2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › NATO Cohesion Advantage › War Escalation
Etzioni and Etzioni, 17 (Amitai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni, PhD, PhD in AI, May 2017, accessed on 6-27-2022, Army University Press, "Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons Systems", .) (NB)
7 According to DeSon, the physical strain of high-G maneuvers and the intense mental concentration and situational awareness required of fighter pilots make them very prone to fatigue and exhaustion; robot pilots, on the other hand would not be subject to these physiological and mental constraints. Moreover, fully autonomous planes could be programmed to take genuinely random and unpredictable action that could confuse an opponent. More striking still, Air Force Capt. Michael Byrnes predicts that a single unmanned aerial vehicle with machine-controlled maneuvering and accuracy could, “with a few hundred rounds of ammunition and sufficient fuel reserves,” take out an entire fleet of aircraft, presumably one with human pilots.8
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › NATO Cohesion Advantage › War Escalation
Etzioni and Etzioni, 17 (Amitai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni, PhD, PhD in AI, May 2017, accessed on 6-27-2022, Army University Press, "Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons Systems", .) (NB)
Those who call for further development and deployment of autonomous weapons systems generally point to several military advantages. First, autonomous weapons systems act as a force multiplier. That is, fewer warfighters are needed for a given mission, and the efficacy of each warfighter is greater. Next, advocates credit autonomous weapons systems with expanding the battlefield, allowing combat to reach into areas that were previously inaccessible. Finally, autonomous weapons systems can reduce casualties by removing human warfighters from dangerous missions.1 The Department of Defense’s Unmanned Systems Roadmap: 2007-2032 provides additional reasons for pursuing autonomous weapons systems. These include that robots are better suited than humans for “‘dull, dirty, or dangerous’ missions.”2 An example of a dull mission is long-duration sorties. An example of a dirty mission is one that exposes humans to potentially harmful radiological material. An example of a dangerous mission is explosive ordnance disposal.
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › NATO Cohesion Advantage › War Escalation
Kyle Hiebert (researcher and analyst formerly based in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, as deputy editor of the Africa Conflict Monitor) “Are Lethal Autonomous Weapons Inevitable? It Appears So” January 27, 2022 https://www.cigionline.org/articles/are-lethal-autonomous-weapons-inevitable-it-appears-so/
Most important of all, mass production of killer robots could offset America’s flagging enlistment numbers. The US military requires 150,000 new recruits every year to maintain its desired strength and capability. And yet Pentagon data from 2017 revealed that more than 24 million of the then 34 million Americans between the ages of 17 and 24 — over 70 percent — would have been disqualified from serving in the military if they applied, due to obesity, mental health issues, inadequate education or a criminal record. Michèle Flournoy, a career defence official who served in senior roles in both the Clinton and the Obama administrations, told the BBC in December that “one of the ways to gain some quantitative mass back and to complicate adversaries’ defence planning or attack planning is to pair human beings and machines.” Other, smaller players are nurturing an affinity for LAWS too. Israel assassinated Iran’s top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, outside of Tehran in November 2020 using a remote-controlled, AI-assisted machine gun mounted inside a parked car, and is devising more remote ways to strike back against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Since 2015, South Korea has placed nearly fully autonomous sentry guns on the edge of its demilitarized zone with North Korea, selling the domestically built robot turrets to customers throughout the Middle East. Speaking at a defence expo in 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India — the world’s second-largest arms buyer — told the audience: “New and emerging technologies like AI and Robotics will perhaps be the most important determinants of defensive and offensive capabilities for any defence force in the future.”
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › NATO Cohesion Advantage › War Escalation
Mary Wareham (advocacy director in the arms division at Human Rights Watch) “Summary: Stopping Killer Robots” August 10, 2020 https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and
United States. At the Human Rights Council in May 2013, the United States said that lethal autonomous weapons systems raise “important legal, policy, and ethical issues” and recommended further discussion in an international humanitarian law forum.[263] A 2012 Department of Defense policy directive on autonomy in weapons systems was renewed without substantive amendments in 2018 for another five years.[264] The policy permits the development of lethal autonomous weapons systems, but the US insists that “it neither encourages nor prohibits the development of such future systems.”[265] The US is investing heavily in military applications of artificial intelligence and developing air, land, and sea-based autonomous weapons systems. In August 2019, the US warned against stigmatizing lethal autonomous weapons systems because, it said, they “can have military and humanitarian benefits.”[266] The US regards proposals to negotiate a new international treaty on such weapons systems as “premature” and argues that existing international humanitarian law is adequate.[267] The US participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019.
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › NATO Cohesion Advantage › War Escalation
Michael T. Klare (professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association) “Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Laws of War” March 2019 https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-03/features/autonomous-weapons-systems-laws-war
The Navy is not alone in exploring future battle formations involving various combinations of crewed systems and swarms of autonomous and semiautonomous robotic weapons. The Air Force is testing software to enable fighter pilots to guide accompanying unmanned aircraft toward enemy positions, whereupon the drones will seek and destroy air defense radars and other key targets on their own. The Army is testing an unarmed robotic ground vehicle, the Squad Multipurpose Equipment Transport (SMET) and has undertaken development of a Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV). These systems, once fielded, would accompany ground troops and crewed vehicles in combat, trying to reduce U.S. soldiers’ exposure to enemy fire. Similar endeavors are under way in China, Russia, and a score of other countries.1 For advocates of such scenarios, the development and deployment of autonomous weapons systems, or “killer robots,” as they are often called, offer undeniable advantages in combat. Comparatively cheap and able to operate 24 hours a day without tiring, the robotic warriors could help reduce U.S. casualties. When equipped with advanced sensors and artificial intelligence (AI), moreover, autonomous weapons could be trained to operate in coordinated swarms, or “wolfpacks,” overwhelming enemy defenders and affording a speedy U.S. victory. “Imagine anti-submarine warfare wolfpacks,” said former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work at the christening of Sea Hunter. “Imagine mine warfare flotillas, distributed surface-warfare action groups, deception vessels, electronic warfare vessels”—all unmanned and operating autonomously.
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › NATO Cohesion Advantage › War Escalation
Jay Ettinger, 20, (Jay Ettinger, Jay is JD & Legal Intern, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fall 2020, “Overcoming International Inertia: The Creation of War Manual for Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Minnesota Journal Of International Law, https://minnjil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Ettinger-MACRO.pdf, 6-27-2022) SCade
Second, LAWS have the potential to offer a much greater military advantage than previously banned weapons.152 Historically, the major military powers have been cautious to limit their military options through international treaties, particularly when the treaty involves strategically important weapons.153 A number of experts believe that AI functionality will have a revolutionary impact on warfare.154 LAWS technology has the potential to create a significant competitive asymmetry for the State that can first successfully develop the technology.155 In fact, the U.S. Military has explicitly stated that its goal for AI development is to create “an enduring competitive edge that lasts a generation or more.”156 This significant first mover advantage has created a high-degree of competition in LAWS development, in particular between the United States, Russia, and China.157 All three are heavily invested in LAWS development and view it “as fundamental to the future of armed conflict.”158 Some conceptualize this competition as an “AI arms race.”159 Each major military power is concerned that attempts to limit or outright ban LAWS development may put them at a competitive disadvantage if their peer States are not party to the treaty or do not abide by the treaty obligations.160 Even if all major military States were party to the treaty, the prohibition on LAWS development would be challenging to enforce due to the dual use (civilian and military) functionality of AI technology.161 This would make it difficult for an overseeing treaty body to ensure that States were complying with their treaty obligation not to develop AI technology for LAWS purposes.
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › NATO Cohesion Advantage › NATO Cohesion – Warming Defense
Zing Tsjeng, 19, 2-27-2019, executive editor and the author of the Forgotten Women book series, "The Climate Change Paper So Depressing It's Sending People to Therapy", [https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vbwpdb/the-climate-change-paper-so-depressing-its-sending-people-to-therapy], AVD
"Deep Adaptation" is quite unlike any other academic paper. There's the language ("we are about to play Russian Roulette with the entire human race with already two bullets loaded"). There's the flashes of dark humor ("I was only partly joking earlier when I questioned why I was even writing this paper"). But most of all, there's the stark conclusions that it draws about the future. Chiefly, that it's too late to stop climate change from devastating our world—and that "climate-induced societal collapse is now inevitable in the near term." How near? About a decade. Professor Jem Bendell, a sustainability academic at the University of Cumbria, wrote the paper after taking a sabbatical at the end of 2017 to review and understand the latest climate science "properly—not sitting on the fence anymore," as he puts it on the phone to me. What he found terrified him. "The evidence before us suggests that we are set for disruptive and uncontrollable levels of climate change, bringing starvation, destruction, migration, disease, and war," he writes in the paper. "Our norms of behavior—that we call our 'civilization'—may also degrade." "It is time," he adds, "we consider the implications of it being too late to avert a global environmental catastrophe in the lifetimes of people alive today." Even a schmuck like me is familiar with some of the evidence Bendell sets out to prove his point. You only needed to step outside during the record-breaking heatwave last year to acknowledge that 17 of the 18 hottest years on the planet have occurred since 2000. Scientists already believe we are soon on course for an ice-free Arctic, which will only accelerate global warming. Back in 2017, even Fox News reported scientists' warnings that the Earth's sixth mass extinction was underway. Erik Buitenhuis, a senior researcher at the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, tells me that Bendell's conclusions may sound extreme, but he agrees with the report's overall assessment. "I think societal collapse is indeed inevitable," he says, though adds that "the process is likely to take decades to centuries." The important thing, Buitenhuis says, is to realize that the negative effects of climate change have already been with us for some time: "Further gradual deterioration looks much more likely to me than a disaster within the next ten years that will be big enough that, after that, everybody will agree the status quo is doomed." "Jem's paper is in the main well-researched and supported by relatively mainstream climate science," says Professor Rupert Read, chair of the Green House think-tank and a philosophy academic at the University of East Anglia. "That's why I'm with him on the fundamentals. And more and more people are." Read's key disagreement with Bendell is his belief that we still have time to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, saying, "I think it's hubris to think that we know the future." But that doesn't mean Bendell's premise is wrong: "The way I see it, deep adaptation is insurance against the possibility—or rather, the probability—of some kind of collapse," says Read. "'Deep Adaptation' is saying, 'What do we need to do if collapse is something we need to realistically plan for?'" When I speak to Bendell, he tells me he thinks of "Deep Adaptation" as more of an ethical and philosophical framework, rather than a prophecy about the future of the planet. "The longer we refuse to talk about climate change as already here and screwing with our way of life—because we don't want to think like that because it's too frightening or will somehow demotivate people—the less time we have to reduce harm," he says with deliberation. What does he mean by harm? "Starvation is the first one," he answers, pointing to lowering harvests of grain in Europe in 2018 due to drought that saw the EU reap 6 million tons less wheat. "In the scientific community at the moment, the appropriate thing is to say that 2018 was an anomaly. However, if you look at what's been happening over the last few years, it isn't an anomaly. There's a possibility that 2018 is the new best case scenario." That means, in Bendell's view, that governments need to start planning emergency responses to climate change, including growing and stockpiling food. He minces his words even less in his paper: "When I say starvation, destruction, migration, disease, and war, I mean in your own life. With the power down, soon you won't have water coming out of your tap. You will depend on your neighbors for food and some warmth. You will become malnourished. You won't know whether to stay or go. You will fear being violently killed before starving to death." Should people start building bunkers and buying bulletproof vests? "There's no way of getting through this unless we try together," he says. "We need to help people stay fed and watered where they live already to reduce disruption and reduce civil unrest as much as we can." Of the Silicon Valley financiers prepping for the apocalypse in New Zealand, he says: "Once money doesn't matter anymore and the armed guards are trying to feed their starving children, what do you think they'll do? The billionaires doing that are just deluded." Bendell wasn't always this gloomy about the state of the world. He once worked for WWF, one of the biggest environmental charities in the world, and in 2012 founded the Institute for Leadership and Sustainability (IFLAS) at the University of Cumbria. The World Economic Forum named him a Young Global Leader for his work. So how did he end up writing a paper that determined that civilization—and environmental sustainability as we currently understand it—is doomed? "Since the age of 15, I've been an environmentalist," he tells me. "I've given my life professionally and personally. I'm a workaholic, and it was all about sustainability." Once he sat down with the data, however, he realized that his field was quickly becoming irrelevant in the face of oncoming climate catastrophe. "It would mean not getting super excited about the expansion of your recycling program in a major multinational," he says. "It's a completely different paradigm of what we should be looking at." What he didn’t expect was for the paper to take off online. "It was aimed at those people in my professional community and why we're in denial," he says. "When I put it out there, I didn’t expect 15-year-olds in schools in Indonesia to be reading it with their teachers." He says that "Deep Adaptation" has been downloaded over 110,000 times since it was released by IFLAS as an occasional paper. "Someone in the alternative economics and bitcoin crowd told me, 'Oh, everyone's talking about deep adaptation in London at all the dinner parties,'" he laughs. Researchers from the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), an established progressive think-tank, consulted Bendell's paper in the process of writing its new report, "This is a crisis: Facing up to the age of environmental breakdown." Laurie Laybourn-Langton, its lead author, told me via email: "I appreciated the frankness of the report in facing up to issues that so many in research and policy communities seem unwilling to. We don't subscribe to the view that social collapse is inevitable, however." He explains: "This is partly because it's so hard to predict the outcomes of the complex and uncertain process of environmental shocks interacting with social and economic systems. We simply don't know. That said, they shouldn’t be disregarded as a potential outcome, and so we are calling for greater levels of preparedness to these shocks." Not everyone was so taken with the paper. Bendell submitted it to a well-respected academic journal for publication, with little success. Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal (SAMPJ) told me that the paper was in need of "major revisions" before it would be ready for publication. Bendell ended up publishing it through IFLAS and his blog. "The academic process is such that I took that as an effective rejection," he explains, saying that the reviewers wanted him to fundamentally alter his conclusions. "I couldn't completely rewrite the paper to say that I don't think collapse is inevitable. It was asking for a different paper." Emerald, the scholarly publisher that owns SAMPJ, says it takes issue with how Bendell frames its reception of its paper on his blog: "the study on collapse they thought you should not read—yet." A spokesperson told me: "The decision was arrived at based on the merit of the submitted article and the double blind peer review process integral to academia and the advancement of knowledge. SAMPJ, and [editor Carol Adams] are proud members of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and adhere to the highest ethical standards in publishing. We see no evidence that the decision of Major Revision was politically motivated. "Emerald requested the author correct their blog post to reflect the facts. This request was unfortunately ignored. The post continues to imply the paper was rejected because it was deemed too controversial. The paper was not rejected, and was given a Major Revision due to the rigorous standards of the scholarly output of the journal." Bendell says he did reply to Emerald's request to amend his blog post—but only if they would consider telling him the decisions of those who reviewed his paper. (Under the double blind peer review, reviewers' decisions are anonymous.) "That title can be read in a number of ways," he says. "It is a paper that the reviewers didn't want you to read. They didn't want it published." Climate gloom and doom is nothing new—doomsday preppers have been stockpiling their freeze-dried food rations for decades now. But Bendell's paper appears to have hit a unique nerve, especially given that the average scientific paper is estimated to be read by only three or so people. Rupert Read tells me that he was sent it simultaneously by three other academics when it was published. But it hasn’t trended on Twitter. It hasn't been pushed by a celebrity. It was briefly mentioned in a Bloomberg Businessweek article, but that's it. "Deep Adaptation" is that unique social phenomenon: an academic paper that has gone viral through word of mouth. Nathan Savelli, a 31-year-old high school life coach from Hamilton, Canada, was recommended the paper by a local environmental activist. Reading it sent him spiraling into depression. "I guess in some ways it felt like I was diagnosed with a terminal illness," he tells me. "If I'm being honest, it was a mix of heartbreaking sadness and extreme anger." Savelli felt so low that he sought help from a climate grief support group organized by 350.org, the global grassroots climate movement. "I had attended counseling in the past for other issues, but never a group session, and thought it might be something helpful for me," he tells me. Did it help? "I'm not sure I'd say it alleviated my grief, but it was definitely comforting to be around people who understood what I was feeling." And therein lies the problem with "Deep Adaptation:" if you accept that the paper is entirely correct in its prediction of collapse, how do you move on with your life? How do you even get out of bed in the morning? "I'm aware of what difficult emotions it triggers," Bendell acknowledges. "I do believe that if you’ve come across this [paper], then absolutely some grief and despair is very natural. Why isn't that OK? We all die in the end. Life is about impermanence." On his blog, he lists several sources for psychological support, including several groups on Facebook and LinkedIn that discuss collapse and offer help to those struggling to come to terms with the conclusions of his paper. But, Bendell adds, reading the paper has been "transformative" for some. "People find a new boldness about living life on their own terms—actually connecting to their heart's desire. How do they wish to live, and why don't they live that way now rather than postponing it?" In one case, it even helped prompt one high-ranking academic to quit her job and the city. In December of 2017, Dr. Alison Green left her post as the pro vice-chancellor of Arden University. She had read the IPCC report warning that the world is nowhere near averting global temperature increases, as well as the 1,656-page National Climate Assessment on how climate change is now dramatically affecting our lives—and then she read Bendell's paper.
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › NATO Cohesion Advantage › NATO Cohesion – Warming Defense
Sebastian Farquhar 17 leads the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective Altruism, et al., 2017, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf
The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction.15 The existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable,16 and would completely devastate agriculture.17 This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.18 Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.19 Moreover, the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios. The probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.20 If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,21 which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.22 The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,23 and of 10°C is around 3%.24 These estimates are of course highly uncertain. It is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO2 emissions and eventual warming,25 and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.26 Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO2 emissions. If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures.
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › NATO Cohesion Advantage › NATO Cohesion Fails
Steinberg 5 (Gerald M., Academic and political scientist, PhD in government from Cornell University, “The Myth of International Law” October 15, 2005, http://www.zionismontheweb.org/myth_of_international_law.htm)
In this reality, the principles that are said to constitute “international law” lack the two central properties required for any legitimate legal system: the consent of the governed, and uniform and unprejudiced application. International law and the claims made in its name fit neither criteria. In a democratic framework, the legal system gains legitimacy through the consent of the citizens, and accountable to democratic procedures. We accept the limitations placed on us by the system of laws and the role of the police in enforcing these laws as part of the requirements for justice and order in any functioning society. But we do not accept limitations imposed from the outside, without our consent. Thus, the claims of the UN, the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and campaigns run by obsessed extremists in Europe, lack any legitimate moral foundation or standing in democratic societies with their own legal system. Similarly, when judges sitting on the Israeli High Court base decisions on international law, they are attempting to impose an external framework which lacks the legitimacy provided by the consent of the governed. THE OTHER problem with the use of international law is the absence of equitable implementation. No legal system that focuses its attention selectively can be considered legitimate. Thus, the routine condemnations of Israeli or American policy by the UN, the ICJ, and accompanying NGOs have no moral or legal validity when the principles are not applied uniformly. In contrast to these destructive polemics, in order to promote a meaningful universal moral code, it is necessary to recognize the need for the consent of the governed and for consistent and universal enforcement. International law based on justice, and not ideology, remains a worthy objective. But the substitution of political rhetoric that invokes the myths and rhetoric for the real thing is entirely counterproductive.
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › NATO Cohesion Advantage › NATO Cohesion Fails
Melissa Heikkila (Politico) “NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.” March 29, 2021 https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/
On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way. The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use. “We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO. The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight. David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus. "I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said. Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground. For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications. The pitch NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said. The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said. The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems. “If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said. “We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued. Mission impossible? The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban.
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Terrorism Advantage › Terrorism – Impact Defense
Romero 18 – Luiz, reporter for Quartz cites Maryland terrorism database. “New data shows terror attacks are becoming less frequent and much less deadly”, Quartz, , 08-01-2018
New data shows the world is becoming safer, at least by one measure. The latest update of the Global Terrorism Database, compiled by the University of Maryland and published Wednesday (Aug. 1), shows terrorism has retreated for the third consecutive year. Attacks around the world dropped from about 17,000 in 2014 to about 11,000 in 2017. The number of fatal victims fell by almost half in the same period. But as the chart shows, the total number of attacks last year was still considerably higher than in the 1990s and 2000s. Though ISIL remained the most active terrorist group in 2017, it committed 10% fewer attacks, and caused 40% fewer deaths compared to 2016. The terror group reached its peak around 2014, when it made advances in the Middle East, conquering the cities of Raqqa, Syria and Mosul, Iraq. It also took credit for a series of deadly attacks in Europe and beyond. Since then it has lost much of its territory. Despite an improvement at the global level, some specific countries registered more terrorism than before. In the US, the number of lethal attacks almost tripled, with the deadliest case being the Las Vegas shooting in October.
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Terrorism Advantage › Terrorism – Impact Defense
McIntosh and Storey 18 – Christopher, visiting assistant professor of political studies at Bard College. Ian, a fellow at the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and Humanities at Bard College. “Between Acquisition and Use: Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 62, No. 2, pg. 289-300, , 04-19-2018
This last point is worth emphasizing. Even in the remote case where an actor successfully acquires a nuclear weapon and primarily seeks raw numbers of casualties—whether due to outbidding or audience costs—other forms of WMDs are likely to be more appealing. As Aum Shinrikyo indicates, this is particularly the case for the group that overcomes the inevitable political and technological hurdles (Nehorayoff et al. 2016, 36–37). For these groups, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons (CBRW) are considerably easier to acquire, use, and stockpile. This is especially true when considered over time, rather than a single operation.18 While there are certainly downsides to CBRWs vis-à-vis nuclear weapons (delivery may paradoxically be easier and the maintenance risks comparatively smaller), they are undoubtedly easier to procure and produce (Zanders 1999). More importantly, CBRWs are perceived as easier to produce and thus likely to be viewed by targets as iterable. Unlike a nuclear attack, CBRW threats are more credible because a single CBRW attack can likely precipitate an indefinite number of follow-ups.
In addition to the problem of iterability, a terrorist organization must always worry about the possible ratchet effect of an attack—a problem Neumann and Smith (2005, 588– 90) refer to as the “escalation trap.” A terrorist organization is different than a state at war because it manipulates other actors primarily through punishment. Campaigns are a communicative activity designed to convince the public and the leaders that the status quo is unsustainable. The message is that the costs of continuing the target state’s policy (such as the United States in Lebanon, France in Algeria, or the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland) will eventually outweigh the benefits. Once an organization conducts a nuclear attack, it lacks options for an encore. Not even the most nightmarish scenarios involve an indefinite supply of weapons. If a single attack plus the threat of one or two others does not induce capitulation, the organization might unwittingly harden the target state’s resolve. The attack could raise the bar such that any future non-nuclear attack constitutes a lessening of costs vis-à-vis the status quo.
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Terrorism Advantage › Terrorism – Impact Defense
Mueller 21 – John, Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, and member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. “The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency, Chapter 4: Al-Qaeda and the 9/11 Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan”, Cambridge University Press, 03-04-2021
The exaggeration of terrorist capacities has been greatest in the many much overstated assessments of their ability to develop nuclear weapons or devices. It has been widely predicted for two decades now that, because al-Qaeda operatives used box cutters so effectively on 9/11, they would, although under siege, soon apply equal talents in science and engineering to fabricate nuclear weapons and then detonate them on American cities. A popular estimate was that such a disaster might well happen by 2014.29 Given the decidedly limited capabilities of terrorists, this concern seems to have been substantially overwrought: thus far, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. That lack of action may be because, after a brief exploration of the possible routes, they – unlike generations of alarmists – have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful.30
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Terrorism Advantage › Terrorism – Recruiting Internal Link
Aqil Shah, 6-10-2018, "Drone Blowback: Much Ado about Nothing?", Lawfare, <Aqil Shah is Wick Cary Assistant Professor of South Asian Politics in the David L. Boren College of International Studies at the University of Oklahoma and a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.>, ke
Targeted killings of suspected Islamist militants by armed drones have become the mainstay of U.S. counterterrorism campaigns in non-traditional conflicts in countries like Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Analysts, human rights organizations, and former U.S. officials claim that drone strikes produce blowback: Rather than reducing the terrorist threat, drone strikes increase it by providing terrorist groups with fresh recruits. According to two prominent experts, David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum, “every one of these dead noncombatants [in Pakistan] represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased.” Although intuitive, the blowback argument lacks empirical support. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has launched an estimated 430 drone strikes in Pakistan since 2004 (roughly 75 percent of its known total strikes worldwide). My research there shows that drone blowback may be much ado about nothing. Drawing on interviews with 167 well-informed adults from North Waziristan Agency (NWA), the most heavily targeted district in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), extensive interviews with respected experts on terrorism, and an official Pakistani police survey of 500 detained terrorists from southern Sindh Province, I find no evidence of a direct link between drones strikes and radicalization or the recruitment of militants, either locally or nationally. Instead, my data and secondary sources suggest that militant recruitment is a complex process driven by a variety of factors, such as political grievances, state sponsorship of militancy as a tool of foreign policy, state repression, weak governance, and coercive recruitment by militant groups—not drone strikes. At the local level, finding evidence of blowback from well-informed locals should be relatively easy given the dense social and kinship ties of NWA inhabitants. Virtually every family in NWA has been affected by the conflict, whether through the death of a relative, the destruction of property, or displacement resulting from a military offensive. Yet these people have largely been left out of debates about the threats they face and the effect these threats have on their lives. Moreover, the inhabitants of FATA identify themselves as members of a particular Pashtun qabail or qaum (tribe) divided into khels (sub-tribes), each of which consists of extended clans or families. Inhabitants are therefore enmeshed in dense social networks, which makes them uniquely informed about the effects of drone strikes on their community. Most respondents claimed to personally know or be aware of someone in their clan or village who had been involved in militant activity or who had been indirectly linked to militants, but none believed that the reason was the loss of a relative in a drone strike. As one tribal elder from Dande Darpa Khel in Miranshah, the drone-targeted headquarters of the Haqqani Network, explained: “We hear rumors that this or that man joined the Taliban or al-Qaeda because of anger over drone strikes. It is possible. But I know almost every family in my area, and I do not know of a case where a local man or boy joined the Taliban as direct result of death or injury to a close relative in a drone strike. In fact, most of the Taliban fighters were already radicalized, or inclined toward militancy for various reasons, or forced to join these groups.” Comments like this came up frequently in my sample. Even local leaders of Islamist and other right-wing parties acknowledged that the ability of drone strikes to spawn militants is exaggerated. The views of this informed group of NWA residents rest on pragmatic calculations. Most were resentful of the coercive tactics the Taliban used to terrorize and control the local population, especially after the Pakistani military struck a peace deal with them in September 2006. Taliban tactics included taxation and harsh penalties for minor offenses. Local resentment is also rooted in state repression. Until recently, FATA was governed under the colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulation (enacted under British rule in 1901), which prescribes harsh penalties for crimes without the right of appeal in a court of law, including collective responsibility for offenses committed by one or more members of a tribe or those committed by anyone in its area. During its operations, the Pakistani military has used collective punishments, including economic blockades, to punish families or clans whose members they suspected of harboring foreign militants. The state’s application of these draconian and often indiscriminate measures against the local population, and its appeasement of militants through peace agreements, has only compounded local alienation stemming from counterinsurgency operations that, some studies show, benefit insurgents. But in North Waziristan, many locals are alienated from both the Pakistani state and the militants.
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Terrorism Advantage › Terrorism – Recruiting Internal Link
Zachary Kallenborn (research affiliate with the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, a policy fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, and a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command “Mad Scientist.”) “Applying arms control frameworks to autonomous weapons” October 05, 2021 https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/applying-arms-control-frameworks-to-autonomous-weapons/
At the same time, militaries see great value in the development of autonomous weapons. Autonomous weapons offer speed. A typical human takes 250 milliseconds to react to something they see. An autonomous weapon can respond far faster—Rheinmetall Defense’s Active Defense System can react to incoming rocket-propelled grenade in less than one millisecond. According to General George Murray, head of the U.S. Army’s Future Command, that speed may be necessary to defend against massive drone swarms. These weapons may be the difference between survival and defeat. Giving them up in an arms control treaty would be foolish. Militaries also dispute the risk of error. Humans get tired, frustrated, and over-confident. That creates mistakes. Autonomous weapons have no such emotion, and advocates of military AI applications argue a reduced error-rate makes pursuing the technology a moral imperative. Plus, artificial intelligence can improve aiming. That reduces collateral harm. For example, Israel reportedly used an artificial intelligence-assisted machine gun to assassinate an Iranian nuclear scientist without hitting the scientist’s wife inches away. So, in their view, what are arms control advocates really afraid of?
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Terrorism Advantage › Terrorism – Recruiting Internal Link
Kyle Hiebert (researcher and analyst formerly based in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, as deputy editor of the Africa Conflict Monitor) “Are Lethal Autonomous Weapons Inevitable? It Appears So” January 27, 2022 https://www.cigionline.org/articles/are-lethal-autonomous-weapons-inevitable-it-appears-so/
More Just War — or Just More War? Rapid advances in autonomous weapons technologies and an increasingly tense global order have brought added urgency to the debate over the merits and risks of their use. Proponents include Robert Work, a former US deputy secretary of defence under the Obama and Trump administrations, who has argued the United States has a “moral imperative” to pursue autonomous weapons. The chief benefit of LAWS, Work and others say, is that their adoption would make warfare more humane by reducing civilian casualties and accidents through decreasing “target misidentification” that results in what the US Department of Defense labels “unintended engagements.” Put plainly: Autonomous weapons systems may be able to assess a target’s legitimacy and make decisions faster, and with more accuracy and objectivity than fallible human actors could, either on a chaotic battlefield or through the pixelated screen of a remote-control centre thousands of miles away. The outcome would be a more efficient use of lethal force that limits collateral damage and saves innocent lives through a reduction in human error and increased precision of munitions use. Machines also cannot feel stress, fatigue, vindictiveness or hate. If widely adopted, killer robots could, in theory, lessen the opportunistic sexual violence, looting and vengeful razing of property and farmland that often occurs in war — especially in ethnically driven conflicts. These atrocities tend to create deep-seated traumas and smouldering intergenerational resentments that linger well after the shooting stops, destabilizing societies over the long term and inviting more conflict in the future.
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency - Moral Justification
Andrew Keen Woods 2022— (ANDREW KEANE WOODS* (Winter, 2022). ARTICLE: ROBOPHOBIA. University of Colorado Law Review, 93, 51. .)
In other words, international law and domestic regulations demonstrate a clear bias in favor of human deciders over robot deciders, despite the real promise of autonomous weapons to reduce civilian casualties. Robot performance is capped at human performance; human performance is a ceiling, not a floor, for robot performance.
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency - Moral Justification
Andrew Keen Woods 2022— (ANDREW KEANE WOODS* (Winter, 2022). ARTICLE: ROBOPHOBIA. University of Colorado Law Review, 93, 51. .)
Weapons systems are increasingly automated, meaning that many tasks formerly done by humans are now being done by machines. This includes tasks like flying aircrafts, detecting incoming fire, and even deciding how to respond, including firing weapons. In addition to the military advantage these weapons pose, there is a case to be made that they are more ethical than human combatants. As Ronald Arkin notes, lethal autonomous weapons systems may be imperfect, but they promise to be better than human soldiers at reducing casualties and adhering to the laws of war. In addition to never being fatigued or upset, robot weapons need not have a self-preservation instinct. And in the event that the laws of war are broken, robots will be more likely to report the abuse than a human soldier.
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency - Moral Justification
Reuters, 21 (Reuters, News Corporation based in Washington, DC, 1-26-2021, accessed on 6-28-2022, the Guardian, "US has 'moral imperative' to develop AI weapons, says panel", https://www.theguardian.com/science/2021/jan/26/us-has-moral-imperative-to-develop-ai-weapons-says-panel?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Other)
The US should not agree to ban the use or development of , a government-appointed panel has said in a draft report for Congress. The panel, led by former Google chief executive Eric Schmidt, on Tuesday concluded two days of public discussion about how the world’s biggest military power should consider AI for national security and technological advancement. Its vice-chairman, Robert Work, a former deputy secretary of defense, said autonomous weapons are expected to make fewer mistakes than humans do in battle, leading to reduced casualties or skirmishes caused by target misidentification. “It is a moral imperative to at least pursue this hypothesis,” he said. The discussion waded into a controversial frontier of human rights and warfare. For about eight years, a coalition of non-governmental organisations has , saying human control is necessary to judge attacks’ proportionality and assign blame for war crimes. Thirty countries including Brazil and Pakistan want a ban, according to the coalition’s website, and a UN body has held meetings on the systems since at least 2014. While autonomous weapon capabilities are decades old, concern has mounted with the development of AI to power such systems, along with research finding biases in AI and examples of the software’s abuse. The US panel, called the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, in meetings this week acknowledged the risks of autonomous weapons. A member from Microsoft for instance warned of pressure to build machines that react quickly, which could escalate conflicts. The panel only wants humans to make decisions on launching nuclear warheads. Still, the panel prefers anti-proliferation work to a treaty banning the systems, which it said would be against US interests and difficult to enforce. Mary Wareham, coordinator of the eight-year Campaign to Stop Killer , said the commission’s “focus on the need to compete with similar investments made by China and Russia … only serves to encourage arms races.” Beyond AI-powered weapons, the panel’s lengthy report recommended use of AI by intelligence agencies to streamline data gathering and review; $32bn (£23.3bn) in annual federal funding for AI research; and new bodies including a digital corps modelled after the army’s Medical Corps and a technology competitiveness council chaired by the US vice-president. The commission is due to submit its final report to Congress in March, but the recommendations are not binding.
2022
SDI
Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency - Moral Justification
Kovic, 18 (Marko Kovic, Co-founder and President of ZIPAR Policy Brief, February 2018, accessed on 6-27-2022, ZIPAR Policy Brief, "The strategic paradox of autonomous weapons", ) (NB)
War has always created suffering. Over the centuries, however, the morality of warfare has improved. For example, spoils of war for the victors, including raping women and pillaging, used to be common military practice. Today, there are jus in bello rules that dene morally acceptable and morally unacceptable behavior during warfare. These rules are the rules that comprise international humanitarian law, both as formal treaties and as customary law [13]. The broad strokes of humanitarian law, such as the Geneva Conventions, are almost universally accepted. However, humans make errors, and we can be irrational, emotional, sadistic, psychopathic, and so forth. Morally acceptable behavior in war is difficult to monitor and almost impossible to enforce. Autonomous weapons could make a significant positive impact in this area: Since autonomous weapons achieve their goals with the help of artificial intelligence, that artificial intelligence can be designed in such a way that moral principles of humanitarian law are at the top of the autonomous weapons’ utility function [14, 15, 16]. All the errors and biases that we humans are prone to do not exist in artificial intelligence (Unless we design the artificial intelligence in such a faulty way.). In addition, the rules of humanitarian law can be very explicitly and formally implemented in autonomous weapons, without the possibility that the autonomous weapon can override those rules. After all, artificial intelligence is simply a utility-maximizing apparatus that seeks to achieve the goals it is designed to achieve. This is a very simple point, but one that might run counter to a more intuitive understanding of morality in the context of artificial intelligence. We might feel that artificial intelligence is intrinsically «bad» or «evil» because it is only a machine, not a human. In reality, however, artificial intelligence is merely a tool that performs (some) tasks better than humans, precisely because it does not suer from our human limitations. If our goal is to wage war in a morally acceptable manner, then artificial intelligence could help us do so better. I believe that the probability for this outcome is very high, somewhere between 0.8 and 1.