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2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage: Operator Trust

TEVV is key to build trust in commanders and operators. This improves our military readiness - broken weapons don’t win wars

Flournoy, Haines et al 2020 - former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Director of National Intelligence [Michèle and Avril, Gabrielle Cheftiz Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy October, “Building Trust through Testing Adapting DOD’s Test & Evaluation, Validation & Verification (TEVV) Enterprise for Machine Learning Systems, including Deep Learning Systems” https://cset. georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Building-Trust-Through-Testing.pdf Acc 6/23/22 JZ]

The Pentagon cannot let TEVV become a barrier to fielding AI-enabled systems in an operationally relevant time frame, but must do so in a manner that engenders trust in such systems and is consistent with U.S. values and principles. The ultimate goal of any TEVV system 4 should be to build trust—with a commander who is responsible for deploying a system and an operator who will decide whether to delegate a task to such system—by providing relevant, easily understandable data to inform decision-making. Fielding AI systems before our competitors may not matter if DOD systems are brittle and break in an operational environment, are easily manipulated, or operators consequently lose faith in them. Military operations present a challenging environment. The Defense Department needs ML/DL systems that are robust and secure. They need to be able to function in a range of environmental conditions, against adversaries who are adaptive and clever, and in a manner that engenders trust by the warfighter.

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage: Operator Trust

The Impact – an effective NATO is key to containing the Ukraine conflict – weakness will cause Russia to escalate to a great power war.

Graham, 2022 – Fellow at the Center for Preventive Action and Europe Program at the Council on Foreign Relations [Thomas, March 8 Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 38 “Preventing a Wider European Conflict” Starter Packet]

The large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine now underway could quite plausibly precipitate a wider conflict in Europe. The United States is focused primarily on raising the costs to Russia with punishing sanctions and reassuring North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies neighboring Russia of its commitment to collective defense. Less attention has been given to containing the war to Ukraine and preventing its escalation into a broader European conflict. The stakes are enormous. The ripple effects of a wider conflict in Europe would spread across the globe, stressing the geopolitical, economic, and institutional foundations of the international order the United States has fashioned and underwritten since the end of the Second World War. It would test the resilience of the U.S. global system of alliances, the international financial system, global energy markets, arms control regimes, and global institutions in the face of ever more violent great power competition. No region of the world would be spared, although developments on the Eurasian supercontinent, the other locus of world power and economic might outside North America, would bear the gravest consequences for U.S. interests. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) The Russian military intervention in Ukraine could easily escalate into a larger conflict stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and further west into Europe. Although Russia, wielding massive military superiority, might overrun Ukrainian forces in a matter of weeks, stabilizing and pacifying the country will likely prove to be a grueling and costly affair. A significant Ukrainian resistance movement is almost certain to emerge. With sustained Western support, it could prolong the warfare for months, if not years. The first wave of sanctions that Washington has levied on Moscow could be followed by others in a continuing effort to raise the cost to Moscow and force it to yield. A negotiated end to the conflict will not come easily, since Washington has framed it in Manichean terms as a world historical struggle between the democratic West and the aggressive, malevolent, and autocratic Russia. Anything short of “victory” will be decried as surrender or appeasement in the West, while Russia will not capitulate on a matter it considers vital to its security and prosperity. The stage is thus set for an escalating cycle of violence, with Moscow seeking to stamp out a Ukrainian insurgency and retaliate against Western efforts to stop Russia’s advance. If the conflict wears on, Moscow could be increasingly tempted to expand its military operations further into Europe to achieve its goals. As a first option, Russia could intensify pressure on states neighboring Ukraine (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) that could provide safe havens for insurgents or the inevitable government-in-exile. It will doubtless reinforce its military presence in Kaliningrad and elsewhere in the Baltics and patrol the Baltic Sea more aggressively. It could deploy hybrid-war tactics—cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic sabotage—to destabilize countries providing safe havens. If those actions did not sufficiently degrade the resistance, Moscow could even launch direct attacks on insurgents and their supporters outside Ukraine, as well as attempt to assassinate leading figures in the government-in-exile, akin to the attacks it has made on Chechen rebels and Federal Security Service (FSB) defectors in Europe in recent years. Such steps could, at a minimum, draw frontline NATO states directly into the military conflict with Russia, obligating the United States and other allies to come to their defense. To build up further pressure, Moscow could also “weaponize” the inevitable refugee flows into neighboring states. Refugees, who would likely number in the millions, would move first into unoccupied Ukrainian territory but eventually into adjacent European states, which have shown little tolerance for outsiders. Moscow could use harsh military and police tactics that would increase the number of refugees and seek to guide them into countries where they would create the greatest socioeconomic stress, such as Moldova. In addition, Moscow could increase the tension by pushing Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko to again seek to push thousands of Middle Eastern migrants across the borders into Poland and Lithuania. That could lead to border clashes, as it almost did on occasion last fall, with Russia supporting its ally, Belarus, and NATO states coming to the defense of allies under attack. A second option Moscow could pursue is opening up a second front in the Balkans. In recent years, Russia has taken a number of destabilizing actions in the region, seeking to weaken Montenegro after its accession to NATO, exacerbate tensions between Serbs and Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and undermine relations between Serbia and Kosovo. As it fought in Ukraine, Russia could encourage Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik to press for separation from Bosnia, threatening to reignite the bitter wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia. A Balkans war would complicate the security calculus of all countries in the region, as well as that of Germany and France, which have significant interests there. To quell the fighting, NATO countries could decide to use military force against Bosnian Serb forces enjoying Russian support. If the conflict wears on, Moscow could be increasingly tempted to expand its military operations further into Europe to achieve its goals. A third, riskier, option would be to directly attack the United States, the country that Moscow believes is orchestrating a larger anti-Russia campaign. In response to Western sanctions designed to crater Russia’s financial system and undermine critical industries, Moscow could launch major cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. If a cyberattack were to take down a major financial institution or corrupt its records, the ensuing havoc in U.S. markets could prompt overwhelming public and congressional pressure for a forceful response. The U.S. and NATO response to Russian actions will impact Moscow’s decisions on the conduct of the conflict. Both a weak response and an excessively harsh one could lead to escalation. In the first case, Moscow could be tempted to press militarily even further into Europe to enlarge its sphere of influence. Vladimir Putin has demanded that NATO withdraw its forces back to the lines they held in 1997, when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed and the first wave of post−Cold War expansion remained in the future. His remarks announcing the start of hostilities against Ukraine hinted at a broader effort to restore Russia’s control over all of the former Soviet Union. That could include military action against the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, through which Moscow could try to carve out a land corridor to Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea. NATO would have little choice but to provide military aid to those states if it did not want to forfeit its role as the central pillar of European security. Crippling sanctions, meanwhile, could provoke Putin to lash out with greater violence. If Putin felt cornered, he could escalate the conflict either horizontally to other countries or vertically to the nuclear level in a desperate effort to save himself, his regime, and, in his mind, Russia itself. And he could find considerable public support for such a reaction. Already, some Russians believe that U.S. and EU sanctions are aimed not simply at the leaders behind the war but, by cratering the economy, at all Russians. Warning Indicators As is the case with the current crisis in Ukraine, Moscow’s intentions will remain ambiguous. The indicators of an approaching escalation in the conflict beyond Ukraine are likely to fall into three categories. The first indicators that political and military conditions are increasing the risk of broader conflict include a breakdown in channels of communication with Moscow. The absence of active diplomatic ties would preclude a negotiated resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. An end to U.S.-Russian military-to-military channels would undermine any effort to avoid direct military conflict between the two countries. Another indicator would be major insurgent successes that dramatically increase Russian casualties. Moscow would be tempted to move more aggressively against insurgent safe havens rather than capitulate on what it considers to be its vital interest in Ukraine. A wider European conflict would pose the stiffest challenge to the global standing of the United States since the end of the Cold War and to the international system it has built and underwritten for decades longer. Second are the indicators that Moscow is preparing for a broader conflict, which it would undoubtedly argue had been forced by Western actions. Such signs include Kremlin efforts to prepare the Russian public for a wider conflict, which could entail official statements, greater media focus on escalating Western “aggression,” an increased pace of civil defense drills, and mobilization of reserves. Another indicator includes the massing of Russian forces in the Baltic region. It could include such moves as aggressive hybrid actions to destabilize Poland and the Baltic states, coupled with efforts to rally indigenous ethnic Russian communities against their governments. Third are the indicators that Moscow is intentionally seeking to widen the conflict. This could include greater support for Bosnian Serb leader Dodik, such as diplomatic and financial backing, and provision of weapons. They could also encourage Serb leaders to more assertively pursue their grievances against Kosovo. Implications for the United States A wider European conflict would pose the stiffest challenge to the global standing of the United States since the end of the Cold War and to the international system it has built and underwritten for decades longer. It would test the durability of its global system of alliances and the efficacy of international regimes and institutions that have guarded world peace, security, and prosperity. The challenge would come at a time when the United States itself is in immense disarray, as a deeply polarized polity confronts massive domestic problems—the pandemic, inflation, racial justice, and cultural wars—that leave less time and fewer resources for foreign matters. The United States will be tested to see whether it can muster the will, energy, and creativity to execute an effective policy toward the unfolding crisis in Europe. At home, public attention has been focused on developments in and around Ukraine, but the Joe Biden administration cannot ignore the home front. In response to U.S.-levied sanctions, Russia can be expected to step up its cyber operations against the United States. It will more actively sow disinformation, seek to exacerbate domestic tensions, and paralyze critical infrastructure. The severity of the attacks will likely rise in proportion to the harshness of the sanctions Washington levies on Moscow. Abroad, the fate of the transatlantic community, a central pillar of U.S. security and prosperity, would be a stake. One of the Biden administration’s priorities, as laid out in the Interim National Security Strategy Guidance released in March 2021, is repairing U.S. alliances—especially with Europe—after four disruptive years under President Donald Trump. Although relations are more cordial, significant substantive differences remain and the willingness of allies to align behind a common purpose for the long haul remains questionable. The United States’ allies have rallied behind a harsh set of sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but preserving unity as the conflict drags on remains a challenge, especially if sacrifice is spread unevenly across NATO, as will most likely be the case. Putin will seek to exploit divisions through differentiated levels of pressure on NATO members, targeted energy cutoffs, offers of negotiation, and the like to advance two long-standing Russian goals: the end of NATO as a collective defense organization and the erosion of the foundations of the EU. Should he succeed, the new order that would emerge in Europe is far from certain. But Russia would undoubtedly play a central role in its formulation, and almost any conceivable new order would diminish the power and role of the United States on the continent. A similar situation obtains in the Indo-Pacific region. The Biden administration spent 2021 bolstering relations with its allies and partners—energizing the Quad (the United States, Australia, India, and Japan), and cutting a submarine deal with the United Kingdom and Australia—to meet the growing strategic challenge posed by China. A major, prolonged European distraction could undo further efforts to pivot to Asia, raise doubts among allies and partners about the credibility of the U.S. commitment, and free China to pursue its objectives with greater vigor. The United States could avoid this outcome by pursuing lesser goals in Europe—leading to the quicker development of a new order less favorable to American interests—or by a massive buildup of its military capabilities that would enable it to play a major, perhaps decisive, role in both regions. The latter would have to come at the cost of the Biden administration’s domestic priorities. Whether the Biden administration could muster sufficient domestic political support, if it decided to move in this direction, is far from certain. The United States’ allies have rallied behind a harsh set of sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but preserving unity as the conflict drags on remains a challenge, especially if sacrifice is spread unevenly across NATO. In addition to regional challenges, a major European conflict would also stress critical international regimes and institutions. One of the first victims would likely be the arms control regime that has served as the foundation of strategic nuclear stability for the past fifty-plus years. The United States withdrew from some central elements—including the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties—but two critical elements have remained in place: the New START treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). A wider conflict in Europe would all but guarantee that the United States and Russia could not agree to a follow-on treaty to the New START treaty before it expires in 2026, and the NPT review conference tentatively scheduled for August 2022 would fall by the wayside. As a consequence, the incipient arms race now underway, fueled by new technologies—hypersonics, cyber tools, and artificial intelligence—would accelerate. A new wave of nuclear proliferation could ensue, especially if U.S. allies and partners lose faith in America’s commitment to extended deterrence. Mutually assured destruction, which for better or worse has anchored strategic stability since the early 1970s, would be severely stressed in a multipolar nuclear landscape with Russia and the United States fighting at least a proxy war. Likewise, a broader conflict in Europe would stress, perhaps to the breaking point, the United Nations and many of its auxiliary organizations. Already stymied by a growing rift between the Western permanent members and Russia and China, the Security Council would have failed in its primary reason for being—to prevent the outbreak of a major conflict in Europe. It could continue to exist as a forum for the airing of grievances and acrimonious debate, but it would serve little purpose as a platform for addressing major global issues. Finally, the humanitarian costs of a wider conflict in Europe would be staggering, particularly given the destructiveness of modern weapons. Beyond the physical destruction and loss of life, untold numbers of refugees would flow across borders not only into Central East Europe but perhaps further West depending on the scale of the fighting. The strain on the socioeconomic systems—coming on top of the stress of the two-year-old pandemic, economic dislocation, and mounting inflation—could bring some close to collapse. Preventive Options U.S. policy toward Russia has traditionally been a combination of deterrence and diplomacy. The Biden administration deployed both as it tried to dissuade Russia from invading Ukraine. Both have a role to play in reducing the risk of a wider European conflict, now that Russia has invaded. Many of the steps that the Biden administration is now taking to counter Russia could be accelerated and expanded to deter it from expanding its military operations beyond that country. They would likely prove more effective due to NATO’s Article 5 collective defense guarantee, which does not apply to Ukraine. The Biden administration could: With its NATO allies, accelerate and expand its current augmentation of forces in vulnerable allies along the frontier with Russia to reassure them—and convince Moscow—of the alliance’s commitment to collective defense. Step up its already intensive schedule of consultations with allies to maintain alliance unity in the face of a burgeoning Russian threat. Develop a long-term plan to reduce Europe’s dependence on imported Russian gas, building on the stopgap measures it is already putting in place to deal with a near-term decision by Moscow to stop flows of gas westward. Consider cutting off energy imports from Russia, and asking the Europeans to do the same, but only after it has prepared the American public for the economic hardship (rising energy costs, inflation) such a step would entail. Accelerate efforts to harden American and allied critical infrastructure against cyber intrusions. The Biden administration could also resume its diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution. To that end, it could: Resist the temptation to cut off channels of communication, as past administrations have done in reaction to Russian aggression. White House−to-Kremlin and military-to-military channels will be critical to reducing misunderstandings that could lead to direct military confrontation between the two countries. In addition, a White House−to-Kremlin link could provide a platform for negotiating an end to the conflict before it spreads beyond Ukraine. Carefully recalibrate its rhetoric to ensure that the confrontation does not turn into an existential one, where victory, whatever that might mean, is the only acceptable outcome. Such a posture would ignore the reality that Russia is unlikely to capitulate in a matter of vital interest—and would escalate rather than surrender. Talk of regime change and possible war crimes charges would probably prove counterproductive and fuel public support for escalation, especially at a moment when polls suggest the war effort enjoys the backing of the vast majority of the Russian population. Avoid appearances that the United States and NATO are waging a conflict against the Russian people. Releasing constructive proposals for resolving the conflict (including provisions for the lifting of sanctions), and urging the Ukrainians to publish reasonable negotiating terms, would be more likely than bellicose warnings to turn the Russian elites and public against the war. Russians need to be persuaded that the United States and Europe are not seeking a punitive peace but are open to a renewal of relations should their country act to end the conflict. Accelerate efforts to get information to the Russian people that would give them a more accurate portrayal of the brutal, unnecessary conflict their leaders are waging allegedly on their behalf. Students and young professionals would be particularly receptive to such information and inclined to protest. The mitigating options identified below, with the exception of invoking Article 5, could also be taken now to induce Russia to de-escalate and withdraw from Ukraine and to prevent it from expanding its military operations beyond Ukraine. Mitigating Options Should the conflict spread beyond Ukraine despite U.S. efforts, the task will be to bring it to an end on terms favorable to the United States as quickly as possible. Washington could consider diplomatic initiatives, defensive steps, and sanctions. Diplomatically, Washington could invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to make clear NATO’s determination to come to the aid of members under Russian attack. It could call for an urgent session of the UN Security Council to focus on the threat posed by Russia to international peace and security. The debate would doubtlessly be acrimonious, but the United States needs to make a concerted effort to shape public opinion and isolate Russia as the aggressor. Washington could also propose a P5 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) meeting to discuss steps to reduce the risk of nuclear war. To avoid turning this into a two-bloc standoff between Russia and China and the Western powers, India could be added to the discussion. But New Delhi could resist being drawn into an East-West conflict, as it has in the past. The Biden administration should take care not to provoke severe Russian retaliation or produce spillover effects that cause undue harm to its or its allies’ interests. With regard to defensive measures, Washington could enlarge NATO de facto to coordinate strategy and tactics with Sweden and Finland, with an eye to their de jure membership in the near future. It could also send a small NATO contingent to the Balkans (Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia) to warn Serbia and Republika Srpska against aggressive actions against Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Concerning sanctions, Washington could build on the sanctions it had already levied to raise the costs further. However, the Biden administration should take care not to provoke severe Russian retaliation or produce spillover effects that cause undue harm to its or its allies’ interests. Recommendations The Biden administration is already taking steps to prevent the spread of conflict in Europe and harden the resilience of allies and partners in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: further augmentation of NATO forces, including a greater presence of American troops and equipment, along the entire Russia/NATO frontier stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea; frequent consultations with allies and partners; steps to handle the large-scale exodus of refugees from Ukraine; organization of fuel shipments to Europe from various sources to cover gaps in the event of a Russian cutoff of gas exports; measures to harden U.S. and allied computer networks against attacks. The task is to turn those expedient measures into strategies to fortify the transatlantic community against a prolonged threat from the East, which Russia will continue to pose even if the current crisis is somehow defused in the near future. In particular, the United States needs to work with its European allies to drastically reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. The goal should be to cut that dependence in half by the end of the decade by fully using the regasification facilities in place, building more, and accelerating work on renewables. In addition, even as the United States and European Union are dealing with the war in Ukraine, they need to recommit themselves to sorting out the continuing problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina and between Serbia and Kosovo to reduce the opportunities for destabilizing Russian interference in the Balkans. Finally, to ease the burden on states bordering Ukraine, the United States should be working with the UNHCR and its allies to develop plans for the long-term resettlement of Ukrainian refugees throughout Europe in case of a long period of instability in Ukraine. The United States should confront the urgent crisis in Europe without unduly sacrificing focus on the strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific. All these steps, however, do not go far enough to deal with the enduring Russia challenge. The Biden administration needs to do more, ideally as part of a larger effort to reposition the United States strategically on the global stage. Critically, the United States should confront the urgent crisis in Europe without unduly sacrificing focus on the strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific, and to prepare for a major change in the geopolitics of the Eurasian supercontinent. A tall order but not an impossible task. There are three core elements to this task: rethinking NATO, enhancing the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific, and creating a security forum to enhance allies’ support for U.S. policy across Eurasia. Rethinking NATO. The strategic goal should be the achievement of a near perfect overlap in NATO and EU membership among European states. That would provide the foundation for the development of a united European pillar inside NATO, in a sense resolving the tension between NATO and the EU (if not necessarily between the United States and Europe). The European pillar would assume ever greater responsibility for the defense of the continent, backed up by the American strategic deterrent, thus freeing up American forces to deal with the growing challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. The alliance’s new strategic concept, to be adopted at the Madrid Summit this coming June, provides an opportunity to articulate this goal, as well as to lay out the full breadth and enduring nature of the Russia challenge. The United States should consider pressing for the following steps: Fortify NATO’s eastern border. The alliance should abandon the pledge of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act not to deploy permanent substantial combat forces to new members. It should augment its forces in vulnerable member states, as long as there is no agreement between NATO and Russia to mutually restrict force levels in border zones. Prepare for the eventual membership of Finland and Sweden to reinforce the northern flank. In the face of Russian conduct, the populations of these two countries are reconsidering their long-standing traditions of neutrality. While staying out of the domestic debate, the United States and other allies should indicate that they would welcome the two countries into the alliance and articulate clearly the changing nature of the security environment in the Baltic region brought on by a more aggressive Russia. Repair relations with Turkey. This is a matter primarily for the United States, which has levied sanctions on its ally for its purchase of S-400s, an advanced Russian air defense system. The United States could take a first step by approving the sale to Turkey of the F-16s it has requested. Washington should also look for an opportunity amidst deteriorating relations with Moscow to persuade Ankara to reconsider its purchase of S-400s. Forego expansion into the former Soviet space for an extended period. No one believes that any former Soviet state will be ready for membership for years to come. Without necessarily abandoning the Open Door policy, the alliance should make clear that it will not expand eastward while it focuses on its own consolidation.

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage: Operator Trust

Focusing on AI safety is key to US Military Effectiveness because it is key to allied cooperation and interoperability

Lewis 2019 - project lead for the DOD’s Joint Lessons Learned studies [Larry, “AI Safety: Charting out the High Road”, War on the Rocks Dec 19, https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/ai-safety-charting-out-the-high-road/ LMSi]

Safety Is Strategically Smart Why is it a problem if the United States does not rise to establish concrete steps to emphasize AI safety? After all, current and former U.S. government leaders have spoken about how neither Russia nor China will be slowing down their AI efforts in order to address ethical or safety issues. Does it matter? A focus on safety and care in the conduct of operations has served the United States well. During the second offset, Washington developed precision capabilities to help counter the Soviet Union’s advantages in troop numbers. These developments then enabled the United States to take additional steps to promote safety in the form of reduced civilian casualties: developing and fielding new types of munitions for precision engagements with reduced collateral effects, developing intelligence capabilities for more accurately identifying and locating military targets, and creating predictive tools to help estimate and avoid collateral damage. These steps had strategic as well as practical benefits, enhancing freedom of action and boosting legitimacy of U.S. actions while enabling steps to reduce the civilian toll of recent operations. If AI is leveraged to help promote safety on the battlefield, it can yield similar strategic and practical benefits for the United States. AI safety also has relevance to U.S. allies. Unlike its peer competitors, Russia and China, the United States almost always operates as part of a coalition effort. This is a significant advantage for the United States politically, numerically, and in terms of additional capabilities that can be brought to bear. But ally cooperation, and the interoperability of partners within a coalition, will depend on what capabilities our allies are willing to adopt or to operate in the same battlespace with. It is important that the United States be able to convince would-be allies of both the effectiveness and the safety of its military AI. AI and America’s Future The revelation that China used AI to violate human rights contrasts strongly to U.S. promises to take the high road with regard to its military applications of AI. Eric Schmidt and Bob Work have declared that the United States could easily lose its leadership in AI if it does not act urgently. The leadership the United States has shown in AI ethics is commendable, but to fully be the leader it needs to be for our national security and for our prosperity, America must lead the way on safety too. The opportunity to develop AI of unrivaled precision is historic. If it can build AI that is lethal, ethical, and safe, the United States would have an edge in both future warfare and the larger climate of competition that surrounds it. Developing safer AI would once again show the world that there is no better friend and no worse enemy than the United States.

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage: Operator Trust

Operator trust is essential to effective military operations – NATO deterrence fails if the military does not trust its weapons systems

Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman, 2022 – prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Lena and Zoe, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA]

Safety and security For humans to meet ethical and legal commitments when developing and deploying AI, the systems themselves must be safe, secure, and reliable. More simply put, if humans and institutions interacting with AI do not have confidence that the systems will perform as expected, then they cannot assure that its development and deployment are responsible. This makes safety and security a key pillar of responsible AI governance for any actor.82 As this section explores for NATO in particular, safety and security are indispensable to the Alliance’s stated goals to focus its approach to EDTs in the areas of “deterrence and defense, capability development, legal and ethical norms, and arms control aspects.”83 Politically, democratic militaries using AI cannot be accountable to their citizenries nor their coalition partners if they lack mechanisms to trace and explain how their systems are reliable. Accidents and interference with AI systems could likewise create political risks for the Alliance. For example, if deepfakes and micro-targeted information attacks compromise confidence in the integrity of information used to build a common operating picture, then the operational difficulties could also erode political trust between Allies in a few key ways. In the North Atlantic Council, disagreement about the integrity of information could slow the decision-making body’s ability to react to fast-changing operational realities.84 Further, compromised AI systems may not only make it harder for forces to prevent harm to non-combatants, but also to prevent friendly fire. In this way, coalition forces arguably face even higher obligations to coordinate on the reliability of their systems, relative to adversaries and near-peer competitors that tend to operate alone. As such, responsible AI governance is not purely technical; policy alignment and strategic planning are likewise necessary to draw attention to risk management above the tactical level.

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage: Cyber Attacks

TEVV is key to protect military AI from cyber-attacks – AI systems are prone to attack and failure – TEVV helps promote innovations to prevent these attacks.

Flournoy, Haines et al 2020 - former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Director of National Intelligence [Michèle and Avril, Gabrielle Cheftiz Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy October, “Building Trust through Testing Adapting DOD’s Test & Evaluation, Validation & Verification (TEVV) Enterprise for Machine Learning Systems, including Deep Learning Systems” https://cset. georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Building-Trust-Through-Testing.pdf Acc 6/23/22 JZ]

Second, the context in which DOD operates means these technologies are prone to adversary attack and system failure, with very real consequences. Machine learning systems have an increased potential for failure modes relative to other systems, such as bias due to a distribution shift in data, as well as novel vulnerabilities to attacks ranging from data poisoning to adversarial attacks. One could easily imagine an image classifier that accidentally classifies a civilian school bus as a tank or an adversary exfiltrating a model processing sensitive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or communications data. Image classification algorithms developed for one environment (e.g., the desert) could turn out to work incorrectly in another environment (e.g., cities). Third, with an effective TEVV system, the United States can reduce barriers to innovation and facilitate U.S. leadership in ML/DL technologies. As most of the innovation in ML/DL will come from the private sector, unless the U.S. government is able to effectively draw on private sector work in this arena, it will not be able to leverage the best cutting-edge technology. Research on new TEVV methods and organizational reforms to adapt the current system is simply not keeping pace with private sector development. Without urgent reforms and prioritized investment in new research and infrastructure, the Defense Department will lose its chance to shape industry’s approach to ML/DL development in a manner consistent with DOD standards for safety, reliability, and accountability. It will lose the opportunity to take advantage of new private sector developments, while allowing other nations without such standards to adopt the latest innovations. It is critical that the U.S. government not only shape its own U.S. industry standards but also promote compatible global standards and norms. Fourth, adversary advancements will likely increase pressure to field AI-enabled systems faster, even if testing and assurance are lacking. China has elevated AI to be a major national priority across sectors and is already exporting armed drones with varying degrees of autonomy.3 Russia is also pursuing R&D on AI for military 5 purposes4 and fields AI-enabled robotic systems in Syria with little regard for ethical considerations.5 However, it shouldn’t be a race against our competitors to field AI systems at any cost. It’s a race to field robust, lawful, and secure AI systems that can be trusted to perform as intended. Finally, high standards for robustness, assurance, interpretability, and governability can ultimately be a tremendous source of strategic advantage, incentivizing industry to harden systems to adversary attack. Taken together, these risks and opportunities suggest that devising an effective, efficient, and ethical TEVV process is critical for maintaining the U.S. military and economic competitive edge, as well as deploying reliable and trustworthy ML/DL systems.

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage: Cyber Attacks

AI increases threats to cyber security because it increases the dependence on data, while creating new targets of data attacks.

Goldfarb and Lindsay, 2022 – Chair in AI and health care at the Univ of Toronto, Prof of Cybersecurity at the Georgia Tech [Avi, Jon, 2/25/22, , “Prediction and Judgement: Why Artificial Intelligence Increases the Importance of Humans in War” 6/18/22, LND]

In short, there may be more data in modern war, but data management has also become more challenging. Although U.S. weapons may be fast and precise, U.S. wars in recent decades have been protracted and ambiguous. We argue that AI will most likely deepen rather than reverse these trends. Indeed, automation is both a response to and a contributing cause of the increasing complexity of military information practice.

Just as commanders are already preoccupied with C2 architecture, officers in AI-enabled militaries will seek to gain access to large amounts of data that are relevant to specific tasks in order to train and maintain AI systems. Units will have to make decisions about whether they should collect their own data organically or acquire shared data from other units, government agencies, or coalition partners. We expect many relevant databases to be classified and compartmented given the sensitivity of collection techniques or the content itself, which will complicate sharing. Units might also choose to leverage public data sources or purchase proprietary commercial data, both of which are problematic because nongovernmental actors may affect the quality of and access to data. As militaries tackle new problems, or new operational opportunities emerge, data requirements will change, and officers will have to routinely find and integrate new data sources. AI strategy will require militaries to establish data policies, and thus negotiating access to data will be an ongoing managerial—and human—challenge. We contend that militaries will face not only data access but also data relevancy challenges. Heterogenous data-generating processes allow biases and anomalies to creep into databases. Although metadata may help to organize information processing, they are also vulnerable to data friction that only humans can fix. Cleaning and curating data sources will therefore be as important as acquiring them in the first place. To the challenges of producing or procuring data must be added the challenges of protecting data. Just as supply chains become attractive targets in mechanized warfare, data supplies will also become contested. Overall, we expect the rise of AI to exacerbate the already formidable challenges of cybersecurity. Cybersecurity professionals aim to maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an organization's data. Two of these goals—integrity and availability—capture the AI requirements of unbiased and accessible data, as discussed above. The goal of confidentiality is also important insofar as data provide AI adopters with a competitive advantage. In commerce, AI companies often try to own (rather than buy) the key data that enable their machines to learn. The military equivalent of this is classified information, which is hidden from the enemy to produce a decision advantage. Military organizations will have strong incentives to protect the classified data that military AI systems use to learn. For the same reasons, adversaries will have incentives to steal, manipulate, and deny access to AI learning data. To date, most discussions of AI and cybersecurity have focused on a substitution theory of cybersecurity, that is, using AI systems to attack and defend networks. But we argue that a complementary theory of cybersecurity is just as if not more important. AI will require the entire military enterprise to invest more effort into protecting and exploiting data. If AI systems are trained with classified information, then adversaries will conduct more espionage. If AI enhances intelligence, then adversaries will invest in more counterintelligence. If AI provides commanders with better information, then adversaries will produce more disinformation. Inevitably, different parts of the bureaucracy will tussle among themselves and with coalition partners and nongovernmental actors to access and curate a huge amount of heterogeneous and often classified data. Organizations will also struggle with cyber and intelligence adversaries to maintain control of their own data while also conducting their own campaigns to collect or manipulate the enemy's data. To appreciate the strategic implications of AI, therefore, it is helpful to understand cyber conflict, most of which to date resembles espionage and covert action more than traditional military warfare. In fact, chronic and ambiguous intelligence contests are more common than fast and decisive cyberwar. Military reliance on AI becomes yet another factor abetting the rise of cyber conflict in global affairs, and the (ambiguous, confusing, interminable, gray zone) dynamics of cyber conflict are likely to have a strong influence on the dynamics of AI conflict.

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage: Cyber Attacks

AI systems are extremely vulnerable to cyberattacks – accidents will escalate quickly

Scharre, 2019 - Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Paul, May-June, “Killer Apps: The Real Dangers of an AI Arms Race,” https://omnilogos.com/killer-apps-real-dangers-of-ai-arms-race/6/18/22 MD]

Equally alarming for U.S. policymakers is the sharp divide between Washington and Silicon Valley over the military use of AI. Employees at Google and Microsoft have objected to their companies' contracts with the Pentagon, leading Google to discontinue work on a project using AI to analyze video footage. China's authoritarian regime doesn't permit this kind of open dissent. Its model of "military-civil fusion" means that Chinese technology innovations will translate more easily into military gains. Even if the United States keeps the lead in AI, it could lose its military advantage. The logical response to the threat of another country winning the AI race is to double down on one's own investments in AI. The problem is that AI technology poses risks not just to those who lose the race but also to those who win it. THE ONLY WINNING MOVE IS NOT TO PLAY Today's AI technologies are powerful but unreliable. Rules-based systems cannot deal with circumstances their programmers did not anticipate. Learning systems are limited by the data on which they were trained. AI failures have already led to tragedy. Advanced autopilot features in cars, although they perform well in some circumstances, have driven cars without warning into trucks, concrete barriers, and parked cars. In the wrong situation, AI systems go from supersmart to superdumb in an instant. When an enemy is trying to manipulate and hack an AI system, the risks are even greater. Even when they don't break down completely, learning systems sometimes learn to achieve their goals in the wrong way. In a research paper last year, a group of 52 AI researchers recounted dozens of times when AI systems showed surprising behavior. An algorithm learning to walk in a simulated environment discovered it could move fastest by repeatedly falling over. A Tetris-playing bot learned to pause the game before the last brick fell, so that it would never lose. One program deleted the files containing the answers against which it was being evaluated, causing it to be awarded a perfect score. As the researchers wrote, "It is often functionally simpler for evolution to exploit loopholes in the quantitative measure than it is to achieve the actual desired outcome." Surprise seems to be a standard feature of learning systems. Machine-learning systems are only ever as good as their training data. If the data don't represent the system's operating environment well, the system can fail in the real world. In 2018, for example, researchers at the MIT Media Lab showed that three leading facial recognition systems were far worse at classifying dark-skinned faces than they were at classifying light-skinned ones. When they fail, machine-learning systems are also often frustratingly opaque. For rules-based systems, researchers can always explain the machine's behavior, even if they can't always predict it. For deep-learning systems, however, researchers are often unable to understand why a machine did what it did. Ali Rahimi, an AI researcher at Google, has argued that much like medieval alchemists, who discovered modern glassmaking techniques but did not understand the chemistry or physics behind their breakthroughs, modern machine-learning engineers can achieve powerful results but lack the underlying science to explain them. Every failing of an AI system also presents a vulnerability that can be exploited. In some cases, attackers can poison the training data. In 2016, Microsoft created a chatbot called Tay and gave it a Twitter account. Other users began tweeting offensive messages at it, and within 24 hours, Tay had begun parroting their racist and anti-Semitic language. In that case, the source of the bad data was obvious. But not all data-poisoning attacks are so visible. Some can be buried within the training data in a way that is undetectable to humans but still manipulates the machine. Even if the creators of a deep-learning system protect its data sources, the system can still be tricked using what are known as "adversarial examples," in which an attacker feeds the system an input that is carefully tailored to get the machine to make a mistake. A neural network classifying satellite images might be tricked into identifying a subtly altered picture of a hospital as a military airfield or vice versa. The change in the image can be so small that the picture looks normal to a human but still fools the AI. Adversarial examples can even be placed in physical objects. In one case, researchers created a plastic turtle with subtle swirls embedded in the shell that made an object identification system think it was a rifle. In another, researchers placed a handful of small white and black squares on a stop sign, causing a neural network to classify it as a 45-mile-per-hour speed-limit sign. To make matters worse, attackers can develop these kinds of deceptive images and objects without access to the training data or the underlying algorithm of the system they are trying to defeat, and researchers have struggled to find effective defenses against the threat. Unlike with cybersecurity vulnerabilities, which can often be patched once they are uncovered, there is no known way of fully inoculating algorithms against these attacks.

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage: Nuclear AI

AI early warning systems undermine nuclear deterrence and stability – automation bias and false alarms ruin reliability

Horowitz and Scharre 2021 - Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and  Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Michael, Paul, January 12 2021, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence- Building Measures”, , Acc 6/18/22. M.A.]

The introduction of AI into military operations could also pose risks in certain circumstances due to the nature of the military mission, even if the AI system performs correctly and consistent with human intentions. Some existing research already focuses on the intersection of AI with specific military mission areas, most notably nuclear stability. Nuclear stability is an obvious area of concern given the potential consequences of an intentional or unintentional nuclear detonation. Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), a particular use of AI in which lethal decision-making is delegated from humans to machines, also represents a focus area of existing research. Other areas may deserve special attention from scholars concerned about AI risks. The intersections of AI with cybersecurity and biosecurity are areas worthy of exploration where there has been relatively less work at present. Potentially risky applications of AI extend beyond the battlefield to the use of AI to aid in decision-making in areas such as early warning and forecasting adversary behavior. For example, AI tools to monitor, track, and analyze vast amounts of data on adversary behavior for early indications and warning of potential aggression have clear value. However, algorithms also have known limitations and potentially problematic characteristics, such as a lack of transparency or explainability, brittleness in the face of distributional shifts in data, and automation bias. AI systems frequently perform poorly under conditions of novelty, suggesting a continued role for human judgment. The human tendency toward automation bias, coupled with the history of false alarms generated by non-AI early warning and forecasting systems, suggests policymakers should approach the adoption of AI in early warning and forecasting with caution, despite the potential value of using AI in intelligent decision aids. Education and training to ensure the responsible use of AI in early warning and forecasting scenarios will be critical.

The Impact - this increases the risk of accidental nuclear war because the speed of AI causes countries to adopt Lunch On Warning postures.

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage: Nuclear AI

Untested AI systems jeopardize nuclear command and control – they are susceptible to hacking by non-state actors

Fitzpatrick, 2019 - former the IISS Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme [Mark, 21 May, “Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Command and Control,” MD]

Among the most revealing vulnerabilities exposed in the exercise was the way in which private-sector technological breakthroughs might be expropriated by another non-state actor for malevolent purposes, with dire consequences for strategic stability. In the hypothetical two months before the exercise started, a US technology company called QuantumAI, which received significant seed funding from the CIA and won Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency contracts for its advanced magnetometers and gravimeters, partnered with another company to launch four open-source, quantum-sensing satellites that used AI to measure infinitesimal changes in magnetic and gravitational fields on the earth. Subscribers began using the new system to identify new mining opportunities, sunken shipwrecks and toxic metallic effluents from industrial sites. QuantumAI only marketed its product to government-approved researchers from NATO countries, and its technology was export-controlled under both US International Traffic in Arms Regulations restrictions and the Wassenaar Arrangement. In round one, satellite imagery of the South China Sea that rendered the water transparent and revealed the location of three Chinese submarines was put online, allegedly from sources linked to QuantumAI. While the Chinese team suspected that the US government was responsible, the US team worried that whoever put this information online might similarly reveal the location of US submarines. Exactly that transpired in round two. The same website posting locational data regarding Chinese submarines expanded its coverage to include a global map with additional markers for Russian and US nuclear submarines. This posed a clear risk to strategic stability in compromising the second-strike capability that stealthy nuclear-armed submarines provide. Adding the markers for US submarines made it clear that the revelatory website was not affiliated with the US government. Its registration history and hosting service provider in Switzerland suggested it was actually linked to the World Peace Guardians. When US Department of Homeland Security and FBI officials approached large US social-media firms for information regarding World Peace Guardians accounts, the companies replied that they would ‘share relevant information with the government when it becomes available’. The US president did decide that QuantumAI hard drives could be seized, although the CEO of QuantumAI was not fully cooperative. The idea of trying to seize World Peace Guardians servers in Switzerland was discussed, but rejected. The QuantumAI aspect of the exercise was one manifestation of what the background paper described as a ‘black box model extraction’ vulnerability. Such an extraction reverse-engineers an AI system to determine its parameters. An adversary may be able to use this information to enhance the effectiveness of future operations against the system by stealing intellectual property; identifying sensitive or proprietary information related to the system’s training data or objectives; or developing ‘adversarial inputs’ to be covertly introduced into the original AI system. Such inputs confuse the system’s classifiers or its pattern-recognition function, thereby causing it to miscalculate, misclassify or misinterpret elements in its operational environment.

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage: Nuclear AI

An AI Arms Race will increase nuclear instability – nations will rely on AI command and control, which is vulnerable to disinformation and interference

Fitzpatrick, 2019 - former the IISS Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme [Mark, 21 May, “Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Command and Control,” MD]

The year was 2021. The fictionalised events occurred in an IISS tabletop exercise in London in November 2018, for a project funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York designed to examine the potential impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on nuclear strategic stability. Experts from China, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic played roles as decision-makers in Beijing, Moscow and Washington as they sought to understand, address and take advantage of the scenarios and variations posed by the IISS control team. The major powers’ nuclear command-and-control systems increasingly rely on AI programmes, or, more precisely, expert systems and machine-learning algorithms, to enhance information flow, situational awareness and cyber security. Such capabilities can provide such systems with a larger window of opportunity in which to respond in the event of a crisis and thereby support de-escalation. Malevolent actors, however, can also use new technologies offensively to deceive, disrupt or impair command-and-control systems and their human controllers. The IISS tabletop exercise sought to explore several of these malfeasance pathways and vulnerabilities in plausible crisis scenarios. It demonstrated how an AI arms race could reduce strategic stability as the nuclear-weapons states become more reliant on AI for strategic warning in relation to nuclear command-and-control functions. Escalation via ‘deep fakes’ A key danger played out in the exercise was the potential for third parties to spoof warning systems and embed disinformation to fool human operators. In the scenario, a hitherto unknown non-state actor, the World Peace Guardians, circulated falsified videos and photographs on social-media platforms to create the impression that three US special-operations-forces soldiers had been killed by nerve gas in clashes with Russian military advisers in Syria. Some US pundits argued the legal case for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in response. Doctored videos then appeared on American and Chinese media platforms that showed the families of several prominent US officials hurriedly departing Washington DC. Further eyewitness accounts on social media claimed that missile silos in the western US had gone to high alert, and that the crews of two had even opened the silo doors. As a result of these and other secondary indicators used by Russian AI-driven situational-awareness algorithms, Moscow’s strategic-warning systems began informing the Kremlin leadership that a US missile launch could be imminent. In the first situation report generated by the control team, Chinese President Xi Jinping cautioned the US not to conduct a nuclear strike against any country and warned that if the US did not provide ‘credible evidence’ that it was not mobilising for war, China would have to take unspecified defensive actions. Generally speaking, the scenario was a plausible example of escalation by third parties. In this case, a non-state actor made a deep fake sufficiently believable that it generated a crisis between two nuclear states. A workshop background paper explained how offensive AI capabilities could widen the psychological distance between the attacker and its target. The paper fore-warned that a third-party actor might attempt to use AI-driven adversarial inputs, data-poisoning attacks, and audio and video manipulation to create escalatory effects between nations. While other early-warning systems would eventually discredit the spoof, it would still create high levels of uncertainty and tension in a short period of time. Doctored videos would likely force both parties to put their respective militaries on high alert. They would utilise overhead imagery, signals intelligence or human reporting to determine the reality on the ground. Collecting and processing the intelligence would take precious time during an escalatory crisis in which AI algorithms were urging immediate response actions.

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage: Brittle AI

US standards for TEVV reduce the risk of accidental conflicts

Schmidt and Work, 2021 – Chairs of The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence [Eric and Robert, “National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence Final Report Executive Summary” Acc 6/7/22 TA]

Manage risks associated with AI-enabled and autonomous weapons. AI will enable new levels of performance and autonomy for weapon systems. But it also raises important legal, ethical, and strategic questions surrounding the use of lethal force. Provided their use is authorized by a human commander or operator, properly designed and tested AI enabled and autonomous weapon systems can be used in ways that are consistent with international humanitarian law. DoD’s rigorous, existing weapons review and targeting procedures, including its dedicated protocols for autonomous weapon systems and commitment to strong AI ethical principles, are capable of ensuring that the United States will field safe and reliable AI-enabled and autonomous weapon systems and use them in a lawful manner. While it is neither feasible nor currently in the interests of the United States to pursue a global prohibition of AI-enabled and autonomous weapon systems, the global, unchecked use of such systems could increase risks of unintended conflict escalation and crisis instability. To reduce the risks, the United States should (1) clearly and publicly affirm existing U.S. policy that only human beings can authorize employment of nuclear weapons and seek similar commitments from Russia and China; (2) establish venues to discuss AI’s impact on crisis stability with competitors; and (3) develop international standards of practice for the development, testing, and use of AI-enabled and autonomous weapon systems.

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage: Brittle AI

The Impact - Military AI escalates conflicts – it causes accidental escalation, prevents war termination and undermines ceasefires and negotiations

Horowitz and Scharre 2021 - Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and  Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Michael, Paul, January 12 2021, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence- Building Measures”, , Acc 6/18/22. M.A.]

Unintended actions by autonomous systems in militarized disputes or contested areas are a challenge for militaries as they adopt more autonomous systems into their forces. The complexity of many autonomous systems used today, even ones that rely on rule-based decision-making, may mean that the humans employing autonomous systems lack sufficient understanding of what actions the system may take in certain situations. Humans’ ability to flexibly interpret guidance from higher commanders, even to the point of disregarding guidance if it no longer seems applicable, is by contrast a boon to managing escalation risks by retaining human decision-making at the point of interaction among military forces in contested regions. Unintended escalation is not merely confined to lethal actions, such as firing on enemy forces. Nonlethal actions, such as crossing into another state’s territory, can be perceived as escalatory. Even if such actions do not lead directly to war, they could heighten tensions, increase suspicion about an adversary’s intentions, or inflame public sentiment. While in most cases, humans would still retain agency over how to respond to an incident, competing autonomous systems could create unexpected interactions or escalatory spirals. Complex, interactive dynamics between algorithms have been seen in other settings, including financial markets, and even in situations where the algorithms are relatively simple. Another problem stems from the potential inability of humans to call off autonomous systems once deployed. One reason for employing autonomous functionality is so that uninhabited vehicles can continue their missions even if they are operating without reliable communication links to human controllers. When there is no communication link between human operators and an autonomous system, human operators would have no ability to recall the autonomous system if political circumstances changed such that the system’s behavior was no longer appropriate. This could be a challenge in de-escalating a conflict, if political leaders decide to terminate hostilities but have no ability to recall autonomous systems, at least for some period of time. The result could be a continuation of hostilities even after political leaders desire a cease-fire. Alternatively, the inability to fully cease hostilities could undermine truce negotiations, leading to the continuation of conflict. These problems are not unique to autonomous systems. Political leaders have imperfect command-and-control over human military forces, which has, at times, led to similar incidents with human-commanded deployed forces. For example, the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812 was fought after a peace treaty ended the war because of the slowness of communications to deployed forces.

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage: Brittle AI

Premature deployment of AI weapons risks miscalculation and war - they will fail when they operate outside of their prescribed environments.

Goldfarb and Lindsay, 2022 – Chair in AI and health care at the Univ of Toronto, Prof of Cybersecurity at the Georgia Tech [Avi, Jon, 2/25/22, , “Prediction and Judgement: Why Artificial Intelligence Increases the Importance of Humans in War” 6/18/22, LND]

In contrast with chess, the risks of premature automation are more extreme in the military realm (e.g., fratricide and civilian casualties), but the logic is the same. Militaries abound with standard operating procedures and tactical doctrines that guide the use of lethal capabilities (e.g., instructions for the safe operation of weapon platforms, playbooks for tactical maneuvers, and policies for employing weapons). To the degree that goals and mission parameters can be clearly specified, tactical operations will appear to be attractive candidates for automation. To the degree that combat timelines are expected to be extremely compressed, moreover, automation may appear to be even more urgent. Rapid decision-making would necessitate the pre-specification of goals and payoffs and the coupling of AI prediction to robotic action. Lethal autonomous weapon systems use prediction to navigate complex environments in order to arrive at destinations or follow targets, within constraints that are supplied by human operators. Their targeting systems base their predictions on training data that identify valid targets. Using algorithms, machines may rapidly and accurately identify targets at far greater distances than human visual recognition, and algorithmic target recognition may be collocated with sensors to reduce response times. Many AI-enabled weapons already or imminently exist. The Israeli Harpy loitering munition can search for and automatically engage targets, and China has plans for similar “intelligentized” cruise missiles. Russia is developing a variety of armed, unmanned vehicles capable of autonomous fire or unarmed mine clearance. The United States has been exploring combat applications for AI in all warfighting domains. In the air, the “Loyal Wingman” program pairs an unmanned F-16 with a manned F-35 or F-22 to explore the feasibility of using humans to direct autonomous aircraft, such as the XQ-58A Valkyrie. Air combat algorithms that can process sensor data and plan effective combat maneuvers in the span of milliseconds have already defeated human pilots in some simulators. At sea, the U.S. Navy's LOCUST project explores the feasibility of launching swarms of expendable surface-to-air drones. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel program is designed to search for enemy missile submarines and automatically trail them for months at a time, reporting regularly on their locations. On land, U.S. Marine “warbot companies” equipped with networks of small robots might provide distributed sensing and precision fire. Automated counter-battery responses, which accurately retaliate against the origin of an attack, could give human commanders leeway to focus on second- and third-order decisions in the wake of an attack. In the cyber domain, AI systems might autonomously learn from and counter cyberattacks as they evolve in real time, as suggested by the performance of the Mayhem system in DARPA's 2016 Cyber Grand Challenge. AI could be especially useful for detecting new signals in the electromagnetic spectrum and reconfiguring electronic warfare systems to exploit or counter them. Space satellites, meanwhile, have been automated from their inception, and space operations might further leverage AI to enhance surveillance and control. Much of the AI security literature is preoccupied with the risks posed by automated weapons to strategic stability and human security. Risks of miscalculation will increase as the operational context deviates from the training data set in important or subtle ways. The risk of deviation increases with the complexity and competitiveness of the strategic environment, while the costs of miscalculation increase with the lethality of automated action. The machine tries to optimize a specific goal, but in the wrong context, doing so can lead to false positives. AI weapons may inadvertently either target innocent civilians or friendly forces or trigger hostile retaliation. In these cases, the AI would have the authority to kill but would not understand the ramifications. The risks are particularly stark in the nuclear arena. Nuclear war is the rarest of rare events—keeping it that way is the whole point of nuclear deterrence—so training data for AI systems is either nonexistent or synthetic (i.e., based on simulation). Any tendency for AI systems to misperceive or miscalculate when confronted with uncertain or novel situations could have catastrophic consequences. In short, autonomous weapon systems that combine prediction with action can quickly make tragic mistakes.

Premature deployment of AI increases the risk of crisis escalation due to inflexibility and automation bias

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Contention One

The DOD AI Strategy underfunded reliability testing – it focused on ethics, but not safety.

Lewis 2019 - project lead for the DOD’s Joint Lessons Learned studies [Larry, “AI Safety: Charting out the High Road”, War on the Rocks Dec 19, https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/ai-safety-charting-out-the-high-road/ LMSi]

Promise 1: Addressing Safety Risks Unique to AI In its AI strategy, the Department of Defense made a promise to address the safety risks unique to AI technology. This is reflective of America’s long record of commitments to safety and adherence to international laws for armed conflict. For example, all military systems are subject to test and evaluation activities to ensure that they are reliable and safe, as well as legal reviews to ensure they are consistent with international humanitarian law (e.g., the Geneva Conventions). It is not surprising, therefore, that safety is prominent in the defense AI strategy. Though a commendable intention, the strategy has not yet resulted in significant institutional steps to promote safety with regard to AI. The U.S. military has been busy supporting the Defense Innovation Board’s development of AI ethics, with the Joint AI Center also emphasizing the critical role ethics plays in AI applications, yet the pursuit of safety — for example, avoiding civilian casualties, friendly fire, and inadvertent escalation — has not received the same sort of attention. I acknowledge a few steps are being taken towards promoting AI safety. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has a program working to develop explainable AI, to help address challenges with the use of machine learning as a black box technology. Explainability will enhance AI safety: for example, by being able to explain why an AI application does something amiss in testing or operations and to take corrective actions. But such steps, while important, do not make up a comprehensive approach to identify and then systematically address AI safety risks. To that end, our most recent report draws on a risk management approach to AI safety: identifying risks, analyzing them, and then suggesting concrete actions to begin addressing them.

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Contention One

Unfortunately, Believing you are in an Arms Race is also dangerous - it creates a Security Dilemma where both states are pressured to deploy AI as soon as they can - weapons are deployed before they are tested, safe, and reliable. This disrupts the balance of power and crisis stability.

Scharre 2021 – Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Paul, 6/28/21,https://tnsr.org/2021/06/debunking-the-ai-arms-race-theory/, “Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory”, 6/18/22, LND]

Even if military AI spending does not rise to the level of an “arms race,” many nations are nevertheless engaged in a security competition in the adoption of military AI, a competition that does pose risks. The situation that states find themselves in with regard to AI competition is much more accurately described as a security dilemma, a more generalized competitive dynamic between states than the more narrowly defined “arms race.” In his 1978 article, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” Robert Jervis defined the security dilemma as follows: “[M]any of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.” As Charles Glaser has pointed out, it is not obvious from this definition why it would be intrinsically bad for an increase in one state’s security to come at the expense of another’s security. In fact, decreasing the security of other states could have beneficial effects in enhancing deterrence and reducing the risks of aggression or achieving a favorable balance of power in a region, which could lead to greater political influence. The problem comes in the second- and third-order effects that could develop when another state reacts to having its security reduced. Responses could include counterbalancing with a net effect of no change in security (or worsening security). Glaser argues that there are some situations in which security competition is a rational strategy for a state to pursue even if competitors will arm in response. In other situations, arming may be a suboptimal strategy for a state, which would be better served by restraint or pursuing arms control. Security competition could even leave both states worse off than before. This can occur during a traditional arms race if nations expend vast sums of money in an unsuccessful attempt to gain an advantage over one another, with the result that both nations divert funds from non-defense expenditures. If the outcome of a security competition is the same relative military balance as before, the balance of power may not have meaningfully changed, but both nations could face diminished economic and social well-being at home relative to if they had avoided a security competition. Even absent this “guns vs. butter” tradeoff, however, there are other ways in which security competition can lead to a net negative outcome for both states. One way this could occur is if military innovation and the development of new capabilities alter the character of warfare in a manner that is more harmful, more destructive, less stable, or otherwise less desirable than before. In his 1997 article, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” Glaser gave the example of military capabilities that shifted warfare to a more offense-dominant regime. There are other ways in which warfare could evolve in a net negative direction as well. For example, in World War I, Germany’s interest in developing and deploying chemical weapons was spurred in part due to fears about France’s developments in poison gas. The result was the introduction of a weapon that increased combatant suffering on both sides, without delivering a significant military advantage to either. The same could occur with AI: It could alter the character of warfare in a way that would be a net negative for all participants. One possibility for how AI could alter warfare in a manner that would leave all states worse off would be if it accelerated the tempo of war past the point of human control, making warfare faster, more violent, and less controllable. There are advantages to adding intelligence into machines, but given the limitations of AI systems today, the optimal model for achieving the highest quality decision-making would be a joint human-machine architecture that combines human and machine decision-making. One way in which machines outperform humans, however, is in speed. It is possible to envision a competitive dynamic in which countries feel compelled to automate increasing amounts of their military operations in order to keep pace with adversaries. Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work summed up the dilemma when he asked, “If our competitors go to Terminators and we are still operating where the machines are helping the humans and it turns out the Terminators are able to make decisions faster, even if they’re bad, how would we respond?” This is a classic security dilemma. One state’s pursuit of greater automation and faster reaction times undermines other states’ security and leads them to similarly pursue more automation just to keep up. If states fall victim to this trap, it could lead to all states being less secure, since the pursuit of greater automation would not merely be an evolution in weapons and countermeasures that simply leads to the creation of new weapons in the future warfare could shift to a qualitatively different regime in which humans have less control over lethal force as decisions become more automated and the accelerating tempo of operations pushes humans “out of the loop” of decision-making. Some Chinese scholars have hypothesized about a battlefield “singularity,” in which the pace of combat eclipses human decision-making. U.S. scholars have used the term “hyperwar” to refer to a similar scenario. While the speed of engagement necessitates automation in some limited areas today, such as immediate localized defense of ships, bases, and vehicles from rocket and missile attack, expanding this zone of machine control into broader areas of war would be a significant development. Less human control over warfare could lead to wars that are less controllable and that escalate more quickly or more widely than humans intend. Similarly, limiting escalation or terminating conflicts could be more challenging if the pace of operations on the battlefield exceeds human decision-making. Political leaders would have a command-and-control problem in which their military forces are operating “inside” (i.e., faster than) their own decision cycle. The net effect of the quite rational desire for nations to gain an edge in speed could lead to an outcome that is worse for all. Yet, competitive dynamics could nevertheless drive such a result. One state’s pursuit of greater automation and faster reaction times undermines other states’ security and leads them to similarly pursue more automation just to keep up. Financial markets provide an example of this dynamic in a non-military competitive environment. Automation introduced into financial markets, especially high-frequency trading in which trades are executed at super-human speeds in milliseconds, has contributed to unstable market conditions that can lead to “flash crashes,” in which prices rapidly and dramatically shift. Financial regulators have responded by employing “circuit breakers” that automatically halt trading for a pre-determined period of time if the price moves too quickly. Financial markets have the benefit of a regulator who can force cooperative measures on competitors to address suboptimal outcomes. Under conditions of anarchy in the international security environment, any such cooperation would have to come from state v s themselves.

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › 1AC › 1AC - Contention One

We are Not in an AI Arms Race. We think that we are, but those claims are overblown – the AI adoption process is routine continuation of modernization

Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and  Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Michael, Paul, January 12 2021, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence- Building Measures”, , Acc 6/18/22. M.A.]

AI is a general-purpose technology akin to computers or the internal combustion engine, not a discrete technology like missiles or aircraft. Thus, while concerns of an “AI arms race” are overblown, real risks exist. Additionally, despite the rhetoric of many national leaders, military spending on AI is relatively modest to date. Rather than a fervent arms race, militaries’ pursuit of AI looks more like routine adoption of new technologies and a continuation of the multi-decade trend of adoption of computers, networking, and other information technologies. Nevertheless, the incorporation of AI into national security applications and warfare poses genuine risks. Recognizing the risks is not enough, however. Addressing them requires laying out suggestions for practical steps states can take to minimize risks stemming from military AI competition. One approach states could take is adopting confidence-building measures (CBMs): unilateral, bilateral, and/or multilateral actions that states can take to build trust and prevent inadvertent military conflict. CBMs generally involve using transparency, notification, and monitoring to attempt to mitigate the risk of conflict. There are challenges involved in CBM adoption due to differences in the character of international competition today versus during the Cold War, when CBMs became prominent as a concept. However, considering possibilities for CBMs and exploring ways to shape the dialogue about AI could make the adoption of stability-promoting CBMs more likely.

2022 MNDI Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Introductory Page

Thesis of this case:

AI is inevitable. It is a normal part of modernizing our military. Because it is a dual use technology, it will diffuse much more easily, which means there is not a huge military advantage to be the First to develop it. So, we are not in an “Arms Race.”

However, we – along with China and Russia - believe that we are in an arms race. We believe we have to develop it first because if China develops it first, we will be at a huge disadvantage. Not true, but that is what we believe. China believes the same thing about us. This is what is called a “Security Dilemma” – our pursuit of our security undermines another nation’s security, and their reaction is to pursue their security in a way that undermines ours, without a natural stopping point. We “create” a race by believing in it, which is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

So, what is the harm of believing that we are in an arms race? This Arms Race Framing or Arms Race Mentality causes us to deploy AI weapons as fast as we can, which causes us to rush to deploy them before they are tested, evaluated, verified and validated (TEVV). Before they are safe and reliable. If we rush, we cut corners, and put out “brittle” AI, which means AI that collapses in the real world when the real world is different from their testing environment. It’s like when EA pushed out Battlefront II way too early to try to beat other game publishers to the market, and it was full of bugs and malfunctions. Except this time, “bugs” in military AI that controls our nuclear weapons could malfunction in ways that cause nuclear war.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Affirmative DA NATO Expansion Answers › AT: NATO Expansion Reduces U.S. Defense Obligations

Adding Sweden and Finland won’t reduce U.S. defense commitments – those exist regardless

Maitra 22 – National Security Fellow, at the Center for the National Interest [SUMANTRA, MAY 23, 2022, Center for Renewing America, “NATO EXPANSION FOR FINLAND AND SWEDEN: A DANGEROUS AND UNNECESSARY DISTRACTION FROM US INTERESTS” https://americarenewing.com/issues/nato-expansion-for-finland-and-sweden-a-dangerous-and-unnecessary-distraction-from-us-interests/ Acc 6/19/22 ER]

For any other military or intelligence needs, bilateral or EU frameworks are more than sufficient.23 Sweden and Finland’s telecom companies such as Nokia and Ericsson already can get privileged treatment and American defense contracts, and provide a bulwark against Chinese dominance in the domain; a formal alliance isn’t necessary or needed for that. The argument that adding more countries in the alliance will free up American troops is also flawed, as historically that has only led to further Eastern European reliance and demands as well as West European free-riding on the American military. It is simply ahistorical to contemplate that this particular dynamic would change with Finland and Sweden within NATO. Consider that Sweden is not even in NATO yet, and is already calling for more US naval presence in the Baltic sea.24 In fact, Russian force posture towards Finland and Sweden might change once they join NATO, with more potential Russian bases in the Arctic, adding to further increased demands of American military presence.25 The cost-benefit analysis suggests that the only material difference for NATO will be the cost of an additional nearly thousand-mile frontier, and further chances of miscalculation and feeding of Russian paranoia about encirclement, which the Russian ruling elite will use to further justify their worldview.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Affirmative DA NATO Expansion Answers › U.S. Won’t Send Troops to Finland

Expansion will require more forces in Finland that the U.S. won’t send

Poast 22 – associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago [Paul Poast, June 7, 2022, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “What NATO Needs to Do Before Finland and Sweden Join” , Acc 6/18/22 ER]

One step for NATO to take is obvious: deploy forces, immediately. Unlike during past NATO membership expansions, time is not on the alliance’s side here. If it’s too late for pre-planning, then NATO must quickly move to reposition troops into the alliance’s new northeastern flank. If the NATO allies are not willing to commit new troops, this could be achieved by repositioning existing forces. Alternatively, perhaps this is the time for the EU itself, given that Finland and Sweden are both members, to fully commit to being a security provider. The EU could fill the gap in force deployments by encouraging its members to move forces to the Finnish-Russian border, potentially leveraging NATO’s command and control capabilities. Given that the contributions to the Enhanced Forward Presence are shared in a fairly equitable fashion among various NATO members, perhaps this approach can be duplicated in Finland.

However, under the current structure of NATO, the United States is the ultimate backstop for such deployments, and it will ultimately fall on Washington to fill in any gaps in forces for Finland. This is problematic. Though U.S. President Joe Biden and his administration strongly support Finland’s and Sweden’s bids to join NATO, it is unclear that the Biden team, or any future U.S. administration, is willing to base sizeable deployments of U.S. forces on Finnish territory.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Affirmative DA NATO Expansion Answers › NATO Expansion Unnecessary – Russia Weak

Russia is so weak that expanding NATO is unnecessary

Maitra 22 – National Security Fellow, at the Center for the National Interest [SUMANTRA, MAY 23, 2022, Center for Renewing America, “NATO EXPANSION FOR FINLAND AND SWEDEN: A DANGEROUS AND UNNECESSARY DISTRACTION FROM US INTERESTS” https://americarenewing.com/issues/nato-expansion-for-finland-and-sweden-a-dangerous-and-unnecessary-distraction-from-us-interests/ Acc 6/19/22 ER]

“NATO membership would strengthen Finland’s security. As a member of NATO, Finland would strengthen the entire defence alliance,” Finland’s President Sauli Niinisto and Prime Minister Sanna Marin said in a joint statement citing the Russian threat of invasion. “Finland must apply for NATO membership without delay.”1The very same day, The Times of London reported (albeit, per Ukrainian military sources) that the Russians lost an entire battalion with over 50 vehicles, and “as many as 73 T-72 and T-80 tanks, BMP armoured fighting vehicles, armoured tractors, a tugboat and other equipment were destroyed,” and that around 1,000 to 1,500 soldiers were killed, while crossing a tactical bridge in Eastern Ukraine, arguably near Russian strongholds.2

Threat is a combination of intention, power, proximity and capability. For that reason, the lackluster performance of Russia in Ukraine, and corresponding heightened threat perception in Europe, is baffling to realists. After all, what is the hegemonic threat potential of a great power across a continent that cannot provide air cover to its massacred battalions over a pontoon bridge, much less total air supremacy over a theatre of war? It is a pertinent line of inquiry. Wounded by her own folly, Russia remains without any demonstrable hegemonic capabilities to conquer Ukraine and molest parts of Eastern Europe or the wider continent.3 Without the threat of Russia as a hegemon, the argument in favour of the US incurring further security commitments in Europe by expanding the NATO alliance to Finland and Sweden is weak.