2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Impact Defense › Russia
Rodriguez 19 – Lusia, research fellow at the Forethought Foundation for Global Priorities Research, she also researched nuclear war at Rethink Priorities and as a visiting researcher at the Future of Humanity Institute, holds an M.A. from The Heller School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University. “How likely is a nuclear exchange between the US and Russia?”, Effective Altruism Forum, , 06-19-2019
My previous posts address how bad a nuclear war is likely to be, conditional on there being a nuclear war (see , and ), but they don’t consider the likelihood that we actually see a US-Russia nuclear exchange unfold in the first place. In this post, I get a rough sense of how probable a nuclear war might be by looking at historical evidence, the views of experts, and predictions made by forecasters. I find that, if we aggregate those perspectives, there’s about a 1.1% chance of nuclear war each year, and that the chances of a nuclear war between the US and Russia, in particular, are around 0.38% per year.
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Impact Defense › Russia
Woolf 21 – Amy F, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, received a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 1983. “Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization”, CRS, , 09-13-2021
One analyst has postulated that Russia may actually raise its nuclear threshold as it bolsters its conventional forces. According to this analyst, “It is difficult to understand why Russia would want to pursue military adventurism that would risk all-out confrontation with a technologically advanced and nuclear-armed adversary like NATO. While opportunistic, and possibly even reckless, the Putin regime does not appear to be suicidal.” 144 As a study from the RAND Corporation noted, Russia has “invested considerable sums in developing and fielding long-range conventional strike weapons since the mid-2000s to provide Russian leadership with a buffer against reaching the nuclear threshold—a set of conventional escalatory options that can achieve strategic effects without resorting to nuclear weapons.”145 Others note, however, that Russia has integrated these “conventional precision weapons and nuclear weapons into a single strategic weapon set,” lending credence to the view that Russia may be prepared to employ, or threaten to employ, nuclear weapons during a regional conflict.
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Impact Defense › Climate
Cascio 19 – Jamais, a professional futurist who has been exploring the intersection of environmental, technological, and cultural change for 25 years. Selected by Foreign Policy magazine as one of their Top 100 Global Thinkers in 2009, Cascio specializes in plausible scenarios of the future. He is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute for the Future, where he works on a wide array of projects. Cascio’s written work has appeared in both academic and popular journals and collections. “The apocalypse: It’s not the end of the world”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 75, No. 6, pg. 269-272, , 10-28-2019
There’s a 25- to 50-year lag between the emission of atmospheric carbon and its persistent impact on temperature. This means the environmental disruption attributable to global warming we’re seeing now is the result of carbon emissions up through the 1980s. It also means we could cut off all carbon emissions today, globally, and still see another generation of warming. Beyond the environmental, economic, and human consequences, imagine the political impact of taking bold action that produces no observable benefits for 20 years, or even longer.
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Impact Defense › Climate
Zycher 21 – Dr. Benjamin, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, Doctorate in Economics from UCLA, Master in Public Policy from the University of California, Berkeley, and Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from UCLA, Former Senior Economist at the RAND Corporation, Former Adjunct Professor of Economics at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and at the California State University Channel Islands, and Former Senior Economist at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology. “The Case for Climate Change Realism”, AEI, , 06-21-2021
Unable to demonstrate that observed climate trends are due to anthropogenic climate change — or even that these events are particularly unusual or concerning — climate catastrophists will often turn to dire predictions about prospective climate phenomena. The problem with such predictions is that they are almost always generated by climate models driven by highly complex sets of assumptions about which there is significant dispute. Worse, these models are notorious for failing to accurately predict already documented changes in climate. As climatologist Patrick Michaels of the Competitive Enterprise Institute notes:
During all periods from 10 years (2006-2015) to 65 (1951-2015) years in length, the observed temperature trend lies in the lower half of the collection of climate model simulations, and for several periods it lies very close (or even below) the 2.5th percentile of all the model runs. Over shorter periods, such as the last two decades, a plethora of mechanisms have been put forth to explain the observed/modeled divergence, but none do so completely and many of the explanations are inconsistent with each other.
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Impact Defense › Environment
Hance 18 – Jeremy, wildlife blogger for the Guardian and a journalist with Mongabay focusing on forests, indigenous people, climate change and more. He is also the author of Life is Good: Conservation in an Age of Mass Extinction, “Could biodiversity destruction lead to a global tipping point?”, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/radical-conservation/2018/jan/16/biodiversity-extinction-tipping-point-planetary-boundary, 01-16-2018 *edits notated with brackets
Just over 250 million years ago, the planet suffered what may be described as its greatest holocaust [mass death]: ninety-six percent of marine genera (plural of genus) and seventy percent of land vertebrate vanished for good. Even insects suffered a mass extinction – the only time before or since. Entire classes of animals – like trilobites – went out like a match in the wind.
But what’s arguably most fascinating about this event – known as the Permian-Triassic extinction or more poetically, the Great Dying – is the fact that anything survived at all. Life, it seems, is so ridiculously adaptable that not only did thousands of species make it through whatever killed off nearly everything (no one knows for certain though theories abound) but, somehow, after millions of years life even recovered and went on to write new tales.
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Impact Defense › Environment
Kareiva and Carranza 18 – Peter, Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA.Valerie, Ph.D. Candidate at “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back”, Futures, Vol. 102, Pg. 39-50, , 01-05-2018
The interesting question is whether any of the planetary thresholds other than CO2 could also portend existential risks. Here the answer is not clear. One boundary often mentioned as a concern for the fate of global civilization is biodiversity (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2012), with the proposed safety threshold being a loss of greater than 0.001% per year (Rockström et al., 2009). There is little evidence that this particular 0.001% annual loss is a threshold—and it is hard to imagine any data that would allow one to identify where the threshold was (Brook, Ellis, Perring, Mackay, & Blomqvist, 2013; Lenton & Williams, 2013). A better question is whether one can imagine any scenario by which the loss of too many species leads to the collapse of societies and environmental disasters, even though one cannot know the absolute number of extinctions that would be required to create this dystopia.
While there are data that relate local reductions in species richness to altered ecosystem function, these results do not point to substantial existential risks. The data are small-scale experiments in which plant productivity, or nutrient retention is reduced as species numbers decline locally (Vellend, 2017), or are local observations of increased variability in fisheries yield when stock diversity is lost (Schindler et al., 2010). Those are not existential risks. To make the link even more tenuous, there is little evidence that biodiversity is even declining at local scales (Vellend et al., 2013, Vellend et al., 2017). Total planetary biodiversity may be in decline, but local and regional biodiversity is often staying the same because species from elsewhere replace local losses, albeit homogenizing the world in the process. Although the majority of conservation scientists are likely to flinch at this conclusion, there is growing skepticism regarding the strength of evidence linking trends in biodiversity loss to an existential risk for humans (Maier, 2012; Vellend, 2014). Obviously if all biodiversity disappeared civilization would end—but no one is forecasting the loss of all species. It seems plausible that the loss of 90% of the world’s species could also be apocalyptic, but not one is predicting that degree of biodiversity loss either. Tragic, but plausible is the possibility of our planet suffering a loss of as many as half of its species. If global biodiversity were halved, but at the same time locally the number of species stayed relatively stable, what would be the mechanism for an end-of-civilization or even end of human prosperity scenario? Extinctions and biodiversity loss are ethical and spiritual losses, but perhaps not an existential risk.
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Impact Defense › Food
Islami 21 – Zenobia, completed a doctorate in Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge. Before this she was a researcher at the Centre for Social Development in Africa at the University of Johannesburg. She also worked with the Afrobarometer research programme for three years based at Idasa where she was responsible for managing survey data collection in southern Africa and outreach co-ordination across all the countries in the study. In addition she was a senior researcher at the Community Agency for Social Enquiry where she managed a number of research projects for government departments and donors. Before moving into social research she was a market researcher working in the private sector and later a lecturer at the School of Economic and Business Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand. “Interaction between Food Prices and Political Instability”, The K4D helpdesk, , 05-21-2021
2. Methodological issues relating to food prices and political instability
Countries that are affected by food shortages tend to be prone to conflict, violence or instability. Nineteen countries that the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) classifies as being in a protracted food crisis are also affected by conflict and violence (Martin-Shields & Stojets, 2018). Thus, scholars have pondered about the relationship between the availability of food and probability of conflict, especially after 2008 when the media reported on many food related protests in low-and-middle-income countries (Van Weezel, 2016). Furthermore, Smith (2014, p. 679) states that “Dramatic weather events, diversion of crops for fuel production, and continuing volatility in international grain markets have led many to postulate that urban food riots will become more frequent, pervasive and disruptive in the future.”
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Impact Defense › Food
Vestby et al. 18 – Jonas, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO, and Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU); and Associate Editor of the Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography. “Does hunger cause conflict?”, , 05-18-2018
It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests.
Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Impact Defense › Biosafety
Wimmer 18 – Eckard, Professor at Stony Brook University. “Synthetic Biology, Dual Use Research, and Possibilities for Control”, Defence against Bioterrorism, pg. 7-11, , 03-23-2018
Listed below are some constraints that show how in the US the development of dangerous infectious agents, referred to as “select agents”, is controlled – perhaps misuse even prevented – through technical and administrative hurdles:
I. Re-creating an already existing dangerous virus for malicious intent is a complex scientific endeavor. (i) It requires considerable scientific knowledge and experience and, more importantly, considerable financial support. That support usually comes from government and private agencies (NIH, NAF, etc.), organizations that carefully screen at multiple levels all applications for funding of ALL biological research. (ii) It requires an environment suitable for experimenting with dangerous infectious agents (containment facilities). Any work in containment facilities is also carefully regulated.
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Impact Defense › Biosafety
Lentzos et al. 14 – Flippa, a Senior Lecturer in Science & International Security at the Department of War Studies and Co-Director of the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) at King’s College London. Catherine Jefferson, researcher in the Department of Social Science, Health, and Medicine at King’s College London. Claire Morris, a senior research fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health, and Medicine at King’s College London. “The myths (and realities) of synthetic bioweapons”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, , 09-18-2014
Even experts have a hard time enhancing disease pathogens. Some observers have also expressed concerns that synthetic biology could be used to enhance the virulence or increase the transmissibility of known pathogens, creating novel threat agents.
Mousepox and bird flu (H5N1) experiments are frequently cited to demonstrate how dangerous new pathogens could be designed. But assessments of this threat tend to overlook a salient fact: In both these experiments, the researchers did not actually design the pathogens. With respect to H5N1, researchers had indeed been trying to design an air-transmissible virus variant for some time, without success. The ferret experiment was set up as an alternative approach, to see whether natural mutations could generate an air-transmissible variant. The researchers had no influence on the specific mutations induced. In the mousepox experiment, researchers inserted the gene for interleukin-4 into the mousepox virus to induce infertility in mice and serve as an infectious contraceptive for pest control. The result—that the altered virus was lethal to mice—was unanticipated by the researchers. In other words, it was not planned.
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Impact Defense › Bioterrorism
Pinker 18 Steven Arthur Pinker is a Canadian-American cognitive psychologist, Professor at Harvard University. [Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, Viking, Penguin Group]
Biological agents are particularly ill-suited to terrorists, whose goal, recall, is not damage but theater (chapter 13).58 The biologist Paul Ewald notes that natural selection among pathogens works against the terrorist’s goal of sudden and spectacular devastation. 59 Germs that depend on rapid person-to-person contagion, like the common-cold virus, are selected to keep their hosts alive and ambulatory so they can shake hands with and sneeze on as many people as possible. Germs get greedy and kill their hosts only if they have some other way of getting from body to body, like mosquitoes (for malaria), a contaminable water supply (for cholera), or trenches packed with injured soldiers (for the 1918 Spanish flu). Sexually transmitted pathogens, like HIV and syphilis, are somewhere in between, needing a long and symptomless incubation period during which hosts can infect their partners, after which the germs do their damage. Virulence and contagion thus trade off, and the evolution of germs will frustrate the terrorist’s aspiration to launch a headline-worthy epidemic that is both swift and lethal. Theoretically, a bioterrorist could try to bend the curve with a pathogen that is virulent, contagious, and durable enough to survive outside bodies. But breeding such a fine-tuned germ would require Nazi-like experiments on living humans that even terrorists (to say nothing of teenagers) are unlikely to carry off. It may be more than just luck that the world so far has seen just one successful bioterror attack (the 1984 tainting of salad with salmonella in an Oregon town by the Rajneeshee religious cult, which killed no one) and one spree killing (the 2001 anthrax mailings, which killed five).60 To be sure, advances in synthetic biology, such as the gene-editing technique CRISPR-Cas9, make it easier to tinker with organisms, including pathogens. But it’s difficult to re-engineer a complex evolved trait by inserting a gene or two, since the effects of any gene are intertwined with the rest of the organism’s genome. Ewald notes, “I don’t think that we are close to understanding how to insert combinations of genetic variants in any given pathogen that act in concert to generate high transmissibility and stably high virulence for humans.”61 The biotech expert Robert Carlson adds that “one of the problems with building any flu virus is that you need to keep your production system (cells or eggs) alive long enough to make a useful quantity of something that is trying to kill that production system. . . . Booting up the resulting virus is still very, very difficult. . . . I would not dismiss this threat completely, but frankly I am much more worried about what Mother Nature is throwing at us all the time.”62 And crucially, advances in biology work the other way as well: they also make it easier for the good guys [public protectors] (and there are many more of them) to identify pathogens, invent antibiotics that overcome antibiotic resistance, and rapidly develop vaccines.63 An example is the Ebola vaccine, developed in the waning days of the 2014–15 emergency, after public health efforts had capped the toll at twelve thousand deaths rather than the millions that the media had foreseen. Ebola thus joined a list of other falsely predicted pandemics such as Lassa fever, hantavirus, SARS, mad cow disease, bird flu, and swine flu.64 Some of them never had the potential to go pandemic in the first place because they are contracted from animals or food rather than in an exponential tree of person-to-person infections. Others were nipped by medical and public health interventions. Of course no one knows for sure whether an evil genius will someday overcome the world’s defenses and loose a plague upon the world for fun, vengeance, or a sacred cause. But journalistic habits and the Availability and Negativity biases inflate the odds, which is why I have taken Sir Martin up on his bet. By the time you read this you may know who has won.65
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Impact Defense › Bioterrorism
Lentzos 17 – Filippa, Senior research fellow jointly appointed in the Departments of War Studies and of Global Health and Social Medicine at King’s College London. “Ignore Bill Gates: Where bioweapons focus really belongs”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, , 07-03-2017
I disagree. At a stretch, terrorists taking advantage of advances in biology might be able to create a viable pathogen. That does not mean they could create a sophisticated biological weapon, and certainly not a weapon that could kill 30 million people. Terrorists in any event tend to be conservative. They use readily available weapons that have a proven track record—not unconventional weapons that are more difficult to develop and deploy. Available evidence shows that few terrorists have ever even contemplated using biological agents, and the extremely small number of bioterrorism incidents in the historical record shows that biological agents are difficult to use as weapons. The skills required to undertake even the most basic of bioterrorism attacks are more demanding than often assumed. These technical barriers are likely to persist in the near- and medium-term future.
Gates does a disservice to the global health security community when he draws media and policy attention to amateurs such as terrorists. Where biological weapons are concerned, the focus should remain on national militaries and state-sponsored groups. These are the entities that might have the capability, now or in the near future, to develop dangerous biological weapons. The real threat is that sophisticated biological weapons will be used by state actors—or by financially, scientifically, and militarily well-resourced groups sponsored by states. So far, state-level use of biology to deliberately inflict disease or disrupt human functions has been limited by the strong international norm against biological weapons enshrined in the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. These two biological cornerstones of the rules of war uphold the international prohibition against the development, production, stockpiling, and use of biological weapons. But this norm may not survive indefinitely.
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Impact Defense › Pandemics
Thompson et al. 19 - R.N., Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford. C.P. Thompson, Department of Zoology, University of Oxford. O. Pelerman, The Chaim Rosenberg School of Jewish Studies. S. Gupta, Department of Zoology, University of Oxford. U. Obolski, Department of Zoology, University of Oxford. “Increased frequency of travel in the presence of cross-immunity may act to decrease the chance of a global pandemic”, Philosophical Transactions Of The Royal Society Of London, Vol. 374, Issue 1775, , 05-06-2019
3. DISCUSSION The large increase in international travel over the last century might be assumed to have resulted in a high chance of a devastating global pandemic (see e.g. [32]). Here we have used a general epidemiological model to demonstrate that an important, yet often overlooked, factor in the dynamics of a newly introduced high-virulence (HV) pathogen strain is partial immunity driven by exposures to related pathogen strains. When a HV pathogen strain arrives in a population following an epidemic of a related but low virulence (LV) strain, the probability of a major epidemic of the HV strain is decreased. High rates of travel between spatially distinct subpopulations can drive larger outbreaks of low virulence pathogens, in turn providing higher levels of immunity if/when a HV strain, which has the potential to cause a devastating epidemic, appears in the population (Fig 4a-c). Not only did we find that the probability of a major epidemic of the HV strain decreases when travel between subpopulations increases, but the expected final size of the HV strain outbreak can also be reduced. This was particularly pronounced when the level of cross-immunity between strains was high (Fig 4i), since lower cross-immunity levels combined with high travel rates can lead to large epidemics due to increased mixing between subpopulations (Fig 4g). When between-subpopulation travel was increased, the reduction in the probability of a major epidemic of the HV strain, and the expected size, was largely due to cross-immunity reducing the proportion of outbreaks that proceeded to become major epidemics. If/when major epidemics occurred, we found that they were typically larger when there was more travel between regions (Fig 4d-e), although this was not always the case, particularly when the level of cross-immunity was very high (Fig 4f). Partial cross-immunity against a highly virulent strain from prior exposure to a less virulent strain is characteristic of influenza outbreaks in different seasons. For example, it has been suggested that individuals born before 1890 were protected against the 1918 H1N1 pandemic due to the outbreak in 1889-90 [33] and that individuals infected with multiple historical seasonal H1N1 influenza strains were protected against the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic strain [34]. Our results suggest that cross-immunity might be a potential explanatory factor as to why there has not been a pandemic as devastating as the 1918 influenza epidemic in the century since, despite the emergence of a strain antigenically similar to the 1918 pandemic strain in 2009. Travel rates increased substantially during the 20th century. As a theoretical exercise, we obtained crude estimates of the travel rates from Europe to the USA, comparing rates during the early 20th century with current travel rates. For the early 20th century rates, we used registry statistics from USA ports from 1914 to 1924 (see Supplementary Material Section 5). Oceanic travel should approximate overall trans-Atlantic travel in this time period, as other modes of long-distance travel were extremely rare. This yielded the approximation λ≈ 3.6· 10-6 per day. Conversely, when estimating current rates of travel from European countries to the USA, approximated using data on air travel, we obtain much higher values of λ≈ 3.7· 10-4 per day. It might be expected that such a significant rise in travel in this time period might have reduced the risk of a global pandemic of a pathogen with circulating strains that induce cross-immunity. Cross-immunity is known to affect the dynamics of outbreaks of various pathogens. Vibrio cholera, for example, exhibits almost complete cross-immunity between strains (a study by Koelle et al. [35] used a cross-immunity level of α= 0.955). On the other hand, human Respiratory Syncytial Virus (hRSV) has been shown to provide incomplete cross-immunity against infections from the same virus group (α ≈ 0.6, [36]). It also provides low levels of cross-immunity again hRSV infections from different virus groups (α ≈ 0.16, [36]), and partial cross-immunity against infections with human Parainfluenza Virus[37]
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Impact Defense › Pandemics
Ord 20 – Dr. Toby, Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University, DPhil in Philosophy from the University of Oxford. “The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity,”, Hachette Books, pg. 124-126, 03-03-2020
Are we safe now from events like this? Or are we more vulnerable? Could a pandemic threaten humanity’s future?10
The Black Death was not the only biological disaster to scar human history. It was not even the only great bubonic plague. In 541 CE the Plague of Justinian struck the Byzantine Empire. Over three years it took the lives of roughly 3 percent of the world’s people.11
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › NATO › DA’s Turn Resilience
Giovanna De Maio 2020 visiting fellow at GWU George Washington University, former visiting fellow Center for the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/FP_20201028_nato_covid_demaio-1.pdf, "," Brookings Institution (ermo/sms, Acc:6-17-2022)
The goal of this essay is to provide a critical assessment of NATO’s preparedness and response to COVID-19. By exploring the mechanisms in place, the support offered, and the measures taken by NATO to avert a security crisis, it provides reflections on how lessons learned from this pandemic could help to manage and prevent similar future crises. In conclusion, this report argues that the alliance has proved capable of overcoming political tensions and has given an important sign of resilience and solidarity at a crucial moment for its member states. However, more could have been done with better preparedness in managing health risks and most importantly with better political coordination between member states. Despite the disruptive effect COVID-19 had on global economy and international relations, the virus’s impact on the future of the alliance will be marginal. NATO’s survival and success in responding to global challenges will ultimately be contingent on a relaunch of trans-Atlantic relations.
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › NATO › DA’s Turn Resilience
NATO, 7-9-2016, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm, "Commitment to enhance resilience," Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-17-2022)
We will enhance resilience by continuing to invest in robust, flexible, and interoperable military capabilities in accordance with NATO’s Level of Ambition and in line with our pledge on defence investment made at our Summit in Wales. We will protect our military supply chains and are working to address, as appropriate, existing dependencies on Russian-sourced legacy military equipment through national efforts and multinational cooperation.
We will also strengthen and enhance, as a matter of priority, the protection of our national infrastructure and networks against the increasing threat and sophistication of cyber-attack. In this context, we have today made a Cyber Defence Pledge to ensure that the Alliance keeps pace with the fast evolving cyber threat landscape.
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › NATO › DA’s Turn Resilience
NATO, 7-9-2016, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm, "Commitment to enhance resilience," Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-17-2022)
The foundation of our resilience lies in our shared commitment to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. By taking the necessary steps today to enhance our resilience, we reaffirm our unwavering commitment to defend our populations and our territory against any threat, and to uphold these values.
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › NATO › Ecology Focus Better for resilience
Jim Townsend, 10-14-2020, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy and an adjunct senior fellow in the CNAS Transatlantic Security Program and Anca Agachi assistant director with the Foresight, Strategy and Risks (FSR) Initiative in the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/nato20-2020/build-resilience-for-an-era-of-shocks/, "Build resilience for an era of shocks," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-17-2022)
What would this look like in practice? Consider, for example, climate change—a non-traditional threat whose consequences will occur at far greater frequency than pandemics, and for which the Alliance should start preparing now. NATO should study the impact of climate change and its resulting crises on allied security, following the model of seminal studies like those by the Center for Naval Analysis.11 NATO should also examine its own impact on climate change and how the Alliance could minimize its environmental footprint. Instead of waiting to respond to extreme weather events and drought-enabled conflicts that may take place in allied countries, NATO could leverage its new core task and expanded NDPP to prepare for disaster by acquiring and building stockpiles of emergency equipment and necessary assets. Working alongside the EU and national emergency management agencies, NATO could help European allies plan measures ranging from decentralized energy systems to coastal hazard protection methods to blunt the impact of the next climate disaster. A consistent schedule of natural disaster training exercises would guarantee that when a crisis does occur, clear responsibilities and required information exist within the system, including a defined role for NATO. Finally, a reinforced EADRCC should help coordinate immediate relief efforts, while NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC) should develop a continuous, dynamic “lessons learned” program. Such a program would integrate the knowledge gathered from NATO’s responses to various strategic shocks into existing strategies.
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › NATO › Ecology Focus Better for resilience
Jeremy Schwab, 8-1-2020, Boston University https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/08/pandemic-fight-costs-500x-more-than-preventing-one-futurity/, "Fighting COVID-19 could cost 500 times as much as pandemic prevention measures," World Economic Forum (ermo/sms, Acc:6-17-2022)
Significantly reducing transmission of new diseases from tropical forests would cost, globally, between $22.2 and $30.7 billion each year.
The COVID-19 pandemic will likely end up costing between $8.1 and $15.8 trillion globally.
2022
SDI
Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › NATO › Transparency Turn
Jocelyn Solis-Moreira 11-13-2021, New York-based health and science journalist with experience writing about medical research, mental health, and psychology. She has a degree in integrative neuroscience and a Master’s in psychology concentrating on behavioral neuroscience, Fact checked by Anna Guildford, Ph.D., https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/how-did-we-develop-a-covid-19-vaccine-so-quickly, "COVID-19 vaccine: How was it developed so fast?," Medical News Today (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)
Creating a vaccine in under 1 year is no small feat. While the coronavirus pandemic made a new normal of mask-wearing and physical distancing, it also spurred global cooperation for vaccine research and distribution.
However, a vaccine is only effective if people are willing to receive it. With rapid research development, some may be concerned that the vaccine was rushed, and with these concerns comes vaccine hesitancy.