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Our approach to this question begins with the observation that policy can be made in Congress, through delegation of authority to executive agencies, or by some mixture of these two. Furthermore, the amount of discretionary authority delegated is a decision made by Congress, which can write either detailed legislation that leaves the executive with little latitude in implementation or vague laws that leave executive actors with broad discretionary powers. And when deciding where policy will be made, Congress trades off the internal policy production costs of the committee system against the external costs of delegation. Thus, Congress’s decision to delegate is similar to a firm’s make-or-buy decision; hence our usage of the term ‘‘transaction cost politics.’’

It is clear from these examples that where policy is made – in Congress or through delegation to the executive – has a significant impact on policy outcomes. The central puzzle to be explained, then, is why does Congress delegate broad authority to the executive in some policy areas but not in others? Does this delegation reflect the particularities of an issue area, such as who are its benefactors, who are adversely affected, and what are its complexities? Does it reflect deeper structural factors, such as legislative organization, committee composition, or congressional–executive conflict (divided government)? Is executive branch decision making different from the internal workings of Congress, and how does this affect the decision to delegate? Can Congress perfectly control delegated authority through administrative procedures, oversight, and administrative law? Does it want to? In the end, what are the implications of delegating discretionary authority for our separation of powers system and the incremental mode of policy making that it was meant to encourage? Can the virtues of separate powers intended by the Founders be maintained alongside significant delegation to the executive?

God and the devil are in the details of policymaking, as they are in most other important things-and the details are to be found at the agency level. This would remain true, moreover, even if the nondelegation doctrine were revived and statutes were written with somewhat greater specificity, for many of the most significant impacts on members of the public would still be indeterminate until the agency grappled with and defined them.

Finally, the agency is often the site in which public participation is most effective. This is not only because the details of the regulatory impacts are hammered out there. It is also because the agency is where the public can best educate the government about the true nature of the problem that Congress has tried to address. Only the interested parties, reacting to specific agency proposals for rules or other actions, possess (or have the incentives to acquire) the information necessary to identify, explicate, quantify, and evaluate the real-world consequences of these and alternative proposals. Even when Congress can identify the first-order effects of the laws that it enacts, these direct impacts seldom exhaust the laws' policy consequences. Indeed, first-order effects of policies usually are less significant than the aggregate of more remote effects that ripple through a complex, interrelated, opaque society. When policies fail, it is usually not because the congressional purpose was misunderstood. More commonly, they fail because Congress did not fully appreciate how the details of policy implementation would confound its purpose. Often, however, this knowledge can only be gained through active public participation in the policymaking process at the agency level where these implementation issues are most clearly focused and the stakes in their correct resolution are highest.

Negative claims that excluding critical alternatives is detrimental to education fail to be persuasive when decision-making logic is taken into account. [because] Critical intellectuals and policymakers both take into account the probability that their actions will be successful. Fiating that individuals alter their method of thinking circumvents these questions of probability and thus not only destroys education about policymaking, but offer[ing] a flawed approach to activism (or any other purview of action/philosophy the negative is advocating), Intellectuals and activists have many important considerations relating to resources, press coverage, political clout and method. These questions all are directly related to who is taking action. Alternative debates thus often become frustrating because they do a poor job of explaining who the subject is. Consider the popular Nietzschcan alternative, "do nothing." Who is it that the negative wants to do nothing? Does the USFG do nothing? Is it the debaters? Is it the judge who does nothing? Is it every individual, or just individuals in Africa that have to do with the affirmatives harm area? All of these questions directly implicate the desirability of the alternative, and thus the education that we can receive from this mode of debate. Alternatives like "vote negative to reject capitalism," "detach truth from power," or "embrace an infinite responsibility to the other" fall prey to similar concerns. This inability to pin the negative down to course of action allows them to be shifty in their second rebuttal, and sculpt their alternative in a way that avoids the affirmative's offense. Rather than increasing education, critical frameworks are often a mask that allows the negative to inflate their importance and ignore crucial decision-making considerations.

My belief is that the importance of institutional choice and comparative institutional analysis is not universally shared, however. There are, in fact, dramatic anomalies in the study of law and public policy when it comes to the subject of deciding who decides. For example, one would assume that the central issue of constitutional law is the choice of who decides- the choice between alternative social decision-makers such as the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary- and that, therefore, constitutional scholarship would be replete with sophisticated analyses of these alternatives. In turn, one would assume that, when economic analysts of law-usually non-constitutional law-consider the issue of who decides these high priests of trade-offs and opportunity costs would know that one cannot decide who decides by examining only one alternative. Yet most constitutional scholars ignore the issue of who decides or at most treat it with superficial maxims. And when economic analysts of law address the subject of who decides, they often focus their attention on the attributes of only one alternative.

Constitutional law and the economic approach to law are important enough aspects of legal study that such anomalies standing alone would justify searching inquiry. But, in fact, these anomalies are only dramatic examples of pervasive problem in the analysis of law and, more generally, of public policy. Although important and controversial decisions about who decides are buried in every law and public policy issue, they often go unexamined, are treated superficially, or, at best, are analyzed in terms of the characteristics of one alternative.

Monetary policy refers to the actions of central banks to achieve macroeconomic policy objectives such as price stability, full employment, and stable economic growth. Fiscal policy refers to the tax and spending policies of the federal government. Fiscal policy decisions are determined by the Congress and the Administration; the Fed plays no role in determining fiscal policy. The U.S. Congress established maximum employment and price stability as the macroeconomic objectives for the Federal Reserve; they are sometimes referred to as the Federal Reserve's dual mandate. Apart from these overarching objectives, the Congress determined that operational conduct of monetary policy should be free from political influence. As a result, the Federal Reserve is an independent agency of the federal government. Fed FAQ: Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy? Play Video Accessible Keys for Video [Space Bar] toggles play/pause; [Right/Left Arrows] seeks the video forwards and back (5 sec ); [Up/Down Arrows] increase/decrease volume; [M] toggles mute on/off; [F] toggles fullscreen on/off (Except IE 11); The [Tab] key may be used in combination with the [Enter/Return] key to navigate and activate control buttons, such as caption on/off. The Federal Reserve uses a variety of policy tools to foster its statutory objectives of maximum employment and price stability. Its main policy tools is the target for the federal funds rate (the rate that banks charge each other for short-term loans), a key short-term interest rate. The Federal Reserve's control over the federal funds rate gives it the ability to influence the general level of short-term market interest rates. By adjusting the level of short-term interest rates in response to changes in the economic outlook, the Federal Reserve can influence longer-term interest rates and key asset prices. These changes in financial conditions then affect the spending decisions of households and businesses. The monetary policymaking body within the Federal Reserve System is the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The FOMC currently has eight scheduled meetings per year, during which it reviews economic and financial developments and determines the appropriate stance of monetary policy. In reviewing the economic outlook, the FOMC considers how the current and projected paths for fiscal policy might affect key macroeconomic variables such as gross domestic product growth, employment, and inflation. In this way, fiscal policy has an indirect effect on the conduct of monetary policy through its influence on the aggregate economy and the economic outlook. For example, if federal tax and spending programs are projected to boost economic growth, the Federal Reserve would assess how those programs would affect its key macroeconomic objectives--maximum employment and price stability--and make appropriate adjustments to its monetary policy tools.

The emergence of implementation as a subject for policy analysis coincides closely with the discovery by policy analysts that decisions are not self-executing. Analysis of policy choices matters very little if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood. In answering the question, "What percentage of the work of achieving a desired governmental action is done when the preferred analytic alternative has been identified?" Allison estimated that, in the normal case, it was about 10 percent, leaving the remaining 90 percent in the realm of implementation.

Fiscal policy refers to the actions taken by governments to help direct their economies. This is done through a variety of measures, including taxation. There isn't just one central body responsible for fiscal policy. In fact, both the President and the U.S. Congress have a hand in it, which means it is directed by both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S: In the executive branch, the two most influential offices in this regard belong to the President and the Secretary of the Treasury, although contemporary presidents often rely on a council of economic advisers as well. In the legislative branch, the U.S. Congress passes laws and appropriates spending for any fiscal policy measures. This process involves participation, deliberation, and approval from both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The so-called Taxing and Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, authorizes Congress to levy taxes. 1 However, the Constitution really only specifies two legitimate purposes for taxation: To pay the debts of the federal government and to provide for the common defense. Even though an argument could be made that the clause's provisions exclude the use of taxes for fiscal policy purposes, such as a tax-cut bill to expand the economy, basic macroeconomics suggests that any level of taxation has an impact on aggregate demand. KEY TAKEAWAYS In the United States, fiscal policy is directed by both the executive and legislative branches of the government. In the executive branch, the President and the Secretary of the Treasury, often with economic advisers' counsel, direct fiscal policies. In the legislative branch, the U.S. Congress passes laws and appropriates spending for any fiscal policy measures. The judicial branch of the government can impact fiscal policy by legitimizing, amending, or declaring unconstitutional certain measures taken by the executive or legislative branches. Contractionary fiscal policy increases taxation and reduces government spending when the economy overheats while expansionary fiscal policy does the opposite during periods of slowdown. What Is Fiscal Policy? Fiscal policy is an economic strategy that uses a government's taxing and spending powers to impact a nation's economy. Contemporary fiscal policy is largely founded on the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes who rose to prominence during the 1930s. He developed many of his ideas in response to the Great Depression and proposed that governments could stabilize the business cycle and regulate economic output by adjusting spending and tax policies. 2 Per Keynesian economic theory, both government spending and tax cuts should boost: Aggregate demand The level of consumption and investment in the economy Help reduce unemployment It is commonly used in conjunction with monetary policy to help keep the economy in check. Monetary policy is set by a central bank and focuses on interest rates and the money supply to either slow down or propel economic growth. 3 As noted above, the legislative and executive branches play a major role in shaping fiscal policy. But the judicial branch—the Supreme Court and even lesser courts—can also impact fiscal policy by legitimizing, amending, or declaring unconstitutional certain measures taken by the executive or legislative branches to affect the national economy. The power to spend to encourage certain outcomes has been generally interpreted as constitutional ever since the South Dakota v. Dole ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987. In this case, the court upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute that withheld federal highway funds from states whose legal drinking age did not conform to federal policy (a minimum drinking age of 21). 4 5 Contractionary vs. Expansionary Fiscal Policy The type of fiscal policies enacted by the executive and legislative branches depends on the course of the economy. They may take a contractionary or expansionary approach based on what outcome they wish to achieve. Contractionary Fiscal Policy: These actions are used when the economy is booming and needs to be slowed down so things don't get out of control. When this happens, there's a very good likelihood of market bubbles, overconfidence, and other economic hurdles that can lead to overheating. Fiscal policies are used to curb all this growth through increased taxation and a reduction in government spending. Although it does keep inflation in check, contractionary fiscal policy does raise the unemployment rate. Expansionary Fiscal Policy: This type of fiscal policy is used when things get too slow, commonly during a recession, and the government wants to fuel growth. Government spending increases and tax rates drop. Unemployment falls as jobs open up and more people jump back into the workforce. This policy helps put more money into people's pockets so they can spend more. Inflation can create major problems for the economy, which is why governments and economists closely monitor it. They each use fiscal and monetary policies to fuel growth or to stop the economy from overheating. How Fiscal Policy Is Set As we already mentioned in the previous section, expansionary fiscal policy in the U.S. has been pursued through a combination of spending public funds on politically attractive ends, such as infrastructure, job training, or anti-poverty programs. It also involves lowering taxes on all or some taxpayers. 6 Fiscal policies in the U.S. are normally tied into each year's federal budget, which is proposed by the president and approved by Congress. This budget highlights details of what is to be expected in the upcoming fiscal year, which begins on October 1. Here are the main priorities of the budget: To provide Congress with a signal of the president's fiscal policy for the year, including spending, and how much revenue that's expected to be collected from taxpayers. It also indicates whether the government intends to run under a deficit or a surplus and by how much. To signal priorities in the president's federal programs, including how much spending is expected on health, education, and defense. To make tax policy and spending recommendations to Congress. But there have been times when no budget has been proposed, which makes it more difficult for market participants to react and adjust to coming fiscal policy proposals. Once the budget is approved, Congress then develops budget resolutions. These are used to set parameters for spending and tax policy. After resolutions are made, Congress begins the process of appropriating funds from the budget toward specific targets. These appropriations bills must be signed by the President before they can be enacted. 7 What Role Does the President Play in Fiscal Policy? The president has a major role in the country's fiscal policy. As part of the executive branch, the president lays out plans during the annual budget proposal. This proposal indicates the amount of tax revenue the government intends to collect and how much government spending is anticipated per portfolio, such as education, defense, and health. Is Congress Involved in Fiscal Policy? Congress has a big role to play in fiscal policy. It is one of the bodies that help shape the country's spending and tax policies along with the executive branch. This branch of the government is responsible for developing budget resolutions once the president's annual budget is approved. What Causes the President and Congress to Enact Expansionary Fiscal Policy? Expansionary fiscal policy involves an increase in government spending and a drop in the collection of taxes, perhaps through lowered tax rates. Governments use expansionary fiscal policies in order when they want to fuel growth after a recession. Prices rise and unemployment drops. During this period, people have more money in their pockets and can spend more freely. The Bottom Line Authorities have a few tools at their disposal when it comes to helping control the direction of the economy. Monetary policy is enacted by central banks like the U.S. Federal Reserve while fiscal policy is the responsibility of the government—namely the executive and legislative branches. It commonly involves the use of government spending and taxation. The president submits an annual budget, which Congress uses to develop budget resolutions.

The Framers sought to protect liberty by creating a central government of enumerated powers. They divided power between the state and federal governments, and they further divided power within the federal government by splitting it among the three branches of government, and they further divided the legislative power (the power that the Framers most feared) by splitting it between two Houses of Congress.

12 Proposals on the Table in Washington Raise the Full Retirement Age The age when a person becomes eligible to receive full Social Security retirement benefits (the full retirement age) has been increasing from age 65 on a schedule set by Congress in 1983. It has reached 66 and will gradually rise to 67 for those born in 1960 and later. Raising the full retirement age further is one option to help close Social Security’s funding gap. The earliest age for claiming reduced benefits could remain at age 62, but the benefit at that age would be further reduced. One proposal would raise the full retirement age to 68. Starting in 2023, the age would increase by two months each year until it reached 68 in 2028. This is estimated to fill 18 percent of the funding gap. Another proposal would raise the full retirement age to 70. Starting in 2023, the age would increase by two months each year until it reached 70 in 2040. This is estimated to fill 44 percent of the funding gap. Pro: People are living longer than ever before, and the full benefits age should be increased. Otherwise, recipients will spend an ever-greater amount of their lives living in retirement, which we simply cannot afford. When Social Security started in 1935, 65-year-old men expected to spend about 13 years in retirement. Soon, men will live about 20 years in retirement. Women in 1935 averaged 15 years in retirement. Soon, they will live almost 22 years. (David John,Heritage Foundation) Con: Raising the full retirement age is a benefit cut no matter what age you begin taking benefits. The increase from 65 to 67 already in law cuts benefits by 13 percent. Low-earning workers have seen little or no gains in longevity. Raising the full retirement age for everyone simply because well-off Americans are living longer is a stealth benefit cut that is unnecessary and unjust. We can afford to improve and pay for Social Security without benefit cuts. (Virginia Reno, National Academy of Social Insurance) “I’vebeenpayinginto Social Security for years” Begi n Lon gevi tyIndexing If, as projected, Americans continue to live longer from one generation to the next, individuals will, on average, receive Social Security benefits for a longer period of time. The trend contributes to Social Security’s funding gap, and one option to offset it is longevity indexing. Indexing would automatically modify Social Security to pay smaller monthly benefits as lifespans increase. Reducing the monthly payments could be accomplished either by increasing the age at which a person becomes eligible for full, unreduced retirement benefits (full retirement age) or by changing the benefit formula. Depending on the specific proposal, this is estimated to fill 20 -26 percent of the funding gap. Pro: Indexing the Social Security retirement age is a fair way to handle the fact that Americans are expected to live longer in the future. Assuming lifespans continue to increase, this method would increase Social Security’s full benefits age by about one month every two years; if it started in 2025, the retirement age would increase from 67 to 68 by about 2049. This increase does not necessarily mean that someone would have to retire later. The alternative is a very slightly reduced monthly benefit. The individual retiree would have this information in plenty of time to decide which approach to take. (David John,Heritage Foundation) Con: To index benefits for longevity would unfairly cut benefits for almost everyone. Low -earning workers and other disadvantaged groups have seen little or no gains in longevity. Cutting benefits for everyone just because well -off Americans are living longer would be profoundly unjust. Moreover, this change would violate the purpose of Social Security, which is to ensure basic economic security. Rent, utilities, groceries and medical care don’t cost less just because some people are living longer. (Virginia Reno,National Academyof Social Insurance) Reca lcu l a t eth e COLA Social Security benefits generally keep up with inflation through a cost - of-living adjustment, or COLA. Since 1975, Social Security has based such adjustments on the consumer price index, which measures changes in the prices of consumer goods and services. One option to modify Social Security would be to use an alternative price index for calculating the COLA . Options include: • Chained consumer price index: By applying a different formula to the same goods and services data, this index aims to account for ways consumers change their buying habits when prices change. Experts predict that the annual COLA would be on average 0.3 percentage points lower under this new formula. For example, if the current formula produced a 3.0 percent annual COLA, the chained consumer price index might yield a 2.7 percent COLA. Permanently reducing the size of the benefit adjustment by this amount every year is estimated to fill 23 percent of the gap. • Elderly index: This method aims to reflect specific spending patterns of older Americans, in particular the greater amounts they spend on health care costs. Experts predict that the annual COLA would be on average 0.2 percentage points higher under this formula. For example, if the current formula would produce a 3.0 percent annual COLA, the elderly price index might yield a 3.2 percent COLA. Permanently increasing the size of the benefit adjustment by this amount every year is estimated to increase the funding gap by 16 percent. Pro (chained consumer price index): The index used for the COLA must provide the most accurate estimate of inflation. The best index is the chained consumer price index, which both measures the inflation experienced by a larger part of the population than the current index and better represents the way that real people react to price changes in different types of goods and services. (David John,Heritage Foundation) Pro (elderly index): The current COLA doesn’t keep up with the inflation that seniors face because they spend more than other Americans for out -ofpocket health care costs and those costs rise faster than average inflation. The chained consumer price index would make matters worse by reducing the COLA. A more accurate Social Security COLA would compensate for the higher inflation that seniors actually experience by using an elderly index. (Virginia Reno,National Academyof Social Insurance) “Th emidd l e c l a ss n eedSocia lSecuri ty t osurvi vethei r reti remen t yea rs .” Increa seth e Payro l l TaxCap The Social Security payroll tax currently applies to annual earnings up to $110,100. Any wages earned above $110,100 go untaxed for Social Security. This cap generally increases every year as the national average wage increases. Today, the cap covers about 84 percent of total earnings in the nation. Raising the cap to cover a higher percent of total earning would help close Social Security’s funding gap. How much depends on how high the cap is set and how quickly the cap would be raised to reach that level. One commonly mentioned goal would raise the cap to cover 90 percent of all earnings, which in 2012 would have meant a cap of about $215,000. Raising the cap to 90 percent is estimated to fill 36 percent of the funding gap. Pro: Lifting the cap to cover 90 percent of all earnings is sensible and fair. Only 6 percent of workers earn more than the current cap of $110,100. It is fair for top earners to pay more into Social Security, and they would get a bit more in benefits. This change reflects the intent of Congress in 1977, when it set the cap to include 90 percent of earnings. Congress also provided for automatic adjustments for average wage growth so that the cap would continue to cover 90 percent. But with today’s top earners enjoying much bigger gains than everyone else, the cap now covers only about 84 percent of all earnings. This proposal, together with other changes, could keep Social Security strong and pay for benefit improvements. (Virginia Reno,National Academy of Social Insurance) Con: In general, increasing taxes is a serious mistake. It reduces the amount that Americans have to spend on their family’s food, housing, clothes, education, etc. This bad idea would cause a hefty tax increase for middle -income taxpayers while not affecting the rich. It would especially hurt the self-employed and certain smaller business owners.To make matters worse, this tax increase delays Social Security’s problems by only eight years. It does not fix them. (David John,Heritage Foundation) Eliminate the Payroll Tax Cap The Social Security payroll tax currently applies to annual earnings up to $110,100. Any wages earned above $110,100 go untaxed for Social Security. This cap generally increases every year with increases in the national average wage. Today, the cap covers about 84 percent of total earnings. Eliminating the cap so that all earnings would be subject to Social Security’s payroll tax would help close the program’s funding gap. If all earnings were immediately subject to the Social Security tax, the new revenue is estimated to fill 86 percent of the funding gap. Pro: Eliminating the tax cap would make Social Security’s financing more fair. Only 6 percent of workers earn more than the current cap of $110,100. They would pay on all their earnings throughout the year just as everyone else does, and would get a modest increase in benefits. This change alone would just about eliminate Social Security’s long -term financing gap. Combining this with other changes could wipe out the gap and pay for needed benefit improvements. (Virginia Reno, National Academy of Social Insurance) Con: At first blush, the idea that people should pay Social Security taxes on all of their earnings seems both fair and attractive. However, this “solution” would cause huge Social Security checks for very high -income people. To avoid this, Congress must change the fundamental nature of the program, and then some people would end up paying higher taxes and getting nothing in return. Once that process starts, it could lead to making Social Security a welfare program. (David John,Heritage Foundation) “Washingtonneedsto openupisdoorsandlisten .” Reduce Benefits for Higher Earners Social Security benefit payments are based on the portion of a worker’s earnings that was subject to Social Security payroll taxes. While higher lifetime earners receive higher payments than lower lifetime earners, their benefits replace a smaller share of their past earnings than do the benefits provided to lower earners. One option to help close Social Security’s funding gap would be to reduce benefits for higher lifetime earners. This could be done by modifying Social Security’s benefit formula in a number of ways, depending on who is classified as higher earners and how much their benefits are reduced. Most options use a sliding scale to reduce the benefits most for higher earners, make smaller changes for middle earners and make no benefit changes for lower earners. Options include: • Reduce benefits for the highest-earning 25 percent. Gradually reducing benefits over time for the highest-earning 25 percent of individuals by a sliding scale up to a 15 percent benefit reduction for maximum earners is estimated to fill 7 percent of the funding gap. • Reduce benefits for the highest-earning 50 percent. Gradually reducing benefits over time for the highest-earning 50 percent of individuals by a sliding scale up to a 28 percent benefit reduction for maximum earners is estimated to fill 31 percent of the funding gap. Pro: In coming years, when Social Security won’t have enough payroll tax money to pay full benefits to everyone, it seems only fair to pay full benefits to lower-wage workers and lower benefits to those who had higher earnings. Wealthier retirees have other ways, such as pensions and savings, to fund their retirements. They don’t need full benefits. Everyone would still receive a benefit, but higher-earning retirees would receive less than they do now. (David John,Heritage Foundation) Con: These proposals would actually cut benefits for middle-class workers making as little as $35,000 a year. They are not “high earners.” Benefits are already modest. Retirees’ health care costs are rising while other retirement resources – home equity, pensions, lifetime savings – are at risk or unavailable for too many Americans. Most seniors get most of their income from Social Security. Cuts are not the answer. We can afford to preserve Social Security’s promised benefits. (Virginia Reno, National Academy of Social Insurance) Benefi t Improvemen ts Social Security provides benefits to retired workers and their families; to the spouses and dependents of workers who have died; and to workers who have become disabled and their families. Those benefits are too low for certain groups, according to some who argue that as part of any effort to strengthen Social Security, lawmakers should consider increasing benefits for more -vulnerable recipients. Some of the proposals to improve benefits are: • Increased benefits for a surviving spouse • Earnings credits for people who are not in the paid workforce because they are caring for a child or other family member • A new minimum benefit that’s guaranteed to keep low -paid workers with long careers above the poverty level Each of these proposals would require other adjustments to benefits or revenue. Proposals to improve benefits for caregivers and low -wage workers have been estimated to increase the funding gap by 5 -13 percent. There are no available estimates for proposals to improve benefits for surviving spouses. Pro: Social Security has features of an ideal pension plan: It is portable from job to job, keeps up with inflation and lasts as long as you live. Most seniors rely on it for most of their income. Yet benefits are modest —$1,230 a month on average. We can afford to improve it. We could ensure that people who pay in at least 30 years will not be poor in retirement, give working parents’ credit for care giving and improve benefits for survivors. We could also help any child of workers who die or become disabled by continuing benefits until age 22 if the child is in college or vocational school. (Virginia Reno,National Academyof Social Insurance) Con: Although Social Security benefits for some groups are too low, they should only be improved as part of an overall reform. Otherwise, the added costs would only exhaust the trust fund faster. If that happens, benefits would be reduced for everyone. Instead, all of Social Security’s benefits should be reviewed so that some can receive improved amounts, while ensuring Social Security will be able to pay every person appropriate benefits for decades to come. (David John,Heritage Foundation) Increase the Payroll Tax Rate Employees and employers each currently pay a 6.2 percent tax to Social Security on earnings up to $110,100. Self-employed workers pay both the employer and employee share for a total of 12.4 percent. One option to help close the Social Security funding gap would raise the payroll tax rate for all workers and employers. For instance, on a $50,000 annual salary, increasing the payroll tax to 6.45 percent would increase both the annual employee and employer contribution by $125 each. Changing it to 7.2 percent would increase the annual employee and employer contribution by $500 each. The rate increase could occur gradually or all at once. Increasing the payroll tax rate from 6.2 percent to 6.45 percent immediately is estimated to fill 22 percent of the funding gap. Increasing the payroll tax rate gradually over 20 years on employers and employees from 6.2 percent to 7.2 percent is estimated to fill 64 percent of the funding gap. Pro: Gradually increasing the Social Security tax rate from 6.2 to 7.2 percent over 20 years makes good sense. Most Americans say they would rather pay more than see Social Security cut. This change —just 50 cents more a week for an average earner —would close just over half of the financing gap. Together with eliminating the earnings cap, it could pay for much -needed improvements and keep Social Security strong for the long - term. (Virginia Reno,National Academyof Social Insurance) Con: Increasing Social Security’s payroll tax rate is a bad idea that would increase everyone’s taxes, no matter their income. Economists have known for decades that if the cost of employees gets too great, employers will start to replace them with machines or move to locations with lower taxes. Unfortunately, this does not hit all employees equally. Employers are most likely to replace younger workers and those with lower skill levels. (David John, Heritage Foundation) “SocialSecurityneedssomechangesbut theymust protectretirementecurityoffuturegenerations .” TaxAllSalaryReductionPlans Employees now pay Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes on their contributions to tax-preferred employer-sponsored retirement accounts, such as 401(k) plans. They don’t, however, pay these payroll taxes on their contributions to some other types of benefit plans at work, like Flexible Spending Accounts. Collecting payroll taxes on all such benefit plans would increase the Social Security program’s funds, as well as increase the earnings used to calculate the Social Security benefits of workers who have those benefit plans. Taxing these salary reduction plans for Social Security the same way we tax contributions to 401(k) plans is estimated to fill 10 percent of the funding gap. Pro: Congress should complete a reform it launched in 1983 when it treated workers’ contributions to 401(k) salary reduction plans as earnings that are taxed and counted toward Social Security benefits. Extending the same treatment to other such plans would be consistent, it would ensure workers that all of their earnings will count toward their future Social Security benefits, and it would reduce the Social Security funding gap. (Virginia Reno,National Academy of Social Insurance) Con: This would be a case of robbing Peter to pay Paul. Changing the tax treatment of salary reduction plans would increase the cost of health care and other employee benefits because the tax savings help to offset the employer’s cost of operating the plans. The result would be fewer employers that are willing to offer these types of benefits. Individual workers would either have to buy these benefits themselves or to do without. (David John,Heritage Foundation) Ibelieveit’simportant tostrengthen bothbutwiththecurrentgridlockin Washington,I’mnotsureit’spossible.” CoverAllNewlyHiredStateandLocal GovernmentWorkers About 25 percent of state and local government employees are not covered by Social Security. Rather, these workers are covered by retirement plans provided by state or local governments that have chosen not to participate in the Social Security program. Under one proposed change, Social Security would cover all newly hired state and local government workers. Those workers and their employers would each pay their share of Social Security payroll taxes, and the workers would receive Social Security benefits. Current state and local government workers would not be affected. This proposal is estimated to fill about 8 percent of Social Security’s funding gap. Pro: Social Security works best for everyone when it covers everyone. Workers gain seamless, portable life and disability insurance as well as basic retirement income protection. Any employer-provided pensions are then added to Social Security. Extending coverage to newly hired workers, as was done with federal employees in 1983 legislation, would ease the transition for the workers and jurisdictions that would be affected. (Virginia Reno,National Academyof Social Insurance) Con: Making newly hired workers join Social Security would increase revenue now, but eventually the program would have to pay these workers benefits. That would make Social Security’s financial problems even worse. In addition, certain already underfunded state and local government employee pension plans would see reduced contributions, and almost certainly need tax hikes to pay promised benefits. (David John, Heritage Foundation) Increase Number of Year sUsed to Calculate Initial Benefits Social Security retirement benefits are based on a worker’s average earnings history. Average earnings are computed from a worker’s highest 35 years of annual indexed earnings that were subject to Social Security payroll taxes. If a worker has fewer than 35 years of earnings, each year needed to reach 35 is assigned zero earnings. One option to help close the Social Security funding gap would increase the number of years of earnings used to calculate Social Security benefits from 35 to 38 or even 40. Because that method would typically include more years of lower earnings, the average earnings would decrease and benefits would be lower. Increasing the number of computation years to 38 is estimated to fill 13 percent of the solvency gap. Pro: Increasing the number of years an individual must work to qualify for full Social Security benefits recognizes that most people are living and working longer than they did in the past. Today’s method produces a skewed picture of an individual’s full employment history and inaccurate Social Security benefits. Adding more years would encourage younger people to start working sooner, and the resulting small benefit changes would help to preserve Social Security for everyone. (David John,Heritage Foundation) Con: This proposal would reduce benefits the most for people who need them most: women and lower-income, less-educated and minority retirees. It would reduce benefits not only for retired workers, but also for their dependents and survivors. Social Security benefits are modest and are already being cut as the retirement age goes up. We can afford to preserve, improve and pay for the Social Security benefits that today’s workers are earning with their Social Security taxes. (Virginia Reno, National Academy of Social Insurance) “Whenpeopleworkhard all their lives,thereshouldbe somepeaceof mindinretirement.” Begin Means-Testing Social Security Benefits Social Security benefits have always been provided to anyone who has paid into the system and who meets the work and age requirements. That’s regardless of other income—investment, pension, savings—the person receives in addition to Social Security benefits (although a portion of Social Security benefits is taxable if the total income exceeds a certain threshold). One option to help close Social Security’s funding gap is to “means test.” Means testing would reduce benefits for higher income recipients and could even eliminate benefits altogether for the highest- income households. Unlike Option 4, which uses a measure of career average earnings to reduce benefits, means testing would reduce benefits based on the full range of current income. Who would be affected and by how much depends on how the income thresholds are defined. One version of means testing is estimated to fill about 11 percent of the funding gap. Pro: In an era of scarce resources, Social Security can’t continue to pay benefits to all retirees regardless of what other retirement income they have. Instead, the program should provide monthly benefits only to retirees who have less than a certain amount of non-Social Security annual income. Social Security would continue to be insurance against retirement poverty for everyone, but would focus its benefit payments on those who really need them. (David John, Heritage Foundation) Con: Means testing would change Social Security from an earned right to welfare. It would penalize you if you saved or earned a pension because that income would reduce your Social Security. And it would cost more to administer. The government would have to routinely check your income and assets in order to adjust your benefit. Means testing would be a huge breach of faith with working Americans who earned their benefits by paying in over the years. (Virginia Reno, National Academy of Social Insurance)

The “Green New Deal” is officially titled ”Recognizing the duty of the Federal Government to create a Green New Deal” (H.Res. 109 and ). These resolutions, if passed, would not change any law, but express the sentiment that it is “the duty of the Federal Government to create a Green New Deal.”

The resolution calls for a lot of big changes, but it doesn’t specify how to make them happen, only that they should happen. The Green New Deal is laughably vague, making bold promises and ignoring economic, social, and fiscal costs.

What would a federal job guarantee program look like? The program would be administered by the Department of Labor and overseen by the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary and Department of Labor will be charged with working in conjunction with other agencies, and states and localities to identify an inventory of public infrastructure tasks and associated jobs.

1. Jobs to support state and local governments. State and local governments account for most of the government employment in the United States, and they comprise an important part of our federalist system. In a range of policy domains – public health, education and job training, infrastructure, health provision and conservation – it is state and local governments that have the legal authorities and historical capacities to act. Yet state governments also have the weakest capacity to respond to an economic crisis. First, state governments have nothing like the Federal Reserve to back their debt (this is one among several reasons that the Federal Reserve has recently been looking into mass purchases of municipal bonds). They cannot print money. Second, state governments lack the expansive revenue-generating capacity of the federal government. Beyond this, state governments have in recent decades constrained their powers with balanced budget amendments, while a number of states (Illinois and Connecticut are two examples) have badly underfunded pension systems, and still others have tethered their income to commodity (especially petroleum) sales, which are at historically low prices and whose price declines have damaged state revenues.

How can we achieve full-employment legislation that is not watered down, that starts out with and holds onto a genuine, enforceable job guarantee? Make no mistake about it. Such legislation would be transformative, removing an essential source of disciplining the labor force, freeing workers of the threat of unemployment, and providing them with labor rights that are all too scarce in today’s “precarious” workplace. Of course, we need stronger and more sustained efforts to mobilize public support and create a powerful social movement, but that will depend partly on legislation worth fighting for—legislation that guarantees a job to anyone who needs and applies for one; has safeguards against inflation; specifies a living wage; and has an adequate funding source that is likely to be acceptable to a wide swath of the public, such as the financial transfer tax proposed in the Jobs for All Act (H.R. 1000) that will be reintroduced in the 116th Congress by Rep. Frederica Wilson (D-Fla.). Whereas earlier proposals failed to specify “remunerative” employment, current proposals call for wage levels; compatible with those of living-wage advocates such as “Fight for Fifteen”—important potential participants in a jobs-guarantee campaign.

Experts consulting with legislators who favor a job guarantee agree about the general goal of a permanent job guarantee and about the essential component of direct government job-creation but disagree on some other elements of design. It is important for experts to reach consensus so supporters won’t be divided. The experts are beginning to confer, explain their decisions, explore their differences, and hopefully achieve some common ground.

So much of the JG - its cost, its effect on the economy and (for the purposes of this chapter) its political sustainability - depends on the kind of work JG workers would perform. Advocates have set out the criteria for jobs provided by the JG. These are: 1. They must produce output of social benefit. 2. They must require low or general skills, have low capital costs and be commensurate with payment at the minimum (per Chapter 3, sub-minimum) wage. 3. They must be distinct from the rest of the public sector. 4. They must be buffer stock employment - it must be ultimately a matter of indifference whether the job is performed or not, so that workers can move between the JG and regular employment at will. It is undeniable that a government could offer a job to anyone and that a great deal of socially beneficial work is currently undone. However, it is not clear that a government could address both problems with the same solution. This chapter proposes that the JG is faced with an “impossible quadrilateral” (see Figure 1, below) that prevents these criteria from being met simultaneously. It will examine the tensions and contradictions along the axes of the impossible quadrilateral. These can be divided into three overarching tensions: (1) many suggested JG jobs require skills that are not commensurate with the minimum wage; (2) most social needs are ongoing, so should not be addressed through short-term jobs provided in a countercyclical fashion; and (3) it is difficult to keep the JG and the mainline public sector distinct. The kind of jobs JG workers perform is not just an administrative question, but bears on the political sustainability of the program. Even if the macroeconomic concerns surrounding the JG are unjustified, the program will only last as long as there is political support for it. Figure 1: Illustrative depiction of the “Impossible Quadrilateral” Social benefit Low or general skills Buffer stock employment Distinct from public sector 42 1. The Impossible Quadrilateral: “Social Benefit” vs. “Low Skills” JG jobs are minimum-wage jobs - and must, therefore, be commensurate with payment at the minimum wage. They must require few specialist skills and little training. Many, if not most, of the jobs suggested by Wray (1998: 142-143) and others do not meet these criteria. “Companions to the elderly [and] orphans, the bedridden, and the mentally or physically disabled”, “public classroom assistants” and “day care assistants” (for example) are not the type of work that can be done without training, and workers generally have to go through criminal background and character checks to determine whether they are suitable to work with vulnerable people. Wray (ibid.) goes on to exclude most work in education and care work (and infrastructure) because they are too skilled, implying that JG workers in these fields would instead staff lowresponsibility assistant and administrative positions. Other JG supporters cite largescale public infrastructure projects among examples of the kind of work a JG could perform (Gordon, 1997; Forstater, 2005). Beyond the previously mentioned objections, construction work is a potentially unsafe work environment, particularly to untrained workers, and poor construction quality poses a hazard to future users. Many of the jobs proposed for the JG have a wide range of possible safety issues, both for the workers and the public. For example, Cook, et al. (2008: 134) suggest that JG workers could “support […] alcohol free zones” and staff “community patrols”. It is not clear what this would entail, but to have JG workers enforcing public safety in any fashion would require giving them training in dealing with potentially aggressive or erratic individuals, while still leaving open the (possibly significant) risk of physical injury. It is possible that the JG would allow workers to refuse certain jobs, though, as Sawyer (2005: 240) notes, this is not stated. That JG advocates would even suggest such work is an indication that they do not appreciate the obstacles it present

Working through the details on a job guarantee is crucially important, especially for political survival. American history shows that even a mostly effective program can become politically toxic. In the 1970s, amid economic malaise driven by the oil crisis, the federal government began funding job positions through the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). The program got some $47 billion in funding from its passage in 1973 to its dissolution in 1982; in 1977, President Jimmy Carter started directing more and more of that money toward public sector jobs, until by 1978 some 725,000 people had public sector jobs through CETA. “CETA’s size,” Temple University political scientist Gary Mucciaroni writes, “dwarfed not only the employment programs of the 1960s but the entire War on Poverty effort.” If you believe job guarantee advocates, the program should have been politically durable and popular, as it tied benefits to recipients’ willingness to work in the public sector and contribute to society. It wasn’t. Instead, among its many opponents, the program became synonymous with corrupt liberal governance — a “visible symbol,” Mucciaroni writes, “of what its opponents argued was the futility and failure of government attempts to solve social and economic problems.” “Like any government program, there were problems … but by and large it was a pretty successful program that got people employed quickly,” Carl Van Horn, a distinguished professor public policy at Rutgers and an expert on employment policy, told me. “But when Ronald Reagan was elected to succeed Carter, he announced that we had to get rid of this program … It was more about the symbol, of sorme people getting jobs to do things that weren’t perceived as worthwhile.” And to be clear, some people with CETA jobs were doing things that weren’t worthwhile. Van Horn estimates that 5 to 10 percent of CETA projects were boondoggles or otherwise wasteful. But those projects are easy to publicize, and can be used to doom the program as a whole. When the next recession hit, in 1981 to 1982, the worst downturn until the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis, the CETA program was so “radioactive,” as Van Horn puts it, that no one really proposed trying mass public job creation again. “It also became intertwined with race,” Brown political scientist and sociologist Margaret Weir notes. Joblessness was seen as a black problem, and blacks were seen as primary beneficiaries of the public sector positions created by CETA in cities. If CETA was effective but politically toxic, plenty of other public employment programs haven’t even been effective. While job guarantee programs envision a broad, inclusive program that can integrate all participants into the broader economy, the result is often a program that serves people who can’t get work anywhere else, and still can’t get work anywhere else after the program is finished. Berkeley economist David Card recently conducted a meta-analysis of more than 200 evaluations of programs meant to boost labor markets, along with fellow economists Jochen Kluve and Andrea Weber. While they found a variety of impacts of different programs, one constant was that public employment programs that simply hired people directly performed worst. “Public sector employment subsidies tend to have negligible or even negative impacts at all horizons," the study concludes. "This pattern suggests that private employers place little value on the experiences gained in a public sector program.” One reason, they suggested, was that the programs did nothing to help build skills that would make participants more employable. Job guarantee advocates counter that a well-designed program would get around these concerns. CAP’s Martin argues that sound design would both permanently increase public employment, meaning unemployability in the private sector isn’t a concern, and that it will involve training programs that can boost skills. Margaret Weir also expresses hope that a universal job guarantee could be more politically viable than the 1970s public employment program. “The jobs problem is perceived as a white problem now,” she notes. “I think that local government and nonprofits are more capable/professional now than they were in the 1970s, and could more easily implement a jobs program.” Van Horn, on the other hand, expressed skepticism, fearing the same factors could doom public sector employment this time around, especially America’s fundamental uneasiness with direct government intervention into also a reach,” he the job market. “I’d say it’s more likely we’d have a single-payer health care system than a guaranteed job program, and that’s says. “There’s a very long tradition in public policy and the history of this country that this is a lightly managed economy … The idea that the government would suddenly change after 200 years of not doing that, and certainly not in the modern era, I just don’t think it’s likely.” All which means job guarantee advocates should be thinking seriously about the details. The experience with CETA is a reminder that the line between a brilliant idea and a political failure is narrow, and that funding even a handful of bad or bad-looking projects can easily doom a program. After the initial energy for public jobs and even a jobs guarantee in the 1960s and 1970s, “the flurry of new programs,” Weir wrote in her 1992 book Politics and Jobs, “was followed only a few years later by disillusionment and a sharp scaling down of resources devoted to them.”

Interest in UBI is on the rise in the United States and other advanced countries. Decades of wage stagnation and concerns about automation, robots, and job destruction, as well as discontent with the current social safety net, provide the foundation for interest in this area. Support for UBIs has led to several pilot programs and policy proposals in the United States, Canada, Finland, and Switzerland. Despite all of this, there is a lack of clarity on what makes a UBI, what problem it is meant to solve, whether the social safety net can provide or is providing these benefits, and what (if anything) can be learned from the pilot programs that we do not already know from the decades of existing research on individual and household responses to the social safety net, and on wages and income opportunities more broadly. Our article seeks to fill this gap. A pure UBI (providing a set benefit to all regardless of income, age, etc.) funded to meet basic needs for a household without earnings would be extremely expensive, about twice the cost of all existing transfers in the United States. Funding it would require substantial new revenue. The source of the new funds is a first-order issue and will have substantial impacts on the distributional effects of the policy and its ability to target those most in need of assistance. In particular, replacing existing antipoverty programs with a UBI would be highly regressive, unless substantial additional funds were put in. Much about the effects of a UBI on labor supply, income, and family well-being can be gleaned from the existing research, which we have briefly reviewed here. We have identified a few outstanding questions, such as the impact of a truly universal program (presumably without stigma) as well as the effects on human capital and, hence, labor supply in the longer run. Unfortunately, the planned and ongoing pilots are not well suited to answer these questions. Experimentation aimed at identifying parameters and mechanisms (Ludwig et al. 2011, Rothstein & von Wachter 2017, Deaton & Cartwright 2018) would be more useful than evaluations of small UBI pilots.

A general approach to a true Universal Basic Income doesn’t require much explanation, as the amount of stipulations is rather small. Rather, its radically different nature requires more explanation in how it differs from current programs than explanation of the schema itself. Universal Basic Income systems in applied practice will likely differ in the amount paid as a proportion of relative poverty levels, the timing of the payment, and the amount by which other programs are reduced – though a true UBI would replace all other programs. The only fundamental requirement of a UBI would be a simple age restriction, generally the legal age of adulthood. From the substantially generous proposal in Switzerland of $2,800 USD per month to the comparatively meager monthly sum of $10 USD equivalent provisioned in the Namibian experiment (Lowery, 2013), UBI systems aim to raise all individuals out of poverty by supplementing their working incomes. Just as with most anti-poverty programs, the lower income segments of An Overview of Universal Basic Income 5 society would benefit more in relative terms, but providing a UBI to all adult citizens would generate benefits beyond the goals of poverty reduction. These benefits are discussed in greater detail in later sections of this paper

The old Liberal Democratic Party, before the advent of the current libertarian Senator David Leyonhjelm, also put forward its own idea. What's the attraction of a universal basic income? The concept is that, rather than pay a whole range of different pensions and allowances and subsidies, all payments from the state are consolidated and simplified into a single payment. For simplicity and fairness, the payment goes to all citizens, homeless people and billionaires alike. The recipient can decide how best to spend it. After these fundamentals, every proposal for a universal basic income varies tremendously in the detail. The Swiss idea had no detail; a proposal by Charles Murray in the weekend's Wall Street Journal suggested $US13,000 ($18,000) a year for every US adult but with the abolition of all other payments and health programs and pensions and the abolition of the federal infrastructure that administers such programs. A drastic shrinkage in the size of the state, in other words, which is the aim of the right in supporting this concept. Australia's Henderson inquiry suggested a two-tier plan, immediately undercutting one of the main arguments in favour: that it should be a single, simple payment to all. Henderson envisaged a basic universal payment the equivalent in today's dollars of about $8000 a year, says the director of the Social Policy Institute at ANU, Professor Peter Whiteford, supplemented by an extra payment for those on low incomes. For low-income people, this would bring the total up to the equivalent today of about $13,000 a year, broadly equivalent to the Newstart allowance. Today, for anyone on a pension or disability allowance, this would imply a savage cut. The starting point for such a proposal today would have to be about the size of age pension, about $20,000 a year, Whiteford suggests. Paid to all 18 million Australian adults, that comes to $360 billion a year. Abolishing all other social welfare payments would save about $150 billion, so the net extra cost would be of the order of $210 billion a year. "It's enough to frighten the horses," Whiteford concludes. How to pay for it? Tax rates would have to soar to collect this sum. If you increased the GST, you'd put a disproportionate burden on the poor, defeating the purpose of the exercise. Relying on higher incomes taxes would push the top personal tax rate to something like 70 or 80 per cent from today's 50per cent, Whiteford estimates, which is politically implausible. The Fraser Liberal government dismissed Henderson's 1975 proposal for a guaranteed minimum income. "Fraser rejected it because of the cost of the proposed changes," Whiteford says, "and because they were committed to cutting back social welfare," not increasing it. Another question: if everyone were given money for nothing, what would happen to the incentive to work? Four pilot programs in the US in the late 1960s and early '70s tried to measure this. They found that the primary breadwinner cut his work hours by between 1 per cent and 7 per cent when given a basic unconditional income, and the second earner cut back by between 17 and 31 per cent. These are the reasons why, in the long history of the idea, no government has ever introduced a universal basic income. It's impractical. So why is it in vogue? The idea has been revived by the rising panic over the future of work. If robotics and technology wipe out whole employment categories, how will people survive? The answer, however, isn't a universal payment. The answer is for governments to foster innovation and entrepreneurship, so disappearing jobs are replaced by new ones. And this is exactly what has happened after every other similar jobs panic since the dawn of the industrial revolution.

Talking about basic income in the singular does not make much sense. Evaluating such a proposition in the abstract, without specifying what kind of basic income we are talking about, even less so. For it is an instrument that can be used for a diversity of purposes and with varied effects depending on the political project guiding its implementation. Therefore, this article proposes to distinguish between three ideal types of basic income: neoliberal, social-democratic, and of ecological and social transition. These ideal types distinguish themselves by their internal characteristics (amount; financing; articulation with existing social protection) and by the political projects that guide them. The question of the radicality of the basic income proposal thus depends on the model envisaged. The “neoliberal” model is radical in the simplification of the welfare state it proposes, while the “transition” model is radical in its aim to transform social relations and economic dynamics. The “social-democratic” model, in contrast, does not intend to revolutionise social protection, but rather to introduce a reform that, while being more realistic in the short term, is likely to initiate a more gradual transformation of welfare states towards a strengthening of social protection.

But a new National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) working paper by Hilary Hoynes and Jesse Rothstein dumps some cold water on UBI enthusiasm. In their paper, the economists argue that a developed-world UBI is more distant than we realize, and that pilot programs aren’t going to change that. The aim of their paper was to pin down some UBI proposals in enough detail to analyze their effects, and to summarize what we know already (from existing research on the effects of welfare) about the likely income and employment effects of a UBI. “There is a lack of clarity on what makes a UBI, what problem it is meant to solve, whether the social safety net can or is providing these benefits, and what (if anything) can be learned from the pilot programs that we don’t already know,” the paper argues. “Our paper seeks to fill this gap.” Their takeaway? We’re studying the wrong things. We’ve pinned so many hopes to UBI — some of them contradictory — that it’s not clear anymore what concrete empirical results from our pilot programs would help us conclude it’s a good idea. At the same time, proponents typically haven’t characterized their plans in enough detail that we can figure out how to pay for them and how they’ll affect the poor. That doesn’t necessarily mean UBI is a utopian pipe dream. But it does suggest that, right now, UBI is proposed as a solution to many different social ills, and the details of UBI proposals are often underspecified — so it’s not clear who’d get money, how much, or how we’d pay for it. If we want to fix our welfare system, that has to change. Giving people money solves problems — but which ones? The idea of a universal basic income is simple: give everyone free money, no strings attached. There are a lot of problems with America’s current welfare system. People fall through its cracks; they have difficulty finding out which programs they’re eligible for and experience shame and stigma for being on welfare. There are also a lot of problems on the horizon. Technological unemployment hasn’t quite panned out yet — new technology might shift where the jobs are, but it doesn’t seem to destroy them — but some people fear that won’t be true forever, as we learn to automate more and more. And inequality is rising, leaving people worried that the gains from new technologies will leave most of us behind.