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2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › NATO › Specification Turn

Plan hurts resilience – its vaccine specificity disrupts the “all hazards”

NATO, 6-17-2022, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm, "Resilience and civil preparedness – Article 3 ," NATO (ermo/sms, Acc:6-17-2022)

NATO’s work to improve resilience follows an all-hazards approach, not specific to any single vulnerability. It contributes to protecting Alliance territory and populations from all potential hazards. At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, Allied Leaders decided to boost NATO’s resilience to the full spectrum of threats and continue developing their countries’ individual and NATO’s collective capacity to resist any form of armed attack. They agreed seven baseline requirements for national resilience against which member states can measure their level of preparedness:

Assured continuity of government and critical government services: for instance the ability to make decisions, communicate them and enforce them in a crisis;

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › NATO › Vaccine Nationalism Good Turn

Vaccine Nationalism good – cooperation empirically fails

John Kampfner, 6-30-2021 Executive Director, UK in the World Programme, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/vaccine-competition-may-now-be-worlds-best-bet, "Vaccine competition may now be the world’s best bet," Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank (ermo/sms, Acc:6-19-2022)

Relations between the major powers are at their worst for decades with cooperation thin on the ground, and COVID-19 having deepened suspicions further.

In April, the US Senate passed the Strategic Competition Act with bipartisan support, promising to ‘counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally’. In front of his American counterpart, China’s top foreign policy official denounced the effrontery of those who ‘smear’ Chinese democracy. Joe Biden calls Vladimir Putin ‘a killer’, while the Kremlin has put the US at the top of its list of unfriendly countries. Tension between China and India is high, the EU and UK are involved in repeated spats. Competition and mistrust are everywhere.

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › NATO › Solvency

No resilience outside of EU

NATO, 6-17-2022, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm, "Resilience and civil preparedness – Article 3 ," NATO (ermo/sms, Acc:6-17-2022)

Enhancing resilience and civil preparedness is also part of NATO’s support to partners and a way to project stability in the Alliance’s neighbourhood. Examples of practical cooperation include the deployment of teams of civil preparedness experts in support of Ukraine in 2014, Jordan in 2015 and Iraq in 2019. The cooperation with Jordan, which runs from 2019 until 2022, resulted in a joint United Nations-NATO three-year project to assist Jordan in improving its preparedness in the field of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

Continued engagement with the private sector and other international organisations like the European Union (EU) and the United Nations is also key to strengthening resilience, especially by developing shared situational awareness. The EU, in particular, remains a unique and essential partner for the Alliance, particularly through staff-to-staff consultations and practical cooperation in a number of resilience-related areas.

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Dual Use Turns

Biotech experiments undermine anthropocentrism

Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

Although the public now has a clearer understanding of the risks posed by dual-use biotechnology, and the international community has made great efforts to mitigate those risks, disputes over safety and ethics are still common in formulating governance policies worldwide. In the field of stem cell research, the Japanese government revised its “Treatment Policy for Specific Embryos” in 2019, which approved research on cultivating human organs for transplantation in animals by implanting human stem cells into animal embryos. At the same time, it lifted restrictions on the termination of humananimal chimeric embryos within 14 days and restrictions on implanting those embryos into surrogate uteruses [29]. Such embryos may develop into human-animal chimeras, raising ethical disputes over the blurring of boundaries between human and non-human animals. The cause of the governance disputes is that dual-use biotechnology entails human-made risks that are difficult to control in addition to information asymmetry risks. As a result, the traditional self-governance of the biotechnology industry is placed in a predicament where it is difficult for governance models to keep up with the development of emerging technologies.

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Dual Use Turns

Dual use biotech risks human rights violations

Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

Normative risks use dual-use biotechnology to destroy the framework of international biosafety governance conventions, including the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). For example, new neuropeptide biological agents that can influence and manipulate specific wills or emotions have been manufactured. These agents can induce visual or auditory hallucinations, and cause disability or even extreme hysteria during interrogation, violating the human rights of detainees and breaking international humanitarian law. Normative risks also concern the self-regulation of scientists. In 2018, He Jiankui of China’s Southern University of Science and Technology created the world’s first gene-edited infant, in violation of the international regulation that “gene-edited early human embryos (within 14 days of age) and germ cells should not be used for pregnancy.” Normative risks also involve the application of dual-use biotechnology to existing international ethical principles and norms. He Jiankui violated the Helsinki Declaration, the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, and other international ethics, and principles and common views designed to “respect and protect subjects, maximize subject benefit and avoid subject injury as much as possible” [14].

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Dual Use Turns

Dual use biotech risks racial and insect pathogens

Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

Novel agent risks are the identification or development of new biological agents or toxins with the assistance of dual-use biotechnology. These risks also encompass “gain of function” research into pathogenic viruses, including combinatorial chemistry, high-throughput screening, DNA shuffling, directed evolution or protein engineering [3]. For example, gene editing technology, represented by CRISPER-Cas9, can greatly change the biological traits of pathogens, animals and plants, and even humans in a short time. Gene synthesis technology can artificially resurrect extinct pathogenic viruses, so that bacteria and viruses with higher pathogenicity can be synthesized, the receptors of which may have unprecedented biological characteristics [9]. In 2018, Canadian scientists obtained overlapping gene fragments through mail order, splicing them to synthesize a horse pox virus which was similar to the smallpox virus [10]. These artificially synthesized viruses are more capable of infecting, spreading, killing, and escaping than natural viruses, so it is more difficult to trace their origins. In addition, RNA interference and personal genomics, realized by gene driving technology, may not only be used as crowd-specific weapons to reduce human reproductive capacity and change the number of specific human populations, but also be used to manufacture insect weapons for transnational transmission of dengue fever, Zika, and other diseases.

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Militarization Turns

EO subtracking funded now, post brink

Patrick Tucker, 12-1-2018, Technology Editor, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/12/us-military-genetically-engineering-new-life-forms-detect-enemy-subs/153200/, "The US Military Is Genetically Engineering New Life Forms To Detect Enemy Subs," Defense One (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)

The Naval Research Laboratory, or NRL, is supporting the research. Here’s how it would work: You take an abundant sea organism, like Marinobacter, and change its genetic makeup to react to certain substances left by enemy vessels, divers, or equipment. These could be metals, fuel exhaust, human DNA, or some molecule that’s not found naturally in the ocean but is associated with, say, diesel-powered submarines. The reaction could take the form of electron loss, which could be detectable to friendly sub drones.

“In an engineered context, we might take the ability of the microbes to give up electrons, then use [those electrons] to talk to something like an autonomous vehicle. Then you can start imagining that you can create an electrical signal when the bacteria encounters some molecule in their environment,” NRL researcher Sarah Glaven said at a November event put on by the Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Lab.

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Militarization Turns

Public consultation / Recruiting CP

Marsha Greene & Zubin Master, 2018, Senior Policy Analyst, Peraton & Biomedical Ethics Research Program, Mayo Clinic, https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/Incoming/AY21%20Briefings/NDU%206070/CRISPR_Military.pdf?ver=2020-08-11-170728-347, " Ethical Issues of Using CRISPR Technologies for Research on Military Enhancement" Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)

We conclude with two points. First is to encourage public and stakeholder engagement on the ethics of using CRISPR in military enhancement technology. Currently, public debate on the use of CRISPR for germline and enhancement purposes indicates that many in the public display concern about somatic and germline enhancements (McCaughey et al. 2016; Pew Research Center 2016; STAT-Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health 2016; Gaskell et al. 2017; Scheufele et al. 2017). These studies capture the views of different populations and vary in how questions are worded thereby accounting for some of the differences in opinions. But no study has yet to investigate the views of stakeholders on the use of CRISPR for enhancement for the purpose of protecting soldiers. Public and stakeholder views may differ when considering the use of CRISPR technology for military enhancement. Engagement within DoD and the public will help DoD research ethicists and leadership understand public and stakeholder concerns and be able to manage ethical issues of research involving military personnel as the research is translated into human applications. To promote discourse, several deliberative strategies and research methods could be employed including town hall meetings, citizen juries, consensus conferences, polling, and focus groups among others (Abelson et al. 2003). Deliberation can focus on a range of ethical questions such as how to translate CRISPR gene technology for military applications, how best to handle research ethics issues including informed consent and risk analysis for first-in-human studies, and when and how to best inform the public to ensure transparency of gene editing research.

The second point is that DoD should consider several research ethics issues as this technology moves forward. Gene editing is clearly advancing and as gene modification becomes accepted in military research, several considerations need to be made to minimize risks and ensure service members are appropriately informed should they become research participants. This will include taking steps to reduce the group pressure that could be a by-product of military cohesiveness training and making improvements in the consent process such that service members understand the risks and purpose of these interventions. The military will likely be watching the first-in-human trials very closely while simultaneously exhausting all preclinical options in order to fully evaluate the risks of off-target effects. There will need to be some certainty from further validated studies prior to initiating any wide-scale use for military applications. Additionally, researchers and military leadership alike will need to be cognizant of the potential for CRISPR applications to be deployed in the military setting prior to approval of these interventions by the FDA. Prior to invoking the Interim Rule due to a bioterrorist threat, several considerations need to be weighed to ensure appropriate protections to front line military personnel. From the DoD perspective, ensuring that service members have the best available protection in a war zone is paramount. However, this creates many ethical issues regarding breach of individual rights and autonomy. At the same time, a consideration could be that these risks are built into enlisting and recruiting discussions so that service members understand clearly that this is a possibility under certain scenarios. While the President’s Council in 2003 felt that the risks of using gene editing for military enhancement were too high, it remains unclear given scientific advancements in gene editing whether similar conclusions would be made.

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Militarization Turns

Genetic modification will dramatically increase ableism

Marsha Greene & Zubin Master, 2018, Senior Policy Analyst, Peraton & Biomedical Ethics Research Program, Mayo Clinic, https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/Incoming/AY21%20Briefings/NDU%206070/CRISPR_Military.pdf?ver=2020-08-11-170728-347, " Ethical Issues of Using CRISPR Technologies for Research on Military Enhancement" Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)

CRISPR has revitalized the debate over human gene enhancement. In contemporary bioethics debates, a distinction between gene editing to treat or prevent disease and enhancement for non-health purposes is sometimes made with the latter being more strongly discouraged (Scheufele et al. 2017; Annas and Annas 2009; Ashcroft 2008; Amoroso and Wenger 2003). The distinction is meant to draw a line between practices that are considered morally permissible (gene editing for therapeutic purposes) versus those that are prohibitory (gene editing for enhancement) (Buchanan et al. 2000). Therapy is considered medically necessary in order to achieve normal function. But what is considered Bnormal^ function and what is Bpathological^ is susceptible to change. Yet in some cases, the moral difference between the therapy versus enhancement distinction becomes blurry. The classic example of two young boys both of whom are born with very short stature helps illustrate this point. Boy A is born short due to a deficiency in the human growth hormone (HGH) gene whereas Boy B is born short because both his parents are very short. Using CRISPR to correct the mutation in Boy A would be considered therapy because of a known gene defect whereas performing gene editing for Boy B would be considered enhancement because there is no clearly identifiable clinical pathology. Yet both Boy A and Boy B would suffer the social prejudice known as heightism, both desire to be taller, and both have very short statures due to a genetic lottery and to no fault of their own. In this situation, it would be ethically permissible to help both boys (Buchanan et al. 2000). Additionally, what may be considered an enhancement now might be considered treatment or routine care in the future (Frankel and Chapman 2000; Buchanan et al. 2000). In the above example, if we knew the specific set of genes making Boy B very short, this may be labelled as a pathology and thus could benefit from CRISPR therapy.

But there are valid reasons for maintaining the therapy/enhancement distinction including concerns that enhancement may be a form of a new, albeit softer, eugenics which likely furthers inequality among those who cannot afford to create children with enhanced traits (Frankel and Chapman 2000; Kiuru and Crystal 2008; Comfort 2015). The disability community finds the topic of gene modification particularly concerning. Many are concerned that the medical model characterizes disabilities as a medical problem that must be mitigated or eliminated (Generations Ahead 2010). Disability is a social construct with a socially dominant view that disabled people are unhappy and discounts the pride which people have in their disabilities and how it brings diverse and new perspectives to the world (Shakespeare 1995, 1998). Several in the disability community view genetic modification to rid disabilities in the world as highly discriminatory and argue that efforts towards such goals may increase social intolerance and further prejudice disabled persons.

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Militarization Turns

No legal prohibition on DOD enhancement now

Marsha Greene & Zubin Master, 2018, Senior Policy Analyst, Peraton & Biomedical Ethics Research Program, Mayo Clinic, https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/Incoming/AY21%20Briefings/NDU%206070/CRISPR_Military.pdf?ver=2020-08-11-170728-347, " Ethical Issues of Using CRISPR Technologies for Research on Military Enhancement" Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)

Currently, there is no specific regulation barring the enhancement of service members for military purposes although the Department’s current emphasis on optimization as opposed to enhancement suggests general weariness regarding permanent gene editing for service members. Nevertheless, research into human performance optimization and by extension biomedical enhancements is very active within the DoD (Land 2010; Jonas et al. 2010). As discussed, using CRISPR, it is possible to create semi-permanent gene enhancements. As public acceptability of gene editing for somatic versus germline therapies shifts (Scheufele et al. 2017), so may acceptance of somatic enhancements. It is thus conceivable that in the future, enhancements could become fully in compliance with the Department’s policies.

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Militarization Turns

Gene therapy innovation should happen outside the military for ethical reasons

Peter H. Schwartz, April 2020, Indiana University Center for Bioethics, Indiana University School of Medicinehttps://www.cell.com/molecular-therapy-family/molecular-therapy/pdf/S1525-0016(20)30142-8.pdf, " Ethics of Gene Therapy in the Military: Promise and Potential Problems" Molecular Therapy Vol. 28 No 4 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)

While certain enhancements are accepted in current medical practice, such as plastic surgery for appearance or botox for wrinkles, these cosmetic interventions are classified differently than most medical care, for instance not covered by health insurance. When proposed enhancements involve long-term medications or, worse, genetic modification, concerns grow, as can be seen with current programs in military enhancement, such as human-machine interfaces and neuroenhancement.8 The proposed gene therapy, in contrast, is more like a vaccine to protect against future illness (in this case caused by nerve agents rather than viruses).

The most important concerns about this gene therapy stem from its potential risks, much like for other new therapeutics. While being long-acting is a major point in the approach’s favor, this feature also brings potential dangers: scientists have already pointed out that the synthetic enzyme made by the gene could, by persisting in the blood stream, stimulate an immune response to the naturally occurring form, which is important in cholesterol metabolism.1 In addition, the fact that the treatment permanently modifies the individual’s genome raises the dangers of other long-term side effects, such as increasing cancer risk, which would be difficult to identify. The short-term benefits, one might hope, would make such longterm dangers acceptable, initially in research projects and then more generally in widespread use, but here things get complicated, in part because of the potential military use. For one thing, it can be difficult to carry out ethical clinical trials in the military, since military personnel may not feel as if they can choose to participate, due to command structure and culture.7,9

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Militarization Turns

Biotech medical research risks weaponization

Ronit Langer & Shruti Sharma, 11-20-2020, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Technology and International Affairs Fellow & Technology and Society Sr. Research Analyst), https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/20/blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity-pub-83252, "The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity," (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)

The coronavirus pandemic has brought into sharp focus the possible benefits and potential pitfalls of biotechnology research. Although such research can be used to produce medical countermeasures to fight diseases and develop healthier crops and livestock, it can also be deployed to produce biological weapons. Even though the current pandemic, as argued by most scientific experts, is believed to have originated from natural sources, the origin of this particular pandemic does not rule out the possibility that other future infections could emerge from laboratories.

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › CRIPR Bad Turns

CRISPR off target turn

Marsha Greene & Zubin Master, 2018, Senior Policy Analyst, Peraton & Biomedical Ethics Research Program, Mayo Clinic, https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/Incoming/AY21%20Briefings/NDU%206070/CRISPR_Military.pdf?ver=2020-08-11-170728-347, " Ethical Issues of Using CRISPR Technologies for Research on Military Enhancement" Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)

Considering that military service members already take significant risks simply by enlisting in the armed services, the risk/benefit analysis for research may be more favourable towards gene enhancement as the enhancement itself could improve the chances of survival during armed conflict (Annas and Annas 2009). Nevertheless, the risks of research must be addressed in a systematic manner to ensure that service members are not being exposed to unnecessary harm. Most concerning with gene editing research using CRISPR is the potential for off-target effects. If the CRISPR machinery accidentally docks at an unintended location in the genome it could cause mutations and disrupt or accelerate nontargeted biological processes thereby resulting in any number of illnesses, some of which may be life threatening. Nevertheless, the possibility of significant off target effects remains hypothetical. A recent report indicating that CRISPR gene editing had caused over one thousand single nucleotide mutations and over one hundred deletions was later retracted after heavy criticism of the scientific methods used and the validity of the paper’s conclusions (Schaefer et al. 2017; Wilson et al. 2017; Nature Methods, 2018). Nevertheless, our knowledge of biological processes and potential CRISPR effects remains limited. The risk–benefit calculus would require military IRBs to balance risks of off-target effects against the potential benefits of improved survival. The risks would be difficult to predict because more research on the frequency of off-target effects needs to be done in order to determine whether the benefits outweigh the risks. Risks may be minimized through preclinical experiments using robust animal models, reliable measures of off-target effects, and from an adequate understanding of how gene changes affect biological function. Risks may also be minimized if a reversible system was used.

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Private Model Turns

Future pandemics inevitable – accelerated CEPI model dramatically cuts development time (CEPI as CP?)

Karen Gilchrist, 2-18-2022, CNBC London Correspondent, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/18/bill-gates-covid-risks-have-reduced-but-another-pandemic-will-come.html, “Bill Gates says Covid risks have ‘dramatically reduced’ but another pandemic is coming,” CNBC (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)

Bill Gates said Friday that the risks of severe disease from Covid-19 have “dramatically reduced” but another pandemic is all but certain.

Speaking to CNBC’s Hadley Gamble at Germany’s annual Munich Security Conference, Gates, co-chair of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, said that a potential new pandemic would likely stem from a different pathogen to that of the coronavirus family.

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Private Model Turns

CEPI moonshot internal

By, 4-13-2022, https://www.healio.com/news/infectious-disease/20220413/cepis-moon-shot-developing-pandemic-vaccines-in-100-days, "CEPI’s moon shot: Developing pandemic vaccines in 100 days," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:6-20-2022)

The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, or CEPI, launched a multi-billion dollar plan to accelerate the development and production of vaccines during the next pandemic, with a goal of making them available in just 100 days.

If the “100 Days Mission” is successful, it would far outpace the development and authorization of the world’s numerous COVID-19 vaccines, which took place in record time.

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Private Model Turns

CEPI 2.0 key to solve

Richard Hatchett & Morrison, 6-29-2021, CEO of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovation, CEPI & former BARDA, acting director U.S. Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, & J. Stephen Morrison, senior vice president here at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS

https://www.csis.org/analysis/cepi-20-critical-inflection-point, "CEPI 2.0: A Critical Inflection Point," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:6-20-2022)

Richard Hatchett, M.D.: Well, CEPI 2.0 is actually about the opportunities that have been created by the response to the pandemic. And it—Julie, when you started and were talking about CEPI’s creation and the idea that it was founded because there was a realization that there weren’t technical barriers or scientific barriers necessarily but there were funding barriers and there was an absence of political will. And I think we’re kind of in the same situation with respect to pandemic risk, in that we’re going to emerge from this pandemic with a whole suite of new tools and new technology platforms that have been validated and that have demonstrated that, you know, rapid vaccine development is possible.

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Private Model Turns

Impact hub model emerging now – trades off with aff’s nation-state model

Katherine Aguirre,, 6-21-2021, researcher at the Igarapé Institute. Gordon LaForge is a senior researcher at Princeton University and a lecturer at Arizona State University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management. Robert Muggah is a principal at the SecDev Group, a co-founder of the Igarapé Institute, and the author, with Ian Goldin, of Terra Incognita: 100 Maps to Survive the Next 100 Years. Twitter: @robmuggah Anne-Marie Slaughter is the CEO of New America https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/21/global-vaccination-covax-gavi-covid-19-pandemic-impact-hubs-public-private-funding-united-nations/, "Three Years Is Too Long to Wait for a Global Vaccine Rollout," Foreign Policy (ermo/sms, Acc:6-20-2022)

In fact, a wide range of actors contributes to Gavi, which itself partners with local governments and nongovernmental organizations to distribute vaccines and run immunization programs. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, Gavi had immunized nearly 900 million children against infectious diseases. It is an archetypal “impact hub,” an international initiative that assembles multiple actors from various sectors to make demonstrable progress toward solving a range of seemingly intractable global challenges.

Impact hubs such as Gavi offer a model for a new kind of international cooperation oriented around multistakeholder networks rather than nation states. They form the basis of what United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres calls “networked multilateralism,” in which member states—together with U.N. agencies, international financial institutions, businesses, philanthropic groups, regional and municipal governments, and civil society organizations—work together to fix the world’s most intractable problems.

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Dual Use Defense

Can’t weigh the dual use impact – risk predictions impossible

Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

2.2. Predicament 2: Top-Down Public Regulation often Lags behind Technological Iteration Due to Difficulty in the Prediction of Human-Made Risks of Dual-Use Biotechnology

It is difficult to predict the human-made risks of dual-use biotechnology before it has been used. According to Giddens, scientific and technological risk is a kind of “man-made risk” [32], and technology is neither good nor evil in itself. People use technology for good or evil purposes. Compared with the risk of public health and safety, the risk of biotechnological dual-use depends more on the intention and ability of its users. Therefore, the cause of biotechnology dual-use risk is stakeholders’ behavior out of control under the comprehensive influence of both the internal and external environment.

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Dual Use Defense

Unilateral and global mechanisms mitigate dual use biotech risks

Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

By the end of the 20th century, all countries had begun to pay attention to the four risks caused by dual-use biotechnology. In “Biotechnology, Weapons, and Humanity” (1999), the British Medical Association, for the first time in its history, expressed concern about the malicious abuse of genetic engineering, biotechnology and other emerging technologies, and suggested that social supervision should be strengthened and moral standards be established within the sciences to prevent the exacerbation of potential risks. In 2002, the Chinese government promulgated the “Regulations on Export Control of Dual-use Biological Products and Related Equipment and Technologies” to restrict the export of dual-use biological products and related equipment and technologies, to prevent them from being used to manufacture biological weapons [16]. In 2003, the National Academy of Sciences of the United States released a report, “Biotechnology Research in the Era of Terrorism” (the Fink Report), a pioneering document of the research into national security risks in the field of life science. The Fink Report identified seven types of biological experiments with dual-use risks, including microbiology and molecular biology experiments, which require safety inspections before project approval and funding [17]. To this end, the U.S. government set up a federal advisory committee under the National Biosafety Scientific Advisory Committee, which took charge of formulating policies and recommendations on dual-use research concerns (DURC) in life science research [2]. In 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that “every major new technology can be used not only for peaceful purposes, but also for hostile purposes. To tackle the common security challenges to all mankind, we should put the protection of biotechnology from being maliciously used above the security interests of all countries.” In 2009, the European Union passed Regulation No. 428/2009, which listed the controlled goods subject to export restrictions and licenses, including dual-use biological materials and production equipment [18]. In the same year, the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB) warned that “scientists who educate their research on potential dual-use shall pay more attention to taking necessary safety control measures” [19].

Since 2011, countries have paid more attention to the dual-use of biotechnology. After the research results on genetic modification of H5N1, the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus published in “Nature” in September 2011 triggered global controversy. The United States issued several regulatory policies concerning dual-use biotechnology, including the “Regulatory Policy on Dual-use Life Science Research of the U.S. Government” (2012) by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), and the “Regulatory Policy of Dual-Purpose Research Institutions in Life Sciences of the U.S. Government” (2013) by Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) [20]. In 2014, NSABB halted research on the Gain of Function of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and middle east respiratory syndrome (MERS) viruses, and required all independent and federal research institutions to strictly abide by the “Dual-use Research of Concern” (DURC) from 24 September 2015, and established a special entity review body, the IRE. In 2015, the U.S. government established the “Institutional Regulatory Policy Concerning Dual-use Research in Life Sciences” [21]. In 2018, the U.S. government issued a “National Biodefense Strategy,” and the National Academy of Sciences of the United States released the report “Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology”, which emphasized the imminent threat of synthetic biotechnology being used as a virus weapon for terrorist activities by biohackers [22]. In 2017, the Chinese government issued “Safety Management Measures for Biotechnology Research and Development” to impose special control measures for biotechnology research and development activities with high risks of causing serious diseases in humans or animals [23].

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Solvency

Panviral can’t solve – profit motives, drugs & testing

Jennifer Kahn 4-21-2020 UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism “How Scientists Could Stop the Next Pandemic Before It Starts” New York Times Magazine (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

But for years, Racaniello notes, the real obstacle to making panviral drugs or vaccines has been that no one was willing to pay for their development. For pharmaceutical companies, he points out, panviral vaccines are simply a terrible business proposition: Companies have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to develop a shot that people will get once a year at most — and not at all in years when no particular disease is ascendant.

Panviral drug treatments are unprofitable for similar reasons. For one, the course of treatment is short, usually just a few weeks; for chronic diseases (diabetes, high blood pressure), patients take regimens of pills daily, often for years. (One person noted that Gilead’s stock price actually dropped after the company produced a revolutionary hepatitis C drug. Because the treatment completely cured patients, the market for it started to shrink, undermining the company’s bottom line.)