Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › Net Benefit › ---AT: Democracy

Whalen’s solution is stakeholder engagement.

Wallace 21 Clinton G. Wallace, Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law, 2021, “Article: Democracy Avoidance in Tax Lawmaking”, University of Florida Tax Review, liam.

A. Analysis of Actual or Typical Taxpayers Congress should require its own expert staff to prepare analysis of the effects of proposed tax changes on specific taxpayers, including individuals with different family situations and at various income levels, and covering different geographies and demographics. This could be done by creating hypothetical taxpayers or it could be done by reference to actual taxpayers. 169The analysis should be specific and it should be politically relevant: it should include different typical taxpaying units in each state and each congressional district, reflecting features of each local economy. The analysis of a set of changes to individual income tax rules would estimate changes in tax liability for typical households, integrating data such as median income in the congressional district, state and local tax burdens and other characteristics specific to a given state or district. It could also include distributional tables indicating the tax liability changes per taxpayer by income band (e.g., taxpayers with [*317] income less than $ 10,000 will have tax liability of $ x less this year as compared to their anticipated liability under current law). 170The more granular and localized projections would be far more illuminating for voters than existing analysis. Taxpayer-specific analysis would connect voters to the actual decisions made by their representatives, bolstering democratic accountability and responsiveness. Reliable analysis of effects would provide a simple way for voters to provide input to their representatives and to hold their representatives accountable. Constituents would be empowered to contact the representatives' offices directly and, later, to hold them to account in elections. By helping voters become more informed, this information could benefit either incumbents-giving them material to bolster reelection by showing how they delivered benefits to their constituents--or challengers, showing the opposite. Information about effects of legislation provided in relatable terms could make it harder for representatives to support narrow interests at the expense of their own constituents, bolstering majoritarian responsiveness. The use of typical taxpayers already plays an informal role in tax policy debates at the federal level. During consideration of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, various outside groups released analysis of hypothetical taxpayers and how those taxpayers would fare under different versions of the proposed legislation. 171Although these estimates were often non-partisan, the groups that produced them often had specific normative and political commitments that were relevant to the kind of [*318] data they might be interested in providing. Further, the assumptions built into their calculations were not always disclosed or clear. An officially sanctioned version of typical taxpayer analysis could include mechanisms for transparency and consistency between different sample taxpayers and across different pieces of legislation over time. This sort of information could help taxpayers base their opinions on common and consistent information, and develop a better understanding of what their representatives supported or opposed. 172This would empower individuals as voters and as constituents able to engage with their representatives. To be most useful for engaging participants in the lawmaking process and facilitating accountability and responsiveness tailored to the particular representative system that is the U.S. Congress, this analysis could be produced for each congressional district. That would allow voters to directly connect a proposed change in law to their own circumstances. Further, the tailoring could match prevailing economic conditions in each district. For example, in a suburban district with many families with children, typical taxpayers might include a family with the median number of children and the median income for such a family. In a place with retirees, analysis would focus on fixed income individuals without children. If a particular district were dominated by a single employer--for example, a large distribution center or manufacturer, or a government facility--the analysis could be tailored to that particular sector of employment and expected pay. The more specific and detailed the typical taxpayer analysis can be, the better for political accountability. The JCT could analyze a variety of different types of taxpayers--single filers, joint filers, families of varying sizes, young people, old people, and so on. The analysis should reflect differences across states or even within states. For example, a tax law might affect a family of four living in New York City differently than a family of four living in upstate New York, and differently than a similar family living in South Carolina. It could provide analysis of a family at the median income in each jurisdiction, and at the median national income for both. It could be further specified to account for [*319] relevant differences in state laws, for example anticipating the deduction for state income tax rates in each jurisdiction. Further, the analysis could reflect additional distilling of tax and other data to specify "the ways in which the tax laws have disparate impacts along the lines of race, ethnicity, socioeconomic class, gender and gender identity/expression, sexual orientation, immigration status and disability" as well as geographic location, across different industries, and so on. 173 Although preparing highly specific analysis of typical taxpayers in 535 different jurisdictions would be a burdensome task, it is certainly one that is possible, and indeed it should be doable with existing data. The JCT currently bases its distributional tables and revenue estimates on a data from of more than 300,000 actual individual income tax returns, which provides a very workable data set on which to build an individual taxpayer model. 174Combining this model used for revenue estimates with congressional district or more specific census data would require significant work but is doable. 175To the extent feasible, this analysis might also be integrated with broader analysis of the distributional effects of spending programs. 176 A further step towards transparency and accountability that would also sidestep the issue of modeling taxpayers would be to analyze actual taxpayers. This would mean the JCT staff would use real tax return data to find illustrative taxpayers. Already, the models JCT uses are based on actual taxpayer data, although personal information [*320] is removed by the IRS. 177Actual taxpayers' identifying information could be removed from the analysis to protect taxpayer privacy and comply with current privacy protections, but it would still be useful to inform the public in a potentially more meaningful way than would the use of hypothetical taxpayers. Alternatively, Congress could establish a procedure to request that individuals to a limited extent allow JCT staff to actually meet with them and discuss impacts of potential tax changes in non-technical terms, for example by reference to the taxpayer's budget and spending priorities or other potential effects.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › Net Benefit › ---AT: Democracy

Public input establishes legitimacy and avoidance is non-unique.

Wallace 21 Clinton G. Wallace, Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law, 2021, “Article: Democracy Avoidance in Tax Lawmaking”, University of Florida Tax Review, liam.

1. An Independent Commission to Write Tax Law Another perennial proposal reflecting democracy avoidance is that Congress should turn over policymaking authority to reform the federal tax [*301] code to an independent commission. As discussed below, Congress attempted versions of this proposal in 1992, 2010 and 2018, and proposals were offered regularly in the 1990s and early 2000s, though none ever successfully resulted in any legislative enactment. Hines and Logue offer a version of this sort of proposal as well under which a group of appointed experts-specifically not elected officials-would be charged with producing a comprehensive plan that would go into effect unless Congress voted to block it. 109 The basic idea is that the decision makers would be able to deliver the tough medicine policies that the country needs in a way that "politics or logrolling among members of Congress" could never be expected to achieve. 110Similar ideas have been proposed by various politicians and policymakers over the years, although there are some important distinctions from a democratic perspective among the various permutations. 111Hines and Logue compare their proposal to the Base [*302] Realignment and Closure Commissions (BRACs) that Congress established at several junctures to reduce the number of military bases in the 1990s and 2000s, 112as well as to one of the recent "super committee" proposals. 113The BRACs had several iterations, each of which was similar; BRACs were generally made up of a panel of people with some military or government expertise but not anyone currently holding a federal elected office or executive branch appointment. 114The commission proposals required several formal approvals--by military leaders, by the president, and a final opportunity for Congress or the President to reject the entire closure plan. This allowed for some democratic oversight, but still transferred specific policy decisions to the commission. 115 Applying this concept to tax reform, Hines and Logue imagine a process whereby Congress would authorize "a group of experts" to put together a comprehensive plan that would go into effect with the approval of the President unless Congress specifically voted to prevent its implementation. 116The advantages they tout for this sort of approach include ability to overcome any "politically powerful constituency" that might block reform of specific provisions. 117Hines and Logue are [*303] particularly interested in the prospect of addressing "long-run fiscal imbalance," 118which implies increasing tax revenue, reducing spending or both over time. By shifting that authority from members of Congress subject to regular elections to decision makers insulated from electoral politics, the result is likely a different sort of analysis of whose taxes should be increased, and what spending should be cut. 119 Compared to the Federal Reserve proposal, this kind of independent commission proposal is more malleable in ways that affect the extent to which it might be undemocratic in practice. In particular, the BRAC experiences show that an independent tax commission could offer some democratic process benefits. The design of the 2005 BRAC required that it be carried out in various ways intended to foster public input, transparency and reason-giving. 120Although the commissioners were not elected office holders, they had a diverse variety of professional and personal backgrounds, reflecting various constituencies that would potentially be interested in the decisions with which the BRAC was tasked. 121They were tasked with evaluating various options by independently collecting information and holding public hearings in the proposed closure sites and elsewhere. 122 And the Commission was required to produce a public report justifying, in detail, the considerations that went into each of its [*304] recommendations. 123The final report and appendices from the 2005 round of base closures runs 758 pages and provides extensive justifications for each military facility that the Commission determined should be closed, as well as explanations for those it determined should be kept running. 124Thus, Congress structured the delegation not only to take advantage of expertise, but also to have someone carry out a public process that would establish legitimacy and help to justify to the public the final decisions. 125 Further, importantly, the BRAC authority was highly constrained as compared to a tax reform commission: Congress made clear the policy goal of reducing military spending by limiting the physical footprint of military facilities, and asked how to do that in ways that serve the needs of the four branches of the armed services. In contrast, a tax reform commission that could make proposals to cut or increase taxes on different groups, and to cut or increase different types of spending, wields much more power. This is true even if Congress were to impose specific constraints, such as setting revenue or spending targets--tax reform raises a vastly larger and deeper set of issues than does base closures. The more apt comparison for a BRAC-type intervention in taxation would be a commission to determine how to implement a tax system enacted by Congress, or, even more apt, to determine what physical facilities were necessary to carry out the tax system. That is essentially what the BRAC did for Congress and the military: given a set of existing laws and strategic initiatives provided by statute and less formally by the President and President-appointed leadership, what [*305] existing physical installations can be eliminated? This sort of implementation issue is far different from a democratic perspective than making more openended policy decisions. In a lawmaking context, more power in the Federal Reserve or in an independent commission could favor certain insiders, such as sophisticated taxpayers who are able to hire representatives to navigate and engage with less public decision-making processes. 126Further, explicit in the proposal is a decision to prioritize a select set of normative commitments over other potential allocative or distributional decisions that might come to bear if Congress maintained plenary authority over tax rates and considered rate changes in conjunction with other tax policy changes. In short, the authors anticipate better outcomes in some specific respects, accomplished by transferring decision making from (at least potentially) politically accountable representatives to (deliberately) politically insulated experts. Thus, in what is a common theme across proponents of these democracy avoidance proposals, the positive case for the potential benefits of greater expertise and insulation from politics implicitly justifies the potential democratic costs. That is, the narrow consequentialist approach focuses on substantive outcomes, but without attention to the value of democratic decision making. The fact of costs is apparent in the ways that democratic engagement is limited, but the extent of costs is more challenging: as discussed in Part III, these costs are imposed on taxpayers who perceive that they have not been treated fairly (or not been included at all) in the tax policymaking process, and when certain taxpayers' interests are losers in that closed process. * * * Each of these two types of proposals--broad delegations to politically insulated officials, and an independent lawmaking commission to reform the tax code--seeks to shape the tax lawmaking process in ways that limit who has a say in certain policy decisions. Although tax [*306] policy is not necessarily a unique venue for these types of proposals, 127the point of highlighting these specific proposals is that this democracy avoidance is a common impulse in tax lawmaking. Tax experts and policymakers focused on preferred outcomes are attracted to expert-shaped policies conceived in a setting that is insulated from democratic participation, rather than existing venues that may be shaped more by publicly accountable elected officials or otherwise with public input. Democracy avoidance proposals allow for decision-making authority to be turned over to experts directly, or by relying on constraints to limit the options that elected officials can consider and to channel public input in specific ways that are filtered through experts. The democratic implications of these process adjustments, and the theory that seems to justify these constraints on democratic debates, are considered in the next Part.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › Net Benefit › ---AT: Democracy

Transparency is key to democratic engagement. The legislative process can’t access it, but giving stakeholders authority can.

Wallace 21 Clinton G. Wallace, Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law, 2021, “Article: Democracy Avoidance in Tax Lawmaking”, University of Florida Tax Review, liam.

B. Features of Democratic Decision Making As a descriptive matter, whether a decision making process is "democratic" is a nuanced question, and there are a variety of different ways to evaluate it. Studying the process of states moving towards (and away from) democratization, Charles Tilly distinguished four general approaches: First, "constitutional" democracy is defined simply by a constitutional text that purports to place power in the hands of the people. 40Second, substantive approaches look beyond constitutional structure so that democracy can be defined holistically by whether the regime features things like "individual freedom, security, equity, social equality, public deliberation" and so on. 41Third, procedural definitions of democracy look at specific rules for voting and otherwise engaging in the decision making process. 42Fourth, process-oriented approaches look at an "interlocking set of political processes"-not just specific [*284] procedures--that might or might not yield decision making by the people in practice. 43 This Article adopts the process-oriented approach. 44Focusing on process seems particularly fitting in the context of tax lawmaking, where there is evidence that when regular taxpayers (i.e., non-experts) consider tax fairness, they are more concerned about process and procedure than distributional outcomes. 45The focus here is on who is included in the tax policymaking process, and how those participants engage with each other in the decision making process. While the particulars of the procedures might vary depending on context, there are several basic features that are necessary regardless. The remainder of this Part introduces three important features of decision making that are prerequisites for effective democratic processes--transparency, accountability and responsiveness. 46These features are closely linked with other aspects of democratic decision making such as who has power [*285] to set the legislative agenda, who is able to influence decisionmakers, and the decision procedure of majoritarianism, but this Article sets aside those concerns as less mutable because of their grounding in constitutional design and interpretation. 47These features animate the critique of democracy avoidance techniques in Part II and the proposals in Part III. Start with transparency, which is fundamental to public participation in decision making. 48As Sheffrin observed, "[f]or voice to be meaningful, there is a deep sense in which it must mean 'informed voice,'" which requires information about the issues at hand. 49Consider one aspect of transparency that targets the challenge of informed voice: reducing information costs to outsiders. Reducing information costs can help bolster informed voice for potential participants who would otherwise be outsiders, and it can help to address one particular form of derailing responsiveness that features centrally in tax lawmaking, what Wendy Wagner has deemed "information capture." 50In the context of agency rulemaking, she shows that sophisticated regulated interests are able to take advantage of the fact that they control much of the data relevant to the subject matter of a policy decision. By providing that data [*286] selectively in the regulatory process, and by providing it in ways that were inaccessible to potentially competing interests, these groups use information to control the process to achieve their own desired outcomes. 51The same sort of phenomenon can exist in tax lawmaking, if well-resourced potential taxpayers control detailed information that may reveal how they will respond to different sorts of changes in law. Some of the proposals introduced in Part III would promote transparency for the purpose of informed voice by requiring the decision-making body--e.g., a tax committee in Congress--to produce relevant data and also to cull, synthesize and explain it in a way that levels the playing field as between interests with varied levels of sophistication. 52 Existing institutions for federal tax lawmaking are strong in promoting transparency in some respects and weak in others. 53Consider who the decision makers are in tax policy, and how the tax lawmaking process proceeds: to perhaps understate the obvious, both of these are somewhat muddled. Formally, there is an organized tax legislative process 54and an organized hierarchy of decision [*287] makers. 55There are some taxspecific additions to the standard (formal) legislating process that could be understood as motivated by a desire to increase transparency, including the involvement of the JCT and the requirement that Congress rely on revenue estimates. 56In practice, however, the formal legislative process is often circumvented, and power centers have developed other than the ones prescribed in the rules, such that the identities of the actual people wielding influence are hard to discern. 57For example, the Senate leadership (meaning party [*288] leaders, not committee chairs) has become increasingly important to tax policymaking in recent years because tax changes are so often enacted under time pressure as part of omnibus end-of-year legislation. 58Further, although Congress has established some non-partisan sources of information, 59and built the tax policymaking process to make use of that information, sometimes the rules regarding information disclosures are ignored, and some of the sources of information have come under partisan attack from members of the Republican party recently. 60 If citizens can understand what is happening in the democratic process, and thus are empowered to participate in democratic governance in one form or other, "a key to express their preferences characteristic of democracy is the continued responsiveness of the government" to those preferences. 61When adequate and effective transparency allows affected interests to know and understand what policy has been enacted and why, it facilitates accountability and, in turn, government responsiveness. 62Thus, particularly in a representative system, transparency is [*289] a prerequisite for establishing means of recourse so that citizens can "sanction" unrepresentative actions. 63For example, in America's representative democratic system, numerous critics have observed that the requirements of the notice and comment procedure for regulations produced by non-elected executive branch officials are designed to ensure transparency, but the result is a "passive" and incomplete attempt at democratic legitimation. 64But accountability and responsiveness are values that demand more than passivity as to whether the actions of the government align with the preferences expressed by citizens. 65 Responsiveness can be complicated. A government may have mechanisms in place to be responsive, but if the participants to whom the government responds are skewed in some respect, then the government's actions will not be responsive to community preferences. 66And even if participation reflects the appropriate affected interests, there arises a related question: "To whose interests should the government be responsive when the people are in disagreement and have divergent preferences?" 67Representatives in a representative democracy "must be able to act when public preferences are confused or split, when citizens are apathetic or ignorant, and even when the public is outright [*290] opposed to what the government must do." 68To overcome these challenges, representatives must have some degree of autonomy as decisionmakers, or else they will simply reflect the paralysis of the public at large. 69 In short, democratic decision making relies on transparency, accountability and responsiveness, but there are many challenges in promoting these values in actual institutions.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › Net Benefit › 2NC---AT: Delegation Bad

Multiple factors check legitimacy and accountability.

Hines and Logue 15 James R. Hines, Jr., Kyle D. Logue, James R. Hines, Jr. is the L. Hart Wright Collegiate Professor of Law, and Kyle D. Logue is the Wade H. and Dores M. McCree Collegiate Professor of Law, both at the University of Michigan Law School, 2015, “DELEGATING TAX”, Michigan Law Review, , liam.

The arguments against broad delegation of powers are also well known, concentrating largely on issues of legitimacy and accountability.49 Granting agencies broad authority raises the possibility that they will enact regulations inconsistent with congressional intent. Furthermore, even if the regulations adopted by an agency reflect what Congress intended, the mere procedural fact that an agency rather than Congress is directly responsible for the final product may worsen the public perception of its legitimacy.50 An elected Congress is endowed with the power and responsibility to make national laws, and answers to voters if it performs poorly in doing so.51 Congress generally holds open hearings and votes, permitting voters to understand their representatives’ contributions to legislative outcomes, and to a certain degree, why legislators voted the way they did. It may be more difficult for voters to hold Congress accountable for the actions of an agency, even if Congress created the agency while fully anticipating its future behavior.52 As a result, delegation arguably reduces the democratic nature of the system, undermining the legitimacy of its actions. These are valid concerns, although they have often been overstated by the leading critics of broad delegation to agencies.53 First, if an agency acts in a way that substantially diverges from the wishes of the legislature, Congress can pass another statute to restrict or remove the agency’s authority. Numerous examples from the era of deregulation support this claim. To take one famous example, when Congress determined that the regulation of the airline industry was not working well, thereby producing excessively high fares, overcapacity, and inefficient nonprice competition (among other problems) it responded with a statute that “deregulated” the industry and abolished the Civil Aeronautics Board, the agency that was responsible for price and quantity regulation.54 Similar stories can be told about deregulation of other industries, including telecommunications, energy, and finance. Whether these deregulatory efforts have, in retrospect, been net benefits to society is often debated. But that is beside the current point, which is this: when Congress decides that an agency has gone too far, Congress is capable of reining that agency in, one way or another. This is not a complete response, of course, since one of the reasons for delegation is the inability of Congress to act, and the political coalition that passed the delegating statute in the first place may be difficult or impossible to put together to pass constraining or clarifying legislation. This is especially a concern in a world of congressional gridlock, marked by record-low enactment of laws.55 Nevertheless, Congress’s power to pass new laws does serve as a constraint on agency discretion, at least in cases involving obvious agency overreach. Second, public opinion can be channeled to affect agency action. In the case of executive agencies, the President’s policy preferences also constrain agency discretion, and the electorate in turn renders judgment over the President’s management of the executive branch. Indeed, some argue that being accountable to the President, who is more attuned to the preferences of the majority of national voters than is any member of Congress, is more democratic than being accountable to Congress.56 In addition, the notice and comment process that agencies use in crafting regulations and that partly justifies their authority allows interested parties to draw public and congressional attention to instances of potential regulatory overreach. Media coverage also ensures accountability for high-profile issues. If an agency does something egregiously bad, voters find out, and Congress can be animated to act. Third, judicial review constrains agency discretion. Courts are often called on to determine whether an agency has exceeded its legislative authority. Even if Congress were to convey broadly worded authority to an agency, the application of that authority in particular situations can be challenged in court by the affected parties. Finally, there are agency norms that significantly influence the actions of professional staff and even political appointees. Regulatory agencies are staffed by professionals whose reputations and long-run effectiveness depend on high levels of competence, as well as a certain degree of political independence.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › Net Benefit › 2NC---AT: Delegation Bad

Delegation is inevitable, desirable, and the plan fails without it.

Hines and Logue 15 James R. Hines, Jr., Kyle D. Logue, James R. Hines, Jr. is the L. Hart Wright Collegiate Professor of Law, and Kyle D. Logue is the Wade H. and Dores M. McCree Collegiate Professor of Law, both at the University of Michigan Law School, 2015, “DELEGATING TAX”, Michigan Law Review, , liam.

One of the most remarked-on developments in American law, ever, is the rise of the regulatory state.21 For many commentators, the delegation of broad lawmaking authority and the increased role of regulatory agencies were both inevitable and desirable developments given the increasing complexity of modern economies.22 One of the traditional rationales for broad delegation is relative expertise, meaning that regulatory agencies have greater knowledge and focus in particular areas and specific issues than Congress does—or realistically can.23 An extreme example is the National Science Foundation, to which Congress delegates the task of selecting which researchers will receive federal grants to do basic research.24 The NSF, staffed and assisted by preeminent experts in many fields of scientific inquiry,25 has greater knowledge about which scientific projects are likely to yield important results than any congressional committee or committee staff could realistically acquire. Furthermore, the highly effective peer-review process used by the NSF to judge grant applications would be difficult politically for Congress to use.26 Thus Congress’s role is limited primarily to setting funding levels and articulating the most general policy agenda,27 leaving the discretion to determine which projects get funded to NSF experts.28 The same delegate-to-the-experts principle applies on a grander scale to any major regulatory legislation, such as the Food and Drug Act29 or the Clean Air Act.30 Although members of Congress and congressional staff can become relatively well versed in general policy goals, the details of implementation simply have to be delegated. Of course, individual legislators and their staffs are capable of developing important expertise on any number of policy questions. But it is unrealistic to expect legislators to maintain detailed knowledge of how to best implement policy in the whole range of areas affected by federal law. In theory, Congress could create a committee for every major policy issue, staffed with experts who would spend of all their waking hours working out detailed legislative solutions to every regulatory issue. In such a world, the committees would fill in details rather than the agencies. But that division of labor is generally considered inefficient in every policymaking area other than tax. However capable their staffs, members of Congress would be inappropriate and overtaxed supervisors if they needed to work through all of the issues apt to arise. To the contrary, the more efficient place to insert such detailed, specialized, and constantly updated expertise in the lawmaking process is with an agency postenactment. The congressional staff that drafted the broad delegations in the Clean Air Act,31 for example, probably knew at the time of enactment a great deal about the need to regulate air quality generally and the hazards of pollution to human well-being and the environment. But they would not have been expected to keep up to date on all of the subsequent scientific advances and accumulating knowledge concerning pollutants that threaten public health and what should be done about them. That is why the statute, for example, empowers the EPA to determine which pollutants might “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” in the motor vehicle context.32 Of course, no one really disagrees that Congress needs to delegate the detail work. The harder question is whether Congress should delegate the more substantive policy choices, and this Article argues that perhaps it should—or that the case for delegating choices is as strong with tax as elsewhere.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › Net Benefit › 2NC---AT: Democracy Bad

Democratic decline triggers global wars – extinction.

Magsamen 18, et al, Center for American Progress vice president (Kelly, Max Bergmann, CAP senior fellow, Michael Fuchs, CAP senior fellow, and Trevor Sutton, CAP fellow, “The Case for a Democratic Values-Based U.S. Foreign Policy,” Center for American Progress,

Reviving America’s strategic position in the world in the wake of President Donald Trump will require a foreign policy that both firmly embraces democratic values and systematically pushes back against authoritarian competitors such as Russia and China. The Trump presidency has already severely undercut the United States’ global standing, causing immense harm to the nation’s strategic position, credibility, and moral authority. Allies are losing faith in American leadership while illiberal regimes are growing in number, stature, and audacity. Trump’s rise reflects a pre-existing deterioration in the vitality of democratic systems, a global phenomenon which his presidency has now turned into a crisis. The damage cannot be reversed simply by electing a different president or reverting to previous foreign policy approaches. Instead, the United States must adopt bold new policies to regain the advantage in great power competition and help vulnerable democracies, including its own, resist authoritarian influence and strengthen a growing global democratic community. This report explains why a democratic values-based foreign policy is the right choice for the United States on both a strategic and moral level. It also offers specific policy recommendations as a roadmap for how the next administration could pursue a democratic values-based foreign policy. Today, democracy is under strain in America and threatened across the globe. The spread of democratic governance, which for decades seemed all but inevitable, has stalled and now faces serious setbacks. Across the democratic world, ordinary people have lost trust in their institutions of government and delivered stunning rebukes to their political establishments. These setbacks have also emboldened authoritarian regimes. Russia, China, and other illiberal states have sought to exploit the openness of democratic societies for their geopolitical advantage and have put forward an alternative autocratic model for politics and economic development that undermines liberal democratic values. America’s enduring security, prosperity, and strength depend on the survival and success of democracy—both at home and abroad—as well as on the resilience of institutions, rules, and norms that protect the liberal democratic values on which the United States’ global standing is built. Yet at the very moment when liberal democracy faces its greatest ideological challenge since the Cold War, President Trump has chosen to reject America’s historic role as leader of the world’s democracies. He has treated democratic allies as ideological foes and murderous dictators as respected friends and equals while stoking nativist and isolationist impulses among the American people. President Trump has also systematically denigrated democratic values and norms at home through unprecedented attacks on the press, the independent judiciary, and law enforcement, as well as political purges of civil servants.1 While U.S. democratic institutions have shown resilience in the face of his challenges, it is already clear that some of the damage Trump does will outlast his presidency. The critical question today is whether the United States after Trump will summon the resolve to lead, protect, and expand the world’s democracies or stand by and suffer the consequences as autocracy and illiberalism crack the foundations of the American-led global system. Advancing a values-based foreign policy after Trump will inevitably invite a vigorous debate over how—or even whether—values should factor into U.S. foreign policy. Critics will likely point to America’s prior foreign policy errors and shortcomings, for example, the use of democracy promotion aims to justify misguided foreign policies such as the invasion of Iraq; the broader U.S. failure to promote democracy in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring; and Cold War-era support for dictators who sided against the Soviet Union. Critics may also point to the urgency of domestic challenges relative to foreign policy ones or fear of U.S. overextension abroad to argue that a values-based foreign policy is unwise or simply not possible. This report takes these critiques seriously. However, in reflecting on the stakes for U.S. leadership, present and future, it arrives at the conclusion that an American foreign policy shorn of American values would ultimately deliver less security and prosperity at home, while making U.S. leadership in the world less sustainable and impactful. This report asserts that an approach that embraces America’s core democratic values will allow the United States to compete more effectively with authoritarian powers such as China and Russia and will deliver better results for the country in the long haul. To address setbacks abroad, the United States will need to pursue a new foreign policy that systematically puts liberal democratic values at the center of its engagement with the world. This will require more than just lip service. It will entail a meaningful, sustained shift in how the United States conducts its foreign relations, launched with quick and decisive action and sustained with persistence and strategic vision. A democratic values-based foreign policy strategy is rooted in faith in democratic self-government, not just as being better than all the alternatives but also as a value in and of itself. Such a foreign policy will also advance U.S. national interests. America’s presence as a prosperous, multi-ethnic, free democratic society poses a challenge to autocrats through the model it sets. Instead of taking this power for granted, it is time for America to cultivate it. At the heart of such an effort should be a realignment of American foreign policy to meet the challenge posed by resurgent illiberalism. This can be done by forging stronger cooperation among democratic states, including in the defense of democracies under assault and the expansion of the global democratic space. In both the short- and long-term, the United States will need to take the following steps: Restore democratic values and norms at home. Work with democratic allies to design and implement a counter-authoritarian playbook to push back against the encroachment on and abuse of the open systems of democratic states. Build stronger international networks of democracies to create a global democratic bulwark. Privilege U.S. relationships with democracies, and reflect this in U.S. policy decisions and spending. Strengthen international support mechanisms for populations nonviolently mobilizing for democracy around the world, while more systematically pressuring countries to uphold human rights and adhere to international law. Reorienting U.S. foreign policy toward a values-based approach will require policymakers to take the long view, recognize the intrinsic strength of democratic governance, and acknowledge that the best way to advance democracy worldwide is through the example set by successful democracies. Critically, it will also require U.S. leaders to heed the lessons of history by recognizing that the most effective way to promote and sustain democracy is supporting and encouraging democratic institutions and movements, rather than employing coercive measures. The United States has numerous tools to vigorously defend its values and advance democracy without seeking to impose it using force. Some may fear that a values-based foreign policy would come at the expense of traditional U.S. interests. But that critique misdiagnoses and underestimates the geopolitical challenge to U.S. interests that a rising illiberal tide presents. American interests will be far more difficult to secure if liberal democracy is supplanted as the pre-eminent and most sought-after political system. There will inevitably be times when U.S. interests will necessitate partnering with nondemocratic regimes. Still, a principled but pragmatic approach can do both: cooperate selectively with such regimes on matters of vital national interest while also recognizing that the greatest strategic gains to U.S. security and prosperity will rest on the success of other democracies and that America’s staying power and strategic resilience will depend on investing in them. The challenge: A democracy crisis at home and abroad For most of the past 50 years, the world has witnessed the dramatic spread of democratic governance throughout the globe. Between 1970 and 2010, the number of democratic states nearly tripled, with transitions to democracy stretching from the southern cone of South America to West Africa, Southeast Asia, and the former Soviet bloc.2 By 2000, more than half the world’s population lived under a democratic government for the first time in recorded history.3 This democratic wave brought a host of political and social rights to hundreds of millions of people and coincided with a historic decline in the incidence of interstate wars.4 The ascendance of democracy globally and the emergence of an increasingly robust set of international rules and institutions fostered a prevailing assumption that a more democratic world was here to stay: Democratic states would prosper and more autocratic states would transition to democracy. But this optimism about democracy has waned due to a number of varying and reinforcing trends. First, democracies have experienced setbacks. Many countries once held up as examples of democratic progress—such as Poland, Turkey, and Venezuela—have experienced a deterioration in rule of law and electoral competitiveness.5 In other countries, such as Thailand and Egypt, democratically elected governments were overthrown by force. Meanwhile, across the Middle East, the democratic promise of the Arab Spring faltered in the face of violent repression. During this same period, illiberal and insular populist movements became resurgent in many established democracies, weakening international cooperation among democratic states and imperiling many of the achievements of the postwar era. These movements occurred most notably in the European Union, where a Center for American Progress and American Enterprise Institute study found that “in the past decade, such parties have moved from the margins of Europe’s political landscape to its core.”6 A key feature of this illiberal resurgence has been elected leaders’ use of strongman tactics to undermine democratic institutions and norms. In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has gained increasing control over the political, economic, and military aspects of the Turkish state.7 In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has used xenophobic rhetoric and crony capitalism to erode political checks and balances and consolidate power.8 Poland’s current leaders and others have followed Orbán’s playbook, attacking the independence of the country’s media and judiciary and campaigning on an exclusionary vison of Polish society.9 President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, meanwhile, has flaunted his disdain for the rule of law and human rights as he pursues a campaign of mass violence against drug users and dealers, which has included state sponsorship of extrajudicial killings.10 In all of these cases, attacks on democratic institutions and norms have been carried out by democratically elected leaders themselves.11 Even in the United States, President Donald Trump is showing signs of authoritarian envy, regularly criticizing the media, the judiciary, and law enforcement, while openly admiring some of the world’s most brutal dictators. As Trump said of Kim Jong Un, who rules over a totalitarian dictatorship where people are thrown into labor camps for criticizing the government: “He’s the head of the country, and I mean he’s the strong head. … Don’t let anyone think anything different. He speaks and his people sit up at attention. I want my people to do the same.”12 These trends do not mean in any way that democracy is a lost cause or that the global tilt toward illiberalism is irreversible. Demand for democratic change and greater civil and political rights remains a potent force that transcends culture and geography, as recent events in countries as diverse as Burkina Faso, Armenia, and Malaysia illustrate.13 But these positive developments do not negate the democratic backsliding that has occurred elsewhere. Across the world, democracy faces an uncertain future. Second, confidence in democratic politics has waned, even in states with long traditions of representative government. In the past two decades, democracies have struggled to deliver economic results for their people. Even democracies that have experienced rapid growth have too often seen it disproportionally benefit small elites or specific regions, while causing significant disruption elsewhere in society.14 The Great Recession of 2008 and years of painfully slow recovery helped fuel a sharp decline in trust in government institutions across the democratic world.15 Stagnation and deepening inequality, coupled with demographic change and political dysfunction, have created fertile ground for distrust, division, and demagoguery that illiberal populist parties have exploited. These groups draw on xenophobic and racist messaging but also resentment at economic stagnation and elite capture of supposedly democratic institutions. In some cases, they have also made both subtle and overt appeals to authoritarian modes of governance.16 The United States has not been immune to this democratic malaise. Americans today distrust their government in greater numbers than at any point in modern U.S. history, including the height of the Vietnam War and during the Watergate scandal.17 Two of the most significant drivers of distrust have been the rise of unfettered special interest spending to distort U.S. politics and the political paralysis that has arisen from the growth of counter-majoritarian practices such as gerrymandering and abuse of the legislative filibuster.18 These problems have fed a widespread perception that the U.S. political system no longer represents the interests of ordinary Americans nor does it address grave challenges such as inequality, racial injustice, and opioid addiction. Such failures, compounded by foreign policy failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, have contributed to a profound loss of faith in American institutions that Donald Trump effectively channeled in his bid for the presidency. Third, illiberal and authoritarian regimes have sought to encourage and exploit the crisis of confidence in democratic states in order to weaken them from within, assert the superiority of their own models, and attack the foundations of the post-Cold War geopolitical order. Of these revisionist states, Russia has been the most overt and aggressive in its challenge to liberal democracy. Despite a stagnating economy and shrinking population, Moscow has launched ambitious measures to reestablish a sphere of influence in nearby countries, fueled right- and left-wing populist movements across Europe and North America, and sowed confusion and discord among the democratic citizenries of EU states and NATO members, including America.19 The tools it has deployed in this campaign include disinformation operations using both traditional and social media; targeted use of corruption to cultivate political proxies; cyberespionage aimed at influencing electoral outcomes; covert funding of insurgent political movements; and exploitation of neighbors’ energy insecurity.20 Together, Russian tactics constitute a new authoritarian playbook to which the United States and other democratic powers have yet to develop an effective response.21 If Russia has been the boldest challenger, the most serious long-term external threat to democratic governance comes from China. Beijing has been—and will almost certainly remain—an essential partner of the United States in solving major global challenges, from climate change to nonproliferation. But as China amasses power, too often it has put its newfound capabilities and immense resources behind a model of political and economic development and interstate cooperation that neither requires nor encourages liberal democratic values.22 In fact, China’s full-throated assertion of narrow national interests in areas such as internet governance, free speech, trade, and human rights often actively undermines democratic values.23 China has also sought to use economic coercion to undermine U.S. security alliances and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region and erode cohesion among EU member states.24 Meanwhile, Beijing has used its economic and growing military might to immunize itself from the consequences of flouting long-standing international principles such as freedom of navigation.25 Tragically, these developments coincide with President Trump’s abandonment of America’s commitments to global leadership, including the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate agreement, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Fourth, the institutions, rules, and norms that underpin the liberal international order have not lived up to expectations, providing space for illiberal and undemocratic states to seize the advantage. The global and regional organizations established since World War II were built to protect and encourage liberal values, including universal human rights and rules-based international conduct. But these institutions largely reflect the world of 1945 and have not been adequately updated to recognize the massive shifts in global economic and political power. Today, many of these institutions are losing the capacity to perform their basic missions because of inherent structural flaws, outdated mechanisms, and deliberate efforts by world powers to undermine or circumvent them. The U.N. Security Council is rarely able to meaningfully respond to gross abuses of human rights or even outright aggression.26 The United States and other democracies face growing challenges in upholding international rules or solving big problems such as chemical weapons use in Syria, ethnic cleansing in Myanmar, China’s violations of international law in the South China Sea, and Russia’s use of gray-zone tactics in Ukraine. The World Trade Organization has likewise struggled to address abuses of its trade rules by states such as China.27 Without more effective and coordinated efforts to push back against these abuses and transgressions, authoritarian governments will continue to probe the boundaries of international rules and norms in ways contrary to both U.S. values and interests. Fifth, economic globalization has exposed autocratic systems to democratic values, but it has also exposed democratic systems to autocratic influence. As the globalization of the world economy accelerated in the 1990s, experts assumed that integration would result in a more liberal future.28 Authoritarian states, once closed, would be opened up and exposed to the practices and values of liberal democratic states. Gradually, these autocratic states would begin to take on more liberal characteristics, accelerating the trend toward greater democratization. But globalization has proved to be a two-way street. Liberal states have also been exposed to the influence of authoritarian states. Foreign investment from autocratic regimes has served as a vehicle to influence their recipients, most notably in the form of Russian cultivation of political actors across Eastern Europe.29 The corrupt and uncompetitive inducements of autocrats have at times proved a more attractive path than more transparent business and investment practices favored by democracies.30 The immense wealth concentration in autocratic states—and liberal ones as well—has spawned a complex transnational network of illicit finance that has distorted both developed and developing economies.31 Lastly, the Trump administration is now undermining the democratic values and international rules the United States has traditionally sought to uphold. Although the challenges facing global democracy have been building for many years, they have accelerated since 2016 in part because of the policies and rhetoric of the current occupant of the Oval Office. In a remarkably short period of time, President Trump has taken dramatic steps to abandon America’s long-standing moral leadership in the world. President Trump’s first secretary of state publicly declared that the United States would not prioritize human rights.32 The Trump administration has vigorously attacked America’s democratic allies while showing an affinity for autocrats and dictators.33 On an almost daily basis, the president makes clear his disregard for many long-standing norms of American government, such as separation of personal and public interests and respect for the autonomy of the judiciary and law enforcement. While in the past American foreign policy has been prone to charges of hypocrisy—such as claiming to uphold democracy while backing autocrats—the Trump administration has abandoned any pretense of concern for democratic values. This sharp shift in America’s approach to the world under President Trump has been immensely destabilizing in ways that are only beginning to become clear.34 The answer: A democratic values-based foreign policy Donald Trump is hardly the only skeptic of a democratic values-based foreign policy. A range of policymakers and scholars of foreign policy, including some progressives, have argued that the United States should de-prioritize the promotion of democratic values in its foreign policy. Some make the argument that the United States needs to take a more hardheaded and transactional approach to advance its security and economic interests. However, this report argues that not only are these false choices but that the United States should see democratic values as a U.S. comparative advantage—and not a weakness—in global competition. America’s liberal democratic values have been key to building, enhancing, and sustaining America’s geopolitical power. With the global backsliding of democracy and the rise of alternative authoritarian models, it is ever more urgent to rediscover the power of core American values to secure U.S. interests in the long term. A democratic values-based foreign policy is worth pursuing for three key reasons. First, it will advance long-term U.S. economic and security interests abroad and create a safer and more prosperous world. Compared with authoritarian regimes, democracies are less likely to go to war against each other, less likely to ally against the United States, less likely to sponsor terrorism, less likely to experience famine or produce refugees, and more likely to adopt market economies and form economic partnerships with other democracies.35 Since liberal democracies tend to share values rooted in rule of law, fair competition, and transparency, they are natural partners in promoting the stable, prosperous, open, and peaceful international environment that the United States ought to cultivate through its foreign policy. It is true that the process of democratization can be long and uneven and can sometimes produce destabilizing and aggressive state behavior. However, mature and established democracies are more stable, peaceful, and prosperous, and more full-fledged democracies mean more economic and security benefits for the United States.36 Furthermore, the global system of democratic alliances, institutions, and norms the United States helped create and lead after World War II has improved material conditions and brought peace and prosperity to hundreds of millions of people across the world. Bolstering that democratic system and the democratic values that underpin it will ensure that future generations can also enjoy the fruits of democracy and a liberal world. Second, this kind of foreign policy will help secure an American advantage in great power competition by advancing a compelling alternative and strengthening the global democratic bulwark. Although the challenge posed by illiberal regimes today has evolved since the Cold War, there are still lessons to be drawn from that era. One of the most significant factors in the collapse of the Soviet Union was the powerful example and contrast set by flourishing democratic societies in the United States and Europe. Today, one of America’s greatest strategic assets is its global network of democratic allies and partners. The power of that democratic network, even underutilized as it is today, stands in stark contrast to what today’s illiberal and authoritarian regimes can offer: namely, political order purchased at the cost of extreme corruption, xenophobia, oligarchy, and arbitrary use of state power. To succeed, any approach to countering the authoritarian playbook must present a compelling alternative. This means that the United States, alongside its democratic allies and partners, must demonstrate that liberal democracy represents the best path to deliver inclusive prosperity, rule of law, and a just and equal society to a country’s citizens.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › Net Benefit › AT: Links to Politics

Delegation lets Congress shift blame without sacrificing accountability.

Hines and Logue 15 James R. Hines, Jr., Kyle D. Logue, James R. Hines, Jr. is the L. Hart Wright Collegiate Professor of Law, and Kyle D. Logue is the Wade H. and Dores M. McCree Collegiate Professor of Law, both at the University of Michigan Law School, 2015, “DELEGATING TAX”, Michigan Law Review, , liam.

There is a related criticism that broad congressional delegation of lawmaking authority to agencies permits Congress to avoid accountability by shifting blame to agencies if some voters are unhappy.57 Indeed, this Article notes that the ability to shift blame may make it possible for Congress to enact some beneficial reforms that political dynamics would otherwise prevent. Critics argue that the federal government should not be able to wield its power to interfere with economic activity, or with individual liberty, unless a certain number of legislators representing disparate parts of the country can publicly agree that doing so makes sense.58 Exactly how Congress ought to express its policy preferences is potentially a separate question. There are some who argue that having Congress enact more general standards, with the specifics of implementation left to agencies, actually enhances Congress’s accountability.59 Professor Sunstein notes that, as a general matter, “[t]here is no evidence that agencies operating pursuant to open-ended authority do better, on any dimension, than agencies operating pursuant to statutes that sharply limit their discretion; nothing appears to link agency performance with statutory clarity.”60 More specifically, there is no evidence that agencies do better at maximizing social welfare when they are given a very specific statute than when they are given general guidance.61 While there is no shortage of normative arguments for and against broad delegation of authority by Congress to agencies, the point that should be emphasized is that Congress has—in virtually every policy domain other than tax—determined that the balance of the arguments weighs in favor of broad delegation. But not with tax. The modern practice of engaging in broad delegation takes an atypical form in tax legislation, where the IRS is limited it its ability to modify tax rules and not permitted to modify tax rates.62 From a normative standpoint it is not at all clear why tax should be exceptional in this regard. The arguments in favor of delegation in other legal spheres, that Congress has apparently found to be compelling, would seem to apply with equal or greater force to tax law as to other laws.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › Net Benefit › AT: Links to Politics

Delegating authority avoids politics.

Hines and Logue 15 James R. Hines, Jr., Kyle D. Logue, James R. Hines, Jr. is the L. Hart Wright Collegiate Professor of Law, and Kyle D. Logue is the Wade H. and Dores M. McCree Collegiate Professor of Law, both at the University of Michigan Law School, 2015, “DELEGATING TAX”, Michigan Law Review, , liam.

Inherent differences between the process of issuing regulations and the process of passing statutes provides another common justification for broad congressional delegations of lawmaking power.33 Even when the legislative process is working well, it may take longer for Congress to pass a law than it takes an agency to make a rule. As a result, agencies can react more quickly to new information than Congress can, including recent scientific findings and changed circumstances. In addition, the nature of the legislative process inhibits action.34 This can be true, for example, when there is consensus that some action should be taken with respect to a particular problem, but there is deep division—say, between Republicans and Democrats, or within either party—on what precisely, if anything, should be done. In such a case, a broad and somewhat vague delegation of authority by Congress can permit legislators to take credit for successful policies, while reserving the ability to duck responsibility for the final outcome.35 One real-world example of this phenomenon, already mentioned, was the closing of military bases in the late 1980s and early 1990s.36 Observers agreed at the time that the rapid decline of the Soviet military threat necessitated a radical reduction of the size of the U.S. military.37 Moreover, there was a consensus specifically that the number of military bases was untenable.38 The difficulty, however, was that any member of Congress who voted for a measure that closed a base in his or her own jurisdiction risked political suicide. This presented a major collective action problem: a change that clearly enhanced welfare, and that needed to be made, could not be directly enacted given individual lawmakers’ incentives. Congress could, however, vote to solve the problem indirectly, and it did. In 1988 Congress passed the Base Closure and Realignment Act, which created an independent commission with legal authority to determine which bases to close, subject to Congress’s right to overturn the proposal through a joint resolution.39 Under the Act, the head of each military service first submitted a list of recommended base closures to the Secretary of Defense, who could add to or subtract from that list.40 The secretary then submitted the revised list to the commission, which in turn had the power to add or subtract bases.41 At that point, the final list of recommended base closures went to the President, who could either approve the list (with no changes) or veto it, starting the whole process over.42 If the President approved the list, the Secretary of Defense then had the authority to begin implementing the closures on the list, unless Congress halted the process within forty-five days of presidential approval by issuing a joint resolution.43 Congress has adopted similar mechanisms in other areas. The ACA, for example, delegates enormous Medicare cost-cutting authority to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the newly created IPAB.44 Under the ACA, the IPAB, consisting of fifteen experts named by the President and confirmed by the Senate, has the authority to recommend policy changes to Congress to cut Medicare costs. These recommendations can include “ideas on coordinating care, getting rid of waste in the system, incentivizing best practices, and prioritizing primary care.”45 What is interesting about these recommendations is the way in which they create legislative pressure to cut Medicare costs. First, Congress can accept IPAB’s recommendations and enact them into law. Or, alternatively, “[i]f Congress rejects the recommendations, and Medicare spending exceeds specific targets, Congress must either enact policies that achieve equivalent savings or let the Secretary of Health and Human Services follow IPAB’s recommendations.”46 The parallels between this delegation and the base-closure delegation are obvious. At the most general level, Congress created the IPAB to address the need to cut healthcare costs, a need that virtually everyone agrees is essential to the long-term fiscal well-being of the country; likewise, Congress created the base closure commission to address the need to cut military expenditures, about which, again, there was general agreement.47 Moreover, the collective action problem that inhibited Congress from making military spending cuts through the normal legislative process (no legislator wanting to vote for a law that kills a military base in his or her state) has analogs in the healthcare context. For example, although it was universally agreed that cutting Medicare costs would enhance overall public welfare, individual legislators resisted competitive bidding that could undermine their ability to secure contracts for medical device manufacturers or pharmaceutical companies in their own districts.48

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › Net Benefit › AT: Too slow

Delegation makes implementation faster.

Hines and Logue 15 James R. Hines, Jr., Kyle D. Logue, James R. Hines, Jr. is the L. Hart Wright Collegiate Professor of Law, and Kyle D. Logue is the Wade H. and Dores M. McCree Collegiate Professor of Law, both at the University of Michigan Law School, 2015, “DELEGATING TAX”, Michigan Law Review, , liam.

Inherent differences between the process of issuing regulations and the process of passing statutes provides another common justification for broad congressional delegations of lawmaking power.33 Even when the legislative process is working well, it may take longer for Congress to pass a law than it takes an agency to make a rule. As a result, agencies can react more quickly to new information than Congress can, including recent scientific findings and changed circumstances. In addition, the nature of the legislative process inhibits action.34 This can be true, for example, when there is consensus that some action should be taken with respect to a particular problem, but there is deep division—say, between Republicans and Democrats, or within either party—on what precisely, if anything, should be done. In such a case, a broad and somewhat vague delegation of authority by Congress can permit legislators to take credit for successful policies, while reserving the ability to duck responsibility for the final outcome.35 One real-world example of this phenomenon, already mentioned, was the closing of military bases in the late 1980s and early 1990s.36 Observers agreed at the time that the rapid decline of the Soviet military threat necessitated a radical reduction of the size of the U.S. military.37 Moreover, there was a consensus specifically that the number of military bases was untenable.38 The difficulty, however, was that any member of Congress who voted for a measure that closed a base in his or her own jurisdiction risked political suicide. This presented a major collective action problem: a change that clearly enhanced welfare, and that needed to be made, could not be directly enacted given individual lawmakers’ incentives. Congress could, however, vote to solve the problem indirectly, and it did. In 1988 Congress passed the Base Closure and Realignment Act, which created an independent commission with legal authority to determine which bases to close, subject to Congress’s right to overturn the proposal through a joint resolution.39 Under the Act, the head of each military service first submitted a list of recommended base closures to the Secretary of Defense, who could add to or subtract from that list.40 The secretary then submitted the revised list to the commission, which in turn had the power to add or subtract bases.41 At that point, the final list of recommended base closures went to the President, who could either approve the list (with no changes) or veto it, starting the whole process over.42 If the President approved the list, the Secretary of Defense then had the authority to begin implementing the closures on the list, unless Congress halted the process within forty-five days of presidential approval by issuing a joint resolution.43 Congress has adopted similar mechanisms in other areas. The ACA, for example, delegates enormous Medicare cost-cutting authority to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the newly created IPAB.44 Under the ACA, the IPAB, consisting of fifteen experts named by the President and confirmed by the Senate, has the authority to recommend policy changes to Congress to cut Medicare costs. These recommendations can include “ideas on coordinating care, getting rid of waste in the system, incentivizing best practices, and prioritizing primary care.”45 What is interesting about these recommendations is the way in which they create legislative pressure to cut Medicare costs. First, Congress can accept IPAB’s recommendations and enact them into law. Or, alternatively, “[i]f Congress rejects the recommendations, and Medicare spending exceeds specific targets, Congress must either enact policies that achieve equivalent savings or let the Secretary of Health and Human Services follow IPAB’s recommendations.”46 The parallels between this delegation and the base-closure delegation are obvious. At the most general level, Congress created the IPAB to address the need to cut healthcare costs, a need that virtually everyone agrees is essential to the long-term fiscal well-being of the country; likewise, Congress created the base closure commission to address the need to cut military expenditures, about which, again, there was general agreement.47 Moreover, the collective action problem that inhibited Congress from making military spending cuts through the normal legislative process (no legislator wanting to vote for a law that kills a military base in his or her state) has analogs in the healthcare context. For example, although it was universally agreed that cutting Medicare costs would enhance overall public welfare, individual legislators resisted competitive bidding that could undermine their ability to secure contracts for medical device manufacturers or pharmaceutical companies in their own districts.48

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › Net Benefit › AT: No Spillover

Delegating authority promotes long-run fiscal sustainability even if Congress controls the tax distribution.

Hines and Logue 15 James R. Hines, Jr., Kyle D. Logue, James R. Hines, Jr. is the L. Hart Wright Collegiate Professor of Law, and Kyle D. Logue is the Wade H. and Dores M. McCree Collegiate Professor of Law, both at the University of Michigan Law School, 2015, “DELEGATING TAX”, Michigan Law Review, , liam.

Second, and more controversially, Congress should consider delegating some control over income tax rates, which would be unprecedented in U.S. history. Such authority could be granted to the Treasury Department, or, perhaps more realistically, to some other, arguably more independent, agency such as the Federal Reserve or a newly created independent authority. Giving the Federal Reserve some control over income tax rates would allow it to coordinate fiscal policy with existing monetary policy in the hope of dampening business cycles. Moreover, the Fed or some other independent agency might be able to precommit to an optimal policy plan over time, which Congress notoriously struggles to do. Third, in designing the tax system efficiently and fairly to promote longrun fiscal sustainability—a goal that has eluded Congress for decades—the legislative body should consider delegating the tax reform component of a long-run deficit-closure effort to an independent commission similar to the Base Realignment and Closure model.15 The rationale for this move has to do with collective action problems that inhibit the legislative branch from taking action, even in the face of strong evidence that such action is social welfare-maximizing. In addition, it should be noted that Congress could delegate in any or all of these ways while still retaining a considerable degree of control over the one aspect of tax lawmaking that many regard as quintessentially legislative in character: namely, distributional consequences. Lawmakers and voters may consider it important for Congress to determine as much as possible the ultimate distribution of the federal tax burden across taxpayers. In that case, Congress could attach a requirement to any or all of these new forms of tax delegation that any policymaking output by the agency must be accompanied by a particular distribution of the tax burden designated in advance by, and remaining fully within the control of, Congress. We discuss this possibility further below.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › Net Benefit › 2NC---Yes NB

Democracy is declining, but citizen engagement solves.

Frye 21 Joshua J Frye, Professor, Ph.D. in rhetoric and organizational communication, Purdue University, July 28th, 2021, “Capacitating civic engagement with deliberative democracy initiatives”, National Communication Association, Taylor and Francis Group, , liam.

We currently exist in highly polarized and fragmented institutions and public culture. The lack of robust norms surrounding an ongoing, structured public conversation regarding significant local/national issues perpetuate and amplify attitudes of charged differences, discontinuity, poor leadership, and mistrust. These trends will continue to impact people, state economies, labor forces, and university communities in adverse ways without building a more dialogic and normative public culture. Adversarial, com-petitive, and interest-based decision-making is the perceived norm if not the actual prac-tice among different stakeholder groups and institutional powerbrokers. Beginning and sustaining communication-led citizen engagement initiatives can potentially have tremendous outcomes and benefits. In Doing Democracy, London (2010) asserts that democracy needs more than just visible institutions and public governance bodies. It depends on its “ecosystem, which© 2021 National Communication AssociationCONTACTJoshua J. Fryejoshua.frye@humboldt.eduDepartment of Communication, Humboldt State University,Telonicher House 103, Arcata, CA 95521COMMUNICATION EDUCATION2021, VOL. 70, NO. 4, 437–440https://doi.org/10.1080/03634523.2021.1958240is made up of civic alliances, social norms, and deliberative practices that have an organic rather than an institutional quality. In this ecosystem, what citizens produce by working with other citizens is crucial”(London,2010, p. 6). Deliberative democracy, or “govern-ance through talk”(Carcasson et al.,2010, p. 1), and communication scholars have recently joined forces. In 2015, the National Communication Association’s Legislative Assembly approved a new Public Dialogue and Deliberation Division. The rhetorical tra-dition within the communication field has the birthright of addressing issues relating to communication processes and public judgments when facing social reality’s uncertainties(Farrell,1993; Zarefsky,1986). Small group communication (Gastil,1992; Gastil et al.,2008) and interpersonal communication (Anderson & Cissna,2008; Baxter,1988; Mon-tgomery & Baxter,1998) have also developed useful knowledge that contributes to effective dialogue and discussion. Communication research and pedagogy at this nexus now has a broad yet focused platform for advancing theory and practice aimed at capa-citating individuals and communities to deliberate effectively. Yet, opportunities for communication students to gain organic experiential education with discourse arts for democratic leadership are less developed within higher education communication programs. Even with the productive knowledge emanating from various subdisciplines within the field regarding effective communication for engaged citizenry, most knowledge is taught in traditional academic courses and benefits individuals rather than entire communities. Engagement with these communication knowledge and skillsets in the actual presence of the community and more diverse stakeholders remains elusive (Carcasson et al.,2010). Much remains to be done in terms of communication departments’ faculty and students combining forces to use their study and practice of communication for an integrated movement of education, research, and service with public stakeholders.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › AT: Perms › 2NC---AT: Perm Other Issues

Delegation must be specific.

Leopold 4/4 Matthew Z. Leopold, Matthew Z. Leopold is a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Hunton Andrews Kurth. Leopold was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as General Counsel of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and served from 2018–2020. Previously, Leopold served as a career attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division and the General Counsel of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, April 4th, 2023, “The Burden on Agencies to Confirm Congressionally Delegated Authority in the Wake of West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency”, ABA, , liam.

Because agencies have no inherent authority to establish laws in the form of regulations, they need a specific delegation from Congress, which exercises legislative power under the Constitution. While Congress may delegate its authority to administrative agencies, Supreme Court precedent has required that Congress provide “intelligible principles” in the statutory delegation because it reflects a shift in constitutional authority from the legislative branch to the executive branch. In other words, the “non-delegation doctrine” requires a congressional delegation to be limited and not open-ended to preserve the separation of powers. Thus, Congress is prohibited from granting broad, general rulemaking authority, and agencies should issue rules consistent with a particular, limited congressional grant of authority. The Court in West Virginia grounds the major questions doctrine in the separation of powers, holding that the congressional delegation for agency rulemaking authority should be very clear, specific, and not left to the agencies to interpret in matters with extraordinary economic and political significance. Therefore, the decision’s second burden shift is to Congress, by requiring more legislative rigor when Congress wishes to give an agency the power to decide “major questions.”

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › AT: Perms › ---Basic Income

UBI is unconditional

Buchs 22 – [Milena; 2/2/22; IPL expert Professor of Sustainable Welfare; UNESCO Inclusive Policy Lab; “Sustainable welfare: would a mix of universal basic income and universal basic services help?”; https://en.unesco.org/inclusivepolicylab/analytics/sustainable-welfare-would-mix-universal-basic-income-and-universal-basic-services-help; accessed 7/21/23; Lowell-JL]

UBI is defined here as a regular income paid by the state to every resident, unconditional on employment, family status or other criteria, and at a level that contributes to needs satisfaction (Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017). UBI therefore differs from “minimum income” schemes where benefits remain means or needs tested. UBI can be “partial” which would mean lower than the level required to satisfy all needs, and I will argue below that this could be a way forward for combining it with UBS (Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017, pp. 165–169). UBS are publicly or collectively provided services for everyone in society free at the point of use. UBS address basic needs; examples include health, social care, education, housing, water, energy, transport and internet (Büchs, 2021).

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › AT: Perms › ---Basic Income

‘Basic Income’ cannot be conditioned.

Torry 19 Malcolm Torry, Malcolm Torry (London School of Economics, United Kingdom) has been Director of the Citizen’s Basic Income Trust for most of the past thirty-five years. He has first degrees in mathematics, theology, philosophy, economics and management, master’s degrees in theology, philosophy, and social policy, and a Ph.D. in theology, September 28th, 2019, “The Palgrave International Handbook of Basic Income”, Palgrave Macmillan, , liam.

‘Basic Income’ A ‘Basic Income’—also sometimes known as a ‘Citizen’s Basic Income’, a ‘Citizen’s Income’ or a ‘Universal Basic Income’—is an unconditional and nonwithdrawable income paid to each individual by virtue of their legal residence in a country. ‘Nonwithdrawable’ is often included in the defnition to emphasise the fact that the Basic Income would not be withdrawn as other income rose: but strictly speaking the word is redundant because ‘unconditional’ implies that the income is not conditional on the level of other income, so it is by defnition nonwithdrawable as other income rises. A variety of assumptions are often made alongside the normal defnition: that the income will be paid regularly, either weekly or monthly; that it will not vary from payment to payment (although it might be uprated each year); that it will be paid in cash into a bank or similar account under the control of the individual to whom it is due; and that it will be permanent (Torry 2017).

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › AT: Perms › ---Federal Job Guarantee

‘Adopt’ requires implementation – it forecloses consideration.

Hanes ’4 [Grayson P. Hanes, Benjamin Leigh, Deborah C. Welsh, and Marilyn Rust; October 25, 2004; Senior Counsel at Reed Smith, JD at George Washington University; attorney at Mims, Atwill & Leigh, P.C., J.D. at the University of Richmond; attorney at Welsh & Lanham, P.L.C., JD at the University of Richmond; attorney at Marilyn P. Waston, P.C.; “Opening Brief of Appellants” in Gas Mart Corp. v. Board of Supervisors of Londoun County, 2004 WL 3757706]

The court was wrong in concluding that “consideration” of a proposal is the functional equivalent of an intention to adopt that proposal. Merely “considering” a proposed amendment is not the same as “intending” to “adopt” it. This Court consulted dictionary definitions in Glazebrook when ascertaining the meaning of the terms “descriptive” and “summary,” and a *31 similar dictionary-based approach towards analyzing the meanings of “consider,” “intention,” and “adopt” is instructive.

The verb “to consider” means “to observe, think about.” Merriam Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary at 246 (10th ed. 1997). By contrast, the verb “to adopt” means “to accept formally and put into effect <a constitutional amendment>.” Id. at 16. Having an “intention” means having “a determination to act in a certain way.” Id. at 608. Based upon these definitions, it is readily apparent that a notice -- like the Public Hearing Notices at issue here -- which announces that a governing body merely proposes to “consider” legislative measures, is completely different from the statutorily-required notice of an “intention” to “adopt” those measures. See Glazebrook, 266 Va. at 555, 587 S.E.2d at 591 (relying on the dictionary definitions of the terms “descriptive” and “summary” to interpret the requirements of Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2204(A)).

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › AT: Perms › 2NC---AT: Perm do CP

2---"Federal Government” – it’s the three branches – the commission is independent of them.

US Legal No Date ("United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition", )

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › AT: Perms › 2NC---AT: Perm give not divest authority

Strategic choice is key to solving economic problems – turns case.

Whalen 13 Charles J. Whalen, Macroeconomic Analysis Division, Congressional Budget Office, 2013, “Core Concepts of Institutionalist Public Finance:Problem Solving, Institutional Analysis,Strategic Choice, and Stakeholder Engagement”, Forum for Social Economics, , liam.

CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONALIST PUBLIC FINANCE IN AN ERAOF SIGNIFICANT BUDGETARY CHALLENGES

On 13 September 2011, Douglas W. Elmendorf, director of the Congres-sional Budget Office (CBO), testified before the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction of the US Congress. ‘‘The federal government is confronting significant and fundamental budgetary challenges,’’ Elmendorf(2011: 1) told the committee. He continued: ‘‘If current policies are continued in coming years, the aging of the population and the rising cost of health care will boost federal spending, as a share of the economy, well above the23 For discussions of experience with stakeholder engagement outside the United States, see, for example, Ramstad (1991) and Reynolds (2004).FORUM FOR SOCIAL ECONOMICS372amount of revenues that the federal government has collected in the past. Asa result, putting the federal budget on a sustainable path will require significant changes in spending policies, tax policies, or both.’’ But there was still more. ‘‘The task of addressing the nation’s formidable fiscal challenges is complicated by the weakness of the economy and the large numbers of unemployed workers, empty houses, and underused factories and offices,’’ Elmendorf (2011: 1) added.24Thus, tradeoffs are unavoidable: ‘‘Changes that might be made to federal spending or tax policies could have a substantial impact on the pace of economic recovery during the next few years as well as on the nation’s output and people’s income over the longer term.’’ The CBO director made it clear that Congress needs to make strategic choices. ‘‘There is no commonly agreed upon level of federal debt that is sustainable or optimal,’’ he stated, acknowledging that economics offers no textbook answer to the question of how much (as well as to that of how)deficit reduction should be accomplished (Elmendorf 2011: 26). To be sure, his testimony also demonstrated that economic analysis offers some insight, especially into the economic effects of the timing and composition of fiscal policy action. But policymakers still face difficult choices: ‘‘The most fundamental question is what role the government should play in the US economy and society’’ (Elmendorf 2011: 34).Elmendorf’s testimony describes the setting in which American institu-tional economists are seeking to reexamine the core concepts of institution-alist public finance. And, as mentioned above, short-term and long-term fiscal challenges are not confined to the United States. This article has responded by identifying four core concepts: problem solving, institutional analysis, strategic choice, and stakeholder engagement. Those concepts were first fashioned decades ago, but continue to provide a solid basis for constructive analyses of fiscal and budgetary challenges. The four concepts examined in this article combine to form a coherent institutionalist approach to the study of fiscal policy questions. The approach begins with an interest in real-world problem solving and with an accompanying recognition that solving economic problems requires institu-tional adjustments. That interest directs institutionalists to an analysis of institutions for the purpose of getting to a problem’s roots by means of thecomparative case method. That method can shed light on policy alternativesand likely consequences, but only strategic choice can enable researchers and24 The task is also complicated by fiscal problems in Europe and weaker prospects for economic growthoutside the United States, observed Elmendorf (2011: 9–10).CORE CONCEPTS OF INSTITUTIONALIST PUBLIC FINANCE373policymakers to assess and choose among policy alternatives. And the need for strategic choice, combined with the absence of a value-free measuring stick or universal policy criterion, leads institutionalists to highlight the usefulness of stakeholder engagement. The institutionalist approach described in this article rests heavily on the scholarship and insight of John R. Commons. Commons thought it was appropriate for stakeholders to select the criteria by which a problem and policy options would be evaluated. He also thought the ‘‘right’’ solution was one arrived at with meaningful input from all affected parties. That would not generate a ‘‘perfect’’ solution in any objective sense, but it would instead be a ‘‘reasonable’’ solution that could be tested in practice and taken as astarting point for further investigations of economic problems (Commons1925).25Of course, Commons’s last book was published posthumously in 1950, and institutionalism has lost considerable ground within the economics profes-sion in the decades since then. Indeed, scholars were writing the tradition’s obituary in the 1960s. Nevertheless, given the fiscal policy challenges now confronting the United States and many other nations, Groves’s (1964a: 246)response to those writers continues to ring true: ‘‘If institutional economics is dead or dying, so much the worse for economics and public finance.’’

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › AT: Perms › 2NC---AT: Perm give not divest authority

Delegation must be specific.

Leopold 4/4 Matthew Z. Leopold, Matthew Z. Leopold is a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Hunton Andrews Kurth. Leopold was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as General Counsel of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and served from 2018–2020. Previously, Leopold served as a career attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division and the General Counsel of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, April 4th, 2023, “The Burden on Agencies to Confirm Congressionally Delegated Authority in the Wake of West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency”, ABA, , liam.

Because agencies have no inherent authority to establish laws in the form of regulations, they need a specific delegation from Congress, which exercises legislative power under the Constitution. While Congress may delegate its authority to administrative agencies, Supreme Court precedent has required that Congress provide “intelligible principles” in the statutory delegation because it reflects a shift in constitutional authority from the legislative branch to the executive branch. In other words, the “non-delegation doctrine” requires a congressional delegation to be limited and not open-ended to preserve the separation of powers. Thus, Congress is prohibited from granting broad, general rulemaking authority, and agencies should issue rules consistent with a particular, limited congressional grant of authority. The Court in West Virginia grounds the major questions doctrine in the separation of powers, holding that the congressional delegation for agency rulemaking authority should be very clear, specific, and not left to the agencies to interpret in matters with extraordinary economic and political significance. Therefore, the decision’s second burden shift is to Congress, by requiring more legislative rigor when Congress wishes to give an agency the power to decide “major questions.”

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › AT: Perms › 2NC---AT: Perm give not divest authority

Delegators want to avoid information costs – they’ll clarify the perm.

Feinstein 22 Brian D. Feinstein, Assistant Professor of Legal Studies & Business Ethics at the University of Pennsylvania, 2022, “Submerged Independent Agencies”, University of Chicago Law School, , liam.

Discretion, however, not only arises de jure, but also from de facto considerations. The most important are information costs, that is, the resources required to learn about existing subdelegated authorities as well as what decisions are made pursuant to them. Because it is costly for delegator to learn about how delegatees are exercising their authority, delegatees often exercise great discretion in practice. In the words of the previously-mentioned SEC commissioner: During my tenure, the staff has improved at giving Commissioners a “headsup” about notable actions that the staff plans to take using its delegated authority. Nevertheless, there are still times when the staff acted based on delegated authority on important matters (or, at least, important to one or more Commissioners) without notice to the Commissioners.110 As a result, it is often extremely difficult for agency heads to learn about decisions made pursuant to delegated authority until after the fact. These information costs are particularly high for new political appointees with steep learning curves.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
CP---Stakeholders---CFMP › AT: Perms › 2NC---AT: Perm give not divest authority

B---Functionally – maintaining authority requires additional action.

Feinstein 22 Brian D. Feinstein, Assistant Professor of Legal Studies & Business Ethics at the University of Pennsylvania, 2022, “Submerged Independent Agencies”, University of Chicago Law School, , liam.

Delegators can also be explicit in the other direction: that is, to make clear that they do not divest themselves of authority. Most commonly, agency heads explicitly “reserve” authority to exercise the delegated power themselves. Sometimes they issue blanket reservations of authority. The Secretary of Transportation, for example, declares that “except as otherwise provided,” she “may exercise powers and duties delegated or assigned to officials other than the Secretary.” 95 Alternatively, subdelegations can also specify reservations for individual grants of power. The Secretary of Agriculture specifically reserves authority from a delegation to the Under Secretary for Trade and Foreign Agricultural Affairs on issues “related to foreign agriculture” and for “[a]pproving export controls.” 96 Under these circumstances, courts generally decline to apply Accardi since the rule itself retains authority in the initial delegator.97 Between these two poles are a host of delegations that are ambiguous: they lack both clear reservations of authority and explicit intent to divest authority completely. Unfortunately, our dataset does not capture which delegations fall into each of these categories given the challenges of collecting and coding data on reservations of authority. Reservations, whether blanket or individual, are often placed in different parts of the Code of Federal Regulations and have idiosyncratic appearances in the Federal Register. They must be matched, often manually, with each delegated power through cross-references. Nevertheless, to try to get some sense of magnitude, we drew a random sample of 200 of the delegations in our dataset and found only two for which explicit reservations were present in the same Federal Register entries. Further, none of the 200 delegations in this sample included an express statement of divestment within the same entry. For these more ambiguous rules, judges will defer to the agency after deploying the ordinary tools of regulatory interpretation. 98