2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – Democracy ! Defense
Inga de Jong 22, Inga is a senior journalist at CNS Media Group BV. She has a bachelors in technology., 2-25-2022, “AI poses a real threat to food security, Cambridge University researchers warn,” , oj
25 Feb 2022 ---The use of artificial intelligence (AI) in agriculture poses substantial risks to food security, warns a risk analysis from the University of Cambridge’s Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER). “The idea of intelligent machines running farms is not science fiction. Large companies are already pioneering the next generation of autonomous ag-bots and decision support systems that will replace humans in the field,” says Dr. Asaf Tzachor, University of Cambridge, CSER. “But so far, no-one seems to have asked the question ‘Are there any risks associated with a rapid deployment of agricultural AI?’” he adds. The researchers warn that the risks of AI to farming and food security are “poorly understood and under-appreciated” and raise the alarm about cyber attackers potentially disrupting farms by poisoning datasets, shutting down sprayers, autonomous drones and robotic harvesters. Capacity to destabilize cities Despite the considerable promise of AI for improving crop management and agricultural productivity, potential risks must be addressed responsibly, the Cambridge researchers urge. New technologies need to be tested adequately in experimental settings to ensure safe and secure against accidental failures, unintended consequences, and cyber-attacks. Crops that feed millions can be rendered useless by a single hacking incident. “AI is being hailed as the way to revolutionize agriculture. As we deploy this technology on a large scale, we should closely consider potential risks and aim to mitigate those early on in the technology design,” says Dr. Seán Ó héigeartaigh, executive director of CSER. The researchers sketch a hypothetical scenario in which hackers access the AI system that controls drip-irrigation, tractors, combine harvesters and weather responsive tech on an acres-long field of wheat intended to supply bread to cities. A staple crop feeding millions of people is rendered useless in one fell swoop. The analysis “Responsible artificial intelligence in agriculture requires systemic understanding of risks and externalities” has been published in Nature Machine Intelligence. The authors provide a catalog of risks to be considered in the responsible development of AI for agriculture and ways to address them. To guard against hacking, the authors suggest that ‘white hat hackers’ help companies uncover any security failings during the development phase so that systems are safeguarded against real hackers. Mitigating accidental AI failure In a scenario associated with accidental failure, the authors suggest that an AI system programmed to deliver the best crop yield in the short term might ignore the environmental consequences of achieving this, leading to overuse of fertilizers and soil erosion for a long time. Over-application of pesticides in pursuit of high yields could poison ecosystems; over-application of nitrogen fertilizer would pollute the soil and surrounding waterways. The authors suggest involving applied ecologists in the technology design process to avoid these scenarios. Autonomous machines could improve the working conditions of farmers, relieving them of manual labor. However, without inclusive technology design, socioeconomic inequalities currently entrenched in global agriculture – including gender, class, and ethnic discrimination – will remain. “Expert AI farming systems that don’t consider the complexities of labor inputs will ignore, and potentially sustain, the exploitation of disadvantaged communities,” warns Tzachor. Many farmers are already dependent on artificial intelligence for monitoring and harvesting crops. Dangers of targeting drones Ag-bots, drones and sensors are already used to gather information on crops and support farmers’ decision-making. This includes detecting diseases or insufficient irrigation. Self-driving combine harvesters can bring in a crop without the need for a human operator. While these automated systems aim to make farming more efficient, save labor costs, optimize for production and minimize waste, it also relies on AI. It leads to increased revenues for farmers as a result. Another blind spot in the use of AI is that small-scale growers, who cultivate most farms worldwide, are likely to be excluded from AI-related benefits. Poor internet penetration rates might prevent smallholders from using advanced technologies, widening the gaps between commercial and subsistence farmers. Wageningen University and Research (WUR) researchers are also investigating the impact of AI on the agri-food space, following US$2.5 million in funding from the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO).
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – Democracy ! Defense
Patrick Porter 18. Professor of strategic studies at the University of Exeter. “The tyrannies of distance” in A. T. Thrall and B. H. Friedman eds. US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century. Routledge. 114-127.
But even if Taiwan was forcibly stripped of its surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) , and China could command the skies at low cost, in a wider context China faces a dilemma, a tradeoff between surprise and preparation. Whether it struck in 2009 14 or 2019, surprise and deception would come at the expense of preparedness and speed of engagement with large-scale forces, and vice versa. To inflict a surprise first strike that successfully suppressed Taiwan's air defences to the extent that it achieved air dominance, China would need to do so from a standing start, and to avoid giving the game away would have to forgo the prior preparation of a large-scale invasion force into a cross-strait armada, to cross the 100 nautical miles (run) from its bases closest to the most plausible point of assault, the small number of locations on the north-west beaches of Taiwan. It could hardly amass this force invisibly if a watchful Taiwan was minimally alert and used its surveillance technology efficiently. The interval between the first strike and then preparation for the attempted invasion would afford a vital window of time for Taiwan to recover and prepare for the next phase, including the roughly seven hours it would take for a fleet travelling at 15 knots to make the one-way crossing. Conversely, to prepare adequately with a buildup of force would sacrifice surprise, giving Taiwan days at least to disperse its forces, ensure the survival of large parts of its air force and get its planes off the airfields. Taiwan's topography is such that there are only a few landing-friendly points along its 500-mile coastline where a massed invasion could take place and where the defender could concentrate its forces. Consider the contrast with the Allied invasion of Normandy, where an amphibious assault could have taken place along a coastline 1,200 miles long and without the surveillance assets of today. Since the invasion fleet would have to be a sizable one of 100 assault ships loading vehicles, troops and supplies, and since a fully loaded invasion fleet would take about seven hours going at 15 knots in a one-way crossing of 100 nautical miles at the closest point, it is inconceivable that Taiwan would not see the buildup or see them coming.
Given China's greater strength of numbers and firepower and the problem that Taiwan would simply be unable to out-match it in crude material terms, a vital part of Taiwan's defence is the degree to which it has chosen prudent 'doctrine', and how realistically it defines victory. Doctrine simply means ideas of force employment. It scarcely determines outcomes, and relies on execution, but is needed to link technological means with strategic ends. Taiwan may not be able to out-gun China materially, but as history suggests, well-prepared weaker defending sides can return fire by optimising what they have to create an imposing defensive system. Taiwanese and international observers have intensively debated what it should do with its lesser resources in the face of an adversary whose relative material strength is growing alarmingly. Several competing doctrinal options have been on the table. None of these are mutually exclusive but there are tradeoffs involved, as each would draw resources from the others. They can be organised around two ideal-typical 'poles', 'classical defence' and 'porcupine defence'.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – Democracy ! Defense
Pei 16 (Minxin Pei is the Tom and Margot Pritzker ’72 Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College, “Transition in China? More Likely than You Think,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 27, Number 4, October 2016, online)//cmr
“Refolution” is a combination of reform and revolution. Typically, this process starts with limited reform initiated by the old regime, but ends with its involuntary exit from power. This phenomenon was first observed by Alexis de Tocqueville, who famously observed that “the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways.”22 This Tocquevillean paradox was vividly illustrated when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s mid-1980s program of limited political reform, known as perestroika, sparked nationalist independence movements and ultimately a democratic revolution in the Soviet empire. Based on the instances of regime transition since the mid-1970s, “refolution” (or “transplacement,” to use Huntington’s term) can be divided into two categories. The first consists of those transitions that begin with reform and end with the removal of the ruling elites through “founding elections”—peaceful and competitive votes that are negotiated between the old-regime elite and the opposition. The second variant also starts with limited regime-initiated reform, but it ends with the collapse of the old regime rather than its negotiated exit via elections. The final phase of this type of “refolution” resembles a classic revolution, but with one critical difference: The demise of the old regime comes with relatively little bloodshed; rather than suffering defeat at the hands of an armed opposition, the regime essentially disintegrates—its authority evaporates, and its key supporters defect. By Huntington’s count, between 1974 and 1990 eleven transitions qualified as “transplacement.”23 To this list we may now add Burma. Although the country is not yet a full democracy, the democrats are now in charge of the government after the military regime’s humiliating and decisive loss in Burma’s first competitive elections, held in 2015. [End Page 15] The most critical variable in a “refolution” scenario is the shifting balance of power between the old regime and the opposition.24 This insight is crucial when considering the possible transition scenarios in regimes with conditions that are inhospitable to revolution, such as totalitarian or posttotalitarian regimes. For example, mass uprisings have no chance of success in regimes with strong repressive capacity. If, however, a regime becomes significantly weaker during the initial phase of the transition process, there may be some possibility that it could be overthrown at a later stage. The weakening of an old regime typically begins with the decay of its key institutions and the deterioration of its performance. This process can lead to two outcomes: A near-certain outcome is increasing opposition to the old regime and the erosion of its popular support. A less certain outcome is the rise of reformers inside the regime. The deterioration of the old regime could undermine the hard-liners and help reformers to emerge and take control of the top positions. These reformers could then undertake limited changes in the hope of reversing the regime’s deterioration. This would loosen up the old system and create initial opportunities for mass political mobilization. Of course, if the hard-liners manage to hold on to power in spite of the worsening conditions, reform would not occur and decay would continue. If, however, moderate reformers succeed in gaining power and launching limited reforms, three subsequent developments are certain to occur. First, the old regime will suffer a further split into three groups: moderate reformers in power, hard-liners opposed to even limited changes, and radical reformers demanding fundamental changes. This three-way rift will often produce a stalemate that creates highly favorable conditions for the removal of the old regime (primarily because it paralyzes the old regime’s repressive apparatus). Second, even in a stalemated reform process societal forces will gain unprecedented freedom and lose their fear of repression. This window of opportunity allows them to mobilize and acquire new capacities, thus shifting the balance of power in their favor. Third, the erosion of the old regime’s legitimacy will continue at an accelerating pace. Posttotalitarian regimes that attempt to reform must bear the heavy burden of history—specifically, the responsibility for crimes committed by their totalitarian predecessors against their own people. Limited [End Page 16] reform invariably brings greater press freedom, which in turn exposes the old regime’s crimes, laying bear the “Big Lie” that had shored up the regime’s legitimacy. A thoroughly delegitimized old regime is highly vulnerable to revolutionary overthrow. In essence, this describes the “refolution” dynamics that led to the collapse of the USSR. In the Chinese case, the likelihood of “refolution” will increase in the next ten years. By then, China will have experienced roughly an additional decade of regime decay. The effects of long-term economic stagnation, social frustrations, and deteriorating performance will have become plainly visible. If Xi steps down at the end of his second term, his successor will be under immense pressure to reverse the CCP’s declining fortunes. Such speculation, of course, assumes the likely failure of Xi’s efforts to revive the CCP through a mix of internal discipline, heightened repression, appeals to nationalism, and partial economic reforms. Moreover, by the dawn of the next decade, the CCP’s two post–Mao-era survival strategies—neoauthoritarian crony capitalism and strongman rule—will have proved to be unviable. Xi’s successor will therefore have to find another way to regain legitimacy. It will be a supreme irony of history if the CCP is ultimately brought down by refolution. Since Tiananmen, no nightmare has obsessed the CCP leadership more than the collapse of the Soviet Union, and no political leader has been more reviled by the party than Gorbachev. It is possible that the CCP’s determination not to succumb to the same fate as the Soviet Union will prevent the emergence of a Gorbachev-like figure, however dire the circumstances. But again, authoritarian regimes adopt reform mostly out of despair. Truly desperate dictatorships may have few other options. This dynamic compelled Mao’s immediate successors to embrace capitalism in the late 1970s, and we should not rule out the possibility that the same logic will force future Chinese leaders to take another historic gamble.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – Democracy ! Defense
Heath 15—Senior Defense and International Analyst at the RAND Corporation and Senior China Analyst at USPACOM (2009-2014) [Tim, “No, China’s Not About to Collapse,” 13 Mar, , accessed 9 Nov 2016]
The party’s advantages are less often discussed, but these bear reviewing if one is to evaluate the viability of CCP rule. One of the most overlooked, but important, assets is a lack of any credible alternative. The party’s repressive politics prevent the formation of potential candidates, so the alternative to CCP rule for now is anarchy. For a country still traumatized by its historic experience with national breakdown, this grants the party no small advantage. To truly imperil its authority, the CCP would need to behave in so damaging a manner as to make the certainty of political chaos and economic collapse preferable to the continuation of CCP rule. A party that attempted to return to extreme Mao-era policies such as the catastrophic Great Leap Forward could perhaps meet that threshold. But despite the numerous superficial comparisons in Western media, little about the current administration policy agenda resembles classic Maoism.
The second major political advantage lies in improvements to the party’s effectiveness in recent years. In a major paradigm shift, the CCP redefined itself as a “governing party” whose primary responsibility rests in addressing the myriad economic, political, cultural, ecological, and social welfare demands of the people. It has carried out ideological and political reforms to improve its competence and effectiveness accordingly. The Xi administration has refined, but upheld, the focus on increasing the nation’s standard of living and realizing national revitalization, objectives embodied in the vision of the “Chinese dream.” Although the party has rightly come in for criticism for moving slowly and inadequately on these issues, the policy agenda nevertheless appears to resonate with the majority of Chinese citizens. Independent polls consistently show that the party has in recent years enjoyed surprisingly strong public support.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – Democracy ! Defense
Li 13 Eric X. Li is a Henry Crown Fellow at the Aspen Institute. He is also a venture capitalist in Shanghai who serves on the board of directors of China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) and is vice chairman of its publishing arm CEIBS Publishing Group. “The Life of the Party,” Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, 92.1, EBSCO
In November 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 18th National Congress, setting in motion a once-in-a-decade transfer of power to a new generation of leaders. As expected, Xi Jinping took over as general secretary and will become the president of the People's Republic this March. The turnover was a smooth and well-orchestrated demonstration by a confidently rising superpower. That didn't stop international media and even some Chinese intellectuals, however, from portraying it as a moment of crisis. In an issue that was published before the beginning of the congress, for example, The Economist quoted unnamed scholars at a recent conference as saying that China is "unstable at the grass roots, dejected at the middle strata and out of control at the top." To be sure, months before the handover, the scandal surrounding Bo Xilai, the former party boss of the Chongqing municipality, had shattered the CCP'S long-held facade of unity, which had underwritten domestic political stability since the Tiananmen Square upheavals in 1989. To make matters worse, the Chinese economy, which had sustained double-digit GDP growth for two decades, slowed, decelerating for seven straight quarters. China's economic model of rapid industrialization, labor-intensive manufacturing, large-scale government investments in infrastructure, and export growth seemed to have nearly run its course. Some in China and the West have gone so far as to predict the demise of the one-party state, which they allege cannot survive if leading politicians stop delivering economic miracles.¶ Such pessimism, however, is misplaced. There is no doubt that daunting challenges await Xi. But those who suggest that the CCP will not be able to deal with them fundamentally misread China's politics and the resilience of its governing institutions. Beijing will be able to meet the country's ills with dynamism and resilience, thanks to the CCP'S adaptability, system of meritocracy, and legitimacy with the Chinese people. In the next decade, China will continue to rise, not fade. The country's leaders will consolidate the one-party model and, in the process, challenge the West's conventional wisdom about political development and the inevitable march toward electoral democracy. In the capital of the Middle Kingdom, the world might witness the birth of a post-democratic future.¶ ON-THE-JOB LEARNING¶ The assertion that one-party rule is inherently incapable of self-correction does not reflect the historical record. During its 63 years in power, the CCP has shown extraordinary adaptability. Since its founding in 1949, the People's Republic has pursued a broad range of economic policies. First, the CCP initiated radical land collectivization in the early 1950s. This was followed by the policies of the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s to mid-1970s. After them came the quasi-privatization of farmland in the early 1960s, Deng Xiaoping's market reforms in the late 1970s, and Jiang Zemin's opening up of the CCP'S membership to private businesspeople in the 1990s. The underlying goal has always been economic health, and when a policy did not work -- for example, the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution -- China was able to find something that did: for example, Deng's reforms, which catapulted the Chinese economy into the position of second largest in the world.¶ On the institutional front as well, the CCP has not shied away from reform. One example is the introduction in the 1980s and 1990s of term limits for most political positions (and even of age limits, of 68-70, for the party's most senior leadership). Before this, political leaders had been able to use their positions to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao Zedong was a case in point. He had ended the civil wars that had plagued China and repelled foreign invasions to become the father of modern China. Yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes, such as the Cultural Revolution. Now, it is nearly impossible for the few at the top to consolidate long-term power. Upward mobility within the party has also increased.¶ In terms of foreign policy, China has also changed course many times to achieve national greatness. It moved from a close alliance with Moscow in the 1950s to a virtual alliance with the United States in the 1970s and 1980s as it sought to contain the Soviet Union. Today, its pursuit of a more independent foreign policy has once more put it at odds with the United States. But in its ongoing quest for greatness, China is seeking to defy recent historical precedents and rise peacefully, avoiding the militarism that plagued Germany and Japan in the first half of the last century.¶ As China undergoes its ten-year transition, calls at home and abroad for another round of political reform have increased. One radical camp in China and abroad is urging the party to allow multiparty elections or at least accept formal intraparty factions. In this view, only full-scale adversarial politics can ensure that China gets the leadership it needs. However sincere, these demands all miss a basic fact: the CCP has arguably been one of the most self-reforming political organizations in recent world history. There is no doubt that Chinas new leaders face a different world than Hu Jintao did when he took over in 2002, but chances are good that Xi's CCP will be able to adapt to and meet whatever new challenges the rapidly changing domestic and international environments pose. In part, that is because the CCP is heavily meritocratic and promotes those with proven experience and capabilities.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – Democracy ! Defense
Repucci and Slipowitz 20 – Amy Slipowitz is the Research Manager for Freedom in the World, Freedom House’s flagship annual report assessing the condition of political rights and civil liberties around the world. Sarah Repucci is vice-president of research and analysis at Freedom House. ( Repucci, Sarah, and Amy Slipowitz. “Democracy under Lockdown.” Freedom House, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/democracy-under-lockdown. )
The COVID-19 pandemic has fueled a crisis for democracy around the world. Since the coronavirus outbreak began, the condition of democracy and human rights has grown worse in 80 countries. Governments have responded by engaging in abuses of power, silencing their critics, and weakening or shuttering important institutions, often undermining the very systems of accountability needed to protect public health.
This is the conclusion of new Freedom House research on the impact of COVID-19 on democracy and human rights, produced in partnership with the survey firm GQR. Based on a survey of 398 journalists, civil society workers, activists, and other experts as well as research on 192 countries by Freedom House’s global network of analysts, this report is the first of its kind and the most in-depth effort to date to examine the condition of democracy during the pandemic (see full methodology).
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – AT: Democracy !
Belot 21 – [Henry Belot is a political reporter in the ABC's Parliament House bureau in Canberra. He has previously worked for The Canberra Times covering the federal public service. Henry has a masters degree from the University of Melbourne and has studied international security. He was a finalist in the 2016 Walkley Young Journalist of the Year Awards. 9-15-2021, "Curtin University lobbies for retraction of unethical AI study on Uyghur facial recognition," abc news, /kch]
An internal review of research by Associate Professor Wan-Quan Liu – who has since resigned and now works at a university in China – found he breached several ethical codes including a failure to obtain informed consent and approval. The study, first reported by Four Corners in 2019, was partly funded by the Chinese government and was criticised by human rights campaigners who were worried it could be misused by authorities to persecute Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The paper remains online despite Curtin University's deputy vice-chancellor, Professor Chris Moran, repeatedly urging publisher Wiley for it to be retracted, along with any reference to the university immediately removed. The chair of Federal Parliament's intelligence and security committee, Senator James Paterson, praised Curtin University for taking the issue seriously but said he remained concerned about the breaches. "It does raise troubling questions about how this research was allowed to be conducted in the first place and why it went undetected for so long," he told the ABC. "It is alarming to think an Australian university was involved with research that can so clearly be used for profoundly unethical purposes." Letters seen by the ABC and first reported by US website IPVM show the university has had success in lobbying other publishers, including the IEEE Open Journal of the Computer Society, to retract subsequent studies that are based on the data obtained during initial research. In a statement, publisher Wiley told the ABC it was now reconsidering its decision to keep the article online. "WIREs Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery has previously launched an investigation in accordance with the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) guidelines, which resulted in a Publisher's Note and an Expression of Concern," a spokesperson told the ABC. "We take every concern seriously and are reviewing the matter again taking into account the new information provided by Curtin University."In a statement, a Curtin University spokesperson said the research was undertaken informally without its knowledge and that oversight had since been strengthened. "Curtin has established a new risk-based framework and guidelines to deal with informal research activities," the spokesman said. "This is part of Curtin's ongoing commitment to ensuring that we innovate in an ethical and responsible way as developing and managing the world's technologies becomes increasingly complex. "The framework is supported by an emphasis on ensuring academics maintain a current disclosure/registration of interests statement with the university." A letter from Professor Chris Moran to a concerned academic in August said the university found Dr Liu "did not gain the required ethical approvals" and "did not gain informed consent". Allegations of foreign interference in Australian universities is currently being considered by Parliament's intelligence and security committee. The ABC has contacted publisher Wiley and Dr Liu for comment.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – AT: Democracy !
Sherman ’19 (Justin Sherman work at the Atlantic Council focuses on the geopolitics, governance, and security of the global internet. He was a cybersecurity policy fellow at New America, “Why This Framing is Not Only Wrong, But Dangerous for American Policymaking,” New America Cybersecurity initiative, 3/6/19, chapter one) https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/reports/essay-reframing-the-us-china-ai-arms-race/
China is going to develop superior artificial intelligence and take over the world, it seems—at least if one listens to what many commentators have been shouting from the rooftops. Indeed, over the past year, American security analysts, policymakers, and journalists alike have increasingly used a Cold War-era analogy to describe issues around the development of artificial intelligence (AI)—specifically characterizing the state of U.S.-China technological competition as an “AI arms race,”1 whereby the United States and China are presumably locked in competition for artificial intelligence hegemony.2 “Ultimately, we will win the race for AI,” President Trump’s Deputy Assistant for Technology Policy Michael Kratsios recently wrote.3 Talk of U.S.-China “algorithm battles” even made it into a 2018 U.S. National Security Council memo.4 Here, the framing is clearly winner-takes-all: One nation will reap the benefits of artificial intelligence, in fashions as wide-ranging as accelerated economic growth and enhanced military capability, while the other loses out and faces defeat. But this framing of artificial intelligence is not only wrong, it’s dangerous, and it seriously hampers the ways in which American policymakers approach the management of China’s technological rise and the development of artificial intelligence within our country. The United States needs to quickly address China’s growing AI development; artificial intelligence will have important influence over the balance of international power5 and the future world order6 —but, as this report will address, a winner-takes-all arms race framing is not the appropriate lens through which to view this strategic threat. The first chapter argues why this winner-takes-all arms race framing treats AI development as if it occurs in vacuums within the United States and China. By ignoring the interconnection and interdependence of the sectors between the two countries, this framing causes American policymakers to overlook the many mutual benefits that could arise from the furthering of global artificial intelligence capabilities. As a result, policymakers in the United States risk causing damage to AI development, missing opportunities, and mishandling AI risks—when they should focus on engaging with China on AI projects without giving up critical expertise or technologies that could potentially enhance harmful applications of artificial intelligence. The second chapter argues why this framing incorrectly treats artificial intelligence like one technology, rather than a catch-all term that alludes to a variety of technologies. This is blatantly wrong and overlooks the varying speeds and mechanisms of AI’s development in different application areas. Once again, American policymakers may mishandle AI risks and miss out on AI upsides as a result.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – AT: Democracy !
CFDS 19 [Center for Digital Society (CfDS) is a research center under the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Gadjah Mada. 7-11-2019, "China: Where Technology Threatens Human Rights : Center for Digital Society”, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:OFE85dMbys8J:https://cfds.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/2019/07/11/china-where-technology-threatens-human-rights/+&cd=12&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=tw]
China’s rate of technological advancement has been one of the highest in the world. Currently, it is on the 3rd rank of AI ecosystem development[1]. Moreover, the government even already set the target to be the world’s AI leader by 2030, tackling the US technological leadership[2]. This goal was established to maximize the advantages that technology has and will bring towards China, mainly on economic development. However, as many have argued, the Chinese model could succeed because it could maintain the stability of the country by repressing the citi[an1] [TA2] [TA3] zen’s rights through the central planning system. As a result, the government is not hesitant to utilize technology to preserve the balance of the government. Thus, this has also increased international concerns. This commentary will discuss the reasons behind these concerns.
China’s Mass Surveillance Application
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – AT: Democracy !
Omaar 20 [Hodan Omaar is a senior policy analyst at the Center for Data Innovation focusing on AI policy. Previously, she worked as a senior consultant on technology and risk management in London and as a crypto-economist in Berlin. She has an MA in Economics and Mathematics from the University of Edinburgh. 7-17-2020, "U.S. Global Leadership on AI a Welcome Development," Center for Data Innovation, https://datainnovation.org/2020/07/u-s-global-leadership-on-ai-a-welcome-development/]
The U.S. government announced on May 27 that it was joining the Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), a group launched by the G7 to provide cooperation between nations on artificial intelligence. This is a sharp change of course for the United States which had held out on joining the group initially out of concern that its European allies would use the forum to push for aggressive regulation of the technology without clear evidence of harms. Instead, the group is now set up to focus on the responsible development of AI, including by developing research agendas, promoting AI workforce development, and spurring AI innovation and commercialization, while ensuring these uses align with shared democratic values. The U.S. presence on the global stage in AI policy is a welcome step because it provides an alternative to the two dominant views. On one side is China, which has made bold commitments in its national AI strategy to leverage the technology across its entire economy and use this to be more competitive economically and militarily. However, many are concerned that China’s authoritarian government will also abuse the technology to infringe on human rights, including by monitoring dissidents and minority communities. On the other side is the EU, which has embraced the precautionary principle and wants to strictly regulate the use of AI because of fears that the technology will otherwise be used for harmful purposes.
The United States presents an alternative view—unlike China it wants to protect democratic values, and unlike the EU it wants to proceed without an overly burdensome regulatory regime. U.S. leadership on digital policy issues has always been important. For example, in the 1990s the U.S. government championed the multistakeholder approach to Internet governance, creating a balance between the different needs of government, commercial, and civil society stakeholders. For many years, the U.S. government has backed a free and open Internet, helping to resist efforts by other countries to censor content online and impose data localization requirements. Today, the AI economy needs such advocacy even more, as its expansion and evolution depends on the ability of technology firms to operate across borders. For instance, the EU’s data laws that restrict algorithmic decision making inhibit firms from selling AI products and services that automate many processes. The United States could influence its other trading partners to avoid adopting such harmful policies by advancing a light-touch regulatory framework that instead fosters algorithmic accountability. Forums like GPAI present an opportunity for the United States to demonstrate that regulations should be adopted only where they are necessary and only targeting specific harms in particular application areas. This approach will allow for more rapid adoption of AI and faster economic and social progress. Working with other countries to address issues arising from the misuse of AI products will serve the United States well at home too. For example, in response to the flagrant abuse of facial recognition technology in China to target the predominantly Muslim Uighur minority, the United States could engage its geopolitical partners to share resources, expertise, and best practices on establishing global norms on ethical uses of AI. By establishing proper guardrails, rather than enacting misguided bans or innovation-hampering regulation, the United States can prevent consumer backlash that impedes the growth of beneficial AI technologies. Establishing such consensus with allied nations is particularly important in balancing global power dynamics in AI development. Chinese government officials and the country’s industry leaders made it clear in their call for stronger global collaboration in AI this month, that they intend to strengthen their ties with other AI leaders. By joining GPAI, the United States is strengthening its own alliance with like-minded democratic partners, and providing a counterweight to China’s growing economic and political power. Beyond protecting against threats to U.S. economic and national security, GPAI also provides an opportunity for the United States to ensure American values, rather than Chinese ones, prevail on the global scale. There are more commonalities in values and principles among the G7 group than there are divergences, and the United States is correct in thinking that promoting these values—including diversity, inclusion, and civil liberties— is stronger when coordinated. Working together, the group will support the development of AI that integrates shared democratic values and can ultimately ensure these values supersede those of China and other autocratic countries. GPAI is still in the early days of establishing international cooperation, but the United States’ involvement is an encouraging step towards achieving its vision of economic growth, competitive advantage, and social progress.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – AT: Democracy !
Castro, McLaghlin and Chivot 19 – [Daniel Castro is the director of the Center for Data Innovation and vice president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Michael McLaughlin is a research analyst at the Center for Data Innovation specialized in data journalism; and Eline Chivot is a former senior policy analyst at the Center for Data Innovation and worked at one of Brussels’ largest trade associations and managed its relations with representatives of the digital tech industry in Europe and beyond. 8-19-2019, "Who Is Winning the AI Race: China, the EU or the United States?," Center for Data Innovation, https://datainnovation.org/2019/08/who-is-winning-the-ai-race-china-the-eu-or-the-united-states/]
A sneak peek of Joe Biden's national AI strategy: here's what to expect
"Continued American leadership in AI is of paramount importance to maintaining the economic and national security of the United States and to shaping the global evolution of AI in a manner consistent with our Nation's values, policies, and priorities." President Donald J. Trump, February 11, 2019. Although the Trump administration launched the first-ever national AI strategy a few years earlier, it was not until Joe Biden took office that federal AI spending reached historic high. Through 2021, Washington could invest $6 billion into AI-related R&D projects and initiatives. The country's renewed interest in artificial intelligence is largely ignited by Biden's plan to challenge China and its views on AI usage. In the spring of 2022, the National Artificial Intelligence Research Task Force is set to present an interim report highlighting the national artificial intelligence strategy and implementation plan, with the full report expected later that year. Experts believe that the US AI strategy will cover complex scientific, economic, social, and security issues of artificial intelligence and the associated technologies, such as data storage and processing platforms.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – AT: Democracy !
Matthews 21 - [David Matthews is the international editor of Science|Business, covering science and technology policy across the world. In addition, he also write on a freelance basis, focusing on technology, virtual reality in particular. I’ve written for outlets including Nature, The Guardian, The Register, UploadVR and the British Journalism Review., 12-7-2021, "US to push ‘democracy-affirming technology’ with prizes and research projects," Science|Business, /kch]
The US is set to fund prizes, challenges and research projects to create so-called “democracy affirming technologies” that allow open societies to reap the benefits of innovation without sacrificing privacy or accountability. The initiative will be launched this week at the virtual Summit for Democracy, a meeting of 111 invited countries convened by president Joe Biden in an attempt to “renew” democracy. Examples of democracy affirming technologies include methods of machine learning that respect the privacy of individuals, or alternatives to what the US sees as the compulsory genomic surveillance of populations. “We’re really interested in ways we could spur innovation and pioneer a new class of technologies,” Tarun Chhabra, senior director for technology and national security of the US National Security Council told the virtual conference, ‘Technology in and for Society’, hosted by the OECD. These technologies should “advance the values of privacy, transparency, accountability and access to information” he said, setting out the objectives of the programme on Monday, in advance of the Summit on 9 and 10 December. The US wants to set up prizes, challenges and pilot projects “with likeminded countries” in order to “build a future where we can really accelerate the development of technologies,” Chhabra said.
Untested proposition
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – AT: Democracy !
DoD 20, The US DoD is the primary defense sector of the US military, 2-24-2020, “DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence,” , oj
The U.S. Department of Defense officially adopted a series of ethical principles for the use of Artificial Intelligence today following recommendations provided to Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper by the Defense Innovation Board last October.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2nc – China is transparent
Fattal and Tene ’22 (Joshua r. Fattal is an associate in Technology group Business Law Deparment firm, and member of firms Data, Privacy, and Cybersecurity, “China Passes Extensive Regulations Governing Artificial Intelligence Algorithms”, Goodwin Data, Privacy + Cybersecurity insights, 1/28/22)
The Cybersecurity Administration of China (CAC), China’s data protection and cybersecurity watchdog, recently passed the of the Internet Information Service Algorithm Recommendation Management Regulations, an extensive set of rules – one of the most fully developed artificial intelligence (AI) regulations in the world – designed to govern the use of AI-based recommendation algorithms. From to , companies in China and beyond are using recommendation algorithms as one of the most of AI in use today. The new regulations, which were published along with a series of related , are a part of China’s ongoing efforts to regulate technology platforms in contexts ranging from securities regulation and competition to data security and privacy. When implemented, the regulations will have a major impact on companies relying on recommendation algorithms both inside and outside China. The regulations, based off a draft promulgated this past summer, clearly state their goal, to “carry forward the Socialist core value view, safeguard national security and the social and public interest.” They apply to “algorithmic recommendation service providers” – i.e., companies that use algorithmic technologies to “provide information to users,” such as app operators who use algorithmic recommendations in their platforms. The regulations require these providers to “uphold mainstream value orientations, optimize algorithmic recommendation service mechanisms, vigorously disseminate positive energy, and advance the use of algorithm upwards and in the direction of good.” The regulations set out a number of principles that are designed to guide the activity of algorithmic recommendation service providers. Such providers must: take “measures to prevent and curb the dissemination of harmful information” including the generation of “fake news”; avoid setting up algorithmic models that “violate laws and regulations or ethics and morals, such as by leading users to addiction or excessive consumption;” and not carry out “monopolistic or improper competition acts.” Under the regulations, providers must immediately halt the spread of any illegal information that they discover, effectively placing responsibility for content moderation on platforms that, in the U.S., would be from civil liability under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Providers must not only take corrective actions when illegal information is discovered, but also report any such discovery to the CAC. Algorithm providers are further instructed to offer a series of features designed to protect user rights, including notifying users in a clear manner about the basic principles, purposes and operational mechanisms of an algorithm; providing users with a choice “to not target certain of their individual characteristics”; and installing “convenient and efficient user complaint and public complaint and reporting access points.” To afford users these rights, developers may need to create an interface where users can view their profiles and actively select and remove keywords used by the recommendation algorithm, to test alternative outcomes. This would be a first for any regulation of algorithms anywhere in the world. The regulations also contain specific requirements for services that are provided to minors, stating that algorithm providers may not provide minors with information that may incite the imitation of unsafe conduct or lead to “online addiction.” Moreover, the regulations require that providers of algorithm recommendation services to the elderly must consider the “elderly’s requirement in going out, undergoing medical treatment, consumption, handling affairs, etc.” The regulations also acknowledge labor rights, specifying that providers of algorithm recommendation services to workers must guarantee workers’ legal rights and interests, such as renumeration, rest, and vacation. Individuals or organizations that discover activities that violate these provisions may file a complaint or report with the government. Relevant government departments may issue a warning or report and order rectification within a limited time. The government may impose a fine of between 10,000 and 100,000 yuan (between $1,570 and $15,700, amounts that have doubled since the draft regulations) if the violations are not corrected or the circumstances are “grave.” Violations may also be prosecuted with criminal liability. Like the Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL), which came into force last November – less than three months after it passed in the National People’s Congress – the regulations will take effect shortly after they were published, on March 1, 2022. In light of this looming deadline, companies that rely on algorithms for content recommendations and targeted advertising, as well as the platforms that provide these services, should begin to consider how the regulations might affect their business. Companies that operate both in China and overseas may have to pursue a dual-tracked approach, ensuring that their Chinese operations comply with the regulations while maintaining another set of services that align with other countries’ approaches. Nonetheless, h ow these regulations are enforced and how companies adapt to their terms will likely affect the global AI ecosystem.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2nc – China is transparent
Sheehan ’22 (Matt Sheehan--fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, research focuses on global technology issues, with specialization in China’s artificial intelligence ecosystem, “China’s New AI Governance Initiatives Shouldn’t Be Ignored”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1/4/22) https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/01/04/china-s-new-ai-governance-initiatives-shouldn-t-be-ignored-pub-86127
Over the past six months, the Chinese government has rolled out a series of policy documents and public pronouncements that are finally putting meat on the bone of the country’s governance regime for artificial intelligence (AI). Given China’s track record of leveraging AI for mass surveillance, it’s tempting to view these initiatives as little more than a fig leaf to cover widespread abuses of human rights. But that response risks ignoring regulatory changes with major implications for global AI development and national security. Anyone who wants to compete against, cooperate with, or simply understand China’s AI ecosystem must examine these moves closely. These recent initiatives show the emergence of three different approaches to AI governance, each championed by a different branch of the Chinese bureaucracy, and each at a different level of maturity. Their backers also pack very different bureaucratic punches. It’s worth examining the three approaches and their backers, along with how they will both complement and compete with each other, to better understand where China’s AI governance is heading. The strongest and most immediately influential moves in AI governance have been made by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), a relatively new but regulator that writes the rules governing certain applications of AI. The CAC’s approach is the most mature, the most rule-based, and the most concerned with AI’s role in disseminating information. The CAC made headlines in August 2021 when it released a for regulating internet recommendation algorithms, the software powering everything from TikTok to news apps and search engines. Some of those rules are China-specific, such as the one stipulating that recommendation algorithms “vigorously disseminate positive energy.” But other provisions in ongoing international debates, such as the requirement that algorithm providers be able to “” and “remedy” situations in which algorithms have infringed on user rights and interests. If put into practice, these types of provisions could spur Chinese companies to experiment with new kinds of disclosure and methods for algorithmic interpretability, an area of machine learning research. Soon after releasing its recommendation algorithm rules, the CAC came out with a much more ambitious effort: a for governing all internet algorithms. Following through on that road map will require input from many of the nine regulators that co-signed the project, including the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). The second approach to AI governance has emerged out of the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology (CAICT), an . Active in policy formulation and many aspects of technology testing and certification, the CAICT has distinguished its method through a focus on creating the tools for measuring and testing AI systems. This work remains in its infancy, both from technical and regulatory perspectives. But if successful, it could lay the foundations for China’s larger AI governance regime, ensuring that deployed systems are robust, reliable, and controllable. In July 2021, the CAICT teamed up with a research lab at the Chinese e-commerce giant JD to release the country’s first on “trustworthy AI.” Already popular in European and U.S. discussions, trustworthy AI refers to many of the more technical aspects of AI governance, such as testing systems for robustness, bias, and explainability. The way the CAICT defines trustworthy AI in its core principles to the definitions that have come out of U.S. and European institutions, but the paper was notable for how quickly those principles are being converted into concrete action. The CAICT China’s AI Industry Alliance, a government-sponsored industry body, to test and certify different kinds of AI systems. In November 2021, it issued its first batch of for facial recognition systems. Depending on the technical rigor of implementation, these types of certifications could help accelerate progress on algorithmic interpretability—or they could simply turn into a form of bureaucratic rent seeking. On policy impact, the CAICT is often viewed as representing the views of the powerful MIIT, but the MIIT’s leadership has yet to issue its own policy documents on trustworthy AI. Whether it does will be a strong indicator of the bureaucratic momentum behind this approach. Finally, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) has taken the lightest of the three approaches to AI governance. Its highest-profile publications have focused on laying down ethical guidelines, relying on companies and researchers to supervise themselves in applying those principles to their work. In July 2021, MOST that called for universities, labs, and companies to set up internal review committees to oversee and adjudicate technology ethics issues. Two months later, the main AI expert committee operating under MOST released its own , with a special focus on weaving ethics into the entire life cycle of development. Since then, MOST has been encouraging leading tech companies to establish their own ethics review committees and audit their own products. MOST’s approach is similar to those of international organizations such as the and the , which have released AI principles and encouraged countries and companies to adopt them. But in the Chinese context, that tactic feels quite out of step with the country’s increasingly hands-on approach to technology governance, a disconnect that could undermine the impact of MOST’s efforts. One unanswered question is how these three approaches will fit together. Chinese ministries and administrative bodies are with one another, constantly jostling to get their pet initiatives in front of the country’s central leadership in hopes that they become the chosen policies of the party-state. In this contest, the CAC’s approach appears to have the clear upper hand: It is the most mature, the most in tune with the regulatory zeitgeist, and it comes from the organization with the most bureaucratic heft. But its approach can’t succeed entirely on its own. The CAC requires that companies be able to explain how their recommendation algorithms function, and the tools or certifications for what constitutes explainable AI are likely to come from the CAICT. In addition, given the sprawling and rapidly evolving nature of the technology, many practical aspects of trustworthy AI will first surface in the MOST-inspired ethics committees of individual companies. The three-year road map for algorithmic governance offers a glimpse of some bureaucratic collaboration. Though the CAC is clearly the lead author, the document includes new references to algorithms being trustworthy and to companies setting up ethics review committees, additions likely made at the behest of the other two ministries. There may also be substantial shifts in bureaucratic power as AI governance expands to cover many industrial and social applications of AI. The CAC is traditionally an internet-focused regulator, and future regulations for autonomous vehicles or medical AI may create an opening for a ministry like the MIIT to seize the regulatory reins. The potential impact of these regulatory currents extends far beyond China. If the CAC follows through on certain requirements for algorithmic transparency and explainability, China will be running some of the world’s largest regulatory experiments on topics that European regulators have . Whether Chinese companies are able to could inform analogous debates in Europe over the right to explanation. On the security side, as AI systems are woven deeper into the fabrics of militaries around the world, governments want to ensure those systems are robust, reliable, and controllable for the sake of international stability. The CAICT’s current experiments in certifying AI systems are likely not game-ready for those kinds of high-stakes deployment decisions. But developing an early understanding of how Chinese institutions and technologists approach these questions could prove valuable for governments who may soon find themselves negotiating over aspects of autonomous weapons and arms controls. With 2022 marking in the Chinese political calendar, the people and bureaucracies building out Chinese AI governance are likely to continue jostling for position and influence. The results of that jostling warrant close attention from AI experts and China watchers. If China’s attempts to rein in algorithms prove successful, they could imbue these approaches with a kind of technological and regulatory soft power that shapes AI governance regimes around the globe. End of document
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2nc – China is transparent
Holland 22 - Makenzie Holland is a news writer covering big tech and federal regulation. Prior to joining TechTarget, she was a general reporter for the Wilmington StarNews and a crime and education reporter at the Wabash Plain Dealer. (Holland, Makenzie. “Experts See Positives to China's New AI Regulations.” SearchEnterpriseAI, TechTarget, 14 Mar. 2022, https://www.techtarget.com/searchenterpriseai/news/252514586/Experts-see-positives-to-Chinas-new-AI-regulations. )
China's new AI regulations tackle some of the most controversial elements of the technology, including algorithmic explainability and transparency -- something businesses will need to pay attention to, analysts said.
The AI regulations took effect March 1. They AI algorithms that make recommendations to users to be moral, accountable and transparent, according to Guannan Lu, analyst at Forrester Research.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2nc – China ahead now
Matt Hamblenjun, 6-19-2021, "China’s ahead in tech. Here’s where to start the comeback.," Fierce Electronics, https://www.fierceelectronics.com/electronics/china-s-ahead-tech-here-s-where-to-start
President Biden often speaks about challenges to democracy from autocracies such as China and Russia, but there are ways that the U.S. form of democracy, capitalism and strategic investment could be improved without calling out other countries for violating humanitarian principles.
One way is for U.S. policymakers, CEOs and research institutions to get better organized and coordinated, especially to compete with China on the technology front. Recent Senate passage of the $250 billion U.S. Innovation and Competition Act USICA to help the supply chain and build more chip fabs is a good start.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2nc – China ahead now
Initiative For U.S.-China Dialogue On Global Issues 5-6-2022, Initiative For U.S.-China Dialogue On Global Issues, 5-6-2022, "Chinese Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Technology and Trade," No Publication, https://uschinadialogue.georgetown.edu/events/chinese-artificial-intelligence-and-the-future-of-technology-and-trade, accessed 7-15-2022
China is angling to become a global leader in artificial intelligence (AI) theory and technology and has invested heavily in hopes of developing it into a $150 billion industry by 2030. According to the country’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, in the past decade, China has filed nearly 390,000 AI patents. Chinese leaders also view AI as a key component for the country’s future economic transformation and growth. What are the different specialized sectors in AI, and how does China perform in areas like facial recognition, hardware, software, and voice intellection? Meanwhile, some of China's leading companies have yet to turn profits and have been added to an investment blacklist by the U.S. Department of Treasury for alleged involvement in surveillance on minorities in Xinjiang. This panel brought together experts to discuss Chinese AI’s domestic opportunities and challenges, international competition, as well as the economic, ethical, and military implications of this innovative industry.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2nc – China ahead now
Paul Brian, 3-13-2022, "The United States Has Fallen Behind China on Artificial Intelligence," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/techland-when-great-power-competition-meets-digital-world/united-states-has-fallen-behind-china
The recent Beijing Olympics showcased one particular threat, as China trotted out new artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics technologies with vital relevance to Washington’s current geopolitical tensions with Beijing. From driverless buses to high-speed rail powered by 5G, advanced Chinese technology was featured front and center. Indeed, the digital currency-only games, focused around the e-CNY currency which has already been by some 140 million people, were a little peek into a reality that China has embraced while the West has dithered.
As the recent Olympics emphasized, AI is a driving obsession for China. The robot chefs making burgers at Olympic facilities and the smart beds measuring athletes’ vital statistics weren’t just gimmicks for the cameras: they’re a symbol of how China has quickly eclipsed the United States when it comes to the deployment and use of AI technologies.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2nc – China ahead now
Aaron Smith 22, Aaron Smith is a senior from Nottingham, England studying Environmental Studies and International Relations, while pursuing a Master of Environmental Studies through the Progressive Degree Program, 1-6-2022, “How China surpassed the U.S. in the race for AI supremacy,” , oj
Nick Chaillan, the U.S. Department of State’s first-ever software chief, resigned in September 2021. He claimed that the United States had “no competing fighting chance against China in the next 15 to 20 years.” China is currently winning the race toward global dominance in artificial intelligence. But how did China get so far ahead? AI technology will play a major role in driving economic growth and national security in the foreseeable future. China’s AI investment is a new development that only started to gain traction in the past several years. In 2015, China was still behind the United States, along with French and German AI firms as well. However, one event in 2016 pushed China on its upward slope toward AI supremacy. DeepMind, a leading AI application company, created a machine that beat the world champion in Go, the world’s most complex board game. By this time, many American companies had already constructed machines capable of beating chess world champions. However, Go is thousands of times more complex than chess, so many were confident that it would be impossible to create such a machine. Yet, China did it. Skepticism about the potential of China’s AI technology triggered a reaction from President Xi Jinping; contrary to what was being said, he declared that China would become a leader in AI. In the years that followed, Beijing prioritized artificial intelligence and cyber capabilities over traditional military spending, leading to an aggressive approach in dominating the AI industry with a specific focus on surveillance and data collection. Xi wanted major tech companies, instead of government agencies, to lead this innovation. He appointed five national champions — Alibaba for smart cities; Baidu for autonomous driving; iFlytek for voice recognition; SenseTime for facial recognition; and Tencent for computer vision for medical imaging. Xi also set targets that would ensure China’s dominance in AI technology and other related sectors by 2030. And just one year after Xi set his targets and appointed AI leaders, China saw major advancements in its race against the United States. Investments in Chinese AI startups overtook investments in American AI startups; China filed 2.5 times more patents than the United States for AI technologies by 2018. And in 2020 China had three times the number of college graduates in the computer sciences than the United States did. WeChat, which was developed by Tencent, became the world’s largest mobile app in 2018 with over 1 billion monthly users. The app can collect major quantities of data thanks to government support and Newark privacy policies. Today, China dominates the various sectors of AI technology. In financial technology, Apple Pay in the United States has 22 million users. On the other hand, Tencent’s WeChat Pay has 900 million users in China and greater technological capabilities than Apple Pay, which allows the app to generate vast amounts of data about consumer behaviors that Chinese systems can then use to develop more advanced technology. Moreover, in 2018 Chinese consumers spent $19 trillion through mobile payments, while the United States is still struggling to hit $1 trillion. In facial recognition, Washington essentially dropped out of the race due to privacy concerns and the ethics of how this technology could be deployed. Beijing, however, claimed the top 5 spots in the 2018 international competition for facial recognition. Chinese firms individually control a third of the world’s security cameras, can capture high-definition color images with minimal light, and specialize in thermal imaging. Together, they work with Beijing to perfect this technology for both profit and security purposes. China is also beating the United States in speech technology. iFlytek, the world’s top voice recognition company, has a user base of almost double the number of Siri users, with 700 million people using iFlytek. And once again, Chinese teams claimed three of the top five spots, including first place, at Stanford University’s international competition for machine reading comprehension. Of the world’s top five commercial drone brands, three of them are Chinese brands, while just one is American, with Shenzhen drone company DJI controlling 70% of the global market of drone technology. Additionally, 5G infrastructure is essential for a future that runs on AI technology. China has two firms within the top four global leaders for providing this technology, while the United States. has none. Huawei, a Chinese firm, is the world’s leading supplier of 5G infrastructure and technology, occupying 28% of the global market share — equalling the combined shares of its two biggest competitors. However, many consider China far behind the United States when it comes to AI ethics and governance. American social culture and political culture values privacy over security and fosters distrust in authority and the government. American values have led to early debates and conversations on how to regulate AI and its algorithms. These discussions have made it difficult for the United States to significantly advance its AI technology. On the other hand, AI ethics have not been as large of an issue in China. Public opinions in China about privacy have allowed AI to quickly develop. In fact, it wasn’t until October 2021 that China issued its first guidelines on AI ethics, prioritizing user rights and data control. China is not just trying to gain global dominance in AI technology but is currently succeeding and dominating all aspects of the field. AI will have the potential to greatly affect commerce, national security and general society in the next couple of decades. If it wants to keep up, the United States needs to make a decision about whether it will invest in AI technology and begin to seriously compete with China, or continue to waiver on AI and prove Nick Chaillan right.