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2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Democracy Advantage › Democracy Advantage - Link

Facial recognition software is being used to undermine democracy and the right to protest.

Shira Ovide (New York Times) “A Case for Banning Facial Recognition” June 09, 2020 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/technology/facial-recognition-software.html?auth=login-google

Timnit Gebru, a leader of Google’s ethical artificial intelligence team, explained why she believes that facial recognition is too dangerous to be used right now for law enforcement purposes. These are edited excerpts from our virtual discussion at the Women’s Forum for the Economy & Society on Monday. Ovide: What are your concerns about facial recognition? Gebru: I collaborated with Joy Buolamwini at the M.I.T. Media Lab, who led an analysis that found very high disparities in error rates [in facial identification systems], especially between lighter-skinned men and darker-skinned women. In melanoma screenings, imagine that there’s a detection technology that doesn’t work for people with darker skin. I also realized that even perfect facial recognition can be misused. I’m a black woman living in the U.S. who has dealt with serious consequences of racism. Facial recognition is being used against the black community. Baltimore police during the Freddie Gray protests used facial recognition to identify protesters by linking images to social media profiles.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Terrorism Advantage › Terrorism Advantage – Impact

Nuclear terrorism leads to extinction – retaliation – terrorists have capabilities

Dobbins 15 (William Dobbins, Graduate Fellow, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction National Defense University, Major USMC, 2015. “Right of Boom: The Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism”, http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/IAJ-6-2-Spring-2015-77-79.pdf)

Right of Boom: The Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism provides a glimpse of the issues associated with responding to a nuclear terrorist attack, in this case, the detonation of a small nuclear weapon in Washington, D.C. Against this background, Benjamin Schwartz describes the inherent danger of a world with nuclear-armed states (some which may not have the will or capability to appropriately secure such weapons) and new types of terror threats, the lessons learned in nuclear deBterrence and counter terrorism, the global impact of a nuclear terror attack, and the “red lines” that would forever change as a result. What emerges is a bleak picture of potential political and policy consequences of both the terror attack and the American response. In the aftermath of a nuclear terrorist attack on the most important political capital in the world, the confusion, the desire for attribution and retaliation coupled together with the overarching question, “How did this happen?” combine to produce the environment that political leaders would face. At first glance, the author posits, the response to such an event seems straightforward: The U.S. undergoes a nuclear attack, and the U.S. responds in kind. However, the follow-on questions reveal that things are not nearly so simple: From where did the weapon come? In a terror attack in which attribution is not certain, against whom do national leaders direct a response? The history of international nuclear agreements, from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program are all predicated on international relationships that operated at the nation-state level. However, the attack in question reveals that these state-to-state agreements may no longer be sufficient in the face of nuclear terrorism. The proliferation of nuclear knowledge and technology now makes the nuclear terror threat plausible. Hence, Schwartz argues, “we are more vulnerable to nuclear terrorism than at any time since the dawn of the nuclear age.” Could an attack like this actually happen? On the one hand, Schwartz notes legitimate reasons for skepticism. After all, since 9-11, there have been no societally significant terror attacks and no nuclear terror attacks. Moreover, the continual crying of “wolves at the door” by national leaders only makes the lack of terrorist success more pronounced. The failure of intelligence regarding WMD threats—leading to the Global War on Terror—has also cast a pall over the intelligence community’s predictive powers. On the other hand, Schwartz also notes that neither past intelligence failures nor the absence of a nuclear terrorist attack changes the fact that the proliferation of knowledge and technology—especially dual-use technology—increases the threat of nuclear terrorism. Access to the knowledge necessary for nuclear proliferation has itself proliferated since World War II. Even if the hardest part of developing a nuclear weapon is acquiring fissile material, the plans for simple weapon systems can now be found with a quick internet search. Hence, Schwartz argues that, while the threat of thermonuclear war recedes into history, a new threat—like that of the detonation of a small nuclear weapon in a city such as Washington, D.C.—is actually growing. The breakup of the former USSR states created one of the most dangerous situations for the “loose nuke” phenomenon. While CTR provided one of the most successful bi-lateral programs to protect against that possible threat, nations, such as Pakistan or North Korea, outside the scope of CTR may provide material support to terror organizations, or they may simply have insufficient control over their nuclear materials. In light of these complexities, the question naturally, but uncomfortably, arises as to the ongoing role of nuclear deterrence. The working assumption has been that, when faced with total annihilation between two warring states, each opponent may be deterred from nuclear weapons employment. Although this very model arguably worked well for 60 years between the USSR and the United States, Schwartz highlights that the present nuclear world is faced with a different problem: How does a nation-state deter a stateless organization? For that matter, how does a nuclear nation-state deter even a non-nuclear nation-state committed to the support of nuclear terrorists? As a testament to such, since World War II, four out of the five NPT nuclear powers has “lost” a war to a non-nuclear foe without ever using nuclear weapons. In the immediate aftermath of a nuclear terror attack in the United States, the political need to demonstrate control, resolve and to hold someone accountable will be intense. Yet, how does the U.S. determine what objectives to pursue? It is simple to say, “Go kill the terrorists!” It is another to comply with that statement. Individual targets in multiple nations with multiple governments involved do not necessarily constitute an effective counter-terrorism program. How does the U.S. build an international coalition when political interests diverge and intelligence agencies have different opinions about governmental complicity? How does it create a coalition of allied governments whose very citizens may be involved? How does it counter terrorism when “terrorism” itself is an amorphous concept? On this account, Schwartz provides historical examples that run from the Comanche to the United States’ current fight with Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Countering terrorism will be the battle of the future; it will not be an easy one—particularly if it acquires a nuclear dimension. A nuclear terror attack on the United States will affect more than the U.S. It will re-write the international legal system. There may still be treaties and agreements, but after a nuclear weapon detonates, they may simply be pieces of paper. Establishing new arrangements and treaties will have to follow. The idea that what happens within the borders of another nation-state is only that nation-state’s business will be robustly challenged. The risk is simply too great to trust that another government would even be capable of keeping its nuclear issues within its borders. The Peace of Westphalia may simply fade away. Further, the people of the United States could be affected by unprecedentedly intrusive surveillance of goods, materials, and information being imported and exported. In this environment, it is possible that the Baruch plan—or a reasonable facsimile—may be pursued with broader support than it originally had. In the end, Schwartz suggests, an event like this would do more to change the global security calculus than did 9-11. “Catastrophic events”, particularly as the term gets applied to weapons of mass destruction events, are, curious as it may seem, easy to dismiss as someone else’s problem in the big, lumbering federal bureaucracy. This is so because the events thus characterized are so overwhelming that they befuddle the imagination (and certainly would exhaust the resources) of any one agency that sought to deal with them. However, it is this fact which, more than any other, makes the response to catastrophic events the quintessential interagency challenge. The present anthology assembles the work of some of America’s most insightful public servants and clearly demonstrates that every organ of government at every level—tribal, local, state, and federal—is remiss if it fails to ask the question, “What is my role when the unthinkable happens?” and “With whom should I be talking as I imagine the unthinkable?”

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Terrorism Advantage › Terrorism Advantage – Impact

Terrorist attacks are poised to go nuclear

Ayson 2010 (Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Terrorism Advantage › Terrorism Advantage – Recruitment

The US failing to address the drone problem strengthens terrorist groups

Abdulrasheed Al-Faqih, 18, (Abdulrasheed Al-Faqih is the Executive Director of Mwatana Organization for Human Rights, an independent Yemeni organization aiming to defend and protect human rights in Yemen.) Abdulrasheed Al-Faqih. "Civilian Casualties and Effectiveness of U.S. Drone Strikes in Yemen." Just Security. 4-3-2018. 7-1-2019. <https://www.justsecurity.org/54464/ civilian-casualties-effectiveness-u-s-drone-strikes-yemen-part/> (PembrokeHill-MLT)

In 2017, the United States military said that it more than 120 strikes in Yemen, more than three times as many as strikes as . For many years, we at the documented the impact of U.S. drone strikes in Yemen through detailed field research. In 2017 we eight drone strikes and ground operations and found that U.S. operations were responsible for the deaths of at least 32 civilians – including 16 children and six women – and injured ten others, including five children. (The results of these investigations will be released in a forthcoming report.) The 32 civilian deaths and ten injuries are the latest in a long list of victims harmed by U.S. military operations in Yemen who have been waiting for justice for many years. Incidents of civilian harm in Yemen continue to negatively affect the reputation of the United States in the country and push local communities to consider violence and revenge as the only solution to the harm they suffer. With U.S. operations in Yemen in 2018, it is time for much greater attention to be given to the civilians harmed and the effects of this unwise and destructive policy. Documenting U.S. strikes The United States targeted killing operations in Yemen in 2002 under the Bush administration, which dramatically within the first few years of the Obama administration. Under President Trump, strikes have again soared. Within Yemen, U.S. operations have raised a great deal of questions, about the , ethics, objectives, results, effectiveness, effects, and legality of these strikes. Human rights advocates have also the U.S. government about the fate of the hundreds of civilian victims, about the government’s lack of acknowledgment and accountability, and the ways to ensure no new victims are added to the growing list. So far, the U.S. government’s response to many of these questions remains inadequate or nonexistent. During 2013 and 2014, I worked on a team researching civilian victims of U.S. drone strikes. We visited areas and villages in different parts of Yemen that had been affected by U.S. actions. We interviewed witnesses, survivors, doctors, and local social leaders. We inspected the scenes of the attacks, the remains of the munitions, and the effects of such operations on the lives of civilians. We released our findings in a report, Death by Drone: Civilian Harm Caused by U.S. Targeted Killings in Yemen, which we co-authored with the Open Society Justice Initiative. It included the results of our field research as well as recommendations to ensure U.S. operations comply with the law and provide accountability for civilians harmed by U.S. strikes. Sadly, many of those whom we spoke to would speak of the harsh reality of their lives. Our village is poor. We do not have schools, hospitals, roads, or any type of public services. The only thing that we have in the way of progress and development in a modern world are these deadly missiles. This is what Muhammad Nasser Al Jarrah, a villager from Sailat Al Jarrah us during our visit to his remote village on May 31, 2013, after an alleged U.S. strike hit a home full of women and children. Our visit to Sailat Al Jarrah was nearly five years ago, but Muhammad’s somber sentiment was shared with us by a number of survivors and witnesses over the years and in different parts of Yemen. It is now sixteen years after the first U.S. drone strike in Yemen, and we are still working on documenting new attacks and researching their effect on civilians. With Trump’s renewed effort to increase lethal operations in Yemen, it seems that the U.S. has still not learned lessons to prevent civilian harm in the country. Release the kill list: A tool to reduce civilian harm Strikes that we documented across Yemen, from Sana’a, to Dhamar, to highlight the problematic use of U.S. drone strikes and other counterterrorism operations in what—contrary to the U.S. claim that it is in a global conflict against Al Qaeda and ISIS—is better understood as a local, social, and political conflict. From time to time, some of the people we met would also suggest ways that the U.S. could better protect civilians in Yemen. One of the demands that survivors of drone strikes would ask for is a list of wanted individuals. A list that is clear and available to the public so that they can avoid targeted individuals, protect their children, and not allow U.S. targets to have a presence in their areas. Some of the local residents we would interview would claim that a number of the attacks targeted children or ordinary civilians that were not doing anything that might cause suspicion or indicate that they were dangerous or involved in terrorist acts. To them, having a list of wanted individuals would perhaps prevent further civilian harm. Nasser Mabkhout is one of two survivors of an alleged U.S. drone strike on December 2, 2012. He was driving a group of civilians from a market back to the village of Al Sabool, when the car was hit by a U.S. drone. At the time, the attack was one of the deadliest strikes ever, killing 12 civilians, including three children and a pregnant woman. Two civilians were also injured. During an interview at his home in Al Sabool, Nasser told us: “I was not worried at all when I saw the plane flying above us. I was sure that they had specific targets, and that these targets were members of terror groups, while we are just vendors and workers. I had heard a lot that these planes were very smart, and that they knew their targets and were very accurate in their strikes. While we were watching the plane, we were laughing and making jokes until we were stopped by one of its missiles, which hit my car and devastated the people in it.” Local security officials, social leaders, and witnesses of U.S. drone strikes in Yemen told us that the strikes targeted individuals in areas and conditions where it was possible for them to be arrested, investigated, and tried in a court of law. As recently as late last year, the Governor of Mareb researchers that the United States carried out a drone strike in November 2017 against a target that his security forces could access. The Governor lamented the failure of the U.S. government to provide information to local forces that might have led to the capture of terrorism suspects. This leads to a number of questions. How dangerous are the suspects that are targeted in these operations? How feasible is it to arrest, investigate, and try them in court? What do American agencies use to determine who is a suspect when they make the kill list? These and many other questions remain unanswered. Cycle of violence Our research team also traveled to a village in the area of Qaifah, Yemen on May 26, 2013. This area is one that has been targeted the most by drone strikes. While we were there, we heard a number of men who were relatives of the civilian victims of a drone strike loudly discussing whether they should kidnap us to pressure the U.S. government to look into the cases of Yemeni drone strike victims. The group that had this idea was trying to convince the rest of the men that we were working for an American organization, the , and that this organization could pressure the U.S. government to look into cases of Yemeni drone strike victims. We were lucky that one of the village men, who was also our guide in the area, told the others that he could not allow them to kidnap us because we were his guests and under his protection. Ultimately, we were able to leave the area without any problems. The incident, however, shows how the families of the victims, many of whom are poor farmers who have waited so long for an acknowledgment for the harm they suffered, and for justice through legal means, begin to consider violent “solutions” to their problems. The U.S. government should realize that Yemenis on the ground feel that U.S. practices that ignore civilian harm are not only dehumanizing but are also counter-productive to the United States’ long-term counterterrorism objectives. Acknowledgment of accidental civilian deaths can be a vital step toward preventing further acts of violence. I’ve seen some cases where the relatives of civilian drone strike victims are first convinced that the attack was a mistake, that the United States and its Yemeni government ally will officially apologize for the attack, and provide the victims with justice and a remedy. When this apology and remedy does not come, the relatives work to draw attention to their case to highlight that their relatives are civilian victims. And when there is no reaction or response from the U.S. government after those attempts, the families are left only with thoughts of revenge. In these moments, Al Qaeda and similar jihadist groups stand ready to capitalize and exploit these feelings of discontent and injustice. The potential for violent groups to take advantage of civilian discontent has only grown in recent years. Since the start of the current conflict involving the sectarian Houthi group on one side, and the Saudi-led coalition supported by its international partners on the other, Yemen has been torn apart and its institutions almost completely destroyed. This environment has made it easier for jihadist groups to prosper. The war has allowed Al Qaeda to come out of isolation and expand, so it is now more present in areas that, as the crisis in Yemen drags on, will become more friendly to such groups—not least if the United States continues raining down drone strikes and launching lethal raids on the people of Yemen. We are fortunate that, in the different areas in which we have worked, it was clear to us that many people, for now, reject Al Qaeda and jihadist groups, even as they are outraged that drone strikes killed their civilian relatives. This has limited Al Qaeda’s influence in Yemen. But every time the U.S. fails to acknowledge a drone strike that harms civilians, the risk that people will turn to Al Qaeda only grows.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Terrorism Advantage › Terrorism Advantage – Recruitment

Each drone attack amounts to even more terrorist attacks in the future

Anouk S. Rigterink, 18, Rigterink S., Anouk. (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Oxford and has Ph.D. at the London School of Economics and Political Science) “The Wane of Command∗: Evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations.” Department of Economics: University of Oxford. 10-30-18. Accessed 7-1-19. (Pembrokehill-MLT)

Targeting terrorist leaders has become a commonly used US counterterrorism policy since 9/11. According to the US National Strategy for Counterterrorism 2018, targeting key terrorists remains the number one priority action. An underlying goal of this policy is to undermine control within terrorist organizations: the ability of individuals higher up the hierarchy – or more central to the organization – to determine what others in the organization do. This policy is primarily implemented using armed drones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, which can surveil and kill targets. The US now owns hundreds of these armed drones, and 28 other countries have acquired weaponized drones in the last ten years. Targeted killing of terrorist leaders is also referred to as “cutting off the head of the snake”, implying that if one does so, the body will die. The snake analogy portrays the terrorist group as a single organism: a unitary actor. Many theoretical models similarly considering terrorist groups as unitary actors straightforwardly predict that targeting terrorist leaders, and undermining control within terrorist organizations, decreases terrorism (Sandler and Arce, 2003; Sandler and Siqueira, 2006; Powell, 2007; Bandyopadhyay and Sandler, 2011). However, if we consider terrorist organizations as non-unitary actors, predictions are less straightforward. Models that consider terrorist groups as organizations subject to collective action and principal-agent problems, which I will call problems of control for short, suggest that undermining control within terrorist groups may not be effective, or may even backfire. This leaves an empirical question, which this paper addresses: how does counterterrorism which undermines control within terrorist organizations affect terrorism? Specifically, this paper investigates how drone strikes killing terrorist leaders affect terrorist attacks. To investigate this empirically, this paper exploits a natural experiment provided by drone strikes ‘hitting’ and ‘missing’ terrorist leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, which is inspired by Jones and Olken (2009). I construct a new dataset of drone attempts on terrorist leaders’ lives, executing several cross-checks to safeguard data quality. This dataset captures variation across time and terrorist organizations. I argue that conditional on a drone attempt to kill a terrorist leader, drone ‘hits’ and ‘misses’ are quasirandom. Drone hits and misses are not statistically significantly different from one another on an extensive range of characteristics, including pre-trends in terrorist violence. Narratives of why drones miss also suggest that misses are largely driven by chance. This enables a difference-in-difference design, investigating changes in attacks by a terrorist organization before and after a drone hit on its leader, compared to before and after a miss. Results indicate that a drone hit on a terrorist organization’s leader is associated with an increase in the number of terrorist attacks by this organization, compared to a miss. Estimates indicate that this increase amounts to 29 additional terrorist attacks in total across the world in the six months after a drone hit, an increase of 43% compared to the six months after a miss. This result cannot be explained by terrorist organizations ‘speeding up’ the timing of attacks, or by a decrease in the lethality of attacks. Results are robust to estimating the main test statistic using randomization inference, including leader-fixed effects, alternative aggregations of terrorist groups, controlling for Pakistani military action and peace agreements between the terrorist group and the Pakistani government, and using alternative econometric specifications. Several game-theoretical models provide explanations for the results obtained. A first family of models considers problems of control. A principal-agent model by Shapiro (2013) suggests that leader killing, by increasing the costs for the leader to control his operatives, could lead to increased terrorist violence if operatives have a greater preference for (indiscriminate) violence than the leader. Modelling terrorist violence as a public good to terrorists, Enders and Jindapon (2010) suggest that terrorist networks strategically decrease the number of network connections in response to targeted leader killing, leading individual nodes to increase their efforts to commit attacks as they can no longer free-ride on the efforts of others in the network. Other families of models provide alternative explanations of why targeted leader killing may increase terrorist violence: terrorist groups may respond to a loss in capacity by substituting a few high-capacity attacks with many low-capacity attacks, pro-active counterterrorism policies that result in civilian casualties may create backlash if they spur terrorist recruitment, and terrorist organizations may commit more terrorist attacks after their leader has been killed to signal strength. Further analysis suggests that problems of control explain the main result better than alternative theoretical mechanisms. The observed increase in terrorist attacks is primarily driven by attacks that leaders of terrorist organizations do not favour: attacks on civilian and private targets – which terrorist leaders repeatedly instruct their followers to avoid – and attacks by its members that the organization does not publicly claim responsibility for. The observed effect is also stronger for terrorist organizations and leaders that rely more strongly on central control. Furthermore, a drone hit is associated with proxies for network breakdown: an increase in group splintering and infighting. Simultaneously however, results suggest that a drone strike on one group’s leader is associated by an increase in terrorist attacks by other groups, affiliates in its network. A considerable number of existing papers investigate empirically the impact of targeted killing of leaders of terrorist organizations, yet results are mixed. Some authors conclude that targeted leader killing is effective, either because it speeds up the decline of terrorist organizations (Price, 2012) or diminishes the number or intensity of terrorist attacks (Jaeger and Paserman, 2009; Johnston, 2012). Others conclude that it has no effect (Jordan, 2009; Mannes, 2008; Hafez and Hatfield, 2006), or even an adverse effect – either on terrorist organizations in general or on particular categories of terrorist organizations (Kaplan et al., 2006; Jordan, 2009; Mannes, 2008; Abrahms and Potter, 2015; Abrahms and Mierau, 2017).

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Terrorism Advantage › Terrorism Advantage – Recruitment

Drone strikes increase terrorism and anti-us sentiment in Pakistan

Rafat Mahmood (University of Western Australia and Pakistan Institute of Development Economics), Michael Jetter (University of Western Australia, IZA and CESifo) APRIL 2019 IZA Institute of Labor economics, “Military Intervention via Drone Strikes” Accessed 7/2/2019 *mw*

This paper introduces an empirical strategy to isolate the causal effects of drone strikes in Pakistan on subsequent terrorism, anti-US sentiment, and radicalization, employing wind as the key IV. We hypothesize that wind decreases the likelihood of the US military employing a drone strike, conditional on observable characteristics, whereas wind is otherwise orthogonal to terrorist activities. Both assumptions receive support in our sample of 4,018 days from 2006 to 2016. Results from 2SLS estimations suggest drone strikes increase the number of terror attacks in Pakistan in the upcoming days and weeks. This finding prevails in a host of alternative estimations and robustness checks. Extending the timeframe of subsequent terrorism, we find evidence indicating drone strikes do not just affect the timing of attacks (e.g., by moving forward planned attacks) but rather increase the total number of attacks. In terms of magnitude, one drone strike today causes over four additional terror attacks per day in the next seven days which implies drone strikes are responsible for 16 percent of all terror attacks in Pakistan. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests 2,964 people died from terror attacks because of drone strikes. We then explore mechanisms, distinguishing between insiders, i.e., those who already belong to terrorist organizations, and outsiders, i.e., regular Pakistanis. Specifically, we study anti-US sentiment in the major English-language newspaper in Pakistan, anti-US protests, and online searches for terms that may be indicative of radicalization (jihad, Taliban video, and Zarb-e-Momin). In line with the blowback hypothesis, results from 2SLS estimations suggest the general populace increasingly turns to anti-US and radical expressions after drone strikes as all these measures rise substantially because of drone strikes. It is important to put the results pertaining to Pakistani news and Google search behavior in context. We are not suggesting Google Trends as the perfect yardstick to measure radical attitudes – an online search for a radical term does not make a terrorist. Further, identifying more negative emotions and anger 33 in US-related articles does not necessarily prove anti-US attitudes. For instance, articles mentioning the US may systematically apply negative language to their enemies. However, the persistency with which we identify signs of radicalization and anti-US sentiment because of drone strikes in the general Pakistani populace is consistent with the hypothesis that drone strikes systematically turn Pakistanis toward radical groups and against the US. In fact, given a literacy rate of 58 percent (Government of Pakistan, 2017) and the hypothesis that the tendency to radicalize usually decreases with education in Pakistan (Fair et al., 2014), studying an English-language newspaper and online search behavior (requiring literacy and internet access) may actually present a lower bound estimate of anti-US sentiment. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical analysis that is able to isolate causal effects of drone strikes. Contrary to the current opinion in the US military which suggests drone strikes curb terrorism, we find evidence to the contrary: Drone strikes (i) lead to more terrorism, (ii) make the US more unpopular in Pakistan, and (iii)steer Pakistanis toward radical ideas. In other words, not only are insidersretaliating against the US but outsiders appear to change their attitudes. As a consequence, the pool of militants may grow, if anything. As the US military continues to build and expand its drone program (e.g., in Yemen), we hope our research provides useful insights into the underlying consequences.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Solvency › Solvency – DOD Allows Use

DOD policy does not prevent use

Gregory Allen (AI Governance Project and Senior Fellow - Center for Strategic and International Studies) “DOD Is Updating Its Decade-Old Autonomous Weapons Policy, but Confusion Remains Widespread” June 06, 2022 https://www.csis.org/analysis/dod-updating-its-decade-old-autonomous-weapons-policy-confusion-remains-widespread

In November 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) released its policy on autonomy in weapons systems: DOD Directive 3000.09 (DODD 3000.09). Despite being nearly 10 years old, the policy remains frequently misunderstood, including by leaders in the U.S. military. For example, in February 2021, Colonel Marc E. Pelini, who at the time was the division chief for capabilities and requirements within the DOD’s Joint Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office, said, “Right now we don't have the authority to have a human out of the loop. Based on the existing Department of Defense policy, you have to have a human within the decision cycle at some point to authorize the engagement." He is simply wrong. No such requirement appears in DODD 3000.09, nor any other DOD policy. Misconceptions about DODD 3000.09 appear to extend even to high-ranking flag officers. In April 2021, General Mike Murray, the then-four-star commander of Army Futures Command, said, “Where I draw the line—and this is, I think well within our current policies—[is], if you’re talking about a lethal effect against another human, you have to have a human in that decision-making process.” Breaking Defense, a news outlet that reported on Murray’s remarks at the time, stated that the requirement to have a human in the decisionmaking process is “official Defense Department policy.” It is not. DODD 3000.09 does not ban autonomous weapons or establish a requirement than U.S. weapons have a “human in the loop.” In fact, that latter phrase never appears in DOD policy. Instead, DODD 3000.09 formally defines what an autonomous weapon system is and requires any DOD organization proposing to develop one to either go through an incredibly rigorous senior review process or meet a qualifying exemption. Regarding the latter, cyber weapons systems, for example, are exempted.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Solvency › Solvency – Modeling

LAWS meet only one part of the IHL threshold – do not meet on targeting law – their evidence

Ettinger, 20 (Jay Ettinger, 2020, accessed on 6-29-2022, 30 Minn. J. Int'L. 153, "1. NOTE: Overcoming International Inertia: The Creation of War Manual for Lethal Autonomous WeaponsSystems, 30 Minn. J. Int'l L. 153", ) (NB)

In order for LAWS to be compliant with IHL "targeting law," "they must be able to reliably and predictably distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, as well as make rapid judgments on the proportionality of an attack against its potential collateral harms. 67First, there is a question as to whether computer algorithms will be able to gauge the complex, context-dependent, and humanistic clues that soldiers must use to distinguish combatants and non-combatants in the modern battlefield where combatants often attempt to conceal their identities. 68Second, even if such a distinction is technically [*163] feasible, there is a question as to whether these systems can reliably make sound decisions given the vast array and often rapidly changing nature of battlefield contexts. 69For example, one potential risk to the system's reliability is the introduction of bias to decision-making originating in the data sets used to train the AI system. 70Even if both of these technical feasibility questions can be adequately addressed, there is a further question as to whether lethal decision-making inherently requires human involvement under IHL. 71And if there is such a requirement, what degree of human involvement is sufficient to meet IHL obligations must also be determined.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Solvency › Solvency – Modeling

China agrees

Mary Wareham (advocacy director in the arms division at Human Rights Watch) “Summary: Stopping Killer Robots” August 10, 2020 https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and

At the Human Rights Council in May 2013, China supported beginning multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems, which it described as “highly complex.”[65] China has highlighted the potential for fully autonomous weapons to upset the international strategic balance and affect arms control.[66] In December 2016, China said it that such weapons “present considerable uncertainties” for compliance with international humanitarian law and expressed its desire for precautionary measures, highlighting the precedent provided by the ban on blinding lasers.[67] In April 2018, China called for a ban on fully autonomous weapons, but later clarified its call was limited to use only and not development and production.[68] Since then, China has not explicitly repeated its call for a new international treaty to ban fully autonomous weapons. China participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Solvency › Solvency – Accuracy

A2: Humans are more accurate but they believe the tech so it has to be removed

Shira Ovide (New York Times) “A Case for Banning Facial Recognition” June 09, 2020 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/technology/facial-recognition-software.html?auth=login-google

But a police officer or eyewitness could also look at surveillance footage and mug shots and misidentify someone as Jim Smith. Is software more accurate or less biased than humans? That depends. Our analysis showed that for many, facial recognition was way less accurate than humans. The other problem is something called automation bias. If your intuition tells you that an image doesn’t look like Smith, but the computer model tells you that it is him with 99 percent accuracy, you’re more likely to believe that model. There’s also an imbalance of power. Facial recognition can be completely accurate, but it can still be used in a way that is detrimental to certain groups of people. The combination of overreliance on technology, misuse and lack of transparency — we don’t know how widespread the use of this software is — is dangerous.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Solvency › Solvency – Ban Works

Now is key – LAWS are coming in mass now unless a ban is put into place immediately

Michael T. Klare (professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association) “Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Laws of War” March 2019 https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-03/features/autonomous-weapons-systems-laws-war

Yet another approach gaining attention is a concentrated focus on the ethical dimensions of fielding fully autonomous weapons systems. This outlook holds that international law and common standards of ethical practice ordain that only humans possess the moral capacity to justify taking another human’s life and that machines can never be vested with that power. Proponents of this approach point to the Martens clause of the Hague Convention of 1899, also inscribed in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, stating that even when not covered by other laws and treaties, civilians and combatants “remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of human conscience.” Opponents of fully autonomous weapons systems claim that such weapons, by removing humans from life-and-death decision-making, are inherently contradicting principles of humanity and dictates of human conscience and so should be banned. Reflecting awareness of this issue, the Defense Department has reportedly begun to develop a set of guiding principles for the “safe, ethical, and responsible use” of AI and autonomous weapons systems by the military services. Today, very few truly autonomous robotic weapons are in active combat use, but many countries are developing and testing a wide range of machines possessing high degrees of autonomy. Nations are determined to field these weapons quickly, lest their competitors outpace them in an arms race in autonomy. Diplomats and policymakers must seize this moment before fully autonomous weapons systems become widely deployed to weigh the advantages of a total ban and consider other measures to ensure they will never be used to commit unlawful acts or trigger catastrophic escalation.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Solvency › Solvency – NATO Key/Says Yes

Banning lethal autonomous weapons systems should be your moral and ethical imperative – multilateral action key to effectiveness

Mary Wareham (advocacy director in the arms division at Human Rights Watch) “Summary: Stopping Killer Robots” August 10, 2020 https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and

Weapons systems that select and engage targets without meaningful human control are unacceptable and need to be prevented. All countries have a duty to protect humanity from this dangerous development by banning fully autonomous weapons. Retaining meaningful human control over the use of force is an ethical imperative, a legal necessity, and a moral obligation. In the period since Human Rights Watch and other nongovernmental organizations launched the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots in 2013, the question of how to respond to concerns over fully autonomous weapons has steadily climbed the international agenda.[1] The challenge of killer robots, like climate change, is widely regarded as a grave threat to humanity that deserves urgent multilateral action.[2] A growing number of legislators, policymakers, private companies, international and domestic organizations, and ordinary individuals have endorsed the call to ban fully autonomous weapons.[3] Since 2018, the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has repeatedly urged states to prohibit weapons systems that could, by themselves, target and attack human beings, calling them “morally repugnant and politically unacceptable.”

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Solvency › Solvency – General

No autonomous weapons now – they are not inevitable and it is not too late to stop them

Michael T. Klare (professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association) “Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Laws of War” March 2019 https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-03/features/autonomous-weapons-systems-laws-war

Autonomous weapons systems are lethal devices that have been empowered by their human creators to survey their surroundings, identify potential enemy targets, and independently choose to attack those targets on the basis of sophisticated algorithms. Such systems require the integration of several core elements: a mobile combat platform, such as a drone aircraft, ship, or ground vehicle; sensors of various types to scrutinize the platform’s surroundings; processing systems to classify objects discovered by the sensors; and algorithms directing the platform to initiate attack when an allowable target is detected. The U.S. Department of Defense describes an autonomous weapons system as a “weapons system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.”2 Few weapons in active service presently exhibit all of these characteristics. Many militaries employ close-in naval defense weapons such as the U.S. Phalanx gun system that can fire autonomously when a ship is under attack by enemy planes or missiles. Yet, such systems cannot independently search for and strike enemy assets on their own, and human operators are always present to assume control if needed.3 Many air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles are able to attack human-selected targets, such as planes or tanks, but cannot hover or loiter to identify potential threats. One of the few systems to possess this capability is Israel’s Harpy airborne anti-radiation drone, which can loiter for several hours over a certain area to search for and destroy enemy radars.4 Autonomy, then, is a matter of degree, with machines receiving ever-increasing capacity to assess their surroundings and decide what to strike and when. As described by the U.S. Congressional Research Service, autonomy is “the level of independence that humans grant a system to execute a given task.” Autonomy “refers to a spectrum of automation in which independent decision-making can be tailored for a specific mission.” Put differently, autonomy refers to the degree to which humans are taken “out of the loop” of decision-making, with AI-empowered machines assuming ever-greater responsibility for critical combat decisions. This emphasis on the “spectrum of automation” is important because, for the most part, nations have yet to deploy fully autonomous weapon systems on the battlefield. Under prevailing U.S. policy, as enshrined in a November 2012 Defense Department directive, “autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.” Yet, this country, like others, evidently is developing and testing weapons that would allow for ever-diminishing degrees of human control over their future use.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Solvency › Solvency – General

The use of a moratorium creates a period to expand security cooperation- solves for LAWS destruction

Arkin, Ronald C, et al. October 2019 “A Path towards Reasonable Autonomous Weapons Regulation.” IEEE Spectrum, IEEE Spectrum, 21 Oct. 2019, spectrum.ieee.org/a-path-towards-reasonable-autonomous-weapons-regulation. Accessed 28 June 2022. (, an IEEE Fellow, is Regents' Professor, Director of the Mobile Robot Laboratory, and Associate Dean for Research in the College of Computing at the Georgia Institute of Technology. His research focuses on multiagent robotic systems, and he's published numerous articles and book chapters on human-robot interaction and robot ethics. Cutby:neigh)

Component 1: States should consider adopting a five-year, renewable moratorium on the development, deployment, transfer, and use of anti-personnel lethal autonomous weapon systems. Anti-personnel lethal autonomous weapon systems are defined as weapons systems that, once activated, can select and engage dismounted human targets without further intervention by a human operator, possibly excluding systems such as: Fixed-point defensive systems with human supervisory control to defend human-occupied bases or installations Limited, proportional, automated counter-fire systems that return fire in order to provide immediate, local defense of humans Time-limited pursuit deterrent munitions or systems Autonomous weapon systems with size above a specified explosive weight limit that select as targets hand-held weapons, such as rifles, machine guns, anti-tank weapons, or man-portable air defense systems, provided there is adequate protection for non-combatants and ensuring IHL compliance The moratorium would not apply to: Anti-vehicle or anti-materiel weapons Non-lethal anti-personnel weapons Research on ways of improving autonomous weapon technology to reduce non-combatant harm in future anti-personnel lethal autonomous weapon systems Weapons that find, track, and engage specific individuals whom a human has decided should be engaged within a limited predetermined period of time and geographic region Motivation: This moratorium would pause development and deployment of anti-personnel lethal autonomous weapons systems to allow states to better understand the systemic risks of their use and to perform research that improves their safety, understandability, and effectiveness.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Case Extensions › Inherency

Action now is key to prevent the most catastrophic impacts

Coley Felt (International Policy Institute Cybersecurity Fellow) “Autonomous Weaponry: Are Killer Robots in Our Future?” February 14, 2020 https://jsis.washington.edu/news/autonomous-weaponry-are-killer-robots-in-our-future/

Furthermore, an open letter calling for “a ban on offensive autonomous weapons beyond meaningful human control” was signed by Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking and more than 3,000 AI and robotics experts in 2017 (Etzioni, 2017). The letter highlights that the development of this technology requires no costly or hard-to-obtain raw materials, raising concern about how easy it is to produce these types of weapons. Furthermore, researchers emphasize that LAWS are ideal for certain malicious tasks such as assassinations, reducing populations, destabilizing nations and selectively killing specific groups (Busby, 2018). In the United States, tension is high between Silicon Valley and the federal government around this controversial topic. For example, the United States’ Project Maven aims to invest billions of dollars into artificial intelligence research and development pertaining to the military. After Google was originally contracted to work on the project, an employee protest led to the company pulling out once the contract expired. Many Google employees are not supportive of fully autonomous weaponry and refused to be part of its possible development (Fryer-Biggs, 2018).

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – NATO Cohesion Advantage

Warming outweighs---its irreversible and exacerbates biodiversity loss, conflict, disease

Torres 16 (Phil Torres; author, Affiliate Scholar @ Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, founder of the X-Risks Institute, published articles for Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Salon, Journal of Future Studies, and the Journal of Evolution and Technology; 7-22-2016, "Op-ed: Climate Change Is the Most Urgent Existential Risk," FLI - Future of Life Institute, http://futureoflife.org/2016/07/22/climate-change-is-the-most-urgent-existential-risk/, accessed 8-9-2016)

For example, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the effects of climate change will be “severe,” “pervasive,” and “irreversible.” Or, as published in Nature and authored by over twenty scientists puts it, the consequences of climate change “will extend longer than the entire history of human civilization thus far.” Furthermore, in Science Advances confirms that humanity has already escorted the biosphere into the sixth mass extinction event in life’s 3.8 billion year history on Earth. Yet suggests that we could be approaching a sudden, irreversible, catastrophic collapse of the global ecosystem. If this were to occur, it could result in “widespread social unrest, economic instability and loss of human life.” Given the potential for environmental degradation to elevate the likelihood of nuclear wars, nuclear terrorism, engineered pandemics, a superintelligence takeover, and perhaps even an , it ought to take precedence over all other risk concerns — at least in the near-term. Let’s make sure we get our priorities straight.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – NATO Cohesion Advantage

Disagreements exist but the overwhelming consensus is that LAWS need to be banned.

Congressional Research Service “Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems” November 17, 2021 https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11150

In addition, approximately 30 countries and 165 nongovernmental organizations have called for a preemptive ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns, including concerns about operational risk, accountability for use, and compliance with the proportionality and distinction requirements of the law of war. The U.S. government does not currently support a ban on LAWS and has addressed ethical concerns about the systems in a March 2018 white paper, “Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons.” The paper notes that “automated target identification, tracking, selection, and engagement functions can allow weapons to strike military objectives more accurately and with less risk of collateral damage” or civilian casualties.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – War Escalation Advantage

That escalates and causes extinction

Starr 17 [Steven Starr is the director of the University of Missouri's Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility, 1-9-2017, "Turning a Blind Eye Towards Armageddon — U.S. Leaders Reject Nuclear Winter Studies," FAS,

The detonation of an atomic bomb with this explosive power will instantly ignite fires over a surface area of three to five square miles. In the recent studies, the scientists calculated that the blast, fire, and radiation from a war fought with 100 atomic bombs could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a “counterforce” nuclear war between the superpowers. However, the long-term environmental effects of the war could significantly disrupt the global weather for at least a decade, which would likely result in a vast global famine. The scientists predicted that nuclear firestorms in the burning cities would cause at least five million tons of black carbon smoke to quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where it could not be rained out. The smoke would circle the Earth in less than two weeks and would form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would remain for more than a decade. The smoke would absorb warming sunlight, which would heat the smoke to temperatures near the boiling point of water, producing ozone losses of 20 to 50 percent over populated areas. This would almost double the amount of UV-B reaching the most populated regions of the mid-latitudes, and it would create UV-B indices unprecedented in human [humyn} history. In North America and Central Europe, the time required to get a painful sunburn at mid-day in June could decrease to as little as six minutes for fair-skinned individuals. As the smoke layer blocked warming sunlight from reaching the Earth’s surface, it would produce the coldest average surface temperatures in the last 1,000 years. The scientists calculated that global food production would decrease by 20 to 40 percent during a five-year period following such a war. Medical experts have predicted that the shortening of growing seasons and corresponding decreases in agricultural production could cause up to two billion people to perish from famine. The climatologists also investigated the effects of a nuclear war fought with the vastly more powerful modern thermonuclear weapons possessed by the United States, Russia, China, France, and England. Some of the thermonuclear weapons constructed during the 1950s and 1960s were 1,000 times more powerful than an atomic bomb. During the last 30 years, the average size of thermonuclear or “strategic” nuclear weapons has decreased. Yet today, each of the approximately 3,540 strategic weapons deployed by the United States and Russia is seven to 80 times more powerful than the atomic bombs modeled in the India-Pakistan study. The smallest strategic nuclear weapon has an explosive power of 100,000 tons of TNT, compared to an atomic bomb with an average explosive power of 15,000 tons of TNT. Strategic nuclear weapons produce much larger nuclear firestorms than do atomic bombs. For example, a standard Russian 800-kiloton warhead, on an average day, will ignite fires covering a surface area of 90 to 152 square miles. A war fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons would ignite immense nuclear firestorms covering land surface areas of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. The scientists calculated that these fires would produce up to 180 million tons of black carbon soot and smoke, which would form a dense, global stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke would remain in the stratosphere for 10 to 20 years, and it would block as much as 70 percent of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35 percent from the Southern Hemisphere. So much sunlight would be blocked by the smoke that the noonday sun would resemble a full moon at midnight. Under such conditions, it would only require a matter of days or weeks for daily minimum temperatures to fall below freezing in the largest agricultural areas of the Northern Hemisphere, where freezing temperatures would occur every day for a period of between one to more than two years. Average surface temperatures would become colder than those experienced 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age, and the prolonged cold would cause average rainfall to decrease by up to 90%. Growing seasons would be completely eliminated for more than a decade; it would be too cold and dark to grow food crops, which would doom the majority of the human [humyn] population. NUCLEAR WINTER IN BRIEF The profound cold and darkness following nuclear war became known as nuclear winter and was first predicted in 1983 by a group of NASA scientists led by Carl Sagan. During the mid-1980s, a large body of research was done by such groups as the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), the World Meteorological Organization, and the U.S. National Research Council of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences; their work essentially supported the initial findings of the 1983 studies. The idea of nuclear winter, published and supported by prominent scientists, generated extensive public alarm and put political pressure on the United States and Soviet Union to reverse a runaway nuclear arms race, which, by 1986, had created a global nuclear arsenal of more than 65,000 nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, this created a backlash among many powerful military and industrial interests, who undertook an extensive media campaign to brand nuclear winter as “bad science” and the scientists who discovered it as “irresponsible.” Critics used various uncertainties in the studies and the first climate models (which are primitive by today’s standards) as a basis to criticize and reject the concept of nuclear winter. In 1986, the Council on Foreign Relations published an article by scientists from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, who predicted drops in global cooling about half as large as those first predicted by the 1983 studies and described this as a “nuclear autumn.” The nuclear autumn studies were later shown to be deeply flawed, but the proof came too late to stop a massive smear campaign that effectively discredited the initial studies. Nuclear winter was subject to criticism and damning articles in the Wall Street Journal and Time magazine. In 1987, the National Review called nuclear winter a “fraud.” In 2000, Discover Magazine published an article that described nuclear winter as one of “The Twenty Greatest Scientific Blunders in History.” The endless smear campaign was successful; the general public, and even most anti-nuclear activists, were left with the idea that nuclear winter had been scientifically disproved. REJECTION BY LEADERS Yet the scientists did not give up. In 2006, they returned to their labs to perform the research I have previously described. Their new research not only upheld the previous findings but also found that the earlier studies actually underestimated the environmental effects of nuclear war. Dr. Robock of Rutgers and Dr. Toon of the University of Colorado have spent years attempting to bring official attention to their work and get follow-up research studies done by appropriate agencies in the federal government. In a recent (2016) interview, Dr. Toon stated: The Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, which should be investigating this problem, have done absolutely nothing. They have not published a single paper, in the open literature, analyzing this problem … We have made a list of where we think the important issues are, and we have gone to every [federal] agency we can think of with these lists, and said “Don’t you think someone should study this?” Basically, everyone we have tried so far has said, “Well that’s not my job.” In the same interview, Dr. Robock also noted: The Department of Homeland Security really should fund this. They will fund you to study one terrorist bomb in New York City. When you explain to them that a war between India and Pakistan is a much greater threat to the U.S. homeland than one terrorist bomb, as horrible as that is, they respond with “Oh, well that’s not my job, go talk to some other program manager” — who, of course, doesn’t exist. After the more recent series of studies were published in 2007 and 2008, Drs. Robock and Toon also made a number of requests to meet with members of the Obama administration. The scientists offered to brief Cabinet members and the White House staff about their findings, which they assumed would have a great impact upon nuclear weapons policy. Their offers were met with indifference. Finally, after several years of trying, Drs. Robock and Toon were allowed an audience with John Holdren, Senior Advisor to President Barack Obama on Science and Technology. Dr. Robock also eventually met with Rose Gottemoeller, then Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Dr. Robock has written to me that, after these meetings, he and Dr. Toon were left with the impression that neither Holdren nor Gottemoeller think the nuclear winter research “is correct.” But it is not only Holdren and Gottemoeller who reject the nuclear winter research. Greg Mello, of the Los Alamos Study Group, cites a source who confirms that the group that determines the “full range of activities related to the development, production, maintenance (upkeep) and elimination (retirement, disassembly and disposal) of all United States nuclear weapons — the members of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council — have stated that “the predictions of nuclear winter were disproved years ago.” The members of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council include: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Vice Chairman [Chairperson} of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Secretary for Nuclear Security of the Department of Energy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Commander of the United States Strategic Command It is important to understand that some members of this group — especially the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) — also develop the policies that guide the use of nuclear weapons. Perhaps General John Hyten, Head of USSTRATCOM, who is in charge of the U.S. nuclear triad, and General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman [Chairperson] of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the second highest ranking officer in the United States, have never seen or heard of the 21st century nuclear winter studies. Perhaps when they hear a question about “nuclear winter,” they only remember the smear campaigns done against the early studies. Or, maybe, they just choose not to accept the new scientific research on nuclear winter, despite the fact that it has withstood the criticism of the global scientific community. Regardless, the rejection of nuclear winter research by the top leaders of the United States raises some profoundly important questions: Do U.S. military and political leaders fully understand the consequences of nuclear war? Do they realize that even a “successful” nuclear first-strike against Russia could cause most Americans to die from nuclear famine? In 2010, Drs. Toon and Robock wrote in Physics Today: We estimate that the direct effects of using the 2012 arsenals would lead to hundreds of millions of fatalities. The indirect effects would likely eliminate the majority of the human [humyn] population. In 2013, Drs. Toon and Robock wrote in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that: A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in Self-Assured Destruction. RENEWED COLD WAR Although president-elect Trump appears to favor a return to the policy of détente with Russia, many if not most U.S. political leaders appear to support the Obama administration’s policies of direct confrontation with Putin’s Russia. Mainstream corporate media, including the editorial boards of The New York Times and The Washington Post, routinely engage in anti-Russian and anti-Putin rhetoric that surpasses the hate speech of the McCarthy era. Under President Obama, the United States has renewed the Cold War with Russia, with little or no debate or protest, and has subsequently engaged in proxy wars with Russia in Ukraine and Syria, as well as threatening military action against China in the South China Sea. In response to what NATO leaders describe as Russia’s “dangerous and aggressive actions,” NATO has built up a “rapid-response force” of 40,000 troops on the Russian border in the Baltic States and Poland. This force includes hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy artillery. NATO troops stationed in Estonia are within artillery range of St. Petersburg, the second largest city of Russia. The United States has deployed its Aegis Ashore Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in Romania and is constructing another such BMD system in Poland. The Mark 41 launch system used in the Aegis Ashore systems can be used to launch a variety of missiles, including long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles. In other words, the United States has built and is building launch sites for nuclear missiles on the Russian border. This fact has been widely reported on Russian TV and has infuriated the Russian public. In June, Russian President Putin specifically warned that Russia would be forced to retaliate against this threat. While Russian officials maintain that its actions are normal and routine, Russia now appears to be preparing for war. On October 5, 2016, Russia conducted a nation-wide civil defense drill that included 40 million of its people being directed to fallout shelters. Reuters reported two days later that Russia had moved its Iskander nuclear-capable missiles to Kaliningrad, which borders Poland. While the United States ignores the danger of nuclear war, Russian scholar Stephen Cohen reports that the danger of war with the United States is the leading news story in Russia. Cohen states: Just as there is no discussion of the most existential question of our time, in the American political class — the possibility of war with Russia — it is the only thing being discussed in the Russian political class . . . These are two different political universes. In Russia, all the discussion in the newspapers, and there is plenty of free discussion on talk show TV, which echoes what the Kremlin is thinking, online, in the elite newspapers, and in the popular broadcasts, the number 1, 2, 3, and 4 topics of the day are the possibility of war with the United States. Cohen goes on to say: I conclude from this that the leadership of Russia actually believes now, in reaction to what the United States and NATO have said and done over the last two years, and particularly in reaction to the breakdown of the proposed cooperation in Syria, and the rhetoric coming out of Washington, that war is a real possibility. I can’t remember when, since the Cuban Missile Crisis, that the Moscow leadership came to this conclusion in its collective head. Perhaps this narrative will change under president-elect Trump. However, he is inheriting a situation fraught with danger, which retains the possibility of direct military conflict with Russia in Ukraine and Syria, as well as increasingly militarized confrontation with China in the South China Sea.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – War Escalation Advantage

A ban now is key – continued development of lethal autonomous weapons could be catastrophic

Michael T. Klare (professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association) “Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Laws of War” March 2019 https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-03/features/autonomous-weapons-systems-laws-war

Assessing the Risks Given the likelihood that China, Russia, the United States, and other nations will deploy increasingly autonomous robotic weapons in the years ahead, policymakers must identify and weigh the potential risks of such deployments. These include not only the potential for accident and unintended escalation, as would be the case with any new weapons that are unleashed on the battlefield, but also a wide array of moral, ethical, and legal concerns arising from the diminishing role of humans in life-and-death decision-making. The potential dangers associated with the deployment of AI-empowered robotic weapons begin with the fact that much of the technology involved is new and untested under the conditions of actual combat, where unpredictable outcomes are the norm. For example, it is one thing to test self-driving cars under controlled conditions with human oversight; it is another to let such vehicles loose on busy highways. If that self-driving vehicle is covered with armor, equipped with a gun, and released on a modern battlefield, algorithms can never anticipate all the hazards and mutations of combat, no matter how well “trained” the algorithms governing the vehicle’s actions may be. In war, accidents and mishaps, some potentially catastrophic, are almost inevitable. Extensive testing of AI image-classification algorithms has shown that such systems can easily be fooled by slight deviations from standardized representations—in one experiment, a turtle was repeatedly identified as a rifle9—and are vulnerable to trickery, or “spoofing,” as well as hacking by adversaries. Former Navy Secretary Richard Danzig, who has studied the dangers of employing untested technologies on the battlefield, has been particularly outspoken in cautioning against the premature deployment of AI-empowered weaponry. “Unfortunately, the uncertainties surrounding the use and interaction of new military technologies are not subject to confident calculation or control,” he wrote in 2018.10 This danger is all the more acute because, on the current path, autonomous weapons systems will be accorded ever-greater authority to make decisions on the use of lethal force in battle. Although U.S. authorities insist that human operators will always be involved when life-and-death decisions are made by armed robots, the trajectory of technology is leading to an ever-diminishing human role in that capacity, heading eventually to a time when humans are uninvolved entirely. This could occur as a deliberate decision, such as when a drone is set free to attack targets fitting a specified appearance (“adult male armed with gun”), or as a conditional matter, as when drones are commanded to fire at their discretion if they lose contact with human controllers. A human operator is somehow involved, by launching the drones on those missions, but no human is ordering the specific lethal attack. These principles pose a particular challenge to fully autonomous weapons systems because they require a capacity to make fine distinctions in the heat of battle. It may be relatively easy in a large tank-on-tank battle, for example, to distinguish military from civilian vehicles; but in many recent conflicts, enemy combatants have armed ordinary pickup trucks and covered them with a tarpaulins, making them almost indistinguishable from civilian vehicles. Perhaps a hardened veteran could spot the difference, but an intelligent robot? Unlikely. Similarly, how does one gauge proportionality when attempting to attack enemy snipers firing from civilian-occupied tenement buildings? For robots, this could prove an insurmountable challenge. Advocates and critics of autonomous weaponry disagree over whether such systems can be equipped with algorithms sufficiently adept to distinguish between targets to satisfy the laws of war. “Humans possess the unique capacity to identify with other human beings and are thus equipped to understand the nuances of unforeseen behavior in ways that machines, which must be programmed in advance, simply cannot,” analysts from Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Human Rights Clinic of Harvard Law School wrote in 2016.12 Another danger arises from the speed with which automated systems operate, along with plans for deploying autonomous weapons systems in coordinated groups, or swarms. The Pentagon envisions a time when large numbers of drone ships and aircraft are released to search for enemy missile-launching submarines and other critical assets, including mobile ballistic missile launchers. At present, U.S. adversaries rely on those missile systems to serve as an invulnerable second-strike deterrent to a U.S. disarming first strike. Should Russia or China ever perceive that swarming U.S. drones threaten the survival of their second-strike systems, those countries could feel pressured to launch their missiles when such swarms are detected, lest they lose their missiles to a feared U.S. first strike.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – War Escalation Advantage

Autonomous weapons will inevitably become weapons of mass destruction. This makes global war inevitable.

Stuart Russell (professor of computer science at the University of California, Berkeley, and coauthor of the standard textbook "Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach.") “Lethal Autonomous Weapons Exist; They Must Be Banned” June 16, 2021 https://spectrum.ieee.org/lethal-autonomous-weapons-exist-they-must-be-banned

We produced “Slaughterbots" to educate the public and policymakers alike about the potential imminent dangers of small, cheap, and ubiquitous lethal autonomous weapons systems. Beyond the moral issue of handing over decisions over life and death to algorithms, the video pointed out that autonomous weapons will, inevitably, turn into weapons of mass destruction, precisely because they require no human supervision and can therefore be deployed in vast numbers. (A related point, concerning the tactical agility of such weapons platforms, was made in Spectrum last month in an article by Natasha Bajema.) Furthermore, like small arms, autonomous weaponized drones will proliferate easily on the international arms market. As the “Slaughterbots" video's epilogue explained, all the component technologies were already available, and we expected militaries to start deploying such weapons very soon. That prediction was essentially correct. The past few years have seen a series of media reports about military testing of ever-larger drone swarms and battlefield use of weapons with increasingly autonomous functions. In 2019, then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, at a meeting of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, remarked, “As we speak, the Chinese government is already exporting some of its most advanced military aerial drones to the Middle East.