Purported counterexamples overlook the disutility that said examples introduce---util in practice avoids perversity.
Scriven ’13 [Tal; 2013; professor in the Philosophy department at California Polytechnic State University; Between the Species, “Review of Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two-Level Utilitarianism,” vol. 16, no. 1]
As Varner admits, the general maneuver at play here was used by Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick and just about every defender of utilitarianism since. It is the base for most of the standard moves utilitarians make to get around the standard objections to the theory. Suppose you could save three people with failing organs by killing an innocent person and harvesting his organs to save the first three. Wouldn’t utilitarianism require that? So goes the standard test case. And here goes the standard response: Only if you are prepared to ignore all of the disutility generated by a standardization of this practice along with the routine training of medical professionals to think the practice is morally required. Without the assumption of such ignorance the practice could never be even imagined as felicitous. So it would go with a long list of other counterexamples. Is it OK to frame an innocent person if doing so would stop a crime wave? Is it OK to drown your Aunt Bea in a bathtub in order to secure her inheritance and then do good with it? Is it OK to publicly torture prisoners for the amusement of the sadistic masses? In each case the utilitarian is likely to respond by pointing out that justifying any of these things would entail setting up a world full of motives, incentives, habits and virtues that would be— from a utilitarian point of view—perverse.