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The connections between development and peace are firmly supported by social science research. All the standard indicators of economic development, including per capita income, economic growth rates, levels of trade and investment, and degree of market openness, are significantly correlated with peace. Virtually every study on the causes of war finds a strong connection between low income and the likelihood of armed conflict. Economist Edward Miguel describes this link as “one of the most robust empirical relationships in the economic literature.” Irrespective of all other variables and indicators, poverty as measured by low income bears a strong and statistically significant relationship to increased risk of civil conflict.

No one has made this point more convincingly over the years than Paul Collier. He and his colleagues have shown that civil conflict is heavily concentrated in the poorest countries. The risk of civil war is strongly associated with joblessness, poverty and a general lack of development. They famously , “The key root cause of conflict is the failure of economic development.” They also make the reverse point. Raising economic growth rates and levels of per capita income may be “the single most important step that can be taken” to reduce the likelihood of armed conflict.

This paper argues that the changing national security landscape requires a comprehensive, strategic approach toward fragile states, defined as those at the highest risk of coups, conflicts, or mass atrocities. Threats to American national security including terrorism, pandemics, and the spread of violence and conflict emanate increasingly from fragile states. State fragility has also emerged as a leading impediment to human development, trapping many of the world’s poorest individuals and states in a cycle of poverty and violence. In the absence of a more proactive strategy towards fragile states, a growing portion of U.S. assistance and military resources are now spent responding to conflicts and atrocities after they occur – an approach that is both costly and ineffective.

In the wake of 9/11, the United States significantly expanded its focus on the links between state weakness in the developing world and threats to U.S. security. The 2002 National Security Strategy highlighted that “weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.” But while the U.S. government developed new strategies to aid poor but well-governed states and to coordinate reconstruction efforts in the wake of conflicts, it has yet to develop and implement an effective framework for responding to fragile countries on the brink of crises. This represents a significant gap and misalignment of U.S. resources against 21st century challenges.

We agree that more powerful countries are likely to have more influence on the long-term future than less powerful ones, and that a country’s economic development is a strong indicator of its technological and geopolitical power. However, this does not mean that developed countries matter morally more than developing ones. Rather, it underscores the importance of global development—the process of low- and middle-income countries becoming high-income ones. Similarly, although workers in high-income countries generally have higher labor productivity, a large component of this is the place premium. That is, a worker’s productivity increases—sometimes by a factor of 15 or more—when they move from a poor country to a rich country, simply because they are being paid more for the same work. Once again, this speaks to the importance of global development and helping people escape poverty.

This essay describes why it’s important for the long term future for everyone to be in a relatively high-income country, and what it might look like for global development to be a longtermist issue. Global development benefits the long-term future by increasing diversity in global institutions and reducing civilization’s vulnerability to global catastrophic risks like armed conflict and pandemics.

Since the rights granted by a U.S. patent extend only throughout the territory of the United States and have no effect in a foreign country, an inventor who wishes patent protection in other countries must apply for a patent in each of the other countries or in regional patent offices. Almost every country has its own patent law, and a person desiring a patent in a particular country must make an application for patent in that country, in accordance with the requirements of that country. Similarly, local laws apply to trademark, copyrights, and other forms of intellectual property in each jurisdiction.

U.S. patents and trademarks do not generally provide protection in other countries. Some U.S companies have found that foreign manufacturers copy their products, packaging, brochures, and logos. For this reason, those U.S. companies seek patent, copyright, and trademark protection in potential foreign markets in advance of exporting their products to those markets or launching a branding program. It is thus important to know the differences between U.S. and foreign laws with respect to patents, copyrights, trademarks, and other intellectual property law.

By and large, the core concern of intellectual property scholars who study international intellectual property is normative. They want to know how we can permit the broadest possible access to existing knowledge without undercutting the incentives needed to generate a high rate of new knowledge. This substantive, normative focus on the appropriate balance between the incentive effects and the access effects of intellectual property [*4] is the central concern of domestic intellectual property -- and heretofore the concern of states acting in relative isolation. Now that markets, including markets for knowledge goods, are transnational and global, that traditional question is transposed to the family of states. Here, the principle of territoriality -- that is, the principle that intellectual property law is primarily the creation of states and is confined to the borders of states -- induces intellectual property scholars to ask the following central question: is the sum of the intellectual property systems of heterogeneous states, as influenced through international intermediation and institutions, enhancing global welfare or not? The focus is inevitably normative, with some metric of social welfare serving as the focal point for analysis. 9

Intellectual properties provide the foundation for much of our modern economy. They relate to both creativity and commerce.

Intellectual property rights include patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets. They can promote innovation, and they help businesses protect valuable assets. Understanding these concepts and how they apply in different situations is critical for success, but the topic can be complex.

Intellectual property (IP) law is a complex and ever-evolving field, with different rules and regulations governing different countries. It is essential to comprehend the distinction between domestic and international IP law to guarantee that your IP rights are secured. Domestic IP law is the set of laws that control intellectual property inside a particular nation. These laws are typically set up by the legislature of that nation and are intended to secure the privileges of people and organizations to their intellectual property.

This incorporates patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, and other forms of IP. Domestic IP law is usually enforced by the courts of that country, although some countries may have international agreements in place that allow for enforcement of IP rights in other countries as well. International IP law, then again, is a set of laws that control intellectual property across multiple countries. These laws are typically established through international treaties or agreements between countries.

In understanding what Domestic IP Law means, we have to understand the context in which the word “domestic” is used. The English electronic dictionary defines domestic to mean “of or relating to home” and “internal to a specific country”. Adopting this definition, “domestic” qualifies activities peculiar to a locality which is home to some persons. Thus, an opposite of “domestic” will be “foreign” or “international”.

Therefore, Domestic IP Law will refer to the IP Laws of a region, state, or nation that applies to the people of such region, state, or nation. This is opposed to the International IP Laws. Here when we refer to the Domestic IP Law in this sense, we refer to the Domestic IP Law of States like Nigeria, Ghana, England, South Africa, Britain, USA, Cameroon, to mention but a few. For every State, reference must be made to its specific legislation, although the provisions of the law may be similar. There are, however, subsidiary legislations that may be made in a state to regulate IP practices, this class of legislations shall not be treated in this discourse. For the purpose of this discourse I shall identify the Domestic IP Laws of Nigeria, Cameroon and Ghana and reference shall only be made to legislations. I encourage detailed discussions on them on later sessions.

According to plaintiffs, "the [Internal Revenue] Code need not expressly provide for a foreign tax credit if the foreign levy in question falls within the treaty definition of a creditable tax" because "what constitutes a United States income tax for purposes of the application of a treaty derives from the treaty's definition and not from domestic law."32 (emphasis in original; alteration added). Plaintiffs argue that "[d]omestic law therefore does not constitute an absolute limitation on the rights and entitlements that may be granted to treaty beneficiaries under the terms of a U.S. tax treaty." (alteration added). Plaintiffs state that "[t]he parties agree that the NIIT constitutes a United States income tax as defined in Article 2(1) and 2(2) of the French Treaty," and, therefore, "that when a treaty provides a definition of a covered tax, it is that definition, and not the more limited definition under United States or foreign law, that is applied." (alteration added).

Courts should take a "hard look" at the agency's impact analyses and its justifications for excluding critical habitat. Just as the courts routinely struck down the agency's "not prudent," "not determinable," and "redundant" rationales for not designating critical habitat in the 1990s, they should remand critical habitat exclusions that fail to fully consider benefits of CHDs. Because the designation of critical habitat is "the principal means for conserving endangered species," both the agency and the courts must ensure that fulfilling CHDs' conservation objective is the top priority.

to take a human form?” 139. Gemignani appears concerned about the existential costs of delegating justice to anthropomorphic machines.

Unilateral presidential authority over treaties reduces their strength as a signal of commitment. Requiring approval by both branches increases the political costs of treaty termination. Either the Senate may be unwilling to terminate or the President may have to expend political capital to persuade a supermajority of Senators, and at the very least coordinating both branches’ actions can be costly even when controlled by the same political party. Requiring legislative approval bears resemblance to the idea of audience costs because the President will have to make political commitments to the Senate and perhaps the House to consent to treaty termination. His political promises may backfire if he cannot follow through on the foreign policies accompanying withdrawal. The current practice, however, does not require congressional consent. Presidents today need not incur political costs to persuade the House and Senate to agree to treaty termination, which makes treaties a less valuable sign of commitment.

A non-self-execution approach like that of the CWC, however, may cure this problem. If a treaty cannot take domestic effect without legislative implementation, an international agreement will usually require the participation of the House. As an act of Congress, the implementing legislation will require another act of Congress for repeal. A President’s termination of a treaty will dissolve the formal legal obligation, but the policy of the United States will still continue because he cannot repeal the implementing legislation. For example, even if the President withdrew the United States from the Chemical Weapons Convention, the CWCIA would still make the possession of chemical weapons a federal crime. Executing legislation has the effect of creating a mechanism similar to John Jay’s proposal for Senate consent to treaty withdrawal. While the votes required would demand a majority of both Houses rather than two-thirds of the Senate, the filibuster rule in the Senate would still allow a minority of states to block repealing legislation.

But this may not be the best interpretation of these decisions. In other treaty interpretation cases during this period, particularly ones concerning the Hague Convention, the Court actually seems to be embracing international standards of treaty interpretation like those in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.104 The better reading of opinions like BG Group and Bond, I would suggest, is that the Court is increasingly separating interpretation of the treaty from interpretation of domestic obligations and, in particular, treaty interpretation from interpretation of the implementing legislation.105 And cases that some might suggest should turn on interpretation of a treaty are instead turning on something else.

Thus in Bond, Chief Justice Roberts distinguishes between the Chemical Weapons Convention and the implementing legislation, the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, even though the language of the two is almost identical. 106 He then focuses on the latter, which, as an act of Congress, is subject to ordinary methods of statutory interpretation, including application of various presumptions. In this case, the Chief Justice applies a presumption that Congress intends to keep the normal balance of federal-state relations unless it clearly states otherwise,107 finds ambiguity in the term “chemical weapons,”108 and thus determines the statute should not be understood to cover Carol Anne Bond’s “ordinary” attempted poisoning—a matter usually left to state law.109 Although Chief Justice Roberts might be inclined to interpret the Chemical Weapons Convention similarly,110 the logic is applicable only to a congressionally-enacted statute.

Yet refusing to allow direct application of the Convention in U.S. courts would also carry costs. It is consistent with some U.S. traditions to regard international law, even as it applies to individuals, as fully justiciable law, like domestic statutory and case law. In this view, applying the Convention in U.S. cases concerning individuals would be an ordinary exercise of judicial authority. In general, direct application of the Convention in cases involving individuals could have the salutary effect of promoting respect for basic human rights in other countries. There may be other benefits of such application as well. Recognizing the direct applicability of the Convention’s prompt release articles in U.S. court, for example, could defuse conflicts with other states. In addition, the U.S. tradition of promoting international trade and commerce – reflected in the Medellín dissent’s concern that the majority’s decision “threatens to deprive … businesses [and] property owners …. of the workable dispute resolution procedures that many treaties, including commercially oriented treaties, provide”[103] – suggests an historically strong reason not to read the Medellín Court’s non-self-execution holding too broadly. The concern with safeguarding commercial relationships also counsels against writing the non-self-executing provisions of the Advice and Consent Resolution too broadly, or at least counsels in favor of insuring that U.S. legislation fully implements Convention provisions.

If the Convention were self-executing, U.S. courts might help to build state practice and help to reinforce interpretations of the Convention that favor U.S. positions. It is unlikely that U.S. courts would reach decisions construing the Convention in ways that were antithetical to the views of the U.S. Executive Branch. First, U.S. courts could invoke a variety of other prudential abstention doctrines, such as the political question doctrine, to avoid hearing cases that might adversely affect truly sensitive matters of U.S. foreign policy. Both the majority and dissent in Medellín signaled this concern, noting that U.S. courts should not hear such politically sensitive cases. Second, when U.S. courts do apply treaties directly, the courts often accord great weight to the suggestions of the Executive Branch concerning the interpretation of the treaties.[104]

Moreover, by creating a new forum for intellectual property enforcement, ACTA would take away the opportunity to strengthen enforcement norms in the current regimes-whether under the WTO or WIPO. In fact, the creation of multiple fora with overlapping jurisdictions has created serious challenges for national governments. As Kimberlee Weatherall reminded us: There is a risk of confusion and fragmentation in this process, particularly, one would think, for government departments and enforcement bodies subject to multiple overlapping requirements found in multiple overlapping agreements. In a context where we want government to be more efficient, subjecting them to multiple sources of regulation is not likely to lead to happy results. What would we rather government be doing-actually encouraging innovation, or box ticking on their customs processes to check compliance with the multiple different obligations in different treaties? What should money be spent on-grants for artists or yet forms and bodies and meetings about counterfeiting? 620 It is important to remember, given the limited resources, not every country will have the ability to undertake discussions in multiple fora. The more fora there are, the more difficult it will be for less-developed countries to dedicate their efforts to strengthening enforcement norms in a particular forum.

Second, IP is increasingly global, yet IP systems remain largely national or regionally based. This poses a major challenge because IP rights granted in one jurisdiction may not be applicable elsewhere. This is not good for innovation, creativity or business. More coherence in this area is required.

Member states of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) approved a groundbreaking new treaty relating to intellectual property, genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge on Friday at a diplomatic conference in Geneva.

The objective of this Treaty is to enhance the efficacy, transparency and quality of the patent system, and prevent patents from being granted “erroneously” for inventions that are not novel or inventive regarding genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.

International trade rules exist in the realm of global power politics. Based on the text and the WTO's recent dispute resolution decisions, developing states have significant discretion in deciding what enforcement resources to dedicate to intellectual property protection and in establishing penalties for rights violations. Yet developed states and intellectual property rights-holders continue to maintain that the TRIPS Agreement imposes a much more stringent obligation on developing states. This claim may be backed by traditional power-politics threats-namely, that developing states may lose trade preferences or foreign direct investment if they fail to adhere to a more rigid view of the intellectual property protections. Similarly, developing countries may formally have the right to retaliate against a developed country's violations of trade rules in agriculture or other areas but nonetheless refrain from doing so out of fear of the backlash from developed countries. What is left is a potential separation between what the TRIPS Agreement actually requires of governments and what developed states claim the TRIPS Agreement requires. In this sense, the meaning of the TRIPS Agreement and WTO enforcement provisions is contested as a matter of general international politics, with the text of the Agreement and the rulings of the decisions of WTO dispute resolution bodies as only secondary considerations in the development of a state's trade policy.

The possibility of the withdrawal of special trade preferences-benefits that developed states can extend to developing states under the WTO's Generalized System of Preference (GSP)-due to fights over intellectual property rules is real.9 o The US government withdrew GSP benefits from Argentina in 1997 over a disagreement regarding patent test data exclusivity.' Similarly, the US government withdrew GSP benefits from South Africa in 1998 after South Africa announced its intention to make use of the TRIPS compulsory licensing provision to produce generic versions of several HIV/AIDS drugs.

Yet refusing to allow direct application of the Convention in U.S. courts would also carry costs. It is consistent with some U.S. traditions to regard international law, even as it applies to individuals, as fully justiciable law, like domestic statutory and case law. In this view, applying the Convention in U.S. cases concerning individuals would be an ordinary exercise of judicial authority. In general, direct application of the Convention in cases involving individuals could have the salutary effect of promoting respect for basic human rights in other countries. There may be other benefits of such application as well. Recognizing the direct applicability of the Convention’s prompt release articles in U.S. court, for example, could defuse conflicts with other states. In addition, the U.S. tradition of promoting international trade and commerce – reflected in the Medellín dissent’s concern that the majority’s decision “threatens to deprive … businesses [and] property owners …. of the workable dispute resolution procedures that many treaties, including commercially oriented treaties, provide”[103] – suggests an historically strong reason not to read the Medellín Court’s non-self-execution holding too broadly. The concern with safeguarding commercial relationships also counsels against writing the non-self-executing provisions of the Advice and Consent Resolution too broadly, or at least counsels in favor of insuring that U.S. legislation fully implements Convention provisions.

If the Convention were self-executing, U.S. courts might help to build state practice and help to reinforce interpretations of the Convention that favor U.S. positions. It is unlikely that U.S. courts would reach decisions construing the Convention in ways that were antithetical to the views of the U.S. Executive Branch. First, U.S. courts could invoke a variety of other prudential abstention doctrines, such as the political question doctrine, to avoid hearing cases that might adversely affect truly sensitive matters of U.S. foreign policy. Both the majority and dissent in Medellín signaled this concern, noting that U.S. courts should not hear such politically sensitive cases. Second, when U.S. courts do apply treaties directly, the courts often accord great weight to the suggestions of the Executive Branch concerning the interpretation of the treaties.[104]

foreign technology spillovers in low- and middle-income countries (Xu and Chiang, 2005). Not only is internal legislation important for patent decisions but international treaties can also further stimulate innovation activities and disseminate innovative knowledge to signatory countries by reducing the uncertainty of inventing firms. Additionally, high-tech companies can gain potential advantages in larger product markets by seeking protection in countries that participate in the protocols (Dekker et al., 2012). Multilateral technology agreements have a