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2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – War Escalation Advantage

Failure to ban lethal autonomous weapons locks us into a cycle of ever-increasing conflict. Every new interaction could lead to a dramatic escalation

Matthew Anzarouth (Harvard Political Review) “Robots that Kill: The Case for Banning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems” December 02, 2021 https://harvardpolitics.com/robots-that-kill-the-case-for-banning-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems/

Preventing the Next Arms Race. Despite these grave concerns, countries are pushing ahead in the research and development of LAWS. With large military powers leading the race, there are two potential outcomes if this trend goes uninterrupted. One is that LAWS become tools with which powerful militaries destabilize other regions, starting a new chapter of the ‘forever wars’ without boots on the ground. The second potential outcome is that LAWS become front and centre in conflict between the large military powers leading the race. They may drag us into a new war between superpowers without the mutually assured destruction that prevents nuclear warfare since LAWS can engage in a series of smaller, yet still extremely impactful, attacks that will not be deterred by the threat of retaliation. The movement against LAWS is small, but it is growing. More and more countries have expressed concern about the destabilizing effects of these weapons and stressed the need for a collective agreement to rule them out, much like existing treaties that limit chemical, biological and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. However, military powers like the U.S. and Russia have blocked regulations on LAWS at the Convention on Conventional Weapons and are quietly leading what some are calling the third revolution in warfare. The challenge in regulating or banning LAWS, as with many forms of international cooperation, is overcoming collective action problems. The development of LAWS seems like a textbook example of a “security dilemma,” wherein one country perceives heightened security measures by another as a threat and decides to adopt similar measures in response. Together, these factors increase the risk of escalation to an outcome neither party desires. Our best hope in confronting this dilemma is to foster discussions in international negotiations that expose to military superpowers the great risks that LAWS present. While many countries may fear falling behind if they make the first move to disarm and de-escalate, it is possible that when the stakes are sufficiently high and it is clear that nobody, including dominant powers, is immune to the dangers of LAWS, we may see sufficient international will to address them. While LAWS still appear to be in their infancy, we are running out of time to prevent their uncontrolled proliferation. Once one country uses these weapons to significantly tilt the playing field in its favor, others may have no choice but to follow suit. It is therefore imperative that we switch off the robots before they take over the battlefield and the horrors of science fiction become reality.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – Democracy Advantage

The best analysis proves democratic peace theory

Dan Reiter, 2017, Professor at the Department of Political Science at Emory University. "Is Democracy a Cause of Peace?" Oxford Research Encyclopedia. Accessed 2-19-2020 [https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-287]/mnw

This is not to take a maximalist position that quasi-experiments add nothing, or that adding variables is never advised. It does suggest, however, considering other means of assessing causation, in addition to the conventional approach of seeing if adding plausible exogenous variables renders the democracy-peace correlation to be statistically insignificant. Scholars have explored other means of assessing causation in the democratic peace, and have amassed three other types of evidence that support the conclusion that democracy causes peace: evidence demonstrating support for other empirical patterns suggested by democratic peace theory; evidence produced using experimental methods; and evidence produced using case studies. The first type of evidence explores for the existence of other empirical patterns predicted by democratic peace theory. If a theory predicts the existence of a variety of empirical patterns and these patterns are demonstrated through tests, we can be more confident in the validity of the theory, and in turn that observed correlations are causal and not just spurious. And, indeed, there is a wide array of quantitative empirical studies that provide support for various assumptions or implications of democratic peace theory, especially for institutionalist accounts of the democratic peace. Perhaps the central institutionalist explanation of the democratic peace proposes that elected leaders are motivated to avoid fighting wars, because the costs of wars will incite popular discontent in turn threatening their hold on power. Studies have demonstrated a number of empirical patterns consistent with this view. Democracies fight shorter wars (Reiter & Stam, 2002, ch. 7). Democracies suffer fewer casualties when they fight wars (Valentino et al., 2010), and when they fight, popular support for the leadership declines as casualties escalate (Mueller, 1973). The benefits of victorious wars may sometimes push democratic publics to accept the costs of war when they are confident of victory, and accordingly democracies almost never start wars they go on to lose (Reiter & Stam, 2002). During war, public support erodes as the perceived likelihood of victory declines (Gelpi et al., 2009). As the institutional explanation of the democratic peace would predict, variations of institutional and leadership form within democracies also affects conflict behavior, as in general more constrained states are less conflict prone (Reiter & Tillman, 2002). Consistent with the audience costs explanation, democracies can more effectively signal their resolve than at least some kinds of autocratic states (Schultz, 2001; Weeks, 2014). There are also some studies supporting elements of the normative explanation. For example, some studies have found that democracies are especially likely to use mediation or binding arbitration to resolve interstate disputes (Dixon, 1993; Raymond, 1994, 1996). In total, though there are certainly scholarly debates about some of these observed patterns,6 this collection of studies improves our confidence that democracy is causing peace in the manners described by democratic peace theory. The second type of evidence uses experimental methods. Some have proposed that experimental methods enjoy critical advantages over the analysis of observational data in assessing causation. Experimental methods are able largely to skirt some of the biggest causal inference problems associated with quasi-experimental methods, such as biased samples and nonrandom assignments of treatment. That said, the limitation of experimental methods is that, especially in international relations, they can only be used to test some arguments, or some components of arguments. For example, regarding the democratic peace an experimenter cannot take a set of states and then randomly assign some to be democratic and others to be non-democratic. That said, scholars have thus far been able to conduct survey and laboratory experiments that have tested some elements of the democratic peace. A number of surveys have found support for one of the core assertions of dyadic democratic peace theory: that citizens of democracies are significantly less likely to support the use of force against democracies as compared to using force against non-democracies (Geva et al., 1993; Johns & Davies 2012; Lacina & Lee, 2013; Mintz & Nehemia, 1993; Rousseau, 2005, pp. 219–232; Tomz & Weeks, 2013) Other experiments have tested elements of the audience costs variant of the democratic peace, showing that the public does inflict audience costs on leaders who back down in a crisis (Horowitz & Levendusky, 2012; Tomz, 2007; Trager & Vavreck, 2011). A third empirical means of demonstrating causation is to engage in process tracing through case studies. Scholars have presented several individual case studies of the democratic peace in events such as 19th-century American diplomatic crises, the 1898 Fashoda Crisis, the onset of World War II, the Spanish-American War, and many others (see Elman, 1997; Owen, 1997; Ray, 1995; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Rousseau, 2005; Schultz, 2001; for case studies presenting evidence against the democratic peace, see Layne, 1994). Some of these case studies demonstrate specific parts of the causal logic of the democratic peace, such as the ability of democracies to signal more effectively through invoking greater audience costs (Schultz, 2001), or the inability of elected leaders to manipulate public opinion or secretly drag their nations into wars the public would otherwise avoid (Reiter, 2012a). Perhaps the most striking case study of democratic peace dynamics is the pacification of Western Europe after World War II, democracy helping to dissolve immediately and completely one of the most violent interstate conflicts in modern history, the France-Germany rivalry (Russett & Oneal, 2001).

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – Democracy Advantage

Continued democratic decline causes great power conflict

Larry Diamond, 2019, writing democracy good cards since ’88, also has a PhD in Sociology from Stanford, and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. “Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency” Accessed 2-19-2020. [https://www.amazon.com/Ill-Winds-Democracy-Ambition-Complacency-ebook/dp/B07HLR7R7F]/mnw

In such a near future, my fellow experts would no longer talk of “democratic erosion.” We would be spiraling downward into a time of democratic despair, recalling Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s grim observation from the 1970s that liberal democracy “is where the world was, not where it is going.” 5 The world pulled out of that downward spiral—but it took new, more purposeful American leadership. The planet was not so lucky in the 1930s, when the global implosion of democracy led to a catastrophic world war, between a rising axis of emboldened dictatorships and a shaken and economically depressed collection of self-doubting democracies. These are the stakes. Expanding democracy—with its liberal norms and constitutional commitments—is a crucial foundation for world peace and security. Knock that away, and our most basic hopes and assumptions will be imperiled. The problem is not just that the ground is slipping. It is that we are perched on a global precipice. That ledge has been gradually giving way for a decade. If the erosion continues, we may well reach a tipping point where democracy goes bankrupt suddenly—plunging the world into depths of oppression and aggression that we have not seen since the end of World War II. As a political scientist, I know that our theories and tools are not nearly good enough to tell us just how close we are getting to that point—until it happens.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – Democracy Advantage

LAWS are a unique threat to human rights and democracy.

Kyle Matthews (Executive Director of the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights at Concordia University. Alexandrine Royer is a Youth Fellow at the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies.) “Artificial intelligence has been weaponized in China. That should be a wake-up call for the world” May 21, 2019 https://www.cbc.ca/news/opinion/ai-china-1.5140612

Beyond its use by repressive regimes, AI can directly interfere with human rights in democratic and open societies. The infinite collection of personal data by AI systems for micro-ad targeting limits the rights of privacy. AI-enabled online content monitoring impedes freedom of expression and opinion, as access to and the sharing of information by users is controlled in opaque and inscrutable ways. Vast AI-powered disinformation campaigns — from troll bots to deepfakes (altered video clips) — threaten societies' access to accurate information, can disrupt elections and erode social cohesion. An equally frightening scenario is the use of AI in conflict situations. Human Rights Watch has warned that AI could be used in the future to target certain populations in war zones through deploying lethal autonomous weapon systems, commonly known as killer robots.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – Terrorism Advantage

Terrorism causes nuclear war and turns all impacts

Arguello and Buis 2018. Irma Arguello and Emiliano J. Buis, 2018, Arguello is founder and chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation, and head of the secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. She holds a degree in physics, a Master’s in business administration, and completed graduate studies in defense and security. Arguello previously worked on nuclear projects for the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission. She is a member of the Steering Committee of the Fissile Materials Working Group, and a Chatham House Associate Fellow. Since 2010, she has participated in all the official non-governmental events at the Nuclear Security Summits. Buis is a lawyer specializing in international law. He holds a PhD from the University of Buenos Aires (UBA), a Master’s in Human and Social Sciences from the University of Paris/Panthéon-Sorbonne, and a postgraduate diploma in national defense from the National Defense School. Currently he is a professor in international law at UBA, and co-director of the UNICEN Center for Human Rights in Azul. He is also a researcher and professor at the NPSGlobal Foundation. “The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1436812?scroll=top&needAccess=true]/mnw

Though hard to accept, the detonation of a nuclear device – by states or non-state actors – is today a plausible scenario. And while much of the world’s focus has been on the current nuclear weapons arsenals possessed by states – about 14,550 warheads, all of which carry the risk of intentional or unintentional use – the threat of nuclear terrorism is here and increasing. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and other terrorist groups have expressed their desire to acquire fissile material to build and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb. None of them could fulfill that goal – so far. But that does not mean that they will not succeed in the future. Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the postCold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media. Prevention, preparedness, response Given the severity of the impacts, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee its full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling for proliferation purposes. Nor is it realistic to conceive of full compensation to others in the international community, if a catastrophic event happens because of any country’s acts or omissions. Therefore, we consider that prevention is the only acceptable way forward to preserve global stability. Consequently, it is essential for countries to make every effort to prevent nuclear terrorists from fulfilling their goals. It is true that the “primitivism” of currently active terrorist organizations gives a certain space to do what is necessary to enhance the current nuclear security effort concerning prevention and response. However, the perception of the “low likeliness” of a nuclear terrorist attack neutralizes the required sense of urgency in decision-making. Being in fact a “high-risk” scenario, it is imperative that governments consider this reality when setting priorities and making decisions about nuclear security.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – Terrorism Advantage

And a ban is key to set international norms. Even if terror groups can access the weapons, they won’t use them. Its try or die for the affirmative

Jacob Ware (master’s degree in security studies from Georgetown University and an MA (Hons) in international relations and modern history from the University of St Andrews) “TERRORIST GROUPS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND KILLER DRONES” September 24, 2019 https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/terrorist-groups-artificial-intelligence-and-killer-drones/

Secondly, the international community could look to ban AI use in the military through an international treaty sanctioned by the United Nations. This has been the strategy pursued by activist groups such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, while leading artificial intelligence researchers and scientific commentators have published open letters warning of the risk of weaponized AI. That said, great powers are not likely to refrain from AI weapons development, and a ban might outlaw positive uses of militarized AI. The international community could also look to stigmatize, or delegitimize, weaponized AI and lethal autonomous weapons sufficiently to deter terrorist use. Although modern terrorist groups have proven extremely willing to improvise and innovate, and effective at doing so, there is an extensive list of weapons — chemical weapons, biological weapons, cluster munitions, barrel bombs, and more — accessible to terrorist organizations, but rarely used. This is partly down to the international stigma associated with those munitions — if a norm is strong enough, terrorists might avoid using a weapon. However, norms take a long time to develop, and are fragile and untrustworthy solutions. Evidently, good counter-terrorism options are limited. The U.S. government and its intelligence agencies should continue to treat AI and lethal autonomous weapons as priorities, and identify new possible counter-terrorism measures. Fortunately, some progress has been made: Nicholas Rasmussen, former director of the National Counterterrorism Center, admitted at a Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee hearing in September 2017 that “there is a community of experts that has emerged inside the federal government that is focused on this pretty much full time. Two years ago this was not a concern … We are trying to up our game.” Nonstate actors are already deploying drones to attack their enemies. Lethal autonomous weapon systems are likely to proliferate to terrorist groups, with potentially devastating consequences. The United States and its allies should urgently address the rising threat by preparing stronger defenses against possible drone and swarm attacks, engaging with the defense industry and AI experts warning of the threat, and supporting realistic international efforts to ban or stigmatize military applications of artificial intelligence. Although the likelihood of such an event is low, a killer robot attack could cause massive casualties, strike a devastating blow to the U.S. homeland, and cause widespread panic. The threat is imminent, and the time has come to act.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – Terrorism Advantage

Fourth, ending the strategy of needless intervention and the war on terror

Matthew Anzarouth (Harvard Political Review) “Robots that Kill: The Case for Banning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems” December 02, 2021 https://harvardpolitics.com/robots-that-kill-the-case-for-banning-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems/

The Danger in Killer Robots. The use of LAWS would lower the threshold for states going to war, increasing the likelihood of conflict. Many philosophers, political scientists and governments have expressed the concern that militaries will resort to conflict more often if they do not need to rely on soldiers and can use LAWS instead. Domestic populations will be less wary of conflict if it no longer means seeing fellow citizens risk their lives on the battlefield. The threshold-lowering effect of LAWS is particularly relevant in the context of a current bipartisan trend in the U.S. against intervention. It is plausible that without LAWS, the era of U.S. unilateral interventions and the war on terror would come to an end. Recognizing the failures of wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, politicians on both sides of the political spectrum are pushing not to send troops abroad to risk their lives. But the option of using LAWS and sidestepping the costs to a country’s soldiers threatens to reverse this anti-war trend and provide militaries with a politically palatable way of fighting wars. There could be catastrophic consequences if we liberate militaries from political constraints preventing them from going to war. The first wave of the proliferation of LAWS may simply look like the natural progression of our current drone capabilities. For instance, Russia may have already used autonomous drones to attack targets in Syria, but these weapons are only different from current semi-autonomous drones in the greater degree of risk assumed by eliminating human intervention. In other instances, however, the use of LAWS will present substantial advantages that make them different in kind from drones as we know them. Consider, for example, Azerbaijan’s use of Israeli-supplied IAI Harop drones in the war with Armenia in 2020. The loitering munition system used by the military allowed tiny and hardly-detectable autonomous drones to circle over the enemy’s defense line, pick out targets and attack them, an ability that proved decisive in Azerbaijan’s victory in the war. To understand what a world with LAWS will look like in the long term requires a bit of imagination. Perhaps a post-withdrawal Afghanistan will involve weapons like the Harop drones constantly roaming the skies and diving into the ground to take out targets. Or maybe we will see the chilling predictions of science fiction come true. In their book AI 2041, writers Chen Qiufan and Kai-Fu Lee express their fear that LAWS will fall into the hands of armed groups and terrorists. They describe a “Unabomber-like scenario in which a terrorist carries out the targeted killing of business elites and high-profile individuals,” using autonomous drones that rely on facial recognition to identify their targets. Leading expert in artificial intelligence Toby Walsh warns of these weapons falling into the hands of dictators and being used as tools of ethnic cleansing. Even if we assume that LAWS are operated primarily by legitimate militaries, additional complications arise when we consider what happens in the case of unjust killings. Philosopher Robert Sparrow argues that the autonomy of LAWS makes it impossible to hold anyone accountable for illegitimate killings they commit. If the robot acted autonomously, tracing accountability back to another agent seems morally objectionable and legally infeasible. But it would also be unjust to not punish illegitimate killings. This dilemma presents a so-called ‘responsibility gap’, where no one can be held responsible for illegitimate killings, and wrongful acts of war go undeterred.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – Terrorism Advantage

Lethal autonomous weapons cause massive radicalization—even a small increase in recruitment would trigger the impact

John Feffer, 5-25-2016, "The Coming Drone Blowback", Institute for Policy Studies, <John Feffer is director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies.>, ke

The U.S. drone campaign isn’t exactly a covert operation, though the CIA has generally refused to acknowledge its role in the attacks (the Pentagon is more open about its use of drones for strikes on more conventional military targets). But critics of drone attacks — myself included — have long argued that all the civilian casualties caused by drone attacks will produce blowback. Drone strikes and the anger they generate effectively serve to recruit people into the Taliban and other extremist organizations. Even those involved in the program have come to the same conclusion. Consider, for instance, this impassioned plea to President Obama from four Air Force veterans who piloted drones. “The innocent civilians we were killing only fueled the feelings of hatred that ignited terrorism and groups like ISIS, while also serving as a fundamental recruitment tool,” they argued in a letter last November. “The administration and its predecessors have built a drone program that is one of the most devastating driving forces for terrorism and destabilization around the world.” But now along comes Aqil Shah, a professor at the University of Oklahoma, who has just published a report attempting to debunk this claim. According to a set of 147 interviews he conducted in North Waziristan, an area in Pakistan’s FATA that has sustained the largest number of drone strikes, 79 percent of respondents support the campaign. A majority believes that the strikes rarely kill non-combatants. Further, according to experts cited by Shah, “most locals prefer drones to the Pakistan military’s ground and aerial offensives that cause more extensive damage to civilian life and property.” I don’t doubt these findings. Most people in Pakistan have no sympathy for the Taliban. According to a recent Pew poll, 72 percent of respondents in Pakistan had an unfavorable view of the Taliban (with earlier polls suggesting that this lack of support extends to FATA). Drones are no doubt better than Pakistan’s military operations, just as they represent an improvement over the scorched-earth policies used by the United States in the Vietnam War to destroy large sections of Southeast Asia. Shah’s research was not exactly scientific. He admits that his interviews were “not statistically representative” — and then goes on to draw conclusions about the entire population of FATA. It’s also true that several other polls suggest that Pakistanis throughout the country oppose the drone program and believe that it encourages militancy, but these polls have generally not included FATA. But Shah’s most controversial conclusion is that the high level of support for the drone program means that no blowback has taken place. Even if his interviews were statistically representative, I don’t understand this analytical leap. Blowback doesn’t require universal opposition. Only a small percentage of the mujahedeen went on to fight with Osama bin Laden. Only a certain number of Contras were involved in operations that pumped drugs into the United States. It’s not as if the entire population of FATA is going to join the Taliban. If only a couple thousand young men join the Taliban out of anger over drone strikes, that counts as blowback. There are over 4 million people living in the FATA. A fighting force of 4,000 people is 1 percent of the population — and that easily falls within the 21 percent of respondents who disapproved of drones in Shah’s findings. And what of the suicide bomber who embarks on his path of extremism because a drone strike took out his brother? The Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, was motivated at least in part by drone strikes in Pakistan, even though they hadn’t killed anyone in his family. Ultimately, blowback can be just one angry and determined person who makes his mark on history without first showing up in a survey.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – Terrorism Advantage

Second, the proliferation of autonomous weapons system development makes leaks inevitable. The more people that have the technology, the more likely it is for terrorists to get it.

Jacob Ware (master’s degree in security studies from Georgetown University and an MA (Hons) in international relations and modern history from the University of St Andrews) “TERRORIST GROUPS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND KILLER DRONES” September 24, 2019 https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/terrorist-groups-artificial-intelligence-and-killer-drones/

Firstly, modern terrorist organizations have advanced scientific and engineering departments, and actively seek out skilled scientists for recruitment. ISIL, for example, has appealed for scientists to trek to the caliphate to work on drone and AI technology. The individual technologies behind swarming killer robots — including unmanned aerial vehicles, facial recognition, and machine-to-machine communication — already exist, and have been adapted by terrorist organizations for other means. According to a French defense industry executive, “the technological challenge of scaling it up to swarms and things like that doesn’t need any inventive step. It’s just a question of time and scale and I think that’s an absolute certainty that we should worry about.” Secondly, autonomous weapons technology will likely proliferate through sales. Because AI research is led by private firms, advanced AI technology will be publicly sold on the open market. As Michael Horowitz argues, “militant groups and less-capable states may already have what they need to produce some simple autonomous weapon systems, and that capability is likely to spread even further for purely commercial reasons.” The current framework controlling high-tech weapons proliferation — the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology Control Regime — is voluntary, and is constantly tested by great-power weapons development. Given interest in developing AI-guided weapons, this seems unlikely to change. Ultimately, as AI expert Toby Walsh notes, the world’s weapons companies can, and will, “make a killing (pun very much intended) selling autonomous weapons to all sides of every conflict.” Finally, autonomous weapons technology is likely to leak. Innovation in the AI field is led by the private sector, not the military, because of the myriad commercial applications of the technology. This will make it more difficult to contain the technology, and prevent it from proliferating to nonstate actors. Perhaps the starkest warning has been issued by Paul Scharre, a former U.S. defense official: “We are entering a world where the technology to build lethal autonomous weapons is available not only to nation-states but to individuals as well. That world is not in the distant future. It’s already here.”

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – Terrorism Advantage

Lethal Autonomous Weapons systems are susceptible to hacks by terror groups and other nefarious actors. Only banning them solves.

Coley Felt (International Policy Institute Cybersecurity Fellow) “Autonomous Weaponry: Are Killer Robots in Our Future?” February 14, 2020 https://jsis.washington.edu/news/autonomous-weaponry-are-killer-robots-in-our-future/

In respect to the unclear line of accountability as an argument against development, the concept of the war algorithm is a key component to discussing autonomous weapons systems. According to the Harvard Law School, a war algorithm is “any algorithm that is expressed in computer code, that is effectuated through a constructed system, and that is capable of operating in relation to armed conflict” (Lewis, Blum, & Modirzadeh, 2016). When linking the war algorithm to accountability, the line stretches from states and their armed forces, to developers, operators, lawyers, industry bodies and more. As these algorithms continue to advance, they challenge some of the fundamental legal concepts that underpin the regulation of armed conflict. Thus, the development of fully autonomous weapons presents the possibility of “replacing human judgement with algorithmically-derived decisions” on the battlefield (Lewis et al., 2016). Furthermore, there is always a risk of vulnerabilities which raises concern about the potential of a hacker takeover (Lewis et al., 2016). Not only would decisions made by these machines be the product of an algorithm, but ensuring the security and reliability of that algorithm presents a new set of issues. The capabilities that these weapons would attain could be especially attractive to malicious actors, whether it be other states or individuals. These unique characteristics rooted in autonomous weapons systems suggest the need for a specific legal category that can oversee both the design and the behavior of the machines.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – Solvency

LAWS are not accurate, undermining any positive benefit that could theoretically exist. We cannot allow this unregulated and dangerous technology.

Zachary Kallenborn (research affiliate with the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, a policy fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, and a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command “Mad Scientist.”) “Applying arms control frameworks to autonomous weapons” October 05, 2021 https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/applying-arms-control-frameworks-to-autonomous-weapons/

In an autonomous weapon, the system decides when to engage by processing environmental stimuli. Landmines, for example, use simple pressure sensors—the sensor sensitivity determines whether the heft of a tank or the hands of a child are enough to trigger the explosion. Conversely, an anti-radar loitering munition homes in on radar signals. The risk of error—and by extension the arms control concern—depend on the type of environmental stimuli, how the stimuli is processed, and the type of decisions made. Emerging autonomous weapons using machine learning process stimuli in more complex ways. Machine learning systems rely on large amounts of data to draw conclusions about what the system observes. But the data dependence also makes them brittle. Color differences, tree branches, or foggy days may confound the ability of the system to correctly identify a target. Although some states may adopt robust verification and testing programs to increase reliability, others may not. As autonomous weapons are deployed in larger numbers, arms control advocates fear a higher likelihood of something going horrifyingly wrong.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – Solvency

Despite current development by nation states, a weapons ban would be effective and guarantee global follow on. The result of the ban is a global ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems

Mary Wareham (advocacy director in the arms division at Human Rights Watch) “Summary: Stopping Killer Robots” August 10, 2020 https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and

Their active engagement in the CCW talks on killer robots demonstrates growing awareness of and concerns about removing human control from the use of force. There is widespread acknowledgment that technological developments are enabling militaries to incorporate autonomy into weapons systems. China, Israel, Russia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States are investing heavily in the development of various autonomous weapons systems, while Australia, Turkey, and other countries are also making investments. Despite this development, the vast majority of countries that have spoken to date regard human decision-making, control, or judgment as critical to the acceptability and legality of weapons systems. There is now widespread agreement about the need to retain some form of human control over the use of force, including over individual attacks. In 2018, Austria, Brazil, and Chile recommended launching negotiations on a legally binding instrument to ensure meaningful human control over the critical functions of weapons systems.[11] Banning fully autonomous weapons means prohibiting weapons systems that lack meaningful human control. Since 2013, 30 countries have called for a ban on such fully autonomous weapons: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Iraq, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, State of Palestine, Uganda, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. China has called for a treaty to ban the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems, but not their development or production, which is unsurprising given that it is also among the nations most advanced in pursuing such weapons. Several groups of states have endorsed statements calling for a ban on killer robots. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which is comprised of approximately 125 member states, has called for a “legally binding international instrument stipulating prohibitions and regulations on lethal autonomous weapons systems” several times since 2018.[13] Benin spoke in April and August 2018 on behalf of a group of African states to recommend launching negotiations on a legally binding instrument on fully autonomous weapons “at the earliest” as weapons systems “that are not under human control should be banned.”[14] All CCW meetings on killer robots in 2014-2019 saw strong interest or convergence on the importance of retaining human control over weapons systems and the use of force. This is reflected in a principle on human-machine interaction that CCW states agreed to in 2019.[15] Human-machine interaction attracted the greatest interest by far during the virtual Berlin Forum on lethal autonomous weapons systems attended by more than 60 countries on April 1-2, 2020. There was widespread recognition at the Rio Seminar on autonomous weapons on February 20, 2020 that human control is where states should focus their collective work. A legally binding instrument is the optimal framework for dealing with the many serious challenges raised by fully autonomous weapons. A new international ban treaty could lay down explicit rules to ensure appropriate constraints on autonomy in weapons systems and resolve differing views on human control over the use of force. Most importantly, a new treaty would show that states are serious about responding appropriately and with urgency to this existential threat to humanity.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › 1AC › 1AC – Inherency

We are at an incredibly dangerous crossroads with the use of artificial intelligence and military weaponry. Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, more commonly referred to as LAWS, are dangerously close to becoming the future of war. This would have devastating consequences that must be stopped.

Trager and Luca (Robert F. Trager is an associate professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and a Centre for the Governance of AI representative to the U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; Laura M. Luca is a graduate student in political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and a former delegate of Romania to the U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.) “Killer Robots Are Here—and We Need to Regulate Them” May 11, 2022 https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/11/killer-robots-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-ukraine-libya-regulation/

Swarms of robots with the ability to kill humans are no longer only the stuff of science fiction. Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) are here. In Ukraine, Moscow has allegedly deployed an artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled Kalashnikov ZALA Aero KUB-BLA loitering munition, while Kyiv has used Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, which have some autonomous capabilities. Although it’s always hard to determine whether a weapon’s autonomous mode is used, these technologies have reportedly been employed in at least one conflict: Last year, a United Nations report suggested Turkey used autonomous firing by its Kargu-2 drones to hunt fleeing soldiers in Libya’s civil war (though the CEO of the Turkish company that produced the drone denies it is capable of this). Unlike traditional drones, these systems have the ability to navigate on their own, and some can select targets. Although a human controller can still decide whether or not to strike, such weapons are acquiring ever more autonomous capabilities. Now that militaries and paramilitaries worldwide have taken note, these technologies are poised to spread widely. The world today stands at the very moment before much more advanced versions of these technologies become ubiquitous. So far, at least Israel, Russia, South Korea, and Turkey have reportedly deployed weapons with autonomous capabilities—though whether this mode was active is disputed—and Australia, Britain, China, and the United States are investing heavily in developing LAWS with an ever-expanding range of sizes and capabilities. Already, some LAWS can loiter in an area to find targets that machine-learning algorithms have trained them to recognize, including enemy radar systems, tanks, ships, and even specific individuals. These weapons can look vastly different: For instance, the Turkish Kargu-2 drone, which was introduced in 2020 and used in Libya’s war, is 2 feet long, weighs around 15 pounds, and can swarm in groups. Autonomous systems can also be much larger, such as unmanned AI-driven fighter jets like the modified L-39 Albatros, and much smaller, such as rudimentary commercial drones repurposed with autonomous software. Once these technologies have spread widely, they will be difficult to control. The world thus urgently needs a new approach to LAWS. So far, the international community has done nothing more than agree that the issue needs to be discussed. But what it really needs to do is take a page from the nuclear playbook and establish a nonproliferation regime for LAWS. Currently, countries at the forefront of LAWS development resist any calls for their ban. The United States has claimed that existing international humanitarian laws are sufficient to govern LAWS; the U.S. Defense Department’s policy is that they must be designed to ensure “appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.” China has remained ambiguous, stating the importance of “full consideration of the applicability of general legal norms” while insisting on a narrow definition of LAWS. Russia, meanwhile, refuses to even consider the issue, using diplomatic procedural tools to stall and reduce the time the United Nations devotes to debating the subject. But most countries have called for a ban on developing and using LAWS—or, at a minimum, regulating them. In 2019, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres said LAWS are “politically unacceptable, morally repugnant, and should be prohibited by international law.” There are many reasons countries, international nongovernmental organizations, scholars, and AI experts worry about LAWS. Although they do not all agree in their predictions of how such weapons could affect society, there’s a growing consensus that their spread could bring substantial and harmful consequences. First, LAWS could facilitate violence on a large scale since they’re not restricted by the number of people available to man them. Second, in combination with facial recognition and other technologies, they can target individuals or groups that fit certain descriptions, which could appeal to violent groups and state militaries committing political assassinations and ethnic cleansing. Third, LAWS may make it easier for those who control them to hide their identities. LAWS thus have the potential to upend political orders and enable tighter authoritarian control. In addition, they can always malfunction, including by mistaking civilians for combatants. So far, the international community has attempted—and failed—to regulate LAWS. In December 2021, after eight years of technical discussions, government and civil society representatives met at the U.N. in Geneva to set an agenda for regulating LAWS for the first time in what was billed as a “historic opportunity.” Most attendees favored legally binding rules that apply equally to all states to govern the development and use of these technologies. Yet, by any standard, the meeting failed. Despite years of preparatory discussions within the framework of the U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)—a forum for restricting the use of weapons considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately—the attendees barely managed to agree on 10 more days of discussion this March and July. This outcome was to be expected given the positions of the major powers and the CCW rules requiring consensus before action is taken. (Disclosure: Both authors have been affiliated with the CCW.) In response, a wide array of actors—from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to some of the states in favor of a LAWS ban, including Argentina and the Philippines—are calling for a process to develop legally binding prohibitions on these weapons outside of the CCW. Alternative approaches to prohibition treaties have had some success in the past, such as when countries agreed to give up land mines through the 1997 Ottawa convention; cluster munitions through the 2008 Oslo Accords; and even nuclear weapons through the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which was the first treaty to completely ban nuclear weapons in line with international humanitarian law and establish pathways for current nuclear weapon states to renounce them. However, while many states signed these treaties, most of the powerful states did not. Unfortunately, even this limited success is likely to be elusive in the case of LAWS. The primary reason is that states are increasingly aware that these non-substitutable technologies may become crucial to their security and are thus unlikely to unilaterally abandon them. If states’ adversaries have them, they will likely believe they need them—and absent the sort of nonproliferation regime that exists for nuclear weapons, their adversaries will, in fact, continue to rapidly develop LAWS without much oversight.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---Heg Defense

No prolif impact

Mueller 19 – John, Senior Research Scientist and Adjunct Professor at Mershon Center for International Security Studies. “Exaggerated Alarm and Destructive Excursions: Antiproliferation Policy and The Case of North Korea” Prepared for presentation at the First World Congress of Security Studies Hosted by the Research Institute for National Security Affairs, Korean National Defense University, , 08-12-2019

The proliferation of nuclear weapons has been far slower than predicted, and this seems to be because the weapons do not generally convey much advantage to their possessor. Dozens of technologically capable countries have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, but very few have done so. A key reason for this is that the possession of such expensive armaments actually conveys in almost all cases rather little advantage to the possessor. In the main, they are difficult to obtain, militarily useless, a spectacular waste of time, money, and scientific talent, distasteful, and likely to rile the neighbors. Moreover, the weapons have also been exceedingly difficult to obtain for administratively dysfunctional countries.9 Moreover, the consequences of what little proliferation has taken place have been substantially benign. Those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats. For the most part, they have quietly kept the weapons in storage and haven’t even found much benefit in rattling them from time to time. Nor have the weapons proven to be crucial status—or virility—symbols, although Pakistan and Russia do probably garner more attention that they would if they did not have nuclear weapons. But how much more status would Japan have if it possessed nuclear weapons? Would anybody pay a great deal more attention to Britain or France if their arsenals held 5,000 nuclear weapons, or would anybody pay much less if they had none? Did China need nuclear weapons to impress the world with its economic growth? Or with its Olympics? Proliferation alarmists may occasionally grant that countries principally obtain a nuclear arsenal to counter real or perceived threats, but many go on to argue that the newly nuclear country will then use its nuclear weapons to “dominate” the area. That argument was repeatedly trotted out with dramatic urgency before 2003 for the dangers supposedly posed by Saddam Hussein, and it is now being applied to Iran. Exactly how that domination business is to be carried out is never made clear.10 But the notion, apparently, is that should an atomic country rattle the occasional rocket, other countries in the area, suitably intimidated, would supinely bow to its demands. Far more likely, any threatened states will make common cause with each other and with other concerned countries against the threatening neighbor—rather in the way they coalesced into an alliance of convenience to oppose Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---Heg Defense

Alternative explanations for stability outweigh.

Fettweis 20 – Christopher J, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. “Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", CATO Institute, , 06-03-2020

Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to enforce peace. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war) seem poised to disappear any time soon.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.

*only read if they read the SCS scenario*

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---Heg Defense

No leadership impact – empirics.

Fettweis 20 – Christopher J, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. “Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", CATO Institute, , 06-03-2020

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability. Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend. Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐​called egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is. The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---LAWS Don’t get bought

DOD policy means they can’t even buy LAWS

Gregory C. Allen, 22, (Gregory C. Allen, Director, AI Governance Project and Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program, 6-6-2022, Center for Strategic and International Studies, DOD Is Updating Its Decade-Old Autonomous Weapons Policy, but Confusion Remains Widespread, https://www.csis.org/analysis/dod-updating-its-decade-old-autonomous-weapons-policy-confusion-remains-widespread, 7-3-2022) SCade

The DOD recently announced that it is planning to update DODD 3000.09 this year. Michael Horowitz, director of the DOD’s Emerging Capabilities Policy Office and the Pentagon official with responsibility for shepherding the policy, praised DODD 3000.09 in a recent interview, stating that “the fundamental approach in the directive remains sound, that the directive laid out a very responsible approach to the incorporation of autonomy and weapons systems.” While not making any firm predictions, Horowitz suggested that major revisions to DODD 3000.09 were unlikely. In general, this is good news. The DOD’s existing policy recognizes that some categories of autonomous weapons, such as cyber weapons and missile defense systems, are already in widespread and broadly accepted use by dozens of militaries worldwide. It also allows for the possibility that future technological progress and changes in the global security landscape, such as Russia’s potential deployment of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled lethal autonomous weapons in Ukraine, might make new types of autonomous weapons desirable. This requires proposals for such weapons to clear a high procedural and technical bar. In addition to demonstrating compliance with U.S. obligations under domestic and international law, DOD system safety standards, and DOD AI-ethics principles, proposed autonomous weapons systems must clear an additional senior review process where the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under secretary of defense for policy; and the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics certify that the proposed system meets 11 additional requirements, each of which require presenting considerable evidence. Getting the signatures of the U.S. military’s highest-ranking officer and two under secretaries in a formal senior review is no easy task. Perhaps the strongest proof of the rigor required to surpass such a hurdle is the fact that no DOD organization has even tried.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---DIB Link Defense

Distinction between military and civilian innovation – the plan doesn’t hurt the bulwark of the DIB

Vincent Boulanin and Maaike Verbruggen 2017 “MAPPING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS” November 2017 Stockholm International peace research institute https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/siprireport_mapping_the_development_of_autonomy_in_weapon_systems_1117_1.pdf

The innovation ecosystem that is driving the advance of autonomy in weapon systems is diffuse, chiefly because the technologies, academic disciplines and industry sectors involved in the development of autonomous capabilities may vary greatly depending on the type of application and systems at issue. Nevertheless, three general observations can be made. First, much of the fundamental research in the fields of AI and robotics that could feed the advance of autonomy in weapon systems is dual-use. The divergence between civilian and military innovation generally emerges towards the development end of the R&D cycle because civilian and military products often need to meet different performance criteria. Hence, should CCW delegates eventually engage in a formal discussion on the monitoring or regulation of R&D efforts that could lead to the development and production of LAWS, they should focus on the development end of the R&D cycle, as this is where the actual capabilities of LAWS will be definitively created. Attempting to monitor and control R&D at the more basic research level would be challenging from a practical perspective and possibly problematic as it could threaten civilian innovation. Second, the barriers to entry to the development of robotic systems are very low. Nearly all hardware components that might serve the development of autonomous robots are commercially available. It is even possible to acquire off-the-shelf low-cost robotic systems that feature advanced autonomous capabilities. These may be adopted, modified and weaponized by states but also, and more worryingly, by non-state actors seeking, for instance, to conduct terrorist operations. This scenario has not yet received great attention within the CCW discussions on LAWS, despite the fact it represents an imminent humanitarian risk. While it falls outside the traditional scope of the CCW, it would be prudent for the GGE to allocate some time to this issue in 2018. It could start a discussion on the options that are offered outside the CCW to control or limit the diffusion and malevolent use of key technologies. This could include discussing the possibilities offered by export control mechanisms and self-control by the industry. Third, future discussions on the development and control of autonomy in weapon systems could usefully benefit from further exchanges of experience with the civilian sector, especially companies developing safety-critical applications of autonomy (e.g. aerospace companies, carmakers and medical robot companies), considering that a number of issues that are central to discussion on LAWS have already been, or are currently being, actively addressed within the civilian sphere. These issues include the following. 1. How to define and measure autonomy? This question has been the concern of standardization and regulatory bodies for a long time. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission have had multiple projects aimed at generating an official definition of robot-associated terms, including ‘autonomy’ (ISO 8373:2012). In addition, the US National Highway Traffic Safety Association has adopted the Society of Automotive Engineers’ levels of autonomy for self-driving systems, ranging from complete driver control to full autonomy.110 2. How to operationalize meaningful human control? Civilian industry sectors that produce safety-critical systems (e.g. aerospace, automotive and medical robotics) are facing the same human control dilemmas as the defence sector. They too are dedicating their efforts to finding a model of the human–machine command-and-control relationship that will maximize safety. 3. How to test the safety and predictability of autonomous technologies? The commercial aerospace sector has procedures to test and verify advanced automated systems. Inviting experts from this community to talk about existing procedures would help to identify possible best practices for testing and evaluating weapons with advanced autonomous capabilities in the context of Article 36 reviews.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---DIB Link Defense

Precautionary policies good

Maciej Kuziemski 05-01-2018 [Published in Project Syndicate; Data program adviser at the Ditchley Foundation], “A Precautionary Approach to Artificial Intelligence,” Cut By: m.jam

Even without reliable data, decision-makers must move forward with AI governance. And, as the world waits for scientific certainty (which may never arrive), there is an existing solution that can guide us into the unknown: the “precautionary principle.” Adopted globally in 1992 as part of the United Nations on sustainable development, and later incorporated into one of the , the precautionary principle states that a lack of certainty cannot be a basis for failing to protect human health or the environment. That seems like a suitable way to address the uncertainty of a tech-driven future. The precautionary principle is not without its detractors. But while its merits have been debated for years, we need to accept that the lack of evidence of harm is not the same thing as evidence of lack of harm. This simple idea has been applied to – from public health to infant mortality. There are three good reasons why AI should be next. For starters, applying the precautionary principle to the context of AI would help rebalance the global policy discussion, giving weaker voices more influence in debates that are currently monopolized by corporate interests. Decision-making would also be more inclusive and deliberative, and produce solutions that more closely reflected societal needs. The , and at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government are already spearheading work in this participatory spirit. Additional professional organizations and research centers should follow suit. Moreover, by applying the precautionary principle, governance bodies could shift the burden of responsibility to the creators of algorithms. A requirement of explainability of algorithmic decision-making can change incentives, prevent blackboxing, help make business decisions more transparent, and allow the public sector to catch up with the private sector in technology development. And, by forcing tech companies and governments to identify and consider multiple options, the precautionary principle would bring to the fore neglected issues, like environmental impact. Rarely is science in a position to help manage an innovation long before the consequences of that innovation are available for study. But, in the context of algorithms, machine learning, and AI, humanity cannot afford to wait. The beauty of the precautionary principle lies not only in its grounding in international public law, but also in its track record as a framework for managing innovation in myriad scientific contexts. We should embrace it before the benefits of progress are unevenly distributed, or, worse, irreversible harm has been done.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---DIB UQ

Americans Believe the U.S. is Falling Behind in Innovation

Gholz & Sapolsky 21 (Eugene Gholz & Harvey M. Sapolsky (2021) The defense innovation machine: Why the U.S. will remain on the cutting edge, Journal of Strategic Studies, 44:6, 854-872, DOI: . shARK)

The United States is the most powerful nation in the world. It has the most powerful military, the biggest economy, and the most dominating culture. It is the world’s leader in science, engineering, and medicine. Its universities are the most admired. Its corporations are the richest and most successful. People eat Big Macs, drink Coca Cola, fly on Boeings, use their iPhones, and watch Hollywood movies around the globe. Everyone knows the name of the American president, what the CIA does, and who you should call if there is trouble on your border. The United States is also a very secure country. It is surrounded by two big oceans and two unthreatening neighbors. Its surveillance systems scour the globe looking for dangers. It has nuclear weapons, a Navy and Coast Guard on constant patrol, an Air Force on high alert and with a global reach, and an Army and Marine Corps second to none in capability and recent combat experience. But many Americans believe that this is all slipping away, that America is becoming vulnerable and losing its power and dominance. They cite internal and external sources of the vulnerability. American power, they claim, is being frittered away by a dysfunctional Congress, an incompetent president, and a bloated, slow moving, gold-plating acquisition bureaucracy that cannot keep up. Indecision and gridlock have seemingly become the American Way of government. Meanwhile, some fear that agile rival nations, specifically including China, can tap fast moving commercial technology to build modern weapons that will defeat the United States. Here we examine these concerns that the American military advantage in the Post-Cold War era has dissipated in large part because the Defense Department lags behind in developing advanced technologies. Our judgment is that the American defense research and development system, as honed during the Cold War and expanded since, is fully capable of handling any military challenge. It is a gigantic technology-generating, innovation-producing, war-fighting machine. U.S. ‘hard’ innovation capabilities – ‘input and infrastructure factors’ like R&D facilities, human capital, access to foreign technology, and availability of funding – far outstrip those of its potential rivals, even though those factors are the ones often thought of as easier for catch-up countries to obtain. Despite warnings that the United States no longer spends enough on R&D and that Chinese R&D spending is surging, the reality is that the United States dramatically leads in military innovation investment. In functional terms, the United States dominates all other countries, including China, in ‘input factors,’ starting with resource allocations to defense research and development. More important, we believe that the American defense technology system is pushed toward innovation by specific contextual factors, the ‘soft’ categories of attributes and capabilities, that cannot readily transfer to likely rivals.