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2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Turns › Militarism Good Turn

Militarism is good- military deterrence and the willingness to use force will save more lives

Victor Davis Hanson 04, Professor of Classical Studies at CSU Fresno, “The Fruits of Appeasement”, City Journal, Spring 2004, http://www.cityjournal.org/html/14_2_the_fruits.html

The twentieth century should have taught the citizens of liberal democracies the catastrophic consequences of placating tyrants. British and French restraint over the occupation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss, the absorption of the Czech Sudetenland, and the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia did not win gratitude but rather Hitler’s contempt for their weakness. Fifty million dead, the Holocaust, and the near destruction of European civilization were the wages of “appeasement”—a term that early-1930s liberals proudly embraced as far more enlightened than the old idea of “deterrence” and “military readiness.”

So too did Western excuses for the Russians’ violation of guarantees of free elections in postwar Eastern Europe, China, and Southeast Asia only embolden the Soviet Union. What eventually contained Stalinism was the Truman Doctrine, NATO, and nuclear deterrence—not the United Nations—and what destroyed its legacy was Ronald Reagan’s assertiveness, not Jimmy Carter’s accommodation or Richard Nixon’s détente.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Alt Ans › Policy Focus Good

Policymakers must take national interest above all other interests---it’s the only ethical option

William F. Felice 2008, Professor of international political economy, international law, international organization, and human rights at New York University, “Moral Responsibility in a Time of War”, Social Justice/Global Options, https://www.jstor.org/stable/29768499

Ethics, also known as moral philosophy, attempts to distinguish between right and wrong behavior. Ethical theories have been applied to war and violence with "just war" theories influencing policymakers. However, the intellectual framework used by the overwhelming majority of the world's foreign policy decision-makers is an "amoral" calculation of what action best serves the "national interest." The first-rate foreign policy expert will give absolute priority to the interests of his or her nation, which often means neglecting and opposing the material interests of those outside this partial community. Through this lens, policy options pose few moral dilemmas, as these decisions are merely practical solutions to real-world problems. Some who call themselves "political realists" share such a view of the separation of ethics from politics. To a classical political realist, history demonstrates that states must focus on power and wealth to survive in the international system. Morality has a limited role to play in this anarchical, dangerous world. Since the time of Thucydides in ancient Greece, states have consistently chosen power over negotiated diplomatic agreements, with the "logic of fear and escalation" always pushing out the "logic of moderation and peaceful diplomacy." This overriding priority of "national security" means that ethics plays an extremely circumscribed role in the deliberations of states. Many realists argue that in international politics "only the weak resort tomoral argument" (Smith, 1986: 6-7). Many powerful officials in the U.S. government have stated strongly that, in their view, moral considerations have no place in politics. For example, Dean Acheson, former secretary of state under President Harry Truman, was asked by President Kennedy in 1962 to serve on the Executive Committee to advise the president on an appropriate response to the Cuban missile crisis. Acheson later wrote that during these discussions, when the lives of millions of people were in danger, "those involved...will remember the irrelevance of the supposed moral considerations brought out in the discussions...moral talk did not bear on the problem" (Acheson, 1971; Coady, 1993: 373). Realist counsel has traditionally excluded morality from foreign policy and instead focused solely on the "national interest." Yet, this does not mean that no ethics apply to statecraft. Rather, a difference is accepted in the morals that apply to individuals versus those that apply to the state. An individual can base his or her conduct on principles such as honesty and nonviolence. In contrast, the state must protect its position of "power" in the international system. This means that the state should not engage in ideological crusades for democracy and freedom that could dilute its power. Yet key "realist" virtues enhance the state's power position and thus must be embraced. These ethical norms are said to include prudence, humility, study, responsibility, and patriotism. Such an approach allows leaders to conduct a responsible and tough defense of the national interest, but still show respect for others. The claim made for the cosmopolitan significance of this realist approach has been named "ethical realism." "Ethical realism," according to Lieven and Hulsman (2006: 62-83), "is therefore of universal and eternal value for the conduct of international affairs, and especially useful as a guiding philosophy for the United States and its war on terror."As a representative of the community overall, the government official has a primary obligation to the national interest, and, in particular, the security and integrity of the state. The ethics of "humility" and "prudence" can help to protect the security of the state. However, the necessities of national existence cannot be sorted out through an ethical lens of right and wrong conduct. Effective statecraft demands that officials act to protect the whole, even if individual and collective moral principles are sacrificed. The government official must protect the interests of the community above all else. As a result, according to international relations theorist Hans Morgenthau (1979: 13), there is a "difference in the moral principles that apply to the private citizen in his relations with other private citizens and to the public figure in dealing with other public figures." Many of these "political realists" and/or "ethical realists" seem to embrace Machiavelli’s division of morality between the public and private worlds.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Alt Ans › Policy Focus Good

The plan’s policy-relevant and consequentialist framing is more effective

Matthew Bolton 16, assistant professor of political science at Pace University; and Elizabeth Minor, researcher at UK‐based NGO Article 36, September 2016, “The Discursive Turn Arrives in Turtle Bay: The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons’ Operationalization of Critical IR Theories,” Global Policy, Vol. 7, No. 3, p. 385-395

Within the IR literature there is a perennial admonition to make theory more ‘relevant’ to policy makers, but this is usually cast in problem‐solving terms: producing knowledge that solves the problems faced by the existing political framework. (Lepgold, 1998; Eriksson and Sundelius, 2005; Walt, 2005). Many of those engaged in critical theorizing resist such demands to be ‘useful,’ suspicious of the operationalization of academic work in oppressive systems, and tend towards a position of ‘resistance’ to the system as a whole. Critical security studies scholar Anna Stavrianakis (2012, p. 233) for example, calls on disarmament activists to demand ‘transgressive change that fundamentally alters the social landscape as well as generates concrete improvements’ rather than calling for ‘incremental changes that leave the parameters of an issue untouched’. Given the centrality of discourse to critical theorizing, resistance is often framed not in terms of taking territory, mobilizing bodies, changing legislation, gaining votes or raising money. Rather it tends to focus on the critical deconstruction of oppressive discourse and disruption of existing norms (e.g. Hargreaves, 2012). As a result, many critical IR scholars see their academic work – undermining dominant discourses through their scholarship and teaching – as their primary form of resistance. (Said, 1996).An emerging generation of political actors were educated by post‐positivist and critical IR scholars and conceive of their work self‐consciously in discursive terms. That is, they frame their intervention in the political arena as a deliberate attempt to reshape the way society speaks about and gives meaning to a particular phenomenon, people, group or activity. Occupy Wall Street activists drew upon critical and discursive theories to strategize their symbolic disruption of the neo‐liberal order (Welty, 2013). LGBTQA activists and ‘third wave’ feminists are trying to change dominant discourses of gender and sexuality (e.g. St. Pierre, 2000). However, critical theory has had less impact on the realm of international military and security policy, which remains heavily influenced by realist thought (Cooper, 2006).As critical theorizing has begun to be used for solving definable political problems (e.g. Davies, 2012; Merlingen, 2013), what Brown (2013) calls ‘critical problem‐solving theory’, it has eroded Cox's (1981) boundary between ‘problem‐solving’ and critical theories. What happens when a theoretical paradigm that explicitly defines itself in critical opposition is instrumentalized and used in problem‐solving ways? This question, which we begin to explore in this article, is underexamined in the literature (see Weizman, 2012, pp. 185–220 for an important exception).According to the epistemic community literature (e.g. Haas 2004), the education of policy makers can shape their later actions (Eriksson and Sundelius, 2005). Most usefully for this article, it shows how at critical junctures policy makers will turn to experts. Policy makers tend to be less interested in meta‐theory or broad academic debates about an issue. Rather, they look for knowledge that can be used instrumentally to solve a particular policy problem (e.g. Hall, 1993). But moving theoretical ideas from academia, through the activist community, to the policy arena, dilutes the original ideas and reinterprets them in instrumental ways. To help understand this, we draw on postcolonial concepts of ‘translation’ and ‘creolization’ of different ‘knowledge systems’ pushed into contact (Shih and Lionet, 2011, p. 30). We find that some ICAN campaigners responsible for its current strategy have ‘translated’ IR discursive theory into the world of disarmament policy making. In doing so, they selected the aspects of critical security studies ‘to transpose and emphasize’ (cf. Tymoczko, 2000 p. 24) as befit their specific political goals. This creative application of critical theory in a new setting, in its translation of theory into political engagement, may necessarily involve rendering it less threatening to elite audiences, in the process of seeking policy changes (cf. Jeffrey, 2013, pp. 107–131).

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Alt Ans › Alt Fails – AT: Movements

Activist movements fail – they can’t produce concrete alternatives.

Jones 11 [Owen, Masters at Oxford, named one of the Daily Telegraph's 'Top 100 Most Influential People on the Left' for 2011, author of "Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class", The Independent, UK, "Owen Jones: Protest without politics will change nothing", 2011, ]

My first experience of police kettling was aged 16. It was May Day 2001, and the anti-globalisation movement was at its peak. The turn-of-the-century anti-capitalist movement feels largely forgotten today, but it was a big deal at the time. To a left-wing teenager growing up in an age of unchallenged neo-liberal triumphalism, just to have "anti-capitalism" flash up in the headlines was thrilling. Thousands of apparently unstoppable protesters chased the world's rulers from IMF to World Bank summits – from Seattle to Prague to Genoa – and the authorities were rattled.¶ Today, as protesters in nearly a thousand cities across the world follow the example set by the Occupy Wall Street protests, it's worth pondering what happened to the anti-globalisation movement. Its activists did not lack passion or determination. But they did lack a coherent alternative to the neo-liberal project. With no clear political direction, the movement was easily swept away by the jingoism and turmoil that followed 9/11, just two months after Genoa.¶ Don't get me wrong: the Occupy movement is a glimmer of sanity amid today's economic madness. By descending on the West's financial epicentres, it reminds us of how a crisis caused by the banks (a sentence that needs to be repeated until it becomes a cliché) has been cynically transformed into a crisis of public spending. The founding statement of Occupy London puts it succinctly: "We refuse to pay for the banks' crisis." The Occupiers direct their fire at the top 1 per cent, and rightly so – as US billionaire Warren Buffett confessed: "There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning."¶ The Occupy movement has provoked fury from senior US Republicans such as Presidential contender Herman Cain who – predictably – labelled it "anti-American". They're right to be worried: those camping outside banks threaten to refocus attention on the real villains, and to act as a catalyst for wider dissent. But a coherent alternative to the tottering global economic order remains, it seems, as distant as ever. Neo-liberalism crashes around, half-dead, with no-one to administer the killer blow.There's always a presumption that a crisis of capitalism is good news for the left. Yet in the Great Depression, fascism consumed much of Europe. The economic crisis of the 1970s did lead to a resurgence of radicalism on both left and right. But, spearheaded by Thatcherism and Reaganism, the New Right definitively crushed its opposition in the 1980s.This time round, there doesn't even seem to be an alternative for the right to defeat. That's not the fault of the protesters. In truth, the left has never recovered from being virtually smothered out of existence. It was the victim of a perfect storm: the rise of the New Right; neo-liberal globalisation; and the repeated defeats suffered by the trade union movement.¶ But, above all, it was the aftermath of the collapse of Communism that did for the left. As US neo-conservative Midge Decter triumphantly put it: "It's time to say: We've won. Goodbye." From the British Labour Party to the African National Congress, left-wing movements across the world hurtled to the right in an almost synchronised fashion. It was as though the left wing of the global political spectrum had been sliced off. That's why, although we live in an age of revolt, there remains no left to give it direction and purpose.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Alt Ans › War = Human Nature

War is biologically engrained in human nature

Wilson ’12 (E.O. Wilson, an American biologist, naturalist, and writer. June 12th 2021 “Is War Inevitable?” Liveright Publishing Corporation Cayden Mayer

“History is a bath of blood,” wrote William James, whose 1906 antiwar essay is arguably the best ever written on the subject. “Modern man inherits all the innate pugnacity and all the love of glory of his ancestors. Showing war’s irrationality and horror is of no effect on him. The horrors make the fascination. War is the strong life; it is life in extremis; war taxes are the only ones men never hesitate to pay, as the budgets of all nations show us.” Our bloody nature, it can now be argued in the context of modern biology, is ingrained because group-versus-group competition was a principal driving force that made us what we are. In prehistory, group selection (that is, the competition between tribes instead of between individuals) lifted the hominids that became territorial carnivores to heights of solidarity, to genius, to enterprise—and to fear. Each tribe knew with justification that if it was not armed and ready, its very existence was imperiled. Throughout history, the escalation of a large part of technology has had combat as its central purpose. Today the calendars of nations are punctuated by holidays to celebrate wars won and to perform memorial services for those who died waging them. Public support is best fired up by appeal to the emotions of deadly combat, over which the amygdala—a center for primary emotion in the brain—is grandmaster. We find ourselves in the “battle” to stem an oil spill, the “fight” to tame inflation, the “war” against cancer. Wherever there is an enemy, animate or inanimate, there must be a victory. You must prevail at the front, no matter how high the cost at home. Any excuse for a real war will do, so long as it is seen as necessary to protect the tribe. The remembrance of past horrors has no effect. From April to June in 1994, killers from the Hutu majority in Rwanda set out to exterminate the Tutsi minority, which at that time ruled the country. In a hundred days of unrestrained slaughter by knife and gun, 800,000 people died, mostly Tutsi. The total Rwandan population was reduced by 10 percent. When a halt was finally called, 2 million Hutu fled the country, fearing retribution. The immediate causes for the bloodbath were political and social grievances, but they all stemmed from one root cause: Rwanda was the most overcrowded country in Africa. For a relentlessly growing population, the per capita arable land was shrinking toward its limit. The deadly argument was over which tribe would own and control the whole of it. Universal conflict
 Once a group has been split off from other groups and sufficiently dehumanized, any brutality can be justified, at any level, and at any size of the victimized group up to and including race and nation. And so it has ever been. A familiar fable is told to symbolize this pitiless dark angel of human nature. A scorpion asks a frog to ferry it across a stream. The frog at first refuses, saying that it fears the scorpion will sting it. The scorpion assures the frog it will do no such thing. After all, it says, we will both perish if I sting you. The frog consents, and halfway across the stream the scorpion stings it. Why did you do that, the frog asks as they both sink beneath the surface. It is my nature, the scorpion explains. War, often accompanied by genocide, is not a cultural artifact of just a few societies. Nor has it been an aberration of history, a result of the growing pains of our species’ maturation. Wars and genocide have been universal and eternal, respecting no particular time or culture. Archaeological sites are strewn with the evidence of mass conflicts and burials of massacred people. Tools from the earliest Neolithic period, about 10,000 years ago, include instruments clearly designed for fighting. One might think that the influence of pacific Eastern religions, especially Buddhism, has been consistent in opposing violence. Such is not the case. Whenever Buddhism dominated and became the official ideology, war was tolerated and even pressed as part of faith-based state policy. The rationale is simple, and has its mirror image in Christianity: Peace, nonviolence, and brotherly love are core values, but a threat to Buddhist law and civilization is an evil that must be defeated. Since the end of World War II, violent conflict between states has declined drastically, owing in part to the nuclear standoff of the major powers (two scorpions in a bottle writ large). But civil wars, insurgencies, and state-sponsored terrorism continue unabated. Overall, big wars have been replaced around the world by small wars of the kind and magnitude more typical of hunter-gatherer and primitively agricultural societies. Civilized societies have tried to eliminate torture, execution, and the murder of civilians, but those fighting little wars do not comply. Archaeologists have determined that after populations of Homo sapiens began to spread out of Africa approximately 60,000 years ago, the first wave reached as far as New Guinea and Australia. The descendants of the pioneers remained as hunter-gatherers or at most primitive agriculturalists, until reached by Europeans. Living populations of similar early provenance and archaic cultures are the aboriginals of Little Andaman Island off the east coast of India, the Mbuti Pygmies of Central Africa, and the !Kung Bushmen of southern Africa. All today, or at least within historical memory, have exhibited aggressive territorial behavior.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Alt Ans › War = Human Nature

War is inevitable and a part of human nature

Perry 19 (Craig Perry, emerging fellow and professional futurist, February 24 2019, “IS ANOTHER GREAT-POWER WAR INEVITABLE?” APF, Mayer

A century ago, with the world embroiled in what was then naively dubbed the “war to end all wars,” few people imagined a second global conflagration igniting just a generation later. Since the end of World War II, however, humanity has experienced over seven decades of relative peace, with the frequency of war deaths trending sharply downward throughout this period. This is largely attributable to the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, a standoff that spawned numerous proxy conflicts but never turned truly hot. It remains to be seen whether the ongoing reemergence of a multipolar world, with potentially several states capable of exerting influence on a global scale, will lead to yet more wars among these so-called great powers. There are good reasons to fear a return to great-power conflict. Warfare has been endemic to the human condition since the dawn of civilization, and remains the ultimate way of resolving conflicts among states even in the modern era. World affairs are inherently anarchic, with states pursuing their own advantages in a Hobbesian struggle of each against all. While the weak may occasionally band together to balance would-be hegemons, the prevailing self-help system of international relations features no permanent friends or enemies, just interests. “Countries have always competed for wealth and security, and the competition has often led to conflict,” the late neo-realist scholar Kenneth Waltz noted. “Why should the future be different from the past?” Indeed, war has accompanied the rise and fall of great powers throughout recorded history. In his classic account of the Peloponnesian War, Greek historian Thucydides concluded that the growth of Athenian power and the fear this inspired in then-dominant Sparta made war between these city-states inevitable. This dynamic, which political scientist Graham Allison calls the “Thucydides Trap,” has ensnared rising and established powers in more than a dozen wars over the last 500 years—and it threatens to do so again as other states challenge the United States for global influence. Such systemic, structural factors are not the only aspects of international relations that can drive states towards armed conflict. Marxists argue that capitalism compels the core, industrialized powers to compete for dominance as they exploit peripheral countries for labor and raw materials. Political scientist Samuel Huntington suggested it is culture—rather than ideology, politics, or economics—that is shaping patterns of conflict, with the Western belief in the universality of its values leading to clashes with rival civilizations. Constructivists similarly believe ideas shape international relations, as each state perceives world events in its own peculiar way. So why should the future be different from the past? With nearly 200 sovereign states around the globe, it seems inevitable that at least some of them will come into conflict in the coming decades—and great powers will occasionally intervene if only to enforce international law or for some other ostensibly noble purpose. Yet it is far from certain that these great powers will again come to blows with each other, for several reasons. While anarchy will continue to characterize international relations for the foreseeable future, a number of developments—including nuclear deterrence, globalization of trade and investment, relevant international institutions, shifting social norms, and widespread competition below the threshold of war—are incrementally reducing the likelihood of another great-power conflict. Will these trends be enough to prevent the eventual outbreak of World War III?

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Alt Ans › State Militarism Inevitable- Realism

Realism makes militarization and use of military power inevitable- states have a vested interest in armed force

Mareike Oldemeinen 10, Mareike Oldemeinen most recently pursued a second Master’s degree in transatlantic studies at the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill and Humboldt-University Berlin, from which she graduated in September 2018. In January 2019, she will move to Frankfurt to join the strategic communications practice of Hering Schuppener, E-International Relations, 2019, https://www.e-ir.info/2010/02/15/the-political-realism-of-thucydides-and-thomas-hobbes/#:~:text=Political%20Realism%20sees%20international%20relations,a%20permanent%20state%20of%20anarchy.

Political Realism sees international relations mainly as a struggle of self-interested, sovereign states that are involved in a game of power-politics within a permanent state of anarchy. The international system, according to this school of thought, is a moral- and value-free environment in which the state is seen as a rational and unitary actor that finds itself in constant conflict with the other states of the system due to the lack of an overarching world government. Stemming from their pessimistic view on human nature, the only way to achieve security in the international system, according to political realism, is by creating a Balance of Power among the most powerful states of the system. As briefly mentioned earlier, both political thinkers pick up on the realist view of the international system as a value- and moral-free place of anarchy, where states live under a constant fear of attack or betrayal by others and thus are facing a Security Dilemma. Thucydides, taking up the issue of anarchy within the international system, very much agrees with the realist point of view, saying that in a system where there is no overarching authority, the only way to maintain order is through some form of Balance of Power, which – in the case of Thucydides – takes the form of the strong exercising their power over the weak. Hobbes, in comparison, takes quite a different look at this. Stemming from his theory about the ‘State of Nature’, he admits that without a world government, the system is subject to a state of anarchy and of “a war as is of every man against every man”[1]. However, Hobbes opposes the view that under such conditions it is the strong who determine the order of the international system. According to his theory of the ‘State of Nature’, every man is equal and thus “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself.”[2]. The order, according to Hobbes, is rather maintained by a “general rule of reason”[3] which is that “every man ought to endeavour peace”[4] and since every man is equal in strength and desires, there is certainty that this principle will be followed as long as one’s own security is not endangered. This leads on to the realist claim of a moral- and value-free international system. He also claims that peace and security in an international system without an overarching authority can only be achieved through cooperation between states and between individuals. This leads on to the next point which has to be made about the view of Hobbes and Thucydides on individuals and states: cooperation. Political realism sees no actual possibility for states to form successful alliances, as no state can be trusted since it only relies on its self-interest and does not pay much attention to what would happen to other states in the system. Thucydides takes a similar stand as he – although not ignoring the possibility – is very sceptical of the chances of success of such a form of cooperation given the anarchic structure of the international system and solely self-interested states. Hobbes, on the other hand, does recognise the limitations mentioned above, however he also says that due to the fact that all states are equal within the international system, they can “create more stable forms of coexistence among themselves”[8] and thus establish peace and security.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Alt Ans › State Militarism Inevitable- Realism

Realism’s mechanism for change is War

Wivel, 18 Anders Wivel- Professor of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. His research interests include political realism, power politics and foreign policy, in particular the foreign policy of small states. His articles have appeared in various journals including Cooperation and Conflict, Journal of Common Market Studies, Security Dialogue, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Journal of International Relations and Development and European Security. “Realism and Peaceful Change,” E-International Relations, 2018. https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/09/realism-and-peaceful-change/#:~:text=Realism%20is%20most%20often%20depicted,of%20change%20in%20international%20relations.

Realism is most often depicted as a tradition or perspective on international relations explaining war and military conflict. This is not without reason as realists have focused on war as a major or even the primary mechanism of change in international relations. Thucydides, in The History of the Peloponnesian War, written in the fifth century BC, and a standard reference in textbook accounts of the realist tradition, found that ‘[t]he growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable’ (Thucydides 431 BC, 1.23). This position is echoed in realism up until today. For instance, in his modern classic, aptly entitled War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin asserts that ‘a precondition for political change lies in a disjuncture between the existing social system and the redistribution of power towards those actors who would benefit most from a change in the system’, and that change in international relations typically equals war (Gilpin 1981, 9). Likewise, John Mearsheimer, in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, argues that the most war-prone regions are those characterised by unbalanced multipolarity with a potential hegemon seeking to change the established order in its favour by military means, and that the growth of China constitutes the greatest danger to world peace (Mearsheimer 2001). This does not mean that realists are unconcerned with peace. Acting as policy advisors or foreign policy commentators, realists have often been among the most vocal critics of war. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, arguably the two most prominent realists in the latter half of the twentieth century, were both highly critical of US military intervention in Vietnam (Rafshoon 2001; Humphreys 2013). More recently, ‘almost all realists in the United States – except for Henry Kissinger – opposed the war against Iraq’ in 2003 (Mearsheimer 2005), and realists have been highly critical of the US military interventions during the Obama administration from 2009 to 2017 (Walt 2016). However, despite this concern with peace, war remains the primary mechanism for change in realist theory, and realists have been surprisingly reluctant to explore the potential for peaceful change.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Alt Ans › State Militarism Inevitable- Evolution

States’ tendencies towards aggression and selfishness are derived from the evolutionary need to maintain dominance hierarchies

Thayer, PhD, 4

(Bradley A., Department of Political Science and Geography at UT San Antonio. Darwin and International Relations : On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict, University Press of Kentucky, 2004. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Evolutionary theory can also explain domination. Like egoism, the desire to dominate is a trait. In the context of evolutionary theory, domination usually means that particular individuals in social groups have regular priority of access to resources in competitive situations. For most social mammals, a form of social organization called a dominance hierarchy operates most of the time. The creation of the dominance hierarchy may be violent and is almost always competitive. A single leader, almost always male (the alpha male), leads the group. The ubiquity of this social ordering strongly suggests that such a pattern of organization contributes to fitness. Ethologists categorize two principal types of behavior among social mammals in a dominance hierarchy: dominant and submissive.56 Dominant mammals have enhanced access to mates, food, and territory, increasing their chances of reproductive success.57 Acquiring dominant status usually requires aggression.58 Dominance, however, is an unstable condition; to maintain it, dominant individuals must be willing to defend their privileged access to available resources as long as they are able. Evolutionary anthropologist Richard Wrangham and ethologist Dale Peterson explain why an individual animal is motivated to vie for dominant status: "The motivation of a male chimpanzee who challenges another's rank is not that he foresees more matings or better food or a longer life."59 Rather, "those rewards explain why ... selection has favored the desire for power, but the immediate reason he vies for status ... is simply to dominate his peers."60 Dominant animals often assume behavior reflecting their status. For example, dominant wolves and rhesus monkeys hold their tails higher than other members of their group in an effort to communicate dominance. A dominant animal that engages in such displays is better off if it can gain priority of access to resources without having to fight for it continuously.61 Such signaling behavior is found among submissive social mammals as well. They often try to be as inconspicuous as possible and recognize what is permitted and forbidden given their place in the hierarchy. This behavior shows that the subordinate accepts its place in the dominance hierarchy and-at least temporarily-will make no effort to challenge the dominant animal. Ethologists argue that dominance hierarchies evolve because they help defend against predators, promote the harvesting of resources, and reduce intragroup conflict.62 A species that lives communally has two choices. It can either accept organization with some centralization of power, or engage in perpetual conflict over scarce resources, which may result in serious injury and deprive the group of the benefits of a communal existence, such as more efficient resource harvesting.63 Ethological studies have confirmed that a hierarchical dominance system within a primate band minimizes overt aggression and that group aggression often increases when the alpha male is challenged.64 For primates and especially humans, the dominance hierarchy may have produced a fortuitous result: great intelligence.65 As cognitive psychologist Denise Dellarosa Cummins argues, it has had a profound effect on human evolution: "The fundamental components of our reasoning architecture evolved in response to pressures to reason about dominance hierarchies, the social organization that characterizes most social mammals."66 Her study and others have found that dominance hierarchies have contributed to the evolution of the mind, which in turn has contributed to fitness. According to Cummins, submissive individuals can detect, exploit, and circumvent the constraints of domination. If an animal can take what it wants by force, it is sure to dominate the available resources-unless its subordinates are smart enough to outwit it. To survive, a subordinate must use other strategies: deception, guile, appeasement, bartering, alliance formation, or friendship. Thus intelligence is particularly important to the survival of subordinates. "The evolution of mind emerges," Cummins writes, "as a strategic arms race in which the weaponry is ever-increasing mental capacity to represent and manipulate internal representations of the minds of others."67 From their studies of chimpanzee societies, ethologists have learned that the struggle for survival is best characterized as a struggle between those who are dominant and those seeking to outwit them, i.e., between recognizing an opponent's intentions and hiding one's own. The following example illustrates how a subordinate chimpanzee, Belle, who knows the location of hidden food, attempts to deceive Rock, who is dominant: Belle accordingly stopped uncovering the food if Rock was close. She sat on it until Rock left. Rock, however, soon learned this, and when she sat in one place for more than a few seconds, he came over, shoved her aside, searched her sitting place, and got the food. Belle next stopped going all the way [to the food]. Rock, however, countered by steadily expanding the area of his search through the grass near where Belle had sat. Eventually, Belle sat farther and farther away, waiting until Rock looked in the opposite direction before she moved toward the food at all, and Rock in turn seemed to look away until Belle started to move somewhere. On some occasions Rock started to wander off, only to wheel around suddenly precisely as Belle was about to uncover some food .... On a few trials, she actually started off a trail by leading the group in the opposite direction from the food, and then, while Rock was engaged in his search, she doubled back rapidly and got some food. 68 Despite the "arms race" described by Cummins to outwit dominance, the subordinate members of the group continue to participate in the dominance hierarchy because doing so increases the chances of survival. As ethologist David Barash explains, if subordinates "are more fit by accepting" subordinate "ranking than by refusing to participate, then some form of social dominance hierarchy will result."69 Humans and other primates evolved a mental architecture to address the difficulties they encountered in dominance hierarchies. These problems, which "directly impact survival rates and reproductive success," include two crucial needs: "the necessity to recognize and respond appropriately to permissions, obligations, and prohibition," and the necessity "to circumvent the constraints of hierarchy by dint of guile, particularly through successfully forecasting others' behavior. "70 Because human mental architecture was created through evolution, it remains part of human behavior today, as cognitive psychology studies show. 71

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Alt Ans › State Militarism Inevitable- Evolution

Dominance behavior and hierarchies are evolutionarily constant across vastly different species

Johnson, PhD, and Thayer, PhD, 16

(Dominic D. P., PhD from Geneva University in political science, and Bradley, Department of Political Science and Geography at UT San Antonio (2016). The evolution of offensive realism: Survival under anarchy from the Pleistocene to the present. Politics and the Life Sciences, 35(1), 1-26.)//bc

Evolutionary theory can also explain dominance. Like egoism, the desire to dominate is a trait of human nature (which, as with egoism, we stress does not necessarily apply to every individual or situation but is a statistical tendency underlying behavior). As evolutionary economist Robert Frank has explained, ‘‘Evidence suggests that we come into the world equipped with a nervous system that worries about rank. Something inherent in our biological makeup motivates us to try to improve, or at least maintain, our standing against those with whom we compete for important positional resources.’’94 In the context of evolutionary theory, dominance usually means that particular individuals in a social group have priority of access to resources in competitive situations.95 A wide variety of animals exhibit a form of social organization called a dominance hierarchy, in which members of a social group each have a status rank descending from the alpha male down through all the other individuals to the lowliest subordinates. A dominance hierarchy is created competitively, often violently, and is maintained forcefully, but it can serve to prevent or reduce conflict within a group because it establishes a pecking order that is generally respected. As with all things in nature, dominance hierarchies vary considerably. Hierarchies may be weak or strong, and ‘‘alpha’’ males may sire nearly all offspring or just more than others. However, what is striking is the prevalence and potency of dominance in social organization, despite variations in the specifics. Dominance behavior occurs in thousands of taxonomic groups ranging from fish and reptiles to birds and mammals. Of particular note regarding the impact of dominance on human behavior are the roles of both phylogeny (a species’ ancestral lineage) and ecology (its adaptations to local conditions). With regard to phylogeny, most primates and all the great apes (the group to which humans belong) have strong social dominance hierarchies, and humans are no exception—dominance hierarchies have been extensively documented among humans in a wide variety of settings and eras.96,97,98 With regard to ecology, dominance hierarchies are a common form of social organization in the kind of ecological settings in which humans evolved (social groups with competing interests, variation in power, and finite resources). The strength of dominance hierarchies in humans is debated and varies empirically, but such hierarchies are always evident in some form or other. Even where dominance hierarchies are actively suppressed, such as in more egalitarian small-scale societies, suppression itself is evidence of the competition for status that simmers beneath the surface.99 In historical and contemporary societies, competition for power is all too obvious, and the quest for status, dominance, and leadership is ancient and ever present.100,101,102,103 Males of most mammal species are particularly competitive with each other over females. Indeed, the competition for mates is subject to a special type of evolutionary selection process—sexual selection, as opposed to standard natural selection. Reproductive access to females tends to be highly skewed, with a few males responsible for a large proportion of progeny. This is because a single male can reproduce with multiple females, whereas females can usually only reproduce and rear the offspring of one male at a time, with a long delay before becoming reproductively available again. In some species, reproductive access is settled by coercion, in which the strongest male defeats rivals to dominate a harem. In other species, males cannot coerce females, but the females are choosy about with whom they mate, leading to selection pressures for males to demonstrate or signal their quality as attractive partners. In either case, it is females rather than males that are the limiting factor in sexual competition, making male competition for available females intense. Sexual selection has led to costly biological adaptations, such as fighting, the growth of heavy ‘‘weapons’’ (e.g., antlers), risky courtship displays, or adornments that signal genetic quality (e.g., gigantic tails). These types of adaptations not only consume precious time and energy but can also decrease survival in other, nonreproductive domains of life (for example, the plumage of male peacocks limits their ability to fly). Thus, the power of sexual selection can lead to the evolution of traits that actually damage survival in order to achieve superiority over other males.104,105 Reproduction trumps survival in evolution. Sexual selection is typically responsible for the hierarchical nature of group-living animal species, including humans, as males fight for rank and the reproductive benefits in brings. As we would expect, this leads to sex differences in the desire for status. Both laboratory experiments and real-world observations have identified empirical differences between men and women in a range of social behaviors, not least that men tend to have relative-gains, or ‘‘zero-sum’’ motivations (wanting to get ahead at the expense of others), whereas women tend to favor payoff-maximization, or ‘‘variable-sum’’ motivations (content to do well even if others also do well in the process).106,107,108,109 It is well established that dominance and statusseeking behaviors in humans are based on many of the same biochemical and neurological processes as in other mammals, such as the secretion and uptake of testosterone and serotonin, which modify status-challenging behavior.110,111 However rational we may like to think we are, our judgments and decision-making are nevertheless influenced by cognitive mechanisms and biochemicals circulating in our bodies and brains that relate to dominance behavior.112,113,114,115 Dominance hierarchies need not only benefit those at the top. An organized social structure can help promote the harvesting of resources, coordinate group activity, and reduce within-group conflict. Although alphas in the hierarchy tend to have the highest reproductive success, other males may benefit from group membership by gaining protection from other groups, or by biding their time for a chance to challenge the alpha male when they become strong enough or old enough. Ethological studies have shown that hierarchical dominance systems within a primate group’s social network can reduce overt aggression, although aggression increases again when the alpha male is challenged.116,117,118 To summarize, a species that lives communally could have two broad forms of social organization. The group can accept organization with some centralization of power (dominance hierarchies), or it can engage in perpetual conflict (‘‘scramble competition’’), which incurs costs in terms of time, energy, and injuries, as well as depriving the group of many benefits of a communal existence, such as more efficient resource harvesting.119 Among social mammals, and primates in particular, dominance hierarchies have emerged as the primary form of social organization. Thus far, we have emphasized a state of ‘‘anarchy’’ in evolutionary history, in which there was no overarching power to provide protection from predators, rivals, or other threats. Egoism and dominance arose as strategies that provided solutions to achieving survival and reproduction in this environment. However, dominance hierarchies were in some sense a mechanism by which this anarchy could be suppressed—at least within the group—to the benefit of all group members since they share at least some common interests (such as avoiding conflict). This collective benefit points to the special and much more significant role of anarchy at a higher level—anarchy between groups. As we show in the next section, competition between groups is especially significant for human evolution, and for international politics, precisely because it is at the intergroup level where anarchy reigns supreme and is much harder to suppress.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Alt › At: Thayer/Evolution Proves Realism

Thayer is wrong – evolutionary biology’s relation to realism is premised on false notions of warfare and warrantless

Lebow, PhD, 13

(Richard Ned Lebow is a fellow of the British Academy is an American political scientist best known for his work in international relations, political psychology, classics and philosophy of science. He is Professor of International Political Theory at the Department of War Studies, King's College London, Bye-Fellow of Pembroke College, University of Cambridge, and James O. Freedman Presidential Professor Emeritus at Dartmouth College, you can’t keep a bad idea down: Evolutionary biology and international relations, 8-14, Palgrave Macmillan UK // NC)

Thayer’s thesis is flawed at every stage of its construction. It rests on the assumption that offensive realism is an accurate depiction of international relations rather than an ideology without much empirical support. The same might be said for hegemonic stability theory, a justification for the American imperial project that is empirically problematic. Thayer insists that these approaches to international relations are successful because they build on correct assumptions about human nature. There is no discussion whatsoever of efforts to reduce war and ethnic conflict through conflict resolution, institution building, development and humanitarian intervention. They are presumably in conflict with our nature and doomed to failure. Thayer’s arbitrary choice of what is human and what is not is offered without any evidence, as is his claim that war as the most important of all human activities affecting evolution. We are given no mechanisms that would account for the increase in brain capacity warfare that is said to stimulate. Successful warriors are assumed to breed more successfully, another claim unsupported by evidence. We must assume that group advantages, conferred by individual characteristics such as aggression, bravery and loyalty, are somehow passed on through warrior genes and that natural selection does this rest. At the outset, Thayer claims that his approach is both scientific and readily falsifiable. I think we must accept the latter claim. A final word about warfare. Thayer barrages us with evidence about its near universality but offers no nuanced discussion of its diverse causes or roles it serves for societies. He assumes a single materialist motive: the protection of resources or the acquisition of additional ones. There is no recognition of the role of honor, standing, revenge, or war as a route of upward mobility, source of group cohesion or simply an adventure. Thayer weds a crude model of biology to a crude realist one of war and international relations.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Alt › At: Realism- General

Realism fails to explain state behavior and factors realists argue for only increase conflict

Craig and Valeriano ’18 (Anthony S J Craig, PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Cardiff University, and a member of the Research School on Peace and Conflict at the Peace Research institute Oslo, Brandon Valeriano, Donald Bren Chair of Armed Politics at Marine Corps University Reader in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Cardiff University, “Realism and Cyber Conflict: Security in the Digital Age”, Realism in Practice: An Appraisal. An E-IR Edited Collection, February 3, 2018, ) PB

Realism has been challenged for its inability to explain state behaviour or offer productive policy guidance. For example, several studies point to the lack of evidence that states act in accordance with balance of power logic, a prominent hypothesis within the realist literature (Rosecrance and Stein 1993, 10, 17-21; Schroeder 1994). Its contradictory predictions and lack of empirical progress leads Vasquez (1997) to condemn realism as a ‘degenerative’ rather than ‘progressive’ paradigm. Furthermore, statistical studies suggest the factors that realists argue increase national security, such as military build-ups and alliances, are often counterproductive and increase the likelihood of conflict (Senese and Vasquez 2008). Nevertheless, with its focus on security and conflict issues, realism appears to be the natural go-to theory for elucidating pressing cyber security issues.

Realism good is a link- It naturalizes the idea that militarism is necessary bc it says that the way states achieve their interests is all dominated by a will for power which rationalizes suffering

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Alt › At: Realism- General

Realism’s misreadings are rooted in the desire to strengthen power politics and are justified in the name of self-interest

HARTMUT BEHR and AMELIA HEATH in 2009

Professor of International Politics at Newcastle University (UK) and specializes in political theory, sociology of knowledge of the discipline of IR

Misreading in IR theory and ideology critique: Morgenthau, Waltz and neorealism, Review of International Studies / Volume 35 / Issue 02 / April 2009, pp 327 349

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Alt › At: Realism- Cyber

Contrary to realist theory, empirics prove that cyber conflict does not turn into cyber warfare- states avoid escalation

Craig and Valeriano ’18 (Anthony S J Craig, PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Cardiff University, and a member of the Research School on Peace and Conflict at the Peace Research institute Oslo, Brandon Valeriano, Donald Bren Chair of Armed Politics at Marine Corps University Reader in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Cardiff University, “Realism and Cyber Conflict: Security in the Digital Age”, Realism in Practice: An Appraisal. An E-IR Edited Collection, February 3, 2018, ) PB

For some realists, arms races increase the likelihood of war (Jervis 1978, 188; Van Evera 1998, 13), yet for others, military build-ups are a necessary means of deterring a revisionist power (Glaser 2004). A critical question is therefore whether security competition will escalate to actual conflict. Previous scholarship has demonstrated a relationship between arms races and both militarised interstate disputes and war (Sample 1997; Gibler et al. 2005). The concern here is whether cyber arms races will lead to a similar outcome. As Lord and Sharp (2011, 29) argue: ‘conflict in cyberspace is uniquely predisposed to escalation given uncertainties about what constitutes an act of war and the growing number of state and non-state actors seeking offensive capabilities.’ The empirical record, however, suggests that although cyber conflict is becoming more frequent, this increase correlates with low level disruption and espionage tactics rather than more destructive forms of cyber warfare (Jensen, Maness, and Valeriano 2016, 17). Moreover, the data shows that cyber disputes are very unlikely to spill over into the physical domains of warfare suggesting that, rather than escalation, the prevailing trend is one of restraint (Valeriano and Maness 2016). Rather than live up to the predictions of the realist-informed spiral model, states appear to avoid escalation into warfare and restraint appears to be the prevailing norm instead. It may be too early to tell whether escalation may become a future trend, but thirty years of digital conflict demonstrate a remarkable degree of self-restraint in that states have avoided outright destruction and violence in cyberspace.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Alt › At: Realism- Cyber

Contrary to realist beliefs deterrence is not effective in cyber policy

Craig and Valeriano ’18 (Anthony S J Craig, PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Cardiff University, and a member of the Research School on Peace and Conflict at the Peace Research institute Oslo, Brandon Valeriano, Donald Bren Chair of Armed Politics at Marine Corps University Reader in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Cardiff University, “Realism and Cyber Conflict: Security in the Digital Age”, Realism in Practice: An Appraisal. An E-IR Edited Collection, February 3, 2018, ) PB

For realists, the acquisition of military capabilities is key to deterring aggression from other states and maintaining national security (Morgenthau 1947, 14). Deterrence aims at discouraging attacks through a demonstration of one’s military capacity and willingness to respond in kind. Deterrence theory rose to prominence during the Cold War because of the threat of mutually assured destruction from nuclear weapons, and realists figure prominently in the debate arguing that nuclear weapons have a stabilising effect on international relations (Waltz 1990; Mearsheimer 1990, 19-20). Deterrence logic now appears to be influencing cyber policy. For example, in its national cyber security strategy, the US government policy is aimed at ‘convincing a potential adversary that it will suffer unacceptable costs if it conducts an attack on the United States’ (Department of Defense 2015), and the UK government, too, has spoken explicitly about the need to respond to cyber incidents with offensive actions (Elgot 2016). Although it may seem an attractive option because of the perceived difficulty of defence as discussed earlier, there are several issues that undermine cyber deterrence. First, a state’s ability to retaliate is not physically demonstrable due to the virtual nature of cyber weapons and the secrecy states maintain over them. Second, unlike nuclear weapons, cyber weapons do not have the same destructive capacity and so, to have a sufficient deterrent effect, would have to be used repeatedly and to great effect. This is difficult, however, because each cyber weapon is designed for a specific vulnerability which could be subsequently patched. Third, attributing the source of cyber incidents can be difficult and perpetrators often deny involvement. In such cases, therefore, a state cannot be certain of whom to respond against (Libicki 2009, 39-73). These arguments suggest that deterring aggression through cyber means is an unworkable policy in practice.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Alt › At: Realism- Cyber

Realist theory is wrong- cyber power will not transform traditional power dynamics. Full blown cyber war is not a threat.

Craig and Valeriano ’18 (Anthony S J Craig, PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Cardiff University, and a member of the Research School on Peace and Conflict at the Peace Research institute Oslo, Brandon Valeriano, Donald Bren Chair of Armed Politics at Marine Corps University Reader in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Cardiff University, “Realism and Cyber Conflict: Security in the Digital Age”, Realism in Practice: An Appraisal. An E-IR Edited Collection, February 3, 2018, ) PB

As a theory mostly concerned with issues of national security and power, realism would appear to be the instinctive international relations perspective for understanding cyber conflict. Our analysis suggests that realism does remain a relevant framework for identifying important security-related issues in the cyber domain and can sometimes provide useful insights about some enduring characteristics of international relations. However, realist theories about conflict often fall substantially short in explaining the unique dynamics of cyber conflict. In many ways, the cyber domain resembles a realist world with its anarchical nature and lack of institutional governance where states fear one another and develop their capabilities in response. Yet, it is unclear whether cyber arms races are likely to escalate into cyber conflict. Realism also raises interesting questions about cyber power, about who possesses it, and how it relates to international stability. In terms of whether cyber power will transform traditional power dynamics, the evidence suggests this is not the case. The trend we have seen thus far has been restrained from full-blown cyber war in favour of less destructive forms of cyber interactions. The offense-defence balance is the clearest example of a realist theory being used to explain the cyber domain, but it appears empirically inaccurate in its assumptions about the cyber domain and its predictions about cyber conflict. Real-world cases of cyber conflict suggest the offense is not as easy as is often assumed and the fact that we have not seen much cyber conflict suggest the theory is misplaced. Importing the notion of deterrence from the nuclear era is furthermore ill-judged and makes little sense in the context of the reality of cyber weapons.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Alt › At: War is Human Nature

War is a tool used in certain contexts, not an inevitability for human societies

Hallam ’22 (Lisa Hallam currently resides in Toronto ON and is a dedicated student hailed by her peers as kind, strong, and understanding. Lisa is an elucidative writer on a variety of different topics, and has collaborated with an assortment of scholars at a diverse set of levels. She was the 2021 prizewinner of the Margaret Matheson Award in Gender & Women's Studies for her notable academic standing at York University. “Is War Part of Human Nature,” June 2022, Owlcation, https://owlcation.com/humanities/Is-War-Part-of-Human-Nature

The emergence of the industrial revolution in the late 18th century, following the occupation of agrarian societies, was also the coming of age of nations and nationalism (Pagano, 2013). This shift showed the immense possibilities of exploitation inherent in cultural uniformity and war. The switch from having primarily agrarian societies to industrialized communities created differentiated access to land and its commodities, facilitating the exercise of authority over others. According to Pagano (2013), social mobility is hampered by cultural diversity, whereas cultural standardization is hampered by social immobility. Social mobility and cultural uniformity enabled the exploitation of a wide variety of possibilities and facilitated the powerful process of creative destruction that is a hallmark of a capitalist society (Pagano, 2013). Societies that were socially stagnant and culturally distinct were ultimately left behind in terms of economic growth and, as a result, economic power. Furthermore, countries that had developed cultural homogeneity were incapable of being conquered; rather, they could readily colonize agrarian societies (Pagano, 2013). People seem to think that because war has existed for such a long period of time, it must be ingrained in our nature and constitute an undeniable, biological drive to participate; as stated by the 19th Century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche: “I am by nature warlike. To attack is among my instincts.” (Marlantes, 2011). But this view has been rebutted — war is not a drive that demands release, as food or sex do; a state will not suffer from deprivation if it abstains from war (Gat, 2019). Although battle is not a main motivation for people, this does not imply that they are not hardwired for it. It is hypothesized that warfare is imprinted in humans as a tool, just as collaboration may be used to reach an agreement rather than utilizing conflict or violence (Gat, 2019). Granting, cooperation would mean working together with a different nation, which is not in our nature, thereby possibly being an explanation for the heavy presence of war. Modern weaponry and extremes of money and power increase both the costs and rewards of combat, as well as the extent to which compulsion may promote violence against a fighter’s self-interest (Gat, 2019). Perhaps less evident are the ramifications of large-scale human socialization, in which people fight against one another but also, as we know, create coalitions against other groups (Cashdan & Downes, 2012).Human evolution has been influenced significantly by lethal tribal competition. Human social groups have almost undoubtedly competed with one another throughout humanity’s civilization for territory, food, shelter, and mates. At most, the defeated communities will have lost access to desirable territory and reserves; most unfavourably, they were murdered by the victorious group (Clark & Winegard, 2020).

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Alt › At: War is Human Nature

War is not part of human nature- it’s only a recent social construct

Robin Lally 18, Senior editor/writer experienced in Media Relations with a demonstrated history of working in the higher education industry, Rutgers University, “We are not hardwired to go to War” https://www.rutgers.edu/news/we-are-not-hardwired-go-war#:~:text=There%20is%20no%20scientific%20proof,in%20our%20nature%20at%20all.

Is it in our nature to go to war? Should we just accept the fact that humans have this innate tendency and are hardwired to kill members of other groups? No, says R. Brian Ferguson, professor of anthropology at . There is no scientific proof that we have an inherent propensity to take up arms and collectively kill.In a paper published in , Ferguson argues that war may not be in our nature at all. People might fight and sometimes kill for personal reasons, but homicide, he argues, is not war. Many scientists and scholars believe that humans as a species are aggressive, brutal and bloodthirsty and this behavior is part of our DNA. Ferguson argues, however, that there is no real indication or scientific proof that humans have been waging war for the entire history of the species.“Warlike cultures in some places became common only over the past 10,000 years and in most places more recently than that,” Ferguson says. In his research, Ferguson looked at cases reported as violent deaths throughout the prehistoric record. He found that 15 percent to 25 percent of deaths that many anthropologists and archeologists say were the result of war may reflect cherry-picking the most violent cases, which are contradicted by broad surveys of all archaeological sites.“Individual killing is not the same as war on social groups,” says Ferguson. “War leaves physical traces that archaeologists can find. When and where it began is very different in different places around the world, but there are stretches of even thousands of years when there are no clear signs of war.” Part of the reason for the debate, Ferguson says, is that the evidence used to identify prehistoric warfare – weapons, art and cave paintings, defensive structures and skeletal remains – are often ambiguous and difficult to interpret. Careful examination of all evidence typically finds no strong indication of war in early remains, which changes to clear signs of war in later periods. Is it in our nature to go to war? Should we just accept the fact that humans have this innate tendency and are hardwired to kill members of other groups? He disputes the belief of many scholars that humans may have inherited their genetic makeup from their chimpanzee cousins millions of years ago. After examining every reported chimpanzee killing, Ferguson, who is writing a book on the subject, believes that war among chimps was not an evolved evolutionary strategy but rather a response to human contact and disturbances. So why did war become so common in more recent archaeological finds? Ferguson says that preconditions that made war more likely became far more widespread, including social hierarchy, a more sedentary existence, a growing regional population, valuable resources and the establishment of boundaries. These conditions have sometimes worsened with severe environmental changes, he says. Ferguson, who also studies contemporary war, brutal civil wars around the world and U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, agrees with anthropologist Margaret Mead that “warfare is only an invention, not a biological necessity,” but does he not see war ending.“Anthropologists think about prospects for war in the long term,” Ferguson says. “If the idea that war is part of human nature is not scientifically supported, alternative futures open up. If more people work for prevention, the eventual eradication of war is a definite theoretical possibility.”

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Alt › At: War is Human Nature

Warfare and violence aren’t a human instinct- anthropological studies prove

R. Brian Ferguson 18 professor of Anthropology at Rutgers University, Scientific American “War is not part of Human Nature”,

Do people, or perhaps just males, have an evolved predisposition to kill members of other groups? Not just a capacity to kill but an innate propensity to take up arms, tilting us toward collective violence? The word “collective” is key. People fight and kill for personal reasons, but homicide is not war. War is social, with groups organized to kill people from other groups. Today controversy over the historical roots of warfare revolves around two polar positions. In one, war is an evolved propensity to eliminate any potential competitors. In this scenario, humans all the way back to our common ancestors with chimpanzees have always made war. The other position holds that armed conflict has only emerged over recent millennia, as changing social conditions provided the motivation and organization to collectively kill. The two sides separate into what the late anthropologist Keith Otterbein called hawks and doves. (This debate also ties into the question of whether instinctive, warlike tendencies can be detected in chimpanzees. If war expresses an inborn tendency, then we should expect to find evidence of war in small-scale societies throughout the prehistoric record. The hawks claim that we have indeed found such evidence. “When there is a good archaeological picture of any society on Earth, there is almost always also evidence of warfare.... Twenty-five percent of deaths due to warfare may be a conservative estimate,” wrote archaeologist Steven A. LeBlanc and his co-author Katherine E. Register. With casualties of that magnitude, evolutionary psychologists argue, war has served as a mechanism of natural selection in which the fittest prevail to acquire both mates and resources. This perspective has achieved broad influence. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama wrote that the roots of recent wars and genocide go back for tens or hundreds of thousands of years among our hunter-gatherer ancestors, even to our shared ancestor with chimpanzees. Bradley Thayer, a leading scholar of international relations, argues that evolutionary theory explains why the instinctual tendency to protect one's tribe morphed over time into group inclinations toward xenophobia and ethnocentrism in international relations. If wars are natural eruptions of instinctive hate, why look for other answers? If human nature leans toward collective killing of outsiders, how long can we avoid it? The anthropologists and archaeologists in the dove camp challenge this view. Humans, they argue, have an obvious capacity to engage in warfare, but their brains are not hardwired to identify and kill outsiders involved in collective conflicts. Lethal group attacks, according to these arguments, emerged only when hunter-gatherer societies grew in size and complexity and later with the birth of agriculture. Archaeology, supplemented by observations of contemporary hunter-gatherer cultures, allows us to identify the times and, to some degree, the social circumstances that led to the origins and intensification of warfare. In the search for the origins of war, archaeologists look for four kinds of evidence. The artwork on cave walls is exhibit one. Paleolithic cave paintings from Grottes de Cougnac, Pech Merle and Cosquer in France dating back approximately 25,000 years show what some scholars perceive to be spears penetrating people, suggesting that people were waging war as early as the late Paleolithic period. But this interpretation is contested. Other scientists point out that some of the incomplete figures in those cave paintings have tails, and they argue that the bent or wavy lines that intersect with them more likely represent forces of shamanic power, not spears. (In contrast, wall paintings on the eastern Iberian Peninsula, probably made by settled agriculturalists thousands of years later, clearly show battles and executions.). Debate over war and human nature will not soon be resolved. The idea that intensive, high-casualty violence was ubiquitous throughout prehistory has many backers. It has cultural resonance for those who are sure that we as a species naturally tilt toward war. As my mother would say: “Just look at history!” But doves have the upper hand when all the evidence is considered. Broadly, early finds provide little if any evidence suggesting war was a fact of life. People are people. They fight and sometimes kill. Humans have always had a capacity to make war, if conditions and culture so dictate. But those conditions and the warlike cultures they generate became common only over the past 10,000 years—and, in most places, much more recently than that. The high level of killing often reported in history, ethnography or later archaeology is contradicted in the earliest archaeological findings around the globe. The most ancient bones and artifacts are consistent with the title of Margaret Mead's 1940 article: “Warfare Is Only an Invention—Not a Biological Necessity.” My work disputes the claim that chimpanzee males have an innate tendency to kill outsiders, arguing instead that their most extreme violence can be tied to specific circumstances that result from disruption of their lives by contact with humans. Making that case has required my going through every reported chimpanzee killing. From this, a simple point can be made. Critical examination of a recent compilation of killings from 18 chimpanzee research sites—together amounting to 426 years of field observations—reveals that of 27 observed or inferred intergroup killings of adults and adolescents, 15 come from just two highly conflicted situations, which occurred at two sites in 1974–1977 and 2002–2006, respectively. From comparative case studies, I conclude that “war” among chimpanzees is not an evolved evolutionary strategy but an induced response to human disturbance. Case-by-case analyses will show that chimps, as a species, are not “killer apes.” This research calls into question as well the idea that any human tendency toward bellicosity might be driven by an ancient genetic legacy from a distant ancestor of chimpanzees and humans. 

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Alt › Alt Solves-Imperialism

Anti imperialism must be the center of any understanding of IR- it creates the tools needed move beyond theorization and create unifying struggles against capital

Anthony Pahnke in 2021

Associate Professor of International Relations at San Francisco State University; Regrounding Critical Theory: Lenin on Imperialism, Nationalism, and Strategy; International Studies Review, Volume 23, Issue 1, March 2021, Pages 181–203; https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/23/1/181/5850500

This article places key elements of Lenin's thought in discussion with dominant currents in Critical Theory. I argue that the latter shows signs of what I call depoliticization. This trend—in privileging norms such as neutrality and private, reclusive forms of reflection—leads theorists to wall themselves off from movements. Politics has become an area for the passive contemplating of affairs. Habermas, a principal voice in this variety of Critical Theory, advocates for dialogue as the preferred mode of social interaction. Such positions are blind to our historical moment when conflict and taking sides is the norm, on the right and the left. Central pillars of Critical Theory—a concern with emancipation and the understanding that concepts must work against domination—remain relevant. Frankfurt School theorists, such as Horkheimer, is particularly instructive in this regard. Fraser's work, as well, offers a way to conceptualize Critical Theory as a project for emancipation that is rooted in connecting with social movement struggles. To further improve our understanding of how this connection can take place, turning to Lenin, as I argue, is crucial. Lenin's thought on imperialism offers a way for us to rethink the place of theory when it comes to the importance of making strategic interventions in political life, especially concerning questions pertaining to territory. In this regard, Lenin highlights the central, yet problematic necessity of working with the state, while also confronting movement divisions to build unity. In Lenin's hands, Critical Theory is a tool to mobilize people, draw distinctions with antagonists, and build movement unity. The many ways he practiced and theorized political action, including writing editorials, producing abstract intellectual works, and delivering statements for conferences, provide multiple illustrations on how to bridge social movement activity with theory. Extreme inequality characterizes international political economy and life within many advanced capitalist states, as we live in what may be considered “a new gilded age.” Powerful states and corporations are connected, linked in ways that generate uneven, global chains of production, exchange, and circulation. Wars rage on in many parts of the world. Global flows have brought some of us together, while at the same time, stoked divisions within and between states. Lenin, at his time, saw similar problems and developments. As an organizer, he worked to build movements oriented around social transformation. He also saw nationalist movements, on the right and the left. While supporting the latter, he rejected the former. Furthermore, while seeing national self-determination as a potential force, Lenin also considered its limitations. His work on imperialism helped him reach this conclusion, which he used to mobilize rank-and-file movement members as well as other organizers. Lenin's relevance is here, precisely, in helping us think on how to bring people together and create unity out of fragmentation, setting the work of emancipation on a path toward creating new political, economic, and cultural relations.