Perm severs. Normal means for the plan is Congress
Supreme Court 3 [Opinion of the Supreme Court; delivered by Justice Ginsberg; ELDRED V. ASHCROFT (01-618) 537 U.S. 186 (2003); No. 01-618; 1/15/3; https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/pdf/01-618P.ZO; Accessed 6/30/24]//maikle
We have also stressed, however, that it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S., at 230 (“Th[e] evolution of the duration of copyright protection tellingly illustrates the difficulties Congress faces … . [I]t is not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve.”); Sony, 464 U.S., at 429 (“[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of [rights] that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product.”); Graham, 383 U.S., at 6 (“Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim.”). The justifications we earlier set out for Congress’ enactment of the CTEA, supra, at 14—17, provide a rational basis for the conclusion that the CTEA “promote[s] the Progress of Science.”