National interests will override state pressure.
Hollis ‘6 [Duncan; September 2006; Assistant Professor of Law at the Temple University Beasley School of Law, Former Attorney Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, A.B. from Bowdoin College, M.A.L.D. from The Fletcher School, J.D. from Boston College Law School; Southern California Law Review, “Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power,” vol. 79]
This is not to suggest that the executive will always align itself with state interests; the executive ultimately operates in pursuit of its own interests. Thus, the executive can opt to disregard states' rights where it perceives the national interest outweighs matters of local concern. As both Missouri and U.S. practice demonstrate, treaty-making can and has occurred in ways that supplant areas traditionally regulated by state law or require action by state officials. What Executive Federalism demonstrates, however, is that the executive does not always do this. More often than not, it appears executive treaty-making incorporates an internal dialogue of national and state interests, which may actually adjust U.S. positions to accommodate state laws and powers. As such, whether or not there are, or should be, external judicial or legislative safeguards on federalism in the treaty context, there are undoubtedly internal executive safeguards of federalism.