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2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › Lots of Mechanisms

A coordinated AI effort between the US and its allies improves interoperability and increases security

Imbrie et al. ‘20 (Andrew Imbrie, Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Ryan Fedasiuk, Research Analyst at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Catherine Aiken, Director of Data Science and Research at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Tarun Chhabra, nonresident fellow with the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Brookings Institution; Husanjot Chahal, Research Analyst at Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; February 2022; “HOW THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES CAN DELIVER A DEMOCRATIC WAY OF AI”; CSET; )-amc

The United States and its allies should also consider wargaming and table-top exercises to explore how sharing selected government data sets could shore up de- fenses against counter-AI techniques and other efforts to exploit the vulnerabilities of AI systems. Specifically, they should explore how sharing militarily relevant data sets and certain AI algorithms could help allied countries better test system robust- ness, expose mutual vulnerabilities, accelerate development of countermeasures, and establish common standards for testing, verification, and validation.68 The United States and its allies should define common standards for the level of robustness required for a given operation. Common defense planning and capabil- ity development in NATO and the EU should give priority to investments in AI safety and security, as well as common verification procedures for AI-enabled, safety-crit- ical systems. To ensure allies store and process data homogeneously, the United States and its allies should launch an accelerator fund for cloud computing. The United States and its allies could use this fund to more efficiently procure commercial cloud com- puting technology. The United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, for example, could agree to bid out a bulk purchase of cloud compute from major technology companies and distribute access to compute in the form of credits and publicly funded research. This initiative would ensure that democratic nations benefit from techniques in machine learning that require fewer inputs of real-world data but greater computational power to run simulations and self-play methods. Representa- tives from Japan, South Korea, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and the EU each cited increased computing as an AI R&D priority, suggesting an area for aligning focus among allies. Parallel to this effort, the United States and its allies should launch a software development initiative. This initiative could take a page out of the U.S. Air Force’s Kessel Run project by pairing government-led teams with software developers from allied countries. Multinational teams could work together to build capabilities in agile software used in military systems that are part of joint exercises. Allies could also use AI to automatically create “translators” between systems and user interfac- es that are not yet fully interoperable. The United States and its NATO allies should consider partnering with existing frameworks like the AI4EU artificial intelligence test bed, which pools compute and data among EU countries.69 Optimal Partners: Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Japan Multilateral Fora: Five Eyes, NATO, NATO-EU (AI4EU) test bed partnership, U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Defense Cooperation, National Technology and Industrial Base (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States) Criteria for Partnership: The United States should improve technical interopera- bility with the countries that receive the most attention in U.S. global security opera- tions, interact the most with U.S. forces, and express the most concern about disjoint- ed technical requirements and capabilities.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › S – Legal Clarity

Plan builds trust by solidifying legal principles – coop solves

Hill ‘20 [Steven Hill, served until February 2020 as Legal Adviser and Director of the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) at the NATO International Staff, "AI's Impact on Multilateral Military Cooperation: Experience from NATO," 4-27-2020, American Journal of International Law | Cambridge Core, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/ais-impact-on-multilateral-military-cooperation-experience-from-nato/3AEF22AA22550A10B75DD74A806D4D18]/lf

Conclusion: The Need for Multinational Dialogue As noted above, the different national strategies refer to the need for legal and ethical frameworks. They also generally refer to the desirability of multilateral cooperation on AI. The limited work within NATO so far has also pointed to a willingness to take on these issues in a multinational setting. However, the reality is that these discussions have not yet taken off. There may be good reasons for this, including the ongoing nature of LAWS discussions in Geneva or the understandable reluctance—frequently encountered with respect to new technologies—to take positions that could constrain innovation or that could present a strategic disadvantage to those who abide by the rules. At the same time, the perception that there are unresolved legal or ethical issues hovering over military applications of AI clearly poses a risk to the use of this technology, including in a multilateral military setting. There is generally broad agreement among NATO allies that existing international law should apply to the military use of new technologies, including AI. However, a perception of lack of clarity on the rules of the game may lead to a lack of trust that might hamper multinational cooperation. In this regard, dialogue about legal and ethical frameworks can be an important means of building trust. Individual NATO Allies are in the midst of developing their own national strategies for military applications of AI. As noted above, while these strategies use some of the same vocabulary in calling for more clarity on the legal and ethical frameworks of military AI, there is a real risk of a lack of meeting of the minds about the substantive content of these frameworks. Consider but one of the issues that will arise: the potential scope of difference of views related to data ownership, sharing, and use.18 If data is “fuel” for AI, the question of who owns it and under what conditions it can be shared and used by others is of strategic importance. Despite the sense that like-minded countries will need to cooperate to develop their own sources of such “fuel,” there is no agreed transatlantic approach in policy and law on how to handle a wide range of data-related legal issues. Data sharing arrangements need to be in place beyond the limited, generally law enforcement-related sectors in which there are existing arrangements. There is considerable work to be done to create the necessary trust to develop mutually-agreed procedures that strike the balance between the many different equities involved in such an exchange of information. While most of these discussions on data take place outside of NATO, NATO does have some experience that could be relevant. For example, NATO already has in place mechanisms for the secure sharing of information that are based on trust built over the life of a seventy-year-old Alliance. NATO has recently built upon these practices to promote the sharing of evidence gathered in battlefield settings for use in the criminal prosecutions of foreign terrorist fighters.19 Achieving consensus agreement on these initiatives required a considerable amount of legal dialogue for Allies to find a pragmatic way forward, building on NATO’s tradition of “legal interoperability.”20 In the end, NATO’s early-days experience shows that in a multinational setting, it is important to understand AI-enabled military applications and to support their implementation in practical contexts. This requires open dialogue between Allies and other partners as well as with industry. NATO has the potential to play a unique role in this process

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › S - Private Partnerships

Budget is directly relevant to NATO AI interoperability but independent companies allow realignment

Dufour 18(Martin Dufour. Former CWO of the Canadian Army and Reciever of the Eisenhower award. " Will artificial intelligence challenge NATO interoperability?". 12-10-2018. NATO Defense College. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep19838.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A3d8e2cb1e4b2742d7de11be85a7eedec&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1. 6-24-2022.)-cg

At the operational and strategic levels, the adoption of artificial intelligence-enabled autonomous systems connecting sensors, battle management, command and control systems, as well as defensive and offensive assets in a network of learning, adaptive systems will enable “a form of algorithmic warfare and machine learning approach to targeting” which will compress the decision-action cycle to such an extent that countries not connected to the system will be unable to keep up. The 2017 report Future War NATO argues that the “technologically-driven US military strategy is advancing so fast compared to European allies that, sooner rather than later, all-important NATO military interoperability might well become a thing of the past”. This echoed a 2016 report from the Armament Industry European Research Group, which concluded that “a further boost in US defense technology could promote a wider US-Europe gap and the emergence of a two-tier alliance”. It was furthermore observed that the USD3.6 billion invested in Third Offset Strategy technologies in 2017, while representing only 5 percent of the overall US military research and development budget corresponded “to more than 40 percent of the overall EU-European R&D budgets”. While challenges exist, artificial intelligence need not erode NATO cohesion. It is however imperative that countries begin to think seriously about the future impact of artificial intelligence, and how to effectively start adopting the technology. An exploratory look at the development landscape for artificial intelligence and autonomous technologies reveals that most of the innovations in the field occur outside the military-industrial complex. The GAFAs (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) have steadily invested over the years to develop commercial applications for artificial intelligence, and one can find many other startup companies throughout the world. The data company CB Insights’ second annual AI 100 list identified the 100 most promising artificial intelligence startups, noting that they came from nine different countries, including many from smaller nations which “in aggregate... have raised USD11.7 billion in equity funding across 367 deals”. NATO states should therefore strive to develop partnerships with such companies, identify promising applications, and start implementing them at once in their defense framework to act as agent of change It is also interesting to note that when it comes to successfully leveraging emerging technologies, the business model is often more important than the capability. One only needs consider the success of companies such as Uber and AirBnB, giants in their respective fields, but which do not actually own any physical assets. Smaller NATO nations should therefore reconsider their business model and identify niche domains such as cyberwarfare, early threat detection or predictive analysis. They could then leverage partnerships with promising companies to develop those capabilities to obtain a competitive advantage allowing them to remain relevant in times of conflict. These capabilities could offset complex hardware solutions and allow smaller nations to continue sharing the burden of military operations. This is the point made in a 2017 study titled Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Defense, according to which given its “algorithmic and non-defense specific essence…[artificial intelligence] is easier to jump in than is the case for many industrial-kinetic technologies [such as] building a sixth-generation jet fighter”. As such smaller, nimble nations have an opportunity to redefine how they do military development, and harness this key disruptive technology to start filling the growing capability gap between NATO countries.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › S – Coordination Key

Ethical AI development increase NATO interoperability – that props up democratic norms

van der Merwe ‘21 [Joanna van der Merwe holds an MA in International Relations and Global Conflict in the Modern Era, from Leiden University. She conducted her research in collaboration with the Land Warfare Centre of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, focusing on Artificial Intelligence and the future of combat. This research built on her previous experience at the Netherlands Army looking at big data on the future battlefield. Joanna is currently the Privacy and Protection Lead at the Centre for Innovation at Leiden University.  She has also worked on early warning systems for mass atrocities at the Signal Program on Human Security and Technology at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. She also continues to advise and speak on data and AI in contexts such as policy-making and the future of warfare and defence, 2-17-2021, accessed on 6-23-2022, CEPA, "NATO Leadership on Ethical AI is Key to Future Interoperability", https://cepa.org/nato-leadership-on-ethical-ai-is-key-to-future-interoperability/]//PJ

In October 2020, Deputy Secretary General of NATO Mircea Geoană highlighted the benefits of establishing a “transatlantic community cooperating on Artificial Intelligence (AI).” The Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit followed with a commitment to its responsible use. The US Department of Defense (DoD) adopted Ethical Principles for AI in 2020 and has committed to bringing together NATO member and partners to operationalize these principles. Despite these statements and developments, more work is required to tackle the very real challenge that ethical AI will pose to future interoperability within NATO. Without a NATO-led initiative focused on aligning these ethical principles across the Alliance, the interoperability risk of nations fielding AI-based systems that hinder joint operations is high. As the foremost security framework for Europe and North America, as well as the leading defense alliance for promoting and protecting democratic values, NATO is able to facilitate alignment on this issue. As part of a broader strategy on emerging and disruptive technologies, NATO must prioritize ethical AI if it wishes to promote the shared values upon which it was founded, play a key role in facilitating innovation across the Atlantic, and ultimately retain the ability of its members to undertake joint operations. Establishing NATO ethical AI principles is the first step toward both technical and political alignment, in turn enhancing and fostering interoperability, which is the foundation for NATO to respond to emerging threats as an Alliance, in a flexible and timely manner. A key challenge for NATO is raising awareness that the answers to ethical questions can no longer be left to later stages of the development and procurement cycle. Decisions made at the political and legal level will have a significant impact on the engineering practices used to develop AI, as well as the technical characteristics of the AI-based systems. The answers to questions such as respecting human dignity, human control, and accountability will be the foundation upon which many technical elements are programed. Systems developers need to make a number of calls throughout the development cycle informed by the answers to key questions, including: These answers will also impact how AI systems are evaluated and ultimately deployed. If individual nations or groups are left to develop their own ethical principles without wider alignment to NATO, the result will be a number of AI-based systems with varying technical specifications based on the legal and policy decisions made by individual governments when answering the key questions. As has been demonstrated in areas such as facial recognition and policing algorithms, the assumptions made by those developing the tools and answering the key questions have a significant impact on the real-world functioning of the tool and societal acceptance of its ethics. The risk of tools failing to gain acceptance depends on the legal and ethical decisions made by governments. For the military, this may mean one state using an AI-based system that is seen as unacceptable by another, and in a joint operation one state fielding a system that cannot be used by another. Or worse yet, this could render a joint operation impossible. Without the ability to interoperate across NATO, the inability to effectively and efficiently respond to future threats would undermine the Alliance. The role of the private sector is another aspect of ethical AI development that has proved a challenge to governments and the transatlantic relationship. Within states, governments have struggled to adequately regulate Big Tech firms, which has led to these companies encroaching on government responsibilities to protect and uphold the public interest. This encroachment permeates all aspects of government, including defense and security. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks discussed during her confirmation hearings, the lack of competition is also a challenge to innovation in the private defense industry. This, along with a lack of regulation, feeds into the power imbalance between the sectors. Consequently, private sector companies building the AI and AI systems that are or will be deployed on the battlefield are deciding the ethics policies for themselves. The transatlantic partnership must focus on coordinating these core principles and systematic governance to ensure AI systems development aligns with the rule of law and democracy. In particular, this must ensure answering questions about human dignity, human control, and accountability. NATO is the ideal defense and security forum for this alignment. Given the US lead on adopting ethical principles for the entire DoD and the EU’s drive to assert checks and balances for private-sector tech companies, NATO remains the organization that can bring these two together and establishes the ethical bottom line. These will then ensure the diverging legal and ethical stances towards Big Tech do not lead to an interoperability barrier in the future. If developments surrounding the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the challenges it brought for U.S.-based, data-driven companies are any indication, a strong transatlantic led initiative is needed in order to ensure the same challenges do not hinder NATO. The solution to the challenge that ethical AI poses for the future of interoperability within NATO is for the Alliance to establish shared transatlantic ethical principles, informed by the US DoD, the EU, and others. Establishing these principles will not only strengthen transatlantic political relations; more technically, it will allow for the establishment of standardization agreements and inform training and education initiatives of the Alliance in the future.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › S – Coordination Key

The basis for regulation closer to conceptual than mechanical

Husain et al. 18(Amir Husain, August Cole, and Wendy R Anderson. CEO of Spark Cognition & Board of Adivisors for UT Austin’s Department of Computer Science & Member of Council on Foreign Affairs, Senior fellow of Scowcroft Center on Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council & Fellow of Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity at Marine Corps University. " As Budget Polemic Drives Headlines, Do Not Lose Track of NATO’s Approach to AI". 07-27-2018. Royal United Services Institute. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/155282/WendyRAnderson_RUSIArticle.pdf. 6-22-2022.)-cg

A new NATO standard for AI is not a set of measurements or technical specifications, as would be used in establishing, for example, a common calibre for small arms ammunition. This is the era of decentralised innovation and software-driven warfare, where accessible data confers strategic advantage and social media can be as tactically relevant as a light machine gun. This approach to a new NATO AI standard is more of a framework than a technical specification, but it is equally crucial for developing a common understanding and set of expectations about what kind of AI systems the Alliance can utilise. This approach is derived from the operational capabilities covered in the joint NATO operational planning framework. Each operational phase has distinct ways that AI can be most effectively used at an Alliance level. The next step would be the development of specific technical guidelines once an overarching common NATO approach is agreed to.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › S – NATO Says Yes

Allies expressed almost unilateral interest in info-sharing and NATO acts as a foundation for interoperability, info-sharing, and data analysis.

Imbrey et al 20 (Andrew Imbrie is a Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET). He previously worked as a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and as a senior advisor to Visiting Distinguished Statesman Secretary John F. Kerry.) “HOW THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES CAN DELIVER A DEMOCRATIC WAY OF AI” Feb 2020 Edition ZX

The Chinese government undertakes multiple, coordinated efforts to obtain sensitive information from U.S. AI researchers. Many of these pathways and access points for technology transfer are legal or extralegal and therefore poorly understood or monitored by Western intelligence agencies.28 Common vectors include technology transfer centers and forums, copyright infringement, and grant and funding opportunities for Chinese undergraduate, graduate, and post-doctoral researchers to study abroad and collaborate with foreign universities, research labs, and companies.29The United States could improve coordination with allies and partners to counter technology transfer in several ways. Strategic Initiatives 4 T 12 Center for Security and Emerging Technology surveyed country indicated interest in coordinating with the United States to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology. This initiative received the second highest level of agreement, just after coordinated AI norms and standards. Respondents from Japan, Australia, Italy, and France were particularly interested in collaboration around tech transfer policies. The United States should work with allied and partner governments to develop common standards for sharing, pooling, and storing non-sensitive, government-owned data sets. U.S. allies and partners are broadly open to non-sensitive data-sharing arrangements: Nearly 90 percent of officials indicated interest in sharing more data with the United States, and 75 percent cited specific non-sensitive data their country would be willing to share. More than half of responding countries indicated a willingness to share weather pattern data, epidemiological data for disease control, medical images for precision medicine, and video and navigation data from self-driving cars. This initiative may be among the most important for America’s European partners. An EU official noted that the EU would likely be willing to share quite a lot of data, provided rules are in place and enforced. The United States could partner with Singapore, Spain, Italy, and other NATO allies on a data-sharing initiative related to maritime domain awareness in the way that Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, for example, share hydrographic data and cooperate to improve their anti-submarine warfare capabilities.52 NATO states that the maritime domain “is of strategic importance.” Its members could share militarily relevant datasets to improve maritime domain awareness in the Black Sea and other strategic locales.53 U.S. policymakers could also work with counterparts in allied and partner countries to develop common standards for data archival procedures, including standards for ensuring the data is labeled, stored, interoperable, and accessible.54 The U.S. Open Government Initiative began to lay the groundwork for common data standards as early as 2013, and the United States should promote similar practices among allies and partners.55 Such a collaborative approach would enable data flows and promote healthy data management among allies that could further propel the growth of AI. Optimal Partners: United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, France, the Netherlands, and New Zealand Multilateral Fora: NATO, the European Commission, Five Eyes, OECD, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Criteria for Partnership: Optimal data-sharing partners would be countries that widely collect and publish data for public use, and countries where that data is stored and accessible by third parties.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › S – NATO Says Yes

Current AI development requires massive amounts of data mining and improvements to parallel systems (will be probably run-in conjunction with “NATO info/NATO collab key” warrants).

HR 21 (Harbor has over thirty years of experience working with clients on growth strategy and new business creation. At the core of our experience is a deep understanding of the technologies, markets and business characteristics—as well as the management and organizational challenges—that companies face when adopting and developing digital and smart systems) “Capturing the Value of AI” July 21, 2021 // ZX

As networks continue to invade the “physical” world, traditionally unique components and interfaces between and among electronic as well as electro-mechanical elements are becoming more standardized. Product and service design is increasingly influenced by common components and sub-systems. Vertically defined, stand-alone products and application markets will increasingly become a part of a larger “horizontal” set of standards for hardware, software, communications and data. As it becomes easier to design and develop smarter more adaptive systems, competitive differentiation will shift away from unique product features towards how the product is actually used, how the product fosters interactions between and among users in a networked context, and, most importantly, how the data from the product will inform these new insights. Machine data from cyber-physical systems of the real physical world can offer extraordinary business advantages to the companies that understand how to organize that data and model the behavior of the physical world. The ability to develop models from sensor and machine datasets allows not only data patterns but a much higher order of intelligence to emerge. Widespread adoption of AI and machine learning systems is inevitable. But that doesn’t mean that every participant will automatically be shaking a money tree. Value and returns from AI/ML are playing a new game of hide-and-seek. They’re still there, but not where they used to be. If you keep looking in the old places…well, you know what’s going to happen. We think that the economic impact of AI/ML developments will recapitulate the tendency we’ve seen for decades in digital technology generally—less and less physical value, and more and more metaphysical value. Of course, digital computing has radically transformed human affairs. But so far that transformation has taken place entirely on the computer’s terms. Note that even the most remarkable recent achievements of AI and machine learning—autonomous driving, natural language processing, text generation, facial recognition, algorithm design and —have occurred in domains of our physical environment that are subject to rigid sets of rules and laws. We’re in the third decade of the 21st century, and the question still remains, “How many engineers in white lab coats does it take to make AI valuable?” Rapid advancements in silicon, computing and networks are clearly forming the foundations for AI and machine learning capabilities to advance. But these systems, sophisticated as they are, are still in their early stages, and many intended use cases for AI can still be accomplished with more cost-effective traditional tools like basic regressions. It seems clear that will be realized unevenly across markets, applications and use cases. Possibly most important for the growth of AI is that multiple parallel technology developments are now increasingly reinforcing and accelerating one another. Cloud infrastructure resources are providing unprecedented computing scale. Mobile computing devices are extending the reach of computing. Embedded systems and IoT technology are connecting and integrating a broad array of physical and digital applications. And of course the signature achievement of the age of “big data,” the ability to capture and process massive amounts of , has the potential to inform many new and diverse capabilities. Each of those technologies is powerful on its own, but creative combinations of them are what is most exciting. Human-connected devices and machine-connected IoT devices enable exponentially more data at the edge. The scale of core, infrastructural (cloud) computational capabilities enables us to capture and analyze all that information. And this in turn sets the stage for AI and machine learning tools to analyze and capture new insights. This new chapter is motivating tech developers and users to apply advanced neural nets and deep learning tools to their most intractable problems. Most companies believe that implementing advanced AI solutions will lead to significant efficiencies, growth and competitive differentiation. However, matching new tools to high value applications and use cases will challenge many industry participants. We all know that AI tools are trained on large data sets, but most people do not grasp that AI applications require thousands or even hundreds of thousands times more data than a human would need to solve an equivalent problem. If you examine applications where machine learning is successful, it quickly becomes apparent that they are in domains where acquiring lots of data is relatively easy—think facial or speech recognition, where technology developers have vast troves of data they can access. Data-driven apps are the core value creation mechanisms within the Smart Systems and the IoT. But the B2B world that comprises so much of the IoT doesn’t have the same unified sources or monolithic usage tracking and analytics that the consumer world utilizes to make money. Based on our consulting work, we estimate that B2B development projects lack as much as half the data needed to inform new application values and fulfill on artificial intelligence and machine learning opportunities. An additional challenge is the fact that most machine learning systems today run “narrow purpose” applications that can do only a single type of learning. Current neural networks cannot be trained to run multiple parallel applications, such as identifying images and playing video games, or predictively diagnosing machine failures and listening to and identifying music, all at the same time. Finally, the impacts of new AI tools will be higher and more straightforward to achieve where the user’s propensity to experiment with new tools and methods is also higher. AI and machine learning are being turbo charged. An explosion of AI/ML tools is lowering the barrier to entry to high-end data science. Historically, developing AI/ML applications and use cases involved data teams doing much “heavy lifting” to design and deploy complex custom models. Today, new data tools are gaining wider adoption. Standardized schemas for data ingestion and transformation are setting the stage for many more companies to incorporate AI/ML into their products.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › S – NATO Says Yes

NATO needs regulated AI - 3 reasons

Kirdemir 19(Can Kasapoğlu, Bariş Kirdemir. Director of Security and Defense Studies at EDAM and Eisenhower fellow at NATO defense college."Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Conflict". 11-28-2019. Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/artificial-intelligence-and-future-of-conflict-pub-80421. 6-22-2022.)

In 2018, a consortium of U.S. and European experts from industry, civil society, and research institutions published a report that outlined three areas of concern. The first is the digital security domain, in which the report warned of potential AI vulnerabilities that would allow adversaries to stage large-scale, diversified attacks on physical, human, and software targets. Second, in the physical security domain, the availability and weaponization of autonomous systems cause major challenges. Cyber and physical attacks on autonomous and self-driving systems and swarm attacks—coordinated assaults by many agents on multiple targets—are other potential threats. Third, there are significant risks to political security. AI-enabled surveillance, persuasion, deception, and social manipulation are threats that will intensify in the near future. New AI capabilities may strengthen authoritarian and discriminatory political behavior and undermine democracies’ ability to sustain truthful public debates. NATO nations need to develop an acceptable level of consensus in the governance of the AI transformation. Although this seems extremely difficult given the current state of political affairs, NATO exists for its member nations to come together and tackle these vital security challenges. AI is likely to cause large-scale economic and workforce shifts. Crucially, it is changing how geopolitical competition plays out. It will equip authoritarian states, some of which are competitors of NATO nations, with new oppressive and discriminatory tools. Besides, AI can offer increasingly smart autonomous weapons systems to states and nonstate actors. The transatlantic community will therefore have a full set of tasks on its plate, from observing how such dynamics develop in different regions to building international partnerships to ensure common interests and regulatory actions NATO would benefit from initiatives to prepare for, govern, and regulate AI-related policy priorities. From developing capabilities to building consensus on the challenges mentioned above, NATO needs new mechanisms to tackle emerging threats and continuously adapt to the dynamism of AI-led developments. Comprehensive collective initiatives are known to be effective in the cybersecurity field. The alliance should establish an AI task force to review policies and strategic issues. On the policy level, NATO should initiate a continuous and meaningful conversation among decisionmakers, industry, civil society, and the scientific research community. The alliance has a long way to go in developing algorithmic warfare capabilities and adopting an AI-enabled C4ISR structure. Because most innovations in AI and robotics come from outside the military-industrial complex, some studies have encouraged the alliance to cooperate closely with big tech or develop ties with promising start-ups. NATO must test its social-cognitive and digital-security vulnerabilities systematically. Ideally, red teaming—in which a group adopts an adversarial point of view to challenge an organization to improve its effectiveness or detect a major weakness—and experimentation efforts should cover both allied exercises and more isolated, peacetime activities to test defenses in national security apparatuses. Inputs from the interdisciplinary and multisectoral conversation, as well as continuous exercises, may provide significant information for new concepts.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › S – NATO Says Yes

NATO wants AI reg

Kirdemir 19(Can Kasapoğlu, Bariş Kirdemir. Director of Security and Defense Studies at EDAM and Eisenhower fellow at NATO defense college."Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Conflict". 11-28-2019. Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/artificial-intelligence-and-future-of-conflict-pub-80421. 6-22-2022.)

In recent years, European lawmakers have been actively seeking regulatory action amid emerging digital threats, data-privacy issues, and hostile influence campaigns. European policymakers often emphasize protecting core values, regulating big tech, and preventing malign actors from using AI and accompanying technologies to target Western political institutions, public safety, and individuals. NATO would benefit from a convergence of transatlantic regulatory and legislative frameworks to better steer the trajectory of the coming transformation.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › S – NATO Says Yes

Allies will agree because alliance commitments – AI cooperation sovles and US is key.

Greenberg ‘20 (Erik Lin-Greenberg, , “Article Title,” Journal/Magazine/etc, “Allies and artificial intelligence: Obstacles to operations and decision making”, Texas National Security Review, 3(2), 56–76, March 05 2020, https://tnsr.org/2020/03/allies-and-artificial-intelligence-obstacles-to-operations-and-decision-making/)-amc

As additional funding and research drive increases in the effectiveness and reliability of AI, the military use of AI technologies will likely expand. And as more states integrate AI into their armed forces, the United States will find itself working with allies to build and exercise AI capabilities that are interoperable and support alliance decision-making processes. Failure to cooperate early and often on the development and use of AI may leave allies ill-prepared for operations in an era in which AI is an increasingly common fixture in the arsenals of both friends and foes.133 Alliances face two broad sets of challenges when integrating AI into operations. First, AI complicates alliance operations. The resource and data requirements needed to build and maintain AI systems pose obstacles to burden-sharing and interoperability. Adversaries can also use AI to launch military deception campaigns that complicate operational coordination. Second, AI can significantly strain alliance decision-making. New AI technologies promise to increase the speed with which allies and adversaries conduct operations, decreasing the time partners have to debate potential courses of action. Decision-making can also be disrupted if adversaries use AI to generate misinformation that can degrade trust among allies. To overcome these challenges, allies will need to establish multinational agreements and standardization guidelines that help ensure data is structured in ways that promote interoperability, while technical measures will help preserve data privacy, allow for data sharing, and minimize the consequences of AI use on the part of adversaries. Whether and how states grapple with these challenges will shape the conduct of multinational operations and has implications for alliance politics and the global balance of power. Alliances that effectively integrate AI technology will be better positioned to counter threats, while those that allow AI to stymie decision-making and operations may find themselves disadvantaged on the battlefield. Within alliances, member states that quickly master the integration of AI into their militaries may gain significant influence, even if they are less powerful than other alliance partners in conventional terms. Because of their AI know-how, these states may play a dominant role in developing the norms, standards, and doctrine for AI use and help set an alliance’s AI strategy. In a similar vein, Estonia leveraged its cyber warfare expertise to bolster its position in NATO. Despite being territorially small and weak in conventional military terms, Estonia’s specialized expertise allowed it to play a leading role in shaping NATO’s cyber doctrine.134 A state’s successful development of AI can therefore increase its voice and sway within complex multinational institutions.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › S – Cooperation Good

Multilateral NATO cooperation necessary to facilitate framework around AI—that’s key for maintaining technical edge, ensuring accountability, and ethical usage.

Hill ‘20 [Steven Hill, served until February 2020 as Legal Adviser and Director of the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) at the NATO International Staff, "AI's Impact on Multilateral Military Cooperation: Experience from NATO," 4-27-2020, American Journal of International Law | Cambridge Core, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/ais-impact-on-multilateral-military-cooperation-experience-from-nato/3AEF22AA22550A10B75DD74A806D4D18]/lf

AI-based military applications present both opportunities and challenges for multinational military cooperation. This contribution takes stock of the state of discussions around AI-based military applications within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While there have been a number of recent developments in national AI strategies and policies, discussions at the NATO level are still in early phases, and there is no agreed NATO policy in this area. Further multilateral work is needed if like-minded states such as NATO Allies and partners are to head off the serious risk that disagreements about these technologies might hamper effective multilateral military cooperation. This essay first frames the overall strategic context within which discussions related to AI at NATO take place. Perceptions of security threats are shifting as a result of the rise of great power competition. At the same time, the AI policies of some individual Allies are rapidly evolving. The essay then describes the publicly-accessible work that has taken place within NATO on AI issues. It uses two potential military applications of AI that are likely to be of interest in a NATO context, as well as some positive and negative elements associated with them. Finally, the essay suggests the need for continued multilateral dialogue on military use of AI. NATO is an alliance of thirty states that has collective defense as one of its three core tasks.1 Part of NATO’s identity is as “an alliance that constantly modernises and adapts to new threats and challenges,”2 including those arising from the development of new technologies. As Allied Heads of State and Government put it at their meeting in December 2019 in London, “To stay secure, we must look to the future together. We are addressing the breadth and scale of new technologies to maintain our technological edge, while preserving our values and norms.”3 These two short sentences contain at least four different ideas that shed light on NATO’s strategic approach to AI. First, they emphasize maintaining “our” technical edge. This could be interpreted as referring to the collective advantage that NATO Allies enjoy or to the advantage that individual member states have. Second, the emphasis on maintaining an edge hints at the growing importance of great-power competition in NATO’s strategic thinking, especially with regard to China. The Alliance increasingly has turned its attention to China, with NATO leaders adopting historic language at the London Summit about the “opportunities and challenges” posed by China.4 Technological competition, including in the AI field, where China has made major advances, is one of these areas. Third, the statement refers to the need to “preserv[e] our values and norms” while dealing with the new technology. While not going into detail about what those values and norms are, this language flags the importance of legal and ethical considerations in working together. Finally, the statement has an express reference to the need for multilateral cooperation in this space going forward: “we must look to the future together.” Another element of the strategic context is the rapid proliferation of national military AI strategies adopted by individual NATO Allies. Many of these strategies explicitly include legal and ethical components. For example, France’s recent strategy on AI and defense sets forth three major principles: (1) respect for international law; (2) the presence sufficient human control; and (3) ensuring responsibility of human command. France is also working to create a defense-focused ministerial ethics committee whose purpose will be to discuss the implications of emerging technologies in the defense field.5 The 2018 German AI strategy—which is general in scope, not specific to the defense sector—refers to the need to “integrat[e] AI in society in ethical, legal, cultural and institutional terms in the context of a broad societal dialogue and active political measures.”6 In the United States, the Department of Defense recently adopted five principles that the Defense Innovation Board proposed to govern the development of AI systems in defense, emphasizing that such development must be: (1) responsible; (2) equitable; (3) traceable; (4) reliable; and (5) governable.7 While these strategies use some of the same categories of terms and thus appear to speak the same language, it is not clear to what extent states would agree about how to apply such principles in the context of a specific military use of AI. While these strategies are developed to govern work at the national level, they also tend to refer—if only in general terms—to the need for multilateral cooperation. The U.S. Department of Defense’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, for example, articulated as one of the pillars of its strategic approach “evolving our crucial international alliances and partnerships abroad. An extended network of mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships provides a durable means of overcoming global AI challenges, deterring aggression, and supporting stability through cooperation.”8 While the European Commission’s February 2020 AI White Paper excludes military AI from its scope,9 a food-for-thought paper on AI developed during the 2019 Finnish presidency of the European Union emphasizes the importance of cooperation with partners, including as part of the increasing trend toward EU-NATO cooperation.10 If NATO Allies must look to the future of new technologies together and if national strategies are calling for more international cooperation, it is worth asking what they have done together to date. Allied Command Transformation (ACT), one of NATO’s two strategic commands,11 has played a leading role in NATO’s work on innovation and disruptive technologies, including AI. In October 2019, for example, ACT organized an informal workshop with NATO ambassadors and military representatives.12 The focus of the event was “the Alliance’s efforts to leverage the power of data science, machine learning and other new technologies to improve its decisionmaking.”13 This event followed up on a similar informal workshop held in March 2018 designed to highlight the broader impact of the development of disruptive technologies on the Alliance.14 One take-away from this informal discussion was that allies may wish to discuss some of the legal implications of this emerging technology in a multilateral forum such as NATO. On the level of policy documents, NATO has developed an “Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Roadmap” that is meant to guide future Alliance work in this area. As ACT describes it, the Roadmap “uses a bottom-up approach to conduct rapid and tangible demonstrations in realistic operational conditions in order to understand the potential of Emerging and Disruptive Technologies from both the opportunity and threat standpoints and to set the conditions to use them within NATO and its Member Nations.”15 This could include drawing out some commonly accepted legal and ethical principles surrounding the military use of AI such as respect for international law, the need to keep humans in the loop, and the importance of clear accountability. More broadly, NATO is actively working to develop a data policy, specifically to put in place standards relating to the oversight of multinational pooling and sharing of data.16 Finally, in terms of training and exercises, NATO is also now regularly integrating new technology in its exercises, especially in the area of humanitarian assistance. For example, a NATO disaster response exercise held in Serbia in October 2018 successfully incorporated disaster relief tools powered by artificial intelligence such as the processing of aerial images of the simulated disaster site in order to identify victims more quickly.17

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › S – Cooperation Good

NATO cooperation creates a laboratory effect which spurs innovation.

Husain et al. 18(Amir Husain, August Cole, and Wendy R Anderson. CEO of Spark Cognition & Board of Adivisors for UT Austin’s Department of Computer Science & Member of Council on Foreign Affairs, Senior fellow of Scowcroft Center on Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council & Fellow of Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity at Marine Corps University. " As Budget Polemic Drives Headlines, Do Not Lose Track of NATO’s Approach to AI". 07-27-2018. Royal United Services Institute. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/155282/WendyRAnderson_RUSIArticle.pdf. 6-22-2022.)-cg

After European leaders faced renewed American pressure to more than double defense spending at NATO’s most recent summit, the budget debate is likely to become the headline-driving narrative about the Alliance’s future in the coming months on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet, what risks being eclipsed by the fiscal polemic is a critical conversation about how the 29 member states approach the one innovation with perhaps the greatest potential to up-end warfare and even NATO itself: artificial intelligence (AI). As an alliance whose potential is defined by the totality of its members, NATO faces a growing challenge in coordination and collaboration around military-relevant emerging technologies – perhaps even more than during the Cold War when there were fewer member states and a relatively unified threat from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Then, it was military innovation that led defense-relevant breakthroughs, the opposite of today’s private-sector driven innovation. AI research and implementation in particular is being led by companies, not governments. Now, and in the future, NATO’s missions will be increasingly dynamic and politically thorny – from policing migration to counternarcotics to strategic deterrence – because of the ‘algorithmic impact’ of increasingly capable social media bots, AI-created fake images and video, and even automated weapons platforms. Recent social media influence offers a preview. In Poland and the Baltic states, automated social media bots, which are a form of AI, produce ‘roughly 70% of all Russian messages about NATO’ according to a study last year from the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Underscoring the risks to come, Russia employed bots, or automated social media accounts, and exploited social media machine-learning algorithms during the 2016 election cycle to target US voters with ads and content designed to exacerbate partisan divides within NATO’s largest member. With a new NATO AI standard, NATO can employ AI in a manner that does more good than harm, operationally and bureaucratically speaking This can be expected to be amplified by states such as Russia, which harmonize highly disruptive propaganda and kinetic operations while committing to investments in military-relevant AI. As Russian President Vladimir Putin has said, ‘whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world’. Under President Xi Jinping, China’s ambitions are equally grand, with the state’s 2017 New Generation Artificial Intelligence Plan recognizing that China ‘must, looking at the world, take the development of AI to the national strategic level …’. As this is a larger global challenge, NATO is a perfect ‘laboratory’ for member states to find their way forward with AI by embracing commonality through the Alliance rather than going it alone. AI need not add to NATO’s recent challenges, fiscal or technological. Although individual European NATO members have promising government-and commercial-sector AI investment programs underpinned by national strategies, as the UK and France do, a standardized Alliance-driven approach ensures all members benefit from current and future breakthroughs.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › S – Cooperation Good

NATO standardization and info sharing solve – key to manage Russian threat

Jankowski 21 [Dominik P. Jankowski is a security policy expert, diplomat, think-tanker and social media aficionado. Currently he serves as Head of OSCE and Eastern Security Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Previously he served as Chief Specialist for Crisis Management at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014-2016), Expert Analyst and Head of the International Analyses Division at the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland (2010-2014), Senior Expert at the J5-Strategic Planning Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (2009-2010) as well as foreign policy expert at the President Aleksander Kwasniewski “Amicus Europae” Foundation (2007-2010). NATO in Era of Unpeace: Defending Against Known Unknowns. “NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge.” Pp 99-101. March 19, 2021. Lublin Publications, https://ies.lublin.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/nato-in-the-era-of-unpeace_calosc-1.pdf#page=82]//PJ

Conclusions and Recommendations While the suggestion that EDTs will enable a new class of weapons that will modify the strategic landscape remains to be realised, a number of unresolved security puzzles underlying the emergence of these new technology areas have implications for NATO. As one looks to the future, new adversaries and new science and technology will emerge. The extent to which these EDTs may exacerbate or mitigate the global security and governance challenges that Russia currently poses to NATO Allies will remain an integral question as policy-makers navigate the complex global environment. NATO is a natural forum for deliberations about EDTs, especially in a transatlantic context. It also has vast experience, going back to the Cold War, in working towards standardisation and interoperability among Allies. However, the results achieved have been mixed, which underscores the challenges the Alliance now faces – there are not only 30 Allies with disparate levels of capability, but also a backdrop of rapid technological advances where some of its competitors and adversaries may hold significant advantages. In this context, NATO should concentrate on four core issues with regard to EDTs. First, as Andrea Gilli emphasizes, the Alliance should start a process on “NATO-mation.”29 In fact, the Alliance should serve as a primary transatlantic coordinating institution for information-sharing and cooperation between Allies on the security dimension of EDTs. NATO has an important role to play in the development of a common strategy based on an Alliance-wide EDTs threat assessment and an analysis of opportunities. Therefore, EDTs can serve as a unifying element for NATO’s work on future policies. Second, NATO will need partners on its path towards achieving a comprehensive implementation strategy on EDTs. This will require connection with the private sector early and often, clearly communicating NATO’s priorities and requirements while providing accessible opportunities for industry, including non-traditional ones. Much of the innovative work being undertaken in the commercial sector is being carried out by companies that have never worked in the defence realm or have no wish to do so. Therefore, building new partnerships at NATO with the private sector will enable the Alliance to increase awareness, share data, and creatively tap into experiences and knowledge. Moreover, NATO and the EU should initiate a strategic dialogue to address fundamental issues of tech governance and data sharing in order to overcome the transatlantic tech policy divide. Third, Allies should manage expectations and not overestimate the role of EDTs. EDTs are not a panacea to all of NATO’s problems, including the existing gaps in the still-needed conventional capabilities. Indeed, EDTs will not be a silver bullet to address NATO’s shortfalls. Therefore, Allies should first and foremost concentrate on two elements: overcoming the interoperability gap30 and revitalizing NATO’s once robust standardization programme.31

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › S – Cooperation Good

The US must take the lead on AI and set its own international rules to uphold global human rights, democracy, and to mitigate future risks of AI.

Imbrie et al. ‘20 (Andrew Imbrie, Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Ryan Fedasiuk, Research Analyst at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Catherine Aiken, Director of Data Science and Research at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Tarun Chhabra, nonresident fellow with the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Brookings Institution; Husanjot Chahal, Research Analyst at Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; February 2022; “HOW THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES CAN DELIVER A DEMOCRATIC WAY OF AI”; CSET;

The following 10 initiatives provide a roadmap for how the United States and its allies can defend against threats, network to seize opportunities, and project influence to safeguard democracy in the age of AI. Initiative 9: Shape global norms and standards for AI. The United States has a vested interest in setting the rules of the road for artificial intelligence. Western countries have already taken the lead in developing principles governing the application of artificial intelligence. China has produced its own set of principles and engages actively in international bodies, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), to establish standards for mobile network technologies and the future governance of AI. By assuming leadership in AI, the United States and its allies face risks and opportunities. The risks are twofold. On the one hand, standard setting could become a casualty of geopolitical competition as leading countries precipitate a race to the bottom. On the other hand, China already asserts its principles and standards through a variety of multilateral fora. The opportunity is that the United States and its allies can act now to set global standards for AI reflecting and supporting human rights and liberal democratic values, while addressing critical questions surrounding the rollout of 5G, facial recognition for surveillance, automated cyber exploitation and defense, and autonomous weapons systems. A Japanese official responding to the CSET survey noted that the United States and its allies should adopt a citizen-centric AI strategy. Such citizen-centric strategies would seek to develop and deploy AI for the benefit of democratic societies, including strengthened data privacy standards and respect for civil liberties; economic empowerment of citizens within rules-based market economies; greater access to education, precision medicine, energy efficiency, and more inclusive social service provision. The United States should lead a multilateral effort with allies and partners to set international rules of conduct for AI. This effort should build on and extend the OECD Principles on AI and the International Organization for Standardization working group initiatives on standards for data and AI safety and security. The United States and its allies could establish a standing platform to coordinate policies on standard-setting in multilateral fora. This is likely an area for productive dialogue, as partners are eager to coordinate policies and share best practices around norms and standards. In fact, all surveyed officials were extremely or very interested in this avenue for international collaboration. Longer term, the United States and its allies should explore the conditions for a common AI market, including standards for testing, verification, and validation of AI technologies, as well as common practices for certifying companies that support liberal democratic values and privacy.87 This common market would create incentives for other countries to abide by these principles in the development and deployment of safe and reliable AI. As one EU representative observed, if the West could offer a viable way of doing AI that respects privacy and fundamental rights, developing (and democratic) countries would be more inclined to follow the Western model. Optimal Partners: Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, Singapore, and Japan Multilateral Fora: EU, OECD, International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission Joint Technical Committee 1 Sub Committee 42 – Artificial Intelligence, WTO, 3GPP, NATO-EU joint initiative on standards for emerging technologies Criteria for Partnership: To lead the global discussion on AI safety and ethics, the United States will need to build a coalition of like-minded, influential countries from which it can listen and learn and with whom it can shape norms and standards. Ideal partners will be countries that host active and engaged civil societies, who have historically aligned with liberal democratic values and U.S. policy priorities, and who most actively collaborate internationally to develop AI norms and standards. Allies that more frequently use information and communication technologies, issue governance documents about AI, and host robust public sector discussions about AI and image recognition are optimal partners for shaping global norms, standards, and best practices around these technologies. For one measure of technology use, we included the World Economic Forum’s Government Usage of ICT index, as well as a count of national AI governance documents provided by Nesta.88 We also measured commitment to a democratic way of AI by canvassing national AI strategies for mentions of “principles,” “norms,” “standards,” and “safety.” To measure international clout and diplomatic capacity, we captured the number of diplomatic posts each country operates worldwide, as well as their ranks on the Soft Power 30 Index.89 Finally, we recorded countries’ demonstrated willingness to ban technology imports from Huawei Technologies as a proxy for their willingness to work with the United States.90 Other considerations and caveats: The United States will need to expand cooperation beyond the aforementioned countries to promote liberal democratic norms and standards for AI. Sweden and New Zealand were among the top-scoring countries for this initiative. As the world’s largest democracy, India is also an important partner in this effort. Policymakers will need to weigh additional considerations: countries that generate a high quantity of policy documents about AI may not make for optimal partners if these documents do not align with U.S. values and policy priorities. What’s more, many national guidelines mention or touch on AI but are not directly related to AI, and data is not widely available for non-Anglophone countries.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › S – Cooperation Good

The aff spills over to broader international democratic cooperation on AI

Franke ’21, (Ulrike Esther Franke, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, PhD in International Relations from the University of Oxford. “ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI,” ECRF, January 2021, )

A glance at the history of artificial intelligence (AI) shows that the field periodically goes through phases of development racing ahead and slowing down – often dubbed “AI springs” and “AI winters”. The world is currently several years into an AI spring, dominated by important advances in machinelearning technologies. In Europe, policymakers’ efforts to grapple with the rapid pace of technological development have gone through several phases over the last five to ten years. The first phase was marked by uncertainty among policymakers over what to make of the rapid and seemingly groundbreaking developments in AI. This phase lasted until around 2018 – though, in some European states, and on some issues, uncertainty remains. The second phase consisted of efforts to frame and AI challenges politically, and to address them, on a domestic level: between 2018 and 2020, no fewer than 21 EU member states published national AI strategies designed to delineate their views and aims, and, in some cases, to outline investment plans. The next phase could be a period of international, and specifically transatlantic, cooperation on AI. After several years of European states working at full capacity to understand how to support domestic AI research, including by assembling expert teams to deliberate new laws and regulations, there is growing interest among policymakers and experts in looking beyond Europe. On the EU level, AI policy and governance have already received significant attention, with the European Commission playing an important role in incentivising member states to develop AI strategies, such as by starting to tackle issues around how to make sure AI is “ethical” and “trustworthy”. But recent months have seen a rise in the number of calls for international cooperation on AI driven by liberal democracies across the world. Western countries and their allies have set up new forums for cooperation on how to take AI forward, and are activating existing forums. More such organisations and platforms for cooperation are planned. Calls for cooperation between the United States and Europe have become particularly regular and resonant: following last year’s US presidential election, it was reported that the European Commission planned to propose a “Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council”, which would set joint standards on new technologies. And, in September 2020, the US set up a group of like-minded countries “to provide values-based global leadership in defense for policies and approaches in adopting AI”, which included seven European states, in addition to countries such as Australia, Canada, and South Korea. In June 2020, the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence was founded to consider the responsible development of AI; it counts among its members the US, four European states, and the European Union. This paper examines the reasons European states may want to work with the US on AI, and why the US may want to reach out to Europe on the issue. It also identifies the points of disagreement that may stop the allies from fully fleshing out transatlantic AI cooperation. The paper shows that, while both sides are interested in working together, their rationales for doing so differ. Furthermore, economic and political factors may stand in the way of cooperation, even though such cooperation could have a positive impact on the way AI develops. The paper also argues that transatlantic cooperation in the area of military AI could be a good first step – here, Europe and the US should build on existing collaboration within NATO. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the different forums that have been created or proposed for transatlantic and broader Western cooperation on AI.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Solvency › 2ac – Must Read

NATO key, US key, Military Logistics & Sustainment Key, Say Yes, Spills Over

Konaev & Chahal ’21 (Margarita Konaev is a research fellow with CSET, where Husanjot Chahal is a research analyst. "The Path of Least Resistance Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment" April, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Path-of-Least-Resistance.pdf)

Pathways to Collaboration The United States and its allies face powerful technical, political, and strategic reasons to pursue and deepen collaboration on AI applications for logistics and sustainment. Whether working within existing frameworks or building new partnerships, there are multiple pathways for collaboration. The final NSCAI report, for example, offers a comprehensive list of ongoing multilateral efforts on AI and associated technologies as well as security alliances and partnerships, some of which could serve as a forum for allies to work together on AI-enabled logistics.64 Below, we recommend four options for allies to explore depending on their interests and capabilities. 1. The United States and its allies should establish joint standards and protocols for the safe and secure sharing, pooling, and storage of nonsensitive datasets relevant to AI applications for logistics and sustainment. Data relevant to AI-enabled logistics and sustainment includes data on licensing, maintenance personnel, and repair schedules for predictive maintenance; video and navigation data from ground and aerial semiautonomous and autonomous resupply systems and convoys; data supporting maritime awareness and global shipping, and many other tasks and functions. Considering that data is the foundation of AI/ML-based applications, the United States and its allies will have to agree on standards regulating data sharing, storage, and analysis to ensure privacy, fairness, security, and respect for civil liberties. Identifying the governmental body to lead standardization efforts is a key step. Within the Department of Defense, for example, the responsibility for “the use and implementation of standardization” rests with the Defense Standardization Program Office International Standardization Program.65 Another option is to build on the NSCAI recommendation that the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology lead efforts to “promote international standardization in areas that further U.S. and allies’ national security and defense interests in the appropriate and responsible use of AI.”66 Allies will also need to decide on the scope of such standardization efforts. One pathway for alliance-wide collaboration is through NATO standardization agreements that facilitate interoperability, in part by ensuring the commonality of doctrine, procedures or equipment used and compatibility between allies’ products, processes, and services.67 That said, the lead body and institutional configuration for standardization efforts and data partnerships related to AI-enabled logistics and sustainment can and should vary depending on allies’ needs, interests, and capabilities. 2. The United States and its allies should collaborate on R&D initiatives related to AI for logistics and sustainment. When taken together, the R&D spending of the United States and just six like-minded nations—France, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom—account for more than 50 percent of global R&D investment.68 This is a massive capacity for innovation. And when coupled with the shared interest in AI solutions for logistics and sustainment, there are many opportunities for collaborative R&D projects related to these technologies. One option is to add joint research and development initiatives related to AI for logistics and sustainment to the agenda of earlystage collaborative efforts like the JAIC’s AI Partnership for Defense. Future meetings coordinated by this partnership could serve as a launchpad for R&D projects that include any number of the interested member states. Another option is to expand existing bilateral and multilateral R&D collaborations to include projects related to AI applications for logistics and sustainment. The Technical Cooperation Program, for example, is a collaboration forum for defense research and development activities among Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.69 3. The United States and its allies should promote multinational private-public partnerships to advance research, development, procurement and fielding of AIenabled logistics and sustainment technologies. The United States and its allies are home to many small, midsized, and large-scale private companies with international presence and expertise in AI solutions for financial and business processes, healthcare, autonomous vehicle technology, maintenance management, and other areas relevant to logistics and sustainment. Private companies are at the forefront of innovation in AI, and there are great opportunities to leverage their expertise and commercial interests in defense to establish new and strengthen existing multinational private-public partnerships with a focus on AI applications for logistics and sustainment. The United States could work with allies on a bilateral basis; for example, building on Germany or South Korea’s competitive edge in autonomous vehicles technology to explore opportunities for public-private partnership for innovation in autonomous resupply technologies. There is also the option of working with and through regional bodies like the EU to support existing initiatives and public-private partnerships located in allied countries. 70 Another pathway suggested by experts at the Center for a New American Security in their report on building an alliance innovation base is to “launch a cross-national platform to build new companies” focused on national security technologies.71 4. The United States and its allies should include AI-enabled logistics and sustainment technologies and capabilities in joint military exercises. As AI-enabled technologies become more commonplace, it is vital to include them in joint multinational military exercises.72 From simulations and computer assisted command post exercises to major field exercises that include combined arms live-fire maneuvers integrating air, naval, marine, land, and cyber forces as well as civilian elements, multinational military exercises help forge personal and professional partnerships between allies, ensure doctrinal and technical interoperability, and strengthen readiness.73 Multinational logistic support is different from unilateral logistic support. Thus, if allies expect to use AI-enabled logistic and sustainment technologies in multinational missions, they would benefit from experimenting and training to do so together. Incorporating AI-enabled technologies into joint military exercises will allow allies to test and assess the technologies’ performance and viability in uncontrolled and dynamic environments— conditions in which AI systems are known to be brittle and vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Utilizing AI-enabled logistical elements and functions in joint exercises can also help allied militaries collect feedback from users and assess compatibility between the new technologies and existing concepts of operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures. User feedback can serve to improve the technology, while lessons learned about the ways in which new technologies fit with operational doctrine can inform necessary adjustments, ultimately, strengthening interoperability and readiness. Moreover, including AI-enabled logistics and sustainment technologies and capabilities in military exercises can help build trust between human operators and intelligent technologies. The issue of trust in human-machine teaming is particularly consequential in the context of multinational coalition because people from different countries can differ in their attitudes toward technology which in turn could affect interoperability, military effectiveness, and mission success as a whole.74 Conclusion The idea of an international technology alliance grounded in a shared set of democratic ideals and ethical standards for the development and use of emerging technologies is gaining ground in the United States and among its allies and partners.75 Yet as the strategic competition between the United States and China intensifies, the United States may charge ahead in integrating AI into its military systems while allies trail behind. The growing gap in military and technological capabilities, in turn, could undermine interoperability and threaten the long-term viability of multinational coalitions like NATO and other key U.S. alliances. While there are notable technical, bureaucratic, and political barriers to multinational cooperation in AI, especially for military purposes, AI applications for logistics and sustainment represent both a promising and critical area for collaboration between the United States and its allies. There are many ways allies can work together in this space, including by developing joint standards for data sharing, investing in collaborative R&D programs, advancing multinational public-private partnerships, and integrating AI-enabled logistics and sustainment technologies into joint military exercises. Depending on allies’ interests and capabilities, these efforts can take place within existing alliances, on a bilateral basis, or through a new and separate consortium dedicated specifically to cooperation on AI-enabled logistics and sustainment technologies. Working together with allies on this set of AI technologies will help advance shared security interests, promote interoperability, and ultimately, pave the path toward the ethical and responsible use of AI in military systems and missions.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Cooperation Advantage › AT: Disease Turn

Disease impact is minimal – Reject their fear-mongering

Orent 15—anthropologist and freelance science writer whose work has appeared in The Washington Post, The LA Times, The New Republic, Discover, and The American Prospect, instructor in science journalism at Emory [Wendy, “Ignore predictions of lethal pandemics and pay attention to what really matters” 1/3/2015, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-orent-pandemic-hysteria-20150104-story.html Accessed 8 July 2017]

Prophets of doom have been telling us for decades that a deadly new pandemic — of bird flu, of SARS or MERS coronavirus, and now of Ebola — is on its way. Why are we still listening? If you look back at the furor raised at many distinguished publications — Nature, Science, Scientific American, National Geographic — back in, say, 2005, about a potential bird flu (H5N1) pandemic, you wonder what planet they were on. Nature ran a special section titled — “Avian flu: Are we ready?” — that began, ominously, with the words “Trouble is brewing in the East” and went on to present a mock aftermath report detailing catastrophic civil breakdown. Robert Webster, a famous influenza virologist, told ABC News in 2006 that “society just can't accept the idea that 50% of the population could die. And I think we have to face that possibility.” Public health expert Michael T. Osterholm of the University of Minnesota, at a meeting in Washington of scientists brought together by the Institute of Medicine, warned in 2005 that a post-pandemic commission, like the post-9/11 commission, could hold “many scientists … accountable to that commission for what we did or didn't do to prevent a pandemic.” He also predicted that we could be facing “three years of a given hell” as the world struggled to right itself after the deadly pandemic. And Laurie Garrett, author of what must be the urtext for pandemic predictions, her 1994 book “The Coming Plague,” intoned in Foreign Affairs that “in short, doom may loom.” Although she followed that with “But note the may,” the article went on to paint a terrifying picture of the avian flu threat nonetheless. And such hysteria still goes on: Whether it's over the MERS coronavirus, a whole alphabet of chicken flu viruses, a real but not very deadly influenza pandemic in 2009, or a kerfuffle like the one in 2012 over a scientist-crafted ferret flu that also was supposed to be a pandemic threat. Along the way, virologist Nathan Wolfe published “The Viral Storm: the Dawn of a New Pandemic Age,” and David Quammen warned in his gripping “Spillover” that some new animal plague could arise from the jungle and sweep across the world. And now there's Ebola. Osterholm, in a widely read op-ed in the New York Times in September, wrote about the possibility that scientists were afraid to mention publicly the danger they discuss privately: that Ebola “could mutate to become transmissible through the air.” “The Ebola epidemic in West Africa has the potential to alter history as much as any plague has ever done,” he wrote. And Garrett wrote in Foreign Policy, “Attention, World: You just don't get it.” She went on to say, “Wake up, fools,” because we should be more frightened of a potential scenario like the one in the movie “Contagion,” in which a lethal, fictitious pandemic scours the world, nearly destroying civilization. But there were fewer takers this time. Osterholm's claims about Ebola going airborne were discounted by serious scientists, and Garrett seemingly retracted her earlier hysteria about Ebola by claiming that, after all, evolution made such spread unlikely. The scientific world has changed since 2005. Now, most scientists understand that there are significant physical and evolutionary barriers to a blood and fluid-borne virus developing airborne transmission, as Garrett has acknowledged. Though Ebola virus has been detected in human alveolar cells, as Vincent Racaniello, virologist at Columbia University, explained to me, that doesn't mean it can replicate in the airways enough to allow transmission. “Maybe … the virus can get in, but can't get out. Like a roach motel,” wrote Racaniello in an email. H5N1, we understand now, never went airborne because it attached only to cell receptors located deep in human lungs, and could not, therefore, be coughed or sneezed out. SARS, or severe acute respiratory syndrome, caused local outbreaks after multiple introductions via air travel but spread only sluggishly and mostly in hospitals. Breaking its chains of transmission ended the outbreak globally. There probably will always be significant barriers preventing the easy adaptation of an animal disease to the human species. Furthermore, Racaniello insists that there are no recorded instances of viruses that have adapted to humans, changing the way they are spread. So we need to stop listening to the doomsayers, and we need to do it now. Predictions of lethal pandemics have — since the swine flu fiasco of 1976, when President Ford vowed to vaccinate “every man, woman and child in the United States” — always been wrong. Fear-mongering wastes our time and our emotions and diverts resources from where they should be directed — in the case of Ebola, to the ongoing tragedy in West Africa. Americans have all but forgotten about Ebola now, because most people realize it isn't coming to a school or a shopping mall near you. But Sierra Leoneans and Liberians go on dying.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Cooperation Advantage › AT: Disease Turn

Authoritarian states are worse for disease control – no info sharing.

Kavanagh '20 - directs Georgetown University's Global Health Policy & Politics Initiative at the O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health [Matthew, "Authoritarianism, outbreaks, and information politics," The Lanet, VOLUME 5, ISSUE 3, E135-E136, MARCH 01, 2020]

For Amartya Sen, authoritarian states face serious challenges in information and accountability.6 Governments in closed political systems, without open media and opposition parties, struggle to receive accurate information in a timely manner and to convey urgent information to the public. Governments can be the victims of their own propaganda, because the country's political institutions provide incentives to local officials to avoid sharing bad news with their central bosses and await instructions before acting. Information politics in China undermined a rapid response to the 2019-nCoV outbreak. Health-care workers suspected an outbreak in early December, 2019,7 but information with which the public might have taken preventive measures was suppressed, and communication channels that might have alerted senior officials to the growing threat were shut down.8 Police detained a clinician and seven other people posting reports on 2019-nCoV, threatening punishment for spreading so-called rumors. Social media was censored; a preliminary analysis of Weibo and WeChat published on China's biggest online platform9 showed outbreak discussions were nearly non-existent through much of January, 2020, until the Chinese Government changed its official stance on Jan 20, 2020. Through much of January, 2020, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission reported no evidence of human-to-human transmission, no infection among health workers, that severe cases of disease caused by 2019-nCoV infection were confined to those with underlying conditions and older people, and that the Huanan seafood market was the source.11 Reports in The Lancet7 and New England Journal of Medicine,12 however, show that half of patients admitted to intensive-care units were aged 25–49 years, and two-thirds had no underlying illnesses. Human-to-human transmission and health-worker infection were evident before the Chinese Government made an announcement.12 This information either did not make it to authorities or the public were misinformed. The Mayor of Wuhan has said publicly that not only was information not revealed in a timely manner but also they did not use information effectively.10 By the time quarantine went into effect on Jan 23, 2020, five million people had left the city of Wuhan for holiday travel.10 Outbreaks were subsequently reported throughout China. Without open media and an opposition to check on bureaucratic hierarchy, knowledge from the front lines of the 2019-nCoV outbreak did not reach Beijing. Weeks into the outbreak, leaders were forced to publicly threaten that officials withholding information “will be nailed on the pillar of shame for eternity”.4 Is there an authoritarian advantage in disease response? It seems that authoritarian information politics inhibited a rapid response to the 2019-nCoV outbreak in China, which could have limited the crisis. It is not yet clear if the extraordinary cordons and influx of resources enabled by autocratic rule will prove a successful public health strategy. Yet, in building capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks, democratic openness and competitive politics seem more asset than inadequacy.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Cooperation Advantage › Impact – Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism outweighs and causes extinction

Tom Barnes & Marie Davidsen Buhl 21. Visiting Fellow & Research Intern at Rethink Priorities. PhD student in the Environmental Systems (ES) program at the University of California, Merced. //pipk

Preventing the risk of societies coming under the control of a single group/leader, who hold exclusive political power. At its extreme, this could include totalitarianism. Taking preventative measures to stop democratic backsliding may help to prevent authoritarianism.

What are some ways authoritarianism might affect the long-term future?

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Cooperation Advantage › Impact – Democracy Good

Democracy solves every impact---it’s comparatively more stable than autocracies

Matt Kroenig 20, Professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown. 4/3 “Why the U.S. Will Outcompete China”

National-security analysts see China as one of the greatest threats facing the United States and its allies. According to an emerging conventional wisdom, China has the leg up on the U.S. in part because its authoritarian government can strategically plan for the long term, unencumbered by competing branches of government, regular elections, and public opinion. Yet this faith in autocratic ascendance and democratic decline is contrary to historical fact. China may be able to put forth big, bold plans—the kinds of projects that analysts think of as long term—but the visionary projects of autocrats don’t usually pan out. Watch White Noise, the inside story of the alt-right The Atlantic’s first feature documentary ventures into the underbelly of the far-right movement to explore the seductive power of extremism. Stream Now Yes, democratic governments are obligated to answer to their citizens on regular intervals and are sensitive to public opinion—that’s actually democracies’ greatest source of strength. Democratic leaders have a harder time advancing big, bold agendas, but the upside of that difficulty is that the plans that do make it through the system have been carefully considered and enjoy domestic support. Historically speaking, once a democracy comes up with a successful strategy, it sticks with the plan, even through a succession of leadership. Washington has arguably followed the same basic, three-step geopolitical plan since 1945. First, the United States built the current, rules-based international system by providing security in important geopolitical regions, constructing international institutions, and promoting free markets and democratic politics within its sphere of influence. Second, it welcomed into the club any country that played by the rules, even former adversaries, like Germany and Japan. And, third, the U.S. worked with its allies to defend the system from those countries or groups that would challenge it, including competitors such as Russia and China, rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, and terrorist networks. America can pursue long-term strategy in part because it enjoys domestic political stability. While new politicians seek to improve on their predecessor’s policies, the United States is unlikely to see the drastic shifts in strategy that come from the fall of one political system and the rise of another. Democratic elections may be messy, but they’re not as messy as coups or civil wars. Daniel Blumenthal: The Unpredictable Rise of China Open societies have many other advantages as well. They facilitate innovation, trust in financial markets, and economic growth. Because democracies tend to be more reliable partners, they are typically skillful alliance builders, and they can accumulate resources without frightening their neighbors. They tend to make thoughtful, informed decisions on matters of war and peace, and to focus their security forces on external enemies, not their own populations. Autocratic systems simply cannot match this impressive array of economic, diplomatic, and military attributes. David Leonhardt recently wrote in The New York Times, “Chinese leaders stretching back to Deng Xiaoping have often thought in terms of decades.” Commonly cited examples of that long-term thinking include the Belt and Road Initiative, a program that invests in infrastructure overseas; Made in China 2025, an effort to subsidize China’s giant tech companies to become world leaders in 21st-century technologies, such as artificial intelligence; and Beijing’s promise to be a global superpower by 2049. Since putting in place sound economic reforms in the 1970s, China has seen its economy expand at eye-popping rates, to become the world’s second largest. Many economists predict that China could even surpass the United States within the decade, and some have suggested that China’s model of state-led capitalism will prove more successful, in terms of economic growth, than the U.S. template of free markets and open politics. I doubt these predictions. Because autocratic leaders are unconstrained and do not have to contend with a legislature or courts, they have an easier time taking their countries in new and radically different directions. Then, when the dictator changes his mind, he can do it again. Mao’s autocratic China ricocheted from one failed policy to another: the Great Leap Forward, then the Hundred Flowers Campaign, then the Cultural Revolution. Mao aligned with the Soviet Union in 1950 only to nearly fight a nuclear war with Moscow in the next decade. Beginning in the time of Deng Xiaoping, China pursued a fairly constant strategy of liberalizing its economy at home and “hiding its capabilities and biding its time” abroad. But President Xi Jinping abandoned these dictums when he took over. As the most powerful leader since Mao—he has changed China’s constitution to set himself up as dictator for life—he could once again jerk China in several new directions, according to his whims, and back again. According to the Asia Society, he has stalled or reversed course on eight of 10 categories of economic reform promised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. Moreover, Xi is baring China’s teeth militarily, taking contested territory from neighbors in the South China Sea and conducting military exercises with Russia in Europe. The problem for Beijing is that stalled reforms will stymie its economic potential and its confrontational policies are provoking an international coalition to contain them. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy declared great-power competition with China the foremost security threat to the U.S.; the European Union labeled China a “systemic rival”; and Japan, Australia, India, and the United States have formed a new “quad” of powers to balance China in the Pacific. Furthermore, the plans often cited as evidence of China’s farsighted vision, the Belt and Road Initiative and Made in China 2025, were announced by Xi only in 2013 and 2015, respectively. Both are way too recent to be celebrated as brilliant examples of successful, long-term strategic planning. A certain level of domestic political stability is a prerequisite for charting a steady strategic course in foreign and domestic affairs. But autocratic regimes are notoriously brittle. While institutionalized political successions in democracies typically lead to changes of policy, political successions in autocracies are likely to result in regime collapse and war. China’s “5,000 years of history” were pockmarked by rebellion, revolution, and new dynasties. Fearing internal threats to domestic political stability—consider the protests this year in Hong Kong and Xinjiang—the CCP spends more on domestic security than on its national defense. If you follow the money, the CCP is demonstrating that the government is more afraid of its own people than of the Pentagon. This domestic fragility will frustrate China’s efforts to design and execute farsighted plans. If threats to Chinese domestic stability were to materialize and the CCP were to collapse tomorrow, for example, Chinese grand strategy could undergo another seismic shift, including possibly opting out of competition with the United States altogether. Shadi Hamid: China Is Avoiding Blame by Trolling the World Autocracies have other vulnerabilities as well. State-led planning has never produced high rates of economic growth over the long term. Autocrats are poor alliance builders who fight with their supposed allies more than with their enemies. And the highest priority of autocratic security forces is repressing their own people, not defending the country. The world has undergone drastic changes in just the past few years, but these enduring patterns of international affairs have not. Some fear that Trump’s nationalist tendencies will erode the U.S. position, but the momentum of America’s successful grand strategy has kept the country on a fairly steady course. Despite Trump’s criticism of NATO, for example, two new countries have joined the alliance on his watch, including North Macedonia this week. The coronavirus has upended a sense of security in the U.S., leading many people into the familiar trap of lauding autocratic China’s firm response in contrast to the halting and patchwork measures in the United States. But there is good reason to believe that this assessment will be updated in America’s favor with the benefit of hindsight. Already we are seeing evidence that conditions are much worse in China than CCP officials are letting on and that China’s attempts at international “disaster diplomacy” are backfiring. It has been revealed that the CCP has continually misrepresented the numbers of COVID-19 infections and deaths in China, and European nations have rejected and returned faulty Chinese coronavirus testing kits.