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(Rajeeve Thakur, J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May 2010; B.A., University of Toronto, honors., “Totalization with Mexico: A Path to Immigration Reform,” pg online @ https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1311&context=crsj //pa-ef)

On a positive note, over a five-year time span, a totalization agreement with Mexico would save U.S. workers and employers approximately $ 140 million in contributions to Mexico. 172 Additionally, external economic benefits, such as increased propensity to spend, would likely result because of lower taxes for U.S. workers and employers. U.S. workers in Mexico would have a higher disposable income, as they would only be paying social security taxes to one country at a time. 173 This may encourage them to increase their spending in the United States. A similar argument could be made for authorized Mexican workers within the United States who, because of a U.S.-Mexico SSTA, would only be paying social security taxes in one country. Presumably, their disposable income would also increase, which could cause them to increase their spending while in the United States.

Another method to maintain a solvency in the Social Security system is to shift Social Security Trust Funds to the equities market. As the model above suggests, this reform causes equity returns to decrease and interest rates to increase and necessitates an increase in income taxes to maintain a constant fiscal stance. Clearly, under this reform, equity holders are hurt, bondholders benefit, taxpayers are hurt, current workers are left unaffected (to the extent that under the benchmark their payroll taxes were not affected as they are under the "shifting funds" reform), and future recipients benefit (to the extent that under this reform their benefits are left unchanged compared to being cut under the benchmark case). Under this reform, income transfers from taxpayers and equity holders to bondholders and future recipients (and current workers, as compared to the "increasing payroll tax" reform).

To the extent that all bonds and equities are domestically held, the choice of reform is determined by which groups (equity holders, bondholders, current workers, future Social Security recipients) the government favors. If all groups are weighted equally, then the government should be indifferent between the reforms (the problem would be reduced to having one infinitely lived representative agent, from the government's point of view). If all bonds and equities are not domestically held, then income transfers will occur between domestic residents and foreigners. For example, under the "increase payroll taxes" reform, a redistribution from U.S. workers (paying higher payroll taxes) to foreigners holding U.S. equities will take place since the return on U.S. equities increases following this reform. Furthermore, following this type of reform, income would transfer from foreign bondholders (holding bonds paying a lower interest rate) to U.S. taxpayers (paying lower income taxes because the interest expense portion of government spending is reduced).

The trust funds on which Social Security relies to pay benefits have been running low. The last official projection by the Social Security Administration indicated those funds could run out in 2035, at which point 79% of promised benefits would be payable. That estimate did weigh any pandemic effects.

Even so, fears that the program will run dry and benefit checks will stop are unfounded, said Shai Akabas, director of economic policy at the Bipartisan Policy Center.

But the proposed totalization agreement with Mexico is profoundly different from prior agreements in four important ways:

1. One-sided. Unlike the 20 existing agreements, a totalization agreement with Mexico would be one-sided. Its beneficial effects to U.S. workers would be miniscule compared to those received by potentially millions of Mexicans. It is expected that the totalization agreement with Mexico would:

(Dawn, Specialist in Income Security, Dawn Nuschler and Alison Siskin Domestic Social Policy Division, “Social Security Benefits for Noncitizens: Current Policy and Legislation,” pg online @ https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20050121_RL32004_2b5092caf9d7482be7998994c2c5b10d31f44afc.pdf //um-ef)

As mentioned previously, the SSA cost estimate shows that a totalization agreement with Mexico would have a negligible effect on the long-range actuarial balance of the Social Security trust funds. However, a sensitivity analysis performed by SSA at GAO’s request shows that a 25% or more increase in the number of initial new beneficiaries (i.e., 13,000 or more above the base estimate of 50,000) would result in a measurable impact on the long-range actuarial balance of the trust funds. GAO found that error rates in estimating the number of initial new beneficiaries under previous totalization agreements often exceeded 25%. Based on the large number of unauthorized workers from Mexico in the United States, GAO considers the estimated cost of a totalization agreement with Mexico more uncertain than cost estimates for previous agreements. In its report, GAO states that “a totalization agreement with Mexico is both qualitatively and quantitatively different than any other agreement signed to date.”47

(Rajeeve Thakur, J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May 2010; B.A., University of Toronto, honors., “Totalization with Mexico: A Path to Immigration Reform,” pg online @ https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1311&context=crsj //pa-ef)

C. Economic Impact

(Dawn Nuschler, Specialist in Income Security, Congressional Research Service, “International Social Security Agreements,” pg online @ https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20100111_R41009_f1dc12843e82d3913aa00854a71db03a76c1ee57.html#_Toc251315428 //um-ef)

In 2005, GAO reported concerns regarding the potential exposure of the Social Security trust funds to improper payments resulting from inaccurate or falsified foreign data and documentation (such as birth, death, marriage and divorce records). GAO reported that "Historically, SSA has conducted only limited reviews, focusing primarily on broad policy issues and systems compatibility, rather than examining the integrity and reliability of earnings data and evidentiary documents."125 However, GAO also reported that SSA was in the process of developing new initiatives to identify risks associated with totalization agreements. GAO further stated:

In addition, senior citizen groups such as "The Seniors Coalition,"' 172 are concerned that the Trust Fund will not be able to provide for Mexican nationals who may benefit from the Social Security system under this agreement. 173 The Retired Enlisted Association ("TREA") Senior Citizens League has recently sent a petition to Congress trying to initiate another attempt to adopt a resolution aimed at blocking a U.S.-Mexico agreement. 74 Another concern raised by critics is that a totalization agreement with Mexico will promote a policy that encourages Mexican citizens to immigrate, legally or illegally, to the United States in order to qualify for SSDI and other benefits. 75 Many critics fear that if an agreement is allowed to take effect, Mexicans will become eligible for Social Security benefits regardless of their legal status in the United States. 76 This eligibility could cause an increase in the incidents of fraud against the Social Security system if Mexicans systematically claim disabilities which may or may not actually exist.177 Another complaint from critics is that once a Mexican national is vested in the U.S. Social Security system, benefits will be paid to the worker and his spouse for the remainder of their lives, and because the current U.S. Social Security system is progressive, benefits are incrementally better for low-wage earners. The critics fear that this payout will add too great a burden on the Trust Fund. 17 8 The fears swirling around the U.S.-Mexico agreement are only exacerbated by a recent General Accounting Office ("GAO") report that states the "cost of such an agreement is highly uncertain.', 179 The GAO report lists several areas of concern in trying to determine the true cost of an agreement. 180 These areas of concerns include: the SSA's process for developing the agreement was neither thorough nor well-documented, 181 the research of the Mexican Social Security system was too informal to validate the integrity and compatibility of the Mexican system with the U.S. system,' 82 and poor data was relied upon by the SSA. 183 This poor data was used to project the short-term and long-term costs of the totalization agreement with Mexico.184 Mexico's social security program is not as financially beneficial to low wage earners as the United States' program.185 The Mexican program takes 1,250 weeks of contributions, or a full twenty-four years, to become vested in the program, and even then the worker only receives what he or she actually contributed plus interest.186 By comparison, the United States fully vests workers after only forty credits, which could be earned in as little as ten years. 87 Mexican social security is divided into two separate systems: one for the private sector and another for the public sector.' 88 The Mexican program for the public sector is in dire straits because the promised benefit is 100% of the last twelve months of salary upon retirement and the retirement age in Mexico is fifty-six with a current life expectancy of seventy-eight. 89 Currently, the ratio of workers per retirees in the public sector is five-to-one, but this is expected to change to two-to-one by 2020.190 Mexico's private sector's social security program has been converted from a "defined-benefit" plan to a "defined-contribution" plan that provides the Mexican government some short-term relief from bankruptcy.191 A large majority of Mexican workers may opt out and not contribute anything to their retirement, which is one of the problems with the Mexican "defined-contribution" plan. 1 92 1. Fiscal impact of a Totalization Agreement with Mexico. The impact of a totalization agreement with Mexico is unclear. 93 According to the Office of the Chief Actuary ("OCACT"), the estimated cost of the first year of a totalization agreement with Mexico will be $78 million (in constant 2002 dollars) and will grow to $650 million by 2050.194 The SSA's cost estimate assumes that the initial number of newly-qualified Mexican beneficiaries would be 50,000, or the number of current beneficiaries now living in Mexico, and the number will grow six fold over time.195 This number seems to be rather small in comparison to the 7.8 million Mexican immigrants estimated to be in the United States as of 2001.96 A GAO review of other totalization agreements shows that the actual number of beneficiaries was frequently underestimated and far exceeded the original actuarial projections. 197 The possible underestimation of the number of Mexican beneficiaries is problematic because only a 25% increase in the estimated beneficiaries, or an additional 13,000 beneficiaries, would have a measurable impact on the long-range actuarial balance of the Trust Fund. 198 The fiscal impact of the actuarial data being underestimated in the case of Mexico could be severe. 199 The U.S. Census Bureau projects that Mexico accounts for around 30% of all immigrants in the United States or 7,800,000.200 This projection makes Mexico the single largest country of origin for any immigrant group found in the United States, nearly six times greater than the next highest country.0 1 Meanwhile, Canadian immigrants total about 678,000.202 When considering that the SSA estimates only an increase of 50,000 newly-qualified beneficiaries under a Mexican agreement, it is hard to understand why the SSA did not address the other 7,750,000 Mexican immigrants currently in the United States.20 3 The SSA projects that the amount of eligible beneficiaries will increase only six fold by 2050, which would only amount to 300,000. Again, the SSA does not address the other 7,500,000 Mexican immigrants in the United States. 204 The OCACT based its initial estimate of 50,000 on the premise that the number of Mexican immigrants who had worked in the United States for enough time to be vested with Social Security benefits equaled the number of immigrants who worked in the United States between two and nine years before returning to Mexico.2 °5 In other words, initial new beneficiaries would be equivalent to the 50,000 recipients currently receiving benefits in Mexico.20 6 According to the GAO, the OCACT did not determine whether the 50,000 persons currently receiving benefits would serve as a good measure for the Mexican immigrant population, 20 7 nor did it appear that the OCACT adjusted its projections for the huge increase of Mexican immigrants into the United States from 1990 to 2000, or the increase since 2000.208

The MAGA Oversight Committee Is Only Looking to Obstruct the Biden Administration. House Republicans have long planned to use their investigative power to obstruct the Biden administration, with the top target being Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas. Top Republican Steve Scalise (R-LA) told reporters that Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas “might have a reserved parking spot (at the Capitol) he’s gonna be up here so much,” and Lauren Boebert said investigations into Mayorkas would be President Biden’s “own demise.” Mayorkas has always been the number one target of the House GOP, with 31 MAGA Republicans signing articles of impeachment even before the midterm elections. The House GOP committee is only using investigations to disrupt the Department of Homeland Security and hinder the Biden administration. The GOP House Is Just Using The Border As An Issue To Campaign On. The House GOP is using border policy as an endless crisis issue to campaign on. Several top Republicans serving on the MAGA judiciary committee have echoed far-right lies about immigrants as part of a web of conspiracy theories known as “Great Replacement” theory, stoking racist sentiments about the country’s changing racial demographics. At least fourteen House Republicans serving on the Judiciary or Oversight committees have openly embraced the far-right theory. These lies demonstrate that the House GOP is only interested in inciting racially charged fears about demographic replacement in order to mobilize their base, instead of addressing the real issues associated with immigration and the border. House Republicans Refused to Provide Oversight Into Trump’s Failed Border Policies. MAGA Republicans in the House are hypocritically investigating the Biden administration and attacking the very same policies and circumstances that transpired during the Trump administration. For years, Republicans ignored oversight of the Trump administration’s disastrous border policies. In 2019, the CBP declared a “humanitarian and national security border crisis.” Humanitarian organizations reported a sharp rise in human rights abuses during detention encounters as the administration mounted a failed response to the surge in border crossings. In spite of this, James Comer, Jim Jordan, and the Oversight Republicans opposed bipartisan efforts to investigate the policy of forced child separation along the southern border, including opposing subpoenas against Trump cabinet officials. House Republicans were virtually silent as evidence of waste and mismanagement at the border piled up, and Rep. Jordan instead took to Fox News to claim that Trump bore no responsibility for unrest unfolding during his presidency. House Republicans Can’t Even Agree On Their Own Immigration Priorities. The MAGA House GOP is so focused on investigating the Biden administration that they can’t even agree on their own policy platform. Two Texas Republicans have introduced competing proposals to address deportation policy and the fate of asylum-seekers and both have threatened to completely derail debt ceiling negotiations over border security bills. Though Rep. Chip Roy’s proposal has been billed as the House Republicans’ prime legislative effort on border security, the fierce pushback shows that even their own caucus is in total disarray when it comes to immigration policy. House Republicans Don’t Care About Solving Immigration or Fixing The Border. Republicans have refused to work with the Biden administration or even the Senate on immigration reform or border policy. They spent millions campaigning on border issues and putting on elaborate political stunts like sending migrants to Martha’s Vineyard to critique policies imposed or exacerbated by the Trump administration. Yet the House GOP’s talking points almost universally lack any solutions – they are happy to reiterate the Trump playbook and use immigrants as “political scapegoats” without outlining any achievable policy objectives. The GOP Has Always Refused to Find Solutions. Today’s MAGA obstruction is no different than the past 15 years. In 2020, the GOP refused to update their policy platform on immigration, instead choosing to campaign on Trump’s calls for a failed border wall. They filibustered comprehensive, bipartisan proposals introduced in 2007 (Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act), 2013 (Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act), 2017 (DREAM Act), and 2021 (U.S. Citizenship Act). Congressional Republicans have wholeheartedly refused to act on immigration since passing the Secure Fence Act in 2006. Time and time again, Republicans have been unwilling to work towards comprehensive immigration reform.

(Benjamin A, Associate Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, 35 Fordham Int'l L.J. 98, “ARTICLE: SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AS A MODEL FOR INCREASING TRUST FUND RETURNS,” pg lexis//um-ef)

Despite the economic logic behind diversifying the Trust Fund, policymakers and politicians have not considered diversification in the most recent round of discussions on how to address the imminent funding crisis. 9 One concern voiced is that market volatility could lead to lower returns during some periods of time and this might result in some generations having to pay higher taxes in order to fund benefits. 10 Additionally, conservatives oppose the proposal on philosophical grounds, arguing that government investment is a form of socialism, which may result in political interference in private enterprise. 11

The fact that little information was available for over three years regarding [*66] the proposed agreement only fueled the gossip and myths about the agreement's anticipated effects on immigration. Now that the text is available, it is possible that some of the opposition to the agreement will diminish. Misperceptions about the immigration incentives created by the agreement, however, persist and are publicized by opposition groups. 48 Until the laws and regulations regarding benefit qualifications (as described below) are clarified, opposition to the proposed agreement will continue to focus on the misperceptions about the agreement rather than on its actual weaknesses. Ironically, opponents' efforts to publicize their inaccurate understandings may actually increase incentives to illegally immigrate to the United States by furthering the belief that benefits will be made widely available to unauthorized workers.

(Dawn, Specialist in Income Security, Dawn Nuschler and Alison Siskin Domestic Social Policy Division, “Social Security Benefits for Noncitizens: Current Policy and Legislation,” pg online @ https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20050121_RL32004_2b5092caf9d7482be7998994c2c5b10d31f44afc.pdf //um-ef)

Some observers express concern that, although Section 202(y) of the Social Security Act prohibits the payment of benefits to aliens in the United States who are not lawfully present, a totalization agreement with Mexico could allow unauthorized aliens to receive payments in the United States, depending on how the agreement is written.38 They contend that a totalization agreement with Mexico may be used as a de facto way to legalize unauthorized aliens and assert that the question remains unresolved until the exact language of the agreement becomes available. Still others express concern that a totalization agreement with Mexico could provide an incentive for unauthorized workers from Mexico to come to the United States. In addition, given the Social Security system’s long-range financing problems, some question the feasibility of adding a potentially large number of recipients to the rolls in the absence of structural reform.

Most totalization agreements have been signed with little or no notice from the public. 165 However, the proposed U.S.-Mexico agreement has made some concerned citizens' groups furious.'1 66 Senior citizens and border-protection groups have expressed opposition to this agreement. 67 A resolution was even introduced in Congress expressing disapproval with the signed totalization agreement with Mexico. 168 Concerns have been expressed before the House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the Judiciary Committee 169 that under the proposed agreement with Mexico, illegal immigrants would qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") after only being in the United States for eighteen months,170 and that the system would be ripe for abuse from Mexican nationals aided by unscrupulous physicians who could diagnose and treat illegitimate injuries."' In addition, senior citizen groups such as "The Seniors Coalition,"' 172 are concerned that the Trust Fund will not be able to provide for Mexican nationals who may benefit from the Social Security system under this agreement. 173 The Retired Enlisted Association ("TREA") Senior Citizens League has recently sent a petition to Congress trying to initiate another attempt to adopt a resolution aimed at blocking a U.S.-Mexico agreement. 74 Another concern raised by critics is that a totalization agreement with Mexico will promote a policy that encourages Mexican citizens to immigrate, legally or illegally, to the United States in order to qualify for SSDI and other benefits. 75 Many critics fear that if an agreement is allowed to take effect, Mexicans will become eligible for Social Security benefits regardless of their legal status in the United States. 76 This eligibility could cause an increase in the incidents of fraud against the Social Security system if Mexicans systematically claim disabilities which may or may not actually exist.177 Another complaint from critics is that once a Mexican national is vested in the U.S. Social Security system, benefits will be paid to the worker and his spouse for the remainder of their lives, and because the current U.S. Social Security system is progressive, benefits are incrementally better for low-wage earners. The critics fear that this payout will add too great a burden on the Trust Fund. 17 8 The fears swirling around the U.S.-Mexico agreement are only exacerbated by a recent General Accounting Office ("GAO") report that states the "cost of such an agreement is highly uncertain.', 179 The GAO report lists several areas of concern in trying to determine the true cost of an agreement. 180 These areas of concerns include: the SSA's process for developing the agreement was neither thorough nor well-documented, 181 the research of the Mexican Social Security system was too informal to validate the integrity and compatibility of the Mexican system with the U.S. system,' 82 and poor data was relied upon by the SSA. 183 This poor data was used to project the short-term and long-term costs of the totalization agreement with Mexico.184 Mexico's social security program is not as financially beneficial to low wage earners as the United States' program.185 The Mexican program takes 1,250 weeks of contributions, or a full twenty-four years, to become vested in the program, and even then the worker only receives what he or she actually contributed plus interest.186 By comparison, the United States fully vests workers after only forty credits, which could be earned in as little as ten years. 87 Mexican social security is divided into two separate systems: one for the private sector and another for the public sector.' 88 The Mexican program for the public sector is in dire straits because the promised benefit is 100% of the last twelve months of salary upon retirement and the retirement age in Mexico is fifty-six with a current life expectancy of seventy-eight. 89 Currently, the ratio of workers per retirees in the public sector is five-to-one, but this is expected to change to two-to-one by 2020.190 Mexico's private sector's social security program has been converted from a "defined-benefit" plan to a "defined-contribution" plan that provides the Mexican government some short-term relief from bankruptcy.191 A large majority of Mexican workers may opt out and not contribute anything to their retirement, which is one of the problems with the Mexican "defined-contribution" plan. 1

(Senior Citizens League, “Totalization With Mexico Would Add Billions In New Costs To Social Security,” pg online @ https://seniorsleague.org/totalization-with-mexico-would-add-billions-in-new-costs-to-social-security/ //um-ef)

Totalization with Mexico is highly controversial because of the millions of Mexicans who have illegally worked in the United States without authorization. The agreement raises concerns that millions of such workers and their dependents would become newly eligible for Social Security benefits worsening the long-term solvency of the program. In addition, substantial new costs could trigger benefit cuts and higher taxes for both retirees and workers.

Armenia, by contrast, is emerging from an extremely traumatic period – a painful loss in the war against Azerbaijan last year and polarizing national elections in June. It has yet to produce a coherent foreign policy strategy suitable for the new realities. As usual, among foreign powers Russia  in the elections. Some Armenian analysts, particularly those sympathetic to the opposition, now  for some sort of Moscow-Yerevan-Tehran realignment to counter the Baku-Ankara alliance. Re-elected prime minister Nikol Pashinyan, with a renewed and strengthened mandate in the parliament, however, seems more likely to seek a peace deal with Azerbaijan than attempt to balance Azerbaijan and Turkey with Russian and Iranian help.

That may be just fine with Tehran. Raisi’s top priority is to address the country’s desperate economic situation. Since his election is widely seen as a steppingstone to succeed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, he needs stability on the country’s borders to focus on its manifold internal challenges. There is a consensus in the Iranian security establishment that the Middle East and Persian Gulf are arenas of vital national security interest, and that the South Caucasus is not. In addition, Afghanistan, during the rapid withdrawal of American forces, is fast emerging as another source of threats for Iran. These regions remain priorities irrespective of who occupies the Iranian presidency.

First, function of natural resources in conflict is narrowly explained. Less research has been devoted to non-resource factors of conflicts and their connection with resources. Conflict is composed of multiple dimensions (political, economic, historical, cultural, ethnic and geographical etc.) rather than single factor. It is not clear how non-resource dimensions o1f conflict interact with natural resources, namely poor performance of state institutions or scarcity of state capacity One may understand how natural resources influence non-resource dimensions but one may not find how and whether non-resource dimensions affect scarcity or abundancy of natural resources. In this regard, it is not sufficient to simply propose scarcity or abundancy of natural resources as the fundamental reason for conflicts. Second, less research has scrutinized political and economic costs of resources wars, namely occupation cost, international cost and investment costs (e.g. Meierding, 2016). The existing works give a misleading impression that resource incomes can cover easily invasion, investment and international costs of wars.

While demand has been stronger than expected, supply in critical sectors coped better than expected. The predicted pandemic breakdowns in supply chains for food and medical supplies proved to be overstated. Surveys of logistical firms last year revealed that the pandemic had minimal effects on their operational capabilities. Even when it came to medicines and personal protective equipment, there were only minor disruptions after the initial shock in March 2020. Claims that the global supply chain in medical products rendered states vulnerable to weaponized interdependence proved to be wildly exaggerated. The pandemic affected service sectors such as tourism far more severely than any manufacturing sector. Indeed, Slate's Jordan Weissmann pointed out recently that "imports were up 5 percent year-over-year in September, and up 17 percent compared with the same time in 2019." This happened despite the decline in air passenger traffic, which restricted yet another means of shipping goods by air. Supply has increased—it's just that demand has surged even more.

The private sector is responding to market signals by ramping up production and ensuring multiple supply lines. Intel, Samsung, and TSMC are all spending tens of billions of dollars to build new chip foundries in the United States. Skyrocketing shipping prices are incentivizing additional construction of new container ships. The Wall Street Journal reports that in the first five months of 2021, there were nearly twice as many orders for new container ships as there were in all of 2019 and 2020 combined. To ensure holiday inventory, large retailers like Walmart and Home Depot have chartered their own container ships. Container shipping rates have already started to decline from September peaks.

Americans can be forgiven for thinking that every critical system we rely on is breaking down. The country—nay, the globe—has endured years of social, political, environmental, and epidemiological upheaval. Pick your shock: COVID-19, wildfires, George Floyd protests, climate change, January 6. They all seem like harbingers of a chaotic future.

But backlogs in Pottery Barn orders are when shit gets real.

The literature on supply chain resilience includes studies on various types of disruptions. However, pandemics are unique because they are unpredictable in terms of time and scale. The COVID-19 pandemic has caused business disruptions on an unprecedented scale. All industries have suffered sharp alterations in supply and demand structures. In fact, the pandemic disrupted markets so rapidly that companies could not develop and apply risk-aversion strategies, and they were simply unprepared when the disruption occurred [48]. The disruption thus forced them to make real-time decisions and act reactively [98]. Among all sectors, the perishable goods sector assumes exceptional importance because it provides people with essentials items [99]. Therefore, we aimed to investigate the ability of resilience-building efforts to absorb the effects of a disruption and enable recovery.

Our findings are twofold. Although all resilience-building efforts can mitigate disruptions within predetermined limits, the pandemic has exceeded these limits. Therefore, it has not only disrupted supply chains but also caused failures in resilience-building capabilities [100]. Our first significant finding indicates that organisations that were more effective in resilience-building activities were also less affected by the disruption. Some researchers have already sought to explain why some companies are more vulnerable than others. Belhadi et al. [15] report that service and manufacturing companies experience the negative effects of disruptions differently, and companies in global supply chains are more vulnerable to pandemic-related disruptions. Ivanov and Das likewise examined global supply chains and confirmed their greater vulnerability; however, they believe that local alternatives cannot replace the efficiency and effectiveness provided by global supply chains, which, they predict, will survive after the pandemic. Still, they suggest that working with local suppliers would create some flexibility during unexpected global crises [101]. Discussing the food supply chain performance of England during the pandemic, Garnett et al. [100] recommend investing in the agri-food sector and developing locally sustainable capacity that is sufficient to satisfy food demand in England. While they noted the inability of seasonal workers from other countries to cross the border during pandemics, the accuracy of this observation remains in question because such studies are rare and mostly compare companies from different industries. Our study examines only the perishable goods industry, and difference still exists.

This indicates that the increase of economic interdependence does not lead to a decrease of the interstate conflict as captured by defense expenses. On the contrary the increase of exports of country 1 to country 2 leads to an increase of the expenses of both countries. Hence, both countries seem to consider the conflict as vivid even though some trade activity is built. This may be attributed to the fact that the defense expenses of these countries are not necessarily related to the particular interstate conflict with the investigated pair in the dyad. It could also be due to the fact that the economic crisis has potentially led to a decrease of both the economic activity and the defense expenses in some cases. This explains partially the results. Furthermore, country 1 is not always the stronger economy. In addition, it is not necessarily the country that has initiated the conflict. These findings indicate that the topic needs to be further investigated so as to incorporate more dyads and potentially additional proxies of interstate conflict and economic interdependence in order to realize whether the latter impacts the former.

[Table omitted]