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2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---DIB UQ

The DIB got a failing grade in industry health -- The industry is down bad

Stephen Losey 02-11-2022 [Air warfare reporter at Defense News; previously reported for Military.com, covering the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare; Before that, covered U.S. Air Force leadership, personnel and operations for Air Force Times], “COVID drags defense industrial base down to failing grade,” https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2022/02/11/covid-drags-defense-industrial-base-down-to-failing-grade/

WASHINGTON — The National Defense Industrial Association gave the defense industrial base an overall failing grade for the first time ever, as the continues to upend the sector. In its third annual Vital Signs report released Feb. 2, NDIA gave the industrial base a health and readiness score of 69 out of 100, which it deems an unsatisfactory and failing grade and “cause for real concern.” NDIA, which worked on the report with decision science company Govini, scores categories on a 100-point scale, and scores below 70 are considered failing. The association based most of its study on data sources from 2020, the first year of the pandemic and before vaccinations began, so some of these results are lagging indicators. NDIA said the two of the eight key categories it uses to measure the health of the defense industry — the and companies’ production capacity and ability to surge if necessary — have deteriorated significantly, “almost certainly” due to the pandemic’s effects. Three other categories — industrial security, innovation and production inputs — also received failing scores in 2021, though production inputs and industrial security saw slight improvements over the previous two years. And with the pandemic continuing, the association added, it is crucial for the nation to figure out how to sort out these problems. However, NDIA said it opted not to offer policy recommendations, support specific legislative or regulatory changes, or call for investments in the report.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---DIB UQ

The Ukraine confilct has exposed weakness in the DIB and Bidens budget doesn’t leave room for growth in the industry

Clark, Maiya. “The War in Ukraine Continues; Can the U.S. Defense-Industrial Base Keep Up?” The Heritage Foundation, 2019, www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-war-ukraine-continues-can-the-us-defense-industrial-base-keep.

To some degree, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has served as a stress test for the West’s defense industrial base. From that has come a growing recognition that, for too long, America has underestimated the amount of munitions and platforms required in modern warfare. Due to the complexity and time required to manufacture today’s precision weapons, we must start thinking now, before a war breaks out, about whether America has enough weaponry to sustain a conflict. Last month President Biden released a defense budget request that does not even keep up with the rate of inflation, much less provide for any growth to meet our own needs. It’s a recipe for weakness at a time when the free world desperately needs strength.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 2NC › A2: DOD not buying LAWS

The DOD is rewriting internal policy to allow for broader acquisition of LAWS

Gregory C. Allen, 22, (Gregory C. Allen, Gregory C. Allen is the director of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance Project and a senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., 6-6-2022, CISA, DOD Is Updating Its Decade-Old Autonomous Weapons Policy, but Confusion Remains Widespread, https://www.csis.org/analysis/dod-updating-its-decade-old-autonomous-weapons-policy-confusion-remains-widespread, 7-3-2022) SCade

The DOD recently announced that it is planning to update DODD 3000.09 this year. Michael Horowitz, director of the DOD’s Emerging Capabilities Policy Office and the Pentagon official with responsibility for shepherding the policy, praised DODD 3000.09 in a recent interview, stating that “the fundamental approach in the directive remains sound, that the directive laid out a very responsible approach to the incorporation of autonomy and weapons systems.” While not making any firm predictions, Horowitz suggested that major revisions to DODD 3000.09 were unlikely. In general, this is good news. The DOD’s existing policy recognizes that some categories of autonomous weapons, such as cyber weapons and missile defense systems, are already in widespread and broadly accepted use by dozens of militaries worldwide. It also allows for the possibility that future technological progress and changes in the global security landscape, such as Russia’s potential deployment of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled lethal autonomous weapons in Ukraine, might make new types of autonomous weapons desirable. This requires proposals for such weapons to clear a high procedural and technical bar. In addition to demonstrating compliance with U.S. obligations under domestic and international law, DOD system safety standards, and DOD AI-ethics principles, proposed autonomous weapons systems must clear an additional senior review process where the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under secretary of defense for policy; and the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics certify that the proposed system meets 11 additional requirements, each of which require presenting considerable evidence.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 2NC › A2: LAWS not k2 econ

The LAW market is a massive global R&D program that is at the frontier of the market and research

Himanshu Joshi , Sonia Mutreja August 2021 “Autonomous Weapons Market by Product (Missiles, Munitions, Guided Rockets, Guided Projectiles, Hypersonic Weapons, and Others), Platform (Land, Airborne, and Naval), and Type (Semi-Autonomous and Autonomous): Global Opportunity Analysis and Industry Forecast, 2021–2030” https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/autonomous-weapons-market-A13132#:~:text=The%20global%20autonomous%20weapons%20market,registering%20a%20CAGR%20of%2010.4%25.

The global autonomous weapons market was valued at $11,565.2 million in 2020, and is projected to reach $30,168.1 million in 2030, registering a CAGR [Compounded annual growth rate] of 10.4%.The rapid spread of COVID-19 had a significant impact on the global autonomous weapons market in 2020, owing to the implementation of strict lockdown measures across the world. COVID-19 pandemic led to several challenges for the autonomous weapons industry such as disruption in the supply chain of essential raw materials, logistics challenges, reduction in defense spending across various countries, and others. On the other hand, the defense systems manufacturers and service providers had to reduce expansion and R&D investments to withstand the decline in revenue and operating performance of the defense industry. The delay in purchase orders and slow production rate were some of the challenges observed in the autonomous weapons market throughout the year, and are expected to continue for a few years. Without the need for human involvement, autonomous weapons choose and engage targets. They usually include armed quadcopters that can hunt for and eliminate persons who fulfil specific pre-defined criteria, however, they do not include remotely piloted drones or cruise missiles where humans are in charge of all targeting decisions. Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology has advanced to the point that deployment of such systems may be accomplished in a few years, and the stakes are quite high. After gunpowder and nuclear weapons, autonomous weapons have been dubbed as the third revolution in warfare. Rise in technological advancements in autonomy of weapons are being observed throughout the world. Autonomy is being added to different parts of existing weapons systems, from target planning to mission execution. Global military spending on autonomous weapons and AI is anticipated to grow significantly over the years. This factor is expected to account for rapid development of the autonomous weapons market during the forecast period. The market segmentation is based on product, platform, type, and region. The product segment is further divided into missiles, munitions, guided rockets, guided projectiles, hypersonic weapon, and others. By platform, the market is segmented into land, airborne, and naval. By type, it is segmented into semi-autonomous and autonomous. Region wise, the market is analyzed across North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, and LAMEA. Key players operating in the global autonomous weapons market include BAE Systems plc, Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd., Kongsberg Gruppen ASA, Lockheed Martin Corporation, MBDA, Northrop Grumman Corporation, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd., Raytheon Technologies Corporation, Rheinmetall AG, and Thales Group. Increase in number of autonomous defense vehicles, drones, and robots Autonomous defense systems including weapons, smart vehicles, armed drones, and robots play a vital role in the defense operations. These are fully autonomous tools that employ telecommunication technology such as 5G network, at the disposal of defense agencies to provide services in real time at dangerous, inconvenient, and impossible areas of operation such as remote surveillance for enemy infantry. Various countries across the globe have focused on development of autonomous systems to be utilized in public and national safety applications. In recent times, multiple governments from developed and emerging nations such as the U.S., Russia, China, and India have invested billions of dollars for autonomous defense projects. For instance, Europe launched a defense research and development program of $9.32 billion in January 2021 toward financing defense R&D projects. Adoption of autonomous technologies helps in reduction of operational costs and increases efficiency significantly. For instance, during the operation of a naval destroyer for a single day $700,000 are spent by the U.S. navy whereas in the case of an autonomous ship's operation costs would come down to $15,000 to $20,000 per day. Moreover, for increased efficiency; several nations around the world are deploying the use of 5G in the operation of autonomous defense vehicles, robots, and drones. For instance, U.S. ignite launched a technology pilot program in January 2021 for 5G Living Lab at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar situated in San Diego. Moreover, several pilot projects aimed at utilization of 5G in autonomous defense vehicles, drones, and robots are underway globally. Rise in adoption of autonomous technology to improve defense capabilities of nation globally is anticipated to propel growth of the global autonomous weapons market during the forecast period. Increase in investments to develop autonomous weapons Although autonomous weapons technology is still in its early stages, several militaries and private companies are developing and testing weapons that could one day be deployed to fight on their own. For instance, Russia is performing tests on autonomous tanks on Syrian battlefields, the U.S. has successfully tested swarms of drones, the UK wants to induct drone squadrons in combat roles as soon as possible, and China is developing unmanned submarines capable of carrying out kamikaze attacks (Japanese suicide bombing tactic) on enemy vessels. Armed forces across the world have been working on autonomous weapons for several decades now. Presently, at least 30 countries use them, mainly to defend airbases, ground vehicles, or ships against missile attacks. Various countries are competing with each other intensely to manufacture or procure leading-edge autonomous weapons. For instance, China and Russia aim to pursue development of autonomous weapons and are heavily investing in R&D activities. In addition, UK’s new defense strategy is aimed at propelling defense capabilities leveraging AI, as does Israel. According to the Brookings Institution (a Washington, DC-based non-profit public policy organization), the Chinese military and defense sector have been investing heavily in robots, swarming, and other artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning applications (ML). So far, advancements in autonomous weapons have drawn on existing research and development expertise. Moreover, Russia is developing an array of autonomous weapon platforms utilizing artificial intelligence as part of an ambitious push supported by high-tech cooperation with China. Such developments provide rise in demand for autonomous weapons, which is anticipated to propel growth of the global autonomous weapons market during the forecast period. Serious issues with fully autonomous weapons Fully autonomous weapons are those that can choose and fire on targets without the need for human interaction. Fully autonomous weapons are capable of assessing tactical context on a battlefield and deciding on appropriate assault based on processed data. Several countries fund and assist operations aimed at developing and researching completely autonomous weaponry. China, Germany, India, Israel, Republic of Korea, Russia, and the UK. UK, U.S., Israel, and South Korea have already deployed robotic systems with varying degrees of autonomy and lethality. Although abovementioned nations project great prospects for fully autonomous weapons, experts across the globe have pointed out issues related to accountability, protection of lives of citizens, and falling of such technology with non-authorized persons. No single human may be held responsible for his or her acts in an armed battle if the weapon system is autonomous. Instead, accountability is shared among a larger, possibly unidentifiable group of people, which could include robot's programmer or maker. Removal of humans from the selection and execution of attacks on targets, as the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions noted in their report to the Human Rights Council, represents a critical moment in the new technology that is considered a revolution in modern warfare. It was advised to nations to carefully consider consequences of such weapon systems, adding that such technology raises danger of states engaged in armed conflicts, owing to a lower risk of military casualties. Fully autonomous weapons could lower conflict threshold, particularly in cases where other side lacks comparable systems to deploy in response. These factors, as experts have pointed out, could lead to serious conflicts and uncalled war like situations caused due to unsupervised attacks made by fully autonomous weapons, and hinder growth of the global autonomous weapons market during the forecast timeframe. Rise in use of autonomous weapons globally Use of weapons that make their own judgments or autonomous weapons, have increased in recent years as a result of technological improvements and rise in complicated conflicts such as the Syrian and Libyan civil wars. Libya is not the only place where destructive autonomous weapons have been utilized in recent years. For instance, autonomous quadcopters were employed by Turkey to monitor its border with Syria. In September 2020, when Azerbaijan attacked Armenian-occupied territory, it used loitering munitions (drones that can autonomously fly over an area and divebomb enemy radar signals) made by both Turkish and Israeli companies. These weapons appear to be miniature versions of remote-controlled drones that the U.S. military has deployed extensively in battles with Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries. Loitering munitions, on the other hand have a built-in explosive and destroy themselves on impact with their target, rather than releasing missiles via remote control. These factors prove lethality and efficiency of autonomous weapons and rise in use of autonomous weapons is expected to propel growth of the global autonomous weapons market during the forecast period.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 2NC › A2: No LAWS Race

China is matching US spending on AI – at worst proves that the aff can’t spillover

Jon Harper 1/6/2022 (Jon Harper is

The U.S. military and China’s [PLA] People’s Liberation Army are both pursuing[AI] artificial intelligence capabilities which could give them a leg up in future conflicts. PLA investment in AI is now on par with the Pentagon’s, experts say. The United States [US] views China as its top military and economic competitor. “Supported by a burgeoning AI defense industry, the Chinese military has made extraordinary progress in procuring AI systems for combat and support functions,” according to a recent report from the Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology. The People’s Liberation Army is most focused on procuring AI for intelligence analysis, predictive maintenance, information warfare, and navigation and target recognition in autonomous vehicles, said the study, “Harnessed Lightning: How the Chinese Military is Adopting Artificial Intelligence,” by analysts Ryan Fedasiuk, Jennifer Melot and Ben Murphy. Additionally, laboratories affiliated with the Chinese military are actively pursuing AI-based target recognition and fire-control research, which may be used in lethal autonomous weapon systems, according to the authors. “If public contracts reflect how the PLA prioritizes different emerging technologies, then it is likely the PLA spends more than $1.6 billion each year on AI-enabled systems,” the study said. “However, because it is still an emerging technology, the PLA’s true spending on AI likely exceeds this number, as more funding is captured in research and development rather than off-the-shelf technology procurement. Moreover, the most resource-intensive AI projects are likely classified,” it added. The analysts estimate that annual Chinese military spending on AI is in “the low billions” of U.S. dollars, a level of funding that is “on par” with Pentagon’s investments. “Various analyses of DoD budgets for procurement and research indicate that it spent between $800 million and $1.3 billion on AI in 2020, with an additional $1.7 billion to $3.5 billion for unmanned and autonomous systems,” the report said. For fiscal year 2022, the Defense Department requested $874 million for artificial intelligence projects, reflecting the “rapidly growing importance of AI in every facet of the department’s operations,” according to budget documents. That money would help fund more than 600 AI-related efforts. “It remains to be seen how exactly AI might alter the balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific,” the CSET report said. Additional Pentagon research into “counter-autonomy” capabilities, as well as U.S. and allied efforts to regulate access to semiconductor devices, may hinder the utility and availability of artificial intelligence systems for the PLA, the authors noted.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 2NC › A2: LAWS not Key

LAW’s are the new frontier of innovation – also check every enemies aggression

Vincent Boulanin and Maaike Verbruggen 2017 “MAPPING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS” November 2017 Stockholm International peace research institute https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/siprireport_mapping_the_development_of_autonomy_in_weapon_systems_1117_1.pdf

In 2015 the USA elevated the issue of autonomy to the highest strategic level with the publication of its new ‘Defense Innovation Initiative’, which is also referred to as the ‘Third Offset Strategy’.11 Like the first two offset strategies that were introduced during the cold war, the Third Offset Strategy is based on the idea that the USA should seek to leverage emerging and disruptive technologies in innovative ways to offset the advantages of potential adversaries and maintain its strategic superiority.12 Each of the previous offset strategies had a specific ‘technological sauce’ as Robert Work, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, puts it.13 For the First Offset Strategy, it was the miniaturization of nuclear components, which enabled the adoption of tactical nuclear weapons for conventional deterrence. For the Second Offset Strategy, it was the development of digital microprocessors, information technologies, new sensors and stealth, which enabled the USA to develop precision-guided weapons and achieve dominance in conventional warfare. For the Third Offset Strategy, a key component is going to be AI (particularly machine learning) and autonomy.14 The reasons for this are manifold (and will be presented in the next subsection), but the main rationale is that AI and autonomy could leverage many operational benefits that could allow the US military to improve the strength and cost-effectiveness of its forces. In this way, it would continue to outmatch Russia, China, Iran or North Korea, even if those countries were to catch up with the USA in the development of high-end weapon technologies, such as precision-guided munitions, robotic technology, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities and A2/AD denial technologies.1

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 2NC › A2: No LAWS now

US companies are developing LAWs now

Frank Wolfe 12-02-2019 [A native of the Washington, D.C. area, Frank graduated Williams College with a degree in history and Russian studies in 1989. He also received a master’s degree in journalism from Columbia University and a master’s in international public policy from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He has worked as a journalist at The Washington Times, Forbes Magazine, The Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Defense Daily and LRP Publications. He has also worked as a senior analyst on U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army programs for Science Applications International Corp. and as a consultant on anti-corruption for The World Bank Institute]

“Companies Developing Lethal Autonomous Weapons, As Groups Seek Ban, Report Says,” https://www.aviationtoday.com/2019/12/02/companies-developing-lethal-autonomous-weapons-as-groups-seek-ban-report-says/ Cut By: m.jam

Dozens of defense companies are developing lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS), as humanitarian groups seek to build international support for a treaty to ban them, according to a recent report. LAWS, so-called "killer robots," would rely on artificial intelligence (AI) to remove the human from targeting decisions, but how close such systems are to mature development and deployment readiness is a matter of debate in technology circles. "As part of an imminent arms race to develop increasingly autonomous weapons, states rely on and involve arms producing companies in those efforts," according to by the Dutch non-governmental organization, PAX for Peace. "While digital technology, especially artificial intelligence, can be beneficial in many ways, countless AI and robotics experts have warned that the technology must not be used to develop lethal autonomous weapons. The research however shows the clear proliferation of increasingly autonomous weapon systems. Not only is there a growing number of companies in a growing number of countries developing such weapons, these technologies are also applied to an ever-expanding range of military systems, in the air, on the ground and at sea." The United Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) has been discussing LAWS' concerns and is to start devising a "normative and operational framework" for such weapons at meetings in Geneva on June 22-26 and August 10-14. But humanitarian groups are frustrated that CCW has not progressed further in its work on the issue and that CCW has not brought up a legally binding document to stop or significantly restrict LAWS. In a message to CCW's Group of Government Experts convened for a meeting on emerging LAWS technologies last March, U.N. Secretary General António Guterres wrote that "autonomous machines with the power and discretion to select targets and take lives without human involvement are politically unacceptable, morally repugnant and should be prohibited by international law." "This reflects what I see as the prevailing sentiment across the world," Guterres wrote. "I know of no state or armed force in favor of fully autonomous weapon systems empowered to take human life." Last February, Russia's ZALA Aero Group, the unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) division of Kalashnikov, unveiled a "kamikaze" drone -- the KUB-BLA -- at the International Defense Exhibition and Conference (IDEX) in Abu Dhabi. The small UAS is designed to have a maximum speed of about 80 miles per hour, an endurance of 30 minutes, and an explosive payload of 7 pounds against "remote ground targets." Loitering munitions can have a dwell time up to six hours and are equipped with sensors to allow the drones to detect and attack targets independently. Early 1980s-era examples include Israel Aircraft Industries' Harpy suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) drone and the U.S. Air Force AGM-136 "Tacit Rainbow" SEAD system by Northrop Grumman -- a $4 billion development program canceled in 1991. "Especially significant are the developments related to loitering munitions, which are able to operate for longer amounts of time and over larger areas in order to select and attack targets," according to last month's PAX for Peace report. "Major efforts related to swarm technologies multiply the potential of such weapons. These developments raise serious questions of how human control is guaranteed over these weapon systems." The Turkish state-owned firm STM is "improving the capabilities of its KARGU loitering munitions through using AI, including facial recognition," the report said. "According to the company, the KARGU can 'autonomously fire-and-forget through the entry of target coordinates.' It has been suggested that these systems will be deployed on the border with Syria." A September article in The New Scientist magazine reported that KARGU positions Turkey "to become the first nation to use drones able to find, track and kill people without human intervention." The Turkish newspaper, Hürriyet, has said that some 30 STM "kamikaze" drones will be deployed early next year to the Turkish-Syrian border region. The PAX for Peace report on LAWS listed 30 "high concern companies," as the latter "work on increasingly autonomous weapon systems and do not appear to have a policy in place [to ensure meaningful human control over such weapons] and did not respond in a meaningful way to our survey." Such companies include Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon in the United States; China's AVIC and CASC; Russia's Rostec; Israel's IAI, Elbit Systems, and Rafael; and Turkey's STM, according to the report.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 2NC › 2NC---DIB Impacts

American primacy de-escalates South China Sea tensions

Nicholas Kristof, 15, 5-29-2015, (American journalist and political commentator. A winner of two Pulitzer Prizes) "EDITORIAL: Pushback in the South China Sea", https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/opinion/pushback-in-the-south-china-sea.html, AVD

The United States has good reason to push back more forcefully against China’s grab for power in the South China Sea, as Defense Secretary Ashton Carter did on a trip to Asia this week. Beijing has repeatedly ignored earlier warnings to moderate the aggressive behavior that is unsettling its regional neighbors and further undermining its relations with the United States. On Friday, American officials disclosed that China had installed two on an artificial island it is building in the sea, which is rich in natural resources like oil and gas and where China clearly hopes to establish some form of hegemony. The weapons are not considered a threat to American naval forces. Still, they reinforce fears that China intends to militarize the Spratly Islands, a collection of reefs and rocks also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Taiwan, and use them to control the waterway’s shipping lanes and dominate its smaller neighbors. China’s ambitions have become increasingly clear since 2012 when it publicly asserted a claim to of the South China Sea. In recent months, China is moving with alarming speed to turn the Spratlys into more substantial land masses, complete with runways and harbors. Some American officials now believe China regards its claims in the South China Sea as nonnegotiable. If so, that’s terrible news for the region but also ultimately for China, which claims it prizes stability but will find it impossible to realize its economic goals if Asia is in constant tension. China’s bullying on the South China Sea has already caused many Asian countries to forge closer defense ties with the United States. Now, the Obama administration has decided to more firmly underscore America’s intention to remain a Pacific power and to ensure that the region and its waters remain accessible to all nations. That is a role the United States has played constructively for decades, promoting a stability that has allowed Japan, South Korea and other countries, including China, to develop. “There should be no mistake: the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as forces do around the world,” Mr. Carter said in his speech. He also called for “an immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by all claimants.” Although the administration would obviously prefer a peaceful resolution of all South China Sea disputes, it cannot allow China’s claims to go unchallenged. It sent a surveillance plane close to one of China’s artificial islands, is considering air and sea patrols that could go closer to disputed reefs and shoals, and is expanding military exercises with regional partners. President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China plan to meet later this year. In the meantime, American officials and their Chinese counterparts must avoid any miscalculation that could lead to a direct confrontation.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 2NC › 2NC---DIB Impacts

Primacy solves great power conflict, growth and prolif

Hal Brands and Charles Edel, 2019, Hal Brands is the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs in the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Charles Edel is a senior fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and previously served on the U.S. Secretary of State's policy planning staff. “The Lessons of Tragedy Statecraft and World Order” Ch. 5 Yale University Press. Accessed 7-14-2019 [MoStateLibraries]/mnw

As William Wohlforth has noted, American primacy and activism acted as a powerful deterrent to great-power conflict by creating enormous disincentives for Russia, China, or other actors to incur the “focused enmity” of the United States. 11 The persistence and even extension of the U.S. security blanket smothered potential instability in unsettled regions such as Eastern Europe, while removing any possibility of German or Japanese revanchism—a prospect much feared in the early 1990s—by keeping those countries tightly lashed to Washington. American intervention helped extinguish bloody conflicts in the Balkans before they could spread to neighboring countries; U.S. diplomatic and military pressure kept aggressive tyrannies such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea bottled up and helped slow the spread of nuclear weapons. U.S. support helped democratic forces triumph in countries from Haiti to Poland, as the number of democracies rose from 76 in 1990 to 120 in 2000; America crucially assisted the advance of globalization and the broad prosperity that came with it by promoting pro-market policies and providing the necessary climate of reassurance and stability. 12

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 2NC › 2NC---DIB IL

U.S. DIB K2 Military Competitivness

Lord and Nader 21. (Ellen Lord, Senior Fellow, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. Jeffrey Nadaner, Executive Director, Commanding Heights of Global Transportation Initiative. “A 21st Century Defense Industrial Strategy for America.” Hudson Institute, June 14, 2021. . shARK.)

The American military is still the most powerful in the world. Its leading defense industry companies are still global leaders in weapons innovation and production. Likewise, the Department of Defense is still the colossus of the federal system, i.e., the single biggest buyer of goods in the US government. But unless the industrial and manufacturing base that develops and builds those goods modernizes and adjusts to the world’s new geopolitical and economic realities, America will face a growing and likely permanent national security deficit. America’s defense industrial base was once the wonder of the free world, constituting a so-called “military-industrial complex” that, regardless of criticism, was the model for, and envy of, every other country—and the mainstay of peace and freedom for two generations after World War II. Today, however, that base faces problems that necessitate continued and accelerated national focus over the coming decade, and that cannot be solved by assuming that advanced technologies like autonomous systems, artificial intelligence (AI), 5G, and quantum will wave those challenges away, and magically preserve American leadership. On the contrary, those advanced technologies themselves rely on a manufacturing complex whose capability and capacity will have to be trusted and secure to protect the Pentagon’s most vital supply chains. These include microelectronics, space, cyber, nuclear, and hypersonics, as well as the more conventional technologies that make up our legacy defense equipment. What will be required is a defense industrial strategy based on a four-part program to:

Reshore our defense industrial base and supply chains to the United States and to allies, starting with microelectronics, and restore our shipbuilding base.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 2NC › 2NC---Lockheed Specific Link

Lockheed Martin, a DIB company, is working on autonomous systems - the ban hurts their ability to develop AI

Facing Finance 12-05-2014 [Promoting a more responsible and sustainable financial system. For a responsible and sustainable use of money]

“Lockheed Martin: Production of Autonomous Weapons,” https://www.facing-finance.org/en/database/cases/lockheed-martin-production-of-autonomous-weapons/ Cut By: m.jam

Lockheed Martin offers multiple unmanned weapons systems for air, land and sea, including a recently revealed ultra high speed UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) project, drone SR-72. According to Lockheed Martin this would be both a spy and a strike aircraft, but will not be ready to fly until 2030 Lockheed Martin has developed a fully autonomous surveillance and target-acquisition system combining a ground robotic vehicle and an unmanned helicopter (the SMSS acting as the ground segment and the K-MAX unmanned air vehicle). The company is also a producer of autonomous weapons which are under strong criticism to be indiscriminate and violate International Humanitarian Law. Armed with a proven penetrator and blast-fragmentation warhead, LRASM (Long Range Anti-Ship Missile) cruises autonomously, day or night, in all weather conditions.'

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 2NC › 2NC---Raytheon Specific Link

Raytheon, a DIB company, is working on improving AI for military strength – the ban hurts their ability to develop AI

Raytheon Intelligence & Space 06-30-2021 [One of the four business segments of U.S. defense and aerospace conglomerate Raytheon Technologies. Headquartered in Arlington, Virginia, RIS has a total employment of 39,000 and 2019 sales of US$15 billion. Roy Azevedo is the segment's president.], “How AI can alter multi-domain warfare,” https://www.raytheonintelligenceandspace.com/news/2021/06/30/how-ai-can-alter-multi-domain-warfare Cut By: m.jam

Military commanders often have very little time to make decisions – sometimes just seconds. And with threats like hypersonic missiles accelerating the pace of modern warfare, that window of time is shrinking. Complicating things is the sheer volume of data flow. There are petabytes of intelligence information coming from sensors on land, at sea, in the air and in space, many using different formats. The solution, according to experts at Raytheon Intelligence & Space, a Raytheon Technologies business, is clear: Artificial intelligence – specifically, teaming military commanders with intelligent systems to cull through data in seconds. This will be key to bringing the vision for the U.S. Department of Defense’s Joint All Domain Command and Control network, often called JADC2, to reality. That network will link military capabilities around the world and in every domain. With artificial intelligence and machine learning, those systems can define, combine and provide the right information to the right people at the right time – giving them the best possible chance to make the best possible decision. “Manually processing all that data would require armies of analysts, but with AI/ML, we can task systems to cull through the data and produce higher level information useful to operators,” said Jim Wright, RI&S technical director for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Systems. Experts from Raytheon Intelligence & Space discussed the concept further during a that is now available on-demand. Here’s a preview of what they discussed. 1. AI/ML makes sense of the complex There’s a confluence of factors that are driving the need for autonomy and automation in data analysis – a proliferation of information and a shortage of analysts to start. AI and ML can help by doing the legwork – searching, processing and fusing larger amounts of data across the domains – and helping the humans save their brainpower for decision-making. “A customer once told me that the military collects 22 football seasons worth of video every day,” Wright said. “There’s a colossal amount of information circling in today’s battlespace. We’re developing smart software, called Cognitive Aids to Sensor Processing, Exploitation and Response, to lighten the operator’s workload and use automation to help make decisions faster. The cognitive aids will do the groundwork and data analysis to provide recommended courses of action, leaving the operators to focus on making the best decision.” The Department of Defense is also mobilizing combatant commands to use AI/ML for the future battlefield in a new effort called the Artificial Intelligence and Data Acceleration Initiative. “Its goal is to rapidly advance data and AI-dependent concepts like Joint All-Domain Command Control,” Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks said during the department’s on June 22. 2. AI/ML counters threats more quickly and intelligently Another factor is the speed of modern weapons. “Think about hypersonic glide vehicles and similar types of weapons,” Wright said. “From the time you see them to the time when you must counter them is very short, and there isn’t time for operators to search multi-sensor data to optimize targeting solutions. Instead, AI/ML can automatically search across many sensor sources to accurately detect and classify threats, and then quickly evaluate multiple engagement alternatives to find the optimum weapons target pairing.” AI and ML could even give combatant commanders insights into adversaries’ decision-making processes – information they can use to anticipate enemy actions and proactively outmaneuver them. “At that point, the adversary won’t be able to respond in time because our commander is already way ahead of them,” said Chris Worley, director for Civil and Digital Solutions at RI&S.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 2NC › 2NC---LAWS Links

Wilbur Wright proves risk taking drives innovation

Adam Thierer 05-26-2022 [Research fellow at Mercatus Center at George Mason University; Covers digital technology policy issues; co-blog with @TechLiberation]

“The Proper Governance Default for AI,” https://medium.com/@AdamThierer/the-proper-governance-default-for-ai-d05db6970924 Cut By: m.jam

The precautionary principle holds that innovations are to be curtailed or potentially even disallowed until the creators of those new technologies can prove that they will not cause any theoretical harms. The classic formulation of the precautionary principle can be found in the “Wingspan Statement,” which was formulated at an academic conference that took place at the Wingspread Conference Center in Wisconsin in 1998. It read: “Where an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human health, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.” There have been many reformulations of the precautionary principle over time but, as legal scholar Cass Sunstein has noted, “in all of them, the animating idea is that regulators should take steps to protect against potential harms, even if causal chains are unclear and even if we do not know that those harms will come to fruition.” Put simply, under almost all varieties of the precautionary principle, innovation is treated as “guilty until proven innocent.” We can also think of this as permissioned innovation.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 2NC › 2NC---LAWS Links

A LAW ban hurts the DIB and Dod ability to make and use better weapons

,  and  06-02-2021 [Jennie Matuschak is a former research assistant for the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS); Ainikki Riikonen is a former Research Associate for the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Her research focuses on emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence and information systems in the context of international competition; Pederson comes from Washington, where she received her undergraduate degree in English literature from Seattle University] “Sharper: Defense Tech,” https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/sharper-defense-tech Cut By: m.jam

The prevalence of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, the growing centrality of information warfare, and threats to traditional command and control are redefining combat in the age of strategic competition. Amidst debates on the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) and pressure to modernize U.S. defense capabilities, what steps must the United States take to maintain its military advantage? CNAS experts are sharpening the conversation about the deployment of autonomous weapons and other defense technologies to enhance U.S. military readiness. Continue reading this edition of Sharper to explore their ideas and recommendations. Gaining an advantage in managing information and exercising command is a precondition of victory in warfare. This necessity has become even more acute as military organizations have integrated information technology into their forces and operations. The Pentagon’s belated response to these strategies appears overly technological and unrealistically fixated on regaining the kind of information dominance that the U.S. armed forces enjoyed in the aftermath of the Cold War. A new CNAS report by Chris Dougherty examines how the Department of Defense (DoD) can embrace, rather than fight against, the changes in the character of warfare and learn to thrive within its chaos in ways that China and Russia may be unable to match. In recent years, the machine learning revolution has sparked a wave of interest in AI applications across a range of industries. Nations are also mobilizing to use AI for national security and military purposes, write Paul Scharre and Michael Horowitz. It is therefore vital to assess how the militarization of AI could affect international stability and how to encourage militaries to adopt AI in a responsible manner. Doing so requires understanding the features of AI, the ways it could shape warfare, and the risks to international stability resulting from the militarization of artificial intelligence. America’s future leadership in the world and on the battlefield will be dependent on its ingenuity. Yet, while America remains the world’s leader in technology, its relative advantage wanes, argues Mikhail Grinberg in a CNAS policy brief. Future military operating environments will require technology from more diverse sources and business models that enable faster innovation cycles. Grinberg concludes that the superiority of next-generation weapon systems will be derived from progress in science, and the next National Defense Strategy needs to help the nation prioritize basic research as a source of competitive advantage. An international debate over lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) has been under way for nearly a decade. A new CNAS report by author Robert O. Work offers seven new principles that concentrate on the responsible use of autonomous functionalities in armed conflict in ways that preserve human judgment and responsibility over the use of force, and help minimize the probability of loss of control of the system or unintended engagements. Michèle Flournoy and Gabrielle Chefitz argue in a CNAS policy brief that the United States is losing its military technological advantage vis-à-vis great-power competitors such as China, and reversing this trend must be DoD leadership’s top priority. Doing so will require focused and empowered leadership, increased investment in the development of new concepts and capabilities, new pathways and incentives for promising prototypes to bridge the “valley of death” into production, a willingness to make hard program and budget choices, the development of a more tech-savvy workforce, and greater partnership with Congress to pursue these goals together.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 2NC › 2NC---LAWS Links

Pre-Cautionary tech bans are bad – Innovation should be preferred

 and  02-04-2019 [Daniel Castro is vice president at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) and director of ITIF's Center for Data Innovation; Castro writes and speaks on a variety of issues related to information technology and internet policy, including privacy, security, intellectual property, Internet governance, e-government, and accessibility for people with disabilities; Michael McLaughlin was a research analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation; McLaughlin researched and wrote about a variety of issues related to information technology and Internet policy, including digital platforms, e-government, and artificial intelligence. 

;], “Ten Ways the Precautionary Principle Undermines Progress in Artificial Intelligence,” Cut By: m.jam

Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to deliver significant social and economic benefits, including reducing accidental deaths and injuries, making new scientific discoveries, and increasing productivity.[1] However, an increasing number of activists, scholars, and pundits see AI as inherently risky, creating substantial negative impacts such as eliminating jobs, eroding personal liberties, and reducing human intelligence.[2] Some even see AI as dehumanizing, dystopian, and a threat to humanity.[3] As such, the world is dividing into two camps regarding AI: those who support the technology and those who oppose it. Unfortunately, the latter camp is increasingly dominating AI discussions, not just in the United States, but in many nations around the world. There should be no doubt that nations that tilt toward fear rather than optimism are more likely to put in place policies and practices that limit AI development and adoption, which will hurt their economic growth, social progress, and global competitiveness.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 2NC › 2NC---DIB UQ

Ukrainian business and American military aid is promoting the DIB now

Nationaldefensemagazine.org, 6/15/2022, www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/6/15/ukraine-to-us-defense-industry-we-need-long-range-precision-weapons.

PARIS — Ukraine has a message it wants to convey to the U.S. defense industrial base and the government. The war-torn nation desperately needs artillery and artillery rounds, but what can truly give it the upper hand over its Russian invaders are long-range precision weapons such as armed Predator drones, loitering munitions and the multiple launch rocket system. Denys Sharapov, Ukraine’s deputy minister of the defense in charge of procurement, support for weapons and equipment, and Brig. Gen. Volodymyr Karpenko, land forces command logistics commander, spoke with National Defense Editor in Chief Stew Magnuson and other reporters through an interpreter in the Ukraine Ministry of Defense’s booth at the Eurosatory conference in Paris on June 15. Back in Washington, politicians and pundits debated this week as to whether it was practical to send Ukraine armed Predator drones as part of a $40 billion aid package. Sharapov and Karpenko said such technology may give Ukraine what it needs to gain an advantage in the war. The interview has been edited for brevity and clarity. Our readers are about 1,800 corporate members of the defense industrial base in the United States. What message do you have for them? And what do you need from them urgently? Sharapov: The [Ministry of Defense] is concentrating currently on fulfilling all the needs of the armed forces. You asked a question about needs. First, you have to understand that the frontline is 2,500 kilometers long. The frontline where there is active combat in more than 1,000 kilometers long. That’s like from Kyiv to Berlin. … As of today, all the people in all of our armed forces and within the defense and security sector is up to one million people. And we have to support them all. We have to supply them with small arms, with personal protection gear and with the means of communication. And of course, to carry out a war in this day and age, we need heavy weapons — that’s primarily artillery systems. As of today, our need for heavy artillery systems is measured by hundreds. That’s why we also need a huge number of rounds for these artillery systems.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 2NC › 2NC---DIB UQ

The Defense Industrial Base is stable and doing well now

US Department of Defense. 2022. DEPARTMENT of DEFENSE REPORT State of Competition within the Defense Industrial Base. media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/15/2002939087/-1/-1/1/STATE-OF-COMPETITION-WITHIN-THE-DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE.PDF.

DoD tracks competition by obligations and contract actions based on data from the Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation (FPDS-NG). The FPDS-NG competition report measures competition and fair opportunity at the contract and order level. The competition rate is calculated as either the dollars obligated for competitive contracts (i.e., two or more offerors) divided by the total dollars obligated, or the number of contract actions for competitive contracts divided by the total number of contract actions. The competition rate varies depending upon the mission and type of product or service being procured. Competition rates also differ greatly depending on whether the calculation uses obligations or contract actions. The DoD competition rate based on dollars obligated is typically in the 50-60% range; if based on the number of contract actions, the competition rate would be consistently in the 90% range. The competitive environment for the DIB remained relatively stable over the past several years. Over the past ten years, DoD has seen total dollars obligated vary from a high of $420 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 to a low of $273 billion in FY 2015. During that time, the competition rates ranged from a high of 58.3% in FY 2014 to 50.1% in FY 2020, and projected at 52% for FY 2021, for a ten-year average of 54.2%. Figure 1 displays the ten-year trend for competitive and non-competitive dollars obligated, with the peak of $420B total dollars obligated in FY 2020 due to increased obligations for COVID-19 related actions. To help improve its tracking of competition within the DIB, DoD developed a Procurement Business Intelligence Service Competition Analysis Scorecard to report competition rates at the 3 Obligations refers to the funds reserved in the accounting system upon contract award. Those dollars are obligated under the contract for expenditure. 57.1% 56.7% 58.3% 55.4% 52.8% 52.0% 53.9% 53.9% 50.1% 52.0% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% $- $50 $100 $150 $200 $250 $300 $350 $400 $450 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Billions Total Competed ($B) Total Not Competed ($B) Competition Rate (%) Fiscal Year 4 product service code and broader portfolio group levels.4 The competition scorecard provides dashboard-like presentations to help components track and analyze competition trends in portfolio groups for major weapon system platforms (e.g., aircraft, ships, and land vehicles), electronic and communications equipment, and their associated sustainment phases. Historically, these portfolio groups report competition rates in the 15–40% range for dollars obligated, which has a significant impact on DoD’s overall competition rate since these weapon systems and major equipment account for a sizeable portion of the total dollars obligated. The competition scorecards provide management-level reports and tools to enable informed business decisions that support procurement policies with the goal of improving competition in the DoD supply chain and industrial base. Similarly, securing competition varies widely based upon the mission and type of product or service being procured. Generally, those contracting organizations supporting installation-level mission support and logistical requirements (e.g., food service, facility maintenance, grounds maintenance, transportation services) and/or depot-level maintenance services requirements (e.g., contractor logistics support for spare parts) have multiple potential suppliers resulting in very high competition rates. This is also true for contracting organizations heavily involved in services, commercial products, and construction. The competitive percentages are lower in organizations that procure major systems (e.g., weapons, automated information systems), specialized equipment, spares (especially on aging weapon systems), and upgrades that may need to be purchased from the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or supplier. These programs can require sole-source extensions of contracts that were originally competed because the programs have moved past the stage in their lifecycle where competition is economically viable. These sole-source transactions are made in accordance with statutory requirements that authorize dealing with only one source.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 1NC › LAWS 1NC

Hegemony is empirically the most stable system and deters all conflict – decline causes transition wars

Robert Kagan, 17, 2-7-2017, Backing Into World War III, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/, Robert Kagan, Ph.D. in American History from American University, M.P.P. in Government from Harvard University, AVD

Think of two significant trend lines in the world today. One is the increasing ambition and activism of the two great revisionist powers, Russia and China. The other is the declining confidence, capacity, and will of the democratic world, and especially of the United States, to maintain the dominant position it has held in the international system since 1945. As those two lines move closer, as the declining will and capacity of the United States and its allies to maintain the present world order meet the increasing desire and capacity of the revisionist powers to change it, we will reach the moment at which the existing order collapses and the world descends into a phase of brutal anarchy, as it has three times in the past two centuries. The cost of that descent, in lives and treasure, in lost freedoms and lost hope, will be staggering. Americans tend to take the fundamental stability of the international order for granted, even while complaining about the burden the United States carries in preserving that stability. History shows that world orders do collapse, however, and when they do it is often unexpected, rapid, and violent. The late 18th century was the high point of the Enlightenment in Europe, before the continent fell suddenly into the abyss of the Napoleonic Wars. In the first decade of the 20th century, the world’s smartest minds predicted an end to great-power conflict as revolutions in communication and transportation knit economies and people closer together. The most devastating war in history came four years later. The apparent calm of the postwar 1920s became the crisis-ridden 1930s and then another world war. Where exactly we are in this classic scenario today, how close the trend lines are to that intersection point is, as always, impossible to know. Are we three years away from a global crisis, or 15? That we are somewhere on that path, however, is unmistakable. And while it is too soon to know what effect Donald Trump’s presidency will have on these trends, early signs suggest that the new administration is more likely to hasten us toward crisis than slow or reverse these trends. The further accommodation of Russia can only embolden Vladimir Putin, and the tough talk with China will likely lead Beijing to test the new administration’s resolve militarily. Whether the president is ready for such a confrontation is entirely unclear. For the moment, he seems not to have thought much about the future ramifications of his rhetoric and his actions. China and Russia are classic revisionist powers. Although both have never enjoyed greater security from foreign powers than they do today — Russia from its traditional enemies to the west, China from its traditional enemy in the east — they are dissatisfied with the current global configuration of power. Both seek to restore the hegemonic dominance they once enjoyed in their respective regions. For China, that means dominance of East Asia, with countries like Japan, South Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia both acquiescing to Beijing’s will and acting in conformity with China’s strategic, economic, and political preferences. That includes American influence withdrawn to the eastern Pacific, behind the Hawaiian Islands. For Russia, it means hegemonic influence in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which Moscow has traditionally regarded as either part of its empire or part of its sphere of influence. Both Beijing and Moscow seek to redress what they regard as an unfair distribution of power, influence, and honor in the U.S.-led postwar global order. As autocracies, both feel threatened by the dominant democratic powers in the international system and by the democracies on their borders. Both regard the United States as the principal obstacle to their ambitions, and therefore both seek to weaken the American-led international security order that stands in the way of their achieving what they regard as their rightful destinies. It was good while it lasted Until fairly recently, Russia and China have faced considerable, almost insuperable, obstacles in achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the international order itself and its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and, since the end of the Cold War, to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has checked their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. During the era of American primacy, China and Russia have participated in and for the most part been beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helps sustain; so long as that system functions, they have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The political and strategic aspects of the order, however, have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions — especially the geographical advance of liberal democracies close to their borders — as an existential threat. That’s for good reason: Autocratic powers since the days of Klemens von Metternich have always feared the contagion of liberalism. The mere existence of democracies on their borders, the global free flow of information they cannot control, the dangerous connection between free market capitalism and political freedom — all pose a threat to rulers who depend on keeping restive forces in their own countries in check. The continual challenge to the legitimacy of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported democratic order has therefore naturally made them hostile both to that order and to the United States. But, until recently, a preponderance of domestic and international forces has dissuaded them from confronting the order directly. Chinese rulers have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their legitimacy at home. Even Putin has pushed only against open doors, as in Syria, where the United States responded passively to his probes. He has been more cautious when confronted by even marginal U.S. and European opposition, as in Ukraine. The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions has been the military and economic power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful, has had to contemplate facing the combined military and economic strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest — including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these U.S.-led alliances present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on few allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, such as the military subjection of Taiwan or a naval battle in the South or East China Sea, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations and the likely cutoff of access to foreign markets on which their own economy depends. A weaker Russia, with its depleted population and oil- and gas-dependent economy, would face an even greater challenge. For decades, the strong global position enjoyed by the United States and its allies has discouraged any serious challenge. So long as the United States was perceived as a dependable ally, Chinese and Russian leaders feared that aggressive moves would backfire and possibly bring their regimes down. This is what the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order: As dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions. And it worked. The United States stepped up, and Russia and China largely backed down — or were preempted before acting at all. Faced with these obstacles, the best option for the two revisionist great powers has always been to hope for or, if possible, engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within, either by separating the United States from its allies or by raising doubts about the U.S. commitment and thereby encouraging would-be allies and partners to forgo the strategic protection of the liberal world order and seek accommodation with its challengers. The present system has therefore depended not only on American power but on coherence and unity at the heart of the democratic world. The United States has had to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm, but the order’s ideological and economic core — the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific — has also had to remain relatively healthy and confident.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 1NC › LAWS 1NC

DIB innovation prevents offshore manufacturing and enables US global leadership

Joel S. Yudken 2010 [ is Principal and Founder of High Road Strategies, LLC.  He is a nationally known expert on policy issues that relate to manufacturing, energy, technology, workforce and economic development.  In a career spanning four decades, Dr. Yudken has held a wide range of professional positions in labor, government, academia, industry, and public interest organizations.  His broad background and training in engineering, political, and socio-economic systems enables him to apply a range of qualitative and quantitative research and analytical tools to his work], “AMERICA’S MANUFACTURING CRISIS AND THE EROSION OF THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE,” https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/88136/afl_cio_Manufacturing_Insecurity_report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Cut By: m.jam

The impacts of an eroding domestic manufacturing base on national security largely stem from the military’s growing reliance on commercial cutting-edge technology since the 1980s. There are reasonable doubts that military technology still lags commercial technologies in all areas, as it generally did during the 1980s and 1990s. Starting in those years, and continuing into the present, defense procurement policy has put an emphasis on promoting greater civilian-military integration, and encouraging agencies and their contractors to purchase commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and “dual-use” technology products. The rationale is that drawing on the often more innovative civilian sector not only would yield more up-to-date products but also big cost savings. Many, if not most, “dual-use” contractors and suppliers try to separate their defense and commercial businesses, in large part to avoid the bureaucratic drag of defense procurement requirements on their commercial work. Nevertheless, the ability of a firm to design, innovate, and improve on defense-critical technologies or devices that it produces for defense markets, increasingly depends on its ability to preserve and draw upon the technological edge it has obtained in its commercial business. As military products become more reliant on commercial advanced technologies, technology transfer from commercial technologies into defense-critical products requires a close relationship between the Pentagon or defense contractor customer and the suppliers of these technologies. However, as the commercial base upon which the defense sector relies for most of its components and subsystems globalizes, integrating commercial technology into defense systems becomes more difficult to achieve. That is, the loss of production facilities can lead to the loss of innovation capabilities, which would dangerously undermine the nation’s ability to maintain a strong defense base.

Specifically, the migration of manufacturing offshore is associated with the following trends: Weakening innovation capabilities of domestic industrial sectors; The transfer—deliberate and unwitting—of cutting-edge technologies and know-how to economic rivals and potential military adversaries; and 72 HRS/JSY—Manufacturing Insecurity A decline in the United States’ overall technological leadership in the world.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Defense Innovation DA › 1NC › LAWS 1NC

A precautionary LAW ban destroys the private sectors’ ability to innovate AI technologies in all areas

 and  02-04-2019 [Daniel Castro is vice president at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) and director of ITIF's Center for Data Innovation; Castro writes and speaks on a variety of issues related to information technology and internet policy, including privacy, security, intellectual property, Internet governance, e-government, and accessibility for people with disabilities; Michael McLaughlin was a research analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation; McLaughlin researched and wrote about a variety of issues related to information technology and Internet policy, including digital platforms, e-government, and artificial intelligence. 

;], “Ten Ways the Precautionary Principle Undermines Progress in Artificial Intelligence,” Cut By: m.jam

Many groups have started movements to ban lethal autonomous weapons—autonomous robotics systems that can independently identify and engage targets based on programmed constraints—due to fears that they will lead to armed conflict on a scale greater and faster than ever before. For example, 116 founders of mostly small robotics and AI companies, including Elon Musk, signed a letter to the United Nations (UN) in 2017 that urges the body to ban lethal autonomous weapons.36 In 2018, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated that “machines that have the power and the discretion to take human lives are politically unacceptable, are morally repugnant, and should be banned by international law.”37 Also in 2018, members of the European Parliament adopted a resolution asking member states and the European Council for “the start of international negotiations on a legally binding instrument prohibiting lethal autonomous weapons systems.”38 If policymakers enacted such a ban, it would slow research into AI, as historically, at least in the United States, defense agencies have been a source of significant funding for technology advancement, such as the Internet. And much of the research to support autonomous weapons would yield dual-use technology that could be used for commercial purposes. For example, a fully autonomous tank will likely rely on large portions of the same algorithms and data used to develop a fully autonomous military transport vehicle.39 These same algorithms would be relevant to developing autonomous vehicles for civilian use.