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In addition to publishing transparency reports, companies are pushing back against compelled data handover by fighting the government in court. In 2016, the FBI brought a lawsuit in an attempt to compel Apple to obtain data from an iPhone belonging to the San Bernardino shooter, who had killed 14 people in a terrorist attack. Apple refused, citing the need to preserve the security of their users and their systems. The FBI eventually dropped the case after contracting its own hackers to access the data, but Apple gained a reputation for taking a stand against the government in privacy-related cases. The method used to access the iPhone has never been made public, though security researchers have made educated guesses.

The clash between the government and companies for control over user data has grown since 2016, with tech giants like Microsoft leading the charge. In 2016, the company sued the Department of Justice over its regular issuance of extensive gag orders. “The proportion [of demands to disclose stored data] was significant – gag orders were attached to well over half of the law enforcement demands they had received,” Nojeim explains, “[In 2017] they settled the case, and the Department of Justice agreed to limitations on its issuance of gag orders.” Even Google – with its reputation for close cooperation with the NSA – brought a lawsuit in an attempt to resist gag orders in 2013, arguing that the enforced secrecy infringes on the company’s First Amendment rights.

Because §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1) are not extraterritorial, we must consider when claims involve “domestic” applications of these provisions. As discussed above, the proper test requires determining the provision’s focus and then ascertaining whether Hetronic can “establish that ‘the conduct relevant to [that] focus occurred in the United States.’” Nestlé, 593 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–4). Much of the parties’ dispute in this case misses this critical point and centers on the “focus” of the relevant provisions without regard to the “conduct relevant to that focus.” WesternGeco, 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5). Abitron contends that §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1) focus on preventing infringing use of trademarks, while Hetronic argues that they focus both on protecting the goodwill of mark owners and on preventing consumer confusion. The United States as amicus curiae argues that the provisions focus on only likely consumer confusion. The parties all seek support for their positions in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U. S. 280 (1952), but that decision is of little assistance here. There, we considered a suit alleging that the defendant, through activity in both the United States and Mexico, had violated the Lanham Act by producing and selling watches stamped with a trademark that was protected in the United States. Although we allowed the claim to proceed, our analysis understandably did not follow the two-step framework that we would develop decades later. Our decision was instead narrow and factbound. It rested on the judgment that “the facts in the record . . . when viewed as a whole” were sufficient to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id., at 285. In reaching this conclusion, we repeatedly emphasized both that the defendant committed “essential steps” in the course of his infringing conduct in the United States and that his conduct was likely to and did cause consumer confusion in the United States.4 Id., at 286–287; accord, e.g., id., at 286 (“His operations and their effects were not confined within the territorial limits of a foreign nation”); id., at 288 (“[P]etitioner by his ‘own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere, brought about forbidden results within the United States’” (alteration omitted)). Because Steele implicated both domestic conduct and a likelihood of domestic confusion, it does not tell us which one determines the domestic applications of §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1). With Steele put aside, then, we think the parties’ particular debate over the “focus” of §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1) in the abstract does not exhaust the relevant inquiry. The ultimate question regarding permissible domestic application turns on the location of the conduct relevant to the focus. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337. And the conduct relevant to any focus the parties have proffered is infringing use in commerce, as the Act defines it. This conclusion follows from the text and context of §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1). Both provisions prohibit the unauthorized use “in commerce” of a protected trademark when, among other things, that use “is likely to cause confusion.” §§1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1). In other words, Congress proscribed the use of a mark in commerce under certain conditions. This conduct, to be sure, must create a sufficient risk of confusion, but confusion is not a separate requirement; rather, it is simply a necessary characteristic of an offending use.5 Because Congress has premised liability on a specific action (a particular sort of use in commerce), that specific action would be the conduct relevant to any focus on offer today. See, e.g., WesternGeco, 585 U. S., at ___– ___ (slip op., at 6–8). In sum, as this case comes to us, “use in commerce” is the conduct relevant to any potential focus of §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1) because Congress deemed a violation of either provision to occur each time a mark is used in commerce in the way Congress described, with no need for any actual confusion. Under step two of our extraterritoriality standard, then, “use in commerce” provides the dividing line between foreign and domestic applications of these Lanham Act provisions.

“It is a ‘longstanding principle of American law “that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”’” Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255 (2010). We have repeatedly explained that this principle, which we call the presumption against extraterritoriality, refers to a “presumption against application to conduct in the territory of another sovereign.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. 108, 119 (2013) (citing Morrison, 561 U. S., at 265). In other words, exclusively “‘[f]oreign conduct is generally the domain of foreign law.’” Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U. S. 437, 455 (2007) (alteration omitted). The presumption “serves to avoid the international discord that can result when U. S. law is applied to conduct in foreign countries” and reflects the “‘commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.’” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S. 325, 335–336 (2016). Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality involves “a two-step framework.” Id., at 337. At step one, we determine whether a provision is extraterritorial, and that determination turns on whether “Congress has affirmatively and unmistakably instructed that” the provision at issue should “apply to foreign conduct.” Id., at 335, 337; accord, Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 117 (asking whether Congress “intends federal law to apply to conduct occurring abroad”); Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 3). If Congress has provided an unmistakable instruction that the provision is extraterritorial, then claims alleging exclusively foreign conduct may proceed, subject to “the limits Congress has (or has not) imposed on the statute’s foreign application.” RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337–338. Step two does not end with identifying statutory focus. We have repeatedly and explicitly held that courts must “identif[y] ‘the statute’s “focus”’ and as[k] whether the conduct relevant to that focus occurred in United States territory.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (emphasis added); accord, e.g., RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337. Thus, to prove that a claim involves a domestic application of a statute, “plaintiffs must establish that ‘the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States.’” Nestlé, 593 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–4) (emphasis added); see, e.g., WesternGeco, 585 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–8) (holding that a claim was a domestic application of the Patent Act because the infringing acts—the conduct relevant to the focus of the provisions at issue—were committed in the United States); Morrison, 561 U. S., at 266–267, 271–273 (concluding that a claim was a foreign application of the Securities and Exchange Act because the “purchase-and-sale transactions” at issue occurred outside of the United States).

LAWRENCE K. NODINE, 2022 – counsel of record for the International Trademark Association. “BRIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY” in the case of ABITRON AUSTRIA GMBH, ET AL., Petitioners, v. HETRONIC INTERNATIONAL, INC. Respondent.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/21/21-1043/250905/20221227154119470_21-1043%20Brief.pdf //DH

Alito ’23 [Samuel; June 29; justice of the US Supreme Court, writing the majority opinion in a 9-0 decision; Abitron Austria GMBH et al. v. Hetronic International, Inc., https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1043_7648.pdf]

With this well-established framework in mind, the first question is whether the relevant provisions of the Lanham Act, see §§1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1), provide “a clear, affirmative indication” that they apply extraterritorially, RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337.3 They do not. It is a “rare statute that clearly evidences extraterritorial effect despite lacking an express statement of extraterritoriality.” Id., at 340. Our decision in RJR Nabisco illustrates the clarity required at step one of our framework. There, we held that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act could have extraterritorial application in some circumstances because many of its predicate offenses “plainly apply to at least some foreign conduct” and “[a]t least one predicate . . . applies only to conduct occurring outside the United States.” Id., at 338. Here, neither provision at issue provides an express statement of extraterritorial application or any other clear indication that it is one of the “rare” provisions that nonetheless applies abroad. Both simply prohibit the use “in commerce,” under congressionally prescribed conditions, of protected trademarks when that use “is likely to cause confusion.” §§1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1). Hetronic acknowledges that neither provision on its own signals extraterritorial application, but it argues that the requisite indication can be found in the Lanham Act’s definition of “commerce,” which applies to both provisions. Under that definition, “‘commerce’ means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.” §1127. Hetronic offers two reasons why this definition is sufficient to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. First, it argues that the language naturally leads to this result because Congress can lawfully regulate foreign conduct under the Foreign Commerce Clause. Second, it contends that extraterritoriality is confirmed by the fact that this definition is unique in the U. S. Code and thus differs from what it describes as “boilerplate” definitions of “‘commerce’” in other statutes. Brief for Respondent 23. Neither reason is sufficient. When applying the presumption, “‘we have repeatedly held that even statutes . . . that expressly refer to “foreign commerce”’” when defining “commerce” are not extraterritorial. Morrison, 561 U. S., at 262–263; see also RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 344. This conclusion dooms Hetronic’s argument. If an express statutory reference to “foreign commerce” is not enough to rebut the presumption, the same must be true of a definition of “commerce” that refers to Congress’s authority to regulate foreign commerce. That result does not change simply because the provision refers to “all” commerce Congress can regulate. See Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 118 (“[I]t is well established that generic terms like ‘any’ or ‘every’ do not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality”). And the mere fact that the Lanham Act contains a substantively similar definition that departs from the so-called “boilerplate” definitions used in other statutes cannot justify a different conclusion either.

“It is a ‘longstanding principle of American law “that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”’” Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255 (2010). We have repeatedly explained that this principle, which we call the presumption against extraterritoriality, refers to a “presumption against application to conduct in the territory of another sovereign.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. 108, 119 (2013) (citing Morrison, 561 U. S., at 265). In other words, exclusively “‘[f]oreign conduct is generally the domain of foreign law.’” Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U. S. 437, 455 (2007) (alteration omitted). The presumption “serves to avoid the international discord that can result when U. S. law is applied to conduct in foreign countries” and reflects the “‘commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.’” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S. 325, 335–336 (2016). Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality involves “a two-step framework.” Id., at 337. At step one, we determine whether a provision is extraterritorial, and that determination turns on whether “Congress has affirmatively and unmistakably instructed that” the provision at issue should “apply to foreign conduct.” Id., at 335, 337; accord, Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 117 (asking whether Congress “intends federal law to apply to conduct occurring abroad”); Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 3). If Congress has provided an unmistakable instruction that the provision is extraterritorial, then claims alleging exclusively foreign conduct may proceed, subject to “the limits Congress has (or has not) imposed on the statute’s foreign application.” RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337–338. Step two does not end with identifying statutory focus. We have repeatedly and explicitly held that courts must “identif[y] ‘the statute’s “focus”’ and as[k] whether the conduct relevant to that focus occurred in United States territory.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (emphasis added); accord, e.g., RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337. Thus, to prove that a claim involves a domestic application of a statute, “plaintiffs must establish that ‘the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States.’” Nestlé, 593 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–4) (emphasis added); see, e.g., WesternGeco, 585 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–8) (holding that a claim was a domestic application of the Patent Act because the infringing acts—the conduct relevant to the focus of the provisions at issue—were committed in the United States); Morrison, 561 U. S., at 266–267, 271–273 (concluding that a claim was a foreign application of the Securities and Exchange Act because the “purchase-and-sale transactions” at issue occurred outside of the United States).

LAWRENCE K. NODINE, 2022 – counsel of record for the International Trademark Association. “BRIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY” in the case of ABITRON AUSTRIA GMBH, ET AL., Petitioners, v. HETRONIC INTERNATIONAL, INC. Respondent.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/21/21-1043/250905/20221227154119470_21-1043%20Brief.pdf //DH

Alito ’23 [Samuel; June 29; justice of the US Supreme Court, writing the majority opinion in a 9-0 decision; Abitron Austria GMBH et al. v. Hetronic International, Inc., https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1043_7648.pdf]

With this well-established framework in mind, the first question is whether the relevant provisions of the Lanham Act, see §§1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1), provide “a clear, affirmative indication” that they apply extraterritorially, RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337.3 They do not. It is a “rare statute that clearly evidences extraterritorial effect despite lacking an express statement of extraterritoriality.” Id., at 340. Our decision in RJR Nabisco illustrates the clarity required at step one of our framework. There, we held that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act could have extraterritorial application in some circumstances because many of its predicate offenses “plainly apply to at least some foreign conduct” and “[a]t least one predicate . . . applies only to conduct occurring outside the United States.” Id., at 338. Here, neither provision at issue provides an express statement of extraterritorial application or any other clear indication that it is one of the “rare” provisions that nonetheless applies abroad. Both simply prohibit the use “in commerce,” under congressionally prescribed conditions, of protected trademarks when that use “is likely to cause confusion.” §§1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1). Hetronic acknowledges that neither provision on its own signals extraterritorial application, but it argues that the requisite indication can be found in the Lanham Act’s definition of “commerce,” which applies to both provisions. Under that definition, “‘commerce’ means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.” §1127. Hetronic offers two reasons why this definition is sufficient to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. First, it argues that the language naturally leads to this result because Congress can lawfully regulate foreign conduct under the Foreign Commerce Clause. Second, it contends that extraterritoriality is confirmed by the fact that this definition is unique in the U. S. Code and thus differs from what it describes as “boilerplate” definitions of “‘commerce’” in other statutes. Brief for Respondent 23. Neither reason is sufficient. When applying the presumption, “‘we have repeatedly held that even statutes . . . that expressly refer to “foreign commerce”’” when defining “commerce” are not extraterritorial. Morrison, 561 U. S., at 262–263; see also RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 344. This conclusion dooms Hetronic’s argument. If an express statutory reference to “foreign commerce” is not enough to rebut the presumption, the same must be true of a definition of “commerce” that refers to Congress’s authority to regulate foreign commerce. That result does not change simply because the provision refers to “all” commerce Congress can regulate. See Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 118 (“[I]t is well established that generic terms like ‘any’ or ‘every’ do not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality”). And the mere fact that the Lanham Act contains a substantively similar definition that departs from the so-called “boilerplate” definitions used in other statutes cannot justify a different conclusion either.

Slowing growth makes it harder for leaders to keep the public happy. Economic underperformance weakens the country against its rivals. Fearing upheaval, leaders crack down on dissent. They maneuver desperately to keep geopolitical enemies at bay. Expansion seems like a solution—a way of grabbing economic resources and markets, making nationalism a crutch for a wounded regime, and beating back foreign threats.

Many countries have followed this path. When the United States’ long post-Civil War economic surge ended, Washington violently suppressed strikes and unrest at home, built a powerful blue-water Navy, and engaged in a fit of belligerence and imperial expansion during the 1890s. After a fast-rising imperial Russia fell into a deep slump at the turn of the 20th century, the tsarist government cracked down hard while also enlarging its military, seeking colonial gains in East Asia and sending around 170,000 soldiers to occupy Manchuria. These moves backfired spectacularly: They antagonized Japan, which beat Russia in the first great-power war of the 20th century.

Money laundering is a necessary component of the organized crime that too frequently spans borders, skirts taxes, funds terrorism and corrupts officials—and it comes with hefty macroeconomic costs. Bad actors are also embracing new technologies on top of their traditional techniques, all of which makes economic growth less inclusive and sustainable, fueling inequality and informality.

The international community has made significant progress toward strengthening safeguards against money laundering and terrorist financing, with  from the IMF and other organizations. We decided a decade ago to take a more bespoke  to identifying key risks, working with member countries and international partners, particularly, the Financial Action Task Force, the international standard-setter in this area.

That entails blocking the pathways to terrorist acquisition of a nuclear weapon: transfer--the sale or handoff of a weapon from a nuclear-weapon state; leakage--the theft of a nuclear weaponor weapons-grade fissile material; and indigenous production--the construction of a nuclear device from illicitly obtained weapons-grade fissile material.

Each pathway to nuclear acquisition by a non-state terrorist group is contingent on an act of commission or negligence by a state. The "leakage" of a weapon to a terrorist group would originate from one of the nine nuclear-weapon states, or the 26 states (at current count) with weapons-grade fissile material in their civilian stocks. Effective strategies on the state level to prevent nuclear terrorism will not eliminate non-state threats, but will go far in achieving that objective.

Doctors have called for an urgent international effort to combat a “pandemic of bad drugs” that is thought to kill hundreds of thousands of people globally every year.

A surge in counterfeit and poor quality medicines means that 250,000 children a year are thought to die after receiving shoddy or outright fake drugs intended to treat malaria and pneumonia alone, the doctors warned.

You can protect yourself and your family by being cautious when buying medicine online. Some pharmacy websites operate legally and offer convenience, privacy, cost savings and safeguards for purchasing medicines.

Not all websites are the same. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration warns that there are many unsafe online pharmacies that claim to sell prescription drugs at deeply discounted prices, often without requiring a prescription. These internet-based pharmacies often sell unapproved, counterfeit or otherwise unsafe medicines outside the safeguards followed by licensed pharmacies.

Carbon Capture Has So Far Mostly Just Captured Taxpayer Money In 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) offered $3.4 billion for the research and development of CCS projects (of that total nearly $1 billion went unspent).1 Out of 11 large-scale demonstration projects selected by the Department of Energy (DOE), 9 were funded by the ARRA and only 2 remain operational.2 Of the five commercial power plant projects, only one (Petra Nova) ever reached operation and Petra Nova faced serious challenges, forcing the plant to close after fewer than 4 years.3 This track record should elicit serious concern; the Inflation Reduction Act increases federal tax credits for CCS technology, putting even more public dollars on the line for a technology with a failed track record. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), additional CCS funding could easily be wasted without additional congressional oversight and accountability: “Absent such a mechanism, DOE may be at risk of expending significant funds on CCS demonstration projects with little likelihood of success.”4 Future CCS projects remain heavily dependent on revenue from tax credits and oil extraction rather than electricity sales. 5 Food & Water Watch reviewed large-scale CCS projects affiliated with the DOE’s joint development programs supported by the ARRA and which featured prominently in the DOE’s 2010 roadmap for carbon capture. This is not a comprehensive review of all announced CCS projects or even those that received federal funding, but rather a representative review of major projects. An MIT database of carbon capture projects through September 2016 recorded 15 canceled carbon capture projects, but that list is also not exhaustive; more than 30 coal plants announced in the mid-2000s considered carbon capture.6 Nonetheless, this is intended as a representative review of major projects. According to the DOE’s 2010 roadmap, 10 projects with start dates between 2013 and 2016 were expected to make use of CCS; as of September 2022, only 2 of these facilities remain operational.7 Carbon Capture Projects That Never Got Off The Ground American Electric Power “Mountaineer” American Electric Power (AEP) attempted to capture the CO2 emissions from a 235-megawatt coal electric power generator in West Virginia and inject the CO2 into geological storage near the facility. AEP withdrew from the project at the definition stage of development, after receiving over $16 million from the DOE. AEP claimed that the project would not be viable without additional federal support or legislation limiting emissions.8 Though the DOE was willing to shoulder half the $668 million cost of the project, AEP was unable to force ratepayers to cover the other half.9 If completed, the CCS-equipped unit would have represented 18 percent of the electric capacity of the power plant.10 Basin Electric “Antelope Valley” Basin Electric proposed capturing CO2 from a 120-megawatt stream at the company’s coal power plant in North Dakota but withdrew before receiving funds because the project was unable to find a plausible plan despite $100 million in potential DOE funding.11 In addition to the DOE grant, the project was also guaranteed a $300 million loan through the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).12 The project was canceled fewer than 6 months after its inception, in part because internal cost estimates found that the project would be 30 percent more expensive than the DOE projected.13 FutureGen 2.0 Power Plant & FutureGen 2.0 Pipeline and Storage FutureGen originated as a Bush administration program that would spend $1 billion of public money to build a new 275-megawatt coal plant that incorporated CCS and hydrogen production at a single site in Mattoon, IL. This original vision didn’t receive the desired funding and by 2008 the DOE restructured the program away from a state-of-the-art living laboratory approach. In 2010, the DOE announced $1 billion in public funding to support yet another, different vision for FutureGen — located at an oil-fired unit in Meredosia, IL. More than a decade after the birth of the program, FutureGen remained early in development and faced rising costs, issues with project development, challenges retrofitting the plant and struggles meeting the 90 percent CO2 capture target.14 The final iteration of the FutureGen 2.0 program in Illinois aimed to capture CO2 and other emissions from a coal plant and transport the CO2 to a storage site 30 miles away. Following years of delay, the DOE withdrew support for the project in 2015. The power plant was unable to start construction because the plant failed to find adequate engineering and did not successfully find investors. The two components of the project (pipeline and power plant) only spent $83.8 and $116.6 million respectively from the DOE.15 Despite the virtually blank check provided to it, when the project was canceled most of the public money remained unspent.16 Hydrogen Energy California In 2007 a joint venture between Rio Tinto and BP was formed to build a new hydrogen CCS facility in Carson, California slated for operation in 2012.17 A company called SCS energy bought out and reformulated the incomplete project in late 2011.18 The revival of Hydrogen Energy California aimed to build and capture emissions from a small integrated gasification combined cycle coal plant for use in Enhanced Oil Recovery 4 miles from the power plant. After contributing $153.4 million, the DOE ended its agreement with Hydrogen Energy California, “after extensive budget and schedule overruns and repeatedly missed milestones.”19 Despite the challenges, the DOE lowered the private finance requirement for the project and made up the difference with federal funds in excess of the original agreement.20 This facility, which was never built, also qualified for $103.5 million in clean coal investment tax credits.21 Southern Company Services “Plant Barry” Southern Company Services withdrew before reaching a funding agreement with the DOE but proposed capturing the emissions from a 160-megawatt coal-powered generation unit located in Alabama.22 Two months after the DOE announced its willingness to provide $295 million for the $665 million project, Southern Company withdrew, claiming an inability to do financial due diligence in time.23 Now, a decade after the original plans fell through, the DOE is offering yet more funding to support another attempted CCS project at the same site.24 Summit Texas Clean Energy Summit aimed to build a new 400-megawatt integrated combined gasification coal plant in Texas, capturing emissions equivalent to a 190-megawatt power plant to use for enhanced oil recovery in the Permian Basin. The DOE contributed $117.9 million but removed further support following a DOE OIG report recommending that the DOE suspend funding for the plant.25 The DOE violated the original cost-sharing agreement with the company and contributed nearly 8 times the funding that had been agreed to even though the plant was never built.26 In 2021, the DOE sued Summit to recover $13.8 million, alleging that Summit refused to fulfill its guarantees to the agency.27 The facility also received $324 million in clean coal investment tax credits.28 Leucadia Lake Charles The Leucadia Lake Charles project aimed to capture 4.5 million tons of CO2 from a new methanol (petrochemical input used to produce a range of products such as plastics, paints and furniture) plant in Louisiana. The project planned to use the CO2 for EOR and received $12.7 million from the DOE before the project was canceled in 2015.29 Unlike the other, operational industrial CCS projects, Leucadia aimed to selectively remove CO2 from a mixed gas stream, rather than purifying an already concentrated stream of CO2 from an industrial process.30 The project was revived in 2015 by a former employee, promising to build a CCS facility at the same site. This new iteration secured $2 billion in conditional loan guarantees from the DOE.31 By early 2022, 15 years after the original proposals, the project remained nonexistent.32 The Major Busts In Carbon Capture Projects Southern Company “Kemper” Southern Company’s notorious power plant project in Kemper, MS featured prominently in the DOE’s 2010 roadmap for its Clean Coal Power Initiative program. The plant aimed to capture 2 million metric tons of CO2 per year, 65 percent of its total emissions.33 The project was awarded at least $680 million in federal grants and tax credits, including millions that Southern Company managed to redirect from another failed clean coal project in Orlando.34 Set to open in 2013, Kemper pushed back its opening day for years.35 By 2015 the project’s overall budget had ballooned from $1.8 billion to $6.2 billion.36 Critical parts of the plant were torn down and rebuilt due to construction challenges, such as a misunderstanding of chemical reactions that led to the replacement of 1,500 feet of pipe.37 In 2015 Southern company claimed that the project was “98 percent or so complete”38 By 2017, regulators forced Kemper to abandon its clean coal plans completely.39 Problems with the plant’s construction were raised early on by a whistleblower who ultimately sued Southern Company for retaliation, but Southern Company suppressed concerns and encouraged engineers to agree to unrealistic timelines.40 In 2021, Southern imploded the Kemper Project, which had just years earlier been celebrated as the country’s first commercial-scale carbon capture project at a coal plant. Petra Nova Until May 2020, Petra Nova was the only operational carbon capture and storage (CCS) power plant in the U.S. It has been put on a pedestal as the CCS power plant poster child, even though it closed after fewer than four years of operation.41 Petra Nova’s story reveals that there are serious economic challenges for CCS: The facility was unable to attain profitability despite generous government support, which could have totaled up to $360 million over the planned lifetime of the project. Although some claim the project was undermined primarily by low oil prices,42 Petra Nova faced numerous technical setbacks, resulting in financial disappointments from the beginning. It’s also far from an environmental success story, considering that this coal-fired power plant used its carbon emissions to produce climate-polluting oil and missed its own carbon-capture targets.43 Petra Nova had limited ambitions and a large price tag. When built, the W.A. Parish facility that’s home to Petra Nova had 3,700 megawatts (MW) of capacity, but the Petra Nova CCS project only captured the CO2 from a 240 MW unit at the plant.44 The CO2 was then compressed and transported from the plant through an 81-mile pipeline to be injected and used for oil recovery at the West Ranch oilfield.45 The plant itself and the cogeneration facility that powers it cost $600 million; the remaining $400 million covered the pipeline, the upgrades to the West Ranch oilfield, and administrative costs.46 (In total $4,200 per kilowatt of capacity retrofitted.47 ) Proponents have focused on the fact that while fully operational, Petra Nova managed to capture over 90 percent of carbon emissions. However, the plant was often offline due to technological problems. For example, Petra Nova experienced leaks from its heat exchangers and its flue gas blower developed a vibration problem from a build-up of limestone used to scrub SO2. The CO2 utilization plan to transport captured carbon to West Ranch oilfields also faced challenges with partial or full shut-ins of the associated pipeline and West Ranch’s inability to receive the captured CO2.48 Over three years of operation, Petra Nova’s components had 294 days’ worth of non-weather related, unplanned outages, leading to a lower overall capture rate. Petra Nova only captured 3,904,978 short tons of CO2 over a three-year period (an average of 1,301,659 short tons per year), 81 percent of its target. In fact, the carbon capture plant only operated at an estimated 69 percent of full functionality.49 Capturing this carbon costs approximately $256 per short ton ($1 billion/3,904,978), excluding the operational costs of this plant. Had NRG Energy (Petra Nova’s parent company) instead invested in wind power, a similar emissions reduction would have cost $320 million, $680 million less than Petra Nova.50 Technological problems also contributed to financial disappointments that began almost as soon as the plant opened. Falling oil prices led NRG Energy to take a $140 million Petra Nova-related hit in 2016.51 Then in late 2017, NRG Energy booked an additional $69 million loss after realizing CO2 injection would produce less oil than originally expected.52 By the end of 2019, NRG Energy had reduced the value of its investment by $317 million, leading the company to renegotiate its arrangement with the joint venture.53 After the first quarter of 2020, NRG Energy reduced Petra Nova’s value by another $18 million.54 While Petra Nova sought to reduce the costs of CCS, the project did not demonstrate substantial improvements to the economics of the technology.55 CCS is still so expensive that some future CCS projects plan to make more money from tax credits and oil extraction than they do from selling electricity.56 Additionally, there is no indication that Petra Nova helped reduce the energy needs of capture equipment. Petra Nova’s CCS system used 35 MW of electricity plus the steam from a 78 MW gas-fired generator which was built to meet the needs of the CCS facility.57 The “parasitic load” of the capture system was likely around 22 percent, a misleadingly low penalty as the natural gas plant powering the capture was more efficient than the coal plant.58 Is This What Carbon Capture Success Looks Like? Air Products and Chemicals Air Products and Chemicals claims to have captured 1 million metric tons of CO2 per year from steam-methane reformers (industrial facilities that turn natural gas into hydrogen) in Texas, beginning operations in 2013. The DOE gave the project $284 million in funding. Captured CO2 is used for enhanced oil recovery.59 To meet the additional energy requirements, Air Products uses a new 21-megawatt gas turbine requiring 270MMbtu/hr of fuel to capture 128.6 short tons per hour. The lifecycle emissions (including methane leakage) of the natural gas burned to capture this CO2 are responsible for more than one-quarter of the greenhouse gas impact of the captured CO2.60 Additionally, the facility only captures process emissions, responsible for about two-thirds of the CO2 released on-site when producing hydrogen.61 While Air Products captures approximately 1 million tons of CO2 per year, according to the EPA, the site was responsible for 2.4 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent emissions in 2020.62 Air Products does not publicly disclose the quantity of captured CO2 to the EPA, but the project is only claiming to capture 60 percent (1 million metric tons) of the 1.65 million metric tons of CO2 emitted from the hydrogen production.63 This suggests a capture rate far below the typically cited and targeted 90 percent, even ignoring the uncaptured natural gas emissions elsewhere at the facility.64 Achieving higher capture rates requires substantially more energy with corresponding costs and environmental impacts.65 After accounting for methane leakage associated with hydrogen produced from fracked gas, CCS facilities that achieve high capture rates would still have significant greenhouse gas footprints.66 Natural gas-sourced hydrogen produced using CCS may only have 9 to 12 percent lower emissions than hydrogen produced without CCS.67 Burning hydrogen in place of natural gas, even when produced with CCS, actually has higher emissions than simply burning natural gas.68 Fortunately, there’s no need for natural gas-fueled hydrogen plants. Evidence suggests that truly clean hydrogen, produced using renewable electricity, could soon become cheaper than hydrogen produced from fossil fuels both with and without CCS.69 Archer Daniels Midland Decatur Ethanol CCS Archer Daniels Midland’s Decatur project, which received $141 million from the DOE and began operation in 2017, aims to sequester 1 million tons of CO2 per year from an ethanol plant in Decatur, Illinois.70 The capture system dehydrates and compresses a stream of 99 percent pure CO2 that is a byproduct of fermenting corn ethanol.71 According to publicly available EPA data, ADM only sequesters 521,000 metric tons of CO2 annually, about half of what its permit allows and a slim fraction of the reported 4.4 million metric tons of total facility emissions.72 ADM’s CCS facility only captures the emissions that are a byproduct of the fermentation process, leaving a wide range of uncaptured emissions from ethanol production.73 And this is an even smaller portion of the overall emissions74 from a fuel that, when burned, will emit CO2.75 Based on survey averages of natural gas and electricity use by ethanol producers, Food & Water Watch estimates that ADM’s ethanol production at this facility requires 8.2 billion cubic feet of natural gas and 260 million kWh of electricity. Emissions from these sources are equal to 1.066 million metric tons per year and equal the emissions ADM plans to capture from the fermentation process.76 In 2020, ADM admitted that the technology to capture these emissions doesn’t exist and speculated that capturing stack emissions is “likely 10 years out.”77 Production of ethanol only accounts for a fraction of overall emissions, fuel and feedstock transport, agricultural emissions and land use change all contribute to the life cycle greenhouse gas footprint.78 Incorporating these emissions, ADM’s captured carbon accounts for only one-third of the life cycle emissions of the ethanol the facility produces, resulting in a fuel with a similar emissions impact to gasoline.79 Accounting for land use changes, ethanol has life cycle emissions up to 24 percent higher than fossil fuel-derived gasoline.80 Ethanol also increases the overall supply of gasoline available to burn, leading to increased consumption and leaving oil that can still be burned later.81 Managing CO2 also requires energy with corresponding, additional emissions.82 The cooling and compression of the CO2 use electricity (with uncaptured emissions) and the chemical used for dehydration is regenerated by boiling with natural gas, another source of emissions.83 Carbon capture proponents often point to this plant as proof of carbon capture’s broader feasibility.84 However, ethanol fermentation emits a very concentrated stream of CO2, making it substantially easier and cheaper to scrub than emissions from power plants or other industrial sources.85 What These 11 Case Studies Tell Us Carbon capture cannot be the centerpiece of any serious climate plan. Its track record makes it appear to be a handout to fossil fuel corporations, publicly financing their attempts to keep their harmful product viable. The truth is we need to move to 100% renewable energy by 2030, and no half-baked schemes are going to replace that course of action. No matter how inconvenient that is to the oil and gas industry, it’s a fact the rest of us need to keep in sight.

Carbon capture and storage is an old technology, first commercialized in the 1970s. Back then it was called enhanced oil recovery, because the carbon dioxide recovered from oil and gas production was injected into depleted oil and gas reservoirs to re-pressurize them and extract more hydrocarbons. As the climate change movement gained momentum, the oil and gas industry wisely rebranded enhanced oil recovery as a “climate-friendly” process with a new name: carbon capture utilization and storage. Today, over 70 percent of carbon capture projects are, in fact, enhanced oil recovery projects used to produce more oil and/or gas, resulting in yet more greenhouse gas emissions. The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis has estimated that most of the total captured carbon throughout history found its use in enhanced oil recovery— approximately 8090 percent. Only a small proportion of carbon capture projects (approximately 1020 percent) have stored carbon in dedicated geological structures without using it for oil and gas production.  Capturing Scope 3 emissions, the biggest chunk of emissions created from using the product, is not being accounted for in “carbon-neutral” claims. The entire efficacy of the carbon capture process has been called into question by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 3/7 Carbon capture in power plants has shown a track record of technical failures since 2000 Despite its long history, carbon capture is a problematic technology. A new IEEFA study reviewed the capacity and performance of 13 flagship projects and found that 10 of the 13 failed or underperformed against their designed capacities, mostly by large margins. The natural gas processing sector dominates the application of carbon capture technology. The gas production process requires the removal of carbon dioxide. While many gas companies now claim to produce “carbon-neutral” gas or liquefied natural gas, this is little more than marketing hubris. The “carbon-neutral” tag has been obtained by using carbon capture to capture the 1015 percent of Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions (the emissions generated from producing natural gas) during the gas production process or by purchasing carbon offsets. Yet up to 90 percent of emissions from oil and gas do not occur at production. Instead, these emissions, called Scope 3 emissions, occur when the product is actually used, that is, burnt. As shown in our study, capturing Scope 3 emissions, the biggest chunk of emissions created from using the product, is not being accounted for in these “carbonneutral” claims. Apart from the poor performance of carbon capture projects, carbon capture in power plants has shown a track record of technical failures since 2000. Close to 90 percent of the proposed global carbon capture capacity in the power sector has failed at the implementation stage or was suspended early. Even if the carbon dioxide can be injected underground, there is no guarantee that it will stay there and not leak into the atmosphere. There are several real-world examples of failure to keep gas underground. The best example is the California Aliso Canyon gas leak in 2015, the worst man-made greenhouse gas disaster in US history, when 97,000 metric tons of methane leaked into the atmosphere. While the leak at Aliso Canyon was a methane, not carbon dioxide, leak, Carbon capture has a long history. Of failure The entire efficacy of the carbon capture process has been called into question depleted oil and gas reservoirs are commonly used to store captured carbon dioxide. The problems encountered at Aliso Canyon could also be encountered with carbon dioxide at a carbon capture project. Another failure was the In Salah project in Algeria, a carbon capture project with a total cost of US$2.7 billion. Injection started in 2004 and was suspended in 2011 due to concerns about the integrity of the seal and suspicious movements of the trapped carbon dioxide under the ground. The entire efficacy of the carbon capture process has been called into question by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. In its special report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage, the IPCC stated: “CO2 storage is not necessarily permanent. Physical leakage from storage reservoirs is possible via (1) gradual and long-term release or (2) sudden release of CO2 caused by disruption of the reservoir.” Carbon capture has been used as a justification for new oil and gas projects. It has a history of poor performance, only captures a fraction of the total emissions from the lifecycle of oil and gas production and its long-term efficacy is questionable. It is no solution for a climate-constrained world.

After billions of dollars in public and private investments over decades, there are no carbon capture success stories — only colossal failures. One of the largest was the Petra Nova coal plant in Texas, once the poster child for CO2 removal. But the plant consistently underperformed, before it finally closed for good last year. Another high-profile example — the San Juan Generating Station in New Mexico, touted as the largest capture project in the world — may already be headed to a similar fate. Between 2005 and 2012, the U.S. Department of Energy spent $6.9 billion to try to demonstrate the feasibility of CCS for coal. However, little came of this investment. From 2014 to 2016, less than 4% of the planned CCS capacity had been deployed. The Biden administration wants to shift its focus to carbon capture for gas-fired power plants. Yet, there’s no reason to think the outcome will be any different. 2. Carbon Capture Is Energy Intensive Running a carbon capture system is incredibly energy-intensive. It essentially requires building a new power plant to run the system, creating another source of air and carbon pollution. That undermines the whole goal of capturing carbon in the first place. Our country emits roughly 5 billion tons of carbon into the atmosphere every year. Removing 1 billion tons of that through direct air capture would require nearly the entire electricity output of the United States. It’s also important to consider the scale of what would be needed. The Energy Department recently announced $12 million to fund “direct air capture” projects. It also touted the possible removal of 100,000 tons of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. To put this in perspective, the largest corporate polluter in 2018 was responsible for releasing 119 million tons of CO2 equivalent — and that’s only one of them. 3. Carbon Capture Actually Increases Emissions Due to the large amount of energy required to power carbon capture, plus the life cycle of fossil fuels, carbon capture in this country has actually put more CO2 into the atmosphere than it has removed. That’s not an accident. “Succesful” capture projects only exist at facilities where the carbon is injected into existing wells to extract more oil. This practice is known as “enhanced oil recovery.” While an oil company CEO might argue that doubling down on fossil fuels is a climate solution, the planet begs to differ. 4. Storage Presents Significant Risks There are also other significant risks related to the disposal and storage of carbon. For example, well failure during injection or a blowout could result in a release of large amounts of CO2. Storage locations can leak CO2, as they are often sited near fossil fuel reservoirs. There, oil and gas wellbores provide a pathway for CO2 to escape to the surface. Those storage leaks could contaminate groundwater and soil. Moreover, CO2 injections could cause earthquakes, which have already been measured at injection sites. As Friends of the Earth noted recently, when a CO2 pipeline in a majority Black community in Mississippi ruptured last year, residents had to seek medical treatment. The incident also killed local plants and wildlife. 5. Carbon Capture Trades Off With Other Critical Solutions Wishful thinking about carbon capture isn’t just an ineffective response to the climate crisis — it’s dangerous. We have a small window where we can take the bold action needed to avert runaway climate chaos. Counting on carbon capture’s effectiveness squanders the opportunity to enact actual emissions reductions (a phenomenon known as “mitigation deterrence“). The reason that the oil and gas industry loves carbon capture is simple: It extends the fossil fuel era instead of ending it. Already, dirty energy companies are pitching the construction of new pipelines and fracked gas power plants. They’re also making totally empty promises about their ability to install capture technology to make this polluting infrastructure “clean.” If carbon capture continues to fail, it doesn’t matter much to the company running the dirty power plant. They will just continue on with business as usual. So long as fossil fuel companies, government officials, and even some progressive advocates are fooled by carbon capture, there will be less pressure to actually stop climate pollution by putting an end to drilling and fracking. The carbon capture mirage will block any hope for the political will needed for a rapid and just transition to 100% renewable energy.

Carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) technologies are critical for putting energy systems around the world on a sustainable path. Despite the importance of CCUS for achieving clean energy transitions, deployment has been slow to take off – there are only around 20 commercial CCUS operations worldwide. But momentum is building. Plans for more than 30 commercial CCUS facilities have been announced in recent years, and despite the Covid‑19 crisis, in 2020 governments and industry committed more than USD 4.5 billion to CCUS. A number of factors can explain the slow uptake of CCUS, but high cost is one of the most frequently heard. Commentators often cite CCUS as being too expensive and unable to compete with wind and solar electricity given their spectacular fall in costs over the last decade, while climate policies – including carbon pricing – are not yet strong enough to make CCUS economically attractive. As we explain in this commentary, to dismiss the technology on cost grounds would be to ignore its unique strengths, its competitiveness in key sectors and its potential to enter the mainstream of low-carbon solutions. Achieving net-zero goals will be virtually impossible without CCUS IEA analysis consistently shows that a broad portfolio of technologies is needed to achieve deep emissions reductions, both practically and cost-effectively. Energy efficiency and renewables are central pillars, but other technologies and strategies have a major role to play as well. In its recently published report, the IEA identified four crucial ways in which CCUS can contribute to a successful clean energy transition: CCUS can be retrofitted to power and industrial plants that may otherwise still be emitting 8 billion tonnes of CO2 in 2050 – around one-quarter of today’s annual energy-sector emissions. CCUS can tackle emissions in sectors with limited other options, such as cement, steel and chemicals manufacturing, and in the production of synthetic fuels for long-distance transport. CCUS enables the production of low-carbon hydrogen from fossil fuels, a least-cost option in several regions around the world. CCUS can remove CO2 from the atmosphere by combining it with bioenergy or direct air capture to balance emissions that are unavoidable or technically difficult to avoid. Limiting the availability of CCUS would considerably increase the cost and complexity of the energy transition by increasing reliance on technologies that are currently more expensive and at earlier stages of development. One such example is the electrification of very high-temperature heat furnaces used for cement production and virgin steelmaking. There is no single cost for CCUS CCUS applications do not all have the same cost. Looking specifically at carbon capture, the cost can vary greatly by CO2 source, from a range of USD 15-25/t CO2 for industrial processes producing “pure” or highly concentrated CO2 streams (such as ethanol production or natural gas processing) to USD 40-120/t CO2 for processes with “dilute” gas streams, such as cement production and power generation. Capturing CO2 directly from the air is currently the most expensive approach, but could nonetheless play a unique role in carbon removal. Some CO2 capture technologies are commercially available now, while others are still in development, and this further contributes to the large range in costs.

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In addition to efficiency improvements and enhancing clean energy use, one key option for limiting future CO2 emissions from fossil fuel energy use is carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS). CCS is a suite of technologies integrated to capture and transport CO2 from major point sources to a storage site where the CO2 is injected down wells and then permanently trapped in porous geological formations deep below the surface. Candidates for CCS technology include fossil fuel power plants; steel, cement, and fertilizer factories; and other industrial facilities. CCS in Developing Countries Despite often-aggressive programs to promote energy efficiency and deploy nuclear, renewable, and other low-carbon energy sources, many developing countries will still rely heavily on fossil fuel energy to power their development for decades to come. There is therefore a need for developing countries to create strategies that address fossil fuel emissions in a way that minimizes the costs of doing so, and consequently minimizes impacts to their national development goals. CCS is currently the only near-commercial technology proven to directly disassociate CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use at scale. Its deployment could potentially allow developing countries to gradually shift away from fossil fuels for energy and industrial needs with relatively little disruption to their long-term development strategies. If deployed as an interim measure, it could allow time for other alternative low-carbon technologies to be developed and deployed, permitting fossil fuels to be gradually phased out. This strategy could assist developing countries to transition to a low-carbon economy in the next 15–50 years. While CCS is potentially attractive to some developing countries, there has been limited development of demonstration projects in Africa, Asia, or Latin America due mainly to their high cost in the absence of expected profits or significant carbon financing. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates the total cost for a new average-sized coal-fired power plant that captures up to 90 percent of its CO2 emissions to be US$1 billion over 10 years. Existing financing for CCS is grossly insufficient to enable demonstration projects in developing countries. The few available funds are either spread over the full array of low-carbon technologies, or fall short of the magnitude or the mandate needed to propel commercial-scale CCS demonstrations forward. Current carbon offset mechanisms are not sufficient to spur CCS deployment in developing countries in today’s context either. Overall, existing CCS financing mechanisms help grow capacity, but their support is insufficient to leverage enough funding from capital markets to implement projects in a non-OECD context. The IEA CCS Roadmap proposes 50 CCS projects in developing countries in the next 10 to 20 years. As well as reducing the developing world’s greenhouse gas emissions, accelerating CCS demonstration efforts in non-OECD countries can likely also improve technologies, increase efficiency, reduce uncertainty and risk, and initiate learning-by-doing at a lower cost than would be possible in OECD countries. The captured benefits from doing so will be more significant the sooner acceleration in CCS development in developing countries begins. About this Paper: Topics of Discussion for Financing CCS in Developing Countries This paper seeks to promote the effective deployment of CCS demonstration projects in developing countries. Aimed at international policymakers and agencies engaged in CCS funding and deployment negotiations and discussions, the paper explores some of the key issues emerging around this critically important topic, and it presents a series of options and recommendations to international policymakers. WRI’s aim is to assist the initial design of an effective approach for financing CCS demonstration projects in developing countries over the next 10 years. Below is a summary of the key topics and options explored in the paper.

Climate change is a global issue that requires a global solution. One proposed solution is carbon capture technologies. These technologies are designed to capture carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from power plants and other industrial sources and store them on the soil. However, many people are concerned about the cost of implementing these technologies and wonder if they are worth the investment. In this article, we will analyze the costs and benefits of carbon capture technologies to better understand their economics. The various economic aspects of carbon capture As the awareness surrounding climate change continues to grow, the adoption of sustainable energy practices has become a pressing issue in global politics. In this context, carbon capture technology is one such practice that has emerged as a potential solution to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate climate change. However, there are concerns about the costs and benefits associated with this technology. Can the benefits outweigh the potential costs? Can such costs be reduced with better technology? Let’s analyze that. – Capital Costs The capital costs associated with carbon capture technologies can be high. Estimates range from $36 to $90 per ton of carbon dioxide captured. These costs vary depending on the type of technology used, the size of the facility, and the location of the site. For example, post-combustion carbon capture technologies tend to have higher capital costs than pre-combustion technologies. Additionally, the more carbon dioxide the facility is trying to capture, the higher the capital costs will be. However, some experts believe that these costs could come down in the future as the technology improves and becomes more widely used. This improvement comes with newer and more efficient techniques of retrieving carbon from the atmosphere and storing it in on the soil, such as the use of enhanced rock weathering (ERW), or more effective ways to prevent CO2 emissions. – Operational Costs In addition to capital costs, there are also operational costs associated with carbon capture technologies. These include the costs of running the equipment, handling the captured carbon dioxide, and monitoring the storage site. Estimates for these costs vary widely, but they tend to be lower than capital costs. Some studies suggest that operational costs can range from $10 to $20 per ton of carbon dioxide captured. These costs will depend on factors such as the location of the facility, the type of technology used, and the cost of storage. Again, techniques such as ERW represent advancements in this area, since in ERW CO2 is stored on the soil through a natural process and for a long period of time. – Economic Benefits Despite the costs of implementing carbon capture technologies, there are also potential economic benefits. One of the main benefits is the ability to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and combat climate change. This could lead to a more stable and sustainable environment in the future. Additionally, there are other potential benefits such as job creation, increased energy security, and improved public health. For example, implementing carbon capture technologies could create new jobs in the energy industry and improve air quality in areas near high-polluting facilities. In the cases of technologies like ERW, the benefits extend to other areas as well. This is because ERW uses mineral and rocks that can improve the soil’s fertility of agricultural areas, thus helping with crops and food production with more sustainable methods. – Government Regulation One factor that could impact the economics of carbon capture technologies is government regulation. Governments around the world are introducing policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. These policies could include incentives for companies to invest in carbon capture technologies. Alternatively, governments could introduce regulations that require companies to reduce their emissions. These regulations could make carbon capture technologies more attractive to companies by creating a market for captured carbon dioxide. It is important to note that the effectiveness of government regulation will depend on a range of factors, including political will and implementation strategies. Understand the economics of carbon capture technologies is essential to better implement them and help with climate change mitigation In summary, the economics of carbon capture technologies are complex. While there are capital and operational costs associated with these technologies, there are also potential economic and social benefits to their implementation. As the technology improves, with the use of more effective and cost-beneficial techniques like ERW, and becomes more widely used, these costs could come down over time. Additionally, government regulation could play a role in making these technologies more attractive to companies. While there is no easy solution to climate change, carbon capture technologies could be one piece of the puzzle. By understanding the economics of these technologies, we can make more informed decisions about their implementation and potential benefits.

human activities. The widespread act associated with this issue is the burning of fossil products for power plants and industries. This phenomenon is the largest contributor of CO2 emissions into the atmosphere. These underlining factors are what lead to climate change and its harmful effects. The release of CO2 from mining operations, natural gas production, etc. can lead to CO2 being exposed externally to the environment. CO2 production source is crucial, with almost 87% of CO2 produced by human activities originating from the burning of fossil fuels. The CO2 emissions balance comes from clearing the forests and industrial processes such as cement production. A paradigm shift in CO2 emissions into the atmosphere has become a necessity. CO2 capture from industrial plants and storage has been crucial in reducing carbon emissions into the atmosphere. The application of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies to the industrial sector is likely to reduce the sector's total emissions by approximately one fifth. Therefore, this shows the importance of CCS, which is also essential in ensuring energy security. Decarbonization of the power sector can be feasible with integrating CCS, especially in regions that highly depend on fossil products for its power generation. This review, therefore, explored various types of CCS technologies. Different geological sequestration approach was equally discussed with some challenges associated with each are highlighted. Despite the progress made, future research must also be aimed at developing novel technology to augment the existing CCS to reduce the present cost. CO2 sequestration in depleted oil and gas reservoirs or unmineable coal seams can also significantly reduce CO2 storage cost with enhanced hydrocarbons recovery. The readily existing infrastructure for oil and gas transportation in oil and gas reservoirs, etc. can effectively reduce the cost of CO2 storage. CO2 sequestration requires in through studies to ascertain the complexity of the deep subsurface conditions and environment. Development of CCS technology will also require an environmental consideration in every aspect of the capturing process from the capture to the transport and finally to the CO2 storage.