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2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Off case › Links – Politics

Democrats support germline genetic engineering

Lev Facher, 6-18-2019, (Lev Facher is a Washington correspondent for STAT, reporting on the politics of health and science. Since joining STAT in 2016, he has written extensively about the federal government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the opioid crisis, and the pharmaceutical industry’s influence on Capitol Hill.) "Why Democrats reopened the debate about germline gene editing", STAT, https://www.statnews.com/2019/06/18/democrats-reopened-debate-about-germline-editing/ lilw-msdi2022

WASHINGTON — A rogue Chinese scientist stunned the world last year when he announced the birth of genetically modified twin girls, prompting widespread outcry from the broader scientific community and calls for a “global moratorium” on editing human embryos that result in births. Yet months later, Democrats on Capitol Hill surprised many science policy experts when they attempted to roll back a related, 4-year-old ban on altering the DNA of embryos intended for pregnancies. To many health policy experts here, and research advocates across the country, the timing — just months after the biggest genome editing scandal in world history — was inexplicable. Several Republicans criticized the proposal by playing up concerns of “maverick bioengineers” operating with little oversight and without ethical norms. And while some scientists supported the effort, others expressed open confusion, in particular at the breadth of the change Democrats sought. Within weeks of proposing to eliminate their plan, Democrats largely backed off. But their sudden effort to reverse what seemed to some like a basic ethical protection serves as a case study in how Washington regulates science — and the immense influence lawmakers, regardless of their scientific expertise, often wield over federal research. “In terms of ‘Why now,’ it does seem odd given there is so much international conversation in the scientific community about how to limit germline editing,” said Remy Brim, a scientist and former Democratic Capitol Hill aide who works at the D.C. lobbying firm BGR. The United States has banned germline editing with the aim of starting a pregnancy since 2015, the result of bipartisan opposition to the practice and preemptive scientific concern about the implications of the gene-editing technology CRISPR. Republicans in particular have supported the ban due to conscience concerns similar to those surrounding the use of fetal tissue in research and using federal funds for abortion — some argue that germline genome editing requires the creation of human embryos that will eventually be discarded. When Democrats took control of the House of Representatives in last year’s midterm elections, they saw an opening to repeal a measure that many felt was overly restrictive. As the House Appropriations Committee considered the spending package that funds the Food and Drug Administration, lawmakers excluded the brief provision that has banned the consideration of certain genome-editing trials — a change that would have essentially lifted the ban, if the law had passed. Republicans quickly criticized the change, calling it hasty and ill-advised — even specifically citing China’s “CRISPR babies” scandal, in which He Jiankui drew worldwide criticism for using the technique to alter the genes of twin girls.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › 2NC Germline turn › 2NC---Germline Extensions

Russia is moving forward w/gene engineering

TASS, 9-1-2021, "Russia to support genetic engineering studies, Putin says", https://tass.com/society/1332539, 6-28-2022, //ms

VLADIVOSTOK, September 1. /TASS/. Creating artificial barriers to the development of genetic engineering is pointless, so Russia will support research in this sphere, Russian President Vladimir Putin said at a back-to-school gathering on Wednesday to mark the occasion of the Day of Knowledge during his visit to Russia’s Far East. "With the help of genetic engineering, it is possible, actually, to shape the quality of future biological objects. This is a very demanding task. The outcome, if humankind goes down this path, is hard to predict, so we have to bear this in mind. There are scientific and moral considerations. [This is] a very important issue," the head of state emphasized. "However, it is fully obvious that its development will continue one way or another. And it makes no sense to put up artificial barriers," he asserted. The president cited as examples the invention of gunpowder and nuclear energy that ended up belonging to all of humanity. "Mankind should formulate shared criteria for work in this direction, make a decision and ensure that these decisions are well-considered, scientifically valid and will be implemented," Putin said. "Nowadays, there is probably nothing more interesting than this. So, we will support this research without any doubt," he concluded. Putin’s meeting with schoolchildren was held within the framework of the New Knowledge educational marathon.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › 2NC Germline turn › 2NC---Germline Extensions

Russia will pursue germline editing of humans – they are willing to act outside of the rules based international order.

Margaret E. Kosal Pages 389-408 | Published online: 15 Sep 2021 The Nonproliferation Review Volume 27, 2020 - Issue 4-6: Chemical and Biological Warfare CRISPR and new genetic-engineering techniques: emerging challenges to strategic stability and nonproliferation doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1879464 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2020.1879464

Exemplifying the twenty-first-century reality that no scientific research is unique to any single nation, a Russian scientist announced in June 2019 that he was pursuing similar gene-editing experiments and intended to use CRISPR for germline editing of humans. Russia has recently thumbed its nose at international norms with the use of unscheduled, military-grade nerve agents against a former intelligence officer, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter, Yulia, living in the United Kingdom. More recently, the Russian domestic dissident Alexei Navalny was poisoned with a Novichok-type organophosphate poison. In an incident that is less well known, three Russians were initially charged with attempting to poison a Bulgarian businessman with contacts in Russia and two others in May 2015. If Russia is pursuing broader efforts to erode the post-World War II rules-based international order, of which the Skripal case arguably is an exemplar, the Russian scientists’ announcement could be an indication of that. Among other alternatives, this could be a case of an individual scientist sending up a test balloon to see how the Russian government responds. Critically, the demonstrated interest in using CRISPR gene-editing techniques for a variety of human applications is ongoing and not limited to any single nation-state.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › 2NC Germline turn › 2NC---Germline Extensions

China is pushing germline editing research – won’t stop – and other countries are following.

WESLEY W. CHEN June 30 2019 HUMAN GERMLINE GENE EDITING: ENGINEERING AN UNSTOPPABLE TRAIN https://mylaw2.usc.edu/why/students/orgs/ilj/assets/docs/28-2-Chen.pdf

No country is pushing human germline gene editing research harder than China. It is fitting that the country that first broke the glass door on gene editing in human embryos would be leading the way for the controversial field. Human germline editing research has been able to thrive in China in part because of how ethical research laws are (or better yet) not enforced. For example, in 2015, when China reported the first case of human germline editing, its Guidelines on Human Assisted Reproductive Technologies stated that “using human egg plasma and nuclear transfer technology for the purpose of reproduction, and manipulation of the genes in human gametes, zygotes or embryos for the purposes of reproduction are prohibited.” 99 However, the 2015 study was likely able to proceed because such administrative research guidelines are considered “soft law” and not thoroughly enforced.100 Today, any Chinese university or hospital can freely conduct clinical trials for gene editing technology with approval from their own ethics commissions and do not require approval by China’s federal government.101 Interestingly, it also seems that China is equally willing to support gene editing research for fixing disorders as opposed to human augmentation. For example, while one Chinese study gene edited embryos to correct the mutation for β-thalassemia,102 another Chinese study enhanced an embryo to give it genetic resistance against HIV.103 With other countries following China’s lead, one wonders whether it is inevitable that the United States will eventually join the fray.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › 2NC Germline turn › 2NC---Germline Extensions

Reject their authors – media makes fantastical exaggerations. If the US doesn’t do research, somebody else WILL and force the US to act – that’s worse – turns case

Mathews 15 Mathews, Debra. Debra Mathews, PhD, is assistant director for science programs at the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. “Experts Debate: Are We Playing with Fire When We Edit Human Genes?” STAT, 17 Nov. 2015, www.statnews.com/2015/11/17/gene-editing-embryo-crispr/#Mathews. Accessed 30 June 2022. //DRE

Fantastic and unrealistic fears inspired by science fiction often get all the attention in popular culture, while the very real potential benefits or risks of genetic research go unexplored and undiscussed. That is ethically problematic. Research on germline editing to gain fundamental knowledge about the nature of the human genome and early embryonic development is important and ethically permissible. We can learn much from this kind of research even if it isn't applied to human reproduction. If we later want to consider genome editing for reproductive use, then this initial basic research will be essential. That said, concerns over modifying the human germline are justified and deserve careful attention. I am part of the Hinton Group, a collaborative of international, interdisciplinary scholars, policymakers, journals, and funders focused on stem cells, ethics, and the law. In a September statement on human germline genetic modification, we said that there may be morally acceptable uses of this technology in human reproduction "given all safety, efficacy and governance needs are met." Before that happens, however, substantial societal discussion and debate will be needed. Regardless of what we decide to do in the United States, germline gene editing for reproductive purposes will be done somewhere around the world. We can have this difficult but deeply important conversation now and make proactive decisions about how to harness this science to achieve the benefits we care most about, or we can wait until the decisions are made for us by others and we are forced to react. I believe that we need to engage the public, policymakers, and broader scientific community to weigh the potential benefits and harms of human genome editing for research and human health instead of stopping all discussion, debate, and research. ‌

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › 2NC Germline turn › 2NC---Heg Impact

Unipolarity is sustainable and creates a structural disincentive for great power war and escalation – power vacuums causes cascade prolif and extinction

Hal Brands 15. On the faculty at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University The Elliott School of International Affairs The Washington Quarterly Summer 2015 38:2 pp. 7–28

The fundamental reason is that both U.S. influence and international stability are thoroughly interwoven with a robust U.S. forward presence. Regarding influence, the protection that Washington has afforded its allies has equally afforded the United States great sway over those allies’ policies.43 During the Cold War and after, for instance, the United States has used the influence provided by its security posture to veto allies’ pursuit of nuclear weapons, to obtain more advantageous terms in financial and trade agreements, and even to affect the composition of allied nations’ governments.44 More broadly, it has used its alliances as vehicles for shaping political, security, and economic agendas in key regions and bilateral relationships, thus giving the United States an outsized voice on a range of important issues. To be clear, this influence has never been as pervasive as U.S. officials might like, or as some observers might imagine. But by any reasonable standard of comparison, it has nonetheless been remarkable. One can tell a similar story about the relative stability of the post-war order. As even some leading offshore balancers have acknowledged, the lack of conflict in regions like Europe in recent decades is not something that has occurred naturally. It has occurred because the “American pacifier” has suppressed precisely the dynamics that previously fostered geopolitical turmoil. That pacifier has limited arms races and security competitions by providing the protection that allows other countries to under-build their militaries. It has soothed historical rivalries by affording a climate of security in which powerful countries like Germany and Japan could be revived economically and reintegrated into thriving and fairly cooperative regional orders. It has induced caution in the behavior of allies and adversaries alike, deterring aggression and dissuading other destabilizing behavior. As John Mearsheimer has noted, the United States “effectively acts as a night watchman,” lending order to an otherwise disorderly and anarchical environment.45 What would happen if Washington backed away from this role? The most logical answer is that both U.S. influence and global stability would suffer. With respect to influence, the United States would effectively be surrendering the most powerful bargaining chip it has traditionally wielded in dealing with friends and allies, and jeopardizing the position of leadership it has used to shape bilateral and regional agendas for decades. The consequences would seem no less damaging where stability is concerned. As offshore balancers have argued, it may be that U.S. retrenchment would force local powers to spend more on defense, while perhaps assuaging certain points of friction with countries that feel threatened or encircled by U.S. presence. But it equally stands to reason that removing the American pacifier would liberate the more destabilizing influences that U.S. policy had previously stifled. Long-dormant security competitions might reawaken as countries armed themselves more vigorously; historical antagonisms between old rivals might reemerge in the absence of a robust U.S. presence and the reassurance it provides. Moreover, countries that seek to revise existing regional orders in their favor—think Russia in Europe, or China in Asia—might indeed applaud U.S. retrenchment, but they might just as plausibly feel empowered to more assertively press their interests. If the United States has been a kind of Leviathan in key regions, Mearsheimer acknowledges, then “take away that Leviathan and there is likely to be big trouble.”46 Scanning the global horizon today, one can easily see where such trouble might arise. In Europe, a revisionist Russia is already destabilizing its neighbors and contesting the post-Cold War settlement in the region. In the Gulf and broader Middle East, the threat of Iranian ascendancy has stoked region-wide tensions manifesting in proxy wars and hints of an incipient arms race, even as that region also contends with a severe threat to its stability in the form of the Islamic State. In East Asia, a rising China is challenging the regional status quo in numerous ways, sounding alarms among its neighbors—many of whom also have historical grievances against each other. In these circumstances, removing the American pacifier would likely yield not low-cost stability, but increased conflict and upheaval. That conflict and upheaval, in turn, would be quite damaging to U.S. interests even if it did not result in the nightmare scenario of a hostile power dominating a key region. It is hard to imagine, for instance, that increased instability and acrimony would produce the robust multilateral cooperation necessary to deal with transnational threats from pandemics to piracy. More problematic still might be the economic consequences. As scholars like Michael Mandelbaum have argued, the enormous progress toward global prosperity and integration that has occurred since World War II (and now the Cold War) has come in the climate of relative stability and security provided largely by the United States.47 One simply cannot confidently predict that this progress would endure amid escalating geopolitical competition in regions of enormous importance to the world economy. Perhaps the greatest risk that a strategy of offshore balancing would run, of course, is that a key region might not be able to maintain its own balance following U.S. retrenchment. That prospect might have seemed far-fetched in the early post-Cold War era, and it remains unlikely in the immediate future. But in East Asia particularly, the rise and growing assertiveness of China has highlighted the medium- to long-term danger that a hostile power could in fact gain regional primacy. If China’s economy continues to grow rapidly, and if Beijing continues to increase military spending by 10 percent or more each year, then its neighbors will ultimately face grave challenges in containing Chinese power even if they join forces in that endeavor. This possibility, ironically, is one to which leading advocates of retrenchment have been attuned. “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China,” Mearshimer writes, “because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.”48 If this is true, however, then offshore balancing becomes a dangerous and potentially self-defeating strategy. As mentioned above, it could lead countries like Japan and South Korea to seek nuclear weapons, thereby stoking arms races and elevating regional tensions. Alternatively, and perhaps more worryingly, it might encourage the scenario that offshore balancers seek to avoid, by easing China’s ascent to regional hegemony. As Robert Gilpin has written, “Retrenchment by its very nature is an indication of relative weakness and declining power, and thus retrenchment can have a deteriorating effect on relations with allies and rivals.”49 In East Asia today, U.S. allies rely on U.S. reassurance to navigate increasingly fraught relationships with a more assertive China precisely because they understand that they will have great trouble balancing Beijing on their own. A significant U.S. retrenchment might therefore tempt these countries to acquiesce to, or bandwagon with, a rising China if they felt that prospects for successful resistance were diminishing as the United States retreated.50 In the same vein, retrenchment would compromise alliance relationships, basing agreements, and other assets that might help Washington check Chinese power in the first place—and that would allow the United States to surge additional forces into theater in a crisis. In sum, if one expects that Asian countries will be unable to counter China themselves, then reducing U.S. influence and leverage in the region is a curious policy. Offshore balancing might promise to preserve a stable and advantageous environment while reducing U.S. burdens. But upon closer analysis, the probable outcomes of the strategy seem more perilous and destabilizing than its proponents acknowledge.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Solvency › Germline leadership turn

Hegemony is empirically the most stable system and deters all conflict – decline causes transition wars

Robert Kagan, 17, 2-7-2017, Backing Into World War III, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/, Robert Kagan, Ph.D. in American History from American University, M.P.P. in Government from Harvard University, AVD

Think of two significant trend lines in the world today. One is the increasing ambition and activism of the two great revisionist powers, Russia and China. The other is the declining confidence, capacity, and will of the democratic world, and especially of the United States, to maintain the dominant position it has held in the international system since 1945. As those two lines move closer, as the declining will and capacity of the United States and its allies to maintain the present world order meet the increasing desire and capacity of the revisionist powers to change it, we will reach the moment at which the existing order collapses and the world descends into a phase of brutal anarchy, as it has three times in the past two centuries. The cost of that descent, in lives and treasure, in lost freedoms and lost hope, will be staggering. Americans tend to take the fundamental stability of the international order for granted, even while complaining about the burden the United States carries in preserving that stability. History shows that world orders do collapse, however, and when they do it is often unexpected, rapid, and violent. The late 18th century was the high point of the Enlightenment in Europe, before the continent fell suddenly into the abyss of the Napoleonic Wars. In the first decade of the 20th century, the world’s smartest minds predicted an end to great-power conflict as revolutions in communication and transportation knit economies and people closer together. The most devastating war in history came four years later. The apparent calm of the postwar 1920s became the crisis-ridden 1930s and then another world war. Where exactly we are in this classic scenario today, how close the trend lines are to that intersection point is, as always, impossible to know. Are we three years away from a global crisis, or 15? That we are somewhere on that path, however, is unmistakable. And while it is too soon to know what effect Donald Trump’s presidency will have on these trends, early signs suggest that the new administration is more likely to hasten us toward crisis than slow or reverse these trends. The further accommodation of Russia can only embolden Vladimir Putin, and the tough talk with China will likely lead Beijing to test the new administration’s resolve militarily. Whether the president is ready for such a confrontation is entirely unclear. For the moment, he seems not to have thought much about the future ramifications of his rhetoric and his actions. China and Russia are classic revisionist powers. Although both have never enjoyed greater security from foreign powers than they do today — Russia from its traditional enemies to the west, China from its traditional enemy in the east — they are dissatisfied with the current global configuration of power. Both seek to restore the hegemonic dominance they once enjoyed in their respective regions. For China, that means dominance of East Asia, with countries like Japan, South Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia both acquiescing to Beijing’s will and acting in conformity with China’s strategic, economic, and political preferences. That includes American influence withdrawn to the eastern Pacific, behind the Hawaiian Islands. For Russia, it means hegemonic influence in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which Moscow has traditionally regarded as either part of its empire or part of its sphere of influence. Both Beijing and Moscow seek to redress what they regard as an unfair distribution of power, influence, and honor in the U.S.-led postwar global order. As autocracies, both feel threatened by the dominant democratic powers in the international system and by the democracies on their borders. Both regard the United States as the principal obstacle to their ambitions, and therefore both seek to weaken the American-led international security order that stands in the way of their achieving what they regard as their rightful destinies. It was good while it lasted Until fairly recently, Russia and China have faced considerable, almost insuperable, obstacles in achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the international order itself and its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and, since the end of the Cold War, to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has checked their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. During the era of American primacy, China and Russia have participated in and for the most part been beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helps sustain; so long as that system functions, they have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The political and strategic aspects of the order, however, have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions — especially the geographical advance of liberal democracies close to their borders — as an existential threat. That’s for good reason: Autocratic powers since the days of Klemens von Metternich have always feared the contagion of liberalism. The mere existence of democracies on their borders, the global free flow of information they cannot control, the dangerous connection between free market capitalism and political freedom — all pose a threat to rulers who depend on keeping restive forces in their own countries in check. The continual challenge to the legitimacy of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported democratic order has therefore naturally made them hostile both to that order and to the United States. But, until recently, a preponderance of domestic and international forces has dissuaded them from confronting the order directly. Chinese rulers have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their legitimacy at home. Even Putin has pushed only against open doors, as in Syria, where the United States responded passively to his probes. He has been more cautious when confronted by even marginal U.S. and European opposition, as in Ukraine. The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions has been the military and economic power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful, has had to contemplate facing the combined military and economic strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest — including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these U.S.-led alliances present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on few allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, such as the military subjection of Taiwan or a naval battle in the South or East China Sea, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations and the likely cutoff of access to foreign markets on which their own economy depends. A weaker Russia, with its depleted population and oil- and gas-dependent economy, would face an even greater challenge. For decades, the strong global position enjoyed by the United States and its allies has discouraged any serious challenge. So long as the United States was perceived as a dependable ally, Chinese and Russian leaders feared that aggressive moves would backfire and possibly bring their regimes down. This is what the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order: As dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions. And it worked. The United States stepped up, and Russia and China largely backed down — or were preempted before acting at all. Faced with these obstacles, the best option for the two revisionist great powers has always been to hope for or, if possible, engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within, either by separating the United States from its allies or by raising doubts about the U.S. commitment and thereby encouraging would-be allies and partners to forgo the strategic protection of the liberal world order and seek accommodation with its challengers. The present system has therefore depended not only on American power but on coherence and unity at the heart of the democratic world. The United States has had to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm, but the order’s ideological and economic core — the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific — has also had to remain relatively healthy and confident.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Solvency › Disease turn

CRISPR technology was vital to defense against COVID-19

Yelena Biberman Dr. Biberman is an associate professor of political science at Skidmore College, a fellow at West Point’s Modern War Institute, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center The Technologies and International Politics of Genetic Warfare STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY FALL 2021 https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-3/Biberman.pdf

In 2020, the United States turned to CRISPR to battle the SARSCoV-2 coronavirus causing the COVID-19 disease. The Food and Drug Administration granted its first “emergency-use” approval for a coronavirus test involving CRISPR, selected for its ability to detect (and signal with fluorescent glow) SARS-CoV-2 genetic material from a nose, mouth, or throat swab in about an hour.40

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Solvency › Disease turn

Germline genetic editing allows for disease prevention

Tetsuyaishii Ishii, 01-xx-2017,Tetsuya Ishii, Professor, Hokkaido University

Tetsuya Ishii, PhD, professor of Office of Health and Safety, Hokkaido University. In 2002, he joined Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) and worked as a program officer. In 2005, he completed the international program officer training program in U.S. NIH. "Reproductive medicine involving genome editing: clinical uncertainties and embryological needs," No Publication,

Assisted reproductive techniques are practised with prior consent by parents. However, widely accepted assisted reproductive techniques such as IVF involve no intentional genetic intervention. Therefore, under what conditions does parental consent justify the germline genetic intervention from the viewpoint of a child's welfare? Consider the UK regulatory framework on mitochondrial transfer (). Such intervention is deemed legal provided the germline modification focuses mtDNA (not nuclear DNA) and intends to prevent the maternal transmission of ‘serious’ mitochondrial disease to offspring. This is employed when a mother carries the risk of transmitting the disease to the child. Its practice is limited to serious conditions among various forms of mitochondrial disease. Similarly, disease prevention via germline genome editing might be accepted in some countries. Notably, in the International Summit on Human Gene Editing, mitochondrial disease was addressed as a candidate for germline genome editing (). Interestingly, the elimination of pathogenic mtDNA using mito TALEN (mitochondria-targeted nucleases to selectively reduce mtDNA haplotypes) requires no oocyte donation, which is indispensable for mitochondrial donation in the UK (). Aside from cases of serious mitochondrial disease, the use of germline genome editing seems compelling in cases of definite inheritance of a serious or life-threating autosomal genetic disorder where preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is inapplicable, such as autosomal dominant diseases in which one or both parents is homozygous (e.g. Huntington disease) or autosomal recessive diseases where both parents are homozygous (e.g. cystic fibrosis) (). At least four reports have demonstrated that genome editing-mediated gene correction and the recovery of phenotypes are feasible in mouse and rat experiments (). In such rare cases, the benefits of genome editing for a prospective child is likely to exceed the risks, such as the failure of disease prevention and off-target mutations (, ). Therefore, parental consent for germline genome editing might be justifiable.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Solvency › Disease turn

Germline editing is what is necessary to eliminate genes that causes diseases – especially those with significant genetic difficulties.

Melanie Hess -2020 A Call for an International Governance Framework for Human Germline Gene Editing 95 Notre Dame Law Review 1369 https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4899&context=ndlr

Germline editing could eliminate genes that cause disease, which could positively affect the treatment of illnesses. Somatic gene editing has proven its potential to be a tool for disease treatment and prevention: in 2015, gene therapies were already being used to treat eye disease, and further trials demonstrate that this type of gene editing may be effective in treating certain blood disorders.39 With regard to germline editing, screening embryos and using in vitro fertilization is an existing method of avoiding genetically inherited diseases like Huntington’s. However, germline editing could potentially completely eliminate these diseases and allow couples who would otherwise fear passing these characteristics to their offspring to parent children genetically related to them.40

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Solvency › Disease turn

Germline editing is safe and improving all the time. It is key to innovating new cures to hereditary disease. The plan stops that – turns case

Li, et al. 19 Li, Yanni, et al. Key Laboratory for Major Obstetric Diseases of Guangdong Province, Center of Reproductive Medicine, The Third Affiliated Hospital of Guangzhou Medical University, Guangzhou. “Human Germline Editing: Insights to Future Clinical Treatment of Diseases.” Protein & Cell, vol. 10, no. 7, July 2019, pp. 470–475, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6588666/, 10.1007/s13238-018-0594-8. Accessed 30 June 2022. //DRE

Last year, the first attempt to genetically modify human embryos in the United States was reported and sparked a huge debate (Ma et al., 2017). Although the first human germline modification was only performed two years ago, the study showed that rapid advances in technology has allowed the rate of off-target effects and mosaicism to be reduced considerably (Liang et al., 2015). Recently, Vertex and CRISPR therapeutics collaborated and developed CTX001, the first CRISPR/Cas9-based therapy, targeting patients with β-thalassemia and have begun phase 1/2 clinical trials. With policies and technologies regarding genome editing both developing rapidly, explorations into the possibility of clinical gene editing for hundreds of hereditary diseases are starting to become achievable. Here, we address the progress of human embryo editing technologies so far and its promise and risks in advancing therapy for hereditary diseases. Researchers have utilized genome editing techniques to modify genetic sequences in somatic cells and germline cells to conduct basic research on gene function or disease treatment. Genetic modifications to a somatic cell are generally non-heritable as they do not contribute to gametes. However, researchers have utilized tetraploid complementation to produce genetically modified offspring from modified mouse and rat pluripotent stem cells (Eggan et al., 2002; Li et al., 2017c). On the other hand, genetic editing to an organism’s germ cells is more universally applicable and will result in the natural inheritance of the modified genome in its offspring. As current genome editing technology often introduces off-target effects such as chromosomal translocations or insertion-deletions (indels) resulting in undesired loss or gain of functions of genes, which is a safety concern when dealing with the human germline (Corrigan-Curay et al., 2015), the potential of genome editing to overcome genetic diseases is therefore held back by the risk of creating more genetic complications or even irreversibly altering the human germline through nondescript mutations. Genome editing research is rather commonplace nowadays, with CRISPR/Cas9-mediated genome modification being at the forefront since its first adaptation into eukaryotic cells (Abrahimi et al., 2015; Cao et al., 2016; Cong et al., 2013; Hsu et al., 2014; Iyer et al., 2018; Li et al., 2017b; Mali et al., 2013; Nelson et al., 2016; Noel et al., 2018; Sato et al., 2015; Savic et al., 2018; Schwank et al., 2013; Shalem et al., 2014; Shen et al., 2014; Slaymaker et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2013). The diverse amounts of ex vivo and in vivo experiments conducted have resulted in the genome editing protocol to be significantly improved in the last 5 years. Today, nuclease delivery into cells for genome editing can be either in the form of RNA or protein for enhanced kinetics of action and nuclease turnover, while also preventing integration of exogenous DNA into the host genome (Abou-El-Enein et al., 2017). Efficient and precise gene correction for mutations takes advantage of the cell cycle, relying on the homology-directed repair (HDR) pathway which functions in the late S–G2 phase (Chapman et al., 2012; Heyer et al., 2010). In the recent year, germline editing has become a hot topic in scientific research. CRISPR/Cas9 microinjections into mouse zygotes have been shown to correct disease associated mutations, producing healthy adult animals (Wang et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2013). Likewise, CRISPR/Cas9 and TALEN have both effectively generated germline mutations in fertilized monkey embryos (Liu et al., 2014; Niu et al., 2014). With numerous successes in both somatic and germline genome editing in animal models, researchers have started to consider the possibility of translating the protocol to edit the human genome for clinical purposes (Cornu et al., 2017). For the first time, US National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Medicine relaxed stance on modification of germline in February 2015 followed by the first reports of gene editing in human embryos. Tripronuclear (3PN) zygotes which were discarded from clinics were used by a group in China to attempt CRISPR/Cas9-mediated gene editing of human endogenous β-globin gene (HBB). They found that the efficiency of single-stranded oligonucleotides (ssODNs) mediated HDR was low and successfully edited embryos exhibited mosaicism i.e., only a portion of the cells were successfully modified, while the remaining cells remained as wild type (Liang et al., 2015). In addition, whole-exome sequencing revealed off-target mutations in these 3PN embryos. Moreover, the researchers identified that although the endogenous delta-globin gene (HBD), a HBB homolog, also functions as a template to compete with ssODNs for HDR repair, majority of the double-stranded breaks (DSBs) caused by Cas9 were repaired through the unideal error-prone non-homologous end joining (NHEJ) pathway.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Solvency › Disease turn

Human germline gene editing will benefit millions by resolving disease burdens – its an ethical necessity.

Savulescu, et.al. 2015 The moral imperative to continue gene editing research on human embryos Julian Savulescu, Jonathan Pugh, Thomas Douglas, Christopher Gyngell Protein Cell 2015, 6(7):476–479 DOI 10.1007/s13238-015-0184-y

Gene editing technologies have enormous potential as a therapeutic tool in the fight against disease. Roughly 6% of all births have a serious birth defect, which is genetic or partly genetic in origin (Christianson et al., 2006). Advanced and precise gene editing techniques could virtually eradicate genetic birth defects, thereby benefiting nearly 8 million children every year. In addition 35% of all deaths are due to chronic diseases, such as cancer and diabetes, in those under 70.1 Gene editing could significantly lower this disease burden thereby benefiting billions of people around the world over time. To intentionally refrain from engaging in life-saving research is to be morally responsible for the foreseeable, avoidable deaths of those who could have benefitted (Singer, 1993). Research into gene-editing is not an option, it is a moral necessity.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Solvency › Its safe / works

Genome editing happens naturally & embryos resilient

O'Neill, H.C. (2020). Quals: Professor School of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia. Clinical Germline Genome Editing: When Will Good be Good Enough? Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 63(1), 101-110. . /nfs

CRISPR-mediated editing is rightly being scrutinized for its ability to alter DNA in unintended ways, but natural cellular events such as innate recombination and increased age can result in similar alterations. We now have the tools to investigate the genome with interminable ability and increasing accuracy, but consideration must be given to the inherent dynamic nature of DNA. While the uses and applications of CRISPR and genome editing are endless, they are limited by nature’s laws and nature’s flaws. Work on human embryos has shown that not only are embryos distinct and elusive, but they are also robust and resilient to human interventions.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Solvency › Its safe / works

Germline editing in humans work and have been successful – the tech has diffused around the globe

Yelena Biberman Dr. Biberman is an associate professor of political science at Skidmore College, a fellow at West Point’s Modern War Institute, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center The Technologies and International Politics of Genetic Warfare STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY FALL 2021 https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-3/Biberman.pdf

In 2015, CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats) ushered a “huge revolution” in gene editing by “effectively democratiz[ing] the technology so that everyone is using it.”33 It is now allowing researchers to cheaply and quickly change the DNA of almost any organism, including human.34 The CRISPR technique relies on a class of enzymes (called “Cas” for “CRISPR-associated,” Cas9 in particular) that uses a guide RNA molecule to pinpoint its target DNA that then edits the DNA to disrupt genes or to insert desired sequences. Researchers typically need to order only the RNA fragment, as the other components can be bought off the shelf. The total cost of gene editing is as little as $30, and the technique is even taught in middle-school science classes.35 CRISPR’s affordability, availability, and ease of use increase the prospects of its misuse “not only by a malicious actor but also through accident.”36 Technologies such as CRISPR are, as the US intelligence community’s 2016 worldwide threat assessment put it, “almost always dual-use” and “diffuse rapidly around the globe.”37 And research is gradually overcoming its technical limitations. In 2015, the first human embryos were genetically engineered using CRISPR.38 Efficiency was low, some cells were altered while others were not within the same embryo, and “off-target” mutations were observed. However, in just two years, these problems were largely overcome. Scientists repaired a severe disease-causing mutation by successfully editing genes in human embryos. In the ensuing embryos, all cells were mutation-free, and there was no evidence of off-target mutations.39

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Solvency › Its safe / works

Not unsafe – viable experiments have been done according to safety guideline and it will only get better as it advances.

Savulescu, et.al. 2015 The moral imperative to continue gene editing research on human embryos Julian Savulescu, Jonathan Pugh, Thomas Douglas, Christopher Gyngell Protein Cell 2015, 6(7):476–479 DOI 10.1007/s13238-015-0184-y

The clearest ethical concerns regarding current gene editing techniques is that they are unsafe. The study by Huang and co-authors showed that current gene editing techniques can lead to a large number of off-target mutations. This could cause significant defects and disabilities in any individuals born as the result of the research. While some research suggests there are ways to edit genes that greatly reduce the number of off-target mutations (Iyer et al., 2015), it would be highly unethical to bring modified human embryos to term unless we were very confident that the technique could be used safely. The risk would simply not be justified by any potential benefits. However this doesn’t justify a moratorium on gene editing research. There is already global agreement that no experiments should be conducted where there is a high risk of harm to the participant, and a low chance of benefit. There is already a moratorium on unsafe research and we don’t need a further moratorium on unsafe gene editing research. It is possible to do this research so that the risk is reasonable to any future child resulting from the future use of such techniques therapeutically. As the study by Huang and co-authors shows, much research on gene editing can be conducted now that satisfies global safety guidelines. This research was carried out using tripronuclear (3PN) zygotes, which have one oocyte nucleus and two sperm nuclei. Polyspermic zygotes such as these occur naturally in ∼2%–5% of zygotes during in vitro fertilization (IVF) clinical trials. Crucially, these zygotes invariably fail to develop normally in vivo (Munné and Cohen, 1998), so they are not considered to be viable for implantation. They will never produce a live baby. Since trialling the CRISPR system in these zygotes had no chance of resulting in a live birth, it is unclear how the study could harm or wrong anyone directly. In fact, this research is important precisely because it increases our understanding about some of the risks involved in targeting humans with current gene editing techniques. One of the stated aims of the research was to determine the frequency of off-target effects when CRISPR is used in human embryos. This type of research is important for increasing our understanding of the types of challenges involved in advancing gene editing techniques to the point where they can be used therapeutically.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Solvency › Bans fail

Bans don’t solve, at best they maintain the squo and at worst cause confusion

“A case against a moratorium on germline gene editing” G Owen Schaefer. March 20th, 2019 is a philosopher by training, specializing in applied ethics. He has published a variety of topics in that area, including research ethics, food ethics, human enhancement, and in vitro fertilizationhttps://theconversation.com/a-case-against-a-moratorium-on-germline-gene-editing-113827 Accessed 6/29/22 T.T

Should researchers put the brakes on genetically engineering babies? Leading scientists and ethicists recently  on clinical applications of : inheritable alterations to the DNA of embryos to improve kids’ health or other features – or just “gene editing,” for short. This declaration was prompted in part by the birth last year of the  in China. The birth was  by experts and  in charges against He Jiankui, the . The call for a moratorium is grounded in two main concerns. Its supporters assert, first, that the risks of gene editing are simply too uncertain and potentially large to proceed. Secondly, the deeply controversial nature and potential social impact of altering human DNA means researchers need “” before proceeding. The authors suggest a five-year pause to wait for more scientific progress and public dialogue. At that point, the authors propose, societies may choose to begin a path forward for gene editing, if risks are deemed acceptable and the process is fully transparent Already,  prohibit this sort of gene editing, either by . For this reason, it was quite easy for the director of the U.S. National Institutes of Health to  – the NIH, the , is already prohibited by law from funding clinical applications of gene editing. So a moratorium is at best redundant in those nations, perpetuating the status quo. It is also liable to cause confusion. If a country or scientific body announces a moratorium as recommended, this could misleadingly imply that germline editing was previously permitted and unregulated. It could also suggest that some countries’ bans will expire in five years, when currently none has a time-limited prohibition.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Solvency › Bans fail

Easy for CRISPR technology to be used outside of laboratories – no way a ban can solve.

Krizia Rivera 2020 Genetic Engineering, Lack of Regulation in the United States of America and its Potentially Problematic Applications

The CRISPR-Cas9 system (hereinafter CRISPR for short) is unique in that, not only is it cheaper than other genetic engineering technologies, but in comparison, is easier to use and is more precise . According to the University of California, Berkeley, anyone can make tens of thousands of precisely guided probes covering an organism’s entire genome for less than $100 in supplies49 . These developments lend themselves to widespread accessibility, it’s use is no longer limited to a lab, schoolchildren are using it in their classrooms50 and you can even buy a DIY kit online for $150. These key features make CRISPR the most popular system on the market52. It has become so popular that it has been dubbed “the rock star tool of biology53 ” by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, even boasting an annual fan convention called CRISPRcon54. In 2015 CRISPR was named Science’s Breakthrough of the Year55 . Despite its popularity, many scientists remain wary of ethical dilemmas and practical dangers, even by Jennifer Doudna, one of its own co-inventors. Doudna described in her book, A Crack in Creation: The New Power to Control Evolution, that the early years after publishing her work, she had a reoccurring a nightmare of Hitler coming up to her with pig-like features wanting to learn about CRISPR56 . Dawn Sinclair Shapira, filmmaker of “The State of Eugenics,” says, “in the wrong hands could become a tool of oppression57.” There are two major debates58: (a) germline editing versus somatic editing and (b) therapy versus enhancement. I will discuss these in turn.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Solvency › Bans fail

Ban fails – never been broad social consensus, and a benchmark for use is totally unrealistic.

Susan Scutti, CNN Updated 1803 GMT (0203 HKT) March 13, 2019 Proposal for global moratorium on editing of inherited DNA is met with criticism https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/13/health/inherited-dna-editing-moratorium-study/index.html

director of the Progress Educational Trust, a nonprofit promoting public understanding of reproductive and genetic science, told the Science Media Centre that a new moratorium "is neither necessary nor useful." A moratorium would not have deterred Jiankui, said Norcross, who also had no role in the commentary. She added that he "acted secretively and in breach of a clear scientific consensus that germline genome editing should not be used in the clinic at this time." Even more, she believes that his practices were "scientifically and ethically unsound in so many different ways, that they would have been wrong regardless of whether or not they involved germline genome editing." Her nonprofit, which frequently organizes public events, has found "that people do not worry specifically about changing the germline," she said. "They are more concerned with whether or not specific applications of genome editing are medically warranted." O'Neill was skeptical for yet another reason: "There has never been a broad societal consensus about anything in any country, not even the allocation of human rights, so expecting this as a benchmark for clinical adoption of germline therapy is unrealistic."

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Solvency › Bans fail

Even international bans will fail – at best they can deal with states – no matter how effective there will be private / rogue gaps.

Scott J. Schweikart, Global Regulation of Germline Genome Editing: Ethical Considerations and Application of International Human Rights Law, 43 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 279 (2021). Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol43/iss3/6

Lastly, it is important to remember that any global governance structure that comes from a treaty or declaration is only intended to bind or influence individual nation-states, assuming that parties to such treaties would use their own national legal framework to enforce relevant matters in their jurisdiction. However, the relevant matters that national governments generally tackle are not always easily enforceable or identifiable in this rapidly changing world of bio-medical advancements. For example, there is already a growing movement of DIY-Bio or “bio-hackers,” who are buying CRISPR kits and are doing genetic modifications at home, outside of the knowledge or purview of any government agency or regulatory authority.95 Under such circumstances, even if a government follows international human rights law to regulate germline genome editing, it may only have influence over the traditional users of biomedical technology, i.e., corporations and university medical centers. No matter how effective any form of international oversight may be, gaps will remain in policing the ethical practice of germline genome editing

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 3 – Bioterrorism › 1NC---Solvency Deficit

The aff card concedes that increasing biotech research results in ways to defend from bioterror

1AC Barry Pavel and Vikram Venkatram , 21, (Barry Pavel, Barry Pavel is the senior vice president and director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Barry Pavel was a career member of the Senior Executive Service in the Officer of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for almost eighteen years. From October 2008 to July 2010, he served as the special assistant to the President and senior director for defense policy and strategy on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, serving both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. Prior to this, Pavel was the chief of staff and principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations/low-intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities. From October 1993 to November 2006, Pavel also led or contributed to a broad range of defense strategy and planning initiatives for both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. In this capacity, Pavel supported post-9/11 deterrence policy (including deterrence of terrorist networks and regional nuclear powers); strategies for reducing ungoverned areas; and a long-range planning construct that accounts for trends and “strategic shocks” that could significantly change Department of Defense’s role in national security. Vikram Venkatram is a Young Global Professional in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Forward Defense at the Atlantic Council. He is a recent graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, where he studied Science, Technology, and International Affairs with a minor in Biology. He is also currently a second-year graduate student in Georgetown’s Security Studies Program. Originally from San Jose, California, his main interests lie in biosecurity issues, ranging from pandemic preparedness to emerging biotechnology to environmental security to bioethics., 9-7-2021, Atlantic Council, Facing the future of bioterrorism, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/facing-the-future-of-bioterrorism/, 7-1-2022) SCade

Given the broad scope and scale of this growing threat, the United States should take a series of actions to mitigate the risks, without unduly stunting the growth of the biotechnology field. To date, bioterrorist attacks have been low-risk, high-impact events. While they have been extremely rare, their frequency will only increase as will their ramifications. However, overregulating the spread of biotechnological tools could stunt innovation and the profound potential of this increasingly important sector. Furthermore, existing methods of preventing bioterrorism may no longer be effective. The government could previously monitor the purchase of expensive and dangerous biotechnology tools and the laboratories that owned them in large quantities. This is no longer possible to the same degree when such tools are increasingly cheap, widespread, and usable in a garage. The FBI is currently attempting to address this risk by building relationships with the iGEM community and with life scientists so that they can report suspicious behavior. These efforts should continue, but are wildly insufficient, since some bioterrorists may have minimal contact with the larger community of biologists and biology hobbyists. The release of a bioweapon by a terrorist, if left unchecked, could spread throughout the globe, just as a naturally occurring pandemic would. Thus, one major step that the United States should take is to establish improved responses to disease outbreaks, particularly learning from COVID-19. This should include building a larger stockpile of PPE and establishing a set of clear step-by-step actions to be taken in the event of an attack. Building resilience in this fashion will not prevent bioterrorism, but it will mitigate its effects, and may slightly disincentivize utilizing bioweapons to cause terror. Beyond this, the United States should secure its laboratories and the data within, as terrorists could leverage that knowledge to build bioweapons. For example, new technology allows pathogens to be synthesized from the data describing their genetic sequences. In a recent controversial study, scientists published a methodology that would allow horsepox virus, a virus very similar to one that causes smallpox, to be synthesized. This research was conducted with a noble goal: understanding how the horsepox virus could be used as a potential treatment for cancer. However, it had significant dual-use implications. Research like this should not be banned outright, but the United States should establish norms to evaluate whether it is worth the risk before such research is conducted, and then ensure that it is conducted and the results published in the most secure ways. Replicability is an important part of science, but the general public should not be able to replicate the most dangerous experiments. Where building resilience would reduce the impact of a bioterror incident, restricting access to dual-use methodologies will reduce the likelihood of one occurring in the first place. Finally, enforcing domestic standards is not enough. Pathogens spread across borders, and the spillover effects of even a targeted bioterrorist attack could kill many unintended victims. Thus, the United States must work with other countries to protect against the bioterrorist threat, monitor the emergence of new viruses and bacteria that could be leveraged for a bioweapon, limit access to the most dangerous pathogens (and data associated with those), and build global response networks in the event of an attack. Importantly, this collaboration should emphasize working with allies, but should also include adversaries: if China or Russia remain unregulated, an attack within their borders would still affect the United States and its allies. Emerging biotechnology will result in new medicines and medical techniques, a greater understanding of how pathogens function and spread (and thus a better understanding of how to combat them), a healthier populace, innovative new capabilities that could transform daily life, and greater engagement with the biological sciences. While ensuring that these benefits are maintained, the United States and its allies and partners must take logical steps to protect themselves from the worst-case scenarios. The risk of bioterrorism is growing, and the United States must be prepared to face the future.