successful containment strategy. The policies that won the Cold War and thereby made the modern liberal international order were products of an unexpected hot war. The catastrophe in Ukraine could play a similar role today.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC -- HEG RESILIENCE

U.S. unipolarity is inevitable---no rivals are strong enough to challenge it

Beckley 18 [Michael Beckley, Michael Beckley is a leading expert on the balance of power between the United States and China. The author of two books and multiple award-winning articles, Michael is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Previously, Michael was an International Security Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He continues to advise offices within the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense. Unrivaled : Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower., pg. 135-154, Cornell University Press, 2018. EBSCOhost]//AA

CHAPTER 6 The Unipolar Era “If Sparta and Rome perished,” the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau asked, “what State can hope to endure forever?”1 The resounding answer given by history is “no state.” In time, perhaps in another century or so, the American empire will crumble and new powers will rise. But we are not there yet, nor will we be for many decades. We are living in the unipolar era, and it will probably outlive us. So what? The United States might be the most powerful country in his- tory, but it has a limited presence in many corners of the globe, and weaker nations routinely trample on U.S. interests.2 The United States failed to pre- vent the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the rise of the Islamic State, the Russian inva- sion of Crimea, Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, North Korean nuclear proliferation, and Chinese island-building in the South China Sea. Unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity: What difference does it make? In this final chapter, I explain why this view is wrong by highlighting several ways that unipolarity transforms world politics. The good news is that unipolarity dramatically reduces the likelihood of great power war. The bad news is that it may increase the likelihood of asymmetric conflict and undermine American national unity and the liberal world order. No Hegemonic Rivalry The story of world politics is often told as a game of thrones in which a rotating cast of great powers battles for top-dog status. According to researchers led by Graham Allison at Harvard, there have been sixteen cases in the past five hundred years when a rising power challenged a rul- ing power.3 Twelve of these cases ended in carnage. One can quibble with Allison’s case selection, but the basic pattern is clear: hegemonic rivalry has sparked a catastrophic war every forty years on average for the past half millennium. The emergence of unipolarity in 1991 has put this cycle of hegemonic competition on hold. Obviously wars and security competition still occur in today’s unipolar world—in fact, as I explain later, unipolarity has made certain types of asymmetric conflict more likely—but none of these con- flicts have the global scope or generational length of a hegemonic rivalry. To appreciate this point, just consider the Cold War—one of the four “peaceful” cases of hegemonic rivalry identified by Allison’s study. Although the two superpowers never went to war, they divided the world into rival camps, waged proxy wars that killed millions of people, and pushed each other to the brink of nuclear Armageddon. For forty-five years, World War III and human extinction were nontrivial possibilities. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, by contrast, the United States has not faced a hegemonic rival, and the world, though far from perfect, has been more peaceful and prosperous than ever before. Just look at the numbers. From 1400 to 1991, the rate of war deaths world- wide hovered between 5 and 10 deaths per 100,000 people and spiked to 200 deaths per 100,000 during major wars.4 After 1991, however, war death rates dropped to 0.5 deaths per 100,000 people and have stayed there ever since. Interstate wars have disappeared almost entirely, and the number of civil wars has declined by more than 30 percent.5 Meanwhile, the global economy has quadrupled in size, creating more wealth between 1991 and 2018 than in all prior human history combined.6 What explains this unprecedented outbreak of peace and prosperity? Some scholars attribute it to advances in communications technology, from the printing press to the telegraph to the Internet, which supposedly spread empathy around the globe and caused entire nations to place a higher value on human life.7 Such explanations are appealing, because they play on our natural desire to believe in human progress, but are they convincing? Did humans sud- denly become 10 to 20 times less violent and cruel in 1991? Are we orders of magnitude more noble and kind than our grandparents? Has social media made us more empathetic? Of course not, which is why the dra- matic decline in warfare after 1991 is better explained by geopolitics than sociology.8 The collapse of the Soviet Union not only ended the Cold War and related proxy fighting, it also opened up large swathes of the world to democracy, international commerce, and peacekeeping forces—all of which surged after 1991 and further dampened conflict.9 Faced with overwhelming U.S. economic and military might, most countries have decided to work within the American-led liberal order rather than fight to overturn it.10 As of 2018, nearly seventy countries have joined the U.S. alliance network—a Kantian community in which war is unthinkable—and even the two main challeng- ers to this community, China and Russia, begrudgingly participate in the institutions of the liberal order (e.g., the UN, the WTO, the IMF, World Bank, and the G-20), engage in commerce with the United States and its allies, and contribute to international peacekeeping missions.11 History may not have ended in 1991, but it clearly changed in profound ways—and mostly for the better.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC -- HEG GOOD --- European Stability

Loss of US power now risks Russian conquest of Europe and global instability.

Brands 6/1 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 6-1-2022; "The World Doesn’t Need a More Restrained America”; ; Bloomberg; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

It has been a bumpy year for the restraint coalition — that loose network of analysts, advocates and politicians calling for a sharply reduced US role in the world. Having reached peak influence with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, this group initially found itself marginalized by Russia’s war in Ukraine. Now, the restraint crowd is offering a renewed critique of US policy, one that will probably prove to be persistent, though not persuasive. Restraint is a broad church. It features anti-interventionist academics, who often style themselves as non-ideological “realists,” alongside well-funded think tanks such as the Quincy Institute. It includes libertarians such as Senator Rand Paul who deplore the financial costs of US foreign policy and progressives who contend that American globalism is a cover for imperialism and neoliberalism. There are pacifists who believe that all wars are criminal, as well as nationalists such as Senator Josh Hawley who argue that being appropriately hawkish on China requires being more dovish on nearly everything else. Some restrainers seek wholesale global retrenchment; others mainly decry ongoing US involvement in Europe and the Middle East. What unites them is a conviction that the overuse of US power has been catastrophic for America and the world. This coalition seemed ascendant a year ago, when President Joe Biden denounced the “forever wars” while pulling out of Afghanistan. That decision, two analysts argued, marked Biden as a hard-nosed realist — and perhaps an ally in the struggle to reshape American diplomacy. Yet the moment didn’t last. The collapse of the Afghan state even before the US finished withdrawing showed that, while waging wars is expensive, losing them can impose a serious cost. Then came Russia’s assault on Ukraine. As Vladimir Putin’s forces sought to restore the Soviet empire and murdered Ukrainian citizens, they revealed just how awful a world shaped by great powers other than Washington might be. Indeed, Biden isn’t getting much praise from self-proclaimed realists today. While refusing to intervene militarily, Biden has otherwise backed Ukraine with money, weapons and other support. NATO — whose peaceful expansion allegedly forced Putin to order a campaign of aggression and murder — now appears likely to add two new members, Finland and Sweden. Biden has even invoked the rhetorical legacy of his cold war predecessors, declaring that Ukraine is a vital front in the struggle to save the free world. In response, the restraint coalition has itself opened a new front, finding multiple reasons to attack Biden’s Ukraine policy. First is cost. Sustaining a medium-sized country under a ferocious military assault is fantastically expensive. The latest US support package for Ukraine totals some $40 billion — money, Hawley complained, that could be better spent on giving US military personnel a generous raise. Some Republicans in Congress seem to agree — 57 representatives and 11 senators voted, unsuccessfully, against the aid package. Second is risk. No one knows how the war in Ukraine will end. If the US helps Ukraine defend itself too successfully, the thinking goes, then perhaps a humiliated Russia will escalate wildly rather than accept defeat. Finally, there is politics. With Biden having gone all-in on Ukraine, there’s little space for the restraint contingent on the left. But Hawley and other Republicans seeking to inherit Donald Trump’s political base clearly believe that there is a constituency for claims that supporting a vulnerable democracy equates to putting “America last.” It is uncharitable to label such arguments “pro-Putin.” Forty billion dollars is real money, given that the Pentagon is struggling to find a 10th of that for urgent near-term improvements to America’s military posture in the Pacific. There is, undoubtedly, danger in a scenario where Putin worries that he is losing the war — and in consequence loses his head. But the perpetual problem with restraint is the corresponding unwillingness to consider what happens after America pulls back. Suppose Washington does slash support to Ukraine and leave European security to the Europeans. What does that bring? Judging by the past century — or even the past six months — the answer is not a stable Europe and a more solvent America. Rather, the result is likely to be a partially successful Russian war of conquest that creates pervasive insecurity in Europe; a continent that, lacking American leadership, is less united and confident in opposing Putin; and greater global instability that ultimately makes it harder to contain China, as well.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Clarity › 1NC HEG GOOD

U.S. heg is a prerequisite to solve existential risks, including the rise of authoritarian regimes and climate change

Betz 21 [11/3/2021, Betz, Hans-Georg, Hans-Georg Betz is an adjunct professor of political science at the University of Zurich. Before coming to Zurich, he taught at various universities in North America, including Johns Hopkins University's School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC, and York University in Toronto. He is the author of several books and numerous articles and book chapters on radical right-wing populism. He holds a PhD in Political Science from MIT., “Uncertain Times in a World Without American Hegemony”, Fair Observer, ]//AA

The international order is in deep trouble, and not only since the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not how things were supposed to turn out. The collapse of the “evil empire,” the end of the Cold War and the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU were supposed to bring about a new era of stability and prosperity, the latter epitomized most prominently by China’s embrace of the market. Liberalism was supposed to reign supreme. In the grand battle of ideas, Marx had lost out, Hegel had won — or so his American acolyte, Francis Fukuyama, claimed. Fukuyama proclaimed that the “end of history” was at hand, and the cognoscenti and would-be cognoscenti on both sides of the Atlantic enthusiastically applauded. Three decades later, the world is in disarray. The attacks of September 11 were a drastic reminder that not everybody was sold on Fukuyama’s utopia. The financial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers and, with it, the house of cards built on a derivatives market that had spun out of control exposed the irrationality of rational behavior — taking more and more risks simply because everybody else did so. Finally, COVID-19 has demonstrated how quickly the beautiful world of ever-expanding consumer choices, sustained by cheap labor in remote parts of the world, can grind to a screeching halt. Benign Hegemon It is too early to tell whether or not global turbulences have reached a point of no return. The prospects are not great, and that has a lot to do with the United States. There is a strong sense that America’s hegemonic position, which it assumed after World War II, is on the wane and, with it, the country’s “commitment to promoting a liberal international order.” Or, perhaps, the United States suffers from a severe case of “leadership fatigue” and no longer wants to play the role of the “benign hegemon.” The notion of the benign hegemon is derived from hegemonic stability theory, popular among some experts in international relations. The theory posits that order and stability in world affairs crucially depend on a Great Power capable of sustaining them and willing to do so. As Stephen Kobrin, of the Wharton School, has recently put it, “A stable, open economy requires a hegemon, a dominant power who can provide some of the necessary public goods, absorb costs, and order the system.” Although this pertains particularly to international economic relations, it can be applied to other areas, such as international security. Order and stability require, among other things, that the hegemonic power formulate and underwrite the rules that define and govern the interactions between states in the international system. This was the case in the second half of the 19th century when Great Britain assumed this role, providing and guaranteeing global public goods such as free trade, capital mobility and the British pound, backed up by the gold standard, as the global reserve currency. The system came to an end with World War I. The conflict left Britain weakened and largely unable to reassume its prewar role. The interwar period was characterized by turmoil and crises, paving the way for the rise of autocratic regimes, committed to establishing a new order on the ruins of the old one. They accomplished the latter, but the new order was not theirs to create. The new hegemonic power that emerged from the war was not Hitler’s Germany but the United States, which filled the void left by an exhausted Great Britain. This was anything but a natural transition. In fact, for most of the interwar period, the United States had refused to get entangled in international affairs. America’s retreat from internationalism after World War I was epitomized by Congress’s refusal to join the League of Nations — and that despite the fact that the league had been the brainchild of US President Woodrow Wilson. Isolationism went hand in hand with protectionism. Throughout the 19th century and way into the beginning of the 20th, the United States boasted some of the highest tariffs in the world. The culmination was the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which had a devastating impact on international trade and contributed to the Great Depression. It was not until the United States entered the war against Nazi Germany that it assumed the role commensurate to its position as the economically and militarily by far strongest power in the world. Alternative Options The failure of the most recent G20 meeting in Rome to arrive at a meaningful common position on global warming and climate change ahead of the COP26 in Glasgow is further proof that the United States is no longer in a position to fill this role. Instead of leading, President Joe Biden blamed China and Russia “for any disappointment over the level of commitment by G20 leaders to fight climate change.” This is not to deny that Biden has a point. But given the enormity of the impact climate change is bound to have on the natural environment and life on this planet, it is little more than an exercise in passing responsibility. Biden’s remark, however, does address a serious issue, namely the role of China in a rapidly changing world. A few weeks ago, Chinese coal production reached new historic highs, amounting to an estimated 4 billion tons for this year. Accelerated coal production is supposed to alleviate energy shortages that have threatened to slow down the country’s growth. Unfortunately, emissions-wise, coal happens to be one of the worst sources of energy. A new study on the impact of carbon dioxide emissions on coastal areas predicts catastrophic devastation as a result of rising sea levels for some of the world’s megacities, particularly in India, Indonesia, Vietnam and China — all major coal consumers. Given the concentration of China’s population in a string of coastal cities, one might assume that it has a particular interest in combating climate change. In theory, this would entail an active involvement in global governance, a proposition that China has been more than reluctant to embrace, presumably because it would entail directly challenging the United States. At the same time, however, China has launched major initiatives, such as the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and particularly the One Belt, One Road initiative. Together with China’s massive engagement in Africa, these projects leave the impression that they are part of a comprehensive drive designed to establish China as an alternative to the United States. This might herald the emergence of a new system, no longer dominated by one power but multipolar, and certainly very different from the one established after World War II. For, as Princeton’s John Ikenberry has noted a few years ago, “there is no liberal internationalism without American and western hegemony — and that age is ending.” With the decline of the United States and the parallel rise of China, countries have the option to “seek alternative patrons rather than remain dependent on Western largess and support.” The end result might very well be a bifurcated world order, on the heels of a period of instability and turmoil, or what Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini have called a “G-Zero” world, one without clear leadership and global cooperation. Bifurcation means the coexistence of competing systems that follow fundamentally different rules. This can already be observed in the realm of economic governance. Olga Petricevic and David Teece have recently warned of a “noticeable defiance of the principles of classical economic liberalism and the rule-of-law” by Russia and China. The Chinese “alternative model of governance,” they note, “is deploying coordinated protectionist trade and investment policies and government intervention aimed at accessing and acquiring foreign intellectual property, thereby influencing the global economic and innovation system.” Its success is likely to inspire imitation and attempts to jump on the bandwagon, resulting not only in bifurcation but in polarization reminiscent of the Cold War period.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Clarity › 1NC HEG GOOD

U.S. hegemony resists collapse

Kovac 2/19 (Igor Kovac, PhD in political science from the University of Cincinnati and Foreign Policy Advisor for the Slovenian Prime Minister, 2/12/22, “Persistent Imbalance of Power – A Pervasive Hegemony Theory”, pg ii-iii, accessed 6/18/22)//sfs

Most International Relations literature suggests that when power becomes imbalanced, such a situation will be corrected – hegemony cannot persist over time. However, history offers us several examples of hegemonies lasting over a century, e.g., Ancient Rome, Ming China. So far scholars have offered four explanations for such enduring hegemony (Coercive Hegemony, Cooperative Hegemony, Cultural Hegemony, and Opportunist Hegemony), with a common mechanism: ineffective balancing. Namely, the hegemon has the capacity to put balancing at bay using different strategies flowing from the nature and fundamental principles of its hegemony. Hence, the hegemon uses coercion, institutional leverage, ideological indoctrination, or buyout, in order to assure its hegemony can endure. Yet, through time and through crisis the capacities of the hegemon to make the balancing ineffective diminishes. As such, these theories all share a similar assumption – imbalance is transitory and thus hegemony will breakdown. But what if that common assumption is incorrect. What if under certain conditions, imbalance is not resisted, but rather serves interests of non-hegemonic states as well as the hegemon? Twentieth and twenty-first century US hegemony suggests such conditions may exist. This American imbalance displays a different nature and fundamental mechanism behind its functioning. Although US relative power is declining, its global monetary network centrality is not. Moreover, even in times of severe crisis, such as the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, or the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, we have not witnessed US monetary centrality decline. In fact, quite the opposite is true. The dynamics associated with an imbalance of power in favor of the United States runs against the expectations of existing theories. Therefore, we need a different theory to make sense of these particularities and make better policy recommendations. Thus, I have developed a Pervasive Hegemony Theory, which is based on a ‘buy-in’ behavior, that better explains US hegemony compared to existing alternatives. The ‘buy-in’ behavior relates to non-hegemonic states as well as the hegemon, in which all countries continue to use hegemon’s monetary unit in their monetary relations, even in times of severe economic crisis. This reinforces the hegemony. Even though non-hegemonic states may not prefer the imbalance of power, they prefer conducting their economic relations within the hegemon’s monetary unit and thus perpetuate the imbalance. Subsequently, they can only maximize their selfish interests and autonomy by buying-in to the hegemony and reproducing the imbalance of power. Conversely, the hegemon may not like the current rules and norms of the international system, but it can change those and obtain the support of the non-hegemonic states if it accepts to provide its monetary unit as the central currency of the system. In pursuing this argument, I use both quantitative (Network Analysis and Time Series) and qualitative methods (Process Tracing). I use the former on available economic data to establish the claim of US economic centrality, and that it is something different than what we have seen in the past. Second, I process trace the mechanisms of hegemonic and non-hegemonic state behavior in two international monetary systems (Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods) in order to isolate and identify the buy-in mechanism and provide an explanation of enduring imbalance – ownership over the central monetary unit in global economy. The dissertation, thus, assesses existing theories and indicates their inadequacies in explaining an important international phenomenon and provides a more robust explanation of enduring hegemony with the economic centrality, namely the ownership of the central monetary unit.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Clarity › 1NC HEG GOOD

US heg boosts transatlantic unity, keeps Russia and China in check, spreads democracy, and leads world peace

Ville Sinkkonen 22, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), Center on US Politics and Power, 6/7/2022, "A Fleeting Glimpse of Hegemony? The War in Ukraine and The Future of The International Leadership of The United States ," Transatlantic Policy Quarterly,

The war in Ukraine is a world-historical moment – a pivotal event that comes around maybe once every decade. Already the Russian invasion has upended the post-Cold War European security order. However, beyond shattering established structures, crises tend to create opportunities. In this regard, the war in Ukraine is no different. From the standpoint of the United States, Moscow’s blatant aggression has creating an opening to reassert its leadership of the Western alliance and even recapture some of its post-Cold War hegemonic position, which has been challenged by revisionist powers China and Russia and domestic travails.[1] A little over six months after a chaotic exit from Afghanistan, President Biden and his administration are being hailed for the successful coordination of a joint transatlantic response in sanctions against Russia and military aid to Ukraine. Joe Biden’s triumphant inaugural declaration looks prescient: “America is back”.

However, in the midst of such triumphalism, it is vital to pause and consider pathways forward. As the old international order receded, the Biden administration is facing questions regarding the future direction of America’s international engagement in the “post-February 24, 2022” world.[2] After briefly outlining how the Biden administration arrived at its pivotal date with history, this article zooms in on five sets of challenges that the U.S. needs to deal with to sustain the current “hegemonic moment.” Without attention and resolve to mitigate these challenges, the re-emergence of U.S. leadership in the transatlantic domain, not to mention any visions of reasserting U.S. hegemony more broadly, may prove but a flash in the pan.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC – NO PROLIF

No prolif impact

Mueller 17 (John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University & Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute & Senior Research Scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University "76. Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Terrorism" https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2017/2/cato-handbook-for-policymakers-8th-edition-76_0.pdf)

Except for their effects on agonies, obsessions, rhetoric, posturing, and spending, the consequences of nuclear proliferation have been largely benign: those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats. For the most part, nuclear powers have found the weapons to be a notable waste of time, money, effort, and scientific talent. They have quietly kept the weapons in storage and haven’t even found much benefit in rattling them from time to time. If the recent efforts to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons have been successful, those efforts have done Iran a favor. There has never been a militarily compelling reason to use nuclear weapons, particularly because it has not been possible to identify suitable targets—or targets that couldn’t be attacked as effectively by conventional munitions. Conceivably, conditions exist under which nuclear weapons could serve a deterrent function, but there is little reason to suspect that they have been necessary to deter war thus far, even during the Cold War. The main Cold War contestants have never believed that a repetition of World War II, whether embellished by nuclear weapons or not, is remotely in their interests. Moreover, the weapons have not proved to be crucial status symbols. How much more status would Japan have if it possessed nuclear weapons? Would anybody pay a great deal more attention to Britain or France if their arsenals held 5,000 nuclear weapons, or much less if they had none? Did China need nuclear weapons to impress the world with its economic growth or its Olympics? Those considerations help explain why alarmists have been wrong for decades about the pace of nuclear proliferation. Most famously, in the 1960s, President John Kennedy anticipated that in another decade “fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons.” Yet, of the dozens of technologically capable countries that have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, very few have done so. Insofar as most leaders of most countries (even rogue ones) have considered acquiring the weapons, they have come to appreciate several drawbacks of doing so: nuclear weapons are dangerous, costly, and likely to rile the neighbors. Moreover, as the University of Southern California’s Jacques Hymans has demonstrated, the weapons have also been exceedingly difficult for administratively dysfunctional countries to obtain—it took decades for North Korea and Pakistan to do so. In consequence, alarmist predictions about proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, epidemics, and points of no return have proved faulty. Although proliferation has so far had little consequence, that is not because the only countries to get nuclear weapons have had rational leaders. Large, important countries that acquired the bomb were run at the time by unchallenged—perhaps certifiably deranged—monsters. Consider Joseph Stalin, who, in 1949, was planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union by planting a lot of trees, and Mao Zedong, who, in 1964, had just carried out a bizarre social experiment that resulted in an artificial famine in which tens of millions of Chinese perished. Some also fear that a country might use its nuclear weapons to “dominate” its area. That argument was used with dramatic urgency before 2003 when Saddam Hussein supposedly posed great danger, and it has been frequently applied to Iran. Exactly how that domination is to be carried out is never made clear. The notion, apparently, is this: should an atomic rogue state rattle the occasional rocket, other countries in the area, suitably intimidated, would bow to its demands. Far more likely, threatened states would make common cause with each other and with other concerned countries (including nuclear ones) against the threatening neighbor. That is how countries coalesced into an alliance of convenience to oppose Iraq’s region-threatening invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Yet another concern has been that the weapons will go off, by accident or miscalculation, devastating the planet in the process: the weapons exist in the thousands, sooner or later one or more of them will inevitably go off. But those prognostications have now failed to deliver for 70 years. That time period suggests something more than luck is operating. Moreover, the notion that if one nuclear weapon goes off in one place, the world will necessarily be plunged into thermonuclear cataclysm should remain in the domain of Hollywood scriptwriters.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Clarity › 1NC – NO PROLIF IMPACT

No impact to nuclear proliferation—more nuclear states produce peace

Suzuki 15 – (June 2015, Akisato, Researcher, Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, MA in Violence, Terrorism and Security at Queen's University, “Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests,” Research and Politics, SagePub)

Random Forests has three attractive and distinctive characteristics for the purposes of this paper: first, the estimation of conditional variable importance and partial dependence plots enable conventional applied researchers to interpret non-parametric analysis in an intuitive way; second, Random Forests can examine non-linearity (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341), which is desirable because, as already noted, some theories expect non-linearity between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict; and finally, it can cope with potential interactions and multicollinearity between regressors (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341; Strobl et al., 2008). As noted before, most of the regressors here are highly correlated, and also it is plausible to anticipate some interaction effect between them (e.g. the number of democratic states and the gross world product). The specific capabilities of Random Forests are therefore essential. The estimation of conditional variable importance shows that the nuclear year counter has a negative importance score.7 Thus, the nuclear year counter is not important in explaining the dispute–state ratio. This suggests that the optimist theory is supported. The remaining regressors have an importance score higher than the absolute value of the importance score of the nuclear year counter, meaning that they are all important. Controlling for democratic peace, capitalist peace, and polarity, the number of nuclear states is still a significant predictor in explaining a systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Figure 1 presents the partial dependence plots of the model.8 First, on average, a larger number of nuclear states is associated with a lower dispute–state ratio, although the changes from two nuclear states to three and from six to seven increase the ratio instead. Thus, the relationship is empirically non-linear, as Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982) and Intriligator and Brito (1981) expected in part. Overall, however, the optimist theory is supported, and the change from two nuclear states to nine nuclear states decreases the dispute–state ratio approximately from 0.228 to 0.18. This means that, if there are 194 states in the system (as there were in 2009), the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year decreases approximately from 44 to 35. This is a substantively significant decline. Second, the nuclear year counter shows a concave relationship with the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that new nuclear states are less prone to conflict than middle-aged nuclear states. Thus, the pessimist theory finds no support from either the variable importance estimation or the partial dependence plot. Finally, as for the control variables, the number of democratic states and the gross world product have a complex non-linear relationship with the dispute–state ratio, but if the number of democratic states and the gross world product are sufficiently large, they tend to decrease the dispute–state ratio. Their substantive effects are also significant, though not as much as the number of nuclear states. When comparing the effect of their lowest and highest values (23 and 94 in the number of democratic states and 7 and 71.2 in the gross world product), the number of democratic states decreases the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year approximately from 40 to 37, and the gross world product from 44 to 37. Unipolarity is also associated with a decline in the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that unipolarity is better than bipolarity in terms of a systemic propensity for interstate conflict; however, its effect is negligible, as it reduces the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year from 39 to 38. One caveat is, as explained in the online appendix, that the results of the number of democratic states and unipolarity are significantly sensitive to a parameter setting. Thus, these predictors are less robust, and the aforementioned points about them should be treated with caution. Discussion and concluding remarks The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported:9 first, a larger number of nuclear states on average decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict; and second, there is no clear evidence that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer disputes in the system. This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study’s findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states’ intervention, to the extent that these effects overwhelm the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear–asymmetrical dyads. Thus, dyadic-level empirics cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The systemic-level empirics deserve attention.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC—ALT CAUSES

Trump’s budget cuts are an alt cause to failed disease response

Baumgaertner 17 (Emily Baumgaertner, the former global health projects and partnerships coordiantor at the Pulitzer Center. Prior to joining the Pulitzer Center, Emily earned her Master of Public Health degree in global health metrics at The George Washington University.)(“Trump’s Proposed Budget Cuts Trouble Bioterrorism Experts”, May 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/28/us/politics/biosecurity-trump-budget-defense.html)//ASMITH

WASHINGTON — President Trump has promoted his first budget proposal as placing one mission above all else — keeping America safe. But the president has drawn a narrow definition of national security, and one aspect of defense would actually receive less money: protecting the nation from deadly pathogens, man-made or natural. To help offset a 10 percent increase in military spending, much of the government would take serious hits, including agencies tasked with biosecurity. The Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, which tracks outbreaks of disease, would be cut by $136 million, or 9.7 percent. The National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases — a branch of the that fights threats like and Ebola — would be cut by $65 million, or 11 percent. The C.D.C.’s Center for Global Health would lose $76 million, or 18 percent. Its Emergency Operations Center, which conducts real-time monitoring of outbreak responses, and its Select Agents Program, which sets regulations in lethal toxin labs and helps researchers stay ahead of bioterrorists, face unspecified cuts as well. Experts in biological threats are reacting with alarm. “It’s horrific — worse than I expected,” says J. Stephen Morrison, the director of the Global Health Policy Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “They’re just gutting things, overlaying salt upon key institutions, with devastating human impact.” “When you add those cuts up,” he added, they “will inevitably impact health security.” Republicans in Congress are no less critical. “Sometime in the president’s term, you will have a pandemic,” Representative Tom Cole, Republican of Oklahoma, told the president’s budget director, Mick Mulvaney, at a House budget hearing on Wednesday. “You will have a , you will have an Ebola,” Mr. Cole said. “Cutting the Centers for Disease Control, I think, leaves you very vulnerable and the American people very vulnerable,” he said. Over all, the C.D.C.’s budget would be cut 17 percent. Dr. Thomas R. Frieden, who recently retired as the director of the C.D.C. and led its 2014 Ebola response, sent more than a dozen bullet points cataloging how the proposed budget was “Unsafe at Any Level Of Enactment.” Trump administration officials say they are trying to refocus scientific research in an era of domestic austerity. Too much federal science is competing with work that could be done in the private sector, they say. Under the president’s budget, the at large would be cut 18 percent. Within that, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, which handles Zika, Ebola and /AIDS vaccine research, would lose 18 percent of its budget. “The administration wholeheartedly believes in the commitment to research,” Mr. Mulvaney said Wednesday at the House budget hearing. “We’d like to see more focus on what they call basic research, which is research further away from the marketability of products because that is one of the gaps that the government can and should fill.” The targeting is remarkably specific. At the N.I.H., the Fogarty International Center, a small program that in part trains foreign leaders in pandemic response, would be eliminated. Thousands of scientists and global health professionals rallied on Capitol Hill in April to protest the plan after a list of programs targeted for eradication was released. “They’re making a very radical statement,” Dr. Morrison said. “The big picture is a movement toward suspicion of international programs. The administration is threatening to abandon multilateralism in a big way.” Global health programs at the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development would be cut by at least a quarter. ”Our operations must become more efficient, and our assistance must become more effective,” Hari Sastry, the director of the State Department’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, told reporters on Tuesday. “Our primary mission is going to remain advocating for the national interests of our country.” Military and border patrol spending will increase, if Mr. Trump’s request is funded. But scientists warn that a $1.6 billion project to begin constructing a southern border wall will not keep out the most lethal outbreak of in history, which recently killed 40 percent of patients in China, nor will it keep out Ebola, which has resurfaced in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with 37 suspected cases this month. “The next weapon of mass destruction may not be a bomb,” said , the director of the World Health Organization’s Collaborating Center on Public Health Law and Human Rights. “It may be a tiny pathogen that you can’t see, smell or taste, and by the time we discover it, it’ll be too late,” Mr. Gostin said. “The closed-border, highly nationalistic, America-first vision is not the world’s scientific view of how to keep a population safe and healthy,” he said. The president’s requests on biomedical research and defense are likely to be greeted skeptically by Congress, which ultimately controls spending levels. Lawmakers in both parties have greatly increased funding for the N.I.H. budget, and Georgia’s two senators, both Republicans, have protected the C.D.C. and its Atlanta headquarters. Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, called the Trump proposal “dead on arrival.” And in the House budget hearing on Wednesday, Mr. Cole pressed Mr. Mulvaney on proposed cuts to the disease surveillance program.