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2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Uniqueness › Non-unique

Democrats are likely to win the midterms – Trump, GOP candidates, unemployment

McNally 02/09/22 Joel McNally is a national-award-winning newspaper columnist and a longtime political commentator on Milwaukee radio and television. After graduating from Indiana University, Joel worked for two years at The Chicago Tribune and for 27 years at The Milwaukee Journal where he won a National Headliners Award for “Consistently Outstanding Local Column” and numerous state and local journalism awards. Since 1997, Joel has written a column for the Shepherd Express where he also was editor for two years. “ Don’t Believe Everything You Hear about Republicans Winning the Midterms,” Shepard Express, February. 09, 2022, https://shepherdexpress.com/news/taking-liberties/don%E2%80%99t-believe-everything-you-hear-about-republicans-winning-/

Despite everything you’ve heard, there are still plenty of reasons Democrats could do much better in November’s midterm elections than Republicans and much of the media expect. In fact, the future of American democracy depends on it. Democrats certainly know in normal election years a new president’s party historically loses congressional seats in the first midterms because opponents angry over losing power are more motivated than the winners to vote in low-turnout midterms. But every American also should realize there will never be another normal election year in this country until Republicans free themselves from the control of their defeated president and the violent militias and hate groups that support him who refuse to accept the results of free and fair elections. Rather than distancing themselves from their divisive, unpopular president who was thrown out of office after a single term by the largest voter turnout in history, Republican leaders who know better have joined a lunatic fringe within their party in supporting Donald Trump’s preposterous lie President Biden somehow stole the election by manufacturing millions of fraudulent votes. Extreme Candidates As a result, Republicans will be saddled with a lot of extreme candidates in those November midterms they’re so confident of winning. Adding to the chaos will be Trump himself campaigning for the worst among them who are running against Republicans he wants to punish for accepting accurate election results or condemning his supporters’ terrorist attack on the Capitol. Trump is one of the best agents Democrats have to get out the vote in their party. In the past two national elections, Democrats set new voter turnout records in the 2018 midterms flipping 40 seats to gain House control and in 2020 defeating Trump. 2022 could make it three in a row. The absurd Republican candidates in the midterms include at least five running for House seats who actively participated in that violent Jan. 6 insurrection. A New Hampshire candidate promises to run from prison if he’s incarcerated for breaking into the Capitol. The Ron Johnson Opportunity Wisconsin already provided a prime opportunity in the midterms for Democrats to increase Senate control by flipping the seat held by Ron Johnson, a national embarrassment who’s denied the violence of the attack resulting in five deaths and serious brain injuries to police beaten with iron pipes, hockey sticks and baseball bats. He’s discouraged vaccinations during the latest surge of a new, highly contagious COVID variant endangering the lives of the unvaccinated. Johnson could be joined on the midterm ballot by former Republican Lt. Gov. Rebecca Kleefisch running against Democratic Gov. Tony Evers. Kleefisch enthusiastically supports Trump’s fraudulent election claims and Michael Gableman’s corrupt investigation into Biden’s victory in Wisconsin for Assembly Republicans that’s expected to recommend new Wisconsin voting restrictions. All but the most dimwitted Republican leaders have to realize how dangerous Trump and his violent supporters are to the future of democracy. But they believe they need Trump’s supporters to win the midterms. They’ll worry about controlling the contempt for democracy in their party later. By then, they’ll be the ones under control. The Good News So here’s some more positive news about how much better the political landscape could be for Democrats in those fall midterms. The media have been warning us Republican state legislatures can easily win control of the House of Representatives with their usual corrupt gerrymandering of congressional districts in response to the 2020 census. Surprise, it’s not happening. The latest analysis by David Wasserman, redistricting expert for the non-partisan Cook Political Report, concludes redistricting is on track to create a congressional map slightly less biased in favor of Republicans than it’s been for the past decade. It should actually add a few more Biden-won districts. Wisconsin was specifically cited for one of the biggest ironies. After the racist anti-Obama tea party elections of 2010, Wisconsin and other Republican states drew such extremely gerrymandered maps it’s difficult for Republicans to make them any worse. In some Republican states, nonpartisan commissions and courts also are making a difference. Here’s more positive news for Democrats you haven’t heard nearly enough about. Nobel-prize-winning economist and columnist Paul Krugman described the first year of Biden’s presidency as “a year of spectacular economic recovery.” In early November, a Federal Reserve survey of economists predicted a year-end unemployment rate of 5.8%. Instead, November’s unemployment was 4.2% declining further to 3.9% in December. If supply chain problems keep easing in the coming year to reduce inflation, Biden’s economic success will continue. Here’s more. Not even Joe Manchin or Kyrsten Sinema want their party to be the minority in the Senate after the midterms. They’ll vote for a substantial new package of Biden’s Build Back Better legislation before long to improve the everyday lives of ordinary Americans. Biden and Democrats could go into the midterms in good shape after another successful year. That would be very good news for American democracy.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Impact › Dems good – laundry list

Democrats win is good – federal judges, GOP agenda, investigations, 2024 Senate

Zhouli 22 [Li Zhouli. "Why a Democratic Senate majority still matters ⁠— even if they lose the House". 5-2-2022. Vox. .] – AL

If Democrats lose the House this fall, as they’re widely expected to, their ability to do ambitious bills will be all but moot. Given Republican opposition, it’s likely most legislation, barring must-pass measures like appropriations, will be dead on arrival. That prompts the question: Does it matter if they lose the Senate, too? In fact, holding their majority in the upper chamber is still extremely important for a number of reasons, perhaps none more so than the courts. If elected, a Democratic Senate would be able to confirm more of President Joe Biden’s judicial nominees, including any upcoming theoretical Supreme Court pick. Even without the House, they could approve judges for district courts, circuit courts, and the high court with a simple Senate majority. And that’s not the only benefit: Keeping this majority would also mean that lawmakers could set their own floor agenda and reject bills approved by a GOP-led House. Senate Democrats could ensure, too, that hearings and committee time aren’t used on investigations of Biden and other members of his administration. “Given that it will be investigations on steroids over in the House, the question is how the Senate could serve as a buffer,” says Democratic strategist Jim Manley, a former staffer for former Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. Securing that buffer won’t be easy as the prospects for Democrats this fall are looking increasingly grim. Due to the backlash the president’s party typically faces, and other factors like the country’s ongoing struggles with inflation, Democrats are likely to see some major losses in the House and have no room for error in the Senate. Because of the 2022 Senate map and candidates’ past patterns of bucking national trends, however, Democrats have a slightly better chance of sustaining their narrow hold on the upper chamber. Three reasons Senate control matters Democrats would be pretty limited legislatively under divided government — but there are still three key areas where Senate control matters. Judges “The main difference between a split Congress and one controlled by Republicans completely would be Biden’s ability to fill judicial and other vacancies,” says Kyle Kondik, managing editor of Sabato’s Crystal Ball at the University of Virginia. A GOP Senate majority would be able to vote down Biden’s judicial nominees (including any that come up on the Supreme Court), block them wholesale from consideration, and pressure the White House to pick what they perceive as more moderate options. Republican lawmakers have already signaled that they may not consider Biden’s nominees. In April, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell wouldn’t commit to giving a Supreme Court pick a hearing in 2023 if the Republicans retook their majority. It’s something he’s done before: During the Obama administration, McConnell notably blocked Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland from ever getting a hearing by arguing that his nomination was in an election year. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has said that the “Garland rule” could be used if a high court vacancy comes up in 2024. Such opposition could seriously stymie Biden’s efforts on the courts: In his first year, Biden appointed the most federal judges of any president since Ronald Reagan, including more women, more people of color, and more public defenders than his predecessors. His attempts to continue doing so would be severely constrained without a Democratic Senate majority. Since these judges have lifetime appointments, their appointments have long-term impacts that extend far beyond the administration that nominated them. Trump and a Republican-controlled Senate confirmed more than 200 judges during his presidency, many of whom have contributed to pivotal decisions on immigration policy, mask mandates, and abortion rights. Setting legislative priorities In the majority, Democrats would be able to set the floor schedule and ignore bills that Republicans send over from the House. “It’s crucial to keep the Senate if only to serve as a bulwark against every bad idea that House Republicans are going to think of when they try to send them over to the Senate,” said Manley. If Republicans had Senate control, any bills that passed both chambers could still be vetoed by Biden. In the process, however, they could force vulnerable Democrats to take difficult votes on contentious issues. Similarly, Republicans could use tools like the Congressional Review Act and budget resolutions for messaging votes. Using the CRA, lawmakers could try to undo rules recently imposed by the Biden administration. If a simple majority in both chambers disapproves of a rule, they can pass a resolution trying to repeal it. Biden could also veto this, but Democrats would be pushed to take tough votes on the administration’s policies in the interim. Budget resolutions also only require a simple majority to pass the Senate and could be another forum for Republicans to score political points. Using these resolutions, which are also subject to a presidential veto, they could approve changes to the tax code or spending on climate programs and reproductive health. Investigations Republicans have already vowed to serve as a check on the Biden administration once they retake the majority in either chamber. House Republicans, for example, have announced plans to investigate the business practices of the president’s son Hunter Biden, and even pursue impeachment of certain Cabinet members. “Immediately, the House Republicans are going to start investigating the White House and the administration, basically looking for anything to embarrass the administration as much as they can,” says Neilan Chaturvedi, a political science professor at Cal Poly Pomona. While a GOP-controlled House would be able to dedicate time and resources to these efforts, a Democrat-controlled Senate could make sure that their chamber’s committees didn’t focus hearings on these issues. Additionally, the Senate could attempt to avoid a trial if the House approves articles of impeachment for an administration official. “The House could go ahead and vote to impeach, but there is some ambiguity about whether or not the Senate is compelled to hold a trial,” said George Washington University political science professor Sarah Binder. Democrats’ 2022 wins could decide control of the Senate for years Democratic wins this cycle would cushion potential losses the party could experience in the next election. Since senators hold six-year terms, anyone elected in 2022 would play a major role in preserving the party’s numbers for Congressional terms to come. “I think it matters more down the line because Democrats are staring at a really brutal map in 2024,” says Cook Political Report’s Jessica Taylor. As Vox’s Andrew Prokop has explained, Democrats aren’t currently defending any seats in states that Trump took in 2020. The four most contentious Democratic seats that are up — Nevada, Georgia, New Hampshire, and Arizona — are all places Biden won. Two other swing seats currently held by Republicans — Pennsylvania and Wisconsin — are also places Biden previously won, putting them in Democrats’ potential reach. The 2024 map, however, is far more challenging. That year, Democrats will be defending Sen. Joe Manchin’s seat in West Virginia, Sen. Jon Tester’s seat in Montana, and Sen. Sherrod Brown’s seat in Ohio, all states that voted for Trump in the last election. Additionally, several other Democrat-held seats will be up in states like Arizona, Michigan, and Maine. Essentially, the more seats Democrats can win in 2022, the better position they’ll have to withstand any shake-ups two years from now.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Impact › Dems good – climate

Warming leads to extinction

Kareiva 18, Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al. (Peter, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” Futures, 102)

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (climate change, global freshwater cycle, and ocean acidification) do pose existential risks. This is because of intrinsic positive feedback loops, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all directly connected to the provision of food and water, and shortages of food and water can create conflict and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. Ample clean water is not a luxury—it is essential for human survival. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-guard and produce a true apocalyptic event. Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that runaway climate change, and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Impact › Dems good – climate

Republican win locks in climate change and pollution

Kolbert 20 Elizabeth Kolbert has been a staff writer at The New Yorker since 1999. Previously, she worked at the Times, where she wrote the Metro Matters column and served as the paper’s Albany bureau chief. Her three-part series on global warming, “The Climate of Man,” won the 2006 National Magazine Award for Public Interest. In 2010, she received the National Magazine Award for Reviews and Criticism. She is the editor of “The Best American Science and Nature Writing 2009” and the author of “The Prophet of Love: And Other Tales of Power and Deceit,” “Field Notes from a Catastrophe,” and “The Sixth Extinction,” for which she won the Pulitzer Prize for general nonfiction in 2015. She received the Blake-Dodd Prize, from the American Academy of Arts and Letters, in 2017. Her latest book is “Under a White Sky: The Nature of the Future.” “An Earth Day Reminder of How the Republicans Have Forsaken the Environment ,” April 22, 2022, https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/an-earth-day-reminder-of-how-the-republicans-have-forsaken-the-environment

The idea for Earth Day came to Gaylord Nelson all of a sudden one day in the middle of 1969. That summer, “teach-ins” about the Vietnam War were all the rage. It occurred to Nelson, then the junior U.S. senator from Wisconsin: How about a “teach-in” about the environment? To attract the widest possible audience, Nelson, a Democrat, invited Representative Pete McCloskey, a Republican from California, to co-chair the event. The response was way more enthusiastic than either man had anticipated: on April 22, 1970, some twenty million Americans—a tenth of the country’s population—took to the streets. It was the largest public demonstration in U.S. history, and, as Jamie Henn, one of the founders of 350.org, has put it, it “had bite.” By the end of the year, a Republican President, Richard Nixon, had created the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. This was followed in relatively short order by the passage of the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act. All of these measures were approved with overwhelming bipartisan support. Today, as Earth Day turns fifty, it’s hard to imagine more dolorous circumstances for the occasion. covid-19 has forced online (or cancelled) virtually all the celebrations and protests that had been planned for the anniversary. The Trump Administration has barely even taken the day off from gutting the nation’s environmental regulations. (Last week, the Administration weakened rules governing the emission of mercury and other toxic chemicals from power plants; late last month, it weakened fuel-efficiency standards for cars and light trucks.) Meanwhile, in Congress, environmental protection has become such a thoroughly partisan issue that across-the-aisle collaborations like Nelson and McCloskey’s are rarer than Amur leopards. Owing to this divide, environmental problems that have emerged since 1970 have simply gone unaddressed. Congress has not passed—or even really come close to passing—a single piece of legislation aimed at addressing climate change. (All the steps taken by the Obama Administration to try to curb carbon emissions were done through regulation.) Precisely at the “moment when such legislative action is most needed,” James Morton Turner, a professor at Wellesley College, and Andrew Isenberg, a professor at the University of Kansas, have written, it has become “almost politically unimaginable.” How and why this happened is the subject of Turner and Isenberg’s recent book, “The Republican Reversal: Conservatives and the Environment from Nixon to Trump.” The two trace the G.O.P.’s turn against conservation to Ronald Reagan, who equated environmentalism with pessimism, and pessimism with a lack of patriotism. Reagan combined a sunny faith in the future with an equally sunny indifference to facts. Running for President in 1980, he claimed that acid rain was not caused by power-plant and auto emissions, as scientists had shown, but by the eruption of Mt. St. Helens, in Washington State, earlier that year. Also during the campaign, he declared that “eighty per cent of our air pollution stems from hydrocarbons released by vegetation.” Once elected, Reagan appointed Anne Gorsuch—an inexperienced ideologue (and the mother of the future Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch)—to head the E.P.A. Among her first moves was to propose slashing the agency’s budget by more than forty per cent. One staffer complained that morale was so low there was “no known scientific method to measure it.” Since Reagan, control of the White House has, of course, swung between the parties, as has control of Congress. Throughout the swings, anti-environmentalism has only become that much more entrenched in G.O.P. politics. (McCloskey, it’s worth noting, switched his party affiliation from Republican to Democrat, in 2007, at the age of seventy-nine.) A great deal of money has changed hands to help change minds; according to the Web site Open Secrets, which tracks federal campaign contributions, the oil-and-gas industry contributed nearly twenty-four million dollars to House and Senate Republicans during the past election cycle, compared with five million to Democrats. But, according to Turner and Isenberg, money is only part of the equation; the other part is votes. For Republican politicians, there’s no incentive to, say, back legislation to limit climate change: “Neither their corporate donors nor evangelicals nor the struggling Rust Belt workers who voted for Trump in 2016 see any advantage to it.” The situation is such that, as Aaron Huertas, who works with WeCanVote.US, recently pointed out, were Democrats inclined to pass meaningful climate legislation, they’d need to win not just the Presidency this fall but also a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate. Can this situation be changed? Certainly the hour is late and the facts—if you happen to be concerned about such things—are stark. What the original Earth Day showed is that, when Americans are mobilized, remarkable things are possible. What the past few years have shown is that Americans can be mobilized by the most remarkable falsehoods. To say that the future of the world depends on which of these tendencies prevails is at this point, unfortunately, no exaggeration.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Impact › Internal link defense

Dems holding onto the Senate, staying close to 50 Senators enough to prevent change in agenda

Robison ’22 (Matt Robison, congressional staffer and campaign manager; “Will Democrats Lose in the Midterms? Probably. But It's the Wrong Question”; Newsweek; 5.24.22; https://www.newsweek.com/will-democrats-lose-midterms-probably-its-wrong-question-opinion-1708947)//ccs

If it's the usual one—"Will Republicans take over majorities in Congress?"—then sure, there's a lot of evidence to say yes, they will. But that's not a very profound insight, is it? The President's party has almost always bled seats in midterms, and this year, even a handful of losses will mean a Republican majority. Even Presidents with soaring approval ratings still lose an average of three House seats in midterm elections, and we all know that President Biden's approval is 11 points below his disapproval. Reflecting the Democrats' unpopularity more widely, the "generic ballot" polling question has the Democrats down 2.5 percent. But what if that's the wrong question? NEWSWEEK NEWSLETTER SIGN-UP > I'd argue that there are two much more important questions we should be asking as we close in on November's midterms. Can the Democrats keep things close? Instead of asking whether the Democrats are going to lose their majority—a question we can all agree is best answered with a yes—I'd argue that we should be asking whether the Democrats can keep things close. If you're thinking that "close" only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades, think again: There's a huge difference between losing narrowly and getting blown out, for the same reason that you'd rather be down a field goal than two touchdowns at halftime. The Democrats WASHINGTON, DC - APRIL 06: U.S. President Joe Biden (C) signs the Postal Service Reform Act into law during an event with (L-R) Sen. Gary Peters (D-MI), Senate Majority Leader Charles Schumer (D-NY), Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), House Majority Whip James Clyburn (D-SC), House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-MD) and retired letter carrier Annette Taylor and others in the State Dining Room at the White House on April 6, 2022 in Washington, DC. A part of Postmaster General Louis DeJoy’s controversial 10-year restructuring plan, the law provides $107 billion to modernize and streamline the long-beleaguered Postal Service. CHIP SOMODEVILLA/GETTY IMAGES NEWSWEEK SUBSCRIPTION OFFERS > For one thing, if Democrats can hold just the Senate, they retain critical levers of power that are currently making a real difference. Consider the fact that President Biden has been getting his nominees for federal judges confirmed at a record pace, offsetting some of President Trump's massive reshaping of the judiciary. The Democratic-led Senate has successfully confirmed 369 of 521 nominees for key agency positions so far, and given congressional gridlock, these are the people shaping most of what is happening in government. As just one example, note that the Trump Administration rolled back 112 environmental rules, 30 of them on emissions. Now, Biden's agencies are overturning those changes, including critical rules on fuel standards, gas pipelines, and methane emissions. They need the leadership in place to keep that going. But even if Democrats lose the Senate, keeping the margins narrow means having to take out fewer Republican office-holders in 2024. That matters because incumbents usually start off with about a three-point election advantage. Moreover, consider the fact that slim House majorities are much harder to manage than fat ones. Just look at Nancy Pelosi's recent headaches; the most vulnerable representatives are always on the hot seat. A big majority allows those swing seat members to go against their party on the toughest votes and look bipartisan. Without that shield, the biggest targets are exposed. The good news for Democrats is that the chances of limiting their losses are actually fairly high. Modeling from highly-regarded analyst Alan Abramowitz suggests that Democrats currently have an even shot to hold the Senate and are on track to lose only about 20 House seats. It's not great, but it's within striking distance, and would be hardly a "shellacking." But there's a second and even better question we should be asking, and it's this: Can Democrats win enough races to protect American democracy from disaster? America is likely facing an existential crisis in 2024 from Big Lie MAGAists planning to subvert elections to reinstate Donald Trump or a near clone. Bill Clinton once said that our priority was to "save Social Security first." Today, the mantra has to be "save democracy first." Can Democrats accomplish that? Yes. Step one is to limit their 2022 losses for the reasons noted above, and also because if they can stay positioned to win back enough seats in 2024, it lowers the chances that Republicans can pull another Eastman Memo maneuver, muck with the electoral count, and have the election decided by cronies in the House. Second, Democrats must focus on keeping the Big Lie cabal from winning strategically important offices and legislative majorities in swing states. Closely divided bodies that could flip in 2022 include chambers in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan and Pennsylvania. Secretaries of State will be at the epicenter of the assault on elections, so Democrats must hold offices like Michigan and flip offices in states like Arizona, Georgia, and Nevada. Just to give a sense of the stakes, in Colorado the Democratic Secretary of State, a person who has received countless death threats, is up against a Republican county clerk facing criminal charges for tampering with voting equipment and who a judge barred from overseeing elections. In Pennsylvania, the Republican nominee for governor is a leading voice in the election denial movement and gets to pick the Secretary of State. Democrats must win as many of these critical races as possible. And is that do-able? Yes. Posing the right question means focusing on what you really care about. Democratic doomscrolling of the midterm election is understandable—it has the same appeal as watching the Johnny Depp trial—but what has to matter most is making sure there are still elections to care about in the future, to say nothing of the broader aim the party is supposed to stand for: an inclusive and ever-expanding vision of opportunity. Those are the real goals. And yes, Democrats can still achieve them, even if they lose in the midterms. Of course, the Democrats could still turn this around completely: There are historical outliers where the President's party held serve, and plenty of times where Republicans nominated such extreme candidates that they lost winnable races. But in general, the basic positioning of the parties tends to hold in the runup to an election, while jolts to the race tend to work against the party that holds the White House. Which is why Democrats should be focused on the achievable goals that are very much in reach.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Impact › Internal link defense

No internal link—nothing passes after midterms

Beavers and Everett 22 [Olivia Beavers is a congressional reporter for POLITICO, focusing on House Republicans and GOP leadership. John Burgess Everett is the congressional bureau chief for POLITICO, specializing in the Senate since 2013. POLITICO 1-18-22 How a GOP majority in Congress might handle Biden in 2023 https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/18/gop-majority-congress-biden-2023-527117] 6-26-2022

Republicans are feeling so good about their chances of retaking Congress this fall that they’re already debating their governing relationship with President Joe Biden. And they’re divided over how to handle their potential big wins. With Biden and Democrats floundering right now, the GOP is increasingly favored to vault back to partial power in Washington by flipping the House, and potentially also the Senate, in the coming midterms. What comes next isn’t quite clear: Some Republicans are mulling ways to collaborate with Biden on issues like trade, energy or tech; others are prepared to go scorched-earth as their party eyes the bigger prize of retaking the White House in 2024. The GOP’s pro-bipartisanship camp may not have a lot of space in 2023 to work with the president: funding the government and raising the debt ceiling will be a major challenge, given how often House and Senate Republicans diverge on critical pieces of legislation. And former President Donald Trump will continue trying to influence the party’s direction, criticizing Senate GOP Leader Mitch McConnell and anyone else who steps out of line with his combative politics. Given those dynamics, there’s no unified GOP agenda for voters to examine this fall — other than an up-or-down vote on Biden and congressional Democrats’ record. Republicans aren’t sure what will happen next if they actually win. “It’s really going to be a referendum on him and his administration and on the Democrat leadership in the Congress,” John Thune, the No. 2 Senate Republican who is also running for reelection this fall, said of Biden. “So we need to stay out of our own way.” “It’s really important for us to highlight our differences, how we would do it differently,” the South Dakotan added. “And then … have some things that we would do or could do if there was a willingness to work together.” House GOP plots to keep advantage for 2022 midterms For now it’s Democrats, holding shaky but singular power in Washington, consuming the Capitol’s oxygen as they struggle to enact Biden’s agenda. But the GOP’s splits over whether to work with Biden, even now from the minority, would become the nation’s central political story if it retakes part or all of Congress this fall. With that victory would come the messy job of actually governing, preventing credit defaults and government shutdowns at a minimum. And just as a trio of conservative senators once battled former President Barack Obama on all fronts as they sought the White House, there’s a stable of Senate and House Republicans with national political ambitions that could cut against any attempts to collaborate with Biden. Not to mention the passel of Republicans disinterested in the presidency who are already signaling they’ll push to block Biden at every turn. “Putting a stop to his agenda is the first thing that we would do, because that’s presumably what people would be voting for,” said Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.), a potential 2024 GOP White House hopeful who led the objections to Biden’s election certification. “The message would be: If we’re in the majority, we need to stop what he’s currently doing.” Still, the most powerful Senate Republican has indicated an openness to work with Biden. Already feeling bullish on his party’s chances this fall, McConnell said in a late-September interview: “I don’t think people send us here to do nothing.” “When you have a closely divided government, or a divided government,” McConnell added then in previously unreported comments, “I think the American people are saying, ‘We know you have some big differences, and either of you may not be able to move the ball the way you’d like to. But why don’t you look for things you agree on, and do those?’” McConnell pointed to trade as a potential area of future cooperation with Biden. As Senate majority leader during the last two years of Obama’s administration, McConnell famously blocked the president from filling a Supreme Court vacancy and slowed other judicial confirmations to a trickle. McConnell won’t say how he’d handle a Supreme Court vacancy if one comes up in 2023 or 2024 and he controls the Senate, though Democrats are positive he wouldn’t fill one for Biden either. Yet McConnell also cut a deal with Obama to fast-track new trade deals that then-Democratic leader Harry Reid did not lend a hand with. McConnell later clinched a bipartisan transportation deal with Obama and Democrats. As minority leader during this Congress, McConnell signed off on a huge Biden-backed infrastructure bill and after repeated threats that he would do otherwise, allowed the debt ceiling to increase. House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy and House Republicans opposed those accommodations by the Kentucky Republican — as did Trump. And unlike McConnell, McCarthy and his conference are in the thrall of the party’s former president. That means the House Freedom Caucus and other allies of the former president will be trying to maximize Democrats’ losses even at the expense of legislation some rank-and-file Republicans would otherwise support, particularly in the Senate. When asked about areas House Republicans could team up on with the Biden administration, Georgia Rep. Drew Ferguson, a member of GOP leadership, replied tersely: ”On anything that’s not socialist.” That public posturing reflects a real concern among some Republicans that Biden might not be willing to pivot from his current agenda of expanding social and climate programs, and gutting the filibuster to pass elections reform, in order to work with Republicans on what would probably be small-bore issues. With a bipartisan infrastructure package already law, there’s fewer obvious opportunities for collaboration with the other party at the moment. Rep. John Curtis (R-Utah) suggested immigration as an avenue for partnership. House Minority Whip Steve Scalise (R-La.) wants to work with Biden on battling inflation. Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) said Republicans could talk to Biden about making Social Security “more sustainable.” But it’s hard to imagine a split government delivering on even one of those big-ticket items. And some Republicans are already downplaying any ideological intersection with Biden after the past year. “Are we going to get the president that was a self proclaimed dealmaker in the Senate for his entire career? Are we going to get the guy that’s down in Georgia [for] a face-saving speech to his base because he can’t get something through the Senate?” asked Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-N.D.). “A lot of it depends on which president we get.” Indeed, Armstrong and other Republicans singled out the tone of Biden’s speech in Georgia last week, in which the president suggested that lawmakers who oppose Democrats’ voting rights legislation will be on the same side of history as segregationists and the head of the Confederacy. McConnell quickly condemned Biden’s remarks, calling them “beneath his office,” and Biden later sought to clarify that he hadn’t made that direct comparison about the GOP leader. One telling metric: Even Republicans who voted to impeach Trump last year aren’t sure whether they can find any substantive common ground with Biden if they are in the majority. “Boy, my answer would have been a lot different a year ago,” said freshman Rep. Peter Meijer (R-Mich.), who voted to impeach Donald Trump earlier this year. “I’ve been astounded at the number of areas where we’ll talk with people from the administration. … And then just nothing happens.”

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Impact › A2 Econ

Republican victory isn’t good for the economy – they’ll pursue the same flawed spending and tax policies

Mitchell 17 Daniel J. Mitchell was a senior fellow at the Cato Institute who specialized in fiscal policy, particularly tax reform, international tax competition, and the economic burden of government spending. Prior to joining Cato, Mitchell was a senior fellow with the Heritage Foundation, and an economist for Senator Bob Packwood and the Senate Finance Committee. His work has been published in numerous outlets, including the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Villanova Law Review, Public Choice, Emory Law Journal, Forbes, USA Today, Offshore Investment, Playboy, and Investor’s Business Daily. He has appeared on all the major TV networks, and has given speeches in almost 40 states and more than 30 countries. Mitchell earned a PhD in economics from George Mason University. “Republicans Embrace Bad Economics and Bad Policy,’ August 15, 2017, https://www.cato.org/blog/republicans-embrace-bad-economics-bad-policy

To be blunt, Republicans are heading in the wrong direction on fiscal policy. They have full control of the executive and legislative branches, but instead of using their power to promote Reaganomics, it looks like we’re getting a reincarnation of the big‐​government Bush years. As Yogi Berra might have said, “it’s déjà vu all over again.” Let’s look at the evidence. According to The Hill, the Keynesian virus has infected GOP thinking on tax cuts. Republicans are debating whether parts of their tax‐​reform package should be retroactive in order to boost the economy by quickly putting more money in people’s wallets. That is nonsense. Just as giving people a check and calling it “stimulus” didn’t help the economy under Obama, giving people a check and calling it a tax cut won’t help the economy under Trump. Tax cuts boost growth when they reduce the marginal tax rate on productive behavior such as work, saving, investment, or entrepreneurship. When that happens, people have an incentive to generate more income. And that leads to more national income, a.k.a., economic growth. Borrowing money from the economy’s left pocket and then stuffing checks (oops, I mean retroactive tax cuts) in the economy’s right pocket, by contrast, simply reallocates national income. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why the economy didn’t get much benefit from the 2001 Bush tax cut, especially when compared to the growth‐​oriented 2003 tax cut. Unfortunately, Republicans haven’t learned that lesson. Republicans have taken steps in the past to ensure that taxpayers directly felt the benefits of tax cuts. As part of the 2001 tax cuts enacted by President George W. Bush, taxpayers received rebate checks. The article does include some analysis from people who understand that retroactive tax cuts aren’t economically beneficial. …there are also drawbacks to making tax changes retroactive. …such changes would add to the cost of the bill, but would not be an effective way to encourage new spending and investments. “It has all of the costs of the tax cuts but none of the economic benefits,” said Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget President Maya MacGuineas, who added that “you don’t make investments in the rear‐​view mirror.” I’m not always on the same side as Maya, but she’s right on this issue. You can’t encourage people to generate more income in the past. If you want more growth, you have to reduce marginal tax rates on future activity. By the way, I’m not arguing that there is no political benefit to retroactive tax cuts. If Republicans simply stated that they were going to send rebate checks to curry favor with voters, I’d roll my eyes and shrug my shoulders. But when they make Keynesian arguments to justify such a policy, I can’t help but get upset about the economic illiteracy. Speaking of bad economic policy, GOPers also are pursuing bad spending policy. Politico has a report on a potential budget deal where everyone wins…except taxpayers. The White House is pushing a deal on Capitol Hill to head off a government shutdown that would lift strict spending caps long opposed by Democrats in exchange for money for President Donald Trump’s border wall with Mexico, multiple sources said. So much for Trump’s promise to get tough on the budget, even if it meant a shutdown. Instead, the back‐​room negotiations are leading to more spending for all interest groups. Marc Short, the White House’s director of legislative affairs, …also lobbied for a big budget increase for the Pentagon, another priority for Trump. …The White House is offering Democrats more funding for their own pet projects. The only good news is that Democrats are so upset about the symbolism of the fence that they may not go for the deal. Democrats show no sign of yielding on the issue. They have already blocked the project once. Unfortunately, I expect this is just posturing. When the dust settles, I expect the desire for more spending (from both parties) will produce a deal that is bad news. At least for those of us who don’t want America to become Greece (any faster than already scheduled). Republican and Democratic congressional aides have predicted for months that both sides will come together on a spending agreement to raise spending caps for the Pentagon as well as for nondefense domestic programs. So let’s check our scorecard. On the tax side of the equation, we’ll hopefully still get some good policy, such as a lower corporate tax rate, but it probably will be accompanied by some gimmicky Keynesian policy. On the spending side of the equation, it appears my fears about Trump may have been correct and he’s going to be a typical big‐​government Republican. It’s possible, of course, that I’m being needlessly pessimistic and we’ll get the kinds of policies I fantasized about in early 2016. But I wouldn’t bet money on a positive outcome.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Impact › A2 Econ

No econ impact

Walt 20 [Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, May 13th, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/]

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”

Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Impact › A2 Econ

Economic decline doesn’t cause war – stats prove

Clary 15 Christopher Clary, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Impact › A2 Readiness

GOP win means end of support for Ukraine – turns allied commitments

Kaonga ’22 ( Gerrad Kaonga is a US news reporter, “Russian TV Suggests GOP Midterm Wins Will Scupper U.S. Support For Ukraine,” Newsweek, , 6/9/2022)

A Russian TV host has suggested that if Republicans win the U.S. midterms, support for Ukraine will begin to dwindle. A video of state TV host Vladimir Solovyov making these claims has begun circulating on social media. The video has so far been viewed over 80,000 times after being posted by the Daily Beast's Julia Davis. "This compilation of clips explains why the Russians think they're winning and don't need to negotiate," she tweeted. "We don't need to participate in any negotiations, because time is on our side, the tempo is working in our favor." As the conversation between the host and other political scientists and commentators, Solovyov claimed the support for Ukraine would change in the U.S. after the midterms. "[If the Republicans prevail in November] a lot will change, of course a lot will change, "Solovyov said. "They will calmly say: 'Why do we need to be involved and send so much of our own money?' "Republicans will come and say, 'why the hell do we need a corrupt, Nazi Ukraine?' "They will ask, 'Whom are we supporting? Yes, Russia is bad and the sanctions will stay, but why keep throwing so much money over there [when] our schools lack funding, we have plenty of our own problems. "'Instead of fortifying the border with Mexico, helping our small businesses, we've given that money to corrupt Ukraine and no one knows where it went." Newsweek has contacted Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs for comment. As the Democratic Party prepares for crucial midterm elections, where Republicans could be poised to retake the House of Representatives and the Senate, Joe Biden's approval rating sits at a near-record low. The president's approval rating has shown no sign of significant improvement as the country experiences high inflation with just over six months to go until Americans go to the polls on November 8. Poll tracker FiveThirtyEight assessed Biden's approval rating by analyzing a wide variety of polls and using its own system of pollster ratings.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Impact › A2 Readiness

The welfare state is key to sustaining the American military

Mittelstadt 18 (2018, Jennifer, Jennifer Mittelstadt is a Professor of History at Rutgers University and is the Harold K. Johnson Chair in Military History at the US Army War College; her work about the relationship between the welfare state and the military has been published by the Harvard University Press, “FOR AMERICA, WELFARE IS ESSENTIAL FOR WARFARE”, War On The Rocks,

In 2015 I published a book called that chronicled the history of military benefits and social services in the all-volunteer force. For many in the military, the title constituted fighting words. I didn’t anticipate this when I chose it. Some commenters asked if I thought soldiers were “welfare queens.” Others assumed I was out to cut their benefits. More than a few were angry enough to wish violence on me. If I had a quarter for every incensed email and suspicious question I’ve received, I’d have pocketed far more money than book sales have generated. The title aroused hostility in part due to the widely held belief that the military is separate from civilian life and especially the civilian welfare state. While military personnel partake of subsidized housing, health care, child care, and many more systems of valuable support, most Americans – and military personnel – consider those programs “not social welfare,” but a taken-for-granted entitlement in return for the perceived sacrifices of military life. The differentiation between military benefits and welfare goes even further than drawing bright lines between similar programs in different settings. The distinction shapes fundamental choices of where the nation invests in national power. The military and welfare are depicted as opposite poles in a Manichean battle of the budget. Too many political leaders and policy makers set up a zero-sum game scenario in which they pit , claiming the former is more important than the latter. Others assume that social welfare for civilians creates a weak, dependent society that diminishes national power. The nation must therefore provide funds for worthy “troops” and take them from unworthy “welfare recipients.” For some elected officials, every breath supporting men and women in uniform is matched by a . These views reflect distorted understandings of social welfare and defense, and, as I’ve learned in spending the past year at the , they’re harmful to American national and military power. My conversations with senior leaders have made plain the central role of social welfare in creating the conditions for both military power and national power. The military and welfare are not opposites, they’re intertwined. Welfare is short-hand for “social welfare,” which itself derives from “the general welfare” of the populace enshrined alongside “the common defense” in the United States Constitution. While Americans in recent decades have used the word “welfare” pejoratively to signify means-tested programs for the poor, historically welfare had a positive connotation and broader definition. The majority of Americans of the 1950s, including the war hero and , for example, approved overwhelmingly of “welfare” and “the welfare state.” Health, education, old age pensions, disability protections, workplace safety, minimum wages and maximum hours – all these were properly considered “welfare.” Some Americans receive social welfare through the government, some through private charities. Most partake of both even when they don’t know it; since the 1930s the government has through tax breaks to large companies, all in an effort to deliver as many social and economic supports to as many Americans as possible. These many types of social welfare have built and continue to sustain military power. Take the military’s most basic requirement – fielding a force. The modern U.S. military has never been able to mobilize for war without adequate welfare for its populace. It was precisely the poor health, nutrition and education of many potential draftees during both . Military and Selective Service officials as well as veterans organizations made the case for social welfare programs for military preparedness. , improving public education, creating food and nutrition programs, and . And since the era of the all-volunteer force began in 1973, social welfare has become even more essential. Healthy, able, educated and sound recruits are the sine qua non of the all-volunteer force, and declines in public health and welfare harm the force. Today, standards for military service preclude nearly who cannot qualify for service – they are too sick, too physically unfit, or too undereducated. It has not been possible – and it will not be possible – to fill the ranks to acceptable standards without . If the military needs strong social welfare programs to fill the force, it also needs them to utilize the force. Military benefits and social services – what I call – have grown hand-in-hand with the volunteer force in order t. Since the 1970s, the military has expanded social and economic benefits and services to all ranks and created vast new programs such as child care and family support services. allow military personnel to do the jobs they joined to do, and to do them well. Even with the wrap-around services the military provides, military personnel also continue to rely on the civilian welfare state to fill gaps. Military personnel and their families utilize public schools, child welfare services, and , to name but a few civilian social welfare programs. The military has not been able to fulfill its missions – and will not in the future – without military and civilian investments in social welfare. Social welfare also contributes to the national power of the United States. Regardless of what one thinks about role of America in the world today, there is no doubt that one of the main sources of its influence has been a healthy, educated, and productive populace. Critics of welfare argue that the populace would be better off with a much-diminished welfare state replaced by private charities, de-regulation, and self-reliance. Indeed, they believe government welfare programs . Such a view does not correspond with the historical data on the rise of the United States to the status of a global power and later a superpower, however. As historians have documented, the increasing economic and military might of the United States – and thus its global influence – resulted not from a wildly unregulated free market, but from the better-regulated, well-distributed capitalism of the , which, along with the and postwar expansions of social welfare like the GI Bill, helped produce the . Indeed, one way the United States exerted its global power was through . For their part, my students at the U.S. Army War College seemed intuitively aware of positive relationships between social welfare and national power. In my “Theory of War and Strategy” course, officers adhered to a broad definition of national power. Among other attributes, they cited key outcomes of social welfare – a productive economy, civic vitality, and social equality and opportunity. Students expressed modesty about the ability to achieve goals through military force alone and insisted on the inter-connected importance of political, economic, and social institutions to address matters of international concern. When we studied the history of the Peloponnesian War, my students expressed doubts about the long-term viability of the highly unequal Spartan society that directed all its national resources to war. And they identified tragedy in the imperial over-reach of Athens, a city-state whose relative equality and social and cultural investments ought to have sustained its flourishing role in the larger Greek world. Similarly, during an exercise ranking the power of the world’s states, military power never functioned as their sole criterion. Education, human development, and resultant economic power topped their lists. It’s no coincidence that eight of the ten most powerful nations they listed feature , as defined by the World Bank. In large, complex 21st century societies, organized social welfare programs contribute to national power. Maligning welfare and genuflecting to the military are staples of today’s partisan politics, where politicians stoke the worst fears and deepest passions of their electoral bases. But for those who claim to support U.S. national power and military readiness there is little excuse for reductionist thinking about social welfare programs. Yes, meaningful discussion must take place about how to make sure investments in both social welfare and military spending are ethical and sustainable. But no serious reckoning of national security can falsely decouple the two. Pitting military spending against social welfare might be popular for in the United States today, but it’s also dangerously wrong.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Impact › A2 Readiness

No impact to readiness

George 99 (James L. George, former congressional professional staff member for national security affairs, “Is Military Readiness Overrated?” CATO, 5-27-1999, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/is-military-readiness-overrated)

Military readiness promises to be a major issue when Congress marks up a defense bill later this year. Some members of Congress are already using readiness as a reason to increase funding in the emergency spending bill for the war in Yugoslavia. Most experts cite the initial stages of the Korean War and the Hollow Force of the late 1970s as cautionary examples of being ill-prepared. A closer look at both those examples, however, shows that they really had little to do with readiness. Moreover, the current crisis in Yugoslavia illustrates once again why readiness may be overrated and the funds better spent elsewhere. Although often used as a generic term for all military capabilities, readiness—defined as the ability to respond with appropriate force with little or no warning—is only one of four pillars of military preparedness. The other pillars are force structure, modernization and sustainability. Thus, an effective military force depends on much more than just readiness. Interestingly, the two favorite examples cited by readiness alarmists fail to prove their case. The performance of Task Force Smith, an ill-prepared battalion quickly sent to the front and fairly easily routed by the North Koreans during the initial days of the Korean War, is often cited as the worst case. “No More Task Force Smiths” has become a mantra for the Army. However, critics of Task Force Smith fail to point out that U.S. commanders made the most basic of military mistakes—including grossly underestimating the enemy and sending TFS to an exposed position. When such blunders occur, the end result will be the same whether it is an ill-trained Task Force Smith in Korea or well-trained Marines in Beirut or elite Rangers in Somalia. Moreover, critics also fail to mention that barely a month later the United States stabilized the situation in South Korea, and in another month the Marines conducted their famous Inchon Landing. In fact, without the Chinese intervention, the United States would have won the Korean War a few months after it began. Not bad for a U.S. force that was supposedly ill-prepared. Similarly, the Hollow Force of the late 1970s was not primarily a readiness problem but a combination of many factors—including a military characterized by low morale after Vietnam, serious drug and racial problems, the erroneous induction of too many mentally substandard recruits and low pay eroded further by high inflation. At the same time, major structural changes were transforming the U.S. military, including the introduction of women into the regular forces, the switch from a draft to an all-volunteer force and the initiation of the Total Force Concept that placed more reliance on the Reserves. Given all of that turbulence, no wonder we had a Hollow Force. Often overlooked, however, is how quickly those problems were solved. In some cases, solutions were found without spending a dime. For example, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Thomas Hayward instituted his “Not in my Navy” program of zero tolerance for drugs. The drug problem was solved almost overnight. The induction of too many mentally substandard recruits by mistake which had lowered standards, was identified and corrected. That correction solved most other personnel problems (and should be a warning to people who want to lower standards today). Some members of Congress are now using the crisis in Yugoslavia to get more funds for readiness by arguing that the military is now stretched “too thin.” (Congress doubled President Clinton’s request for $6 billion in emergency spending for the war.) In fact, the situation is quite the opposite. Leaving aside the question of whether the United States should even be involved in Yugoslavia, the new Clinton Doctrine, which does not plan to use ground troops ( a position that is supported by many Republicans), limits the stress placed on the military. Those decisions are all deliberate political actions that have absolutely nothing to do with readiness. Under a well-conceived strategy, even a modestly capable force will probably perform well; but under a poorly conceived strategy, even a force with the highest degree of readiness will probably have serious problems. The experiences of Task Force Smith and the Hollow Force, as well as the invocation of a Clinton Doctrine that eschews the use of ground forces, have major implications. More forces, for example, could be placed in the reserves and scarce funds spent elsewhere. In addition, the military could switch to what Sen. John McCain (R- Ariz.) has called “Tiered Readiness:” a few forces would be kept on expensive ready status and be augmented by reserve forces that could be mobilized if a substantial threat to U.S. security arose. Military readiness is certainly important, and no one is suggesting a return to the truly shallow force of the late 1940s or the Hollow Force of the 1970s. But a close look at those forces shows that their difficulties involved much more than just poor readiness.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Add-Ons › 2AC – Racism Addon

Racism in AI is present and developing. Further implementation exacerbates structural racism and eliminates colored bodies. (really good structural impact card for soft left version, but might need to run with “AI norms spills over” type cards to be completely effective)

Asaro 19 (Peter M. Asaro (M’10) Dr. Asaro received his PhD in the history, philosophy and sociology of science from the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign, Urbana, Illinois, USA, where he also earned a Master of Computer Science degree. October 17, 2019 Racism and Fully Autonomous Weapons ZX

The rise of artificial intelligence is largely due to an increase in power, memory and speed of computers, and the availability of large quantities of data about many aspects of our lives. Through the commercial application of big-data, we are increasingly being sorted into different classifications and stereotypes. In its most benign form, this stereotyping is being used to sell us products via targeted advertising, however, in its most egregious application, we see the weaponization of new information technologies utilize similar classifications based on biased algorithms, to which the consequences for certain communities could be deadly. In this paper I focus on fully autonomous weapons that are currently being developed for military and law enforcement purposes; and their potential threat to the human rights of marginalized communities, in particular persons of color intersectionally. This paper will also consider the systemic nature of racism and how racism would be reinforced and perpetuated by fully autonomous weapons. Fully autonomous weapons can select and attack targets without meaningful human control, they operate based on algorithms and data analysis programming. In essence, this means that machines would have the power to make life-and-death decisions over human beings. The trend towards more autonomy in weaponry without adequate human oversight is alarming especially when we know that digital technologies are not racially neutral. Moreover, when it comes to artificial intelligence (AI) there is an increasing body of evidence that shows that racism operates at every level of the design process and continues to emerge in the production, implementation, distribution and regulation. In this regard AI not only embodies the values and beliefs of the society or individuals that produce them but acts to amplify these biases and the power disparities.iii One example of racism manifesting in AI is the under-representation problem in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields, which in itself is a manifestation of structural racism and patriarchy in western society. Technologies in the west are mostly developed by white males, and thus perform better for this group. A 2010 study by researchers at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the University of Texas, found that algorithms designed and tested in East Asia are better at recognizing East Asians, while those designed in Western countries are more accurate at detecting Caucasians. Similarly, sound detecting devices perform better at detecting male, Anglo-American voices and accents, as opposed to female voices, and non-Anglo-American accents. Research by Joy Buolamwini,v reveals that race, skin tone and gender are significant when it comes to facial recognition. Buolamwini demonstrates that facial recognition software recognizes male faces far more accurately than female faces, especially when these faces are white. For darker-skinned people however the error rates were over 19%, and unsurprisingly the systems performed especially badly when presented with the intersection between race and gender, evidenced by a 34.4% error margin when recognizing dark-skinned women. Despite the concerning error rates in these systems, commercially we already see adaptations of faulty facial recognition systems being rolled out in a variety of ways from soap dispensers to self-driving cars. The issue here is what happens if law enforcement and national security become reliant on a system that can recognize white males with just 1% error rate yet fails to recognize dark-skinned women more than one-third of the time? These types of applications of new information technology fail people of color intersectionally at a disturbing rate. The fact that these systems are commercially available reveals a blatant disregard for people of color, it also positions "whiteness" as the norm, the standard for objectivity and reason. These applications of new information technology including their weaponization favors whiteness at the expense of all others, it is not merely a disempowerment but an empowerment. In real terms, racism bolsters white people's life chances. As we all grew up in a white-dominated world it is not surprising that the vast majority of white people operate within, benefit from and reproduce a system that they barely notice. This is a long-held reality and it is a fundamental problem that we now see infiltrate technology. Historical or latent bias in data is another issue, this is created by frequency of occurrence, for example in 2016 an MBA student named Rosaliaviii discovered that googling "unprofessional hairstyles for work" yielded images of mainly black women with afro-Caribbean hair, conversely when she searched "professional hair" images of mostly coiffed white women emerged, similar google search results are still seen today. This is due to machine learning – algorithms; it collects the most frequently submitted entries and therefore reflects statistically popular racists sentiments. These learnt biases are further strengthened, thus racism continues to be reinforced. A more perilous example of this is in data-driven, predictive policing that uses crime statistics to identify "high crime" areas and then subjects these areas to higher and often more aggressive levels of policing. Crime happens everywhere, however when an area is over-policed such as communities of color that results in more people of color being arrested and flagged as "persons of interest" thus the cycle continues. In 2017, Amnesty International launched a report called "trapped in the Matrix",ix the report highlighted racially discriminatory practices by the UK police force and their use of a databasecalled the "Gangs Matrix" which inputs data on "suspected" gang members in London. As of October 2017, there were 3,806 people on the Matrix, 87% of those are from black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds and 78% are black, a disproportionate number given that the police's own figures show that only 27% of those responsible for serious youth violence are black. Amnesty stated that some police officers in the UK have been acting like they are in the "Wild West", making false assumptions about people based on their race, gender, age and socioeconomic status. As a result, individuals on the Matrix database are subject to chronic overpolicing. With black people six times more likely to be stopped and searched than white people, and ten times more likely to be convicted of drug-related offenses. This system not only interferes with their right to privacy, Amnesty claims that the police often share the Matrix with other local agencies such as job centers, housing associations, social services, schools and colleges. In several cases, this has led to devastating impacts on people's social and economic lives because they are listed as "nominal" gang members, a label which is deliberately vague and stigmatizing. The nature of systemic racism means that it is embedded in all areas of society, the effects of this type of oppression doesn't easily dissipate. Through the continual criminalization and stigmatization of people of color, systemic racism operates by creating winners and losers regardless of what people actually do. This is also the way that it redistributes opportunities and resources based on nothing other than privilege. Given that the UK, as well as five other countries are developing fully autonomous weapons to target, injure and kill based on data-inputs and pre-programmed algorithms, we can see how long-standing inherent biases, pose an ethical and human rights threat. Where some groups of people will be vastly more vulnerable than others, fully autonomous weapons would not only act to further entrench already existing inequalities but could exacerbate them and lead to deadly consequences. Legalities As AI technology advances, the question of who will be held accountable for human rights abuses is becoming increasingly urgent. Machine learning and AI, effect a range of human rights including privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, the right to non-discrimination and equality, the right to life and the right to human dignity. Holding those responsible for the unlawful killings of people of color by law enforcement and the military is already a huge challenge in many countries, however, this issue would be further impaired if the unlawful killing was committed by a fully autonomous weapon. Who would be held responsible: the programmer, manufacturer, commanding officer, or the machine itself? Lethal force by these weapons would make it even easier for people of color to be at the mercy of unlawful killings and far more difficult to obtain justice for victims of color and their families. According to Reni Eddo-Lodge racism perpetuates partly through malice, carelessness and ignorance, it acts to quietly assist some, while hindering others.xi It is within this framework that we must grapple with race and the weaponization of new information technologies. In this regard, we should ask ourselves who controls these technologies and what do they think they know about the people they are "classifying"? What are the politics of these relationships and the deeply-rooted systemic forms of discrimination? Who benefits from these technologies and how? There is a long history of people of color being experimented on for the sake of scientific advances from which they have suffered greatly but do not benefit. An example of this is from James Marion Sims, known as the father of gynecology for reducing maternal death rates in the US, in the 19th century. He conducted his research by performing painful and grotesque experiments on enslaved black women. "All of the early important reproductive health advances were devised by perfecting experiments on black women,".xii Today, the maternal death rate for black women in the US is three times higher than it is for white women. Thus, when it comes to new information technology, facial recognition systems, algorithms and automated and interactive machine decision-making, communities of color are often both deprived of their benefits and subjected to their consequences. This paradox where science is inflicted on communities of color rather than aided by it must be addressed. We must be vigilant against deeply rooted social problems taking root in the technical infrastructure that we create. We must work towards a zero policy on racism in technology, and not weaponize racism in technology. If racism and killer robots are allowed to co-exists these weapons will be used discriminately against people of color and other marginalized groups. For these and many other ethical, moral, human rights, legal and humanitarian reasons the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, numerous governments, regional groups, tech workers, experts, scholars and the UN Secretary-General are all calling for a legally binding instrument to prohibit fully autonomous weapons xiii We call on the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance to condemn fully autonomous weapons and the human rights threat they pose to people of color; and to support a prohibition treaty that will preserve meaningful human control over the use of force and prohibit fully autonomous weapons.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Add-Ons › 2AC- Cyber Addon

Coordinated AI ensures effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance – that stops cyber-attacks and escalation.

Hill ‘20 [Steven Hill, served until February 2020 as Legal Adviser and Director of the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) at the NATO International Staff, "AI's Impact on Multilateral Military Cooperation: Experience from NATO," 4-27-2020, American Journal of International Law | Cambridge Core, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/ais-impact-on-multilateral-military-cooperation-experience-from-nato/3AEF22AA22550A10B75DD74A806D4D18]/lf

AI Applications from a NATO Perspective It is useful to complement this description of NATO’s fairly nascent policy work on military applications of AI with a brief overview of the types of applications that one hears most discussed in NATO circles. Given the amount of academic, media, and political attention to the issue of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), it might come as a surprise that it is the far less high-profile or headline-grabbing applications of AI that receive attention within NATO. This may well be because LAWS are already being discussed by a Group of Governmental Experts within the Geneva-based framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, thus making Allies hesitant to duplicate discussions in Brussels. However, the reason that the issue of LAWS—however important the debates involved—is not on the forefront of the agenda at NATO is likely more straightforward: that current and foreseeable technology suggests different, perhaps more prosaic applications, for AI in the military sphere. This essay focuses on two: (1) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and (2) cyber defense. The development and use of AI-enabled applications in each of these areas clearly presents both opportunities and challenges. Enhancing the information available to support decision-making is one of NATO’s priorities. ISR is based on information-gathering from a variety of assets deployed across domains. The information or data gathered from both NATO and national assets can then be fused together to help identify patterns and trends in support of situational awareness and operational decision-making. Since this data will likely be too voluminous for traditional human analysis, NATO can leverage AI-enabled systems to comb through these datasets. In this way, NATO can apply AI to enhance situational awareness and improve decision-making, a potentially considerable advantage given the challenges of getting all Allies up to speed on rapidly evolving situations. AI applications can also be used in the context of cyber defense, where NATO has a defensive mandate focused on defending NATO’s networks and supporting Allies as they defend their own networks. AI-based applications cover areas such as preemptive patching and the taking of corrective action on the basis of a constant analysis of low-level and recurrent patterns of attacks and cyber threats across networks, all done more quickly and with greater precision. Moreover, the more information exchanged on the nature of attacks in a variety of networks, the easier it is to identify trends in multinational cyber threats. While the use of AI in both these contexts could potentially increase the speed and quality of multinational military cooperation, it clearly also can pose difficulties. For example, increasing speed could be perceived as fueling pressure for inappropriately accelerated action. This kind of acceleration of usual processes might be perceived as going against “normal” NATO decision-making in a number of ways: it might be seen as evading the political control exercised by the North Atlantic Council, overriding the consensus decision-making that applied within the Alliance, being susceptible to misinterpretation or being seen as escalatory in nature, or otherwise leading to unpredictable results. In an extreme case, Allies might see these situations as inconsistent with NATO’s collective defense mandate. This might result in a backlash against the use of AI-enabled military applications, precisely at a time when the Alliance needs to maintain an edge with them. In other words, as with many issues involved in multinational military cooperation, the problem may ultimately boil down to one of trust.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Add-Ons › 2AC – Miscalc Addon

Uncertainty regarding rules of AI as well as future development makes it vital to capitalize on emerging technologies to minimize escalation, otherwise risking unmanned catastrophe through NC3 automation (this one is prob more for goldilocks affs than regs)

Horowitz and Scharre 19 (Michael C. Horowitz is Director of Perry World House and Richard Perry Professor at the University of Pennsylvania. He is currently on a leave of absence from the University to serve as Director of the Office of Emerging Capabilities Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense. Paul Scharre is the Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS. He led the Department of Defense (DoD) working group that drafted DoD Directive 3000.09, establishing the department’s policies on autonomy in weapon systems) December 2019 “A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence” ZX

Nuclear weapons are arguably the single most significant weapon system invented in modern history, meaning uncertainty about the viability of nuclear deterrence in the 21st century constitutes one of the most important security risks facing the world.2 This uncertainty is both a product and source of increased tensions in nuclear dyads worldwide. The proliferation of conventional military technologies, such as hypersonic weapons, could further undermine deterrence by potentially undermining traditional modes of escalation management, and as a consequence, nuclear stability. 3 The impact of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence (AI) for nuclear stability remains understudied, however.4 In early 2017, Klaus Schwab of the World Economic Forum argued that the world is on the cusp of a Fourth Industrial Revolution, wherein several technologies – but most prominently AI – could reshape global affairs.5 Many defense experts around the world share Schwab’s recognition of the potentially transformative effects of AI.6 The most prominent statements about the impact of AI on warfare, however, tend to be extreme. Elon Musk, for instance, has vocally contended that AI run amok could risk World War III.7 This overheated rhetoric masks the way that advances in automation, autonomous systems, and AI may actually influence warfare, especially in the vital areas of nuclear deterrence and warfighting. The intersection of nuclear stability and artificial intelligence thus raises critical issues for the study of international politics. Relative peace between nuclear-armed states in the 20th century arguably relied in part on mutually assured destruction (MAD). 8 MAD prevails when each side recognizes that both it and its opponent have an assured nuclear second-strike capability, or that either side can impose unacceptable damage on the other in retaliation against a nuclear attack.9 Threat of mutual destruction ultimately led both the United States and the Soviet Union to deprioritize the role of preemption in their nuclear war plans.10 Furthermore, as Albert Wohlstetter found, the threat of mutual destruction “offer[ed] every inducement to both powers to reduce the chance of accidental war.”11 While there are no known instances of accidental war, there are historical examples of unintended escalation, either in preconflict crises or once a conflict is underway.12 Accidental escalation is when a state unintentionally commits an escalatory act (i.e. due to technical malfunction, human error, or incomplete control over military forces). 13 Inadvertent escalation can also occur, whereby a state unknowingly commits an escalatory act (i.e., an intentional act that unknowingly crossing an adversary’s red line). 14 Accidents have increased tensions between countries on numerous occasions, but have not led to escalation.15 Nuclear-armed states have expended vast resources to minimize the risk of unintentional escalation, knowing that it could lead to catastrophe should it occur. Automation may complicate the risks of escalation, deliberate or unintended, in a number of ways. Automation has improved safety and reliability in other settings, from nuclear power plants to commercial airliners. Used properly, many applications of automation in nuclear operations could increase reliability, reduce the risk of accidents, and buy more time for decision-makers in a crisis. Automation can help ensure that information is quickly processed, national leaders’ desires are swiftly and efficiently conveyed, and launch orders are faithfully executed. On the other hand, poor applications of automation could render nuclear early warning or command-and-control (C2) systems more opaque to users, leading to human-machine interaction failures. Human users could fall victim to automation bias, for example, surrendering their judgment to the system in a crisis Automation is often brittle and lacks the flexibility humans have to react to events in their broader context. The states most likely to be willing to tolerate these risks for the perceived capability gains would be those that have significant concerns about the viability of their second-strike deterrents. Thus, the more a country fears that, in a world without using autonomous systems, its ability to retaliate to a nuclear strike would be at risk, the more attractive autonomous systems may appear. Uninhabited nuclear delivery platforms could undermine nuclear surety, as they could be hacked or slip out of control, potentially leading to accidental or inadvertent escalation. Automated systems could end up reducing decision-maker flexibility by narrowing options, hampering attempts to manage escalation. These dynamics suggest that autonomous systems could influence the potential for nuclear escalation in three ways. First, while many aspects of the nuclear enterprise are already automated in many countries, from early warning and command and control to missile targeting, as autonomous systems improve, states may elect to automate new portions of the early warning and C2 processes to improve both performance and security. From a security standpoint, for instance, increased automation in nuclear early warning may allow operators to identify threats more rapidly in a complex environment. Likewise, automation may help to ensure the dissemination of launch orders in a timely manner in a degraded communications environment. States may also automate – or threaten to automate – nuclear launch procedures in the belief that doing so would provide them with a coercive advantage over adversaries. Second, as military robotics advance, nuclear powers could deploy uninhabited nuclear delivery platforms for a variety of reasons. For instance, a state might deploy nuclear-armed long endurance uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the belief that doing so would provide additional nuclear signaling or strike options. They might also look to uninhabited nuclear delivery platforms to bolster their secure second-strike capabilities. Nuclear delivery vehicles – such as torpedoes – capable of autonomously countering enemy defenses or selecting targets might be seen to do likewise. Alternatively, a government might choose to automate its nuclear forces so that a small number of trusted agents can maintain control. This might could be especially attractive for a nuclear-armed regime that fears a coup or other forms of interference by its nation’s military elite. Third, the increased automation of conventional military systems might influence nuclear stability in direct and indirect ways.16 It may enable – or more likely yet, be seen to enable – improved counterforce operations by technologically-advanced states. The ineffectiveness of counterforce operations – and hence the survivability of second-strike deterrents – presently hinges in large part on the difficulty of finding and tracking adversary nuclear launch platforms (mobile missiles or submarines) long enough for ordnance to be delivered. Machine learning algorithms and other applications of artificial intelligence could, in principle, improve states’ abilities to collect and sift through large amounts of data in order to locate and track such targets, though it is important to recognize limitations to any developments given the real-time requirements for a disarming strike. Likewise, military autonomy could enable the deployment of conventional autonomous systems designed to shadow and/or attack nuclear-armed submarines. Furthermore, if automation gives (or is perceived to give) one side in a competitive dyad a significant conventional military advantage, the weaker side may feel compelled to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons for deterrence and warfighting. These issues surrounding the potential impacts of artificial intelligence are magnified by uncertainty about the trajectory of technological developments. This article first proceeds by clarifying what autonomous systems are and clarifying often-tricky definitional issues surrounding artificial intelligence. It then lays out some key theoretical expectations. Second, the article explores the impact of autonomous systems on early warning and nuclear command and control, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) relevant for nuclear systems, in the context of recent research. Third, the article discusses the potential for uninhabited nuclear delivery platforms and vehicles featuring new kinds of automation. Fourth, the article describes the way conventional autonomous systems could both directly and indirectly influence nuclear stability. Finally, the article concludes by assessing the net likely impact of autonomous systems on nuclear stability and describing potential pathways for future research. The analysis argues that the impact of autonomous systems could depend on the specific application – both where automation falls in the nuclear enterprise but also how it is implemented in terms of design, human-machine interfaces, training, and operator culture.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › AT: EU CP

Europe start-ups are lagging behind in the tech race due to poor salaries, stock options, and superhubs

Baroudy et. al ‘20 (, head of McKinsey’s Technology, Media & Telecommunications Practice in Europe, Jonatan Janmark, associate partner in the Stockholm office, Tobias Strålin is a partner at McKinsey & Company, Abhi Satyavarapu and Zeno Ziemke, consultants in the San Francisco office, “Europe’s start-up ecosystem: Heating up, but still facing challenges,” McKinsey & Company, October 11 2020, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/technology-media-and-telecommunications/our-insights/europes-start-up-ecosystem-heating-up-but-still-facing-challenges)-amc

Attracting the best talent can be difficult. While Europe has a tech talent cost advantage compared to the United States—salaries for software developers are as much as 50 percent lower in Europe than those in the San Francisco Bay Area or New York City8 —the continent’s start-ups often lack the tools to attract the best talent. Most notably, in many European countries unfavorable equity and stock-option rules make start-ups less appealing to potential employees. For example, more than 75 percent of the EU countries’ stock-option rules analyzed by the European VC firm Index Ventures lagged behind those of the United States.9 At the same time, the significantly lower number of leading tech companies and successful hypergrowth start-ups in Europe reduces the pool of experienced executives and other talent that have hands-on background in building IPO-sized companies. The type of operational knowledge that comes from deep experience launching and exiting from successful start-ups is key to scaling companies through the late stages. Innovation ‘superhubs’ are not as densely packed with resources as those in the United States. “Superhubs” such as Silicon Valley and New York City, which have a high concentration of entrepreneurs, tech talent, and investors, have played a very important role in the success of the US start-up ecosystem. Although London, Paris, Berlin, and Stockholm can be considered the leading hubs in Europe, they have not achieved the same concentration in terms of capital, knowledge, and talent. As a result, only about 30 percent of European start-ups have located their headquarters in a tech superhub—where they might have an easier time attracting talent and funding—versus almost half of US start-ups (Exhibit 8). Furthermore, surveys show that more than 60 percent of founders start their companies where they live or where they have family and support systems.10 Of course, relocating within the United States is not the same as relocating within Europe, given that in the United States the language and culture will generally be the same. However, if COVID-19 means that working remotely or from home becomes more common, this disparity might become less problematic and potentially could lessen the importance of superhubs.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › AT: Unilateral CP

CP rips NATO apart and fuels US unilateralism which dooms European relations.

Soare 20 [Simona R. Soare, Simona R. Soare was a Senior Associate Analyst at EUISS from 2019 to end May 2021. Her research focused on United States security policy, transatlantic security and EU-NATO relations., “DIGITAL DIVIDE? Transatlantic defence cooperation on Artificial Intelligence”, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brief 3, March 2020,

Relatedly, NATO will be increasingly challenged to maintain interoperability and ensure politically relevant contributions, particularly from smaller allies without advanced AI-enabled capabilities. This is because the transatlantic allies operate a mix of new and legacy systems that are diverse and produce data that is fragmented and heterogeneous. Indeed, a replay of the experience in cyber capabilities is entirely possible in AI: a small number of transatlantic partners deploy advanced AI-enabled systems to maintain their full-spectrum military capabilities and the rest either eventually adopt a variety of less sophisticated AI capabilities to remain relatively interoperable or develop AI niche capabilities to enhance their added value to the alliance. This would increase the intra-alliance AI dependence on nations with full-spectrum AI-enabled capabilities, including in the areas of collective decision-making, operations, collaborative capability development and counter-AI. This asymmetry is particularly worrisome for rapid decision-making in NATO, one of the pillars of the Alliance’s adaptation efforts. Wider information asymmetry between transatlantic partners underpinned by asymmetry in AI-enabled capabilities could hinder rapid decision-making between the allies.28 Such dynamics fuel American unilateralism and exacerbate long-standing tensions between the transatlantic partners, as recently demonstrated by the American withdrawal from Syria and the killing of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani. Consequently, European partners will face important ethical, legal and strategic considerations about US operational use of AI-enabled capabilities in Europe and will have to manage the increased risks of European entanglement in an unintended US conflict. This will be a far cry from Europe’s attempt to take back control of its own defence. For these and other reasons, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of active European participation in the formulation of rules for the operational use of AI.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › AT: Brittle Turn

Defense integration and innovation happen quick – even small countries can specialize in specific AI systems.

Husain et al. 18 (Amir Husain, August Cole, and Wendy R Anderson. CEO of Spark Cognition & Board of Advisors for UT Austin’s Department of Computer Science & Member of Council on Foreign Affairs, Senior fellow of Scowcroft Center on Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council & Fellow of Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity at Marine Corps University. " As Budget Polemic Drives Headlines, Do Not Lose Track of NATO’s Approach to AI". 07-27-2018. Royal United Services Institute. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/155282/WendyRAnderson_RUSIArticle.pdf. 6-22-2022.)-cg

Unlike defence industrial bases, which are needed for fighters or tanks, critical AI innovations could come from NATO’s smallest nations, with an Alliance-standard approach ensuring that small states are not crowded out. A set of common NATO AI capabilities matched to the Alliance’s operating concepts can bridge the technical gaps that could leave out states lacking the relevant technology–industry expertise or the ability to implement AI systems in their defence ministries. Moreover, given the complexity of missions around the world, NATO needs to be fully integrated at a mission-systems level, rather than individual states operating individually with incompatible technologies. Technological developments concerning AI are presently advancing with such speed that the trailing behind of any one country with adoption or implementation could undercut whole-of-NATO efectiveness when it is needed most during a crisis. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is becoming a decisive force in the international security environment, with the potential to transform everything from information operations to intelligence analysis to mission planning. Whether NATO takes a unified approach to AI or not is a crucial question for the Alliance to consider. This applies to more than just technology: there is also growing collective responsibility around data, privacy and the power of the state. A NATO AI operational framework can ensure world-leading standards are upheld across the Alliance. Indeed, NATO is working on AI commonality, but it is focused on the question of how much freedom to give autonomous machines. ‘Creating a common standard for describing the role of the human operator and the role of the machine in systems that use AI will help commanders incorporate such systems in their planning processes’, NATO officials wrote in setting-up a study due in 2020 on Human in the Loop Considerations for Artificial Intelligence. ‘In a coalition environment, such systems potentially deploy in parallel during an operation, which requires that NATO commanders understand the subsequent effect on planning and C2’. That is indeed critical, but equally important is considering this at a much higher level. With a new NATO AI standard, NATO can employ AI in a manner that does more good than harm, operationally and bureaucratically speaking. The NATO AI Standard When NATO developed Cold War-era standards on everything from ammunition to aircraft grease-ports, commonality of military hardware was essential in ensuring the feasible collective defense of Europe.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › AT: Leaks/Theft

Removing data sharing barriers and establishing agreements on AI development is key towards interoperability

Greenberg ‘20 (Erik Lin-Greenberg, “Allies and artificial intelligence: Obstacles to operations and decision making”, Texas National Security Review, 3(2), 56–76, March 05 2020, https://tnsr.org/2020/03/allies-and-artificial-intelligence-obstacles-to-operations-and-decision-making/)-amc

To ensure alliances and coalitions are able to leverage AI technologies during their operations, states will need to remove barriers to data sharing and access. One initial step to enabling this type of interoperability is to establish formal agreements that govern the development and use of AI-enabled technologies and associated data. These formal agreements will not only prescribe procedures for collaboration, but help assuage fears that allies will renege on commitments.108 Agreements that explicitly define the responsibilities and expectations of member states help eliminate vagaries that otherwise allow a state to back out of commitments with partners.109 To integrate AI into alliance operations, policymakers will need to first establish how they will jointly develop and employ AI capabilities. This entails identifying the types of operations in which allies are willing to use AI-enabled technologies. Some states may only be willing to employ AI military systems in limited areas and eschew using AI for certain tasks. The U.S.-Singapore agreement, for example, stipulates that the two states will focus their AI efforts on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.110 More narrowly scoped agreements that focus on noncombat operations may prove more palatable to policymakers and their domestic publics. These narrow agreements could serve as useful first steps to collaboration, but still yield lessons and best practices applicable across the full range of military operations.

To successfully integrate AI and share data, however, partners will also need to establish technical standards to ensure data is stored and formatted in ways that make it easily accessible to and usable by various alliance members. In designing these agreements, alliance policymakers might draw insights from existing state-level AI guidelines and alliance standardization protocols. The U.S. National Institute for Standards, for example, released its AI standards in February 2019. The guidance calls for defining data specifications that ensure AI technologies meet “critical objectives for functionality, interoperability, and trustworthiness.”117 In the alliance military context, this might mean ensuring that data associated with geospatial or signals intelligence are formatted and labeled in a common manner and stored on shared alliance networks. Or, it could mean establishing alliance-wide protocols for data security and integrity to minimize the risks of data poisoning. These specifications could be codified in formal arrangements like NATO’s standardization agreements, which provide standards for thousands of systems and processes ranging from aerial refueling equipment to satellite imagery products.118 These standards ensure “doctrine, tactics, and techniques are developed in harmony” to help allies “operate effectively together while optimizing the use of resources.”119

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › Lots of Mechanisms

An A3IC Agency is key---leadership in development of artificial intelligence by setting guidelines and procedures ensures cohesive development across NATO

Gilli 20 [Andrea Gilli December 2020 “’NATO-Mation’: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence” NATO Defense College Research Paper No.15 pp. 35-40 ] -os-

Championing innovation: artificial intelligence, integration and the implementation-enabling centre (A3IC) While innovation is often treated and discussed as an outcome, it is in fact also a process whereby champions – whether individuals or organizations – promote and implement changes leading to performance, mission or operational improvement.116 Within NATO, many stakeholders have an inherent interest in AI and in promoting the AI agenda. However, there is no clear “champion” whose goal is to steer the Alliance’s approach to adopting the technology, promoting the necessary reform, and devising the best practices for its employment. For this reason, the process of “NATO-mation” could benefit significantly from a centre specifically intended to serve this goal – tentatively referred to here as an Artificial Intelligence, Integration and Implementation-Enabling Centre (A3IC). Such a centre could lead adoption of AI for the Alliance, support Allies in their own adoption strategies, and connect the relevant offices and institutions at both the national and NATO levels. With a focus on training and interoperability, an AI champion for NATO could ensure that the Alliance treats innovation as an ongoing process and disseminates successful outcomes. The innovation process often requires a person or an organization mentoring, supervising, advocating and protecting innovations and innovators. Having an innovation champion is important to promote those micro-changes that often permit the successful adoption of an innovation: this is achieved by aligning the interests of all the individuals involved with the overall goal, so that resistance, opposition and sometimes even boycotting are minimized and addressed.117 While the buzzword “innovation” is generally perceived favourably, resistance often emerges because of cultural barriers such as opposition to change, sociological factors such as group identity and concern for loss of status, organizational dynamics such as career advancement being hindered by a new technology, as well as for cognitive and psychological reasons.118 The old adage goes: the thing people really hate, more than the way things are, is change. Military innovation poses even more subtle challenges. Adoption of AI may be perceived as especially daunting, because the technology is intangible and difficult to quantify: we can neither touch it nor see it. Additionally, previous lessons of military innovations show the close relationship between platforms and service identity. For example, innovation in military aviation became easier when air branches became independent organizations, separate from armies and navies.119 Similarly, operators of transport or rotary-wing aircraft have often struggled to obtain the necessary recognition and resources from within their respective military services. These dynamics also occur between surface and underwater services, as well as between combat and intelligence or between surveillance and reconnaissance units. It remains to be seen where AI will fit into the culture of military organizations, but algorithms, data and processors are unlikely to be in the ensigns of any military service, at least in the foreseeable future: the tense discussions about counting drone operations as flying hours or assigning medals to drone pilots bear testament to that.120 This is a small, but powerful lesson: in the foreseeable future, some military services could lack interest in, or display insufficient attention to, these domains.121 This is why an AI champion within NATO may be particularly important.122 There is an additional consideration: interoperability would be difficult without coordination among Allies. At the NATO level, a centralized body could play a particularly useful and effective role in this respect. Future discussions could determine whether such a Centre should be independent, like a Centre of Excellence, or sit within the NATO Enterprise structure (natural options being under Allied Command Transformation or in the NATO Communications and Information Agency). There are, however, strong reasons to assign such a Centre a number of specific goals. Lead. The Centre should be at the forefront of NATO’s and the Allies’ AI efforts, including discussions about ethics and ownership of pilot projects (see below) as well as development of targeted solutions to existing problems and challenges. Support. The A3IC should have an interest in helping Allies adopt AI through a set of procedures, roadmaps, best practices and, where possible, readily available solutions, either developed in-house or borrowed from others. From ethics to training, from recruitment to procurement, from cyber security to data management, the Centre could provide important support, especially for some Allies or some of their services that may lack in- house solutions or expertise. Cases in point would be Testing and Evaluation (T&E) and Verification and Validation (V&V): with the adoption of ML, these will have to be rethought, upgraded and updated in order to integrate the non-deterministic nature of algorithms into existing procedures and methods.123 Similarly, in the age of software, procurement needs a major upgrade. In contrast to traditional military platforms, it is faced with a paradigm shift: rather than deliver finished and well-functioning products, it must come up with adaptable solutions that, by their very nature, can never be considered as “done” once and for all.124 Realistically, not all Allies possess the necessary expertise to face such challenges. The Centre could play an important role in these areas. Since the AI ecosystem, as this document shows, is admittedly massive but also scalable, for many Allies it may be much more convenient to rely on common, Alliance-wide capabilities, since they would probably struggle to achieve the required depth and the breadth if left to their own devices. Connect. The Alliance will not be effective if individual Allies’ efforts remain disconnected; and it will be more efficient if Allies are able to build on each other’s progress and achievements. The Centre could play a major role in this respect. For instance, the software community around the world relies on platforms such as GitHub to accelerate software development.125 The Alliance has the opportunity to move in the same direction, enabling Allies to benefit from each other’s progress. Researchers in different fields need the same types of tools, from science workflows to AI-driven experimentation, from testing and evaluation to other domains. If NATO’s A3IC could provide a central repository of AI software, it would connect all the actors, accelerate their work and also address potential failures.126 Similar considerations apply to data. “Usually, the biggest challenges [are] related to getting sufficient high-quality training data”. In fact, “system performance is directly tied to data quantity, quality, and representativeness”.127 For the A3IC, a key goal would be to make training data available, as this would dramatically accelerate Allies’ progress. Recent progress in AI has been possible, because nowadays there are “many open source code libraries and developer tools that allow organizations to use and build upon the work of external communities. As a result, no team or organization has to start from scratch, and may parts that used to require highly specialized expertise have been largely automated”.128 The A3IC could play a similar role in making all tools and tests available. This is particularly important for T&E/V&V activities, as will be discussed later.